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Need for AKD and JVP/NPP to be educated on complex geopolitics

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India’s security needs consolidate US manoeuvring strategy in Indo-Pacific:

by Daya Gamage
Foreign Service National Political Specialist (rtd.)
US Department of State


Aware or unaware of the intricacies of big power play in the Indo-Pacific region to the emerging political entity in Sri Lanka, JVP-led National People’s Power (NPP) leader Anura Kumara Dissanayake has declared that he and his political party are (now) alive to India’s security concerns after his return from India having had discourses with External Affairs Minister and other leading Modi administration officials needs serious scrutiny.

In an interview with Sri Lanka’s Sirasa TV on February 15, Dissanayake reiterated that the ‘incoming’ National People’s Power administration “will not do anything that undermines Indian security”.

If Dissanayake had been aware that ‘India’s national security’ was somewhat beyond her ‘control’ and connected to the larger Indo-Pacific or Asia-Pacific region with ‘outside forces’ deeply embedded in, he would have made a ‘measured statement’ about India’s national security.

Before examining how India is tied to ‘a foreign military and technological force’ connected to the Asia-Pacific Region and that India’s national security cannot be isolated from ‘outside forces’ engaged in the region, it should be found out how Sri Lanka is connected to the overall regional security, an issue that Dissanayake doesn’t seem to have paid much attention to. The eight-page, 2007 (disclosed) US-Sri Lanka signed Acquisition and Cross-Services Agreement (ACSA) and the 83-page, 2017 ACSA (still kept classified by both Washington and Colombo) have much relevance to the overall Indo-Pacific region.

US Code Title 10 Section 2342: Cross-Servicing Agreement, under which a long process of US government assessment takes effect, how useful a non-NATO country, such as Sri Lanka could be to the national interest of the United States is vital to the understanding of Sri Lankan policy.

The US Code declares (Quote) (a)(1) Subject to section 2343 of this title and to the availability of appropriations, and after consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense may enter into an agreement described in paragraph (2) with any of the following: (Among others)

(D) The government of a country not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization but which is designated by the Secretary of Defense, subject to the limitations prescribed in subsection (b), as a government with which the Secretary may enter into agreements under this section. (End Quote)

Before scrutinising other Sub-Sections, Sub-Section (D) is well connected to a ‘declaration’ of a diplomatic cable that reached Washington from the American Embassy in Colombo: 20 February 2007 diplomatic cable sent under the signature of Ambassador Robert Blake made it very clear (Quote) Since this agreement primarily benefits US forces, we think there are strong arguments to proceed with the signing the agreement (End Quote) referring to the 2007 ACSA. It is not difficult to understand why the 2007 agreement was expanded to 83 pages in 2017 and why it is still kept a secret.

Now to Sub-Section (b) of the U.S. Code Title 10 Section 2342: Cross-Servicing Agreement:

(Quote) (b) (which is well connected to the signing of both the 2007 and 2017 ACSA) The Secretary of Defense may not designate a country for an agreement under this section unless –

(1) the Secretary, after consultation with the Secretary of State, determines that the designation of such country for such purpose is in the interest of the national security of the United States; and

(2) in the case of a country which is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Secretary submits to the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives notice of the intended designation at least 30 days before the date on which such country is designated by the Secretary under subsection (a). (End Quote)

The Pentagon, the State Department and Armed Services and International Committees of the US Senate and House of Representatives are very much involved in the process of using feed backs and assessments from the US diplomatic post in the host nation.

This writer, who was knowledgeable about this process during his engagement with the State Department for more than two decades, was aware of the manner in which the US diplomatic mission in Sri Lanka played that role.

To enter into an ACSA treaty, the designated country – in this case, Sri Lanka, which entered into the agreement in March 2007 and 2017– Washington has to determine (Quote) the designation of such country for such purpose is in the interest of the national security of the United States . (End Quote)

“Sri Lanka occupies some very important real estate in the Indo-Pacific region, and it’s a country of increasing strategic importance in the Indian Ocean region”, declared Alice Wells, US State Department’s Deputy Assistant Secretary addressing the foreign media at the department’s Washington Media Center on 24 January 2020—three weeks before she was in Colombo meeting newly-elected President Gotabhaya Rajapaksa.

