Features
Courting Parthasarathy for JRJ, equation changes after Indira’s assassination
(Excerpted from volume ii of the Sarath Amunugama autobiography)
During one of my visits to Colombo I got a call to see the President at ‘Breamar’. Gamini Dissanayake had told him of my friendship with Parathasarathy and he wanted me to help him repair the damage done to their friendship due to the abuse heaped on GP when he came on a “peace mission” to Colombo.
JRJ had thrown his interlocutor into the ‘deep end’ by arranging a consultation for him with leading monks including Walpola Rahula. The monks had been particularly hard on GP as he was peddling the TULF line. GP was shocked because he had a vision of a peace loving and amiable ‘Sangho.’ that he was used to. Vietnamese Buddhist monks had supported him in his negotiations in Vietnam as Nehru’s envoy.
He had been shocked by this encounter with the monks and tended to think that JRJ had set them up. This was a time when JRJ was disoriented and perturbed by the spectre of 1956 which saw the decimation of the UNP. When I called over the following day at his residence the President was most cordial and inquired about my relations with GP.
He then pulled out a file in which he had gathered information from the time that GP had represented Madras State as a cricketer in the Gopalan Trophy, probably in the 1940s. GP had visited Colombo several times to play against the Ceylon eleven for the trophy. I remember that the news report from the Lake House archives had identified GP as a googly bowler; a good specialty for a future diplomat.
GP had later worked as a journalist in Madras till he moved to New Delhi to join Nehru’s entourage. He was so trusted by India Gandhi that she had appointed him to be the first Chancellor of the Jawaharlal Nehru University [JNU] then being built in the outskirts of Delhi. Since Parthasarathy had left Colombo a disappointed man, JRJ was keen to assure him that the Sri Lanka Government was ready to mend fences and start talking again.
This was a difficult undertaking because the July 1983 riots had severely embarrassed the Indian Government which was being pressurized by the Tamil Nadu politicians and the TULF to intervene. TULF leaders who fled after the riots were housed in Ashok Hotel in New Delhi and were able to get GP to promote their proposals.
Parathasarathy
I collected JRJ’s dossier and flew to New Delhi on my way to Paris GP was most cordial to me and invited me to have breakfast with him at his Lodhi Gardens home. Lodhi Gardens is located in a posh area of the Indian Capital. It housed many of the top officials of the Government. GP’s breakfasts were well known among Indian politicians and bureaucrats because many backroom discussions took place there.
It was a very English breakfast with a butler in atteendance. While breakfasting he assured me that he had no grudge with JRJ though his early goodwill when he accepted the assignment at Indira’s urging had been severely tested. He was agreeable to the idea that I telephone JRJ with that assurance of goodwill. He then pulled a rabbit out of his hat. He wanted me to ioin him on a visit to Ashok Hotel where the Indian Government had housed the leaders of the TULF after they were forced to flee the country following the July riots.
I had no hesitation in joining him as I knew some of these leaders, particularly Sampanthan with whom I had worked in Trincomalee when we demarcated the tourist zones for the Tourist Board. Perhaps GP, being a diplomat, wanted to show me the complex situation confronting Indian decision makers in view of the rapidly changing scenario in Sri Lanka.
Surprisingly the TULF leaders were keen to get back home. Though they were not short of creature comforts in the hotel they were not happy to be virtually incarcerated there without the chance of politicking in the North and East. In their absence the militants were making headway. Since their houses and other possessions in Colombo had been burnt or looted, they were in a state of shock.
Sampanthan told me that what he missed most was his library of books painstakingly collected over a lifetime. His library had been burnt down to the ground. I returned to Paris and telephoned JRJ who was happy that GP had responded that way. He wanted me to keep in touch with my Indian friends so that his position would not be misunderstood.
The Sri Lanka High Commision in New Delhi was not of much use and Hameed the Foreign Minister was asked not to interfere in the negotiations with India. Foreign Secretary Jayasinghe, though a good bureaucrat with strong connections with the Indian immigration officials, made no contribution in helping the President.
This was partly because the President was personally handling foreign policy issues. The lack of coordination in this sphere with a belligerent Lalith Athulathmudali playing a big role through his new Ministry, was beginning to extract its toll Lalith was quickly building up his popularity with the Sinhala voter by adopting a hardline and was being anxiously viewed be Premadasa, Gamini and Ronnie de Mel who could smell a rival when they saw one. The latter two were taking a more conciliatory approach which was welcomed by the Indian authorities.
