Features
Need for AKD and JVP/NPP to be educated on complex geopolitics
India’s security needs consolidate US manoeuvring strategy in Indo-Pacific:
by Daya Gamage
Foreign Service National Political Specialist (rtd.)
US Department of State
Aware or unaware of the intricacies of big power play in the Indo-Pacific region to the emerging political entity in Sri Lanka, JVP-led National People’s Power (NPP) leader Anura Kumara Dissanayake has declared that he and his political party are (now) alive to India’s security concerns after his return from India having had discourses with External Affairs Minister and other leading Modi administration officials needs serious scrutiny.
In an interview with Sri Lanka’s Sirasa TV on February 15, Dissanayake reiterated that the ‘incoming’ National People’s Power administration “will not do anything that undermines Indian security”.
If Dissanayake had been aware that ‘India’s national security’ was somewhat beyond her ‘control’ and connected to the larger Indo-Pacific or Asia-Pacific region with ‘outside forces’ deeply embedded in, he would have made a ‘measured statement’ about India’s national security.
Before examining how India is tied to ‘a foreign military and technological force’ connected to the Asia-Pacific Region and that India’s national security cannot be isolated from ‘outside forces’ engaged in the region, it should be found out how Sri Lanka is connected to the overall regional security, an issue that Dissanayake doesn’t seem to have paid much attention to. The eight-page, 2007 (disclosed) US-Sri Lanka signed Acquisition and Cross-Services Agreement (ACSA) and the 83-page, 2017 ACSA (still kept classified by both Washington and Colombo) have much relevance to the overall Indo-Pacific region.
US Code Title 10 Section 2342: Cross-Servicing Agreement, under which a long process of US government assessment takes effect, how useful a non-NATO country, such as Sri Lanka could be to the national interest of the United States is vital to the understanding of Sri Lankan policy.
The US Code declares (Quote) (a)(1) Subject to section 2343 of this title and to the availability of appropriations, and after consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense may enter into an agreement described in paragraph (2) with any of the following: (Among others)
(D) The government of a country not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization but which is designated by the Secretary of Defense, subject to the limitations prescribed in subsection (b), as a government with which the Secretary may enter into agreements under this section. (End Quote)
Before scrutinising other Sub-Sections, Sub-Section (D) is well connected to a ‘declaration’ of a diplomatic cable that reached Washington from the American Embassy in Colombo: 20 February 2007 diplomatic cable sent under the signature of Ambassador Robert Blake made it very clear (Quote) Since this agreement primarily benefits US forces, we think there are strong arguments to proceed with the signing the agreement (End Quote) referring to the 2007 ACSA. It is not difficult to understand why the 2007 agreement was expanded to 83 pages in 2017 and why it is still kept a secret.
Now to Sub-Section (b) of the U.S. Code Title 10 Section 2342: Cross-Servicing Agreement:
(Quote) (b) (which is well connected to the signing of both the 2007 and 2017 ACSA) The Secretary of Defense may not designate a country for an agreement under this section unless –
(1) the Secretary, after consultation with the Secretary of State, determines that the designation of such country for such purpose is in the interest of the national security of the United States; and
(2) in the case of a country which is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Secretary submits to the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives notice of the intended designation at least 30 days before the date on which such country is designated by the Secretary under subsection (a). (End Quote)
The Pentagon, the State Department and Armed Services and International Committees of the US Senate and House of Representatives are very much involved in the process of using feed backs and assessments from the US diplomatic post in the host nation.
This writer, who was knowledgeable about this process during his engagement with the State Department for more than two decades, was aware of the manner in which the US diplomatic mission in Sri Lanka played that role.
To enter into an ACSA treaty, the designated country – in this case, Sri Lanka, which entered into the agreement in March 2007 and 2017– Washington has to determine (Quote) the designation of such country for such purpose is in the interest of the national security of the United States . (End Quote)
“Sri Lanka occupies some very important real estate in the Indo-Pacific region, and it’s a country of increasing strategic importance in the Indian Ocean region”, declared Alice Wells, US State Department’s Deputy Assistant Secretary addressing the foreign media at the department’s Washington Media Center on 24 January 2020—three weeks before she was in Colombo meeting newly-elected President Gotabhaya Rajapaksa.
