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Need for AKD and JVP/NPP to be educated on complex geopolitics

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India’s security needs consolidate US manoeuvring strategy in Indo-Pacific:

by Daya Gamage
Foreign Service National Political Specialist (rtd.)
US Department of State


Aware or unaware of the intricacies of big power play in the Indo-Pacific region to the emerging political entity in Sri Lanka, JVP-led National People’s Power (NPP) leader Anura Kumara Dissanayake has declared that he and his political party are (now) alive to India’s security concerns after his return from India having had discourses with External Affairs Minister and other leading Modi administration officials needs serious scrutiny.

In an interview with Sri Lanka’s Sirasa TV on February 15, Dissanayake reiterated that the ‘incoming’ National People’s Power administration “will not do anything that undermines Indian security”.

If Dissanayake had been aware that ‘India’s national security’ was somewhat beyond her ‘control’ and connected to the larger Indo-Pacific or Asia-Pacific region with ‘outside forces’ deeply embedded in, he would have made a ‘measured statement’ about India’s national security.

Before examining how India is tied to ‘a foreign military and technological force’ connected to the Asia-Pacific Region and that India’s national security cannot be isolated from ‘outside forces’ engaged in the region, it should be found out how Sri Lanka is connected to the overall regional security, an issue that Dissanayake doesn’t seem to have paid much attention to. The eight-page, 2007 (disclosed) US-Sri Lanka signed Acquisition and Cross-Services Agreement (ACSA) and the 83-page, 2017 ACSA (still kept classified by both Washington and Colombo) have much relevance to the overall Indo-Pacific region.

US Code Title 10 Section 2342: Cross-Servicing Agreement, under which a long process of US government assessment takes effect, how useful a non-NATO country, such as Sri Lanka could be to the national interest of the United States is vital to the understanding of Sri Lankan policy.

The US Code declares (Quote) (a)(1) Subject to section 2343 of this title and to the availability of appropriations, and after consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense may enter into an agreement described in paragraph (2) with any of the following: (Among others)

(D) The government of a country not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization but which is designated by the Secretary of Defense, subject to the limitations prescribed in subsection (b), as a government with which the Secretary may enter into agreements under this section. (End Quote)

Before scrutinising other Sub-Sections, Sub-Section (D) is well connected to a ‘declaration’ of a diplomatic cable that reached Washington from the American Embassy in Colombo: 20 February 2007 diplomatic cable sent under the signature of Ambassador Robert Blake made it very clear (Quote) Since this agreement primarily benefits US forces, we think there are strong arguments to proceed with the signing the agreement (End Quote) referring to the 2007 ACSA. It is not difficult to understand why the 2007 agreement was expanded to 83 pages in 2017 and why it is still kept a secret.

Now to Sub-Section (b) of the U.S. Code Title 10 Section 2342: Cross-Servicing Agreement:

(Quote) (b) (which is well connected to the signing of both the 2007 and 2017 ACSA) The Secretary of Defense may not designate a country for an agreement under this section unless –

(1) the Secretary, after consultation with the Secretary of State, determines that the designation of such country for such purpose is in the interest of the national security of the United States; and

(2) in the case of a country which is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Secretary submits to the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives notice of the intended designation at least 30 days before the date on which such country is designated by the Secretary under subsection (a). (End Quote)

The Pentagon, the State Department and Armed Services and International Committees of the US Senate and House of Representatives are very much involved in the process of using feed backs and assessments from the US diplomatic post in the host nation.

This writer, who was knowledgeable about this process during his engagement with the State Department for more than two decades, was aware of the manner in which the US diplomatic mission in Sri Lanka played that role.

To enter into an ACSA treaty, the designated country – in this case, Sri Lanka, which entered into the agreement in March 2007 and 2017– Washington has to determine (Quote) the designation of such country for such purpose is in the interest of the national security of the United States . (End Quote)

“Sri Lanka occupies some very important real estate in the Indo-Pacific region, and it’s a country of increasing strategic importance in the Indian Ocean region”, declared Alice Wells, US State Department’s Deputy Assistant Secretary addressing the foreign media at the department’s Washington Media Center on 24 January 2020—three weeks before she was in Colombo meeting newly-elected President Gotabhaya Rajapaksa.

The 2018 National Defense Strategy guides the Department of Defense to support the (US) National Security Strategy – the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 – specifically calls for “expanding cooperation with democratic partners in South Asia, including Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka.”

This 2018 document – declassified in January 2021 – evinces a special interest in Sri Lanka’s survival in the Indo-Pacific region, the formulation of its foreign policy, and its relations with India, the United States and China.