The 2018 National Defense Strategy guides the Department of Defense to support the (US) National Security Strategy – the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 – specifically calls for “expanding cooperation with democratic partners in South Asia, including Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka.”

This 2018 document – declassified in January 2021 – evinces a special interest in Sri Lanka’s survival in the Indo-Pacific region, the formulation of its foreign policy, and its relations with India, the United States and China.

It should be mentioned here that the writer along with another (retired) Senior Foreign Service/Intelligence Officer (American) is currently developing a manuscript (for publication) exploring Washington’s foreign policy manipulations and discharges toward Sri Lanka and India, and the manner in which Sri Lanka and India were (and are) playing their roles in response to Washington’s excessive and (almost) hegemonic role in the Indo-Pacific region.

It is in this context that India’s national security can in no way be isolated from Washington’s military/defense and intelligence approaches and activities in the Asia-Pacific region and its foreign policy discharges that this writer and his co-author discovered through their extensive research and investigations.

Some of the salient policy determinations and projections in the now-declassified 2018 National Security Strategy – the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act document of the US government are as follows:

· A strong India, in cooperation with like-minded countries, would act as a counterbalance to China.

· India remains preeminent in South Asia and takes the leading role in maintaining Indian Ocean security, increased engagement with Southeast Asia, and expands its economic, defense, and diplomatic cooperation with other US allies and partners in the region.

· US Objective: Accelerate India’s rise and capacity to serve as a net provider of security and Major Defense Partner; solidify an enduring strategic partnership with India underpinned by a strong Indian military able to effectively collaborate with the United States and her partners in the region to address shared interests.

· US Actions: Build a stronger foundation for defense cooperation and interoperability; expand US defense trade ability to transfer defense technology to enhance India’s status as a Major Defense Partner.

· US Objective: Strengthen the capacity of emerging partners in South Asia, including the Maldives, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, to contribute to a free and open order. US Action: Establish a new initiative with South Asian partners modeled on the Maritime Security Initiative.

· National Security Challenges: How to maintain US strategic primacy in the Indo-Pacific region while preventing China from establishing new illiberal spheres of influence.

· US Action: Enhance combat-credible US military presence and posture in the Indo-Pacific region to uphold US interests and security commitments.

Now, let’s see how ‘Indian National Security’ that Anura Kumara Dissanayake has referred to, and aspires to safeguard under a JVP-led NPP government he is hoping to form, is tied to the Indo-Pacific Region that Washington is playing a dominant role in.

US-India Relationship: Critical to Indo-Pacific

A shared vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific bolsters the US-India relationship as the two countries continue to strengthen defense ties, a senior Pentagon official said on Sept. 19, 2023.

Siddharth Iyer, the Director for South Asia policy in the Office of (US) Secretary of Defense, said the defense partnership had experienced an “incredible and unprecedented amount of momentum” as evidenced by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin twice traveling to India recently and the “warmth and familiarity” between the two countries.

“This relationship is one of the top priorities for the department,” Iyer said. “Our belief is that getting the US and India relationship right is not just necessary, it’s essential to achieving our strategy in the Indo-Pacific.”

What he meant by “our strategy” is the United States’ strategy.

“I think one of the ways in which we think about the roadmap is really a manifestation of Secretary Austin’s commitment to accelerating India’s military modernization, and for him, putting the department on the hook to find targeted opportunities to propose to advance India’s indigenous defense production capabilities,” Iyer said during a discussion on furthering US-India security cooperation hosted by the Hudson Institute in Washington.

“department on the hook”, meaning the United States on the hook.

India’s Minister of Defense Rajnath Singh and Minister of External Affairs Dr. S. Jaishankar engaged with (US) Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin for the fifth US-India 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue in New Delhi on November 10, 2023.

They reaffirmed the importance of the US-India Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership in ensuring international peace and security. The Ministers also underlined their strong commitment to safeguarding a free, open, and an inclusive Indo-Pacific.

