Midweek Review
‘Duty and Devotion’: Former Army Chief’s perspective of war, post-conflict developments
By Shamindra Ferdinando
In the immediate aftermath of the Elephant Pass debacle in late April 2000, the then Army Commander Lt. Gen. Srilal Weerasooriya (Dec 16, 1998 to August 24, 2000), faced the daunting task of explaining the circumstances leading to the catastrophic loss.
The disastrous outcome of the Elephant Pass battle, though not the worst in terms of officers and men killed and wounded during the conflict caused by Indian intervention (July 1983-May 2009), not only was a massive setback that overwhelmed and humiliated the military, but also the entire country.
Elephant Pass remained in the hands of the LTTE till early January 2009. Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka’s Army brought it back under government control and restored the Vavuniya-Jaffna stretch of the Kandy-Jaffna A9 road, thereby paving the way for the last phase of the offensive on the Vanni east front (January –May 2009).
The writer was among a small group of journalists invited to cover the embattled Army Chief’s briefing at Army Headquarters (then situated at the site of the present day Shangri-La Hotel area), where he stoutly defended the decision to abandon vital gateway to the peninsula held by a Division plus troops (Pass withdrawal purely military, says Army Chief, The Island, April 24, 2000). The second story based on that briefing headlined ‘LTTE captured only one artillery piece’ was carried on April 27, 2000. Weerasooriya, in response to a media query, declared that he never wanted censorship (Army Chief says he never wanted censorship, The Island, April 27, 2000).
Weerasooriya, who served as our High Commissioner in Islamabad (2000 to 2007) after retirement from the Army, discusses the entire gamut of war and conflict-related issues in his memoirs ‘Duty and Devotion’ launched on July (07) at S. Thomas College, Mount Lavinia. The book is a Vijitha Yapa publication. Incidentally the publisher had been a schoolmate of the General and the first editor of this newspaper (The Island) as it was launched back in late 1981.
The God fearing General beautifully covers his childhood days and life at one of the premier schools leading to him joining the then mainly ceremonial Army at the age of 19.
Weerasooriya is the second former Army Commander to release his memoirs, the first being Field Marshal Sarath Fonseka, who launched his memoirs on June 28, 2024. Fonseka received appointment as Field Marshal in March 2015, about a year before he was accommodated in the Cabinet by Yahapalana Premier Ranil Wickremesinghe. At Fonseka’s event held at Nelum Pokuna, the Chief Guest had been President Ranil Wickremesinghe whereas the Warden of S. Thomas College, Marc Billimoria, attended the July 7 event as the Chief Guest.
Perhaps digressing a bit we should make a basic comparison of the two commanders. Gen. Weerasooriya is a gentleman from head to toe and ever mindful of decorum, while FM Fonseka is a true warrior from top to bottom.
The highlight of the day’s proceedings was the unveiling of Gen. Weerasooriya’s portrait by the Warden.
The author deals meticulously with major battles, political developments, deployment of IPKF as well as its withdrawal, strategic blunders, slain State Defence Minister Ranjan Wijeratne’s animosity towards India (IPKF), shortcomings within the defence establishment and treachery at the highest level.
Gen. Weerasooriya found fault with the assassinated President Ranasinghe Premadasa and his Foreign Minister the late A.C.S. Hameed for weakening the position of the armed forces in the run-up to the resumption of Eelam War II in June 1990, three months after the withdrawal of the IPKF (Indian Peace Keeping Force).
One significant matter that received the author’s attention was how immature political leadership and absence of common strategy prolonged the war.
The former non-career diplomat’s comments regarding a reckless and irresponsible politician-incumbent Ports, Shipping and Aviation Minister and SLFP Chairman Nimal Siripala de Silva whom he blames for the death of Brigadier Ananda Hamangoda depicting a pathetic situation during Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga’s presidency. If not for Minister de Silva’s unannounced arrival in Palaly and foolishly moving into an area outside the secured area that led to the death of the then Jaffna Brigade Commander Hammangoda on July 4, 1996, in a blast carried out by a suicide cadre. Weerasooriya had been the senior officer in the Jaffna theatre at that time.
The author examined the successful conclusion of the war 15 years after Sri Lanka’s unlikely triumph over the once India’s blundered terror project here and the two abortive Southern insurgencies, in 1971 and 1987-1990. Weerasooriya recalled his confrontations with the JVP during the 1971 insurgency and his role during the second JVP-led terror campaign.
Reference was also made to a Minister who undermined the war effort during Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga’s tenure as the President. Although the author refrained from naming the Minister, his reference to the ‘Sudu Nelum’ movement revealed that the culprit was none other than the late Mangala Samaraweera, who openly undermined the war effort, while the CBK administration simply refused to give an ear to the military underscored the challenges of that time. However, we are all aware that President Kumaratunga created the Sudu Nelum movement and Mangala was one of the key people. There had been about 20 other PA MPs who participated in the disastrous project.
