Midweek Review

Bawa Art Industry: Lunuganga, and Chandrajeewa Atelier: Wennappuwa – II

Published

4 years ago

2022/04/6

By Dr. Laleen Jayamanne
(First part of this article appeared last Saturday (02)

As an architect, Bawa, we know, has transformed local craft work and materials that were not coolly modernist, like ‘Sinhala ulu’ for example, into becoming fashionable and beautiful, creating a cottage industry of sorts. ‘Sinhala ulu’, metal work, coconut rafters and pillars, etc., were revived at some scale. And there is now a cottage industry-style museologically-based enterprise generating visitors, income and new work for international artists and locals to exchange ideas at Lunuganga, by working on specific ideas like the recent Gift project focused on the magnificent garden there.

Sarath Chandrajeewa Atelier in Wennapuwa was established in 1990 and the organisation Contemporary Arts and Crafts Association, with patron Harold Peiris. Wennappuwa is also importantly the area where tiles, Sinhala and rata ulu, are manufactured industrially. This link with clay, a cheap material, is also a universal civilisational material (the first writing was on clay tablets), but the people who practise the craft traditionally belonged to the kumbal caste, one at the lower end of the hierarchical Sinhala caste system, which certainly has not disappeared. But the potters who made functional chatty pots for domestic use, in Kumbal Gama (potters’ village), lost their livelihoods when cheap aluminium utensils flooded the market, after the 1977 economic reforms. Prior to that, Chandrajeewa would go to their workshop, during weekends, in his student days, to learn the craft from the potters themselves. How coolly newsworthy! Sarath also works with Bronze casting of sculpture in his workshop, a difficult and rare ancient craft skill now, and hence the need to go to London to be trained by a fellow Lankan! Wonder what Ananda Coomaraswamy might have thought of this and it is also worth noting with Chandrajeewa that it took 60 years for his Mediaeval Sinhalese Art, a foundational text, to be translated into Sinhala. I remember reading that and the Dance of Shiva as an undergrad studying English lit and Classics. His atelier appears to have a craft ethos, providing training, but the links with mass production are still there, even as it looks back into deep history, well past Modernism to the famous Lankan Bronzes. He wrote a doctoral thesis on one of them in Post-Soviet Russia, the Veragala Avalokitesvara, which has been published with images of the icon and a fascinating argument about a subtle distinction between art and craft. Intellectuals I knew from Peradeniya University in the ‘60s who taught in the Sinhala medium and current ones visit this visionary institution and are made to feel welcome. A new generation of intellectuals teaching fine arts in the Sinhala medium (one of whom a research student of mine at Sydney University), look up to him as a fearless scholar/artist who speaks truth to power. These multiple, material and commercial links and singular vision and craft, bring Bawa’s work into an alignment with Chandrajeeva’s, I believe. And, of course, historically sculptor has been an essential part of architecture, for example, the Greeks, the Cholas.

But beyond this historical relationship there is a material, intimate, temporal exchange between these two artists. Chandrajeewa sculpted Bawa’s head (portrait sculpture), as part of his 1994 exhibition ‘Hundred Impressions on Bronze’, at the National Art Gallery of Sri Lanka. According to newspaper reviews and articles it was a major landmark event in the history contemporary art in Sri Lanka. However, I am not aware of any historiography of contemporary art as yet, which documents this work. At the exhibition, the unknown and the celebrated, (e. g. Tissa Hami from a Veddha tribe and Dr P. R. Anthonis, the brilliant surgeon for example), the famous and the not so famous artists and many others were sculpted by Chandrajeewa as his response to the 1987-89 violence of both the JVP and of the State, where people were beheaded and their heads arranged ornamentally on a roundabout of a campus or impaled on stakes. Like Bawa once said about this period, his response to extreme physical violence was to amplify that which was beautiful. The wall of heads, not all Lankans (Arthur C, Clarke appears as an honorary Lankan), were all there looking at us in strange unfamiliar ways addressing us silently in those very dark times, an activist, craggy collective work in Bronze!

So, having seen numerous Youtube videos of Chandrajeeva’s process of sculpting heads, one in an art school in Florence, it occurred to me that the sheer speed (anywhere between one hour and four), at which he moulds a clay portrait, is what made it ‘performance art’. Not the avant-garde variety done at the time but modelling clay at the speed of unfettered thought. There is no drama and no soliciting of attention in the performance, but an absolute focus of self-forgetfulness. The film star Anoja Weersingha, also popular in Pakistani cinema, who is usually all smiles, on seeing her somber, craggy, sculpted face, exclaimed that her heart had been imprinted on her face. An art historian can ask why Chandrajeeva called his work, seemingly counter-intuitively, “Impressions”.