It should be mentioned here that the writer along with another (retired) Senior Foreign Service/Intelligence Officer (American) is currently developing a manuscript (for publication) exploring Washington’s foreign policy manipulations and discharges toward Sri Lanka and India, and the manner in which Sri Lanka and India were (and are) playing their roles in response to Washington’s excessive and (almost) hegemonic role in the Indo-Pacific region.

It is in this context that India’s national security can in no way be isolated from Washington’s military/defense and intelligence approaches and activities in the Asia-Pacific region and its foreign policy discharges that this writer and his co-author discovered through their extensive research and investigations.

Some of the salient policy determinations and projections in the now-declassified 2018 National Security Strategy – the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act document of the US government are as follows:

· A strong India, in cooperation with like-minded countries, would act as a counterbalance to China.

· India remains preeminent in South Asia and takes the leading role in maintaining Indian Ocean security, increased engagement with Southeast Asia, and expands its economic, defense, and diplomatic cooperation with other US allies and partners in the region.

· US Objective: Accelerate India’s rise and capacity to serve as a net provider of security and Major Defense Partner; solidify an enduring strategic partnership with India underpinned by a strong Indian military able to effectively collaborate with the United States and her partners in the region to address shared interests.

· US Actions: Build a stronger foundation for defense cooperation and interoperability; expand US defense trade ability to transfer defense technology to enhance India’s status as a Major Defense Partner.

· US Objective: Strengthen the capacity of emerging partners in South Asia, including the Maldives, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, to contribute to a free and open order. US Action: Establish a new initiative with South Asian partners modeled on the Maritime Security Initiative.

· National Security Challenges: How to maintain US strategic primacy in the Indo-Pacific region while preventing China from establishing new illiberal spheres of influence.

· US Action: Enhance combat-credible US military presence and posture in the Indo-Pacific region to uphold US interests and security commitments.

Now, let’s see how ‘Indian National Security’ that Anura Kumara Dissanayake has referred to, and aspires to safeguard under a JVP-led NPP government he is hoping to form, is tied to the Indo-Pacific Region that Washington is playing a dominant role in.

US-India Relationship: Critical to Indo-Pacific

A shared vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific bolsters the US-India relationship as the two countries continue to strengthen defense ties, a senior Pentagon official said on Sept. 19, 2023.

Siddharth Iyer, the Director for South Asia policy in the Office of (US) Secretary of Defense, said the defense partnership had experienced an “incredible and unprecedented amount of momentum” as evidenced by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin twice traveling to India recently and the “warmth and familiarity” between the two countries.

“This relationship is one of the top priorities for the department,” Iyer said. “Our belief is that getting the US and India relationship right is not just necessary, it’s essential to achieving our strategy in the Indo-Pacific.”

What he meant by “our strategy” is the United States’ strategy.

“I think one of the ways in which we think about the roadmap is really a manifestation of Secretary Austin’s commitment to accelerating India’s military modernization, and for him, putting the department on the hook to find targeted opportunities to propose to advance India’s indigenous defense production capabilities,” Iyer said during a discussion on furthering US-India security cooperation hosted by the Hudson Institute in Washington.

“department on the hook”, meaning the United States on the hook.

India’s Minister of Defense Rajnath Singh and Minister of External Affairs Dr. S. Jaishankar engaged with (US) Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin for the fifth US-India 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue in New Delhi on November 10, 2023.

They reaffirmed the importance of the US-India Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership in ensuring international peace and security. The Ministers also underlined their strong commitment to safeguarding a free, open, and an inclusive Indo-Pacific.

The Joint Statement released November 10, 2023 on the Fifth Annual India-US 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue reaffirmed the US-India”commitment to further deepen the multifaceted defense partnership through wide-ranging dialogues and military exercises of increasing complexity and sophistication, accelerated joint projects initiated under the June 2023 Roadmap for US-India Defense Industrial Cooperation and expanded collaboration in emerging domains, such as space and artificial intelligence. They expressed satisfaction with the pace of cooperation in Maritime Domain Awareness and looked forward to identifying pathways to promote stronger service-to-service ties and share technologies to address an array of maritime challenges, including in the undersea domain.”

These discourses, dialogues and rapport have prompted steps to “deepen and diversify” the two countries’ so-called Major Defense Partnership.