The General’s comments on Pakistan underscored the value of our all-weather relationship with that country whose support at crucial times prevented the breakup of Sri Lanka. The author didn’t mince his words when he declared the timely arrival of two 30 barrel MBRLs (multi barrel rocket launchers) by sea at Kankesanthurai for immediate deployment against the advancing LTTE units. If not for the successful deployment of MBRLs against three major targets, including Chavakachcheri, the Army couldn’t have held the Muhamalai frontline. Gen Weerasooriya’s Army established the Muhamalai line after the strategic Elephant Pass debacle. It would be pertinent to mention that Chief of Army Staff of Pakistan the late Gen. Pervez Musharraf, who had been a friend and colleague of Gen. Weerasooriya’s PMA (Pakistan Military Academy) within days arranged for the immediate airlifting of two MBRLs to Colombo.
The Sitara-i-Pakistan was awarded to General Weerasooriya in March 2014 in recognition of his commendable contributions to promote and enhance Pakistan-Sri Lanka bilateral relations.
Heart-rending losses of their eldest child, a 16-year-old son, and then their second son, immediately after birth, his love for pretty Dilhani, later his wife, difficulties they experienced and their faith in God dominated ‘Duty and Devotion’ launched on July 7.
One of Sri Lanka’s top retired diplomats, H.M.G.S. Palihakkara, one-time Foreign Secretary, also shared some thought provoking views with the audience.
Overall the five sections of ‘Duty and Devotion’ read out at its launch didn’t really reflect the precarious post-Riviresa (Operation Riviresa conducted in late 1995 brought Jaffna under government control) battlefield situation during Kumaratunga’s presidency though retired Maj. Gen. Ruwan Wanigasooroiya, in his presentation, dealt with the introduction of heat-seeking missiles at the onset of Eelam War III in April 1995 and the loss of two Avros over the northern theatre of operations. Wanigasooriya, one-time Military Spokesman, dealt with the critically important development, the acquisition by the LTTE, without anyone’s knowledge here, of Soviet era SAMs (surface-to-air missiles) that changed the overall nature of the war.
The author found fault with a senior Air Force team that hurriedly determined after having inspected the wreckage of the first Avro crash that it was caused by a technical fault and not by a missile attack. That utterly wrong assessment led the SLAF to send another Avro from Colombo on the following Day – April 29, 1995. The second Avro, too, was shot down over Neerveli. At the time the two Avros were shot down, Weerasooriya had been Task Force Commander, Jaffna, and was one of those who reached the wreckage of the first Avro. Weerasooriya wrote: “I ran to the site, and was one of the first on the scene as it was no more than 200 meters from my quarters. The plane had split into three parts and the debris was strewn all over. There were no survivors. The passengers were badly charred. Everyone had their seatbelts on and their shoes off.”
The author revealed how Flight Lt Kalu Silva, who flew into Palaly at dawn on April 29, 1995, took a different path regardless of the findings made by the high level Air Force team led by AVM Donald Perera.
Kadirgamar’s advice
Until the launch of ‘Duty and Devotion’ the public never knew the circumstances leading to the Army Headquarters briefing in the immediate aftermath of the Elephant Pass debacle, the worst in terms of strategic importance.
In spite of Gen. Weerasooriya’s assertion that the holding of Muhamalai line was as effective as having Elephant Pass, he himself disclosed how no less a person than Security Forces Commander Jaffna, the late Maj. Gen. Janaka Perera, sought to vacate Muhamalai in early June 2000 to a new line north of Varani in Vadamaratchchy. The author quoted Perera as having declared in the presence of the then de facto Defence Minister General Anuruddha Ratwatte that the situation is untenable.
If not for Kadirgamar’s intervention at an emergency session of the National Security Council (NSC) held on the night of April 19, 2000, perhaps Gen. Weerasooriya wouldn’t have called a media briefing on April 23 night to explain the Elephant Pass debacle.
The author quoted Kadirgamar as having told the emergency NSC session: “The country needs to be told of the situation and what happened at Elephant Pass. Gen. Weerasooriya accepted the responsibility to inform the public, the only occasion a Commander of the Army addressed the media regarding a major setback. Overrunning of the Mullaithivu Brigade, consisting of two infantry battalions and support elements, in July 1996, was the worst single debacle in terms of human cost. The Army lost over 1,000 officers and men. The late Gen. Rohan D.S. Daluwatte served as the Commander of the Army at that time (May 1, 1996 to Dec 15, 1998). Srilal Weerasooriya succeeded him.
The other devastating debacle, also in terms of human cost, was Pooneryn (early Nov 1993). Lt. Gen. Cecil Waidyaratne, as the Commander of the Army (Nov 16, 1991 to Dec 31, 1993) accepted responsibility. He resigned nearly two months after the humiliating Pooneryn setback.
The daunting challenges faced by General Weerasooriya cannot be properly examined without taking into consideration the unprecedented success achieved by the LTTE during General Daluwatte’s tenure as the Commander.