The Joint Statement released November 10, 2023 on the Fifth Annual India-US 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue reaffirmed the US-India”commitment to further deepen the multifaceted defense partnership through wide-ranging dialogues and military exercises of increasing complexity and sophistication, accelerated joint projects initiated under the June 2023 Roadmap for US-India Defense Industrial Cooperation and expanded collaboration in emerging domains, such as space and artificial intelligence. They expressed satisfaction with the pace of cooperation in Maritime Domain Awareness and looked forward to identifying pathways to promote stronger service-to-service ties and share technologies to address an array of maritime challenges, including in the undersea domain.”

These discourses, dialogues and rapport have prompted steps to “deepen and diversify” the two countries’ so-called Major Defense Partnership.

The two (US and India) militaries signed their second Master Ship Repair Agreement, with the US Navy and Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Ltd., in August 2023, recommitting themselves to advancing India’s emergence as a hub for the maintenance and repair of forward-deployed US Navy assets and other aircraft and vessels, according to the White House. The countries also made further commitments to the US companies investing more in India’s maintenance, repair and overhaul capabilities and facilities for aircraft.

In late September 2023, Ely Ratner, the US Department of Defense’s Assistant Secretary for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs, Donald Lu, State Department’s assistant secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs, Vani Rao, a secretary in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs and Vishwesh Negi, the Joint Secretary of Indian Ministry of Defense engaged in “a wide range of ambitious initiatives” dialogue between the two nations.

According to a US Defense Department statement “The officials also discussed regional security developments and strategic priorities across the Indo-Pacific region. A strong US-India partnership is essential to upholding security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region.”

India having entered into a military partnership with the United States, and Sri Lanka’s close proximity to India in political and economic spheres, Sri Lanka is at a crossroads surrounded by Washington, New Delhi and Beijing.

As an emerging leader, Anura Kumara Dissanayake could have made a ‘measured statement’ on the official policy of the government he is planning to form towards ‘India’s security’ as data given above show the manner in which Washington has tied up with New Delhi, and the strategy the United States has adopted to forge a strong defense ties with India; contrary to what Dissanayake believes, India is not developing an ‘isolated national security policy’. New Delhi has been formulating her national security policy in collaboration with Washington, and that security policy – to which JVP-NPP has undertaken to protect and safeguard – provides for a dominant role for Washington in the Indo-Pacific (or Asia-Pacific) region. Sri Lanka is unable to escape Washington’s machinations in the Indo-Pacific region as noted at the outset.

Isn’t Dissanayake aware of the US-India defense collaboration? If so, is he concealing that fact, or if not so, isn’t he capable of strategic thinking?

As a footnote, it is necessary to refer to Dissanayake’s pronouncement about foreign nations and their diplomatic agents’ special interest in communicating with him and his political entity, according to him in an interview with SIRASA TV on February 15 (Quote) Anyone who can think logically can understand that states engage with political actors that have power. India, China, the US, and many others are now engaging with us because they think we will win elections (Unquote).

The writer finds it very unusual for the (US) Chief of Mission to entertain the notion that she should maintain close rapport and contact with a non-ruling political party leader. The US diplomats were expected to maintain contacts with (about) two national political parties that alternately exchanged power; they established contacts with ‘non-national’ political parties and their leaders to fulfill ‘diplomatic niceties’ and obtain alternative interpretations to that of what main political leaders and their national parties express.

In the case of JVP-NPP, undoubtedly, they are emerging as a national entity, and foreign diplomats, including the American ambassador Julie Chung, have taken note of the emerging political reality to maintain relations with it. Whether Ambassador Chung believes, in a confused political atmosphere, the JVP-NPP could form the next administration is another matter.

Two questions emerge from Dissanayake’s belief that foreign nations and their diplomats ‘suddenly’ reach out to his political alliance because they strongly believe that its rise to power is imminent: (1) Is it because the reconciliation between the JVP-NPP and India and Dissanayake’s undertaking not to obstruct that nation’s national security interests suits Washington and if JVP-NPP ever captures power or reaches the level of an influential and formidable opposition power Washington (and/or Julie Chung) will have tamed the once anti-American/anti-Indian JVP? (2) Shouldn’t JVP- NPP leader Anura Kumara Dissanayake declare his policy towards the US; the defense collaboration between Washington and New Delhi; and that Ambassador Chung is aware that JVP-NPP has conveniently ignored India’s defence collaboration with the US? Is this a diplomatic achievement of Washington?