The two (US and India) militaries signed their second Master Ship Repair Agreement, with the US Navy and Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Ltd., in August 2023, recommitting themselves to advancing India’s emergence as a hub for the maintenance and repair of forward-deployed US Navy assets and other aircraft and vessels, according to the White House. The countries also made further commitments to the US companies investing more in India’s maintenance, repair and overhaul capabilities and facilities for aircraft.

In late September 2023, Ely Ratner, the US Department of Defense’s Assistant Secretary for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs, Donald Lu, State Department’s assistant secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs, Vani Rao, a secretary in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs and Vishwesh Negi, the Joint Secretary of Indian Ministry of Defense engaged in “a wide range of ambitious initiatives” dialogue between the two nations.

According to a US Defense Department statement “The officials also discussed regional security developments and strategic priorities across the Indo-Pacific region. A strong US-India partnership is essential to upholding security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region.”

India having entered into a military partnership with the United States, and Sri Lanka’s close proximity to India in political and economic spheres, Sri Lanka is at a crossroads surrounded by Washington, New Delhi and Beijing.

As an emerging leader, Anura Kumara Dissanayake could have made a ‘measured statement’ on the official policy of the government he is planning to form towards ‘India’s security’ as data given above show the manner in which Washington has tied up with New Delhi, and the strategy the United States has adopted to forge a strong defense ties with India; contrary to what Dissanayake believes, India is not developing an ‘isolated national security policy’. New Delhi has been formulating her national security policy in collaboration with Washington, and that security policy – to which JVP-NPP has undertaken to protect and safeguard – provides for a dominant role for Washington in the Indo-Pacific (or Asia-Pacific) region. Sri Lanka is unable to escape Washington’s machinations in the Indo-Pacific region as noted at the outset.

Isn’t Dissanayake aware of the US-India defense collaboration? If so, is he concealing that fact, or if not so, isn’t he capable of strategic thinking?

As a footnote, it is necessary to refer to Dissanayake’s pronouncement about foreign nations and their diplomatic agents’ special interest in communicating with him and his political entity, according to him in an interview with SIRASA TV on February 15 (Quote) Anyone who can think logically can understand that states engage with political actors that have power. India, China, the US, and many others are now engaging with us because they think we will win elections (Unquote).

The writer finds it very unusual for the (US) Chief of Mission to entertain the notion that she should maintain close rapport and contact with a non-ruling political party leader. The US diplomats were expected to maintain contacts with (about) two national political parties that alternately exchanged power; they established contacts with ‘non-national’ political parties and their leaders to fulfill ‘diplomatic niceties’ and obtain alternative interpretations to that of what main political leaders and their national parties express.

In the case of JVP-NPP, undoubtedly, they are emerging as a national entity, and foreign diplomats, including the American ambassador Julie Chung, have taken note of the emerging political reality to maintain relations with it. Whether Ambassador Chung believes, in a confused political atmosphere, the JVP-NPP could form the next administration is another matter.

Two questions emerge from Dissanayake’s belief that foreign nations and their diplomats ‘suddenly’ reach out to his political alliance because they strongly believe that its rise to power is imminent: (1) Is it because the reconciliation between the JVP-NPP and India and Dissanayake’s undertaking not to obstruct that nation’s national security interests suits Washington and if JVP-NPP ever captures power or reaches the level of an influential and formidable opposition power Washington (and/or Julie Chung) will have tamed the once anti-American/anti-Indian JVP? (2) Shouldn’t JVP- NPP leader Anura Kumara Dissanayake declare his policy towards the US; the defense collaboration between Washington and New Delhi; and that Ambassador Chung is aware that JVP-NPP has conveniently ignored India’s defence collaboration with the US? Is this a diplomatic achievement of Washington?

As much as JVP-NPP owes the Sri Lankan public an explanation, elucidating its undertaking to safeguard the national security interests, Sri Lankan policymakers and lawmakers need to have a comprehensive understanding of where Sri Lanka stands in this complex foreign policy issue.

(The writer is a retired Foreign Service National Political Specialist of the U.S. Department of State accredited to the Political Section of the U.S. diplomatic mission in Sri Lanka)



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Features

The hollow recovery: A stagnant industry – Part I

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The headlines are seductive: 2.36 million tourists in 2025, a new “record.” Ministers queue for photo opportunities. SLTDA releases triumphant press statements. The narrative is simple: tourism is “back.”

But scratch beneath the surface and what emerges is not a success story but a cautionary tale of an industry that has mistaken survival for transformation, volume for value, and resilience for strategy.

