Opinion
In pursuit of a multi-ethnic Sri Lankan singularity
By Kusum Wijetilleke
(kusumw@gmail.com)
Twitter: @kusumw
The mainstream media’s obsession with the re-entry to Parliament of Ranil Wickremesinghe (RW) betrays an unsophisticated effort at constructing a narrative of an ineffective Opposition Party. What these contributions are actually alluding to is that RW’s seat signals a weakness in the Opposition. A missing X-factor, if you prefer; something the returning former PM is meant to solve. On the face of it, the proposition seems ridiculous, but is nonetheless still being propagated.
History suggests that RW never seemed to understand the aspirations of the rural masses that his UNP so callously abandoned. Perhaps he never appreciated the electorate’s genuine concern for the future of the country’s unitary structure and what it represents in the collective consciousness of the Sinhala-Buddhist working class and working poor. The gravitational centre of RW’s political capital, amongst the elites of Colombo and minority parties, consistently alienated large swathes of the majority.
Intellectuals of all stripes did their utmost to paint RW’s aspirations for, and interpretations of, the 13th Amendment as guaranteeing the unitary state. Actions speak louder than words and try as he did, RW was never able to convince the masses of his integrity on this critical issue. Every time RW repeated his desire to work within the 13th Amendment, preserving a unitary state whilst further devolving powers; the only thing the electorate heard was a call for a “federal state”, a model that has always been a poisoned chalice. The word ‘Federal’ is simplified for the base by RW’s opponents, pointing correctly to the fact that it weakens the centre. A Centre which must represent the majority and is seen by it as a guard-rail to prevent the national train from terminating at a station in Chennai.
From Neo-Liberalism to Social Democracy
As the decades ticked by, while RW remained rooted to his ideals, the electorate was moving past the politics of devolution. Their minds seemingly solidified around the project of a unified centre as opposed to the devolved structure which Nationalists fear would embolden reactionary, separatist elements within minority parties.
Those paying attention noticed the lack of upward social mobility amongst their classes and the dilapidation of their neighbourhoods and villages. They woke up to the reality that political structures aside, their children’s lives and those of their grand-children’s would be indistinguishable from their own. They saw in RW and the UNP, the same playbook from decades past, the same internationalist considerations and pandering to elitist liberal voting blocks of Colombo’s plush suburbs. They continuously chose the alternative, whether it was the top-down neo-liberalism of Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, the nationalist state-capitalism of Mahinda Rajapaksa or the ethno-majoritarian militarization of Gotabaya Rajapaksa.
The more vital project to build a multi-ethnic consciousness; a Sri Lankan singularity, was lost in RW’s confused maze of constitutional devolution. RW, struck by the realisation that he could not win this debate at home, went abroad to preach to and from British and European choirs.
The former PM has still not understood that the holy grail of a trans-cultural Sri Lankan consciousness is unviable if the majority remains so deeply insecure.
What does all this say about the current position and future direction of the SJB as the main Opposition Party? To the relief of many, the SJB has steered clear of some aspects of the UNP playbook. Sajith Premadasa (SP) is widely seen as to the left of RW, more in the tradition of D.S. Senanayake’s agrarianism and commitment to welfare.
On economic policy, the SJB seems to have the broad strokes of the Keynesian New Deal and Sajith Premadasa even alluded to this, specifically name-checking FDR (Franklin D. Roosevelt) at a campaign event in Bataramulla during the Presidential campaign of 2019. Some of the ‘ideologues’ within the SJB, specifically MP Eran Wickramaratne and Dr. Dayan Jayatilleka, could be associated with the economic policies of social democracy.
The Sri Lankan economy with its laundry list of structural weaknesses and a history of madness and mismanagement, requires its own list of solutions. Yet, more pressing for the SJB will be to stake its position on the national issue and this, one suspects, is where RW’s attempted intervention is targeted at.
