Midweek Review

‘Catholic Action!’:

Published

2 years ago

2024/09/25

Sahan Weerasooriya

Nun Other Than; The Chithra Bopage Story by Udan Fernando

Reviewed by Laleen Jayamanne

Udan Fernando, though unknown to me, wrote to ask if I would write a piece on his new film, adding that it was about a Lankan woman who was once a nun and also involved with the JVP, now living in Australia. As a lapsed Roman Catholic, living in Australia, taught by nuns (both Irish and Lankan), with friends who were enthusiastic nuns, I was intrigued, but to write I had to be moved in some way by the film, I said.

I found the archival photos and images documenting the era of the JVP in the 70s and 80s, and also the family photographs moving, as they now carry memory-traces of a deep history of religious and political idealism and historical violence in Lanka within living memory.

‘Nun Other than; The Chithra Bopage Story’ has been screening in different forums in Colombo and Jaffna just before the presidential election. I have just watched it alone on my computer. There is something a little sad about not being able to see this film with other Lankans well disposed towards its rather unusual ambitions. After all, in a Sinhala-Buddhist majoritarian country how many would find a ‘nun’s story’ interesting! Hollywood of course made A Nun’s Story with Audrey Hepburn working in Africa, which was a hit. I recall having seen it with my parents at the Liberty. Then, there is the great British director, Michael Powell’s magnificent technicolour classic of the tragic emotional turmoil among white nuns, set in a remote convent perched precariously high up on a Himalayan crag, called Black Narcissus (‘47). A Catholic priest, I think Father Noel Cruz, made a lively 16mm film set in the slums about a bicycle, I think, in the 60s. Apart from that and of course, the Catholic, Lester James Peiris’ contribution to the Lankan cinema, the internal spiritual-ethical social values of Christianity and its modern institutional ethos (post Vatican 2 reforms), have not been material for cultural production in Lanka, as far as I am aware. I am thinking here about the 60s, and a part of the 70s, when I lived there or visited regularly for research on the Lankan cinema.

Nun Other Than; The Chithra Bopage Story is a ninety-minute Docu-Drama in English and Sinhala by Udan Fernando, who has made several documentary films and has lived and worked overseas for many years. The documentary part is structured on the central figure of Chithra (Mudalige) Bopage, now living in Melbourne, Australia with her husband, Lionel Bopage, who was, between 1978 and 1984, the General Secretary of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) in its second iteration. Chithra recounts her life in Lanka as a young girl and how she decided to become a Roman Catholic nun, having observed as a patient herself, foreign (white), nursing-nuns working in the General hospital with a great sense of care and kindness to the patient. I remember these nuns well and the last of them who worked with dedication at the ‘Leprosy-asylum’ at Hendala, with its very high walls.

The dramatic re-enactment consists of Chithra’s life as a young novice and nun and her early married years after she left the religious order. The film is basically in the genre of ‘Talking-Heads’ with key figures in Chithra’s life, like her elder sister Rohini and brother Kingsley Mudalige and wife Shyama and a delightful nun, Sr Noel Christine Fernando, who was a confident, conveying a vivid sense of Chithra as a spirited and highly focused young girl and woman with a strong sense of social justice and a passion for singing, with a voice to match it.

Lionel and Chithra Bopage with Nirmala Rajasingham at the Jaffna screening

Importantly for me, through these reminiscences, we come to know not only Chithra, but also the liberal ethos of her Roman Catholic family, their easy bilingualism, their openness to the world, a certain Humanist ‘Catholicism’, which means ‘Universal’, not narrowly parochial. I found the absence of any residue of feudal attitudes in Chithra’s family an eye-opener, as I myself come from a Catholic family, with deep roots in Catholic villages, which had some deplorable feudal values, despite being bilingual and my parents also having been educated by religious clergy. The way Chithra’s mother agrees to her becoming a nun (though her clear preference was for her to get married), is one example of this liberalism, and the other being, her attitude to Chithra leaving the religious order to marry Lionel.

It’s not to her liking either and is willing to find another ‘suitable’ person for her, but accepts it, respecting Chithra’s choice. However, her mother is fully there to help out when she takes up the care of her granddaughter, so as to lessen the burden on Chithra at the time when Lionel is unlawfully held in custody without cause. This tolerant and open-minded attitude of Chithra’s Catholic family from Avissawella is a remarkable aspect in our Lankan culture and a real tribute to her parents and siblings. Her siblings and sister-in-law who lovingly talk about Chithra on camera, also have very open attitudes to interpersonal relations between the sexes and are remarkably non-judgemental about Chithra’s choices and admire her courage and her considerable singing talent. I find all of them thoughtful, exemplary Lankans.

In the context of the Sinhala cinema, where ‘sexual promiscuity’ is often coded as Christian (e. g. Hansa Vilak, Dekala Purudu Kenek…), in a censorious manner, this relaxed liberalism, openness to differences, focused on in this film, is a breath of fresh air.