The failed costly Jayasikurui offensive (May 13, 1997-Dec 02, 1998) that was intended to restore the Vavuniya-Kilinochchi stretch of the Kandy-Jaffna A9, the loss of Mullaithivu, in July 1996, and Kilinochchi in the first week of Oct 1998, during General Daluwatte tenure as the Commander, severely undermined the overall war effort. The Overall Operations Commander (OOC) of the disastrous Jayasikurui was the then Maj. Gen. Weerasooriya, who received the appointment in Nov 1997.
The author disclosed an attempt made by the LTTE to assassinate him on his way back to Vavuniya during the Jayasukurui offensive. The chance arrest of an LTTE operative at Thandikulam entry/exit point exposed the assassination plan though the rationale in the LTTE that sent written instructions to a Colombo–based hit squad remains a mystery. The interrogation revealed the hit squad had been tasked to take him out while he was returning from a rally addressed by German evangelist Reinhard Bonnke.
An encounter with PM Ranil

One of the most interesting and, perhaps, the most important chapter, headlined ‘What might have been’, didn’t receive the attention it deserved at the launch. Over 15 years after the conclusion of the war, and 24 years after he retired, General Weerasooriya declared that the LTTE could have been defeated years before if the political leadership provided the armed forces requirements.
The author discussed the failure on the part of the political leadership to meet their requirements in the aftermath of the Araly point blast on August 08, 1992, that claimed the lives of Maj. Gen. Denzil Kobbekaduwa and Brigadier Wijaya Wimalaratne, during Lt. General Cecil Waidyaratne’s tenure as Commander of the Army.
Against the backdrop of bad blood between Waidyaratne and Kobbekaduwa, the latter deeply resented establishment of a new HQ in Anuradhapura to cover his TAOR (Tactical Area of Responsibility). Kobbekaduwa obviously directed his anger at Weerasooriya, too, who was the senior officer assigned to the new HQ. The author quoted an irate Northern Commander as having told him “this HQ has been established to spy on me.”
On the day an accidental blast claimed the lives of Kobbekaduwa and Wimalaratne, Weerasooriya received the appointment as Director Operations at Army HQ, a position that was directly answerable to Commander of the Army.
Short chapter 36 ‘What might have been’ dealt with response of the then government to the armed forces’ needs. In the year 1992, the Army lacked the wherewithal to fight the LTTE. Through the Budget, the government of the day imposed severe restrictions on the expansion of the Army and acquisition and increase in firepower – two major factors that undermined the overall war effort.
The government hadn’t been interested in a comprehensive plan that was formulated by the combined forces on a directive of the then Defence Secretary General Sepala Attygalle. Weerasooriya claimed that Premier Ranil Wickremesinghe, who presided over the armed forces presentation, walked out of the meeting within three minutes after the commencement. Weerasooriya quoted PM Wickremesinghe as having said “I have no time to waste listening to this rubbish’ as he walked out of the conference room. Wickremesinghe couldn’t have been the PM in 1992 as he only got elevated to that position after the assassination of President Premadasa on May Day 1993 and after DB Wijetunga became the new President. Perhaps, the author made a mistake there.
Somehow General Attygalle, having managed to convince Premier Wickremesinghe to return to the conference room, got the military to simply present the plan and their urgent requirements. Weerasooriya declared that Premier Wickremesinghe’s authorization to increase the number of men by 10,000 was a drop in the Ocean.
The Armed forces never received the approval it sought to increase their strength to meet requirements until Mahinda Rajapaksa became the President in November 2005. Rajapaksa authorized the doubling of the Army’s strength to over 200,000. By the time the combined armed forces brought the war to an end in May 2009, there were 205,000 in the Army’s payroll.
Now, the incumbent government wants to reduce the Army’s strength to 100,000 by 2030. The armed forces should take tangible measures to ensure that they retain wartime expertise and experience and sustain intelligence capabilities at the highest level. The reduction of numerical strength should be matched by enhanced intelligence capabilities at all levels and introduction of new technologies.
Future challenges
The author’s assertion that post-war mega projects undertaken by the Rajapaksas, unbridled corruption and lack of accountability as well as leadership vacuum contributed to the overall deterioration leading to the declaration of bankruptcy cannot be discussed without paying attention to two matters – (a) abolition of the time tested Exchange Control Act in July 2017 and (b) procurement of commercial loans to the tune of USD 12.5 bn during the Yahapalana administration (2015-2019).
Therefore, it wouldn’t be fair to find fault with only the Rajapaksas for the economic crisis. It would be also pertinent to mention that loan components of lending agencies ADB and World Banks were relatively small and viable when compared with funds procured from other commercial creditors.
The often made assertion that the political vacuum created by LTTE assassinations deprived Sri Lanka good leadership, as General Weerasooriya declared, has to be carefully examined. The question is whether the country could have avoided bankruptcy if political assassinations were thwarted. Did this reference only pertain to Sinhala parliamentarians and leaders? Even if the LTTE never existed, Sri Lanka would have been bankrupted due to unchecked waste and corruption, criminal mismanagement of the economy and irregularities at every level of administration. That is the ugly truth. Except for a very few, all other politicians and some top officials had been tarnished by corruption charges that were never properly investigated by successive governments. The incumbent dispensation is no exception.