Populism of the Progressive Centre
The former PM thrives in a circular firing squad of his own making; part of his modus operandi for decades. Whilst he astutely dodges fire, his colleagues take pot-shots at one another, leading to an inevitable truce carefully negotiated by RW himself. The SJB should refuse this bait. Whatever ideological differences exist within its major factions, they are far removed from the ‘Ranilism’ of the UNP and the confused Right-Wing Authoritarianism of the SLPP.
The challenge for the SJB is to cast aside the ghost of the UNP’s failed project of political devolution and embarrassing capitulations to even the mildest international pressure.
How? Many commentators have opined that the SJB must occupy the ‘progressive centre’ which might sound like an oxymoron at first, but upon further investigation appears apt. Progressive in policy but never stretching itself too far from the true centre of the polity (https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/why-sajiths-sjb-ranils-unp-are-quite-distinct-and-sajiths-is-the-already-existing-progressive-center/).
Herein lies an opportunity to move beyond the politics of decades past and re-position the consensus. The Easter Attacks created a seismic shift in the political landscape. The emergence of Islamism and the possibility that it was homegrown came as a shock to many, not least within Sri Lanka’s diverse Muslim community. There was a collective gasp from Sri Lankans of varying backgrounds as news trickled down in the aftermath of the Easter Attacks of an alleged “Sharia” University in Batticaloa (https://www.sundaytimes.lk/190505/news/mystery-shrouds-batticaloas-shariah-campus-348098.html).
This brought even sharper focus on the ‘Arabization’ and ‘balkanization’ of the Eastern Province which has now been etched into the psyche of the majority, feeding their fears of cultural invasion and oppression by foreign interference. It seems the Easter Attacks were the result of too much religious freedom, or at the very least, lax regulation in the teaching of religious doctrine. Zahran and his cohorts were able to freely preach Wahabi/ Salafist Islamism under the guise of religious expression, to corrupt and manipulate a mass of Sri Lankans with theocratic nonsense. Did increased autonomy produce the conditions that led to the Easter attacks? (https://colombogazette.com/2020/07/05/pm-warns-against-becoming-prisoners-of-circumstances).
The psychological impact aside; the aforementioned balkanization led to tangible devastation on that fateful Easter Sunday. Queue the soul searching driven by post-Easter SLPP ethno-nationalist rhetoric which reinvigorated nativist elements within the country providing them with a glimpse of their worst fears. The innate insecurity of the majority is perfectly encapsulated by S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike in the 1950s: “…the fears of the Sinhalese, I do not think can be brushed aside as completely frivolous. I believe there are a not inconsiderable number of Tamils in this country out of a population of 8 million. Then there are 40-50 million Tamil people in the adjoining country. What about all this Tamil literature, Tamil teachers, even films, papers and magazines? … I do not think there is an unjustified fear of the inexorable shrinking of the Sinhala language. It is a fear that cannot be brushed aside” (The Politics and Poetics of Authenticity- Harshana Rambukwella).
A Premadasa New Deal and Marshall Plan
The SJB must ensure it does not honour the UNP’s tradition of demonizing voters of the Government, casting them as racists or nativists. One is reminded of Hillary Clintons “basket of deplorables” or Barack Obama’s “clinging to guns and religion”. The opposition voter is not the villain of the piece; address their anxieties and take seriously the values they hold dear.
Dr. Dayan Jayatilleka has already made the ‘progressive case’ for the SJB and Mr. Sajith Premadasa. Far from being an ideological, utopian framework, progressivism can only thrive within the boundaries of populism. (https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/why-sajiths-sjb-ranils-unp-are-quite-distinct-and-sajiths-is-the-already-existing-progressive-center/).
There is also a dependable anti-provincial-council consensus shared by the majoritarian segment of the electorate. Factions within the SLPP openly discuss the abolition of provincial councils. These are political instincts of the right that the emergent new left of Sri Lanka must urgently acquire. (https://island.lk/gevindu-insists-on-abolishing-provincial-councils-under-new-constitution/).
The SJB may not yet be sufficiently self-confident, but should it seek to prove its progressive credentials, it may opt to do so by challenging moderate Tamil politicians to take Federalism off the negotiating table once and for all. Presenting a proposition to either reform or recalibrate the Provincial Council system.