Problem Diagnosis: The Mirage of Recovery

Yes, Sri Lanka welcomed 2.36 million tourists in 2025, marginally above the 2.33 million recorded in 2018. This marks a full recovery from the consecutive disasters of the Easter attacks (2019), COVID-19 (2020-21), and the economic collapse (2022). The year-on-year growth looks impressive: 15.1% above 2024’s 2.05 million arrivals.

But context matters. Between 2018 and 2023, arrivals collapsed by 36.3%, bottoming out at 1.49 million. The subsequent “rebound” is simply a return to where we were seven years ago, before COVID, before the economic crisis, even before the Easter attacks. We have spent six years clawing back to 2018 levels while competitors have leaped ahead.

Consider the monthly data. In 2023, January arrivals were just 102,545, down 57% from January 2018’s 238,924. By January 2025, arrivals reached 252,761, a dramatic 103% jump over 2023, but only 5.8% above the 2018 baseline. This is not growth; it is recovery from an artificially depressed base. Every month in 2025 shows the same pattern: strong percentage gains over the crisis years, but marginal or negative movement compared to 2018.

The problem is not just the numbers, but the narrative wrapped around them. SLTDA’s “Year in Review 2025” celebrates the 15.6% first-half increase without once acknowledging that this merely restores pre-crisis levels. The “Growth Scenarios 2025” report projects arrivals between 2.4 and 3.0 million but offers no analysis of what kind of tourism is being targeted, what yield is expected, or how market composition will shift. This is volume-chasing for its own sake, dressed up as strategic planning.

Comparative Analysis: Three Decades of Standing Still

The stagnation becomes stark when placed against Sri Lanka’s closest island competitors. In the mid-1990s, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, started from roughly the same base, around 300,000 annual arrivals each. Three decades later:

Sri Lanka: From 302,000 arrivals (1996) to 2.36 million (2025), with $3.2 billion

Maldives: From 315,000 arrivals (1995) to 2.25 million (2025), with $5.6 billion

The raw numbers obscure the qualitative difference. The Maldives deliberately crafted a luxury, high-yield model: one-island-one-resort zoning, strict environmental controls, integrated resorts layered with sustainability credentials. Today, Maldivian tourism generates approximately $5.6 billion from 2 million tourists, an average of $2,800 per visitor. The sector represents 21% of GDP and generates nearly half of government revenue.

Sri Lanka, by contrast, has oscillated between slogans, “Wonder of Asia,” “So Sri Lanka”, without embedding them in coherent policy. We have no settled model, no consensus on what kind of tourism we want, and no institutional memory because personnel and priorities change with every government. So, we match or slightly exceed competitors in arrivals, but dramatically underperform in revenue, yield, and structural resilience.

Root Causes: Governance Deficit and Policy Failure

The stagnation is not accidental; it is manufactured by systemic governance failures that successive governments have refused to confront.

1. Policy Inconsistency as Institutional Culture

Sri Lanka has rewritten its Tourism Act and produced multiple master plans since 2005. The problem is not the absence of strategy documents but their systematic non-implementation. The National Tourism Policy approved in February 2024 acknowledges that “policies and directions have not addressed several critical issues in the sector” and that there was “no commonly agreed and accepted tourism policy direction among diverse stakeholders.”

This is remarkable candor, and a damning indictment. After 58 years of organised tourism development, we still lack policy consensus. Why? Because tourism policy is treated as political property, not national infrastructure. Changes in government trigger wholesale personnel changes at SLTDA, Tourism Ministry, and SLTPB. Institutional knowledge evaporates. Priorities shift with ministerial whims. Therefore, operators cannot plan, investors cannot commit, and the industry lurches from crisis response to crisis response without building structural resilience.

2. Fragmented Institutional Architecture

Tourism responsibilities are scattered across the Ministry of Tourism, Sri Lanka Tourism Development Authority (SLTDA), Sri Lanka Tourism Promotion Bureau (SLTPB), provincial authorities, and an ever-expanding roster of ad hoc committees. The ADB’s 2024 Tourism Sector Diagnostics bluntly notes that “governance and public infrastructure development of tourism in Sri Lanka is fragmented and hampered.”

No single institution owns yield. No one is accountable for net foreign exchange contribution after leakages. Quality standards are unenforced. The tourism development fund, 1% of the tourism levy plus embarkation taxes, is theoretically allocated 70% to SLTPB for global promotion, but “lengthy procurement and approval processes” render it ineffective.

Critically, the current government has reportedly scrapped sophisticated data analytics programmes that were finally giving SLTDA visibility into spending patterns, high-yield segments, and tourist movement. According to industry reports in late 2025, partnerships with entities like Mastercard and telecom data analytics have been halted, forcing the sector to fly blind precisely when data-driven decision-making is essential.