Esmond’s Testimony
The periodic arrival of Esmond Wickremesinghe to Paris for International Programme for Development Communications (IPDC) meetings helped us to gather more information above the growing ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka. He told us that JRJ did not anticipate that the events of July would spiral out of control as Cyril Mathew had overstepped his brief Esmond said that he had breakfast with the President the day after the Kanatte incident. JRJ had collapsed at the breakfast table thinking that the Sinhala reaction would turn into a huge bloodbath which would be the end of his government.
He was fearful of a violent overthrow of his regime. That was why he prevaricated and did not address the nation immediately and put a stop to the violence. He hesitated and even in his broadcast he seemed to be lukewarm in condemning the Sinhala rioters and offering solace to the Tamils who were terrified and shocked. JRJ was perhaps right in feeling that this marked a watershed in his regime so early in his second term.
Soon after, all the energies of the Government were diverted to resettlement of refugees, funding them and attempting to recalibrate our economic and foreign policies to accommodate a solution to the ethnic problem. K.M. de Silva and Howard Wriggins in their biography of JRJ mark this as a turning point. “From this time to the end of his tenure of office as the Executive President at the end of December 1988. JR had to live with and deal with the consequences that flowed from the riots of 1983”.
As mentioned by writers like Rajiva Wijesinha, this crisis affected the Esmond Wickremesinghe family in different ways. Esmond’s brother Lakshman, who was the Bishop of Kurunegala, was devastated by the violence. He pleaded for reconciliation, but his cry was ignored. He died of a heart attack a few months later. Ranil Wickremesinghe on the other hand did not want to antagonize the Sinhala nationalist voters and tended to side with Mathew who had a strong base in the Kelaniya-Biyagama area.
Esmond while being disturbed by these events evaded the issue by dealing with the technical aspects of the problem on behalf of JRJ. Unlike his brother he was not disturbed by the moral dimension of the fratricidal violence. He felt that he could not abandon his friend at this critical juncture. Like Rajiva Wijesinha I did not see any remorse in Esmond regarding this collective moral failure. In his latest book Rajiva draws an unflattering picture of JRJ in relation to the ethnic and human rights issues.
Esmond briefed us of the Parathsarathy proposals which at that time was hotly opposed by many including the monks like Walpola Rahula and the Mahanayake of Asgiriya, Palipane Chandananda. The Parthasarathy proposals were for the setting up of Provincial Councils in a merged North and East. He was a proponent of devolution of powers within a sovereign state.
When we met the TULF in Ashok Hotel he told the Tamil leaders that he had held the Assamese student leaders incommunicado in Delhi till they agreed to his proposals. This may have put fear in the heads of the TULF leaders who may be forgiven for thinking that they too were being held in Delhi to receive the Assamese treatment. They wanted to get back to Sri Lanka as early as possible.
But as we saw earlier, GP was heavily biased towards the TULF position and its leaders need not have entertained any fears. They were safe with GP. It was only with his departure that a more flexible solution became feasible. His departure was a direct consequence of the death of Indira. Her demise had a direct bearing on JRJ and Sri Lanka’s fortunes.
As the TULF leaders lamented there were “orphaned by her death”. India entered a new phase Of her destiny with the death of Indira or ‘Goddess Durga’ as her numerous enemies called her. It marked a sea change in India’s policy towards Sri Lanka.
Death of Indira
The tragic death of her favourite younger son Sanjay in an air accident affected Indira deeply. He was her choice to succeed her to the `gadi’. But tragedy was to strike the Nehru family again and again. With the death of Sanjay, Indira began to turn to Hinds mystics – particularly to a handsome Sadhu, which association had the gossip prone Delhi on overdrive. She also increasingly became autocratic.
As PM she had to face the growing strength of the Sikhs who had been assiduously wooed and pacified by her father. The Sikh leaders were pampered by Nehru who admired their commitment to the Indian Congress during the Independence movement. The ‘green revolution’ had turned the Punjab into the `granary of India’, which was growing more prosperous by the day.