The 2018 National Defense Strategy guides the Department of Defense to support the (US) National Security Strategy – the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 – specifically calls for “expanding cooperation with democratic partners in South Asia, including Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka.”
This 2018 document – declassified in January 2021 – evinces a special interest in Sri Lanka’s survival in the Indo-Pacific region, the formulation of its foreign policy, and its relations with India, the United States and China.
It should be mentioned here that the writer along with another (retired) Senior Foreign Service/Intelligence Officer (American) is currently developing a manuscript (for publication) exploring Washington’s foreign policy manipulations and discharges toward Sri Lanka and India, and the manner in which Sri Lanka and India were (and are) playing their roles in response to Washington’s excessive and (almost) hegemonic role in the Indo-Pacific region.
It is in this context that India’s national security can in no way be isolated from Washington’s military/defense and intelligence approaches and activities in the Asia-Pacific region and its foreign policy discharges that this writer and his co-author discovered through their extensive research and investigations.
Some of the salient policy determinations and projections in the now-declassified 2018 National Security Strategy – the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act document of the US government are as follows:
· A strong India, in cooperation with like-minded countries, would act as a counterbalance to China.
· India remains preeminent in South Asia and takes the leading role in maintaining Indian Ocean security, increased engagement with Southeast Asia, and expands its economic, defense, and diplomatic cooperation with other US allies and partners in the region.
· US Objective: Accelerate India’s rise and capacity to serve as a net provider of security and Major Defense Partner; solidify an enduring strategic partnership with India underpinned by a strong Indian military able to effectively collaborate with the United States and her partners in the region to address shared interests.
· US Actions: Build a stronger foundation for defense cooperation and interoperability; expand US defense trade ability to transfer defense technology to enhance India’s status as a Major Defense Partner.
· US Objective: Strengthen the capacity of emerging partners in South Asia, including the Maldives, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, to contribute to a free and open order. US Action: Establish a new initiative with South Asian partners modeled on the Maritime Security Initiative.
· National Security Challenges: How to maintain US strategic primacy in the Indo-Pacific region while preventing China from establishing new illiberal spheres of influence.
· US Action: Enhance combat-credible US military presence and posture in the Indo-Pacific region to uphold US interests and security commitments.
Now, let’s see how ‘Indian National Security’ that Anura Kumara Dissanayake has referred to, and aspires to safeguard under a JVP-led NPP government he is hoping to form, is tied to the Indo-Pacific Region that Washington is playing a dominant role in.
US-India Relationship: Critical to Indo-Pacific
A shared vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific bolsters the US-India relationship as the two countries continue to strengthen defense ties, a senior Pentagon official said on Sept. 19, 2023.
Siddharth Iyer, the Director for South Asia policy in the Office of (US) Secretary of Defense, said the defense partnership had experienced an “incredible and unprecedented amount of momentum” as evidenced by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin twice traveling to India recently and the “warmth and familiarity” between the two countries.
“This relationship is one of the top priorities for the department,” Iyer said. “Our belief is that getting the US and India relationship right is not just necessary, it’s essential to achieving our strategy in the Indo-Pacific.”
What he meant by “our strategy” is the United States’ strategy.
“I think one of the ways in which we think about the roadmap is really a manifestation of Secretary Austin’s commitment to accelerating India’s military modernization, and for him, putting the department on the hook to find targeted opportunities to propose to advance India’s indigenous defense production capabilities,” Iyer said during a discussion on furthering US-India security cooperation hosted by the Hudson Institute in Washington.
“department on the hook”, meaning the United States on the hook.
India’s Minister of Defense Rajnath Singh and Minister of External Affairs Dr. S. Jaishankar engaged with (US) Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin for the fifth US-India 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue in New Delhi on November 10, 2023.
They reaffirmed the importance of the US-India Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership in ensuring international peace and security. The Ministers also underlined their strong commitment to safeguarding a free, open, and an inclusive Indo-Pacific.
The Joint Statement released November 10, 2023 on the Fifth Annual India-US 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue reaffirmed the US-India”commitment to further deepen the multifaceted defense partnership through wide-ranging dialogues and military exercises of increasing complexity and sophistication, accelerated joint projects initiated under the June 2023 Roadmap for US-India Defense Industrial Cooperation and expanded collaboration in emerging domains, such as space and artificial intelligence. They expressed satisfaction with the pace of cooperation in Maritime Domain Awareness and looked forward to identifying pathways to promote stronger service-to-service ties and share technologies to address an array of maritime challenges, including in the undersea domain.”