This, one might say, is the real, enlightening “Catholic Action,” – to use that screaming political headline of the 60s differently here. I remember its use well, when there were organised protests against the ‘Take-Over of Christian Schools’, by the government. My family was involved in the so-called ‘Catholic Action’, fearing that Christian religious education and values would not be taught when they were incorporated into the government school system. It is ironic that when Lionel decided to leave the JVP for good in ’84, the JVP also called it ‘Catholic Action’, no doubt blaming Chithra’s influence on him.

I find the wedding photos of Chithra and Lionel very moving, especially the one of both of them seated with Lionel’s mother, in a white Kandyan sari, looking directly at the camera with a grave expression. I wonder what she thought of her son’s marriage and politics. The photos of the group of friends all seated eating their rice packets, a modest wedding feast, conveys a sense of community feeling. Lionel’s progressive attitude within the JVP context is seen in his choice of the signatories at their marriage; a Tamil and a Sinhala brother in the party. This multi-ethnic-cultural gesture corresponds to his position on the “National Question’, on which he deviated from the official JVP line, having worked in the North and the East.

Apart from the ‘Talking- Heads’, the film also presents an array of photographs, the most remarkable being those of the JVP in their second phase, after Rohana Wijeweera, Lionel Bopage and the rest were released from prison in 1977. They also include news photos of mass murder and mutilation of bodies in the period of 88-89 terror, in the bloody confrontation between the UNP and the JVP. Some of these images evoke strong feelings while also being informative, given their historical resonances. The timing of the release of this film during the days leading up to the Presidential elections on 21/9/24 will also resonate deeply with many Lankans who lived through the 70s and 80s J. R. Jayewardene era, when the current President, Ranil Wickremesinghe was the Minister of Education during July ‘83.

The interplay between the contemporary Chithra at 77, wearing a mauve straw hat, talking to the camera directly in large close-ups, in Melbourne, Australia and her younger self, slowly gathers a rhythm of sorts, a hesitation there and light-sorrow felt here, thoughtfulness and regret that she can’t remember everything well enough. She wishes that she had written down everything, and so do I. But I do wish that Udan had varied a little the mise-en-scene (i. e. the compositions of the shots) so that we might have been able to see Chithra in her ‘new’ context, Australia, her home for over three decades. The same continuous shot of her in close-up meant that we never got the chance to see her in the country which offered her and her family refuge in the 80s. Apart from the opening establishing-shot of her walking down a tree-lined street full of large white Galah birds typical of Australia, she could have been anywhere. This is a missed opportunity because one is curious to see this remarkable woman in her new context, her adopted, generous country, Australia, which has been very hospitable especially to Lankan intellectuals, scholars, artistes and activists over the years and many, others, too. The discursive information provided of the work Chithra did in Australia doesn’t create a milieu and its rhythms, which would have enriched the film and informed Lankans who might still be rather snooty about Australia and how its egalitarian ethos and values work.

: Director Udan Fernando

One sometimes feels that the director was carried away, enjoying watching the young nun in her crisp pastel blue habit and the sari clad Chithra so much, that the camera lingers on her for a little too long, (cinematically speaking), just enjoying looking at her lovely appearance, in tastefully matching saris, though we hear that Chithra had only two or three saris and that too threadbare. Or more generously, it can be viewed as a nice ‘Brechtian touch! A glimpse of the young Dinara Punchihewa as an actress enjoying her role as Chithra, or so I thought, trying to find an excuse for the duration of these scenes. But then again, they do capture the young Chithra’s quite normal enjoyment of clothes, jewellery and hairstyles, in the life of a fun loving young middle-class girl. Dinara is a very watchable, fresh cinematic presence, in that she conveys through her quietly expressive face and capacity for stillness, a quality of intelligence, which I see as a capacity for introspection, self-reflexivity, which are also linked to Chithra’s religious vocation as a nun.

As young Sisters of Perpetual Help, Chithra showed intellectual interests and was chosen to be trained in working with young people in underprivileged backgrounds. During her training at Aquinas University College, she was expected to research the reasons for the devastating 1971 JVP uprising, and massacre of so many young educated youth of the country. We see her reading a book on it in her room. And it’s this exposure, in a proud Lankan Catholic Higher Education Institution (also my Alma Mater), that makes Chithra question her own privileged life in the convent with three square meals and a pleasant environment. She questioned why people rushed to give her a seat in buses and other such preferential treatment to clergy. It is these thoughts that led her to leave the convent and join the JVP. While Lionel’s presence in her life by then appears to have facilitated this radical move, she asserts that the decision was due to her own firm convictions. Her marriage to Bopage, without informing her own family, was felt as a big upheaval by her brother who added lightly that, ‘it’s something you see in the movies or in a novel, not in normal life!’

The post ‘77 JVP appears as a different organisation from that which led to the April ’71 uprising. Women convened a ‘Conference of Socialist Women’s Union’, at which delegates from Iraq and Palestine were present. Also, a striking difference was the creation of a repertoire of Vimukthi Gee (Songs of Liberation) of the JVP, which drew Chithra to it even before she left the convent. It was a lovely surprise to see a photograph of my late friend Sunila Abeysekera in the group and hear Chithra talk about her with affection.