Also, the out migration of Sikhs to western countries had created pockets of political influence abroad supporting the call for Khalistan – an independent Sikh state. RAW with Indira’s backing was creating local leaders like Bhindranwale, to undercut the troublesome independence seeking Akhali leaders. Standing firm on the Punjab was of the greatest strategic importance for her. As Indira was successful in creating a Bangladesh, could not her enemies, particularly Pakistan, create a Khalistan as tit for tat? In a way the notion of a sovereign Khalistan and Kashmir put a brake on RAW scenarios of an independent Eelam. Eelam could trigger other frightful prospects like a bigger `rogue’ Tamil Nadu outside the Indian Union. Khalistan was a litmus test for the integrity of the Indian Union and Indira unleashed her total strength against the Sikh separatists, led by a RAW invented religious leader Bhindranwale [a la Prabhakaran] who had now turned on his masters.
Indira authorized operation ‘Blue Star’ which was an all-out attack on the extremists holed up in the famous Golden Temple of the Sikhs in Amritsar. It was a murderous, no holds barred attack. The offensive succeeded, the rebels were flushed out and killed, the rebellion was aborted and the majority of Sikhs looked on Indira as a monster who had defiled their holiest site.
The direct result of Operation Blue Star was the assassination of Indira by her Sikh bodyguards when she had left her home on foot to her office a few yards away for a TV interview with BBC. Delhi erupted in an orgy of communal rioting in which thousands of Sikhs were killed and their houses torched. As many studies have shown-including Stanley Tambiah’s ‘Levelling Crowds’ – this was rioting on a mega scale.
It was difficult for Indian diplomats to point their finger at Colombo riots, under these circumstances. The death of Indira meant the end of GP’s leadership of the Sri Lanka negotiations. He was replaced by Romesh Bandari, the Foreign Secretary and personal friend of the new PM. Under Rajiv, who reluctantly succeeded his mother, other players in addition to Bandari entered the scene. They were R Chidambaram, a Harvard trained lawyer from Madurai and N. Ram from the famous Kasturi family – the owners of `The Hindu’.
Ram was a journalist, a Cambridge graduate and a cricketer. In the wings was Venkateshwaran of the Foreign Office who was briefly Foreign Secretary. An admirer of Krishna Menon, Venkateshwaran was a hardliner on the Tamil issue and was sacked summarily by Rajiv Gandhi. The monopoly of Tamilians over Foreign policy was broken. This change of guard brought about a rethinking on India’s Sri Lanka policy.
It was an overall change of direction by Rajiv Gandhi who was moving towards an open economy and dismantling many socialist controls which had fast become dysfunctional during his mother’s ideologically rigid regime. Several of her socialist oriented officials, who were anyway superannuated by now, were shunted aside and a more technology oriented American educated coterie were assembled around the new Prime Minister.
The death of Indira was a blow to the hawks in her entourage who wanted a decisive push against JRJ and the Sri Lankan government. Indira had been looking for a political coup for her Congress party which for the first time since Independence was being challenged by the Janata Party led by former stalwarts of the Congress like Jayaprakash Narayan. She had tried to do something big in the South to bolster her strength and checkmate her political opponents. Her death was therefore a misfortune for the Tamil ‘Ultras’, as Rajiv did not have the same commitment towards them. The LTTE confirmed this set back by planning to assassinate him.
A new Era of Dance in Sri Lanka
Kapila Palihawadana, an internationally renowned dancer and choreographer staged his new dance production, Riddhi-Ma, on 28 March 2025 at the Elphinstone theatre, which was filled with Sri Lankan theatregoers, foreign diplomats and students of dance. Kapila appeared on stage with his charismatic persona signifying the performance to be unravelled on stage. I was anxiously waiting to see nATANDA dancers. He briefly introduced the narrative and the thematic background to the production to be witnessed. According to him, Kapila has been inspired by the Sri Lankan southern traditional dance (Low Country) and the mythologies related to Riddhi Yâgaya (Riddi Ritual) and the black magic to produce a ‘contemporary ballet’.
Riddhi Yâgaya also known as Rata Yakuma is one of the elaborative exorcism rituals performed in the southern dance tradition in Sri Lanka. It is particularly performed in Matara and Bentara areas where this ritual is performed in order to curb the barrenness and the expectation of fertility for young women (Fargnoli & Seneviratne 2021). Kapila’s contemporary ballet production had intermingled both character, Riddi Bisaw (Princes Riddhi) and the story of Kalu Kumaraya (Black Prince), who possesses young women and caught in the evil gaze (yaksa disti) while cursing upon them to be ill (De Munck, 1990).