These discourses, dialogues and rapport have prompted steps to “deepen and diversify” the two countries’ so-called Major Defense Partnership.
The two (US and India) militaries signed their second Master Ship Repair Agreement, with the US Navy and Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Ltd., in August 2023, recommitting themselves to advancing India’s emergence as a hub for the maintenance and repair of forward-deployed US Navy assets and other aircraft and vessels, according to the White House. The countries also made further commitments to the US companies investing more in India’s maintenance, repair and overhaul capabilities and facilities for aircraft.
In late September 2023, Ely Ratner, the US Department of Defense’s Assistant Secretary for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs, Donald Lu, State Department’s assistant secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs, Vani Rao, a secretary in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs and Vishwesh Negi, the Joint Secretary of Indian Ministry of Defense engaged in “a wide range of ambitious initiatives” dialogue between the two nations.
According to a US Defense Department statement “The officials also discussed regional security developments and strategic priorities across the Indo-Pacific region. A strong US-India partnership is essential to upholding security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region.”
India having entered into a military partnership with the United States, and Sri Lanka’s close proximity to India in political and economic spheres, Sri Lanka is at a crossroads surrounded by Washington, New Delhi and Beijing.
As an emerging leader, Anura Kumara Dissanayake could have made a ‘measured statement’ on the official policy of the government he is planning to form towards ‘India’s security’ as data given above show the manner in which Washington has tied up with New Delhi, and the strategy the United States has adopted to forge a strong defense ties with India; contrary to what Dissanayake believes, India is not developing an ‘isolated national security policy’. New Delhi has been formulating her national security policy in collaboration with Washington, and that security policy – to which JVP-NPP has undertaken to protect and safeguard – provides for a dominant role for Washington in the Indo-Pacific (or Asia-Pacific) region. Sri Lanka is unable to escape Washington’s machinations in the Indo-Pacific region as noted at the outset.
Isn’t Dissanayake aware of the US-India defense collaboration? If so, is he concealing that fact, or if not so, isn’t he capable of strategic thinking?
As a footnote, it is necessary to refer to Dissanayake’s pronouncement about foreign nations and their diplomatic agents’ special interest in communicating with him and his political entity, according to him in an interview with SIRASA TV on February 15 (Quote) Anyone who can think logically can understand that states engage with political actors that have power. India, China, the US, and many others are now engaging with us because they think we will win elections (Unquote).
The writer finds it very unusual for the (US) Chief of Mission to entertain the notion that she should maintain close rapport and contact with a non-ruling political party leader. The US diplomats were expected to maintain contacts with (about) two national political parties that alternately exchanged power; they established contacts with ‘non-national’ political parties and their leaders to fulfill ‘diplomatic niceties’ and obtain alternative interpretations to that of what main political leaders and their national parties express.
In the case of JVP-NPP, undoubtedly, they are emerging as a national entity, and foreign diplomats, including the American ambassador Julie Chung, have taken note of the emerging political reality to maintain relations with it. Whether Ambassador Chung believes, in a confused political atmosphere, the JVP-NPP could form the next administration is another matter.
Two questions emerge from Dissanayake’s belief that foreign nations and their diplomats ‘suddenly’ reach out to his political alliance because they strongly believe that its rise to power is imminent: (1) Is it because the reconciliation between the JVP-NPP and India and Dissanayake’s undertaking not to obstruct that nation’s national security interests suits Washington and if JVP-NPP ever captures power or reaches the level of an influential and formidable opposition power Washington (and/or Julie Chung) will have tamed the once anti-American/anti-Indian JVP? (2) Shouldn’t JVP- NPP leader Anura Kumara Dissanayake declare his policy towards the US; the defense collaboration between Washington and New Delhi; and that Ambassador Chung is aware that JVP-NPP has conveniently ignored India’s defence collaboration with the US? Is this a diplomatic achievement of Washington?
As much as JVP-NPP owes the Sri Lankan public an explanation, elucidating its undertaking to safeguard the national security interests, Sri Lankan policymakers and lawmakers need to have a comprehensive understanding of where Sri Lanka stands in this complex foreign policy issue.