But the abiding emotional impact of the film comes from the reflective, steadfast consciousness at its heart, Chithra herself at 77, a quietly wonderful presence. That she can talk about the importance of her work as a nun and of her complex feelings so lucidly with ease is again linked, I think, to the ‘Westernised’, bilingual attitudes in her ethos and also at the convent where she was free to confide in a friendly nun who admired Chithra’s decision to leave the convent and also of her ease with the priest who she considered a good friend with whom she felt free to discuss her decision.

These are urbane aspects of a Catholic institutional ethos, after the Ecumenical Council of the 60s. Buddhists unfamiliar with this aspect of Christianity can learn about an ethos free of feudal ideologies. Sinhala- Buddhist ideology appears to re-feudalise institutions and practices (even secular ones) of Lanka, in an alarming way now, thus betraying the universal avihinsa, rational values of Buddhist philosophy itself. In this sense too, the film shows a progressive church with considerable freedom for women to choose alternative ways of living and behaving. Udan himself as a Protestant (Methodist), appears to be fascinated by the institutional architectural richness of the Catholic church interiors, their ritual ornamentation, which Protestantism eschewed with Luther’s Reformation.

Chithra and Lionel’s quite considerable social and religious differences would have become, in a Sinhala genre film, the stuff of melodrama and tragedy. But in Udan’s film we see them age together with grace, as their children grow up in a foreign country, which offered them refuge from the political violence of Lanka. Thus, Australia also shines in having offered refuge and hope to this remarkable couple and their two children.

As I see it, the film is also a tribute to the Ecumenical values (broad sympathy and interests), of the Catholic Church in Lanka, in that it facilitated a rare and happy (romantic), love story of personal steadfastness to each other and to the political and ethical values they stood for, at a time of great danger in Lanka.

One wonders if the film might create a public discourse on the history of the JVP (the role of women and ethnic and religious minorities), in its several iterations.

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Midweek Review

2019 Easter Sunday carnage in retrospect

Published

2 days ago

2026/04/8

Sahan Weerasooriya

November 21, 2019: President Gotabaya Rajapaksa meets Archbishop of Colombo, His Eminence Malcolm Cardinal Ranjith at the Bishop House where he requested the Church to nominate a representative for the Presidential Commission of Inquiry (PCoI) probing the Easter Sunday carnage.

Coordinated suicide attacks targeted three churches—St. Anthony’s in Colombo, St. Sebastian’s at Katuwapitiya and Zion Church in Batticaloa—along with popular tourist hotels Shangri-La, Kingsbury, and Cinnamon Grand. No less a person than His Eminence Archbishop of Colombo Rt. Rev. Malcolm Cardinal Ranjith is on record as having said that the carnage could have been averted if the Yahapalana government shared the available Indian intelligence warning with him. Yahapalana Minister Harin Fernando publicly admitted that his family was aware of the impending attack and the warning issued to senior police officers in charge of VVIP/VIP security is evidence that all those who represented Parliament at the time knew of the mass murder plot. Against the backdrop of Indian intelligence warning and our collective failure to act on it, it would be pertinent to ask the Indians whether they knew the Easter Sunday operation was to facilitate Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s victory at the 2019 presidential poll. Perhaps, a key to the Easter Sunday conspiracy is enigma Sara Jasmin (Tamil girl from Batticaloa converted to Islam) whose husband Atchchi Muhammadu Hasthun carried out the attack on St. Sebastian’s Church, Katuwapitiya

By Shamindra Ferdinando

Pivithuru Hela Urumaya (PHU) leader Udaya Gammanpila’s Pasku Praharaye Mahamolakaru Soya Yema (Searching for the mastermind behind the Easter Sunday attacks) inquired into the 2019 April 21 Easter Sunday carnage. The former Minister and Attorney-at-Law quite confidently argued that the mastermind of the only major post-war attack was Zahran Hashim, one of the two suicide bombers who targeted Shangri-la, Colombo.

Gammanpila launched his painstaking work recently at the Sambuddhathva Jayanthi Mandiraya at Thummulla, with the participation of former Presidents Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who had been accused of being the beneficiary of the Easter Sunday carnage at the November 2019 presidential election, and Maithripala Sirisena faulted by the Presidential Commission of Inquiry (PCoI) that probed the heinous crime. Rajapaksa and Sirisena sat next to each other, in the first row, and were among those who received copies of the controversial book.

PCoI, appointed by Sirisena in September, 2019, in the run-up to the presidential election, in its report submitted to President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, in February, 2020, declared that Sirisena’s failure as the President to act on ‘actionable intelligence’ exceeded mere civil negligence. Having declared criminal liability on the part of Sirisena, the PCoI recommended that the Attorney General consider criminal proceedings against former President Sirisena under any suitable provision in the Penal Code.

PCoI’s Chairman Supreme Court Judge Janak de Silva handed over the final report to President Rajapaksa on February 1, 2021 at the Presidential Secretariat. Gotabaya Rajapaksa received the first and second interim reports on 20 December and on 2 March, 2020, respectively.

The Commission consists of the following commissioners: Justice Janak De Silva (Judge of the Supreme Court and Chairman of the Commission), Justice Nissanka Bandula Karunarathna (Judge of the Court of Appeal), Justice Nihal Sunil Rajapakse (Retired Judge of the Court of Appeal), Bandula Kumara Atapattu (Retired Judge of the High Court) and Ms W.M.M.R. Adikari (Retired Ministry Secretary).