Kapila weaves a tapestry of ritual dance elements with the ballet movements to create visually stunning images on stage. Over one and a half hours of duration, Kapila’s dancers mesmerized the audience through their virtuosic bodily competencies in Western ballet, Sri Lankan dance, especially the symbolic elements of low country dance and the spontaneity of movements. It is human bodily virtuosity and the rhythmic structures, which galvanised our senses throughout the performance. From very low phases of bodily movements to high speed acceleration, Kapila managed to visualise the human body as an elevated sublimity.
Contemporary Ballet
Figure 2 – (L) Umesha Kapilarathna performs en pointe, and (R) Narmada Nekethani performs with Jeewaka Randeepa, Riddhi-Ma, at Elphinstone Theatre, Maradana, 28th March 2025. Source:
Malshan Witharana
The dance production Riddhi-Ma was choreographed in several segments accompanied by a flow of various music arrangements and sound elements within which the dance narrative was laid through. In other words, Kapila as a choreographer, overcomes the modernist deadlock in his contemporary dance work that the majority of Sri Lankan dance choreographers have very often succumbed to. These images of bodies of female dancers commensurate the narrative of women’s fate and her vulnerability in being possessed by the Black Demon and how she overcomes and emancipates from the oppression. In this sense, Kapila’s dancers have showcased their ability to use the bodies not much as an object which is trained to perform a particular tradition but to present bodily fluidity which can be transformed into any form. Kapila’s performers possess formlessness, fluid fragility through which they break and overcome their bodily regimentations.
It was such a highly sophisticated ‘contemporary ballet’ performed at a Sri Lankan theatre with utmost rigour and precision. Bodies of all male and female dancers were highly trained and refined through classical ballet and contemporary dance. In addition, they demonstrated their abilities in performing other forms of dance. Their bodies were trained to achieve skilful execution of complex ballet movements, especially key elements of traditional ballet namely, improvisation, partnering, interpretation and off-balance and the local dance repertoires. Yet, these key ballet elements are not necessarily a part of contemporary ballet training (Marttinen, 2016). However, it is important for the dance students to learn these key elements of traditional ballet and use them in the contemporary dance settings. In this sense, Kapila’s dancers have achieved such vigour and somatic precision through assiduous practice of the body to create the magic on stage.
Pas de deux
Among others, a particular dance sequence attracted my attention the most. In the traditional ballet lexicon, it is a ‘pas de deux’ which is performed by the ‘same race male and female dancers,’ which can be called ‘a duet’. As Lutts argues, ‘Many contemporary choreographers are challenging social structures and norms within ballet by messing with the structure of the pas de deux (Lutts, 2019). Pas de Deux is a dance typically done by male and female dancers. In this case, Kapila has selected a male and a female dancer whose gender hierarchies appeared to be diminished through the choreographic work. In the traditional pas de deux, the male appears as the backdrop of the female dancer or the main anchorage of the female body, where the female body is presented with the support of the male body. Kapila has consciously been able to change this hierarchical division between the traditional ballet and the contemporary dance by presenting the female dominance in the act of dance.
The sequence was choreographed around a powerful depiction of the possession of the Gara Yakâ over a young woman, whose vulnerability and the powerful resurrection from the possession was performed by two young dancers. The female dancer, a ballerina, was in a leotard and a tight while wearing a pair of pointe shoes (toe shoes). Pointe shoes help the dancers to swirl on one spot (fouettés), on the pointed toes of one leg, which is the indication of the ballet dancer’s ability to perform en pointe (The Kennedy Centre 2020).
The stunning imagery was created throughout this sequence by the female and the male dancers intertwining their flexible bodies upon each other, throwing their bodies vertically and horizontally while maintaining balance and imbalance together. The ballerina’s right leg is bent and her toes are directed towards the floor while performing the en pointe with her ankle. Throughout the sequence she holds the Gara Yakâ mask while performing with the partner.
The male dancer behind the ballerina maintains a posture while depicting low country hand gestures combining and blurring the boundaries between Sri Lankan dance and the Western ballet (see figure 3). In this sequence, the male dancer maintains the balance of the body while lifting the female dancer’s body in the air signifying some classical elements of ballet.
Haptic sense
Figure 3: Narmada Nekathani performs with the Gara Yaka mask while indicating her right leg as en pointe. Male dancer, Jeewaka Randeepa’s hand gestures signify the low country pose. Riddhi-Ma, Dance Theatre at Elphinstone Theatre, 28th March 2025. Source: Malshan Witharana.