As much as JVP-NPP owes the Sri Lankan public an explanation, elucidating its undertaking to safeguard the national security interests, Sri Lankan policymakers and lawmakers need to have a comprehensive understanding of where Sri Lanka stands in this complex foreign policy issue.

(The writer is a retired Foreign Service National Political Specialist of the U.S. Department of State accredited to the Political Section of the U.S. diplomatic mission in Sri Lanka)



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Export diversification: Missing the wood for the trees – Part I

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Export of Jackfruit

by Gomi Senadhira

A few recent news items prompted me to write this article. The first was in the Sinhala newspaper Divaina on jackfruits, which said that out of the 280 million jackfruits produced in Sri Lanka, only 80 million were consumed. Does this mean the rest, 200 million fruits, are just wasted every year? However, other available reports estimate that about 70% of the production is consumed and only 30 percent is wasted. Whatever the exact number, we know a substantially large number of jackfruits go to waste. The second was a more recent article in an English paper on cinnamon exports: it states that Sri Lanka is targeting US$ 300 million in cinnamon export earnings this year and aiming for annual export earnings of US$ 500 million by 2030!

Good sense

These news items reminded me of another article I read in The Island a few years ago. It was by Dr. Upatissa Pethiyagoda, a well-known Sri Lankan scientist, diplomat, and writer, about a chance encounter he had with former Prime Minister Wijayananda Dahanayake (WD) in the early 1970s at a Perera & Sons outlet in Kollupitiya, where both had stopped for iced coffee, In those days, politicians, even former prime ministers, walked around without bodyguards and could be spotted at coffee shops, like P&S, in CTB buses or on trains. After learning that Dr. Pethiyagoda was a senior researcher at the Tea Research Institute, Dahanayake quipped that Sri Lanka should focus on five key crops: paddy, sugarcane, pasture grass, coconut, and jack (kos). Dr Pethiyagoda further adds “The unsophisticated wisdom of WD still haunts. Being self-reliant in basic foodstuffs is very respectable and a base for true national pride. A Canadian slogan in support of their (salmon) fishery was “We eat what we can and can what we can’t” or the Thai advertisement line, accompanying a tantalising picture of a fruit basket was “We have got it, come and get it”. Capturing tourism and horticulture simultaneously!”

I do not know why WD advocated promoting jack instead of tea. Yet, 50 years later, while we are trying to expand cinnamon exports into an already saturated market, the global market for jackfruit has become larger than the market for Ceylon cinnamon. Hence, the slogans quoted by Dr Pethiyagada are more than appropriate to promote jackfruit exports.

“We eat what we can and can what we can’t”

Globally, the demand for jackfruit has rapidly increased in recent years due to its appeal to vegan, vegetarian, and health-conscious consumers. However, it is difficult to grasp the size of the global market for jackfruit through import/export statistics, as jackfruit doesn’t have a specific standalone customs code. Customs data, even at the HS eight-digit level, groups jackfruit along with several other tropical fruits. Hence, the numbers given in this article are from various reports available on the Internet. Although the numbers presented in those reports vary, trade dynamics point to a multi-billion-dollar global market for jackfruit which has already reached USD 2.8 billion in 2025 and is likely to reach USD 5.2 billion by 2034. This market is largely dominated by jackfruit processed products (including canned, frozen, and dried items). The market for fresh jackfruit hovers around USD 500 million a year.

“We have got it, come and get it”

With around 300,000 tons of exports annually, Thailand is the leading exporter of jackfruits, closely followed by Vietnam. Interestingly, the value of jackfruit exports from Vietnam has increased remarkably from “… just $3 million in 2015 to an impressive $236.8 million in 2023. ” The South Asian countries are also emerging as leading jackfruit exporters. India exported over 26 million kg (26,000 tons) of jackfruit valued at approximately US$40 million during the 2023-2024 fiscal year. The annual exports from Bangladesh fluctuated between 1000 to 2000 metric tons during the recent years. In contrast, jackfruit exports from Sri Lanka are estimated to be around 20 to 30 metric tons per month, which are mainly in processed form.

