Opinion

Naval hostilities close to a neutral coastal state: Legal assessment of a submarine attack on an Iranian warship near Sri Lanka

Published

7 months ago

2026/03/9

SLN rescue operation to save the IRIS Dena survivors of the US submarine attack. (Handout picture from the government of Sri Lanka)

A submarine attack on an Iranian destroyer proximate to Sri Lanka represents more than a discrete naval engagement; it signals a potential horizontal escalation of conflict into the wider Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Historically, confrontations between Iran and Western powers have been largely confined to the Persian Gulf and adjacent regional waters. A strike near Sri Lanka, however, shifts the operational theatre from a semi-enclosed regional sea into the open Indian Ocean. This globally vital maritime space encompasses critical trade routes, energy supply corridors, and strategically sensitive naval zones.

This geographic expansion carries multiple strategic implications. First, it demonstrates the long-range maritime strike capabilities and blue-water operational reach of the belligerent forces. Second, it functions as a form of deterrence signalling, conveying a willingness to project force beyond traditional conflict zones. Third, it widens the theatre of operations, increasing the probability of third-party entanglement and amplifying regional instability.

Beyond its immediate military and strategic dimensions, the incident raises complex legal questions under both jus ad bellum—the body of law governing the use of force between states—and jus in bello, encompassing international humanitarian law applicable to armed conflict at sea. The central questions addressed in this paper are:

a. Lawfulness of Force:

Whether the use of force against the Iranian warship was lawful under the United Nations Charter, including considerations of self-defence and Security Council authorisation.

b. Compliance with International Humanitarian Law:

Whether the attack adhered to the principles and norms of international humanitarian law governing naval warfare, including the lawfulness of the target, proportionality, distinction, and obligations toward shipwrecked personnel.

c. Neutrality and Coastal State Rights:

Whether Sri Lanka’s rights and obligations as a neutral coastal state were violated, particularly within its territorial sea and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

d. Operational and Geostrategic Implications:

The broader implications of conducting military operations within or near neutral maritime zones, and the interplay between legal permissibility, maritime security, environmental obligations, and regional stability.

These questions form the analytical framework that will guide the discussion throughout this paper, providing a structured lens for examining the legal, humanitarian, and strategic dimensions of the incident.

Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello:

Legality of the Use of Force

The legality of a submarine attack against a commissioned warship during an armed conflict must be assessed within a structured framework of international law comprising the jus ad bellum regime under the United Nations Charter, the corpus of international humanitarian law (IHL), and customary principles of naval warfare as reflected in the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea.

At the threshold level, the UN Charter governs the lawfulness of the use of force between states. Article 2(4) establishes a general prohibition on the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, subject only to narrow exceptions. These exceptions include the inherent right of self-defence under Article 51 and actions authorised by the United Nations Security Council under Chapter VII.

Accordingly, if an Iranian warship were torpedoed by a submarine, the attacking state would be required to demonstrate that the action was undertaken either pursuant to a valid claim of self-defence, necessitated by an armed attack or imminent threat, or as part of an already existing international armed conflict. Absent such justification, the attack could constitute an unlawful use of force in violation of the Charter’s collective security framework.

Where an international armed conflict is already in existence, the analysis shifts from jus ad bellum to Jus in bello, namely the rules governing the conduct of hostilities.

Jus in bello

: Naval Warfare and Attack Against an Iranian Naval Ship

Where an international armed conflict exists between the United States and Iran, the analysis shifts to jus in Bello. Commissioned warships form part of a state’s armed forces and constitute lawful military objectives. Under customary naval warfare law, as reflected in the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, enemy warships may be attacked, including by submarine-launched torpedoes, without prior warning. An Iranian destroyer operating as part of Iran’s navy would therefore constitute a legitimate military objective in principle.

However, the legality of a torpedo attack by a United States submarine remains subject to the foundational principles of international humanitarian law, including distinction, proportionality, military necessity, and precautions in attack. The principle of distinction requires that the target be military in nature; proportionality prohibits attacks expected to cause incidental harm excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage; and military necessity demands that the force employed be directed toward achieving a legitimate military objective.