Yes there are contentions surrounding executive powers granted to the Councils, but any meaningful de-politicization of this PC system, bringing it in line with the national objectives of the centre, will reassure the insecure majority that their guard rails are in place. If Provincial Councils do not fall in line with national objectives, Sri Lanka will never find a singular purposeful path to advanced statehood and a modern economy. Thus, without reaching advanced statehood, all attempts at a devolved structure of governance will remain at least several decades in the future.
The emergence of a younger generation of politicians rising up the ranks of the TNA and affiliated parties should provide fresh impetus. Youth that is unburdened with the heavy baggage of the 13th Amendment, unlike their forefathers.
P.K. Balachandran makes this point, referring to results from the General Election; “The polls in the Northern Province showed that Tamil extremism is on the wane, although some pro-LTTE radicals like Gajendrakumar Ponnambalam and C. V. Wigneswaran won. The bulk of the seats was won by the moderate Tamil National Alliance (TNA) fighting under the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Katchi’s “House” symbol. The elections in the North also showed that the Tamils now want economic development, besides federalism. This is seen in the success of the pro-government EPDP (2 seats) and the SLFP (1 seat)” (http://dbsjeyaraj.com/dbsj/archives/69846).
A Grand Bargain
What might the SJB provide in return to the Indo-US axis, the nationalist elements and the Jaffna centric elites of the TNA and beyond? Power (money) and purpose (development).
The SJB could announce a ‘Marshall Plan’ for the Northern and Eastern Provinces. A program of development planned and implemented by the people of those provinces through their elected representatives and appointed councilors. This would complement the “New Deal” aspirations alluded to by the Opposition Leader.
Such a project will dilute foreign claims of systemic oppression of these provinces. It could counter the Buddhist clergy with the allocation of funds from this Marshall Plan towards restoring the Stupas of these provinces or any other purpose deemed necessary to tame the Asgiriya Chapter.
Perhaps a long over-due ‘National Day of Mourning’ to mark the anti-Tamil pogroms of past decades and an admission of the failures of the State to protect its people. Why not a program of targeted reparations towards those that lost loved ones and livelihoods to those pogroms, failing which, a simple, earnest national apology? Now, would that not be progressive? Part of the funding for this Marshall Plan, however small, must come from the annual defense budget. A symbolic gesture of goodwill.
The SJB must seek to alienate not just the reactionary elements of the SLPP but also the separatist elements within minority parties if it is to truly occupy a progressive centre. The ultimate goal is to neutralize the narrative and blunt the tools of the UNHRC and allied multi-lateral machinations, truly exposing their imperialist double standards.
Any number of possibilities emerge when RW is absent from the negotiating table. The SJB has every opportunity to bury the ghosts of neo-liberalism, ushering in a progressive, populist and above all, patriotic pursuit of multi-ethnic plurality, led by a Premadasa.
Opinion
What BNP should keep in mind as it assumes power
BNP rightly deserves our congratulations for winning a decisive victory in the 13th parliamentary election. This outcome reflects an unequivocal mandate that is both politically and historically significant. Coming as it does at a critical point in Bangladesh’s democratic journey, this moment marks more than a change of government; it signals a renewed public resolve to restore democratic norms, accountability, and institutional integrity.
The election came after years of severe distrust in the electoral process, questions over legitimacy, and institutional strain, so the poll’s successful conduct has reinforced trust in the process as well as the principle that governments derive authority from the consent of the governed. For quite some time now, Bangladesh has faced deep polarisation, intolerance, and threats to its democratic foundations. Regressive and anti-democratic tendencies—whether institutional, ideological, or political—risked steering the country away from its foundational goals. BNP’s decisive victory can therefore be interpreted as a call to reverse this trajectory, and a public desire for accountable, forward-looking governance rooted in liberal democratic principles.
However, the road ahead is going to be bumpy, to put it mildly. A broad mandate alone cannot resolve deep-rooted structural problems. The BNP government will likely continue to face economic challenges and institutional constraints for the foreseeable future. This will test its capacity and sincerity not only to govern but also to transform the culture of governance in the country.