Main markets for jackfruits are in North America, Europe, Gulf countries, China, and Australia. Key markets for fresh jackfruits are Gulf countries and China. The governments of the main exporting countries intervene proactively to develop these markets for their exporters. For example, during the visit of the Bangladesh Prime Minister Tarique Rehaman to China in June 2026, one of the MoUs signed was on jackfruit. Based on this MoU, Bangladesh is targeting 500 to 1,000 tons of exports to China during the next year.

Gulf market for fresh jackfruits

As the global demand for jackfruit increases, the demand for fresh jackfruit has also risen in the Gulf countries. The Indian and Bangladeshi exporters have already successfully exploited this market. However, due to perishability and the limited shelf life of fresh jackfruits, exporters from India and Bangladesh rely on air shipments for quicker delivery. Yet, as whole jackfruits are heavy with a high waste-to-edible ratio (thick rind and core), air freighting whole fruit is economically inefficient. Hence, exports are mainly in semi-processed form.

A game changer – export of fresh jackfruits by sea

This brings me to another article published early this month in Bangladesh; it says a Dhaka-based export company shipped 3.5 tons of fresh jackfruits to Dubai by sea in May this year. Though the shipment took over 26 days to reach its destination, the quality of the jackfruit remained intact. If that is so, then it is a game changer. Sea freight from Colombo to Dubai, I believe, takes only 4 to 8 days for a direct port-to-port journey, compared to 26 days from Bangladesh. Hence, exporting jackfruits and other fruits and vegetables by sea to GCC markets from Sri Lanka would be much more efficient and cost-effective.

With its plentiful supply and a lucrative market in close proximity in the Gulf countries, it is difficult to understand how Sri Lanka has not managed to capture a significant share of the market in the GCC, given that Sri Lanka began to export fruits and vegetables into that market long before Bangladesh, Thailand, or Vietnam.

(The writer can be reached at senadhiragomi@gmail.com)

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Insights from Chieftains of Uva: Genealogy of two Kandyan Families – Part II

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Reflections on Kandyan Genealogical Studies:

by Sena Thoradeniya

(Part I of this article appeared in The Island of 19 August 2026)

In the Kandyan territories, genealogical studies have been largely caste based on only those who belong to the so-called upper stratum – the highest echelon of the Govigama caste. Even within this group, attention is reserved for ancient office holders, illustrious figures, and socially prominent members, while non-office holders, side branches, and ordinary kin are omitted. Sub divisions of the Govigama caste, as well as families belonging to the so-called depressed castes, are almost entirely omitted. One reason for this stigmatisation lies in the absence of competition for caste supremacy within the Kandyan regions, unlike in the “low country” areas. This silences the presence of non-elite Kandyans. However, oral genealogies, folk traditions, palm-leaf manuscripts, and colonial records preserve the names of less prominent members.

On the other hand, the descendants of clan leaders, such as the Vidana Maha Durayas, Maha Balitiyannas, Maha Hulawaliyas, Mulacharis, and chiefs of Halu Apullana Henayas, do not seek to record their genealogies as all their ancestral roots have been uprooted and obliterated. In such a context, they have acquired new names, new identities, and fashion a new genealogy as their point of departure. The erasure of older identities forces these families to reconstruct a new lineage.

The only exception within my private collection is “Great Royal Artificer of the Kandyan Kingdom: Devendra Mulachari” by D. D. M. Waidyasekera (2017), which records the architectural works of the master craftsman, chiefly responsible for the design of the Paththirippuwa, Walakulu Bemma, and Mangul Maduwa.

The names of hundreds of master craftsmen and other artificers have been carefully recorded, yet their works remain largely obscure, without their corresponding works save the creations of a few celebrated Sittaras. This creates an inconsistency in cultural memory as in pre-Kandyan days.

In theory, elders are often the custodians of memory, transmitting genealogies across generations, providing names, relationships, anecdotes, and related details that written records are not available, although the memory may be selective and biased influenced by various factors. Today such elders are rare, even within our traditional villages. With the passing of elders, the cultural and historical memory tied to ancient villages was obliterated. I can illustrate this with numerous examples taken from my village.