H.M.P. Buwaneka Herath functioned as the Secretary to the PCoI.

It would be pertinent to mention that the Archbishop of Colombo Malcolm Cardinal Ranjith, declined an opportunity offered by President Rajapaksa to nominate a person for the PCoI. The Church leader asserted such a move would be misconstrued by various interested parties. Both the former President and Archbishop of Colombo confirmed that development soon after the presidential election.

Having declared its faith in the PCoI and received assurance of the new government’s intention to implement its recommendations, the Church was taken aback when the government announced the appointment of a six-member committee, chaired by Minister Chamal Rajapaksa, to examine the PCoI and recommend how to proceed. That Committee included Ministers Johnston Fernando, Udaya Gammanpila, Ramesh Pathirana, Prasanna Ranatunga and Rohitha Abeygunawardena.

The Church cannot deny that their position in respect of the Yahapalana government’s pathetic failure to thwart the Easter Sunday carnage greatly influenced the electorate, and the SLPP presidential candidate Gotabaya Rajapaksa directly benefited. Alleging that the Archbishop of Colombo played politics with the Easter Sunday carnage, SJB parliamentarian Harin Fernando, in June 2020, didn’t mince his words when he accused the Church of influencing a decisive 5% of voters to back Gotabaya Rajapaksa. At the time that accusation was made about nine months before the PCoI handed over its report, President Rajapaksa and the Archbishop of Colombo enjoyed a close relationship.

The Church raised the failure on the part of the government to implement the PCoI’s recommendations six months after President Rajapaksa received the final report.

The National Catholic Committee for Justice to Eastern Sunday Attack Victims, in a lengthy letter dated 12 July 2021, demanded the government deal with the following persons for their failure to thwart the attacks. The Committee warned that unless the President addressed their concerns alternative measures would be taken. The government ignored the warning. Instead, the SLPP adopted delaying tactics much to their disappointment and the irate Church finally declared unconditional support for the US-India backed regime change project.

Sirisena and others

On the basis of the 19th Chapter, titled ‘Accountability’ of the final report, the Committee drew President Rajapaksa’s attention to the following persons as listed by the PCoI: (1) President Maithripala Sirisena (2) PM Ranil Wickremesinghe (3) Defence Secretary Hemasiri Fernando (4) Chief of National Intelligence Sisira Mendis (5) Director State Intelligence Service Nilantha Jayawardena.

The 20th Chapter, titled ‘Failures on the part of law enforcement authorities’ in the Final report (First Volume), identified the following culprits ,namely IGP Pujith Jayasundera, SDIG Nandana Munasinghe (WP), Deshabandu Tennakoon (DIG, Colombo, North), SP Sanjeewa Bandara (Colombo North), SSP Chandana Atukorale, B.E.I. Prasanna (SP, Director, Western province, Intelligence), ASP Sisira Kumara, Chief Inspector R.M. Sarath Kumarasinghe (Acting OIC, Fort), Chief Inspector Sagara Wilegoda Liyanage (OIC, Fort)., Chaminda Nawaratne (OIC, Katana), State Counsel Malik Azeez and Deputy Solicitor General Azad Navaavi.

The PCoI named former Minister and leader of All Ceylon Makkal Congress Rishad Bathiudeen, his brother Riyaj, Dr Muhamad Zulyan Muhamad Zafras and Ahamad Lukman Thalib as persons who facilitated the Easter Sunday conspiracy, while former Minister M.L.A.M. Hisbullah was faulted for spreading extremism in Kattankudy.

Major General (retd) Suresh Sallay, who is now in remand custody, under the CID, for a period of 90 days, in terms of the prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) ,was not among those named by the PCoI. Sallay, who served as the head of the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI/from 2012 to 2016) was taken into custody on 25 February and named as the third suspect in the high profile investigation. (Interested parties propagated that Sallay was apprehended on the basis of UK’s Channel 4 claim that the officer got in touch with would-be Easter Sunday bombers, including Zahran Hashim, with the help of Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan, alias Pilleyan. However, Pilleyan who had been arrested in early April 2025 under PTA was recently remanded by the Mount Lavinia Magistrate’s Court, pending the Attorney General’s recommendations in connection with investigations into the disappearance of a Vice Chancellor in the Eastern Province in 2006. There was absolutely no reference to the Easter Sunday case)

The Church also emphasised the need to investigate the then Attorney General Dappula de Livera’s declaration of a ‘grand conspiracy’ behind the Easter Sunday carnage. The Church sought answers from President Rajapaksa as to the nature of the grand conspiracy claimed by the then AG on the eve of his retirement.

Sallay was taken into custody six years after the PCoI handed over its recommendations to President Rajapaksa and the appointment of a six-member parliamentary committee that examined the recommendations. The author of Pasku Praharaye Mahamolakaru Soya Yema, Gammanpila, the only lawyer in the six-member PCoI, should be able to reveal the circumstances that committee came into being.