These obligations are particularly significant in maritime theatres characterised by dense commercial traffic, such as the sea lanes south of Sri Lanka. Incidental harm to neutral merchant vessels, offshore installations, or third-state interests must therefore be carefully assessed in relation to the anticipated concrete and direct military advantage.Submarine warfare, though technologically sophisticated and strategically consequential, remains subject to these enduring normative constraints, which seek to balance operational effectiveness with humanitarian considerations in the maritime domain.

Customary humanitarian law further requires that feasible measures be taken to search for and rescue the shipwrecked, wounded, and dead following an engagement. In this respect, any action by the Sri Lanka Navy to rescue surviving sailors and recover bodies from the destroyed vessel represents a prudent and legally consonant exercise of humanitarian responsibility. Such conduct reflects long-standing maritime tradition and aligns with the duties recognised under the law of armed conflict and the broader law of the sea, without compromising Sri Lanka’s neutral status.

Sri Lanka’s Legal Position Concerning the Torpedoed Iranian Vessel

Sri Lanka’s legal position is largely determined by the maritime location in which the submarine attack occurred. Should the hostilities have taken place within Sri Lanka’s territorial sea, defined as extending up to 12 nautical miles from the baseline, such conduct would constitute a breach of Sri Lanka’s sovereignty and a violation of the law of neutrality, which forbids belligerent states from engaging in hostilities within neutral waters and imposes a duty on the coastal state to prevent such actions within its jurisdiction. In that circumstance, Sri Lanka would be entitled to issue a diplomatic protest and potentially pursue reparative claims.

By contrast, as the engagement took place within Sri Lanka’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), the analysis is more nuanced under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The EEZ confers sovereign rights for resource exploitation rather than full sovereignty, and prevailing state practice accepts that military operations, including naval manoeuvres, are not per se unlawful in another state’s EEZ. While such an engagement would not automatically breach international law, it would nonetheless generate significant security concerns, including risks to navigational safety, potential environmental damage, and heightened regional instability. Should the sinking result in oil discharge, hazardous material release, or debris affecting shipping lanes, obligations under UNCLOS to protect and preserve the marine environment would be engaged.

Although the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development does not explicitly regulate armed conflict, its principles highlight an increasing expectation for states to protect the environment during hostilities. Similarly, UNCLOS mandates that states protect and preserve the marine environment. Consequently, should the sinking of the Iranian destroyer cause an oil spill, the release of hazardous materials, or navigational hazards, specific environmental liabilities would be triggered. Strategically, a submarine strike near Sri Lanka signals more than a discrete tactical engagement. It reflects the projection of great-power naval capabilities into a strategically sensitive maritime space through which a substantial proportion of global trade transits.

Sri Lanka occupies a pivotal geostrategic position astride the principal East–West Sea Lines of Communication linking Gulf energy supplies, East Asian manufacturing centres, and European markets via the Suez Canal. A substantial proportion of global container traffic transits south of the island, rendering these waters acutely sensitive to instability. Even a limited naval engagement can elevate war-risk insurance premiums, disrupt commercial routing, and indirectly affect port operations in Colombo and Hambantota.

From a jus ad bellum perspective, geographic expansion does not in itself render hostilities unlawful; yet it complicates assessments of necessity and proportionality and increases the risk of escalation affecting neutral states.

The torpedoing of an Iranian naval vessel in maritime zones proximate to Sri Lanka necessitates a carefully layered legal assessment situated at the confluence of jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and the law of the sea. As this paper has demonstrated, the legality of the incident ultimately turns on four interrelated determinations:

(a) whether a lawful basis for the use of force existed under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, grounded in self-defence;

(b) whether the attack complied with the principles of distinction, proportionality, and military necessity under international humanitarian law;

(c) whether the engagement occurred within Sri Lanka’s territorial sea, thereby infringing its sovereignty and violating the law of neutrality; and

(d) whether the obligations owed to survivors, shipwrecked personnel, and the marine environment were respected in accordance with the law of armed conflict at sea and relevant maritime conventions.

If the attack did not occur within Sri Lanka’s territorial sea, it would not amount to a violation of sovereignty or a breach of the law of neutrality capable of engaging state responsibility on that ground.

By contrast, where the engagement occurred beyond the territorial sea whether within the Exclusive Economic Zone or on the high seas prevailing interpretations of the law of naval warfare, reinforced by consistent state practice, suggest that the operation may be regarded as legally defensible, provided that the cumulative requirements of necessity, proportionality, distinction, and humanitarian obligation were satisfied.