More often genealogical records, especially those produced by descendants of noble families, are not impartial records. They conceal historical truths such as collaboration with colonial expeditions, capture of the last King, betrayal during 1818 and 1848 uprisings as some Kandyan chiefs sided with the British during the 1818 and 1848 uprisings, and their servility to British colonial rulers as junior partners in the administration. Their descendants too later held high office under colonial rule, but genealogical records often present only illustrious service. But modern historians, colonial records, and oral traditions unravel these tainted facts. Some descendants of freedom fighters who were executed or transported to the Isle of France, sometimes rose to prominence under the British.

Although genealogical writers are not historians, they can and do omit vital information if they tarnish family prestige. They can consult archival records, oral traditions, and colonial documents to augment their studies. This writer suggests a combination of all sources as explained at the beginning of this essay.

It is true that the line between genealogical study and historical research is less rigid or open. Both genealogists and researchers may use the same sources, but the distinction lies in the purpose and the method. The primary aim of genealogy is to trace lineage, kinship ties and family continuity. It is basically descriptive and compilatory, but it needs critical assessments. Genealogy becomes research when the genealogist moves beyond compiling sources, and analyzing and interpreting them, situating family history in a wider historical process.

In Kandyan genealogical studies, clashes and serious discrepancies between family records, oral traditions, colonial writings, and modern historical scholarship are common. The problem is how to weigh them against one another looking for convergences. Discrepancies arise when genealogical writers adhere to their own records for family pride or myth making, without consulting other sources, without following a more balanced approach, and allowing the reader to formulate independent perspectives. Failure to engage multiple sources perpetuates partial inquiry rather than historical inquiry.

Wanniachy faithfully traces the ancestry of the Taldena family from the era of King Devanam Piyatissa, drawing upon family history, oral tradition, and two folk poems. Yet his account remains narrowly confined, for he pays little attention to other archival sources, colonial writings, and modern historical scholarship. Works such as Paul E. Pieris’s “Sinhale and the Patriots, 1815–1818” (1950/1995), Tennakone Wimalananda’s “The Great Rebellion of 1818” (1963), are conspicuously absent from his study. Although colonial records remain largely inaccessible to the general public, the writings of modern historians reach a wider audience.

Wimalananda records that Taldena Mohottala, a chieftain of Viyaluwa, saw his house ransacked and destroyed by the British troops during the uprising of 1818. In ancient times, a Mohottala, was a scribe, a secretary, whose main function was collecting and sending the King’s and Dissave’s revenue. Mohottalas of Uva also assumed far greater powers by reason of the distance from the capital, Kandy.

The English dismembered the ancient Uva Maha Disawa, under the almost independent authority of a Maha Disava and created six Disavas, of which one was Oya Palatha.

Paul E. Pieris says that Taldena in recognition of his good work for the British, demanded the post of Disava of Oya Palatha. Owing to his collaboration with the colonial administration, he was appointed Acting Dissava of Oya Palatha. Taldena however, again fell under suspicion, was kept under detention at the Barrier Guard and the British administration thought advisable to remove him from Badulla. As he was ill under detention he could not be removed to Colombo as ordered. He was removed from his position of Oya Palata Disava and was called upon to deposit his valuables at the Badulla Kachcheri, as security for his good behaviuor. On depositing his valuables with the Agent, he was released from detention.

Wimalananda further notes that the Taldena family established marital ties with families in the Batticaloa District. A native of Pottuvil, Mutu Banda’s relative, Sama Kumarihamy alias Ramath, married G. B. Taldena; her second husband was Mutukumaru Murugesu Pillai, and their daughter was Madduma Kumarihamy.

The ancient Maha Disava of Uva was further divided. In my series of articles on the Kandyan chieftains under British rule, I have noted that in 1908 Charles Taldena was appointed Gravets Muhandiram of Kandy by J. P. Lewis, Government Agent of the Central Province. In his report, Lewis observed that this office, as had always been the case, was once again entrusted to a Kandyan, whereas previously it had been conferred upon a “lowcountry” official.