(The writer is a retired Foreign Service National Political Specialist of the U.S. Department of State accredited to the Political Section of the U.S. diplomatic mission in Sri Lanka)
Features
Building on Sand: The Indian market trap
(Part III in a series on Sri Lanka’s tourism stagnation.)
Every SLTDA (Sri Lanka Tourism Development Authority) press release now leads with the same headline: India is Sri Lanka’s “star market.” The numbers seem to prove it, 531,511 Indian arrivals in 2025, representing 22.5% of all tourists. Officials celebrate the “half-million milestone” and set targets for 600,000, 700,000, more.
But follow the money instead of the headcount, and a different picture emerges. We are building our tourism recovery on a low-spending, short-stay, operationally challenging segment, without any serious strategy to transform it into a high-value market. We have confused market size with market quality, and the confusion is costing us billions.
Per-day spending: While SLTDA does not publish market-specific daily expenditure data, industry operators and informal analyses consistently report Indian tourists in the $100-140 per day range, compared to $180-250 for Western European and North American markets.
The math is brutal and unavoidable: one Western European tourist generates the revenue of 3-4 Indian tourists. Building tourism recovery primarily on the low-yield segment is strategically incoherent, unless the goal is arrivals theater rather than economic contribution.
Comparative Analysis: How Competitors Handle Indian Outbound Tourism
India is not unique to Sri Lanka. Indian outbound tourism reached 30.23 million departures in 2024, an 8.4% year-on-year increase, driven by a growing middle class with disposable income. Every competitor destination is courting this market.
This is not diversification. It is concentration risk dressed up as growth.
How did we end up here? Through a combination of policy laziness, proximity bias, and refusal to confront yield trade-offs.
1. Proximity as Strategy Substitute
India is next door. Flights are short (1.5-3 hours), frequent, and cheap. This makes India the easiest market to attract, low promotional cost, high visibility, strong cultural and linguistic overlap. But easiest is not the same as best.
Tourism strategy should optimize for yield-adjusted effort. Yes, attracting Europeans requires longer promotional cycles, higher marketing spend, and sustained brand-building. But if each European generates 3x the revenue of an Indian tourist, the return on investment is self-evident.
We have chosen ease over effectiveness, proximity over profitability.
2. Visa Policy as Blunt Instrument
3. Failure to Develop High-Value Products for Indian Market

There are segments of Indian outbound tourism that spend heavily:
* Wedding tourism: Indian destination weddings can generate $50,000-200,000+ per event
* Wellness/Ayurveda tourism: High-net-worth Indians seek authentic wellness experiences and will pay premium rates
* MICE tourism: Corporate events, conferences, incentive travel
Sri Lanka has these assets—coastal venues for weddings, Ayurvedic heritage, colonial hotels suitable for corporate events. But we have not systematically developed and marketed these products to high-yield Indian segments.
For the first time in 2025, Sri Lanka conducted multi-city roadshows across India to promote wedding tourism. This is welcome—but it is 25 years late. The Maldives and Mauritius have been curating Indian wedding and MICE tourism for decades, building specialised infrastructure, training staff, and integrating these products into marketing.
We are entering a mature market with no track record, no specialised infrastructure, and no price positioning that signals premium quality.
4. Operational Challenges and Quality Perceptions
Indian tourists, particularly budget segments, present operational challenges:
* Shorter stays mean higher turnover, more check-ins, more logistical overhead per dollar of revenue
* Price sensitivity leads to aggressive bargaining, complaints over perceived overcharging
* Large groups (families, wedding parties) require specialised handling
None of these are insurmountable, but they require investment in training, systems, and service design. Sri Lanka has not made these investments systematically. The result: operators report higher operational costs per Indian guest while generating lower revenue, a toxic margin squeeze.
Additionally, Sri Lanka’s positioning as a “budget-friendly” destination reinforces price expectations. Indians comparing Sri Lanka to Thailand or Malaysia see Sri Lanka as cheaper, not better. We compete on price, not value, a race to the bottom.
The Strategic Error: Mistaking Market Size for Market Fit
India’s outbound tourism market is massive, 30 million+ and growing. But scale is not the same as fit.