One significant element of this contemporary ballet production is the costume design. The selection of colour palette, containing black, red and while combining with other corresponding colours and also the costumes which break the traditional rules and norms are compelling. I have discussed in a recent publication how clothes connect with the performer’s body and operate as an embodied haptic perception to connect with the spectators (Liyanage, 2025). In this production, the costumes operate in two different ways: First it signifies sculpted bodies creating an embodied, empathic experience.
Secondly, designs of costumes work as a mode of three dimensional haptic sense. Kapila gives his dancers fully covered clothing, while they generate classical ballet and Sinhalese ritual dance movements. The covered bodies create another dimension to clothing over bodies. In doing so, Kapila attempts to create sculpted bodies on stage by blurring the boundaries of gender oriented clothing and its usage in Sri Lankan dance.
Sri Lankan female body on stage, particularly in dance has been presented as an object of male desire. I have elsewhere cited that the lâsya or the feminine gestures of the dance repertoire has been the marker of the quality of dance against the tândava tradition (Liyanage, 2025). The theatregoers visit the theatre to appreciate the lâsya bodies of female dancers and if the dancer meets this threshold, then she becomes the versatile dancer. Kandyan dancers such as Vajira and Chithrasena’s dance works are explored and analysed with this lâsya and tândava criteria. Vajira for instance becomes the icon of the lâsya in the Kandyan tradition. It is not my intention here to further discuss the discourse of lâsya and tândava here.
But Kapila’s contemporary ballet overcomes this duality of male-female aesthetic categorization of lâsya and tândava which has been a historical categorization of dance bodies in Sri Lanka (Sanjeewa 2021).
Figure 4: Riddhi-Ma’s costumes creates sculpted bodies combining the performer and the audience through empathic projection. Dancers, Sithija Sithimina and Senuri Nimsara appear in Riddhi-Ma, at Elphinstone Theatre, 28th March 2025, Source, Malshan Witharana.
Conclusion
Dance imagination in the Sri Lankan creative industry exploits the female body as an object. The colonial mind set of the dance body as a histrionic, gendered, exotic and aesthetic object is still embedded in the majority of dance productions produced in the current cultural industry. Moreover, dance is still understood as a ‘language’ similar to music where the narratives are shared in symbolic movements. Yet, Kapila has shown us that dance exists beyond language or lingual structures where it creates humans to experience alternative existence and expression. In this sense, dance is intrinsically a mode of ‘being’, a kinaesthetic connection where its phenomenality operates beyond the rationality of our daily life.
At this juncture, Kapila and his dance ensemble have marked a significant milestone by eradicating the archetypical and stereotypes in Sri Lankan dance. Kapila’s intervention with Riddi Ma is way ahead of our contemporary reality of Sri Lankan dance which will undoubtedly lead to a new era of dance theatre in Sri Lanka.
References
De Munck, V. C. (1990). Choosing metaphor. A case study of Sri Lankan exorcism. Anthropos, 317-328. Fargnoli, A., & Seneviratne, D. (2021). Exploring Rata Yakuma: Weaving dance/movement therapy and a
Sri Lankan healing ritual. Creative Arts in Education and Therapy (CAET), 230-244.
Liyanage, S. 2025. “Arts and Culture in the Post-War Sri Lanka: Body as Protest in Post-Political Aragalaya (Porattam).” In Reflections on the Continuing Crises of Post-War Sri Lanka, edited by Gamini Keerawella and Amal Jayawardane, 245–78. Colombo: Institute for International Studies (IIS) Sri Lanka.
Lutts, A. (2019). Storytelling in Contemporary Ballet.
Samarasinghe, S. G. (1977). A Methodology for the Collection of the Sinhala Ritual. Asian Folklore Studies, 105-130.
Sanjeewa, W. (2021). Historical Perspective of Gender Typed Participation in the Performing Arts in Sri Lanka During the Pre-Colonial, The Colonial Era, and the Post-Colonial Eras. International Journal of Social Science And Human Research, 4(5), 989-997.
The Kennedy Centre. 2020. “Pointe Shoes Dancing on the Tips of the Toes.” Kennedy-Center.org. 2020 https://www.kennedy-center.org/education/resources-for-educators/classroom-resources/media- and-interactives/media/dance/pointe-shoes/..