In Chapter Four of his booklet, Wanniachy turns to the history and genealogy of the Mullegama family. Though Mullegama does not belong to Uva, the family is linked to the Taldenas through intermarriage, as he explains. Mullegama itself is a village in Harispattuwa, situated about two kilometers off from the Ambatenna junction along the Kandy–Matale road. In tracing the lineage of the Mullegamas, Wanniachy relies closely on A. C. Lawrie’s Gazetteer of the Central Province of Ceylon (1898).

Mullegama, once Dissava of Wellassa and Dissava of Navayodun Korale supported the British expedition. Yet in 1818, British troops plundered his residence at Wellassa, seizing his most treasured possessions, among them gifts from Sri Vickrema, an elephant, and two horses, which were later sold in Badulla, says Paul E. Peiris. During the Uva uprising, he provided the British with valuable intelligence, and in recognition of his services he was subsequently appointed as Siyapattuwe Adhikaram, a post created by Sri Vickrema, an ironic reward for loyalty despite the plundering.

Lawrie records that the estate of the Mullegama Maha Nilame was divided, and that one grandson sold his share to Moormen of Akurana. He further notes that all the walawwa lands were eventually sold, with a Moorman of Akurana purchasing part of the walawwa, repairing it, and residing there. The pathetic decline of the Mullegama estates is poignantly reflected in Asoka M. Herath’s Sinhala novel Nindagama (2002), a symbolic resonance of the literary echo of dispossession.

I am acutely aware that independent researchers and genealogists of Kandyan families often incur the displeasure of presentday descendants, for the facts they uncover are seldom palatable. Their inquiries reveal that certain ancestors occupied the lower rungs of the royal administration yet later attained high office under the British through collaboration with the colonial regime. Such revelations, though historically significant, provoke resentment among descendants who prefer to sustain more exalted narratives of lineage. This genealogical selectivity perpetuates sanitised family histories and conceals the complexities of colonial collaboration.

In Kandyan genealogical studies compiled by kinsmen, attention is almost exclusively bestowed upon the illustrious figures who once served the king. Their descendants, even those living today, are relegated to mere entries in family trees, noted with their matrimonial alliances. Wanniachy’s book is no exception.

Why does this occur? By highlighting only those ancestors who held office or enjoyed distinction, families reinforced their claims to nobility and social standing. Descendants, unless they themselves attained prominence, were recorded routinely since their presence served only continuity but not prestige.

I thought it necessary to highlight certain technical shortcomings of the book. In the present publishing climate, design has become a matter of considerable importance. Proper book design requires attention to margins, chapter titles, and other elements of presentation. Moreover, the volume carries no ISBN, indicating that it has not been registered with the National Library. This omission prevents the work from being catalogued in the Sri Lanka National Archives, the Museum Library, the National Library, and the University of Peradeniya Library and diminishes its archival value. Another notable deficiency is the absence of the author’s address and contact information. (Concluded)

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22nd Amendment: Proof of the pudding will be in the eating

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Superior Courts Complex

by Jehan Perera

It appears that the die has been cast on the 22nd Amendment. The government appears unshaken in its determination to ensure its passage into law. From the government’s perspective, the 22nd Amendment and associated legislation, by increasing the tenure of all judges by two years, will give them the extra time to complete their existing cases. This will do away with the need to change judges midstream and have complex legal cases go back to the beginning, which has too often been the case. The completion of these cases will be to the benefit of the victims who have waited for decades for justice in some cases. It will also be to the government’s benefit as many of the wrongdoers are those in the political opposition. In the past, human rights and democracy activists, not to mention lawyers in the field, have bemoaned the manner in which court cases have got delayed for a variety of reasons, including judges being promoted or transferred midstream or reaching the age of retirement.

Principled opposition to 22nd Amendment is articulated in terms of the ad hoc and sudden emergence of the amendment. Those who advance this argument have expressed concern that extending judges’ tenure could create a sense of indebtedness to the government and weaken judicial independence. They would prefer the extension of judges’ tenure to be part of a comprehensive package of constitutional reforms that would apply across the board to other sectors of the public service and, ideally, find its place in the new constitution that the NPP promised in its election manifesto. The question is one of timing. Public opinion surveys carried out regularly have shown that the vast majority of people consider that corruption and criminality at high levels need to be brought to an end as soon as possible. They want accountability to become real rather than remain an unfulfilled promise. The public mood today is that the era of impunity must finally end.

