Midweek Review
How Premadasa’s ill-conceived strategies undermined Wanasinghe’s Army
A military funeral was held on the evening of June 15, 2025, at the new crematorium of the General Cemetery, Borella, to bid farewell to the late General Hamilton Wanasinghe (retd.) VSV USP ndc. Wanasinghe passed away at the Military Hospital, Narahenpita, on June 13. The eleventh commander of Sri Lanka Army (SLA), Wanasinghe was 91 at the time of his demise.
Admiral Ravindra C. Wijegunaratne did a piece on the late General, titled ‘A legendary military leader of our time’ (The Island, June 20, 2025 edition) in which the former Navy Commander discussed the late Wanasinghe’s four decades long career that included a turbulent period. Wijegunaratne’s piece is a must read. (https://island.lk/a-legendary-military-leader-of-our-time/)
The writer felt the need to discuss the political and security environment at the time Wanasinghe took over the Army, deployed in support of the police engaged in counter-terrorist operations against the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and sudden eruption of fighting in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. The southern terrorism erupted after India intervened in July 1987 to save the LTTE from annihilation in Sri Lanka’s first brigade-level ground campaign in the Vadamarachchi region.
The Army spearheaded the eradication of the JVP threat by Dec. 1989. The writer covered the hastily arranged press conference at the Operational Headquarters of the Defence Ministry on Nov. 13, 1989, to announce the arrest 0f JVP leader Rohana Wijeweera, and his execution by the Army. Whatever the silly claims made by the UNP, and other interested parties, the truth is that the JVP leader was killed by the Army. Wanasinghe had been there along with State Defence Minister Ranjan Wijeratne, IGP Ernest Perera, State Foreign Affairs Minister John Amaratunga and Defence Secretary Cyril Ranatunga (Captured at Ulapane and flown to Colombo: Rohana Wijeweera killed and cremated yesterday, The Island, Nov. 14, 1989).
The Indo-Lanka accord forced on Sri Lanka effectively confined the armed forces to their barracks during the period July 1987-March 1990. By the time India ended its controversial mission here, all bases of the security forces in the Northern and Eastern provinces had been surrounded by the LTTE and overland access to them effectively cut off.
Wanasinghe served as the commander of Army at the time Eelam War II erupted in the second week of June 1990, just four months after the withdrawal of the Indian Army. Wanasinghe’s ill-prepared Army, deployed in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, had to face the brunt of the fighting. The consequences were devastating.
President Ranasinghe Premadasa simply pursued his political strategies, at the expense of national security, and the results were catastrophic. The UNP leader’s political-military miscalculations gave the battlefield advantage to the LTTE, and leader Velupillai Prabhakaran exploited the President’s weaknesses to the hilt before he ordered the UNP leader’s assassination.
Wanasinghe succeeded Air Chief Marshal Walter Fernando as Secretary to the Ministry of Defence several weeks after President Premadasa’s assassination. Wanasinghe held that post from June 06, 1993 to February 10, 1995. Having won both parliamentary and presidential elections in 1994, Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga effected far reaching changes. In line with the People’s Alliance (PA) thinking, Kumaratunga did away with the practice of having senior retired military officers as the Secretary to the Ministry of Defence. After the introduction of the 1978 Constitution, that vital post had been held consecutively by Colonel C.A. Dharmapala, General Sepala Attygalle, General Cyril Ranatunga, Air Chief Marshal Walter Fernando and General Hamilton Wanasinghe. Kumaratunga brought in one-time head of the Elections Department, Chandrananda Silva, who served in that post from 1995 to 2001.
Let me examine the circumstances leading to Eelam War II that caused the swift overall deterioration of the ground situation, the northern battles and debilitating setbacks the Army suffered. Wanasinghe of the Artillery succeeded Engineers’ officer Lt. Gen. Nalin Seneviratne, VSV, on August 16, 1988. Wanasinghe held the top post till Nov. 15, 1991. during a violent period.
Counter-terrorist operations in South
The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) had been on the rampage in areas outside the Northern and Eastern Provinces and the Army was fully deployed to combat terrorism in the South. The crisis that engulfed the country during Wanasinghe’s tenure as the Commander of Army cannot be discussed without taking into consideration President Ranasinghe Premadasa’s response to the growing challenge posed by the LTTE and the JVP. Premadasa’s ill-conceived actions/decisions caused unprecedented mayhem.
Having won the presidential election in Dec. 1988, Premadasa ordered the release of as many as 1,800 suspected JVPers who had been detained by the military and the police. That was done soon after he took oaths at the ‘Paththirippuwa’ at the Dalada Maligawa, in Kandy, on January 2, 1989, like a Sri Lankan king of the past, raising many an eyebrow. The writer, into his third year in journalism, covered that event and what followed was nothing but tragedy.
The then President felt that he could initiate a dialogue with the JVP by releasing its members. Unfortunately, the JVP took advantage of the situation. The then professed Marxist organisation unleashed the newly released men on their political opponents. They had extra hands to cause death and destruction. The release of JVPers was nothing but a cardinal mistake perpetrated by Premadasa.
Premadasa foolishly felt no need to consult the military top brass, or the police, regarding his bid to win over the JVP. The President went a step further, in the wrong direction. Having called for direct talks with the LTTE, the President personally handled the negotiations (May 1989 to June 1990) but obviously Velupillai Prabhakaran had other ideas. The LTTE struck just four months after Premadasa got rid of the Indian Army.