Had we been blessed with a proper system of governance, the country couldn’t have been bankrupted under any circumstances, well over a decade after the eradication of the LTTE. Unfortunately, the system failed the country and here we are struggling on the economic front over 15 years after the end of a conflict many experts declared was unwinnable through military means.
One lacuna in the General’s well-presented personal account is failure to mention about the well-documented foreign interference (countries other than India) in the local conflict where from the beginning there had been arms embargo against Sri Lanka, by the West, and it was the unhesitating help extended by mainly China and Pakistan, as well as Israel, that staved off our virtual defeat at the hands of the terrorists.
Midweek Review
Daya Pathirana killing and transformation of the JVP
JVP leader Somawansa Amarasinghe, who returned to Sri Lanka in late Nov, 2001, ending a 12-year self-imposed exile in Europe, declared that India helped him flee certain death as the government crushed his party’s second insurrection against the state in the ’80s, using even death squads. Amarasinghe, sole surviving member of the original politburo of the JVP, profusely thanked India and former Prime Minister V.P. Singh for helping him survive the crackdown. Neither the JVP nor India never explained the circumstances New Delhi facilitated Amarasinghe’s escape, particularly against the backdrop of the JVP’s frenzied anti-India campaign. The JVP has claimed to have killed Indian soldiers in the East during the 1987-1989 period. Addressing his first public meeting at Kalutara, a day after his arrival, Amarasinghe showed signs that the party had shed its anti-India policy of yesteryears. The JVPer paid tribute to the people of India, PM Singh and Indian officials who helped him escape.
By Shamindra Ferdinando
Forty years after the killing of Daya Pathirana, the third head of the Independent Student Union (ISU) by the Socialist Students’ Union (SSU), affiliated with the JVP, one-time Divaina journalist Dharman Wickremaretne has dealt with the ISU’s connections with some Tamil terrorist groups. The LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) hadn’t been among them, according to Wickremaretne’s Daya Pathirana Ghathanaye Nodutu Peththa (The Unseen Side of Daya Pathirana Killing), the fifth of a series of books that discussed the two abortive insurgencies launched by the JVP in 1971 and the early ’80s.
Pathirana was killed on 15 December, 1986. His body was found at Hirana, Panadura. Pathirana’s associate, Punchiralalage Somasiri, also of the ISU, who had been abducted, along with Pathirana, was brutally attacked but, almost by a miracle, survived to tell the tale. Daya Pathirana was the second person killed after the formation of the Deshapremi Janatha Vyaparaya (DJV), the macabre wing of the JVP, in early March 1986. The DJV’s first head had been JVP politburo member Saman Piyasiri Fernando.
Its first victim was H. Jayawickrema, Principal of Middeniya Gonahena Vidyalaya, killed on 05 December, 1986. The JVP found fault with him for suspending several students for putting up JVP posters.
Wickremaretne, who had been relentlessly searching for information, regarding the violent student movements for two decades, was lucky to receive obviously unconditional support of those who were involved with the SSU and ISU as well as other outfits. Somasiri was among them.
Deepthi Lamaheva had been ISU’s first leader. Warnakulasooriya succeeded Lamahewa and was replaced by Pathirana. After Pathirana’s killing K.L. Dharmasiri took over. Interestingly, the author justified Daya Pathirana’s killing on the basis that those who believed in violence died by it.
Wickremaretne’s latest book, the fifth of the series on the JVP, discussed hitherto largely untouched subject – the links between undergraduates in the South and northern terrorists, even before the July 1983 violence in the wake of the LTTE killing 12 soldiers, and an officer, while on a routine patrol at Thinnavely, Jaffna.
The LTTE emerged as the main terrorist group, after the Jaffna killings, while other groups plotted to cause mayhem. The emergence of the LTTE compelled the then JRJ government to transfer all available police and military resources to the North, due to the constant attacks that gradually weakened government authority there. In Colombo, ISU and Tamil groups, including the PLOTE (People’s Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) enhanced cooperation. Wickremaretne shed light on a disturbing ISU-PLOTE connection that hadn’t ever been examined or discussed or received sufficient public attention.
In fact, EROS (Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students), too, had been involved with the ISU. According to the author, the ISU had its first meeting on 10 April, 1980. In the following year, ISU established contact with the EPRLF (Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front). The involvement of ISU with the PLOTE and Wickremaretne revealed how the SSU probed that link and went to the extent of secretly interrogating ISU members in a bid to ascertain the details of that connection. ISU activist Pradeep Udayakumara Thenuwara had been forcibly taken to Sri Jayewardenepura University where he was subjected to strenuous interrogation by SSU in a bid to identify those who were involved in a high profile PLOTE operation.
The author ascertained that the SSU suspected Pathirana’s direct involvement in the PLOTE attack on the Nikaweratiya Police Station, and the Nikaweratiya branch of the People’s Bank, on April 26, 1985. The SSU believed that out of a 16-member gang that carried out the twin attacks, two were ISU members, namely Pathirana, and another identified as Thalathu Oya Seneviratne, aka Captain Senevi.