Investigations by law enforcement agencies into the misdeeds of politicians in the past have too often come to naught due to the lack of political will on the part of successive governments. But on this occasion there is a manifest expression of such political will, as witnessed in the seemingly endless series of corruption and criminality cases being uncovered and exposed week by week and month by month. It is equally predictable that those under investigation will seek to challenge the legitimacy of this process. Some will perceive the prosecutions as essentially being in the nature of political revenge rather than lawful accountability and argue along those lines. Others will seek to rally public opinion by questioning the independence of the institutions involved. These reactions should surprise no one. But they make it all the more important that the credibility of the institutions through which accountability is pursued be safeguarded.

Safeguard Change

There is an old saying that society is a mule, not a horse. A horse may respond to repeated use of the spurs, but a mule, if driven too hard, may throw its rider off altogether. The proverb captures an important truth about governing societies. History offers many examples of societies that succeeded in exposing wrongdoing but failed to build reconciliation afterwards. The greatest danger is not merely that the guilty will protest their innocence. That is to be expected. The greater danger is that punishment itself becomes the principal language of politics. When that happens, each change of government carries with it the expectation that today’s judgments will tomorrow be revisited, reversed or avenged.

The electoral verdicts of 2024 that swept the NPP into power brought an entirely new group of political leaders to the fore. This transition needs to take place with care to ensure that polarisation and civil conflict are contained rather than intensified. The post-22nd Amendment period will therefore require something more than legal correctness. It will require political sagacity. Accountability needs to be seen in the light of strengthening the legitimacy of institutions rather than becoming sidetracked into another arena of political contestation. If justice comes to be seen as merely the continuation of politics by legal means, even deserving convictions of wrongdoers may lose public confidence on which long lasting justice depends.

Troubling in this context has been the conduct of some opponents of the amendment. They have not only attacked the government leadership for taking forward the 22nd Amendment. They have also launched personal attacks on judges and cast sweeping aspersions on the judiciary itself. Ironically, in seeking to discredit the courts before they deliver their judgments, they risk undermining the very institution they claim to defend. The lawyers who have united against the 22nd Amendment have every right and duty to raise constitutional concerns. Opposition politicians have every right to criticise legislation. But both also carry a responsibility not to erode public confidence in the judiciary through speculative accusations that prejudge the integrity of judges before they have acted. Such argumentation weakens an institution that belongs to the entire country, not to any government or opposition.

Real Test

Sri Lanka is emerging from decades of violent conflict and deep political polarization. Too often in our history, one government’s triumph has become the next government’s point of demonization as in the once widely used phrase of the “17 year curse” by the successor government. Institutions rebuilt today must therefore survive tomorrow’s transfer of power. They must earn the confidence not only of those who celebrate today’s victories, but also of those who will one day sit in opposition. Institutions that command confidence across political divides need to become stronger and not weaker than the governments that created them.

The national challenge is no longer simply whether accountability will be pursued. It is whether accountability will restore faith in the law by ending a culture of impunity that for too long protected the powerful while denying justice to victims. The country has waited too long for that moment. It must not now be compromised by unnecessary political confrontation or irresponsible attacks on the courts. Ultimately, the strongest answer to the critics of the 22nd Amendment will not come from government ministers or parliamentary speeches. It will need to come from the judges themselves.

The extension of the tenure of members of the judiciary will place an even greater obligation upon them to demonstrate, through every judgment they deliver, that they are truly independent, impartial and beholden to no political authority. If they uphold the law without fear or favour, they will expose the predictions of the doomsayers as unfounded. Those in the legal profession, media, civil society and politics should likewise recognise that criticism of judicial decisions must not become an assault on the institution of the judiciary itself. The greatest service that all sides can render Sri Lanka at this moment is to strengthen the people’s faith that justice belongs equally to every citizen and that no one, however powerful, stands above the law.

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