As for such erratic behaviour by President Premadasa, we have to grant that the society is partially to blame, for Premadasa was entirely a self-made man who literally survived by his instincts against many an odd, especially due to caste prejudices he had to suffer throughout his life, some imaginary no doubt like JRJ himself was plotting to make either Lalith Athulathmudali or Gamini Dissanayake his successor. The man, dubbed the 20th Century Fox, was only playing his top men against each other instead of being a threat to him. But he had clearly signalled Premadasa as his successor by appointing him the Prime Minister, but because of his inborn insecurity and the known vileness of JRJ, he did not trust him.
General Gerry de Silva, in his widely read A most noble profession, aptly described the deteriorating situation in the run up to Eelam War II. Having acknowledged that the political and military leadership had failed to recognise the rapidly emerging LTTE threat and disregarded what he called constant humiliation meted out to the armed forces and police by Tigers, the former commander asserted that politico-military hierarchy had to bear up as they didn’t want to cause friction. Wanasinghe had been the Commander of the Army, while General Cyril Ranatunga served as the Defence Secretary. Obviously, they couldn’t talk sense into Premadasa whose irrational directives were carried out by the late A.C. S. Hameed who served as the Foreign Minister at that time.
Having crushed the JVP for the second time, the Army seemed to have not anticipated a conventional type campaign against its isolated detachments in the northern theatre. The LTTE had been in a much better position in the North, having battle hardened against the Indian Army and gained valuable experience. By then, on the orders of the President, the Army had facilitated Prabhakaran to annihilate rival Tamil groups. The Tamil National Army that had been hastily formed by India, prior to their departure, and Varatharaja Perumal installed by them as the Chief Minister of the NE provincial administration, suffered irreversible losses against a series of lightning operations by the LTTE.
During President Premadasa’s honeymoon with the LTTE, the latter received at least Rs 125 mn in outright handouts from the Treasury, in addition to arms, ammunition and other requisites. The President had been so adamant in pursuing his foolish political-military strategy, even after the LTTE resumed hostilities, the UNP leader ordered the then Treasury Chief R. Paskaralingam to release funds. Paskaralingam transferred Rs 50 mn on Nov. 05, 1990, six months after Prabhakaran’s treachery. There had been altogether 16 cash transfers, with the Nov. 05, 1990, transfer being the largest single fund transfer to the LTTE.
Army caught off-guard
The LTTE destroyed the Kokkali Army detachment on the afternoon of July 13, 1990. Having unilaterally ended the 14-month long ceasefire (May 5, 1989-June 10, 1990), the LTTE swiftly gained the upper hand in the Jaffna peninsula and the Vanni, though, in the East, the group faced fierce resistance by combined security forces.
The LTTE targeted troops and police based at the Jaffna Fort at the onset of Eelam war II. It had been the LTTE’s main target in the peninsula. By the last week of June, 1990, the LTTE had been exploring ways and means of overwhelming those beleaguered security forces personnel after having cut off access to and from that base. The Army couldn’t even evacuate their wounded personnel.
A deeply embarrassed Gen. Wanasinghe had no option but to seek the help of the SLAF to evacuate those who had been wounded and trapped in the Jaffna Fort. The Army couldn’t even muster a force to mount a limited ground assault to facilitate the SLAF operation.
Wanasinghe’s predicament must be examined taking into consideration that he, at the behest of Premadasa, supervised the transfer of arms, ammunition and equipment to the LTTE to carry out attacks against the Indian Army. Now his own Army was at the receiving end of those weapons.
In an interview with the writer soon after he was told of President Premadasa’s decision to appoint him as the Commander of the Army, the then Maj. Gen. Wanasinghe discussed ways and means of improving the combat readiness of troops. A jubilant Wanasinghe revealed his plans to expand the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) to meet any eventuality, while emphasising the importance of training troops in jungle operations (Wanasinghe new Army chief––The Island Aug. 7, 1988).
Due to the failure on the part of the Army to evacuate the wounded and send in reinforcements to Jaffna fort, the SLAF was asked to launch an unprecedented operation to airlift the wounded. The unparalleled operation was codenamed ‘Eagle.’
Premadasa’s ill-fated policy of appeasement had weakened the armed forces to such an extent the military top brass were in a permanent state of flux.
The SLAF, too, had been under heavy pressure to mount a rescue operation. It would be pertinent to mention here that the SLAF didn’t have the capability to demolish LTTE positions, situated close to the Jaffna Fort, to enable helicopters to land in the fort. The government hadn’t felt the need to acquire jets, dedicated helicopter gunships or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to facilitate a complicated operation.
Sri Lanka paid attention to enhance firepower only after the LTTE took the upper hand in the North. The SLAF acquired supersonic jets (Chinese F7 and FT 7) in 1991, Kfirs in 1996 and MiG 27s in 2000. The SLAF took delivery of helicopter gunships (Mi 24s) in 1995 and UAVs the following year.
The SLAF initially scheduled Operation Eagle for July 4, 1990. At the eleventh hour, the SLAF advanced the operation by 24 hours. The SLAF decided to mount the operation at 4 a.m. on July 3, 1990.
With the Jaffna fort having been under siege for 21 days, the Army top brass felt it was only a matter of days before the LTTE fought its way into the Dutch built fortress. In fact, many senior officers had given up hope of saving those trapped in the Jaffna fort, when the SLAF took up the daunting task and carried it out successfully. The SLAF achieved success in the wake of two earlier abortive missions.
The then Air Force Commander, Air Vice Marshal Terrence Gunawardena and the late Group Capt. Anselm Peiris, who functioned as the mission commander, too, had been present at Ratmalana when a fixed wing aircraft, carrying the wounded, touched down there at 8 a.m. (Dramatic rescue of injured men from Jaffna Fort––The Island – July 4, 1990).