3. Infrastructure Deficit and Resource Misallocation

The Bandaranaike International Airport Development Project, essential for handling projected tourist volumes, has been repeatedly delayed. Originally scheduled for completion years ago, it is now re-tendered for 2027 delivery after debt restructuring. Meanwhile, tourists in late 2025 faced severe congestion at BIA, with reports of near-miss flights due to immigration and check-in bottlenecks.

At cultural sites, basic facilities are inadequate. Sigiriya, which generates approximately 25% of cultural tourist traffic and charges $36 per visitor, lacks adequate lighting, safety measures, and emergency infrastructure. Tourism associations report instances of tourists being attacked by wild elephants with no effective safety protocols.

SLTDA Chairman statements acknowledge “many restrictions placed on incurring capital expenditure” and “embargoes placed not only on tourism but all Government institutions.” The frank admission: we lack funds to maintain the assets that generate revenue. This is governance failure in its purest form, allowing revenue-generating infrastructure to decay while chasing arrival targets.

The Stop-Go Trap: Volatility as Business Model

What truly differentiates Sri Lanka from competitors is not arrival levels but the pattern: extreme stop-go volatility driven by crisis and short-term stimulus rather than steady, strategic growth.

After each shock, the industry is told to “bounce back” without being given the tools to build resilience. The rebound mechanism is consistent: currency depreciation makes Sri Lanka “affordable,” operators discount aggressively to fill rooms, and visa concessions attract price-sensitive segments. Arrivals recover, until the next shock.

This is not how a strategic export industry operates. It is how a shock-absorber behaves, used to plug forex and fiscal holes after each policy failure, then left exposed again.

The monthly 2023-2025 data illustrate the cycle perfectly. Between January 2018 and January 2023, arrivals fell 57%. The “recovery” to January 2025 shows a 103% jump over 2023, but this is bounce-back from an artificially depressed base, not structural transformation. By September 2025, growth rates normalize into the teens and twenties, catch-up to a benchmark set six years earlier.

Why the Boom Feels Like Stagnation

Industry operators report a disconnect between headline numbers and ground reality. Occupancy rates have improved to the high-60% range, but margins remain below 2018 levels. Why?

Because input costs, energy, food, debt servicing, have risen faster than room rates. The rupee’s collapse makes Sri Lanka look “affordable” to foreigners, but it quietly transfers value from domestic suppliers and workers to foreign visitors and lenders. Hotels fill rooms at prices that barely cover costs once translated into hard currency and adjusted for inflation.

Growth is fragile and concentrated. Europe and Asia-Pacific account for over 92% of arrivals. India alone provides 20.7% of visitors in H1 2025, and as later articles in this series will show, this is a low-yield, short-stay segment. We have built recovery on market concentration and price competition, not on product differentiation or yield optimization.

There is no credible long-term roadmap. SLTDA’s projections focus almost entirely on volumes. There is no public discussion of receipts-per-visitor targets, market composition strategies, or institutional reforms required to shift from volume to value.

The Way Forward: From Arrivals Theater to Strategic Transformation

The path out of stagnation requires uncomfortable honesty and political courage that has been systematically absent.

First, abandon arrivals as the primary success metric. Tourism contribution to economic recovery should be measured by net foreign exchange contribution after leakages, employment quality (wages, stability), and yield per visitor, not by how many planes land.

Second, establish institutional continuity. Depoliticize relevant leaderships. Implement fixed terms for key personnel insulated from political cycles. Tourism is a 30-year investment horizon; it cannot be managed on five-year electoral cycles.

Third, restore data infrastructure. Reinstate the analytics programs that track spending patterns and identify high-yield segments. Without data, we are flying blind, and no amount of ministerial optimism changes that.

Fourth, allocate resources to infrastructure. The tourism development fund exists, use it. Online promotions, BIA expansion, cultural site upgrades, last-mile connectivity cannot wait for “better fiscal conditions.” These assets generate the revenue that funds their own maintenance.

Resilience without strategy is stagnation with momentum. And stagnation, however energetically celebrated, remains stagnation.

If policymakers continue to mistake arrivals for achievement, Sri Lanka will remain trapped in a cycle: crash, discount, recover, repeat. Meanwhile, competitors will consolidate high-yield models, and we will wonder why our tourism “boom” generates less cash, less jobs, and less development than it should.