Against the backdrop of the PCoI making specific recommendations in respect of the disgraced politicians, civilian officials and law enforcement authorities over accountability and security failures, the SLPP owed an explanation regarding the appointment of a six-member committee of SLPPers. Actually, the SLPP owed an explanation to Sallay whose arrest under the PTA eight years after Easter Sunday carnage has to be discussed taking into consideration the failure to implement the recommendations.

Let me briefly mention PCoI’s recommendations pertaining to two senior police officers. PCoI recommended that the AG consider criminal proceedings against SDIG Nandana Munasinghe under any suitable provision in the Penal Code or Section 82 of the Police Ordinance (Final report, Vol 1, page 312). The PCoI recommended a disciplinary inquiry in respect of DIG Deshabandu Tennakoon. The SLPP simply sat on the PCoI recommendations.

Following the overthrow of President Rajapaksa by a well-organised Aragalaya mob in July 2022, the SLPP and President Ranil Wickremesinghe paved the way for Deshabandu Tennakoon to become the Acting IGP in November 2023. Wickremesinghe went out of his way to secure the Constitutional Council’s approval to confirm the controversial police officer Tennakoon’s status as the IGP.

Some have misconstrued the Supreme Court ruling, given in January 2023, as action taken by the State against those named in the PCoI report. It was not the case. The SC bench, comprising seven judges, ordered Sirisena to pay Rs 100 mn into a compensation fund in response to 12 fundamental rights cases filed by families of the Easter Sunday victims, Catholic clergy and the Bar Association of Sri Lanka. The SC also ordered ex-IGP Pujith Jayasundara and former SIS head Nilantha Jayawardene to pay Rs. 75m rupees each, former Defence Secretary Hemasiri Fernando Rs. 50 million and former CNI Sisira Mendis Rs. 10 million from their personal money. All of them have been named in the PCoI report. As previously mentioned, Maj. Gen. Sallay, who headed the SIS at the time of the SC ruling that created the largest ever single compensation fund, was not among those faulted by the sitting and former justices.

Initial assertion

The Archbishop of Colombo, in mid-May 2019, declared the Easter Sunday carnage was caused by local youth at the behest of a foreign group. The leader of the Catholic Church said so in response to a query raised by the writer regarding a controversial statement made by TNA MP M. A. Sumanthiran. The Archbishop was joined by Most Ven Ittapane Dhammalankara Nayaka Thera of Kotte Sri Kalyani Samagri Dharma Maha Sangha Sabha of Siyam Maha Nikaya. They responded to media queries at the Bishop’s House, Borella.

The Archbishop contradicted Sumanthiran’s claim that the failure on the part of successive governments to address the grievances of minorities over the past several decades led to the 2019 Easter Sunday massacre.

Sumanthiran made the unsubstantiated claim at an event organised to celebrate the first anniversary of the Sinhala political weekly ‘Annidda,’ edited by Attorney-at-Law K.W. Janaranjana at the BMICH.

The Archbishop alleged that a foreign group used misguided loyal youth to mount the Easter Sunday attacks (‘Cardinal rejects TNA’s interpretation’, with strap line ‘foreign group used misguided local youth’, The Island, May 15, 2019 edition).

Interested parties interpreted the Easter Sunday carnage in line with their thinking. The writer was present at a special media briefing called by President Sirisena on 30 April, 2019 at the President’s House where the then Northern Province Governor Dr. Suren Raghavan called for direct talks with those responsible for the Easter Sunday massacre. One-time Director of the President’s Media Division (PMD) Dr. Raghavan emphasised that direct dialogue was necessary in the absence of an acceptable mechanism to deal with such a situation. Don’t forget Sisisena had no qualms in leaving the country a few days before the attacks and was away in Singapore when extremists struck. Sirisena arrived in Singapore from India.

The NP Governor made the declaration though none of the journalists present sought his views on the post-Easter Sunday developments.

During that briefing, in response to another query raised by the writer, Army Commander Lt. Gen. Mahesh Senanayake disclosed that the CNI refrained from sharing intelligence alerts received by the CNI with the DMI. Brigadier Chula Kodituwakku, who served as Director, DMI, had been present at Sirisena’s briefing and was the first to brief the media with regard to the extremist build-up leading to the Easter Sunday attacks.

The collapse of the Yahapalana arrangement caused a security nightmare. Frequent feuds between Yahapalana partners, the UNP and the SLFP, facilitated the extremists’ project. The top UNP leadership feared to step in, even after Justice Minister Dr. Wijeyadasa Rajapaksha issued a warning in Parliament, in late 2016, regarding extremist activities and some Muslim families securing refuge in countries dominated by ISIS. Instead of taking tangible measures to address the growing threat, a section of the UNP parliamentary group pounced on the Minister.

The UNP felt that police/military action against extremists may undermine their voter base. The UNP remained passive even after extremists made an abortive bid to kill Thasleem, Coordinating Secretary to Minister Kabir Hashim, on 8 March 2019. Thasleem earned the wrath of the extremists as he accompanied the CID team that raided the extremists’ facility at Wanathawilluwa. The 16 January 2019 raid indicated the deadly intentions of the extremists but PM Wickremesinghe was unmoved, while President Sirisena appeared clueless as to what was going on.