Nevertheless, legal permissibility does not equate to strategic prudence. The deployment of a United States submarine to conduct kinetic operations in proximity to a neutral coastal state within the Indian Ocean underscores the increasingly complex convergence of naval power projection, humanitarian norms, environmental obligations, and coastal state rights within the contemporary maritime domain.

Even where consistent with international law, the extension of submarine warfare into the wider Indian Ocean carries destabilising implications for regional security, commercial shipping, and the safety of neutral coastal states situated along critical sea lines of communication. The geographic expansion of hostilities into this maritime space heightens the risks of miscalculation, escalation, and unintended third-party involvement.

For Sri Lanka, the incident underscores the delicate equilibrium between maintaining neutrality, safeguarding maritime security, and upholding the international legal order. The actions undertaken by the Sri Lanka Navy in conducting rescue and recovery operations for surviving sailors and deceased personnel reflect the discharge of well-established humanitarian duties under international law and exemplify responsible conduct at sea.

Ultimately, this episode illustrates the increasingly complex convergence of naval power projection, international humanitarian norms, and coastal state rights within the contemporary maritime domain. In an era marked by intensifying great-power competition and expanding operational reach in the Indian Ocean, the preservation of legal clarity, strategic restraint, and respect for neutral maritime spaces remains essential to sustaining regional stability and safeguarding the integrity of the international maritime order.

by REAR ADMIRAL (RTD.) JAGATH RANASINGHE
VSV, USP, psc, MSc (DS) Mgt, MMaritimePol (Aus),
PG Dip in CPS, DIP in CR, FNI (Lond), Former Govt Fellow GCSP

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Opinion

Sri Lanka’s geopolitical positioning for future prosperity

Published

19 hours ago

2026/09/25

Thilina Walpola

Kariyawasam

By Chula Goonasekera
For the LEADS Forum (admin@srilankaleads.com)

Sri Lanka’s future prosperity will depend on how effectively it positions itself within an increasingly complex global environment. At a recent LEADS Forum discussion (https://youtu.be/Bbr3e_qU1Fw), veteran diplomat Prasad Kariyawasam, former Secretary to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, High Commissioner to India, Ambassador to the United States, Ambassador /Permanent Representative to the UN in New York and Geneva —outlined the strategic choices Sri Lanka must make to secure long term stability and economic advancement. Kariyawasam offered a rare blend of historical perspective, diplomatic experience and practical guidance.

His central message was clear: Sri Lanka must exercise strategic agency—engaging all major partners while safeguarding its national interests.

Foreign Policy as an Extension of National Aspirations

Foreign policy, Kariyawasam emphasised, is inseparable from domestic priorities. As your text notes, “foreign relations often reflect the medium- and long-term aspirations of a country’s people and its leadership.” Governments must therefore craft external relations that reflect the public’s economic and social expectations, avoiding short-term political impulses that undermine long-term national interests.

For a small nation, foreign policy cannot be symbolic or personality driven. It must be purposeful, pragmatic and directed towards the security and prosperity of the people.

A History of Global Connectivity

Sri Lanka’s history demonstrates that the island has never been isolated. From ancient ties with India and Southeast Asia to Arab, Persian and Chinese maritime networks, the island prospered when connected to the wider world. We must realise that “geography creates opportunity, but geography alone does not create prosperity.” Institutions, infrastructure and policy determine whether geographic advantage becomes economic success.

Colombo’s emergence as a cosmopolitan trading hub and Galle’s role as a resupply station for Indian Ocean shipping in colonial times , illustrate how deeply Sri Lanka has been embedded in global commerce for centuries.

Lessons from Asia’s High Performers

Kariyawasam highlighted the experiences of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Vietnam. Their paths differ, but their success rests on common foundations:

• investment in human capital and infrastructure

• merit based institutions

• integration into global markets

• attraction of investment and technology

• export oriented industries

• strategic engagements with both China and Western economies

The lesson for Sri Lanka is not imitation but continuous adaptation and constructive integration with the global economy.

India: Sri Lanka’s Closest Major Partner

India’s transformation into a global economic power presents Sri Lanka with both opportunity and responsibility. India is already Sri Lanka’s largest source of tourists and a major investor. Kariyawasam states, “The larger question is how effectively Sri Lanka can participate in and benefit from India’s growth.”