(The writer, a senior Chartered Accountant and professional banker, is Professor at SLIIT, Malabe. The views and opinions expressed in this article are personal.)

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The call for review of reforms in education: discussion continues …

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PM Harini Amarasuriya

The hype around educational reforms has abated slightly, but the scandal of the reforms persists. And in saying scandal, I don’t mean the error of judgement surrounding a misprinted link of an online dating site in a Grade 6 English language text book. While that fiasco took on a nasty, undeserved attack on the Minister of Education and Prime Minister Harini Amarasuriya, fundamental concerns with the reforms have surfaced since then and need urgent discussion and a mechanism for further analysis and action. Members of Kuppi have been writing on the reforms the past few months, drawing attention to the deeply troubling aspects of the reforms. Just last week, a statement, initiated by Kuppi, and signed by 94 state university teachers, was released to the public, drawing attention to the fundamental problems underlining the reforms https://island.lk/general-educational-reforms-to-what-purpose-a-statement-by-state-university-teachers/. While the furore over the misspelled and misplaced reference and online link raged in the public domain, there were also many who welcomed the reforms, seeing in the package, a way out of the bottle neck that exists today in our educational system, as regards how achievement is measured and the way the highly competitive system has not helped to serve a population divided by social class, gendered functions and diversities in talent and inclinations. However, the reforms need to be scrutinised as to whether they truly address these concerns or move education in a progressive direction aimed at access and equity, as claimed by the state machinery and the Minister… And the answer is a resounding No.

The statement by 94 university teachers deplores the high handed manner in which the reforms were hastily formulated, and without public consultation. It underlines the problems with the substance of the reforms, particularly in the areas of the structure of education, and the content of the text books. The problem lies at the very outset of the reforms, with the conceptual framework. While the stated conceptualisation sounds fancifully democratic, inclusive, grounded and, simultaneously, sensitive, the detail of the reforms-structure itself shows up a scandalous disconnect between the concept and the structural features of the reforms. This disconnect is most glaring in the way the secondary school programme, in the main, the junior and senior secondary school Phase I, is structured; secondly, the disconnect is also apparent in the pedagogic areas, particularly in the content of the text books. The key players of the “Reforms” have weaponised certain seemingly progressive catch phrases like learner- or student-centred education, digital learning systems, and ideas like moving away from exams and text-heavy education, in popularising it in a bid to win the consent of the public. Launching the reforms at a school recently, Dr. Amarasuriya says, and I cite the state-owned broadside Daily News here, “The reforms focus on a student-centered, practical learning approach to replace the current heavily exam-oriented system, beginning with Grade One in 2026 (https://www.facebook.com/reel/1866339250940490). In an address to the public on September 29, 2025, Dr. Amarasuriya sings the praises of digital transformation and the use of AI-platforms in facilitating education (https://www.facebook.com/share/v/14UvTrkbkwW/), and more recently in a slightly modified tone (https://www.dailymirror.lk/breaking-news/PM-pledges-safe-tech-driven-digital-education-for-Sri-Lankan-children/108-331699).

The idea of learner- or student-centric education has been there for long. It comes from the thinking of Paulo Freire, Ivan Illyich and many other educational reformers, globally. Freire, in particular, talks of learner-centred education (he does not use the term), as transformative, transformative of the learner’s and teacher’s thinking: an active and situated learning process that transforms the relations inhering in the situation itself. Lev Vygotsky, the well-known linguist and educator, is a fore runner in promoting collaborative work. But in his thought, collaborative work, which he termed the Zone of Proximal Development (ZPD) is processual and not goal-oriented, the way teamwork is understood in our pedagogical frameworks; marks, assignments and projects. In his pedagogy, a well-trained teacher, who has substantial knowledge of the subject, is a must. Good text books are important. But I have seen Vygotsky’s idea of ZPD being appropriated to mean teamwork where students sit around and carry out a task already determined for them in quantifying terms. For Vygotsky, the classroom is a transformative, collaborative place.

But in our neo liberal times, learner-centredness has become quick fix to address the ills of a (still existing) hierarchical classroom. What it has actually achieved is reduce teachers to the status of being mere cogs in a machine designed elsewhere: imitative, non-thinking followers of some empty words and guide lines. Over the years, this learner-centred approach has served to destroy teachers’ independence and agency in designing and trying out different pedagogical methods for themselves and their classrooms, make input in the formulation of the curriculum, and create a space for critical thinking in the classroom.