Economic reform imperatives
A key challenge will be stabilising the economy, which continues to face mounting pressures: growth has decelerated, inflation has eroded people’s purchasing power, foreign exchange reserves remain low, and public finances are tight. External debt has increased significantly in recent years, while the tax-to-GDP ratio has fallen to historically low levels. State-owned enterprises and the banking sector face persistent structural weaknesses, and confidence among both domestic and international investors remains fragile.
The new government should begin by restoring macroeconomic discipline. Containing inflation will need close coordination across ministries and agencies. Monetary policy must remain cautious and credible, free from political interference, while fiscal policy should prioritise stability rather than expand populist spending.
Tax reform is also unavoidable. The National Board of Revenue requires comprehensive modernisation, digitalisation, and total compliance. Broadening the tax base, especially by bringing all high-income groups and segments of the informal economy into the formal system, is crucial. Over time, reliance on indirect taxes such as value-added tax and import duties should be reduced, paving the way for a more progressive direct tax regime.
Banking sector reform is equally crucial. Proper asset quality reviews and regulatory oversight are necessary to rebuild confidence in the sector. Political patronage within the financial institutions must end. Without a resilient financial system, private investment cannot recover. As regards growth, the government should focus on diversifying exports beyond ready-made garments and deepening integration into regional value chains. Attracting foreign direct investment will depend on regulatory predictability and improvements in logistics and energy reliability. Ambitious growth targets must be matched by realistic implementation capacity.
Political Challenges
Distrust among political actors, partly fuelled by fears of retribution and violence, is a reality that may persist. BNP will face pressure from its supporters to act quickly in addressing perceived injustices, but good governance demands restraint. If the new government resorts to or tolerates exclusion or retaliation, it will risk perpetuating the very cycle it has condemned.
Managing internal party discipline will also be crucial, as a large parliamentary majority can sometimes lead to complacency or factional rivalry. Strong leadership will be required to maintain unity while allowing constructive internal debate. BNP must also rebuild trust with minority communities and vulnerable groups. Elections often heighten anxieties among minorities, so a credible commitment to equal citizenship is crucial. BNP’s political maturity will also be judged by how it treats or engages with its opponents. In this regard, Chairman Tarique Rahman’s visits to the residences of top opposition leaders on Sunday marked a positive gesture, one that many hope will withstand the inevitable pressures or conflicts over governance in the coming days.
Strengthening democratic institutions
A central promise of this election was to restore democracy, which must now translate into concrete institutional reforms. Judicial independence needs constant safeguarding. Which means that appointment, promotion, and case management processes should be insulated from political influence. Parliamentary oversight committees must also function effectively, and the opposition’s voice in parliament must be protected.
Electoral institutions also need reform, particularly along the lines of the July Charter. Continued credibility of the Election Commission will depend on transparency, professional management, and impartiality. Meanwhile, the civil service must be depoliticised. Appointments based on loyalty rather than merit have long undermined governance in the country. So the new administration must work on curtailing the influence of political networks to ensure a professional, impartial civil service. Media reform and digital rights also deserve careful attention. We must remember that democratic consolidation is built through institutional habits, and these habits must be established early.
Beyond winner-takes-all
Bangladesh’s politics has long been characterised by a winner-takes-all mentality. Electoral victories have often resulted in monopolisation of power, marginalising opposition voices and weakening checks and balances. If BNP is serious about democratic renewal, it must consciously break with this tradition. Inclusive policy consultations will be a good starting point. Major economic and constitutional reforms should be based on cross-party dialogue and consensus. Appointments to constitutional bodies should be transparent and consultative, and parliamentary debates should be done with the letter and spirit of the July Charter in mind.
Meeting public expectations
The scale of public expectations now is naturally immense. Citizens want economic relief, employment opportunities, necessary institutional reforms, and improved governance. Managing these expectations will be quite difficult. Many reforms will not yield immediate results, and some may impose short-term costs. So, it is imperative to ensure transparent communication about the associated timelines, trade-offs, and fiscal constraints.