Soon after the conclusion of the rescue mission, President Premadasa visited thr SLAF headquarters to thank the officers involved in the rescue mission.
No one dared to challenge Premadasa when he ordered the Army to surrender to the LTTE at the onset of Eelam War II.
Although the daring rescue mission boosted the morale of the Army, it didn’t stop the rapid deterioration of the ground situation in the northern region. The LTTE was on the offensive, with the Army struggling to counter the growing threat on all major bases in the Jaffna peninsula and the Vanni region. Officers and men had been thoroughly demoralised and as a result, desertions were extremely high in spite of troops making some headway in the Eastern Province. But, even in the Eastern Province, the Army had suffered some stunning setbacks as the LTTE brought in experienced units in to the battle.
Having quickly taken the upper hand in the Batticaloa District, the LTTE mounted attacks on Kinniya, Uppuveli and Muttur police stations. The LTTE quickly overran Kinniya, though the police at Muttur repulsed the attack with the support of troops based at the adjoining Army detachment. As the Army feared those defending Muttur could not manage the situation on their own, the Army top brass authorised a special operation to relieve them. The then Lt. Commander Lakshman Illangakoon, Commanding Officer of the landing craft ‘Kandula,’ was tasked to ferry troops necessary for the operation.
Chaos in the East
Unfortunately, the operation went awry though the Navy managed to land a contingent of commandos, led by Maj. A. M. Arshad, close to brown rock point, east of Muttur, in the early hours of June 14, 1990. Having allowed the commandos to come ashore without a fight, the LTTE ambushed them a little distance away from the landing point, killing 40. Six commandos, who had survived the ambush, escaped in a boat and drifted for several weeks in the Indian Ocean, though only four managed to reach the beaches of Bangkok in early August 1990. They told how two of their colleagues died during the uncharted journey. At the time of his untimely death, Arshad was to marry the then State Housing Minister Imithiaz Bakeer Markar’s sister (Four commandos escape Tigers, land in Bangkok––The Island Aug. 9, 1990).
Arshad was a distinguished and much admired old boy of Balangoda Central College, according to the then Navy Spokesman Commander Kosala Warnakulasuriya (currently southern commander. He holds the rank of Rear Admiral). For many, Arshad was an inspiring figure, like Colonel Fazly Laphir, Commanding Officer of the 1 Special Forces Regiment, who, too, died in another disastrous rescue mission in July 1996
Exactly a month after the resumption of hostilities with the massacre of over 600 police officers and men after they were ordered to be surrendered to the Tigers by the Premadasa regime, Wanasinghe placed Maj. Gen. Denzil Kobbekaduwa in charge of operations in the Northern region. The situation on the ground had deteriorated to such an extent, Kobbekaduwa’s appointment as the Northern Commander didn’t make any difference. The LTTE had built fortifications around all camps in the Jaffna peninsula as well as in the Vanni. Prabhakaran brazenly took advantage of his ‘honeymoon’ with President Premadasa to build gun positions around bases. The LTTE also moved into positions abandoned by the Indian army.
Besides, President Premadasa had ordered the Army to vacate some of its bases, including strategically positioned troops at Valvettithurai and Point Pedro. The Army could not either reinforce or vacate besieged bases at Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu, Kokavil, Manakulam, Mullaitivu and Jaffna fort.
The Army top brass felt that an urgent offensive was needed to rescue troops in bases vulnerable to an LTTE onslaught. But, the overall planning was chaotic in the absence of a cohesive strategy to decipher the LTTE stratagem. In hindsight, the LTTE was obviously bent on smashing Army bases, situated along the Kandy-Jaffna A9 main road, between Kokavil and Jaffna fort. The Army top brass obviously failed to realise the danger posed by the massive LTTE build-up in the Vanni. Had they realised the threat on the main overland supply route to Jaffna, they would have acted swiftly and decisively. Unfortunately, the Army lacked the wherewithal to reinforce bases situated along the A9. While the Army was engaged in counter insurgency operations against the JVP, in support of the police, the LTTE (July 1987- Feb/March 1990), received much needed retraining. Having crushed the Indian-sponsored TNA in a series of lightning operations, the Tigers had collected a massive arsenal supplied by India, on top of the huge arsenal of weapons supplied by President Premadasa.
Immediately after Maj. Gen. Kobbekaduwa assumed the northern command on July 11, 1990, the LTTE overran the isolated Kokavil detachment, established to protect a Rupavahini tower there. In spite of the detachment being under attack for almost a month, the Army top brass failed to reinforce those defending the base. Lieutenant S.U. Aladeniya of the Sinha Regiment (Second Volunteer battalion) fought to the end, though he was given an opportunity to withdraw at an early stage of the battle.
Refusing to abandon the base, leaving behind casualties, Aladeniya finally urged the Army to pound his own base with long range artillery. Aladeniya was one of the few to receive the Parama Weera Vibhushana (PWV) posthumously, for his gallantry. Army Headquarters pathetically failed to reinforce the Kokavil detachment, comprising two platoons, in spite of Aladeniya calling for reinforcements. They also ran out of ammunition. About 50 volunteers went down fighting at Kokavil. None of their bodies were recovered. Some of the captured volunteer Sinha Regiment personnel are believed to have been executed. Two soldiers who escaped by crawling through the LTTE cordon, managed to reach the Army base at Mankulam, situated north of Kokavil. According to them, those captured were burnt alive.
The rest is history.