Thus, when Dr. Amarasuriya says that our system should not be over reliant on text books, I have to disagree with her (https://www.newsfirst.lk/2026/01/29/education-reform-to-end-textbook-tyranny ). The issue is not with over reliance, but with the inability to produce well formulated text books. And we are now privy to what this easy dismissal of text books has led us into – the rabbit hole of badly formulated, misinformed content. I quote from the statement of the 94 university teachers to illustrate my point.

“The textbooks for the Grade 6 modules . . . . contain rampant typographical errors and include (some undeclared) AI-generated content, including images that seem distant from the student experience. Some textbooks contain incorrect or misleading information. The Global Studies textbook associates specific facial features, hair colour, and skin colour, with particular countries and regions, and refers to Indigenous peoples in offensive terms long rejected by these communities (e.g. “Pygmies”, “Eskimos”). Nigerians are portrayed as poor/agricultural and with no electricity. The Entrepreneurship and Financial Literacy textbook introduces students to “world famous entrepreneurs”, mostly men, and equates success with business acumen. Such content contradicts the policy’s stated commitment to “values of equity, inclusivity and social justice” (p. 9). Is this the kind of content we want in our textbooks?”

Where structure is concerned, it is astounding to note that the number of subjects has increased from the previous number, while the duration of a single period has considerably reduced. This is markedly noticeable in the fact that only 30 hours are allocated for mathematics and first language at the junior secondary level, per term. The reduced emphasis on social sciences and humanities is another matter of grave concern. We have seen how TV channels and YouTube videos are churning out questionable and unsubstantiated material on the humanities. In my experience, when humanities and social sciences are not properly taught, and not taught by trained teachers, students, who will have no other recourse for related knowledge, will rely on material from controversial and substandard outlets. These will be their only source. So, instruction in history will be increasingly turned over to questionable YouTube channels and other internet sites. Popular media have an enormous influence on the public and shapes thinking, but a well formulated policy in humanities and social science teaching could counter that with researched material and critical thought. Another deplorable feature of the reforms lies in provisions encouraging students to move toward a career path too early in their student life.

The National Institute of Education has received quite a lot of flak in the fall out of the uproar over the controversial Grade 6 module. This is highlighted in a statement, different from the one already mentioned, released by influential members of the academic and activist public, which delivered a sharp critique of the NIE, even while welcoming the reforms (https://ceylontoday.lk/2026/01/16/academics-urge-govt-safeguard-integrity-of-education-reforms). The government itself suspended key players of the NIE in the reform process, following the mishap. The critique of NIE has been more or less uniform in our own discussions with interested members of the university community. It is interesting to note that both statements mentioned here have called for a review of the NIE and the setting up of a mechanism that will guide it in its activities at least in the interim period. The NIE is an educational arm of the state, and it is, ultimately, the responsibility of the government to oversee its function. It has to be equipped with qualified staff, provided with the capacity to initiate consultative mechanisms and involve panels of educators from various different fields and disciplines in policy and curriculum making.

In conclusion, I call upon the government to have courage and patience and to rethink some of the fundamental features of the reform. I reiterate the call for postponing the implementation of the reforms and, in the words of the statement of the 94 university teachers, “holistically review the new curriculum, including at primary level.”

(Sivamohan Sumathy was formerly attached to the University of Peradeniya)

Kuppi is a politics and pedagogy happening on the margins of the lecture hall that parodies, subverts, and simultaneously reaffirms social hierarchies.

By Sivamohan Sumathy

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Constitutional Council and the President’s Mandate

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A file photo of a Constitutional Council meeting

The Constitutional Council stands out as one of Sri Lanka’s most important governance mechanisms particularly at a time when even long‑established democracies are struggling with the dangers of executive overreach. Sri Lanka’s attempt to balance democratic mandate with independent oversight places it within a small but important group of constitutional arrangements that seek to protect the integrity of key state institutions without paralysing elected governments.  Democratic power must be exercised, but it must also be restrained by institutions that command broad confidence. In each case, performance has been uneven, but the underlying principle is shared.

 Comparable mechanisms exist in a number of democracies. In the United Kingdom, independent appointments commissions for the judiciary and civil service operate alongside ministerial authority, constraining but not eliminating political discretion. In Canada, parliamentary committees scrutinise appointments to oversight institutions such as the Auditor General, whose independence is regarded as essential to democratic accountability. In India, the collegium system for judicial appointments, in which senior judges of the Supreme Court play the decisive role in recommending appointments, emerged from a similar concern to insulate the judiciary from excessive political influence.