Acknowledgements
The author wishes to thank Himansi Dehigama for proofreading this article.
About the author:
Saumya Liyanage (PhD) is a film and theatre actor and professor in drama and theatre, currently working at the Department of Theatre Ballet and Modern Dance, Faculty of Dance and Drama, University of the Visual and Performing Arts (UVPA), Colombo. He is the former Dean of the Faculty of Graduate Studies and is currently holding the director position of the Social Reconciliation Centre, UVPA Colombo.
Chinese Naval Entry and End of Post-War Unipolarity
The ascendancy of China as an emerging superpower is one of the most striking shifts in the global distribution of economic and political power in the 21st century. With its strategic rise, China has assumed a more proactive diplomatic and economic role in the Indian Ocean, signalling its emergence as a global superpower. This new leadership role is exemplified by initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The Economist noted that “China’s decision to fund a new multilateral bank rather than give more to existing ones reflects its exasperation with the glacial pace of global economic governance reform” (The Economist, 11 November 2014). Thus far, China’s ascent to global superpower status has been largely peaceful.
In 2025, in terms of Navy fleet strength, China became the world’s largest Navy, with a fleet of 754 ships, thanks to its ambitious naval modernisation programme. In May 2024, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) further strengthened its capabilities by commissioning the Fujian, its latest aircraft carrier. Equipped with an advanced electromagnetic catapult system, the Fujian can launch larger and heavier aircraft, marking a significant upgrade over its predecessors.
Driven by export-led growth, China sought to reinvest its trade surplus, redefining the Indian Ocean region not just as a market but as a key hub for infrastructure investment. Notably, over 80 percent of China’s oil imports from the Persian Gulf transit to the Straits of Malacca before reaching its industrial centres. These factors underscore the Indian Ocean’s critical role in China’s economic and naval strategic trajectories.
China’s port construction projects along the Indian Ocean littoral, often associated with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), exemplify its deepening geopolitical and economic engagement in the region. These initiatives encompass multipurpose berth development, deep-sea port construction, and supporting infrastructure projects aimed at enhancing maritime connectivity and trade. Key projects include the development of Gwadar Port in Pakistan, a strategic asset for China’s access to the Arabian Sea; Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka, which became a focal point of debt diplomacy concerns; the Payra deep-sea port in Bangladesh; as well as port and road infrastructure development in Myanmar’s Yunnan and Kyaukphyu regions and Cambodia’s Koh Kong.
While these projects were promoted as avenues for economic growth and regional connectivity, they also triggered geopolitical tensions and domestic opposition in several host countries. Concerns over excessive debt burdens, lack of transparency, and potential dual-use (civilian and military) implications of port facilities led to scrutiny from both local and external stakeholders, including India and Western powers. As a result, some projects faced significant pushback, delays, and, in certain cases, suspension or cancellation. This opposition underscores the complex interplay between economic cooperation, strategic interests, and sovereignty concerns in China’s Indian Ocean engagements.
China’s expanding economic, diplomatic, and naval footprint in the Indian Ocean has fundamentally altered the region’s strategic landscape, signalling the end of early post-Cold War unipolarity. Through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) initiatives, China has entrenched itself economically, financing. Diplomatically, Beijing has deepened its engagement with littoral states through bilateral agreements, security partnerships, and regional forums, challenging traditional Western and Indian influence.
China’s expanding naval deployments in the Indian Ocean, including its military base in Djibouti, and growing security cooperation with regional states, mark the end of unchallenged US dominance in the region. The Indian Ocean is now a contested space, where China’s presence compels strategic recalibrations by India, the United States, and other regional actors. The evolving security landscape in the Indian Ocean—marked by intensifying competition, shifting alliances, and the rise of a multipolar order—has significant implications for Sri Lanka’s geopolitical future.
India views China’s growing economic, political, and strategic presence in the Indian Ocean region as a key strategic challenge. In response, India has pursued a range of strategic, political, and economic measures to counterbalance Chinese influence, particularly in countries like Sri Lanka through infrastructure investment, defense partnerships, and diplomatic engagements.