By Shamindra Ferdinando
Midweek Review
A victory that can never be forgotten
The country is in deepening turmoil over the theft of USD 2.5 mn from the Treasury. The Treasury affair has placed the arrogant NPP in an embarrassing position. The controversial release of 323 red-flagged containers from the Colombo Port, in addition to two carrying narcotics and the coal scam that forced Energy Minister Kumara Jayakody to resign, has eroded public confidence though the NPP pretends otherwise.
Suspicious deaths of a Finance Ministry official, suspended over the Treasury heist of USD 2.5 million, and ex-SriLankan Airlines CEO Kapila Chandrasena shouldn’t distract the government and the Opposition from marking victory over terrorism.
But, the country, under any circumstances, shouldn’t forget to celebrate Sri Lanka’s greatest post-independence achievement. Dinesh Udugamsooriya, a keen follower of conflict and post-Aragalaya issues, insists that those who cherish the peace achieved should raise the national flag in honour of the armed forces.
The armed forces paid a huge price to preserve the country’s unitary status. Those who represent Parliament and outside waiting for an opportunity to return to Parliament must keep in their minds, unitary status is non-negotiable, under any circumstances, and such efforts would be in vain.
By Shamindra Ferdinando
Sri Lanka celebrates, next week, the eradication of the bloodthirsty separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) as a conventional threat to the survival of this nation, at least in our hearts, even if the authorities dampen any celebrations. The armed forces brought the war to a successful conclusion on 18 May, 2009. The body of undisputed leader of the LTTE, Velupillai Prabhakaran, was found on the banks of the Nanthikadal lagoon, on the morning of 19 May, less than 24 hours after the ground forces declared the end of operations in the Vanni theatre.
The LTTE’s annihilation is Sri Lanka’s greatest post-independence achievement. Whatever various interested parties, pursuing different agendas say, the vast majority of people accept the eradication of the LTTE’s conventional military capacity as the armed forces’ highest achievement.
Sri Lanka’s triumph cannot be discussed without taking into consideration how the Indian-trained LTTE, who also went on to fight the New Delhi’s Army deployed here, in terms of the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord, signed in July, 1987, giving it an unforgettable hiding. The Indian misadventure here cost them the lives of nearly 1,500 officers and men. Just over a year after the Indian pullout, in March, 1990, the LTTE assassinated Rajiv Gandhi who, in his capacity as the Prime Minister, deployed the Indian Army here. But India launched the Sri Lanka destabilisation project during Indira Gandhi’s premiership.
Western powers, the now decimated United National Party (UNP), Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), and an influential section of the media, propagated the lie that the LTTE couldn’t be defeated. But, the United People’s Freedom Party (UPFA), under President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s resolute leadership, sustained a nearly three-year long genuine sustained offensive that brought the entire Northern and Eastern regions back under government control.
The UNP relentlessly hindered the war against the LTTE. UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe, hell-bent on undermining the military campaign, had no qualms in questioning the military strategy. The former Prime Minister went to the extent of sarcastically questioning the culmination of the military campaign in the East with the capture of Thoppigala (Baron’s cap) in the second week of July, 2007, calling it just a rock outcrop with no significance. Believing the military lacked the strength to continue with the campaign, Wickremesinghe publicly ridiculed the Thoppigala success. The then Brigadier Chagie Gallage, the pint-sized human dynamo, provided critical leadership to the highly successful Eastern campaign that deprived the LTTE the opportunity to compel the armed forces to commit far larger strength to the region. We clearly recall how he went to announce the prized capture from his forward base, that afternoon, driving his own jeep, dressed as a soldier wearing a cap, with his second in command seated by his side, obviously not to fall victim to any sniper hiding in the surrounding jungles.
The likes of Ravi Karunanayaka, Lakshman Kiriella, Dr. Rajitha Senaratna and the late Mangala Samaraweera demeaned such successes by contributing to a vicious political campaign that dented public confidence in the armed forces. Then Lt. General Sarath Fonseka’s Army needed a massive boost, not only to sustain the relentless advance into the enemy territory, but to hold onto and stabilise areas brought under government control. But the viciousness of these critics were such that Samaraweera had the gall to say that Fonseka was not even fit to lead the Salvation Army.
The Opposition campaign was meant to deter the stepped up recruitment campaign that enabled the Army to increase its strength from 116,000 to over 205,000 at the end of the campaign. In spite of disgraceful Opposition attempts to cause doubts, regarding the military campaign among the public, with backing from Western vultures, who were all for LTTE success, the Rajapaksa government maintained the momentum.
President Rajapaksa had a superb team that ensured the government confidently met the daunting challenge. That team included Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa, Vice Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda, Lt. General Sarath Fonseka, Air Marshal Roshan Goonetileke and the then Chief of National Intelligence (CNI) Maj. General Kapila Hendawitharana. There were also the likes of Rear Admiral Sarath Weerasekera, who returned from retirement to transform the once ragtag Home Guards into a worthy back-up to the military, as the Civil Defence Force, at critical places/junctures.
The then Governor of the Central Bank, Ajith Nivard Cabraal, played a significant role in overall government response to the challenge. The then presidential advisor MP Basil Rajapaksa’s role, too, should be appreciated and Prof. Rajiva Wijesinghe as well as Minister Mahinda Samarasinghe contributed to counter the false propaganda campaigns directed at the country. Whatever the shortcomings of the Mahinda Rajapaksa-led UPFA may have had, the armed forces couldn’t have succeeded if the resolute political leadership he provided, with his team of brothers, failed both in and outside Parliament. That is the undeniable truth.