Let me reproduce the PCoI assessment of PM Wickremesinghe in the run-up to the Easter Sunday massacre. “Upon consideration of evidence, it is the view of the PCoI that the lax approach of Mr. Wickremesinghe towards Islamic extremists as the Prime Minister was one of the primary reasons for the failure on the part of the then government to take proactive steps towards tackling growing extremism. This facilitated the build-up of Islam extremists to the point of the Easter Sunday attack.” (Final report, Vol 1, pages 276 and 277).

The National Catholic Committee for Justice to Easter Sunday Attack Victims, in its letter dated 12 July, 2021, addressed to President Rajapaksa, questioned the failure on the part of the PCoI to make any specific recommendations as regards Wickremesinghe. Accusing Wickremesinghe of a serious act of irresponsibility and neglect of duty, the Church emphasised that there should have been further investigations regarding the UNP leader’s conduct.

SLPP’s shocking failure

The SLPP never made a serious bid to examine all available information as part of an overall effort to counter accusations. If widely propagated lie that the Easter Sunday massacre had been engineered by Sallay to help Gotabaya Rajapaksa win the 2019 presidential poll is accepted, then not only Sirisena and Wickremesinghe but all law enforcement officers and others mentioned in the PCoI must have contributed to that despicable strategy. It would be interesting to see how the conspirators convinced a group of Muslims to sacrifice their lives to help Sinhala Buddhist hardliner Gotabaya Rajapaksa to become the President.

Amidst claims, counter claims and unsubstantiated propaganda all forgotten that a senior member of the JVP/NPP government, in February 2021, when he was in the Opposition directly claimed Indian involvement. The accusation seems unfair as all know that India alerted Sri Lanka on 4 April , 2019, regarding the conspiracy. However, Asanga Abeygoonasekera, in his latest work ‘Winds of Change’ questioned the conduct of the top Indian defence delegation that was in Colombo exactly two weeks before the Easter Sunday carnage. Abeygoonasekera, who had been a member of the Sri Lanka delegation, expressed suspicions over the visiting delegation’s failure to make reference to the warning given on 4 April 2019 regarding the plot.

The SLPP never had or developed a strategy to counter stepped up attacks. The party was overwhelmed by a spate of accusations meant to undermine them, both in and outside Parliament. The JVP/NPP, in spite of accommodating Mohamed Yusuf Ibrahim, father of two Easter Sunday suicide bombers Ilham Ahmed Ibrahim (Shangila-la) and Imsath Ahmed Ibrahim (Cinnamon Grand), in its 2015 National List was never really targeted by the SLPP. The SLPP never effectively raised the possibility of the wealthy spice trader funding the JVP to receive a National List slot.

The Catholic Church, too, was strangely silent on this particular issue. The issue is whether Mohamed Yusuf Ibrahim had been aware of the conspiracy that involved his sons. Another fact that cannot be ignored is Attorney-at-Law Hejaaz Hizbullah who had been arrested in April 2020 in connection with the Easter Sunday carnage but granted bail in February 2022 had been the Ibrahim family lawyer.

Hejaaz Hizbullah’s arrest received international attention and various interested parties raised the issue.

The father of the two brothers, who detonated suicide bombs, was granted bail in May 2022.

Eric Solheim, who had been involved in the Norwegian-led disastrous peace process here, commented on the Easter Sunday attacks. In spite of the international media naming the suicide bombers responsible for the worst such atrocity Solheim tweeted: “When we watch the horrific pictures from Sri Lanka, it is important to remember that Muslims and Christians are small minorities. Muslims historically were moderate and peaceful. They have been victims of violence in Sri Lanka, not orchestrating it.”

That ill-conceived tweet exposed the mindset of a man who unashamedly pursued a despicable agenda that threatened the country’s unitary status with the connivance of the UNP. Had they succeeded, the LTTE would have emerged as the dominant political-military power in the Northern and Eastern Provinces and a direct threat to the rest of the country.

Midweek Review

War with Iran and unravelling of the global order – I

Published

2 days ago

2026/04/8

Sahan Weerasooriya

At present, the world stands in the midst of a transitional and turbulent phase, characterised by heightened uncertainty and systemic flux, reflecting an ongoing transformation of the modern global order. The existing global order, rooted in the US hegemony, shows unmistakable signs of decay, while a new and uncertain global system struggles to be born. In such moments of profound transformation, as Antonio Gramsci observed, morbid symptoms proliferate across the body politic. From a geopolitical perspective, the intensifying coordinated aggression of the United States and Israel against Iran is not merely a regional crisis, but an acceleration of a deeper structural transformation in the international order. In this context, the conduct of Donald Trump appears less as an aberration and more as a morbid symptom of a declining US-led global order. As Amitav Acharya argues in The Once and Future World Order (2025), the emerging global order may well move beyond Western dominance. However, the pathway to that future is proving anything but orderly, shaped instead by disruption, unilateralism, and the unsettling symptoms of a system in transition.