The SSU received information regarding ISU’s direct involvement in the Nikaweratiya attacks from hardcore PLOTE cadre Nagalingam Manikkadasan, whose mother was a Sinhalese and closely related to JVP’s Upatissa Gamanayake. The LTTE killed Manikkadasan in a bomb attack on a PLOTE office, in Vavuniya, in September, 1999. The writer met Manikkadasan, at Bambapalitiya, in 1997, in the company of Dharmalingham Siddharthan. The PLOTE had been involved in operations in support of President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga’s administration.
It was President Premadasa who first paved the way for Tamil groups to enter the political mainstream. In spite of some of his own advisors expressing concern over Premadasa’s handling of negotiations with the LTTE, he ordered the then Elections Commissioner Chandrananda de Silva to grant political recognition to the LTTE. The LTTE’s political wing PFLT (People’s Front of Liberation Tigers) received recognition in early December, 1989, seven months before Eelam War II erupted.
Transformation of ISU
The author discussed the formation of the ISU, its key members, links with Tamil groups, and the murderous role in the overall counter insurgency campaign during JRJ and Ranasinghe Premadasa presidencies. Some of those who had been involved with the ISU may have ended up with various other groups, even civil society groups. Somasiri, who was abducted along with Pathirana at Thunmulla and attacked with the same specialised knife, but survived, is such a person.
Somasiri contested the 06 May Local Government elections, on the Jana Aragala Sandhanaya ticket. Jana Aragala Sandhanaya is a front organisation of the Frontline Socialist Party/ Peratugaami pakshaya, a breakaway faction of the JVP that also played a critical role in the violent protest campaign Aragalaya against President Gotabaya Rajapaksa. That break-up happened in April 2012, The wartime Defence Secretary, who secured the presidency at the 2019 presidential election, with 6.9 mn votes, was forced to give up office, in July 2022, and flee the country.
Somasiri and Jana Aragala Sandhanaya were unsuccessful; the group contested 154 Local Government bodies and only managed to secure only 16 seats whereas the ruling party JVP comfortably won the vast majority of Municipal Councils, Urban Councils and Pradeshiya Sabhas.
Let us get back to the period of terror when the ISU was an integral part of the UNP’s bloody response to the JVP challenge. The signing of the Indo-Lanka accord, in late July 1987, resulted in the intensification of violence by both parties. Wickremaretne disclosed secret talks between ISU leader K.L. Dharmasiri and the then Senior SSP (Colombo South) Abdul Cader Abdul Gafoor to plan a major operation to apprehend undergraduates likely to lead protests against the Indo-Lanka accord. Among those arrested were Gevindu Cumaratunga and Anupa Pasqual. Cumaratunga, in his capacity as the leader of civil society group Yuthukama, that contributed to the campaign against Yahapalanaya, was accommodated on the SLPP National List (2020 to 2024) whereas Pasqual, also of Yuthukama, entered Parliament on the SLPP ticket, having contested Kalutara. Pasqual switched his allegiance to Ranil Wickremesinghe after Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s ouster in July 2022.
SSU/JVP killed K.L. Dharmasiri on 19 August, 1989, in Colomba Kochchikade just a few months before the Army apprehended and killed JVP leader Rohana Wijeweera. Towards the end of the counter insurgency campaign, a section of the ISU was integrated with the military (National Guard). The UNP government had no qualms in granting them a monthly payment.
Referring to torture chambers operated at the Law Faculty of the Colombo University and Yataro operations centre, Havelock Town, author Wickremaretne underscored the direct involvement of the ISU in running them.
Maj. Tuan Nizam Muthaliff, who had been in charge of the Yataro ‘facility,’ located near State Defence Minister Ranjan Wijeratne’s residence, is widely believed to have shot Wijeweera in November, 1989. Muthaliff earned the wrath of the LTTE for his ‘work’ and was shot dead on May 3, 2005, at Polhengoda junction, Narahenpita. At the time of Muthaliff’s assassination, he served in the Military Intelligence.
Premadasa-SSU/JVP link
Ex-lawmaker and Jathika Chinthanaya Kandayama stalwart Gevindu Cumaratunga, in his brief address to the gathering, at Wickremaretne’s book launch, in Colombo, compared Daya Pathirana’s killing with the recent death of Nandana Gunatilleke, one-time frontline JVPer.
Questioning the suspicious circumstances surrounding Gunatilleke’s demise, Cumaratunga strongly emphasised that assassinations shouldn’t be used as a political tool or a weapon to achieve objectives. The outspoken political activist discussed the Pathirana killing and Gunatilleke’s demise, recalling the false accusations directed at the then UNPer Gamini Lokuge regarding the high profile 1986 hit.