During the 2006-2009 campaign, the UNP twice tried to defeat the UPFA Budget, thereby hoping to bring the war to an abrupt end. Th utterly contemptible move to defeat the UPFA Budget ultimately caused a split in the JVP with a section of the party switching its allegiance to President Rajapaksa to save the day.
Amidst political turmoil and both overt and covert Western interventions, the armed forces pressed ahead with the offensive. It would be pertinent to mention that the Vanni campaign began in March, 2007, a couple of months before the armed forces brought the eastern campaign to an end.
Vanni campaign
The Army launched the Vanni campaign in March, 2007. The 57 Division that had been tasked with taking Madhu, and then proceeding to Kilinochchi, faced fierce resistance. The principal fighting Division suffered significant casualties and progress was slow. An irate Fonseka brought in Maj. Gen. Jagath Dias as General Officer Commanding (GoC) of the 57 Division to advance and consolidate areas brought under control.
The Army expanded the Vanni campaign in September, 2007. The Task Force 1 (later 58 Division) launched operations from the Mannar ‘rice bowl’. Fonseka placed Gallage in command of that fighting formation but was replaced by the then Brigadier Shavendra Silva, as a result of a medical emergency.
The Army gradually took the upper hand in the Vanni west while the LTTE faced a new threat in the Vanni east with the newly created 59 Division, under Brigadier Nandana Udawatta, launching offensive action in January, 2008. Having launched its first major action in the Weli Oya region, that Division fought its way towards Mullaitivu, an LTTE stronghold since 1996.
The 53 (Maj. Gen. Kamal Gunaratne) and 55 (Brig. Prasanna Silva) Divisions, deployed in the Jaffna peninsula, joined the Vanni offensive, in late 2008, as the TF 1 fought its way to Pooneryn, turned right towards Paranthan, captured that area and then hit Elephant Pass and rapidly advanced towards Kilinochchi. The TF 1 and 57 Division met in Kilinochchi and the rest is history.
Once the Army brought Kilinochchi under its control, in January, 2009, the LTTE lost the war. The raising of the Lion flag over Kilinochchi meant that the entire area, west of the Kandy-Jaffna A9 road, had been brought under government control. By then the LTTE had lost the sea supply route, between Tamil Nadu and Mannar region. The LTTE was surrounded by several fighting formations in the Vanni east while the Navy made an unprecedented achievement by cordoning off the Mullaitivu coast that effectively cut them off on all sides.
During the final phase of the naval action, they captured Sea Tiger leader Soosai’s wife, Sathyadevi, and her children Sivanesan Mani Arasu and Sivanesan Sindhu. Spearheaded by the elite Fourth Fast Attack Flotilla, the Navy conducted a sustained campaign, with spectacular success in the high seas, and, by late 2008, the Navy dominated the waters around the country.
The sinking of floating LTTE warehouses, with the intelligence provided by the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) and the US Pacific Command, after the Americans decided to speed up the inevitable, and a campaign, directed at operations across the Palk Strait, weakened the LTTE. By early January, 2009, the LTTE had lost its capacity to carry out mid-sea transfers, and the use of Tamil Nadu fishing trawlers to bring in supplies, and it was only a matter of time before the group surrendered or faced the consequences.
Although Tamil Diaspora still believed in the LTTE launching a massive counter attack on the Vanni east front and the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), under the leadership of the late R. Sampanthan, worked hard to halt the offensive, President Rajapaksa declared that the offensive wouldn’t be called off. President Rajapaksa had the strength to resist the combined pressure brought on him by the West and the UN until the armed forces delivered the final blow.
The despicable efforts made by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to block IMF funding for Sri Lanka is in the public domain. Clinton was obviously trying to please the Tamil Diaspora. The US made that attempt as the ground offensive was on the last phase against the backdrop of the international community suspending relief supply ships to Puthumathalan.
The IMF provided the much required funding to Sri Lanka, regardless of Clinton’s intervention.
A targeted assassination
The Air Force conducted a strategic campaign against the LTTE while providing support to both the Army and the Navy. Despite limited resources, the Air Force pulverised the enemy and high profile target assassination of S.P. Thamilselvan, in his Kilinochchi hideout, in early November, 2007, shook the LTTE leadership. The deployment of a pair of jets (Kafir and MiG 27), on the basis of intelligence provided by the DMI and backed by UAV footage, to carry out a meticulous strike on Thamilselvan’s Kilinochchi hideout, caused unprecedented fear among the LTTE.
Current Defence Secretary, Sampath Thuyakontha, in his capacity as the Commanding Officer of No 09 Squadron, played a vital role in action against the LTTE. Thuyakontha earned the respect of all for landing behind enemy lines in support of LRRP (Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol).
As the Army advanced on the Vanni east front, thousands of LTTE cadres gave up their weapons, threw away their trade mark cyanide capsules and surrendered. Their defences crumbled and even hardcore cadres surrendered, regardless of the warning issued by Prabhakaran. By the time the armed forces concluded clearing operations, over 12,000 LTTE cadres were in government custody. Although those who couldn’t stomach Sri Lanka’s victory over the LTTE propagated lies regarding the rehabilitation programme, the ordinary Tamil people appreciated the project.
C.V. Wigneswaran, in his capacity as the Chief Minister of the Northern Province, called for a US investigation into the death of ex-LTTE cadres in government custody. The retired Supreme Court judge sought to consolidate his political power by alleging the Army executed surrendered men by injecting them with poison. The then Yahapalana government failed to take action against Wigneswaran who claimed over 100 deaths among ex-combatants.