How is he like the French impressionists who tried to paint light and time, both elusive forces difficult to grasp. I think that not being there but able to see clearly on YouTube videos his process in real time, he is sensing some intangible quality in the visage of the person he is modelling, and trying to capture that instant or nano-second, on the yielding earthy clay. Afterwards, he castes it in the less yielding bronze, to honour these citizens of Sri Lanka and a few foreigners, who have helped to make it a flourishing culture.

Now that Bawa’s sculpture is in Lunuganga gardens, I am told, its companion appears to be a sculptural sundial (not like the ancient Lankan sundial or suriya thati), which may have, as far as I know, escaped curatorial attention, though not the tourist promos of the garden. I know of the sundial sculpture’s existence only through a mention in a scholarly book co-authored by Chandrajeewa with Anoma and Nimal Jayasingha, An Investigation of the Sundial at the Abhayagiri Monastery in Anuradhapura, Sri Lanka (2021). Geoffrey would have known that the Lunuganga sundial sculpture was in the lineage of an ancient piece of technology to show time from the movement of sunlight and shadow. The book is about the sundial excavated at the Abhayagiri Vihare in Anuradhapura and now in that museum. It shows the complex maths and calculations required to build one but also how monastic and international exchanges were regulated there by this shadow clock. So now it is a sign of deep historical time and as such a conceptual object in the garden. Even Bawa’s sculpture portrait may not have had any curatorial attention, again as far as I can tell from research on the internet. So, I imagine the sundial and the bronze head are probably nestled in some shady spot out of the sunlight. These two objects create an unexpected civilizational link between Bawa and Chadrajeewa, contemporary architect and sculptor, across a vast social and historical divide. I think that imaginative conceptual and historical research on art and culture can come out of acknowledging this reality, as a first step.

When Bawa used lowly local indigenous craft materials by turning to traditional architectural models for inspiration, Asian academics with a taste for theory, swiftly and cannily crafted the concept, ‘Tropical Modernism’, a boom area for business and a boon for ‘third world’ architects in the ‘60s. But, alas! when Chadrajeewa exhibited ‘Creations in Terracotta’ in 1990, an applied art, and later his ‘100 Impressions on Bronze’ in 1994, despite the popularity of these shows and the insightful and stylish writing in both the Sinhala and English press by the likes of bilingual Edwin Ariyadasa, an important film critic and Professor of English and specialist in drama, A. J. Gunawardana, it appears to have been ignored by the western art establishment, such as it was then. His work was subsequently dismissed by some prominent academics and artists, as being ‘traditional’ making ‘lots of money’ and getting ‘a lot of media attention’. That was then, but now, being popular is not considered unseemly and painting on traditional bricks is fine, a beautifully crafted, reflexive political act. And, of course, making money and getting media attention is just a part of the art game at top galleries and the most prestigious European Biennales, the norm.

If per chance, Chadrajeeva is invited to respond to the Lunuganga, Gift 2 project (announced at the end of the first), one hopes that he might feel like coming out of retirement to address his bronze Bawa, in the light of the sundial perhaps hidden somewhere there amid the grass. Bawa would have loved this I am sure. Just look at his expression of child-like delight, captured in a photograph, (I hope this paper will publish it here), when he saw his metal head at the ‘100 Impressions on Bronze’ exhibition 1994. That’s on page 13 of the catalogue of the exhibition, Path of Visual Arts (at Barefoot Gallery, 2005), by Namal Avanthi Jayasinghe. It was an exhibition organized by his former students, as a gift, when he turned 50. What a gift!

In a private correspondence of 23-3-22, Chandrajeewa said the following:

“Bawa has visited my studio twice.

Once came to see a Bronze casting session.

One time he had a party with us in Lunuganga garden. Harold Peiris also participated.

I went to Lunuganga before the Covid pandemic in late 2019. It happened after I was removed from the post of VC.

With a group of my students who are not at university, a happy day.

That was the last time I observed the sundial at Bawa garden. It is a modern Sundial. But not properly working with the sunlight.

Can’t get the clear shadow marking from it. I think some part or parts are missing from the construction.

This is a garden sculpture rather than a Sundial.”

But his first invited visit to Lunuganga was in 1991.