Other Extra-Regional powers
Japan and Australia have emerged as significant players in the post-Cold War strategic landscape of the Indian Ocean. During the early phases of the Cold War, Australia played a crucial role in Western ‘Collective Security Alliances’ (ANZUS and (SEATO). However, its direct engagement in Indian Ocean security remained limited, primarily supporting the British Royal Navy under Commonwealth obligations. Japan, meanwhile, refrained from deploying naval forces in the region after World War II, adhering to its pacifist constitution and post-war security policies. In recent decades, shifting strategic conditions have prompted both Japan and Australia to reassess their roles in the Indian Ocean, leading to greater defence cooperation and a more proactive regional presence.
In the post-Cold War era, Australia has progressively expanded its naval engagements in the Indian Ocean, driven by concerns over maritime security, protection of trade routes, and China’s growing influence. Through initiatives, such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and deeper defence partnerships with India and the United States, Australia has bolstered its strategic presence in the Indian Ocean region.
Recalibration of Japan’s approach
Japan, too, has recalibrated its approach to Indian Ocean security in response to geopolitical shifts. Recognising the Indian Ocean’s critical importance for its energy security and trade, Japan has strengthened its naval presence through port visits, joint exercises, and maritime security cooperation. The Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force (JMSDF) has taken on a more active role in anti-piracy operations, freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS), and strategic partnerships with Indian Ocean littoral states. This shift aligns with Japan’s broader strategy of contributing to regional stability while balancing its constitutional constraints on military force projection.
Japan’s proactive role in the Indian Ocean region is evident in its diplomatic and defence engagements. In January 2019, Japan sent its Foreign Minister, Taro Kono, and Chief of Staff, Joint Staff, Katsutoshi Kawano, to the Raisina Dialogue, a high-profile geopolitical conference in India. Japan’s National Security Strategy, released in December 2022, identifies China’s growing assertiveness as its greatest strategic challenge and underscores the need to deepen bilateral ties and multilateral defence cooperation in the Indian Ocean. It also emphasises the importance of securing stable access to sea-lanes, through which more than 80 percent of Japan’s oil imports pass. In recent years, Japan has expanded its port investment portfolio across the Indian Ocean, with major projects in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. In 2021, Japan participated for the first time in CARAT-Sri Lanka (Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training), a bilateral naval exercise. Japan’s Maritime Self-Defence Force returned for the exercise in January 2023, held at Trincomalee Port and Mullikulam Base.
Japan’s strategic interests in the Indian Ocean have been most evident in its involvement in port infrastructure development projects. Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Myanmar are key countries where early Chinese-led port construction faced setbacks. Unlike India, which carries historical and political complexities in its relations with these countries, Japan is better positioned to compete with China. In December 2021, a Japanese company established a ship repair and rebuilding facility in Trincomalee, complementing the already well-established Tokyo Cement factory. When the Sri Lanka Ports Authority announced plans in mid-2022 to develop Trincomalee as an industrial port—inviting expressions of interest from investors to utilise port facilities and up to 2,400 hectares of surrounding land—Trincomalee regained strategic attention.
The Colombo Dockyard, in collaboration with Japan’s Onomichi Dockyard, has established a rapid response afloat service in Trincomalee, marking a significant development in Japan’s engagement with Sri Lanka’s maritime infrastructure. This initiative aligns with Japan’s broader strategic interests in the Bay of Bengal, a region of critical economic and security importance. A key Japanese concern appears to be limiting China’s ability to establish a permanent presence in Trincomalee. This initiative underscores the broader strategic competition in the Indian Ocean. Trincomalee, with its deep-water harbour, has long been regarded as a critical maritime asset. Japan’s involvement reflects its efforts to deepen economic and strategic engagement with Sri Lanka amid growing regional competition. The challenge before Sri Lanka is how to navigate this strategic contest while maximising its national interests.
Other Regional Powers
In analyzing the evolving naval security architecture of the post-Cold War Indian Ocean, particular attention should be given to the naval developments of regional powers such as Pakistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia. In 2012, Pakistan established the Naval Strategic Force Command (NSFC) to strengthen Pakistan’s policy of Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD). The creation of the NSFC suggests a shift toward sea-based deterrence, complementing Pakistan’s broader military strategy. In December 2012, Pakistan conducted a series of cruise missile tests from naval platforms in the Arabian Sea. Given India’s expanding maritime capabilities, which Pakistan views as a significant threat, the Pakistan Navy may consider deploying tactical nuclear weapons on surface ships as part of its evolving deterrence strategy. Sri Lanka’s foreign policy cannot overlook this development.