Anti-corruption efforts must be credible and monitored at all times. Measures are needed to strengthen oversight institutions, improve transparency in public procurement, and expand digital service delivery to reduce opportunities for rent-seeking. Governance reform should be systematic, not selective or politically driven. Tangible improvements are urgently needed in public service delivery, particularly in health, education, social protection, and local government.
Finally, a word of caution: BNP’s decisive victory presents both opportunities and risks. It can enable bold reforms but it also carries the danger of overreach. The key deciding factor here is political judgment. The question is, can our leaders deliver based on the mandate voters have given them? (The Daily Star)
Dr Fahmida Khatun is an economist and executive director at the Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD). Views expressed in the article are the author’s own.
Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.
by Fahmida Khatun
Opinion
Why religion should remain separate from state power in Sri Lanka: Lessons from political history
Religion has been an essential part of Sri Lankan society for more than two millennia, shaping culture, moral values, and social traditions. Buddhism in particular has played a foundational role in guiding ethical behaviour, promoting compassion, and encouraging social harmony. Yet Sri Lanka’s modern political history clearly shows that when religion becomes closely entangled with state power, both democracy and religion suffer. The politicisation of religion especially Buddhism has repeatedly contributed to ethnic division, weakened governance, and the erosion of moral authority. For these reasons, the separation of religion and the state is not only desirable but necessary for Sri Lanka’s long-term stability and democratic progress.
Sri Lanka’s post-independence political history provides early evidence of how religion became a political tool. The 1956 election, which brought S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike to power, is often remembered as a turning point where Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism was actively mobilised for political expedience. Buddhist monks played a visible role in political campaigning, framing political change as a religious and cultural revival. While this movement empowered the Sinhala-Buddhist majority, it also laid the foundation for ethnic exclusion, particularly through policies such as the “Sinhala Only Act.” Though framed as protecting national identity, these policies marginalised Tamil-speaking communities and contributed significantly to ethnic tensions that later escalated into civil conflict. This period demonstrates how religious symbolism, when fused with state power, can undermine social cohesion rather than strengthen it.
The increasing political involvement of Buddhist monks in later decades further illustrates the risks of this entanglement. In the early 2000s, the emergence of monk-led political parties such as the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) marked a new phase in Sri Lankan politics. For the first time, monks entered Parliament as elected lawmakers, directly participating in legislation and governance. While their presence was justified as a moral corrective to corrupt politics, in practice it blurred the boundary between spiritual leadership and political power. Once monks became part of parliamentary debates, policy compromises, and political rivalries, they were no longer perceived as neutral moral guides. Instead, they became political actors subject to criticism, controversy, and public mistrust. This shift significantly weakened the traditional reverence associated with the Sangha.
Sri Lankan political history also shows how religion has been repeatedly used by political leaders to legitimise authority during times of crisis. Successive governments have sought the public endorsement of influential monks to strengthen their political image, particularly during elections or moments of instability. During the war, religious rhetoric was often used to frame the conflict in moral or civilisational terms, leaving little room for nuanced political solutions or reconciliation. This approach may have strengthened short-term political support, but it also deepened ethnic polarisation and made post-war reconciliation more difficult. The long-term consequences of this strategy are still visible in unresolved ethnic grievances and fragile national unity.
Another important historical example is the post-war period after 2009. Despite the conclusion of the war, Sri Lanka failed to achieve meaningful reconciliation or strong democratic reform. Instead, religious nationalism gained renewed political influence, often used to silence dissent and justify authoritarian governance. Smaller population groups such as Muslims and Christians in particular experienced growing insecurity as extremist groups operated with perceived political protection. The state’s failure to maintain religious neutrality during this period weakened public trust and damaged Sri Lanka’s international reputation. These developments show that privileging one religion in state power does not lead to stability or moral governance; rather, it creates fear, exclusion, and institutional decay.