Market size ≠ market value: The UAE attracts 7.5 million Indians, but as a high-yield segment (business, luxury shopping, upscale hospitality). Saudi Arabia attracts 3.3 million—but for religious pilgrimage with high per-capita spending and long stays.
Thailand attracts 1.8 million Indians as part of a diversified 35-million-tourist base. Indians represent 5% of Thailand’s mix. Sri Lanka has made Indians 22.5% of our mix, 4.5 times Thailand’s concentration, while generating a fraction of Thailand’s revenue.
This reveals the error. We have prioritised volume from a market segment without ensuring the segment aligns with our value proposition.
These needs are misaligned. Indians seek budget value; Sri Lanka needs yield. Indians want short trips; Sri Lanka needs extended stays. Indians are price-sensitive; Sri Lanka needs premium segments to fund infrastructure.
We have attracted a market that does not match our strategic needs—and then celebrated the mismatch as success.
The Way Forward: From Dependency to Diversification
Fixing the Indian market trap requires three shifts: curation, diversification, and premium positioning.
First
, segment the Indian market and target high-value niches explicitly:
* Wedding tourism: Develop specialised wedding venues, train planners, create integrated packages ($50k+ per event)
* Wellness tourism: Position Sri Lanka as authentic Ayurveda destination for high-net-worth health seekers
* MICE tourism: Target Indian corporate incentive travel and conferences
* Spiritual/religious tourism: Leverage Buddhist and Hindu heritage sites with premium positioning
Market these high-value niches aggressively. Let budget segments self-select out through pricing signals.
Second
, rebalance market mix toward high-yield segments:
* Increase marketing spend on Western Europe, North America, and East Asian premium segments
* Develop products (luxury eco-lodges, boutique heritage hotels, adventure tourism) that appeal to high-yield travelers
* Use visa policy strategically, maintain visa-free for premium markets, consider tiered visa fees or curated visa schemes for volume markets
Third
, stop benchmarking success by Indian arrival volumes. Track:
* Revenue per Indian visitor
* Indian market share of total revenue (not arrivals)
* Yield gap: Indian revenue vs. other major markets
If Indians are 22.5% of arrivals but only 15% of revenue, we have a problem. If the gap widens, we are deepening dependency on a low-yield segment.
Fourth
, invest in Indian market quality rather than quantity:
* Train staff on Indian high-end expectations (luxury service standards, dietary needs)
* Develop bilingual guides and materials (Hindi, Tamil)
* Build partnerships with premium Indian travel agents, not budget consolidators
We should aim to attract 300,000 Indians generating $1,500 per trip (through wedding, wellness, MICE targeting), not 700,000 generating $600 per trip. The former produces $450 million; the latter produces $420 million, while requiring more than twice the operational overhead and infrastructure load.
Fifth
, accept the hard truth: India cannot and should not be 30-40% of our market mix. The structural yield constraints make that model non-viable. Cap Indian arrivals at 15-20% of total mix and aggressively diversify into higher-yield markets.
This will require political courage, saying “no” to easy volume in favour of harder-won value. But that is what strategy means: choosing what not to do.
The Dependency Trap

Every market concentration creates path dependency. The more we optimize for Indian tourists, visa schemes, marketing, infrastructure, pricing, the harder it becomes to attract high-yield markets that expect different value propositions.
Hotels that compete on price for Indian segments cannot simultaneously position as luxury for European segments. Destinations known for “affordability” struggle to pivot to premium. Guides trained for high-turnover, short-stay groups do not develop the deep knowledge required for extended cultural tours.
We are locking in a low-yield equilibrium. Each incremental Indian arrival strengthens the positioning as a “budget-friendly” destination, which repels high-yield segments, which forces further volume-chasing in price-sensitive markets. The cycle reinforces itself.
Breaking the cycle requires accepting short-term pain—lower arrival numbers—for long-term gain—higher revenue, stronger positioning, sustainable margins.
The Hard Question
Is Sri Lanka willing to attract two million tourists generating $5 billion, or three million tourists generating $4 billion?
The current trajectory is toward the latter, more arrivals, less revenue, thinner margins, greater fragility. We are optimizing for metrics that impress press releases but erode economic contribution.
The Indian market is not the problem. The problem is building tourism recovery primarily on a low-yield segment without strategies to either transform that segment to high-yield or balance it with high-yield markets.
We are building on sand. The foundation will not hold.