Instead of initiating legal action, the war-winning Rajapaksa government rehabilitated them. Even after the change of government, in 2015, the rehabilitation project continued. Almost all of them had been released and, since the end of war, the members of the defeated LTTE never tried to reorganise, though some Diaspora elements made an attempt.
The LTTE’s demise brought an end to the use of child soldiers. Those who demand justice for Tamils, killed during the war, conveniently forget that forcible recruitment of children, by the LTTE, also ended in May, 2009. Struggling to overcome severe manpower shortage, amidst mounting battlefield losses, the LTTE abducted Tamil children, from the early ’90s, to be press-ganged into their cadre.
Although the UN and ICRC sought a consensus with the LTTE, way back during Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga’s tenure as the President, to cease forced recruitment of children, they couldn’t achieve the desired results. The much publicised UN-ICRC projects failed. The LTTE continued with its despicable abduction of children. The LTTE never stopped child recruitment and, depending on the ground situation, it carried out forced recruitment drives. The signing of the Norwegian arranged Ceasefire Agreement (CFA), too, failed to halt forced child recruitment.
The Darusman report that accused the military of killing over 40,000 civilians during the last phase of the war revealed that the LTTE tried to recruit children as it was about to collapse.
The TNA, or any other like-minded group here or abroad, never urged the LTTE to give up civilian shields and stop recruiting children, though they realised Prabhakaran could no longer change the outcome of the war. Norway, and those who still believed in a negotiated ‘settlement’ in a bid to prevent the annihilation of the group, desperately tried to convince Prabhakaran to give up civilian shields.
A note, dated February 16, 2009, sent to Basil Rajapaksa, by Norwegian Ambassador Tore Hattrem, expressed concern over the fate of those who had been trapped in the Vanni east. Hattrem’s note to Basil Rajapaksa revealed Norway’s serious concern over the LTTE’s refusal to release the civilians.
The following is the Norwegian note, headlined ‘Offer/Proposal to the LTTE’, personally signed by Ambassador Hattrem: “I refer to our telephone conversation today. The proposal to the LTTE on how to release the civilian population, now trapped in the LTTE controlled area, has been transmitted to the LTTE through several channels. So far, there has been, regrettably, no response from the LTTE and it doesn’t seem to be likely that the LTTE will agree with this in the near future.”
In the aftermath of the Anandapuram debacle in the first week of April, 2009, the LTTE lost its fighting capacity to a large extent. The loss of over 600 cadres marked the collapse of the organisation’s conventional fighting capacity.
The LTTE sought an arrangement in which it could retain its remaining weapons and start rebuilding the group again. President Rajapaksa emphasised that only an unconditional surrender could save the group’s remaining cadre. The President refused to recognise an area under the LTTE’s control. The CFA, signed by Wickremesinghe and Prabhakaran, in February, 2002, recognised a vast area under the LTTE control. The CFA gave unparalleled recognition to the terrorist group and that was exploited by them to the hilt.
NPP’s dilemma
During his controversial May Day address this year, President Anura Kumara Dissanayake declared that only the armed forces and police could carry arms. Dissanayake warned that no one else could retain weapons.
President Dissanayake’s declaration is of pivotal importance as the armed forces and police twice crushed JVP-led insurgencies, in 1971 and 1987-1990. Dissanayake is the leader of the JVP and the NPP, two political parties recognised by the Election Commission.
Dissanayake, who is also the Minister of Defence and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, caused controversy last year when the government announced that the President wouldn’t attend the 16th annual war heroes’ commemoration ceremony at War Heroes’ Memorial, in Sri Jayawardenepura Kotte.
That announcement triggered massive backlash. The government rescinded its earlier decision. Having received an unprecedented endorsement from the northern and eastern electorates, both at presidential and parliamentary polls in September and November, 2024, respectively, President Dissanayake seemed to have been somewhat reluctant to join the national celebration.
Yahapalana leaders President Maithripala Sirisena and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe succumbed to Tamil Diaspora and Western pressures to do away with the 2016 annual armed forces Victory Day parade. That treacherous move followed them betraying the war-winning armed forces at the Geneva-based United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in October, 2015.
They co-sponsored accountability resolution, introduced by the US in terms of an understanding with the LTTE’s sidekick. Sirisena and Wickremesinghe forgot that the TNA recognised the LTTE as the sole representative of the Tamil speaking people, in 2001, thereby setting the stage for Eelam War IV. Sampanthan’s outfit, the Illankai Thamil Arasu Kadchi (ITAK)-led TNA, showed its true colours when it joined the UNP-JVP led initiative to defeat Mahinda Rajapaksa. Having accused the war-winning Army Commander, Sarath Fonseka, of unpardonable war crimes, the TNA, along with the UNP-JVP combine, backed Fonseka at the 2010 presidential election. The South rejected Fonseka and he lost the race by a staggering 1.8 mn votes which late JVP leader Somawansa Amarasinghe foolishly called a computer ‘jilmart’, a newly coined word of our fake Marxists. Fonseka’s indefensible declaration, in the run-up to the 2010 presidential election that the celebrated 58 Division executed surrendered LTTE cadres, didn’t do him any good. President Rajapaksa never explained why the US’ unofficial contradiction of Fonseka’s claim was never used cleverly to counter unsubstantiated war crimes allegations, along with Lord Naseby disclosures made in October, 2017.
Sri Lanka’s failure to properly defend the armed forces is nothing but an insult to them. They saved the country from the JVP twice, and Indian trained over half a dozen terrorist groups, finally bringing the largest and the deadliest of them, the LTTE, down to its knees, on the banks of the Nanthikadal lagoon.