Cumaratunga alleged that the SSU/JVP having killed Daya Pathirana made a despicable bid to pass the blame to others. Turning towards the author, Cumaratunga heaped praise on Wickremaretne for naming the SSU/JVP hit team and for the print media coverage provided to the student movements, particularly those based at the Colombo University.
Cumaratunga didn’t hold back. He tore into SSU/JVP while questioning their current strategies. At one point a section of the audience interrupted Cumaratunga as he made references to JVP-led Jathika Jana Balawegaya (JJB) and JJB strategist Prof. Nirmal Dewasiri, who had been with the SSU during those dark days. Cumaratunga recalled him attending Daya Pathirana’s funeral in Matara though he felt that they could be targeted.
Perhaps the most controversial and contentious issue raised by Cumaratunga was Ranasinghe Premadasa’s alleged links with the SSU/JVP. The ex-lawmaker reminded the SSU/JVP continuing with anti-JRJ campaign even after the UNP named Ranasinghe Premadasa as their candidature for the December 1988 presidential election. His inference was clear. By the time Premadasa secured the presidential nomination he had already reached a consensus with the SSU/JVP as he feared JRJ would double cross him and give the nomination to one of his other favourites, like Gamini Dissanayake or Lalith Athulathmudali.
There had been intense discussions involving various factions, especially among the most powerful SSU cadre that led to putting up posters targeting Premadasa at the Colombo University. Premadasa had expressed surprise at the appearance of such posters amidst his high profile ‘Me Kawuda’ ‘Monawada Karanne’poster campaign. Having questioned the appearance of posters against him at the Colombo University, Premadasa told Parliament he would inquire into such claims and respond. Cumaratunga alleged that night UNP goons entered the Colombo University to clean up the place.
The speaker suggested that the SSU/JVP backed Premadasa’s presidential bid and the UNP leader may have failed to emerge victorious without their support. He seemed quite confident of his assertion. Did the SSU/JVP contribute to Premadasa’s victory at one of the bloodiest post-independence elections in our history.
Cumaratunga didn’t forget to comment on his erstwhile comrade Anupa Pasqual. Alleging that Pasqual betrayed Yuthukama when he switched allegiance to Wickremesinghe, Cumaratunga, however, paid a glowing tribute to him for being a courageous responder, as a student leader.
SSU accepts Eelam
One of the most interesting chapters was the one that dealt with the Viplawadi Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna/Revolutionary Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (RJVP), widely known as the Vikalpa Kandaya/Alternative Group and the ISU mount joint campaigns with Tamil groups. Both University groups received weapons training, courtesy PLOTE and EPRLF, both here, and in India, in the run-up to the so-called Indo-Lanka Peace Accord. In short, they accepted Tamils’ right to self-determination.
The author also claimed that the late Dharmeratnam Sivaram had been in touch with ISU and was directly involved in arranging weapons training for ISU. No less a person than PLOTE Chief Uma Maheswaran had told the author that PLOTE provided weapons training to ISU, free of charge ,and the JVP for a fee. Sivaram, later contributed to several English newspapers, under the pen name Taraki, beginning with The Island. By then, he propagated the LTTE line that the war couldn’t be brought to a successful conclusion through military means. Taraki was abducted near the Bambalapitiya Police Station on the night of 28 April, 2005, and his body was found the following day.
The LTTE conferred the “Maamanithar” title upon the journalist, the highest civilian honour of the movement.
In the run up to the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord, India freely distributed weapons to Tamil terrorist groups here who in turn trained Sinhala youth.
Had it been part of the overall Indian destabilisation project, directed at Sri Lanka? PLOTE and EPRLF couldn’t have arranged weapons training in India as well as terrorist camps here without India’s knowledge. Unfortunately, Sri Lanka never sought to examine the origins of terrorism here and identified those who propagated and promoted separatist ideals.
Exactly a year before Daya Pathirana’s killing, arrangements had been made by ISU to dispatch a 15-member group to India. But, that move had been cancelled after law enforcement authorities apprehended some of those who received weapons training in India earlier. Wickremaretne’s narrative of the students’ movement, with the primary focus of the University of Colombo, is a must read. The author shed light on the despicable Indian destabilisation project that, if succeeded, could have caused and equally destructive war in the South. In a way, Daya Pathirana’s killing preempted possible wider conflict in the South.
Gevindu Cumaratunga, in his thought-provoking speech, commented on Daya Pathirana. At the time Cumaratunga entered Colombo University, he hadn’t been interested at all in politics. But, the way the ISU strongman promoted separatism, influenced Cumaratunga to counter those arguments. The ex-MP recollected how Daya Pathirana, a heavy smoker (almost always with a cigarette in his hand) warned of dire consequences if he persisted with his counter views.
In fact, Gevindu Cumaratunga ensured that the ’80s terror period was appropriately discussed at the book launch. Unfortunately, Wickremaretne’s book didn’t cause the anticipated response, and a dialogue involving various interested parties. It would be pertinent to mention that at the time the SSU/JVP decided to eliminate Daya Pathirana, it automatically received the tacit support of other student factions, affiliated to other political parties, including the UNP.