The moral authority of religion itself has also suffered as a result of political entanglement. Traditionally, Buddhist monks were respected for their distance from worldly power, allowing them to speak truth to rulers without fear or favour. However, when monks publicly defend controversial political decisions, support corrupt leaders, or engage in aggressive nationalist rhetoric, they risk losing this moral independence. Sri Lankan political history demonstrates that once religious figures are seen as aligned with political power, public criticism of politicians easily extends to religion itself. This has contributed to growing disillusionment among younger generations, many of whom now view religious institutions as extensions of political authority rather than sources of ethical guidance.
The teachings of the Buddha offer a clear contrast to this historical trend. The Buddha advised rulers on ethical governance but never sought political authority or state power. His independence allowed him to critique injustice and moral failure without compromise. Sri Lanka’s political experience shows that abandoning this principle has harmed both religion and governance. When monks act as political agents, they lose the freedom to challenge power, and religion becomes vulnerable to political failure and public resentment.
Sri Lanka’s multi-religious social structure nurtures divisive, if not separatist, sentiments. While Buddhism holds a special historical place, the modern state governs citizens of many faiths. Political history shows that when the state appears aligned with one religion, minority communities feel excluded, regardless of constitutional guarantees. This sense of exclusion has repeatedly weakened national unity and contributed to long-term conflict. A secular state does not reject religion; rather, it protects all religions by maintaining neutrality and ensuring equal citizenship.
Sri Lankan political history clearly demonstrates that the fusion of religion and state power has not produced good governance, social harmony, or moral leadership. Instead, it has intensified ethnic divisions, weakened democratic institutions, and damaged the spiritual credibility of religion itself. Separating religion from the state is not an attack on Buddhism or Sri Lankan tradition. On the contrary, it is a necessary step to preserve the dignity of religion and strengthen democratic governance. By maintaining a clear boundary between spiritual authority and political power, Sri Lanka can move toward a more inclusive, stable, and just society one where religion remains a source of moral wisdom rather than a tool of political control.
In present-day Sri Lanka, the dangers of mixing religion with state power are more visible than ever. Despite decades of experience showing the negative consequences of politicised religion, religious authority continues to be invoked to justify political decisions, silence criticism, and legitimise those in power. During recent economic and political crises, political leaders have frequently appeared alongside prominent religious figures to project moral legitimacy, even when governance failures, corruption, and mismanagement were evident. This pattern reflects a continued reliance on religious symbolism to mask political weakness rather than a genuine commitment to ethical governance.
The 2022 economic collapse offers a powerful contemporary example. As ordinary citizens faced shortages of fuel, food, and medicine, public anger was directed toward political leadership and state institutions. However, instead of allowing religion to act as an independent moral force that could hold power accountable, sections of the religious establishment appeared closely aligned with political elites. This alignment weakened religion’s ability to speak truthfully on behalf of the suffering population. When religion stands too close to power, it loses its capacity to challenge injustice, corruption, and abuse precisely when society needs moral leadership the most.
At the same time, younger generations in Sri Lanka are increasingly questioning both political authority and religious institutions. Many young people perceive religious leaders as participants in political power structures rather than as independent ethical voices. This growing scepticism is not a rejection of spirituality, but a response to the visible politicisation of religion. If this trend continues, Sri Lanka risks long-term damage not only to democratic trust but also to religious life itself.
The present moment therefore demands a critical reassessment. A clear separation between religion and the state would allow religious institutions to reclaim moral independence and restore public confidence. It would also strengthen democracy by ensuring that policy decisions are guided by evidence, accountability, and inclusive dialogue rather than religious pressure or nationalist rhetoric. Sri Lanka’s recent history shows that political legitimacy cannot be built on religious symbolism alone. Only transparent governance, social justice, and equal citizenship can restore stability and public trust.