Origins of the Conflict

To begin with, the origins and objectives of the parties to the present armed confrontation require unpacking. In a sense, the current Persian Gulf crisis reflects a convergence of long-standing geopolitical rivalries and evolving security dynamics in the Middle East. The roots of tension between the West and the Middle East can be traced back to earlier historical encounters, from the Persian Wars of classical antiquity to the Crusades of the medieval period. A new phase in the region’s political trajectory commenced in 1948 with the establishment of Israel—widely perceived as a Western enclave within the Arab world—and the concurrent displacement of approximately 700,000 Palestinians from their homeland. Since then, Israel has steadily consolidated and expanded its territory, a process that has remained a persistent source of regional instability. The Iranian Revolution introduced a further layer of complexity, fundamentally reshaping regional alignments and ideological contestations. In recent years, tensions between Israel and the United States on one side and Iran on the other have steadily intensified. The current phase of the conflict, however, was directly triggered by coordinated U.S.–Israeli airstrikes on both civilian and military targets on 28 February 2026, which, as noted in a 2 April 2026 statement by 100 international law experts from leading U.S. universities, constituted a clear violation of the UN Charter and International Humanitarian Law (IHL).

Objectives and Strategic Aims

Israel’s strategic objective appears to be directed toward the systematic and total destruction of Iran’s military, nuclear, and economic capabilities, driven by the perception that Iran remains the principal obstacle to its security and its pursuit of regional primacy. Israel was aware that Iran did not possess a nuclear weapon at the time; however, its nuclear programme remained a subject of international contention, with competing assessments regarding its ultimate intent and potential for weaponisation.

The United States, for its part, appears to be pursuing more targeted political and strategic objectives, including eventual transformation of Iran’s current political regime. Washington has long regarded the Iranian leadership as fundamentally antagonistic to U.S. interests in the Middle East. In this context, the United States may seek to enhance its strategic leverage over Iran, including in relation to its substantial oil and gas resources, a point underscored in recent statements by Donald Trump. It must be noted, however, successive U.S. administrations since 1979 have avoided direct large-scale military confrontation with Iran, preferring instead a combination of sanctions, diplomatic pressure, and indirect military engagement.

The positions of other Arab states in the Persian Gulf are shaped by a combination of security calculations, sectarian considerations, and broader geopolitical alignments. While several Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members, notably Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, have expressed tacit support for measures that counter Iranian regional influence, their involvement remains calibrated to avoid direct military confrontation. Their position is informed by the belief that Iran provides backing to militant non-state actors, including Hezbollahs in the West Bank and the Houthis in Southern Yemen, which they view as destabilising forces in the region. These states are balancing competing priorities: the desire to curb Iran’s power projection, maintain strong security and economic ties with the United States, and preserve domestic stability. At the same time, countries such as Oman and Qatar have adopted more neutral or mediating stances, emphasizing diplomatic engagement and conflict de-escalation.

Militarily, Iran is not positioned to match the combined military capabilities of U.S.–Israeli forces. Nevertheless, it retains significant asymmetric leverage, particularly through its capacity to influence global energy flows. Control over critical maritime chokepoints, most notably the Strait of Hormuz, provides Tehran with a potent strategic instrument to disrupt global oil supply. Iranian leadership appears to view this leverage as a key pressure point, designed to compel global economic actors to push Washington and Tel Aviv toward a cessation of hostilities and a negotiated settlement. In this context, attacks on oil and gas infrastructure, shipping routes, and supply lines constitute central components of Iran’s survival strategy. As long as the conflict persists and energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz remain disrupted, the resulting instability is likely to generate severe repercussions across the global economy, increasing pressure on the United States to halt military operations against Iran.

Now entering its fifth week, the conflict continues to flare intensely, characterised by sustained and intensive aerial operations. Joint U.S.–Israeli strikes have reportedly destroyed substantial elements of Iran’s air and naval capabilities, as well as critical military and economic infrastructure. Nevertheless, Iran has retained the capacity to conduct guided missile strikes within Israel and against selected U.S. economic, diplomatic, and military assets across the Middle East, including reported long-range attacks on the U.S. facility at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, approximately 4,000 kilometers from Iranian territory. Initial U.S. and Israeli strategic calculations—anticipating that a decisive initial strike and the targeted killing of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei would precipitate regime collapse and popular uprising—have not materialized. On the contrary, the destruction of civilian facilities has strengthened anti-American sentiment and reinforced domestic support for the Iranian leadership. While Iran faced initial setbacks on the battlefield, it has achieved notable success in the international media front, effectively shaping global perceptions and advancing its propaganda objectives. By the fifth week, Tehran’s asymmetric strategy has yielded tangible results, including the downing of two U.S. military aircraft, F15E Strike Eagle fighter jet and A10 Thunderbolt II (“Warthog”) ground-attack aircraft , signaling the resilience and operational efficacy of Iran’s military power.

The Military Industrial Complexes and ProIsrael Lobby

Why did the United States initiate military action against Iran at this particular juncture? Joe Kent, who resigned in protest over the war, stated that available intelligence did not indicate an imminent Iranian capability to produce a nuclear weapon or pose an immediate threat to the United States. This assessment raises important questions about the stated objective of dismantling Iran’s nuclear programme, suggesting that it may have served to obscure broader strategic and economic considerations underpinning the intervention. To understand the timing and rationale of the U.S. intervention in the Persian Gulf, it is therefore necessary to examine the influence of two powerful domestic pressure groups: the military–industrial complex and the pro-Israel lobby.