A partnership should encompass modern, more open pathways for trade, investment, logistics, energy, technology, digital services, education and professional mobility—And asymmetry between the two economies must be handled with maturity and foresight, seeking special and differential treatment .

China and Other Global Partners

China remains a significant economic partner. Sri Lanka must avoid viewing this relationship through a zero sum lens. The goal should be productive and transparent engagement, ensuring better terms of trade and meaningful technology transfer.

Equally Important relations must be nurtured with the United States, European Union, United Kingdom, Japan, Australia, ASEAN and the Gulf.

All these relationships can be vibrant partnerships that does not lead towards , dependency but mutually beneficial pragmatic arrangements .

A Fragmenting International System

Global geopolitics is becoming more volatile. Trade tensions, wars, sanctions, supply chain disruptions, climate change and technological competition increasingly shape national security. We must realise, “foreign policy cannot be separated from economic policy.”

Sri Lanka’s recent economic crisis demonstrated the importance of international confidence, access to finance and resilient supply chains. Energy security, food security, cybersecurity and digital infrastructure are now core elements of national strategy.

Strategic Agency: The Guiding Principle

Sri Lanka must avoid becoming an arena for great power competition. Strategic agency means making decisions based on national interest, expanding Sri Lanka’s choices, not restricting them.

India is essential. China is important. The United States, Europe, Japan, Australia, ASEAN and the Gulf are important. The objective is a web of partnerships that strengthens resilience and autonomy.

Sri Lanka’s Strategic Assets

1. Location: Sri Lanka’s geography is a long standing advantage. Ports such as Colombo, Hambantota, Trincomalee and Galle can become specialised hubs—if connected to logistics, manufacturing, services and exports.

2. Digital Connectivity: Submarine cables, data centres, cloud services and cybersecurity are now as important as physical geography. Sri Lanka can turn its location into both a maritime and digital advantage.

3. Tourism and Natural Heritage: The focus should shift from tourist numbers to value creation—wellness, heritage, ecotourism, cruise tourism, education and MICE tourism.

4. Human Resources and Demographics: High literacy is no longer enough. Skills in technology, engineering, AI, logistics and advanced manufacturing are essential, especially with an ageing population.

5. Migrant Workforce: Migrant workers are a strategic asset, not merely a source of remittances. Bilateral labour agreements, skills recognition and diaspora engagement should be central to foreign policy.

Requirements for Sustained Prosperity

Sri Lanka’s future depends on:

• peace and security

• access to international markets

• productive investment

• a skilled, productive workforce

• modernised agriculture

• higher value tourism

• demographic preparedness

• climate resilience

• strong, predictable institutions

Please note that “foreign policy can open doors. Domestic institutions determine whether we can walk through them.”

The Role of the State

Sri Lanka does not need a larger state—only a more capable one. Policy continuity, professional institutions, predictable regulation and reduced corruption are essential. Geography does not change; long-term national interests do not change. Intentional relationships built over decades should not be reinvented with each election cycle.

Building Trust Internationally

Trust is a strategic asset. Sri Lanka must be known as a country that honours commitments and maintains predictable policies. This is vital not only for diplomacy but also for investment and long term partnerships.

Avoiding Zero Sum Geopolitics

Sri Lanka does not need to choose between India and China, or between Asia and the West. The task is to identify what each relationship can contribute to national development while protecting sovereignty and freedom of decision making.

Sri Lanka’s geography is an inheritance, but prosperity is not guaranteed. The world is changing rapidly—great-power competition, technological disruption, and climate vulnerability demand a foreign policy that is pragmatic, adaptive, and anchored in national interest.

Sri Lanka must build partnerships without dependencies, maintain strategic agency without isolation, and integrate with the global economy while strengthening domestic capacity.

“We cannot change where Sri Lanka is. We can, however, determine what Sri Lanka becomes because of where it is”

Opinion

A tariff deal with the US? Make haste slowly

Published

2 days ago

2026/09/24

Sahan Weerasooriya

by Gomi Senadhira

Sri Lanka’s former ambassador to the United States Mahinda Samarasinghe is back in Sri Lanka lobbying for speedier finalisation of a new tariff deal with the United States. According to news reports, delivering the keynote address at the Sri Lanka Institute of Directors’ Annual Meeting last week, he stated, “I have recommended very strongly to the government that we need to conclude the agreement so that we can lock in the very favourable tariff rate that Sri Lanka has got up to now“.