Soon after Anura Kumara Dissanayake received the leadership of the JVP from Somawansa Amarasinghe, in December 2014, he, in an interview with Saroj Pathirana of BBC Sandeshaya, regretted their actions during the second insurgency. Responding to Pathirana’s query, Dissanayake not only regretted but asked for forgiveness for nearly 6,000 killings perpetrated by the party during that period. Author Wickremaretne cleverly used FSP leader Kumar Gunaratnam’s interview with Upul Shantha Sannasgala, aired on Rupavahini on 21 November, 2019, to remind the reader that he, too, had been with the JVP at the time the decision was taken to eliminate Daya Pathirana. Gunaratnam moved out of the JVP, in April 2012, after years of turmoil. It would be pertinent to mention that Wimal Weerawansa-Nandana Gunatilleke led a group that sided with President Mahinda Rajapaksa during his first term, too, and had been with the party by that time. Although the party split over the years, those who served the interests of the JVP, during the 1980-1990 period, cannot absolve themselves of the violence perpetrated by the party. This should apply to the JVPers now in the Jathika Jana Balawegaya (JJB), a political party formed in July 2019 to create a platform for Dissanayake to contest the 2019 presidential election. Dissanayake secured a distant third place (418,553 votes [3.16%])
However, the JVP terrorism cannot be examined without taking into JRJ’s overall political strategy meant to suppress political opposition. The utterly disgusting strategy led to the rigged December 1982 referendum that gave JRJ the opportunity to postpone the parliamentary elections, scheduled for August 1983. JRJ feared his party would lose the super majority in Parliament, hence the irresponsible violence marred referendum, the only referendum ever held here to put off the election. On 30 July, 1983, JRJ proscribed the JVP, along with the Nawa Sama Samaja Party and the Communist Party, on the false pretext of carrying out attacks on the Tamil community, following the killing of 13 soldiers in Jaffna.
Under Dissanayake’s leadership, the JVP underwent total a overhaul but it was Somawansa Amarasinghe who paved the way. Under Somawansa’s leadership, the party took the most controversial decision to throw its weight behind warwinning Army Chief General (retd) Sarath Fonseka at the 2010 presidential election. That decision, the writer feels, can be compared only with the decision to launch its second terror campaign in response to JRJ’s political strategy. How could we forget Somawansa Amarasinghe joining hands with the UNP and one-time LTTE ally, the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), to field Fonseka? Although they failed in that US-backed vile scheme, in 2010, success was achieved at the 2015 presidential election when Maithripala Sirisena was elected.
Perhaps, the JVP took advantage of the developing situation (post-Indo-Lanka Peace Accord), particularly the induction of the Indian Army here, in July 1987, to intensify their campaign. In the aftermath of that, the JVP attacked the UNP parliamentary group with hand grenades in Parliament. The August 1987 attack killed Matara District MP Keerthi Abeywickrema and staffer Nobert Senadheera while 16 received injuries. Both President JRJ and Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa had been present at the time the two hand grenades were thrown at the group.
Had the JVP plot to assassinate JRJ and Premadasa succeeded in August 1987, what would have happened? Gevindu Cumaratunga, during his speech also raised a very interesting question. The nationalist asked where ISU Daya Pathirana would have been if he survived the murderous JVP.
Midweek Review
Reaping a late harvest Musings of an Old Man
I am an old man, having reached “four score and five” years, to describe my age in archaic terms. From a biological perspective, I have “grown old.” However, I believe that for those with sufficient inner resources, old age provides fertile ground to cultivate a new outlook and reap a late harvest before the sun sets on life.
Negative Characterisation of Old Age
My early medical education and training familiarised me with the concept of biological ageing: that every living organism inevitably undergoes progressive degeneration of its tissues over time. Old age is often associated with disease, disability, cognitive decline, and dependence. There is an inkling of futility, alienation, and despair as one approaches death. Losses accumulate. As Shakespeare wrote in Hamlet, “When sorrows come, they come not single spies, but in battalions.” Doctors may experience difficulty in treating older people and sometimes adopt an attitude of therapeutic nihilism toward a life perceived to be in decline.
Categorical assignment of symptoms is essential in medical practice when arriving at a diagnosis. However, placing an individual into the box of a “geriatric” is another matter, often resulting in unintended age segregation and stigmatisation rather than liberation of the elderly. Such labelling may amount to ageism. It is interesting to note that etymologically, the English word geriatric and the Sanskrit word jara both stem from the Indo-European root geront, meaning old age and decay, leading to death (jara-marana).
Even Sigmund Freud (1875–1961), the doyen of psychoanalysis, who influenced my understanding of personality structure and development during my psychiatric training, focused primarily on early development and youth, giving comparatively little attention to the psychology of old age. He believed that instinctual drives lost their impetus with ageing and famously remarked that “ageing is the castration of youth,” implying infertility not only in the biological sense. It is perhaps not surprising that Freud began his career as a neurologist and studied cerebral palsy.