I cite these to indicate Bawa’s interest in and appreciation of Chandrajeewa’s work, his methods, his hands-on deep craft knowledge. But Chandrajeewa’s multifaceted scholarly and artistic work does not need Bawa’s authorization for the people of Sri Lanka to appreciate it. They already know why he matters to them in a multilingual, multicultural Lanka, with a deep cross-cultural history connected to the world as far back as the silk routes and even beyond during the time of the Mahavihara and Abhayagiri vihara of Anuradhpura period. But, arguing from the unassailable authority of Bawa as the genius, starchitect of Lanka may be the only way in which the art world might pay attention. While, as an intellectual I try not to argue from authority, but from reason, in this loaded instance, I feel it’s just worth a try to see if it would make a difference. I will hazard my amateur opinion for whatever its worth: ‘Sarath Chandrajeewa seems be the Geoffrey Bawa of contemporary Sri Lankan sculpture’. (Discuss!).

And lastly, wouldn’t it be wonderful to see a collection of Chandrajeeva’s terracotta sculpture, pots and benches in the garden and lamps lit at sunset around the vintage Ena de Silva house, with a touch of Walauwa nostalgia, now lovingly preserved. However, Bawa’s tropical, ecological garden, inspired by the 18th century British architect and landscape designer, Robert Adam, with its European lineage, now can also suggest generative multiple rhizomatic connections (wild like the way grass grows, or the way a potato sprouts, not rectilinear), closer to home. The bronze head and the sundial suggest Sri Lanka’s ancient connections with a larger Asian and Arab-Islamic world and their profound mathematical knowledge. The sundial book is fittingly dedicated to: “The Unknown Masters of Ancient Sundials of Sri Lanka”.

All News Advertisement

Midweek Review

Fonseka clears Rajapaksas of committing war crimes he himself once accused them of

Published

2 days ago

2026/02/25

Sahan Weerasooriya

With Sri Lanka’s 17th annual war victory over separatist Tamil terrorism just months away, warwinning Army Chief, Field Marshal Sarath Fonseka (Dec. 06, 2005, to July 15, 2009) has significantly changed his war narrative pertaining to the final phase of the offensive that was brought to an end on May 18, 2009.

The armed forces declared the conclusion of ground operations on that day after the entire northern region was brought back under their control. LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran, hiding within the secured area, was killed on the following day. His body was recovered from the banks of the Nanthikadal lagoon.

With the war a foregone conclusion, with nothing to save the increasingly hedged in Tigers taking refuge among hapless Tamil civilians, Fonseka left for Beijing on May 11, and returned to Colombo, around midnight, on May 17, 2009. The LTTE, in its last desperate bid to facilitate Prabhakatan’s escape, breached one flank of the 53 Division, around 2.30 am, on May 18. But they failed to bring the assault to a successful conclusion and by noon the following day those fanatical followers of Tiger Supremo, who had been trapped within the territory, under military control, died in confrontations.

During Fonseka’s absence, the celebrated 58 Division (formerly Task Force 1), commanded by the then Maj. Gen. Shavendra Silva, advanced 31/2 to 4 kms and was appropriately positioned with Maj. Gen. Kamal Gunaratne’s 53 Division. The LTTE never had an opportunity to save its leader by breaching several lines held by frontline troops on the Vanni east front. There couldn’t have been any other option than surrendering to the Army.

The Sinha Regiment veteran, who had repeatedly accused the Rajapaksas of war crimes, and betraying the war effort by providing USD 2 mn, ahead of the 2005 presidential election, to the LTTE, in return for ordering the polls boycott that enabled Mahinda Rajapaksa’s victory, last week made noteworthy changes to his much disputed narrative.

GR’s call to Shavendra What did the former Army Commander say?

* The Rajapaksas wanted to sabotage the war effort, beginning January 2008.

* In January 2008, Mahinda Rajapaksa, Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa and Navy Commander VA Wasantha Karannagoda, proposed to the National Security Council that the Army should advance from Vavuniya to Mullithivu, on a straight line, to rapidly bring the war to a successful conclusion. They asserted that Fonseka’s strategy (fighting the enemy on multiple fronts) caused a lot of casualties.