(The writer, a senior Chartered Accountant and professional banker, is Professor at SLIIT, Malabe. The views and opinions expressed in this article are personal.)
Features
Digital transformation in the Global South
Understanding Sri Lanka through the India AI Impact Summit 2026
Artificial Intelligence (AI) has rapidly moved from being a specialised technological field into a major social force that shapes economies, cultures, governance, and everyday human life. The India AI Impact Summit 2026, held in New Delhi, symbolised a significant moment for the Global South, especially South Asia, because it demonstrated that artificial intelligence is no longer limited to advanced Western economies but can also become a development tool for emerging societies. The summit gathered governments, researchers, technology companies, and international organisations to discuss how AI can support social welfare, public services, and economic growth. Its central message was that artificial intelligence should be human centred and socially useful. Instead of focusing only on powerful computing systems, the summit emphasised affordable technologies, open collaboration, and ethical responsibility so that ordinary citizens can benefit from digital transformation. For South Asia, where large populations live in rural areas and resources are unevenly distributed, this idea is particularly important.
People friendly AI
One of the most important concepts promoted at the summit was the idea of “people friendly AI.” This means that artificial intelligence should be accessible, understandable, and helpful in daily activities. In South Asia, language diversity and economic inequality often prevent people from using advanced technology. Therefore, systems designed for local languages, and smartphones, play a crucial role. When a farmer can speak to a digital assistant in Sinhala, Tamil, or Hindi and receive advice about weather patterns or crop diseases, technology becomes practical rather than distant. Similarly, voice based interfaces allow elderly people and individuals with limited literacy to use digital services. Affordable mobile based AI tools reduce the digital divide between urban and rural populations. As a result, artificial intelligence stops being an elite instrument and becomes a social assistant that supports ordinary life.
Transformation in education sector
The influence of this transformation is visible in education. AI based learning platforms can analyse student performance and provide personalised lessons. Instead of all students following the same pace, weaker learners receive additional practice while advanced learners explore deeper material. Teachers are able to focus on mentoring and explanation rather than repetitive instruction. In many South Asian societies, including Sri Lanka, education has long depended on memorisation and private tuition classes. AI tutoring systems could reduce educational inequality by giving rural students access to learning resources, similar to those available in cities. A student who struggles with mathematics, for example, can practice step by step exercises automatically generated according to individual mistakes. This reduces pressure, improves confidence, and gradually changes the educational culture from rote learning toward understanding and problem solving.
Healthcare is another area where AI is becoming people friendly. Many rural communities face shortages of doctors and medical facilities. AI-assisted diagnostic tools can analyse symptoms, or medical images, and provide early warnings about diseases. Patients can receive preliminary advice through mobile applications, which helps them decide whether hospital visits are necessary. This reduces overcrowding in hospitals and saves travel costs. Public health authorities can also analyse large datasets to monitor disease outbreaks and allocate resources efficiently. In this way, artificial intelligence supports not only individual patients but also the entire health system.
Agriculture, which remains a primary livelihood for millions in South Asia, is also undergoing transformation. Farmers traditionally rely on seasonal experience, but climate change has made weather patterns unpredictable. AI systems that analyse rainfall data, soil conditions, and satellite images can predict crop performance and recommend irrigation schedules. Early detection of plant diseases prevents large-scale crop losses. For a small farmer, accurate information can mean the difference between profit and debt. Thus, AI directly influences economic stability at the household level.
Employment and communication reshaped
Artificial intelligence is also reshaping employment and communication. Routine clerical and repetitive tasks are increasingly automated, while demand grows for digital skills, such as data management, programming, and online services. Many young people in South Asia are beginning to participate in remote work, freelancing, and digital entrepreneurship. AI translation tools allow communication across languages, enabling businesses to reach international customers. Knowledge becomes more accessible because information can be summarised, translated, and explained instantly. This leads to a broader sociological shift: authority moves from tradition and hierarchy toward information and analytical reasoning. Individuals rely more on data when making decisions about education, finance, and career planning.
Impact on Sri Lanka
The impact on Sri Lanka is especially significant because the country shares many social and economic conditions with India and often adopts regional technological innovations. Sri Lanka has already begun integrating artificial intelligence into education, agriculture, and public administration. In schools and universities, AI learning tools may reduce the heavy dependence on private tuition and help students in rural districts receive equal academic support. In agriculture, predictive analytics can help farmers manage climate variability, improving productivity and food security. In public administration, digital systems can speed up document processing, licensing, and public service delivery. Smart transportation systems may reduce congestion in urban areas, saving time and fuel.