I do not understand why the former ambassador is urging the government to expedite the finalisation of a new tariff deal or what is “the very favourable tariff rate” he refers to in his speech. However, given the ongoing terrible tariff turbulence in the United States and the fragile economic situation in Sri Lanka, I believe, this is not the right time to rush into finalising any trade agreement with the United States. I am also of the opinion that at this juncture Sri Lanka should maintain strategic patience and explore all available options.

Lessons from the countries that rushed for trade deals

To better comprehend this, let’s look at experiences of the countries that rushed to conclude tariff deals with the United States after President Donald Trump declared his “reciprocal tariffs” under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) in April 2025. As Samarasinghe stated in his keynote, “The bottom line on all these negotiations was that every country that finally agreed to sign the agreement had to give either complete duty-free access for American exports into those markets, or near complete duty-free access.” In exchange for these tariff concessions and other market access commitments these countries managed to get the newly introduced country specific “reciprocal tariffs” reduced.

However, in February 2026, the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) struck down these “reciprocal tariffs” under the IEEPA. With that, the market access gains these countries received in exchange for complete duty-free access for American exports into their markets evaporated under U.S. domestic law. By moving too fast to conclude bilateral tariff agreements with the United States these countries are now bound to strict obligations whereas the benefits they bargained from the U.S. administration are not worth the paper those were written on.

Sri Lanka’s experience

In April 2025, President Trump declared his “reciprocal tariffs” and labelled Sri Lanka as the worst offender, imposing one of the highest additional duties at 44%. Since then, Ambassador Samarasinghe and other negotiators have managed to negotiate this down to 20%. I do not know what the deal was through which Sri Lanka managed to reduce the 44% tariff to 20% or what we gave in return for this “concession.” However, what we received in return has absolutely no value after the decision by the SCOTUS.

Current state of US tariffs

After the decision by SCOTUS, the U.S. administration introduced a temporary 10% additional tariff on all countries for 150 days. At the end of that period, this 10% tariff was replaced by a new “forced labor tariff ” of 10% to 12.5% on all trading partners under Section 301 of U.S. trade law. Twenty-five U.S. states and several small businesses have already filed lawsuits against these tariffs in U.S. courts. This new “forced labour tariff ” on Sri Lanka was first fixed at 12.5%. Later, after President Anura Kumara Dissanayake issued a gazette notice prohibiting the importation of goods produced using forced labour, it was reduced to 10%. That means Sri Lanka has already made a substantial commitment to receive this “tariff concession,” and I presume our negotiators understand the implications of this commitment.

Make haste slowly

After President Trump imposed 44% “reciprocal tariffs” on Sri Lanka, through an article published in The Island on 25th April 2026 (), I urged the government to engage immediately with the US administration on these tariffs. However, I also emphasised that the best way to move forward was to make haste slowly.

Two millennia ago, Augustus Caesar, the first emperor of Rome, frequently used the phrase, “make haste slowly”, because he detested rashness and haste in his military commanders. It was the recurring guiding maxim that he emphasised throughout his 40-year imperial rule. After 2000 years, this classical oxymoron remains a definitive golden rule for professional trade negotiators. More importantly it is the exact blueprint required when navigating turbulence in trade negotiations with the Trump administration.

The endgame – The most dangerous moment in trade negotiation

Samarasinghe has also stated the agreement is 90% complete. Any experienced trade negotiator should know that the final 10% contains high-stakes provisions and is the most dangerous moment in a trade negotiation. A single misplaced comma or ambiguous product description in a tariff schedule can cost millions through unintended loopholes. Rushing this last stretch to secure a deal can permanently expose Sri Lanka to sudden shifts in American trade policy, heavy compliance costs, or strict enforcement under Section 301 regarding supply-chain labour standards. Hence, this is the time for strategic patience.