The influence of the U.S. military–industrial complex on American foreign policy is most clearly manifested through the institutionalized “revolving door” between defense corporations and senior positions within the U.S. administration. Over the past two decades, key figures such as Lloyd Austin (Secretary of Defence, 2021–2025), a former board member of Raytheon Technologies, Mark Esper (Secretary of Defence 2019–2020), who previously served as a senior executive at the same firm, and Patrick Shanahan (2019) from Boeing exemplify the direct movement of personnel from industry into the highest levels of strategic decision-making. This circulation is complemented by influential policy actors such as Michèle Flournoy (Under Secretary of Defence Under President Obama) and Antony Blinken (Secretary of State 2021 to 2025, Deputy Secretary of State 2015 to 2017), whose engagement with consultancies like WestExec Advisors further blurs the boundary between public policy and private defense interests. This pattern appears to persist under the present Trump administration, where the interplay between defense industry interests and strategic policymaking continues to shape procurement priorities and threat perceptions. Consequently, the military–industrial complex operates not merely as an external pressure group but as an internalized component of the policy process, shaping U.S. foreign policy in ways that align strategic objectives with the structural and commercial interests of the defense sector. Armed conflicts may also generate substantial commercial opportunities, as increased military spending often translates into expanded profits for defense contractors.

The influence of the pro-Israel lobby on U.S. foreign policy is best understood as a dense network of advocacy organisations, donors, policy institutes, and political actors that shape both elite consensus and decision-making within successive administrations. At the center of this network is the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, widely regarded as one of the most effective lobbying organisations in Washington, which works alongside a broader constellation of groups and donors to sustain bipartisan support for Israel. This influence is reinforced through the presence of senior policymakers and advisors with strong ideological or institutional affinities toward Israel, including Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu, whose close political alignment has translated into consistent diplomatic and strategic backing. Policy decisions—ranging from the recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital to continued military assistance—reflect not only geopolitical calculations but also the domestic political salience of pro-Israel advocacy within the United States. Consequently, the pro-Israel lobby operates not merely as an external pressure group but as an embedded force within the policy ecosystem, shaping U.S. foreign policy in ways that sustain a strong and often unconditional commitment to Israeli security and strategic interests. A fuller explanation of U.S. policy toward Iran emerges when the influence of both the military–industrial complex and the pro-Israel lobby is considered together. These two forces, while distinct in composition and motivation, converge in reinforcing a strategic outlook that prioritises the identification of Iran as a central threat and legitimizes the use of coercive military instruments.

Global Economic Fallout

After five weeks of sustained conflict, the trajectory of the war suggests that Iran’s strategy of resilience and asymmetric resistance is yielding tangible effects. While the United States, alongside Israel, has inflicted significant damage on Iran’s economic and military infrastructure, it has not succeeded in eroding Tehran’s capacity—or resolve—to continue the conflict through unconventional means. At the same time, Washington appears to be encountering increasing difficulty in bringing the war to a decisive conclusion, even as signs of strain emerge in its relations with key European allies. Most importantly, the repercussions of the conflict are no longer confined to the battlefield: the unfolding crisis has generated a widening economic shock that is reverberating across global markets and supply chains. It is this broader international economic impact of the war that now warrants closer examination.

The Persian Gulf conflict is rapidly sending shockwaves through the global economy. At the forefront is the energy sector: even partial disruptions to oil and gas exports from the region are driving prices sharply higher, placing severe pressure on energy-importing economies in Europe and Asia and fueling inflation worldwide. Maritime trade is also under strain, as heightened risk prompts longer shipping routes, increased freight rates, and rising war-risk premiums. These disruptions ripple through global supply chains, pushing up the cost of goods far beyond the energy sector.

Insurance costs for shipping and aviation are soaring as large zones are designated high-risk or even excluded from coverage, further elevating transport costs and pricing out smaller operators. Together, these pressures constitute a systemic economic shock: industrial production costs rise, supply chains fragment, and trade volumes contract, stressing manufacturing, logistics, and consumption simultaneously.

The cumulative effect is already slowing global growth. Major economies such as the EU, China, and India face slower expansion, while import-dependent states risk recession. Trade-driven sectors are contracting, reinforcing a scenario of high inflation and stagnating growth. Air travel is also impacted, with restricted airspace, higher fuel prices, and elevated insurance premiums driving up ticket costs and lengthening travel routes. Rising energy prices, logistics bottlenecks, and increased production costs are pushing up food prices and cost-of-living pressures, potentially forcing central banks into tighter monetary policy and slowing growth further.

Finally, global manufacturing—from chemicals and plastics to agriculture—is experiencing ripple effects as supply chain disruptions intensify shortages and price increases. The conflict in the Persian Gulf is thus not only a regional security crisis but also a catalyst for broad, interconnected economic disruptions that are reverberating across markets, trade networks, and everyday life worldwide.

(To be continued)