* They tried to discourage the then Lt. Gen. Fonseka

* Fonseka produced purported video evidence to prove decisive intervention made by Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa on the afternoon of May 17. The ex-Army Chief’s assertion was based on a telephone call received by Maj. Gen. Shavendra Silva from Gotabaya Rajapaksa. That conversation had been captured on video by Swarnavahini’s Shanaka de Silva who now resides in the US. He had been one of the few persons, from the media, authorised by the Army Headquarters and the Defence Ministry to be with the Army leadership on the battlefield. Fonseka claimed that the videographer fled the country to escape death in the hands of the Rajapaksas. It was somewhat reminiscent of Maithripala Sirisena’s claim that if Rajapaksas win the 2015 Presidential election against him he would be killed by them.

* Shanaka captured Shavendra Silva disclosing three conditions laid down by the LTTE to surrender namely (a) Their casualties should be evacuated to Colombo by road (b) They were ready to exchange six captured Army personnel with those in military custody and (c) and the rest were ready to surrender.

* Then Fonseka received a call from Gotabaya Rajapaksa, on a CDMA phone. The Defence Secretary issued specific instructions to the effect that if the LTTE was to surrender that should be to the military and definitely not to the ICRC or any other third party. Gotabaya Rajapaksa, one-time Commanding Officer of the 1st battalion of the Gajaba Regiment, ordered that irrespective of any new developments and talks with the international community, offensive action shouldn’t be halted. That declaration directly contradicted Fonseka’s claim that the Rajapaksas conspired to throw a lifeline to the LTTE.

Fonseka declared that the Rajapaksa brothers, in consultation with the ICRC, and Amnesty International, offered an opportunity for the LTTE leadership to surrender, whereas his order was to annihilate the LTTE. The overall plan was to eliminate all, Fonseka declared, alleging that the Rajapaksa initiated talks with the LTTE and other parties to save those who had been trapped by ground forces in a 400 m x 400 m area by the night of May 16, among a Tamil civilian human shield held by force.

If the LTTE had agreed to surrender to the Army, Mahinda Rajapaksa would have saved their lives. If that happened Velupillai Prabhakaran would have ended up as the Chief Minister of the Northern Province, he said. Fonseka shocked everyone when he declared that he never accused the 58 Division of executing prisoners of war (white flag killings) but the issue was created by those media people embedded with the military leadership. Fonseka declared that accusations regarding white flag killings never happened. That story, according to Fonseka, had been developed on the basis of the Rajapaksas’ failed bid to save the lives of the LTTE leaders.

Before we discuss the issues at hand, and various assertions, claims and allegations made by Fonseka, it would be pertinent to remind readers of wartime US Defence Advisor in Colombo Lt. Col. Lawrence Smith’s June 2011 denial of white flag killings. The US State Department promptly declared that the officer hadn’t spoken at the inaugural Colombo seminar on behalf of the US. Smith’s declaration, made two years after the end of the war, and within months after the release of the Darusman report, dealt a massive blow to false war crimes allegations.

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, in 2010, appointed a three-member Panel of Experts, more like a kangaroo court, consisting of Marzuki Darusman, Yasmin Sooka, and Steven Ratner, to investigate war crimes accusations.

Now Fonseka has confirmed what Smith revealed at the defence seminar in response to a query posed by Maj. General (retd.) Ashok Metha of the IPKF to Shavendra Silva, who had been No 02 in our UN mission, in New York, at that time.

White flag allegations

‘White flag’ allegations cannot be discussed in isolation. Fonseka made that claim as the common presidential candidate backed by the UNP-JVP-TNA combine. The shocking declaration was made in an interview with The Sunday Leader Editor Frederica Jansz published on Dec. 13, 2009 under ‘Gota ordered them to be shot – General Sarath Fonseka.’

The ‘white flag’ story had been sensationally figured in a leaked confidential US Embassy cable, during Patricia Butenis tenure as the US Ambassador here. Butenis had authored that cable at 1.50 pm on Dec. 13, 2009, the day after the now defunct The Sunday Leader exclusive. Butenis had lunch with Fonseka in the company of the then UNP Deputy Leader Karu Jayasuriya, according to the cable. But for the writer the most interesting part had been Butenis declaration that Fonseka’s advisors, namely the late Mangala Samaraweera, Anura Kumara Dissanayake (incumbent President) and Vijitha Herath (current Foreign Minister) wanted him to retract part of the story attributed to him.

Frederica Jansz fiercely stood by her explosive story. She reiterated the accuracy of the story, published on Dec. 13, 2009, during the ‘white flag’ hearing when the writer spoke to her. There is absolutely no reason to suspect Frederica Jansz misinterpreted Fonseka’s response to her queries.