Indonesia also emerged as a significant player in the evolving naval security landscape of the Indian Ocean. In 2010, it launched a military modernisation programme aimed at achieving a ‘Minimum Essential Force’ (MEF) by 2024. As part of this initiative, Indonesia sought to build a modern Navy with 247 surface vessels and 12 submarines. One of the primary challenges faced by the Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL) is piracy. To enhance maritime security, Indonesia and Singapore signed the SURPIC Cooperation Arrangement in Bantam in May 2005, enabling real-time sea surveillance in the Singapore Strait for more effective naval patrols. In 2017, Indonesia introduced the Indonesian Ocean Policy (IOP) and subsequently incorporated blue economy strategies into its national development agenda, reinforcing its maritime vision. According to projections from the Global Firepower Index, published in 2025, the Indonesian Navy is ranked fourth in global ranking and second in Asia in terms of Navy fleet strength (Global Firepower, 2025).
In October 2012, the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) announced plans to build a second Scorpène simulator training facility at its base in Kota Kinabalu, in addition to submarine base in Sepanggar, Sabah, constructed in 2002. To enhance its naval capabilities, the RMN planned to procure 18 Littoral Mission Ships (LMS) for maritime surveillance and six Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) between 2019 and 2023. Malaysia and China finalised their first major defence deal during Prime Minister Najib Razak’s visit to Beijing in November 2016. During this visit, Malaysia’s Defence Ministry signed a contract to procure LMS from China, as reported by The Guardian. Despite this agreement, Malaysia continues to maintain amicable relations with both China and India, as does Indonesia.
The increasing presence of major naval powers, the rise of regional stakeholders, and the growing significance of trade routes and maritime security have transformed the Indian Ocean into a central pivot of both regional and global politics, with Sri Lanka positioned at its heart. (To be Continued)
by Gamini Keerawella
Sri Lankan Andrea Marr, now based in Australia, is in the spotlight again. She says she has teamed up with a fantastic bunch of Sri Lankan musicians, in Melbourne, and the band is called IntoGroove.
“The band has been going strong for many years and I have been a fan of this outfit for quite a few years; just love these guys, authentic R&B and funk.”
Although Andrea has her original blues band, The McNaMarr Project, and they do have a busy schedule, she went on to say that “when the opportunity came up to join these guys, I simply couldn’t refuse … they are too good.”
IntoGroove is Jude Nicholas (lead vocals), Peter Menezes (bass), Keith Pereira (drums), Blaise De Silva (keyboards) and and Steve Wright (guitar).
Andrea Marr: Powerhouse of the blues
“These guys are a fantastic band and I really want everyone to hear them.”
Andrea is a very talented artiste with many achievements to her credit, and a vocal coach, as well.
In fact, she did her second vocal coaching session at Australian Songwriters Conference early this year.
Her first student showcase for this year took place last Sunday, in Melbourne, and it brought into the spotlight the wonderful acts she has moulded, as teacher and mentor.
What makes Andrea extra special is that she has years of teaching experience and is able to do group vocal coaching for all styles, levels and genres.
In January, this year, she performed at the exclusive ‘Women In Blues’ showcase at Alfred’s On Beale Street (rock venue with live entertainment), in Memphis, in the USA, during the International Blues Challenge when bands from all over the world converge on Memphis for the ‘Olympics of the Blues.’
The McNaMarr Project with Andrea and Lindsay Marr in the
vocal spotlight
This was her fourth performance in the home of the blues; she has represented Australian Blues three times and, on this occasion, she went as ambassador for Blues Music Victoria, and The Melbourne Blues Appreciation Society’s ‘Women In Blues’ Coordinator.
Andrea was inducted into the Blues Music Victoria Hall of Fame in 2022 and released her 10th album which hit #1 on the Australian Blues Charts.
Known as ‘the pint-sized powerhouse of the blues’ for her high energy, soulful, original music, Andrea is also a huge fan of the late Elvis Presley and has checked out Graceland, in Memphis, Tennessee, USA, many times.
In Melbourne, the singer also plays a major role in helping Animal Rescue organisations find homes for abandoned cats.
Andrea Marr’s wish, at the moment, is that the Lankan audience, in Melbourne, would get behind this band, IntoGroove. They are world class, she added.
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Sun directly overhead Nainamadama, Sandalankawa, Kundasale, Mahiyanganaya and Kalmunanai at about 12:12 noon today [08]
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