Economic opportunities are also expanding. Sri Lanka’s service based economy and IT outsourcing sector can benefit from increased global demand for digital skills. AI-assisted software development, data annotation, and online service platforms can create new employment pathways, especially for educated youth. Small and medium entrepreneurs can use AI tools to design products, manage finances, and market services internationally at low cost. In tourism, personalised digital assistants and recommendation systems can improve visitor experiences and help small businesses connect with travellers directly.
Digital inequality
However, the integration of artificial intelligence also raises serious concerns. Digital inequality may widen if only educated urban populations gain access to technological skills. Some routine jobs may disappear, requiring workers to retrain. There are also risks of misinformation, surveillance, and misuse of personal data. Ethical regulation and transparency are, therefore, essential. Governments must develop policies that protect privacy, ensure accountability, and encourage responsible innovation. Public awareness and digital literacy programmes are necessary so that citizens understand both the benefits and limitations of AI systems.
Beyond economics and services, AI is gradually influencing social relationships and cultural patterns. South Asian societies have traditionally relied on hierarchy and personal authority, but data-driven decision making changes this structure. Agricultural planning may depend on predictive models rather than ancestral practice, and educational evaluation may rely on learning analytics instead of examination rankings alone. This does not eliminate human judgment, but it alters its basis. Societies increasingly value analytical thinking, creativity, and adaptability. Educational systems must, therefore, move beyond memorisation toward critical thinking and interdisciplinary learning.
AI contribution to national development
In Sri Lanka, these changes may contribute to national development if implemented carefully. AI-supported financial monitoring can improve transparency and reduce corruption. Smart infrastructure systems can help manage transportation and urban planning. Communication technologies can support interaction among Sinhala, Tamil, and English speakers, promoting social inclusion in a multilingual society. Assistive technologies can improve accessibility for persons with disabilities, enabling broader participation in education and employment. These developments show that artificial intelligence is not merely a technological innovation but a social instrument capable of strengthening equality when guided by ethical policy.
Symbolic shift
Ultimately, the India AI Impact Summit 2026 represents a symbolic shift in the global technological landscape. It indicates that developing nations are beginning to shape the future of artificial intelligence according to their own social needs rather than passively importing technology. For South Asia and Sri Lanka, the challenge is not whether AI will arrive but how it will be used. If education systems prepare citizens, if governments establish responsible regulations, and if access remains inclusive, AI can become a partner in development rather than a source of inequality. The future will likely involve close collaboration between humans and intelligent systems, where machines assist decision making while human values guide outcomes. In this sense, artificial intelligence does not replace human society, but transforms it, offering Sri Lanka an opportunity to build a more knowledge based, efficient, and equitable social order in the decades ahead.
by Milinda Mayadunna
Features
Governance cannot be a postscript to economics
The visit by IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva to Sri Lanka was widely described as a success for the government. She was fulsome in her praise of the country and its developmental potential. The grounds for this success and collaborative spirit go back to the inception of the agreement signed in March 2023 in the aftermath of Sri Lanka’s declaration of international bankruptcy. The IMF came in to fulfil its role as lender of last resort. The government of the day bit the bullet. It imposed unpopular policies on the people, most notably significant tax increases. At a moment when the country had run out of foreign exchange, defaulted on its debt, and faced shortages of fuel, medicine and food, the IMF programme restored a measure of confidence both within the country and internationally.
Since 1965 Sri Lanka has entered into agreements with the IMF on 16 occasions none of which were taken to their full term. The present agreement is the 17th agreement . IMF agreements have traditionally been focused on economic restructuring. Invariably the terms of agreement have been harsh on the people, with priority being given to ensure the debtor country pays its loans back to the IMF. Fiscal consolidation, tax increases, subsidy reductions and structural reforms have been the recurring features. The social and political costs have often been high. Governments have lost popularity and sometimes fallen before programmes were completed. The IMF has learned from experience across the world that macroeconomic reform without social protection can generate backlash, instability and policy reversals.