Potential for Growth in Old Age
The model of human development proposed by the psychologist Erik Erikson (1902–1994), which he termed the “eight stages of man,” is far more appealing to me. His theory spans the entire life cycle, with each stage presenting a developmental task involving the negotiation of opposing forces; success or failure influences the trajectory of later life. The task of old age is to reconcile the polarity between “ego integrity” and “ego despair,” determining the emotional life of the elderly.
Ego integrity, according to Erikson, is the sense of self developed through working through the crises (challenges) of earlier stages and accruing psychological assets through lived experience. Ego despair, in contrast, results from the cumulative impact of multiple physical and emotional losses, especially during the final stage of life. A major task of old age is to maintain dignity amidst such emotionally debilitating forces. Negotiating between these polarities offers the potential for continued growth in old age, leading to what might be called a “meaningful finish.”
I do not dispute the concept of biological ageing. However, I do not regard old age as a terminal phase in which growth ceases and one is simply destined to wither and die. Though shadowed by physical frailty, diminishing sensory capacities and an apparent waning of vitality, there persists a proactive human spirit that endures well into late life. There is a need in old age to rekindle that spirit. Ageing itself can provide creative opportunities and avenues for productivity. The aim is to bring life to a meaningful close.
To generate such change despite the obstacles of ageing — disability and stigmatisation — the elderly require a sense of agency, a gleam of hope, and a sustaining aspiration. This may sound illusory; yet if such illusions are benign and life-affirming, why not allow them?
Sharon Kaufman, in her book The Ageless Self: Sources of Meaning in Late Life, argues that “old age” is a social construct resisted by many elders. Rather than identifying with decline, they perceive identity as a lifelong process despite physical and social change. They find meaning in remaining authentically themselves, assimilating and reformulating diverse life experiences through family relationships, professional achievements, and personal values.
Creative Living in Old Age
We can think of many artists, writers, and thinkers who produced their most iconic, mature, or ground-breaking work in later years, demonstrating that creativity can deepen and flourish with age. I do not suggest that we should all aspire to become a Monet, Picasso, or Chomsky. Rather, I use the term “creativity” in a broader sense — to illuminate its relevance to ordinary, everyday living.
Endowed with wisdom accumulated through life’s experiences, the elderly have the opportunity for developmental self-transformation — to connect with new identities, perspectives, and aspirations, and to engage in a continuing quest for purpose and meaning. Such a quest serves an essential function in sustaining mental health and well-being.
Old age offers opportunities for psychological adaptation and renewal. Many elders use the additional time afforded by retirement to broaden their knowledge, pursue new goals, and cultivate creativity — an old age characterised by wholeness, purpose, and coherence that keeps the human spirit alive and growing even as one’s days draw to a close.
Creative living in old age requires remaining physically, cognitively, emotionally, and socially engaged, and experiencing life as meaningful. It is important to sustain an optimistic perception of health, while distancing oneself from excessive preoccupation with pain and trauma. Positive perceptions of oneself and of the future help sustain well-being. Engage in lifelong learning, maintain curiosity, challenge assumptions — for learning itself is a meaning-making process. Nurture meaningful relationships to avoid disengagement, and enter into respectful dialogue, not only with those who agree with you. Cultivate a spiritual orientation and come to terms with mortality.
The developmental task of old age is to continue growing even as one approaches death — to reap a late harvest. As Rabindranath Tagore expressed evocatively in Gitanjali [‘Song Offerings’], which won him the Nobel Prize:: “On the day when death will knock at thy door, what wilt thou offer to him?
Oh, I will set before my guest the full vessel of my life — I will never let him go with empty hands.”
by Dr Siri Galhenage
Psychiatrist (Retired)
[sirigalhenage@gmail.com]
Midweek Review
Left’s Voice of Ethnic Peace
Multi-gifted Prof. Tissa Vitarana in passing,
Leaves a glowing gem of a memory comforting,
Of him putting his best foot forward in public,
Alongside fellow peace-makers in the nineties,
In the name of a just peace in bloodied Sri Lanka,
Caring not for personal gain, barbs or brickbats,
And for such humanity he’ll be remembered….
Verily a standard bearer of value-based politics.
By Lynn Ockersz
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JVP leader Somawansa Amarasinghe, who returned to Sri Lanka in late Nov, 2001, ending a 12-year self-imposed exile in Europe, declared that India helped him flee certain death as the government crushed his party’s second insurrection against the state in the ’80s, using even death squads. Amarasinghe, sole surviving member of the original politburo of the JVP, profusely thanked India and former Prime Minister V.P. Singh for helping him survive the crackdown. Neither the JVP nor India never explained the circumstances New Delhi facilitated Amarasinghe’s escape, particularly against the backdrop of the JVP’s frenzied anti-India campaign. The JVP has claimed to have killed Indian soldiers in the East during the 1987-1989 period. Addressing his first public meeting at Kalutara, a day after his arrival, Amarasinghe showed signs that the party had shed its anti-India policy of yesteryears. The JVPer paid tribute to the people of India, PM Singh and Indian officials who helped him escape.