Subsequently, Fonseka repeated the ‘white flag’ allegation at a public rally held in support of his candidature. Many an eyebrow was raised at The Sunday Leader’s almost blind support for Fonseka, against the backdrop of persistent allegations directed at the Army over Lasantha Wickrematunga’s killing. Wickrematunga, an Attorney-at-Law by profession and one-time Private Secretary to Opposition Leader Sirimavo Bandaranaike, was killed on the Attidiya Road, Ratmalana in early January 2009.

The Darusman report, too, dealt withthe ‘white flag’ killings and were central to unsubstantiated Western accusations directed at the Sri Lankan military. Regardless of the political environment in which the ‘white flag’ accusations were made, the issue received global attention for obvious reasons. The accuser had been the war-winning Army Commander who defeated the LTTE at its own game. But, Fonseka insisted, during his meeting with Butenis, as well as the recent public statement that the Rajapaksas had worked behind his back with some members of the international community.

Fresh inquiry needed

Fonseka’s latest declaration that the Rajapaksas wanted to save the LTTE leadership came close on the heels of Deputy British Prime Minister David Lammy’s whistle-stop visit here. The UK, as the leader of the Core Group on Sri Lanka at the Geneva-based United Nations Human Rights Council, spearheads the campaign targeting Sri Lanka.

Lammy was on his way to New Delhi for the AI Impact Summit. The Labour campaigner pushed for action against Sri Lanka during the last UK general election. In fact, taking punitive action against the Sri Lankan military had been a key campaign slogan meant to attract Tamil voters of Sri Lankan origin. His campaign contributed to the declaration of sanctions in March 2025 against Admiral of the Fleet Wasantha Karannagoda, General (retd) Shavendra Silva, General (retd) Jagath Jayasuriya and ex-LTTE commander Karuna, who rebelled against Prabhakaran. Defending Shavendra Silva, Fonseka, about a week after the imposition of the UK sanctions, declared that the British action was unfair.

But Fonseka’s declaration last week had cleared the Rajapaksas of war crimes. Instead, they had been portrayed as traitors. That declaration may undermine the continuous post-war propaganda campaign meant to demonise the Rajapaksas and top ground commanders.

Canada, then a part of the Western clique that blindly towed the US line, declared Sri Lanka perpetrated genocide and also sanctioned ex-Presidents Mahinda Rajapaksa and Gotabaya Rajapaksa. Other countries resorted to action, though such measures weren’t formally announced. General (retd) Jagath Dias and Maj. Gen (retd) Chagie Gallage were two of those targeted.

Against the backdrop of Fonseka’s latest claims, in respect of accountability issues, the urgent need to review action taken against Sri Lanka cannot be delayed. Although the US denied visa when Fonseka was to accompany President Maithripala Sirisena to the UN, in Sept. 2016, he hadn’t been formally accused of war crimes by the western powers, obviously because he served their interests.

On the basis of unsubstantiated allegations that hadn’t been subjected to judicial proceedings, Geneva initiated actions. The US, Canada and UK acted on those accusations. The US sanctioned General Shavendra Silva in Feb. 2020 and Admiral Karannagoda in April 2023.

What compelled Fonseka to change his narrative, 18 years after his Army ended the war? Did Fonseka base his latest version solely on Shanaka de Silva video? Fonseka is on record as claiming that he got that video, via a third party, thereby Shanaka de Silva had nothing to do with his actions.

DNA and formation of DP

Having realised that he couldn’t, under any circumstances, reach a consensus with the UNP to pursue a political career with that party, Fonseka teamed up with the JVP, one of the parties in the coalition that backed his presidential bid in 2010. Fonseka’s current efforts to reach an understanding with the JVP/NPP (President Anura Kumara Dissanayake is the leader of both registered political parties) should be examined against the backdrop of their 2010 alliance.

Under Fonseka’s leadership, the JVP, and a couple of other parties/groups, contested, under the symbol of the Democratic National Alliance (DNA) that had been formed on 22 Nov. 2009. but the grouping pathetically failed to live up to their own expectations. The results of the parliamentary polls, conducted in April 2010, had been devastating and utterly demoralising. Fonseka, who polled about 40% of the national vote at the January 2010 presidential election, ended up with just over 5% of the vote, and the DNA only managed to secure seven seats, including two on the National List. The DNA group consisted of Fonseka, ex-national cricket captain Arjuna Ranatunga, businessman Tiran Alles and four JVPers. Anura Kumara Dissanayake was among the four.