The armed forces shouldn’t hesitate to remember their glorious victory over terrorism. Since the change of government in September, 2024, the armed forces refrained from at least mentioning their battlefield achievements. At the last Independence Day, the armed forces shockingly mentioned their role in the Ditwah cyclone recovery efforts as their main achievement, to please the political masters, who themselves have been lackeys of the West, while outwardly professing to be Marxists, the latter line they have already conveniently dropped for all purposes. The armed forces shouldn’t play NPP politics but explain the situation to the current dispensation. The failure on the part of armed forces to erase their proud achievements against terrorism, out of their press releases/narratives, look rather stupid.
Midweek Review
A Novel, a Movie and a Play
Drawing a Thread through Loss and Creativity in Shakespeare’s Life
William Shakespeare [1556-1616] is generally regarded as the greatest playwright and poet in the English language. Notwithstanding the universal appeal and the timelessness of his work, very little is known about his inner-self. Despite his profound understanding of the human condition, evident in his remarkable works of drama and poetry, the origin of his psychological insights – formed long before formal theories of the mind emerged – remain unknown, often loosely ascribed to an innate gift. The thematic and philosophical dimensions of his work are often said to be influenced by the classics of the ‘ancient world’ such as Ovid’s Metamorphosis.
The bestselling novel, Hamnet, by Maggie O’Farrell is a confluence of fact and fiction. The award-winning movie, by the same name, is an adaptation of the novel, its screenplay co-written by Maggie O’Farrell and Chloe Zhao, the director. The central theme of the novel and the movie is the devastating impact of the death of Shakespeare’s son, Hamnet, in 1596, at an early age of eleven, and the sensitive portrayal of the grieving process of the family, inviting the audience to reflect on the proposition that Shakespeare channelled his personal grief into writing Hamlet, the play, four years later.
Mourning and melancholy take centre stage in Hamlet prompting a probable link between William Shakespeare’s own emotional world and his artistic imagination. Interestingly, the names Hamnet and Hamlet were used interchangeably during the Elizabethan era, adding weight to the speculation.
The movie matches the imaginative and descriptive brilliance of the novel. The narrative unfolds against the backdrop of Stratford-upon-Avon and its environs and its inhabitants of Elizabethan England, finally shifting to London and the Globe Theatre. The film won eight nominations at the 98th Academy Awards, including best picture, best director for Zhao, and best actress for Jessie Buckley, who immortalises Anne Hathaway, [‘Agnes’] Shakespeare’s wife, through whom the real face of family grief is portrayed. Shakespeare [nameless] remains ‘silent’ and virtually ‘back-stage’ in London preoccupied with the playhouse, the players and the plays.
Many Shakespeare scholars have speculated about a probable link between the death of Hamnet Shakespeare and the writing of Hamlet, his Magnum Opus:
“No one can say for certain how the death of Shakespeare’s son affected him, but it is hard not to notice that in the years following Hamnet’s death Shakespeare wrote a play obsessed with fathers and sons, grief, and the persistence of the dead.” [James Shapiro]
“Hamnet’s death must have been a devastating blow…..and the shadow of that loss may well lie behind the profound meditations on mortality in Hamlet.” [Park Honan]
“The death of Hamnet is the most plausible personal event to have touched Shakespeare deeply in these years, and it is tempting to hear an echo of that loss in the grief that permeates Hamlet.” [Germaine Greer]
That echo is clearly heard in Act 4, scene 5 in Hamlet:
He is dead and gone, lady,
He is dead and gone;
At his head a grass-green turf,
At his heels a stone.
Yet, in the play, a son loses his father, and the circumstance of the loss is different. Hamlet mourns the sudden death of his father, king Hamlet, he idolised. The young prince is faced with a complex emotional challenge as the late king’s brother, Claudius, usurper to the throne, marries the widowed queen, denying the young prince of his lawful right to sovereignty. The process of mourning is weighed down by the profound significance of the personal loss to the prince and being bereft of any trusting relationships to share his grief – mourning turning to melancholy.
Shakespeare’s greatest tragedy, Hamlet, has gained unremitting interest of audiences, universally over four hundred years, and has been open to divergent appraisal. Any commentary on the play without an exploration of the psyche of its protagonist, prince Hamlet, would be as the popular cliché goes, ‘like Hamlet without the prince of Denmark!’ Hamlet is the longest of all Shakespearean plays, with the least amount of action, but with the most amount of spoken word, mainly by prince Hamlet, which includes his soliloquies [solo locution: self-discourse] that opens the door to his inner self, inviting in by Hamlet himself: “pluck out the heart of my mystery”.
In the first of his soliloquies, Hamlet reveals his affliction with melancholy. He describes the world as worthless, wishes he is dead, contemplates suicide but regrets that God does not sanction such self-destruction. “O, that this too too solid flesh would melt/ Thaw and resolve itself into dew/ O, that the Everlasting had not fixed/ His cannon ‘gainst self-slaughter. O, God, God/ Seem to me all the uses of this world!’
Hamlet’s anguish is expressed as: ‘This goodly frame, the earth’ is no more than a ‘Sterile promontory’; ‘this majestical roof fretted with golden fire’; the heavens, ‘a foul and pestilent congregation of vapours’; and man, ‘the paragon of animals’, a quintessence of dust’, his mind ‘an unweeded garden/ That grows to seed.’ – Hamlet’s melancholic thought with depressive and nihilistic content expressed in philosophical terms.