(The writer can be reached at senadhiragomi@gmail.com)

Opinion

Buddhist law and constitutional amendments

Published

2 days ago

2026/09/24

Sahan Weerasooriya

Upon reading the article titled “Prof. Pieris says Buddha Dhamma recognized as source of law under Constitution” (Island, September 12, 2026), the classical Sinhala idiom “Yanne Koheda? Malle Pol” immediately comes to mind. The expression, translating literally to answering “I have coconuts in my bag” when asked “Where are you going?”, underscores a complete disconnect in logic. Because it is uncertain whether the article accurately represents the professor’s precise words, the following critique addresses the contents of the report rather than the speaker himself.

The central premise of the report concerns a statement delivered by the Chief Justice regarding a petition filed against the 22nd Amendment to the Constitution. According to the report, the Chief Justice’s observation that the determination would be made strictly on the basis of established law rather than Buddhist teachings was characterised as a “cavalier dismissal” of the Buddha Dhamma. This assertion carries a host of unexamined assumptions. Had the writer specified precisely which tenets of the Buddha Dhamma were violated, a direct legal or philosophical evaluation could take place. However, no specific Buddhist tenet or law was identified as having been transgressed, and for good reason: no such statutory legal framework exists within the Buddha’s teachings.

To understand the flaw in this argument, one must examine the constitutional context alongside the canonical meaning of the terms involved. Article 9 of the 1978 Constitution of Sri Lanka mandates that the Republic shall give Buddhism the foremost place and that it shall be the duty of the State to protect and foster the Buddha Sasana, while guaranteeing the fundamental rights of all religions under Articles 10 and 14(1)(e).

While “Buddhism” and “Buddha Dhamma” are frequently used as interchangeable terms in casual dialogue, they represent distinct concepts. “Buddhism” is an umbrella term coined by 19th-century Western scholars to classify the global institutionalised religion, incorporating its diverse sects, cultural traditions, rituals, and socio-political histories. Conversely, Sasana is the ancient term designating the structural framework established by the Buddha to preserve and transmit his teachings, comprising the monastic order (Sangha) and its supporting institutions.

In classical Theravada commentarial literature, the Sasana operates as a functional three-tiered structure. It encompasses Pariyatti Sasana, the preservation and study of sacred texts; Paṭipatti Sasana, the practical execution of the doctrine through ethical conduct and meditation; and Paṭivedha Sasana, the direct experiential realization of ultimate truth, or enlightenment. This structural breakdown raises fundamental questions about state capacity. While a state can readily support Pariyatti Sasana through academic institutions, textual preservation, and educational funding, it cannot legislate or enforce Paṭipatti or Paṭivedha. Practical engagement and spiritual realisation are inherently internal, first-person experiences. Expecting the state to codify or guarantee enlightenment is a conceptual impossibility.

Furthermore, the Buddha Dhamma refers specifically to the unconditioned truths of existence and the teachings imparted to realize them, including the Four Noble Truths, the Eightfold Path, and Dependent Origination. As the late Venerable Professor Kotagama Wachissara Thera observed, there is no rigid ideologue or “ism” in the core Dhamma. The teachings do not constitute a system of divine commandments or a legal statute enforced through reward and punishment. Rather, Buddhist ethics function as self-directed guidelines for psychological clarity and moral inquiry. Even the Vinaya Pitaka, which contains explicit rules of conduct, functions as an internal monastic code rather than a civil or criminal law intended for the laity.

Throughout the Pali Canon, guidance regarding governance focuses on the moral character of leadership and the social duties of statecraft rather than rigid legal codification. In discourses such as the Cakkavatti Sihanada Sutta (DN 26), the Buddha observes that social instability and crime cannot be eliminated solely through punitive measures, emphasising instead that states must provide economic opportunities, fair wages, and resource distribution to maintain societal balance. Crucially, in the Maha Parinibbana Sutta (DN 16), the Buddha explicitly highlights the importance of respecting established laws and traditions rather than enacting arbitrary regulations.

The natural laws articulated in the Dhamma, such as the law of cause and effect or the three characteristics of existence, govern all phenomena universally, regardless of legal statutes or personal belief. They are not human laws to be applied or suspended by a court of law. Therefore, characterizing the Chief Justice’s adherence to constitutional jurisprudence over religious doctrine as a “cavalier dismissal” lacks logical and textual foundation. Framing the judiciary’s adherence to legal precedent as an attack on the Dhamma distracts from fundamental constitutional principles and risks misguiding the public for political ends.

Geewananda
Gunawardana,
Ph.D.