The experience of countries such as Greece, Ireland and Portugal in dealing with the IMF during the eurozone crisis demonstrated the political and social costs of austerity, even though those economies later stabilised and returned to growth. The evolution of IMF policies has ensured that there are two special features in the present agreement. The first is that the IMF has included a safety net of social welfare spending to mitigate the impact of the austerity measures on the poorest sections of the population. No country can hope to grow at 7 or 8 percent per annum when a third of its people are struggling to survive. Poverty alleviation measures in the Aswesuma programme, developed with the agreement of the IMF, are key to mitigating the worst impacts of the rising cost of living and limited opportunities for employment.
Governance Included
The second important feature of the IMF agreement is the inclusion of governance criteria to be implemented alongside the economic reforms. It goes to the heart of why Sri Lanka has had to return to the IMF repeatedly. Economic mismanagement did not take place in a vacuum. It was enabled by weak institutions, politicised decision making, non-transparent procurement, and the erosion of checks and balances. In its economic reform process, the IMF has included an assessment of governance related issues to accompany the economic restructuring process. At the top of this list is tackling the problem of corruption by means of publicising contracts, ensuring open solicitation of tenders, and strengthening financial accountability mechanisms.
The IMF also encouraged a civil society diagnostic study and engaged with civil society organisations regularly. The civil society analysis of governance issues which was promoted by Verite Research and facilitated by Transparency International was wider in scope than those identified in the IMF’s own diagnostic. It pointed to systemic weaknesses that go beyond narrow fiscal concerns. The civil society diagnostic study included issues of social justice such as the inequitable impact of targeting EPF and ETF funds of workers for restructuring and the need to repeal abuse prone laws such as the Prevention of Terrorism Act and the Online Safety Act. When workers see their retirement savings restructured without adequate consultation, confidence in policy making erodes. When laws are perceived to be instruments of arbitrary power, social cohesion weakens.
During a meeting between the IMF Managing Director Georgeiva and civil society members last week, there was discussion on the implementation of those governance measures in which she spoke in a manner that was not alien to the civil society representatives. Significantly, the civil society diagnostic report also referred to the ethnic conflict and the breakdown of interethnic relations that led to three decades of deadly war, causing severe economic losses to the country. This was also discussed at the meeting. Governance is not only about accounting standards and procurement rules. It is about social justice, equality before the law, and political representation. On this issue the government has more to do. Ethnic and religious minorities find themselves inadequately represented in high level government committees. The provincial council system that ensured ethnic and minority representation at the provincial level continues to be in abeyance.
Beyond IMF
The significance of addressing governance issues is not only relevant to the IMF agreement. It is also important in accessing tariff concessions from the European Union. The GSP Plus tariff concession given by the EU enables Sri Lankan exports to be sold at lower prices and win markets in Europe. For an export dependent economy, this is critical. Loss of such concessions would directly affect employment in key sectors such as apparel. The government needs to address longstanding EU concerns about the protection of human rights and labour rights in the country. The EU has, for several years, linked the continuation of GSP Plus to compliance with international conventions. This includes the condition that the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) be brought into line with international standards. The government’s alternative in the form of the draft Protection of the State from Terrorism Act (PTSA) is less abusive on paper but is wider in scope and retains the core features of the PTA.
Governance and social justice factors cannot be ignored or downplayed in the pursuit of economic development. If Sri Lanka is to break out of its cycle of crisis and bailout, it must internalise the fact that good governance which promotes social justice and more fairly distributes the costs and fruits of development is the foundation on which durable economic growth is built. Without it, stabilisation will remain fragile, poverty will remain high, and the promise of 7 to 8 percent growth will remain elusive. The implementation of governance reforms will also have a positive effect through the creative mechanism of governance linked bonds, an innovation of the present IMF agreement.
The Sri Lankan think tank Verité Research played an important role in the development of governance linked bonds. They reduce the rate of interest payable by the government on outstanding debt on the basis that better governance leads to a reduction in risk for those who have lent their money to Sri Lanka. This is a direct financial reward for governance reform. The present IMF programme offers an opportunity not only to stabilise the economy but to strengthen the institutions that underpin it. That opportunity needs to be taken. Without it, the country cannot attract investment, expand exports and move towards shared prosperity and to a 7-8 percent growth rate that can lift the country out of its debt trap.
by Jehan Perera
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