But his anguish is best depicted in his fourth soliloquy [Act 3, Scene1] arguably, the most quoted piece of verse in all Shakespeare: ‘To be, or not to be’ – about life and death. He questions, ‘whether ‘tis nobler in the mind to suffer/ The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune/ Or take arms against a sea of troubles/ and by opposing, end them’. What happens after death? Is it a peaceful sleep or nightmare? Do we end our miseries by putting ourselves to the ‘quietus’ with a dagger, and enter that ‘undiscovered country’ from which ‘no traveller returns’, or put up with our problems? ‘Conscience makes cowards of us all’ and make us procrastinate.
In his soliloquies Hamlet reveals his affliction with melancholy. He wishes that his body would melt away, describes the world as worthless and contemplates suicide – negative cognitions about the self, the environment and the future, characteristic of severe mood disturbance – but regrets that God does not sanction such self-destruction.
********
Grief is a universal human experience following loss, characterised by sadness, at times mixed with anger and guilt, and frequently transient in nature. Depending on the perceived significance [‘meaningfulness’] of the loss and the absence of a sharing or confiding relationship, grief may become prolonged, with a potential to become pathological.
In a seminal paper published in 1917, Sigmund Freud [1856 – 1939], argued that there are two different responses to loss – ‘Mourning and Melancholia’. His contribution remains the basis for understanding unconscious grief in psychoanalytic thought.
Freud describes mourning as a natural way to respond to losing something or someone significant. It is a transitory process, potentially transforming, albeit painful. In mourning the loss of a loved one, the bereaved gradually withdraws the emotional energy – ‘libido’ – from ‘the lost object’, and the emotional investment is redirected to an ‘alternate object’ or pursuit. Throughout this process the ‘self’ remains intact, allowing the person to heal by integrating the loss into life. In psychology, this process in which a person unconsciously redirects unacceptable or distressing impulses into socially acceptable or constructive activities is called sublimation – a concept introduced by Sigmund Freud and later developed further by his daughter Anna Freud. Instead of expressing the impulse directly, the energy behind it is transformed into something positive or productive – an ‘ego defence’.
On the other hand, Freud described melancholia as a persistent state that stays within the ‘unconscious’ – the repressed aspect of the mind, while the person feels trapped in unresolved emotions which jeopardises their mental and physical well-being.
Shakespeare lost a child, the only son, Hamnet, still in his formative years. The playwright had no option but to leave his family in his birthplace of Stratford-upon-Avon, and return to London after burying his son to continue his work at the playhouse. The significance of the loss to the father would, no doubt, have been profound, as the Greek historian Herodotus fittingly proclaimed, “No one that has lost a child knows what it is to lose a child”.
In the novel, and as depicted in the movie, Agnes [Anne Hathaway] travels to London to meet her husband. Unknown to him she stands with the audience at the Globe Theatre to watch Hamlet, the play, while Shakespeare remains backstage. As O’Farrell poignantly writes in her novel, “Hamlet, here on this stage, is two people, the young man alive, and the father dead. He is both alive and dead. Her husband [Shakespeare] has brought him back to life, in the only way he can”. “She stretches out a hand as if to acknowledge them, as if to feel the air between the three of them, as if to pierce the boundary between audience and players, between real life and play”.
Many literary scholars speculate that Shakespeare in mourning gave voice to his grief through Hamlet, the play’s introspective protagonist, who takes to the stage with melancholic expression. There are others who dispute this view, arguing that Hamlet is a product of his creative genius that transcends any autobiographical explanation. While Hamnet, the novel, and its film adaptation do not assert a direct historical link, they suggest an association between the playwright’s personal loss and his artistic creation. The notion that Shakespeare sublimated his grief into creating the iconic stage work remains suggestive, yet unprovable, but reveals an important ‘therapeutic strategy’ [sublimation] in dealing with loss. Nevertheless, through Hamlet, he gives enduring expression to a universal human condition – grief – that resonates across time.
Moreover, from an aesthetic point of view, a work of art can truly be called Art – whether encountered on the page, the screen, or the stage – when it invites reflection or evokes emotion. The thread that runs through the novel, the movie and the play tend to reinforce that notion.
By Dr. Siri Galhenage, Psychiatrist [Retd]
sirigalhenage@gmail.com
Midweek Review
The Dignity of the Female Head
You’ve been at it these long hours,
Sweeping the sidewalks of the big city,
And scrubbing floors of public toilets,
All the while wiping the sweat off your brow,
And waiting eagerly for departure time,
To get to your comfy nest in the teeming slum,
And see the eyes of your waiting kids,
Light up with love at your sight,
Their hands searching you for sweets,
And such moments of family joy,
Are for you and other women of dignity,
What is seriously meant by Liberation,
But this is lost on grandstanding rulers,
Who know not the spirit of shared living,
Nor the difference between a home and a house.
By Lynn Ockersz
-
News5 days agoEx-SriLankan CEO’s death: Controversy surrounds execution of bail bond
-
Features1 day agoSri Lankan Airlines Airbus Scandal and the Death of Kapila Chandrasena and my Brother Rajeewa
-
Features6 days agoHigh Stakes in Pursuing corruption cases
-
Features6 days agoWhen University systems fail:Supreme Court’s landmark intervention in sexual harassment case
-
News2 days agoLanka’s eligibility to draw next IMF tranche of USD 700 mn hinges on ‘restoration of cost-recovery pricing for electricity and fuel’
-
Midweek Review5 days agoA victory that can never be forgotten
-
Features3 days agoMysterious Death of United Nations Secretary General Hammarskjöld
-
Opinion4 days agoElectricity tariffs have skyrocketed: Can further increases be prevented?