 The Constitutional Council in Sri Lanka  was developed to ensure that the highest level appointments to the most important institutions of the state would be the best possible under the circumstances. The objective was not to deny the executive its authority, but to ensure that those appointed would be independent, suitably qualified and not politically partisan. The Council is entrusted with oversight of appointments in seven critical areas of governance. These include the judiciary, through appointments to the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal, the independent commissions overseeing elections, public service, police, human rights, bribery and corruption, and the office of the Auditor General.

JVP Advocacy

 The most outstanding feature of the Constitutional Council is its composition. Its ten members are drawn from the ranks of the government, the main opposition party, smaller parties and civil society. This plural composition was designed to reflect the diversity of political opinion in Parliament while also bringing in voices that are not directly tied to electoral competition. It reflects a belief that legitimacy in sensitive appointments comes not only from legal authority but also from inclusion and balance.

 The idea of the Constitutional Council was strongly promoted around the year 2000, during a period of intense debate about the concentration of power in the executive presidency. Civil society organisations, professional bodies and sections of the legal community championed the position that unchecked executive authority had led to abuse of power and declining public trust. The JVP, which is today the core part of the NPP government, was among the political advocates in making the argument and joined the government of President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga on this platform.

 The first version of the Constitutional Council came into being in 2001 with the 17th Amendment to the Constitution during the presidency of Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga. The Constitutional Council functioned with varying degrees of effectiveness. There were moments of cooperation and also moments of tension. On several occasions President Kumaratunga disagreed with the views of the Constitutional Council, leading to deadlock and delays in appointments. These experiences revealed both the strengths and weaknesses of the model.

 Since its inception in 2001, the Constitutional Council has had its ups and downs. Successive constitutional amendments have alternately weakened and strengthened it. The 18th Amendment significantly reduced its authority, restoring much of the appointment power to the executive. The 19th Amendment reversed this trend and re-established the Council with enhanced powers. The 20th Amendment again curtailed its role, while the 21st Amendment restored a measure of balance. At present, the Constitutional Council operates under the framework of the 21st Amendment, which reflects a renewed commitment to shared decision making in key appointments.

 Undermining Confidence

 The particular issue that has now come to the fore concerns the appointment of the Auditor General. This is a constitutionally protected position, reflecting the central role played by the Auditor General’s Department in monitoring public spending and safeguarding public resources. Without a credible and fearless audit institution, parliamentary oversight can become superficial and corruption flourishes unchecked. The role of the Auditor General’s Department is especially important in the present circumstances, when rooting out corruption is a stated priority of the government and a central element of the mandate it received from the electorate at the presidential and parliamentary elections held in 2024.

 So far, the government has taken hitherto unprecedented actions to investigate past corruption involving former government leaders. These actions have caused considerable discomfort among politicians now in the opposition and out of power.  However, a serious lacuna in the government’s anti-corruption arsenal is that the post of Auditor General has been vacant for over six months. No agreement has been reached between the government and the Constitutional Council on the nominations made by the President. On each of the four previous occasions, the nominees of the President have failed to obtain its concurrence.

 The President has once again nominated a senior officer of the Auditor General’s Department whose appointment was earlier declined by the Constitutional Council. The key difference on this occasion is that the composition of the Constitutional Council has changed. The three representatives from civil society are new appointees and may take a different view from their predecessors. The person appointed needs to be someone who is not compromised by long years of association with entrenched interests in the public service and politics. The task ahead for the new Auditor General is formidable. What is required is professional competence combined with moral courage and institutional independence.

 New Opportunity

 By submitting the same nominee to the Constitutional Council, the President is signaling a clear preference and calling it to reconsider its earlier decision in the light of changed circumstances. If the President’s nominee possesses the required professional qualifications, relevant experience, and no substantiated allegations against her, the presumption should lean toward approving the appointment. The Constitutional Council is intended to moderate the President’s authority and not nullify it.

 A consensual, collegial decision would be the best outcome. Confrontational postures may yield temporary political advantage, but they harm public institutions and erode trust. The President and the government carry the democratic mandate of the people; this mandate brings both authority and responsibility. The Constitutional Council plays a vital oversight role, but it does not possess an independent democratic mandate of its own and its legitimacy lies in balanced, principled decision making.

 Sri Lanka’s experience, like that of many democracies, shows that institutions function best when guided by restraint, mutual respect, and a shared commitment to the public good. The erosion of these values elsewhere in the world demonstrates their importance. At this critical moment, reaching a consensus that respects both the President’s mandate and the Constitutional Council’s oversight role would send a powerful message that constitutional governance in Sri Lanka can work as intended.

by Jehan Perera

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