Ultimately, the future of Sri Lanka depends on learning from both its past and present. Protecting religion from political misuse is not a threat to national identity; it is a necessary condition for ethical leadership, democratic renewal, and social harmony in a deeply diverse society.
by Milinda Mayadunna
Opinion
NPP’s misguided policy
Judging by some recent events, starting with the injudicious pronouncement in Jaffna by President Anura Kumara Dissanayake and subsequent statements by some senior ministers, the government tends to appease minorities at the expense of the majority. Ill-treatment of some Buddhist monks by the police continues to arouse controversy, and it looks as if the government used the police to handle matters that are best left to the judiciary. Sangadasa Akurugoda concludes his well-reasoned opinion piece “Appeasement of separatists” (The island, 13 February) as follows:
“It is unfortunate that the President of a country considers ‘national pride and patriotism’, a trait that every citizen should have, as ‘racism’. Although the President is repeating it like a mantra that he will not tolerate ‘racism’ or ‘extremism’ we have never heard him saying that he will not tolerate ‘separatism or terrorism’.”
It is hard to disagree with Akurugoda. Perhaps, the President may be excused for his reluctance to refer to terrorism as he leads a movement that unleashed terror twice, but his reluctance to condemn separatism is puzzling. Although most political commentators consider the President’s comment that ‘Buddhist go to Jaffna to spread hate’ to be callous, the head of an NGO heaped praise on the President for saying so!
As I pointed out in a previous article, puppet-masters outside seem to be pulling the strings (A puppet show? The Island, 23 January) and the President’s reluctance to condemn separatism whilst accusing Buddhists of spreading hatred by going to Jaffna makes one wonder who these puppeteers are.
Another incident that raises serious concern was reported from a Buddhist Temple in Trincomalee. The police removed a Buddha statue and allegedly assaulted Buddhist priests. Mysteriously, the police brought back the statue the following day, giving an absurd excuse; they claimed they had removed it to ensure its safety. No inquiry into police action was instituted but several Bhikkhus and dayakayas were remanded for a long period.
Having seen a front-page banner headline “Sivuru gelawenakam pahara dunna” (“We were beaten till the robes fell”) in the January 13th edition of the Sunday Divaina, I watched on YouTube the press briefing at the headquarters of the All-Ceylon Buddhist Association. I can well imagine the agony those who were remanded went through.
Ven. Balangoda Kassapa’s description of the way he and the others, held on remand, were treated raises many issues. Whether they committed a transgression should be decided by the judiciary. Given the well-known judicial dictum, ‘innocent until proven guilty’, the harassment they faced cannot be justified under any circumstances.
Ven. Kassapa exposed the high-handed actions of the police. This has come as no surprise as it is increasingly becoming apparent as they are no longer ‘Sri Lanka Police’; they have become the ‘NPP police’. This is an issue often editorially highlighted by The Island. How can one expect the police to be impartial when two key posts are held by officers brought out of retirement as a reward for canvassing for the NPP. It was surprising to learn that the suspects could not be granted bail due to objections raised by the police.
Ven. Kassapa said the head of the remand prison where he and others were held had threatened him.
However, there was a ray of hope. Those who cry out for reconciliation fail to recognise that reconciliation is a much-misused term, as some separatists masquerading as peacemakers campaign for reconciliation! They overlook the fact that it is already there as demonstrated by the behaviour of Tamil and Muslim inmates in the remand prison, where Ven. Kassapa and others were kept.
Non-Buddhist prisoners looked after the needs of the Bhikkhus though the prison chief refused even to provide meals according to Vinaya rules! In sharp contrast, during a case against a Sri Lankan Bhikkhu accused of child molestation in the UK, the presiding judge made sure the proceedings were paused for lunch at the proper time.
I have written against Bhikkhus taking to politics, but some of the issues raised by Ven. Kassapa must not be ignored. He alleges that the real reason behind the conflict was that the government was planning to allocate the land belonging to the Vihara to an Indian businessman for the construction of a hotel. This can be easily clarified by the government, provided there is no hidden agenda.
It is no secret that this government is controlled by India. Even ‘Tilvin Ayya’, who studied the module on ‘Indian Expansionism’ under Rohana Wijeweera, has mended fences with India. He led a JVP delegation to India recently. Several MoUs or pacts signed with India are kept under wraps.
Unfortunately, the government’s mishandling of this issue is being exploited by other interested parties, and this may turn out to be a far bigger problem.
It is high time the government stopped harassing the majority in the name of reconciliation, a term exploited by separatists to achieve their goals!
By Dr Upul Wijayawardhana
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