Having been arrested on February 8, 2010, soon after the presidential election, Fonseka was in prison. He was court-martialed for committing “military offences”. He was convicted of corrupt military supply deals and sentenced to three years in prison. Fonseka vacated his seat on 7 Oct .2010. Following a failed legal battle to protect his MP status, Fonseka was replaced by DNA member Jayantha Ketagoda on 8 March 2011. But President Mahinda Rajapaksa released Fonseka in May 2012 following heavy US pressure. The US went to the extent of issuing a warning to the then SLFP General Secretary Maithripala Sirisena that unless President Rajapaksa freed Fonseka he would have to face the consequences (The then Health Minister Sirisena disclosed the US intervention when the writer met him at the Jealth Ministry, as advised by President Rajapaksa)

By then, Fonseka and the JVP had drifted apart and both parties were irrelevant. Somawansa Amarasinghe had been the leader at the time the party decided to join the UNP-led alliance that included the TNA, and the SLMC. The controversial 2010 project had the backing of the US as disclosed by leaked secret diplomatic cables during Patricia Butenis tenure as the US Ambassador here.

In spite of arranging the JVP-led coalition to bring an end to the Rajapaksa rule, Butenis, in a cable dated 15 January 2010, explained the crisis situation here. Butenis said: “There are no examples we know of a regime undertaking wholesale investigations of its own troops or senior officials for war crimes while that regime or government remained in power. In Sri Lanka this is further complicated by the fact that responsibility for many of the alleged crimes rests with the country’s senior civilian and military leadership, including President Rajapaksa and his brothers and opposition candidate General Fonseka.”

Then Fonseka scored a major victory when Election Commissioner Mahinda Deshapriya on 1 April, 2013, recognised his Democratic Party (DNA was registered as DP) with ‘burning flame’ as its symbol. There hadn’t been a previous instance of any service commander registering a political party. While Fonseka received the leadership, ex-Army officer Senaka de Silva, husband of Diana Gamage ((later SJB MP who lost her National List seat over citizenship issue) functioned as the Deputy Leader.

Having covered Fonseka’s political journey, beginning with the day he handed over command to Lt. Gen. Jagath Jayasuriya, in July, 2009, at the old Army Headquarters that was later demolished to pave the way for the Shangri-La hotel complex, the writer covered the hastily arranged media briefing at the Solis reception hall, Pitakotte, on 2 April, 2023. Claiming that his DP was the only alternative to what he called corrupt Mahinda Rajapaksa’s government and bankrupt Ranil Wickremesinghe-led Opposition, a jubilant Fonseka declared himself as the only alternative (‘I am the only alternative,’ with strapline ‘SF alleges Opposition is as bad as govt’. The Island, April 3, 2013).

Fonseka had been overconfident to such an extent, he appealed to members of the government parliamentary group, as well as the Opposition (UNP), to switch allegiance to him. As usual Fonseka was cocky and never realised that 40% of the national vote he received, at the presidential election, belonged to the UNP, TNA and the JVP. Fonseka also disregarded the fact that he no longer had the JVP’s support. He was on his own. The DP never bothered to examine the devastating impact his 2010 relationship with the TNA had on the party. The 2015 general election results devastated Fonseka and underscored that there was absolutely no opportunity for a new party. The result also proved that his role in Sri Lanka’s triumph over the LTTE hadn’t been a decisive factor.

RW comes to SF’s rescue

Fonseka’s DP suffered a humiliating defeat at the August 2015 parliamentary polls. The outcome had been so bad that the DP was left without at least a National List slot. Fonseka was back to square one. If not for UNP leader and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, Fonseka could have been left in the cold. Wickremesinghe accommodated Fonseka on their National List, in place of SLFPer M.K.D.S. Gunawardene, who played a critical role in an influential section of the party and the electorate shifting support to Maithripala Sirisena. Gunawardena passed away on 19 January, 2016. Wickremesinghe and Fonseka signed an agreement at Temple Trees on 3 February, 2016. Fonseka received appointment as National List MP on 9 February, 2016, and served as Minister of Regional Development and, thereafter, as Minister of Wildlife and Sustainable Development, till Oct. 2018. Fonseka lost his Ministry when President Sirisena treacherously sacked Wickremesinghe’s government to pave the way for a new partnership with the Rajapaksas. The Supreme Court discarded that arrangement and brought back the Yahapalana administration but Sirisena, who appointed Fonseka to the lifetime rank of Field Marshal, in recognition of his contribution to the defeat of terrorism, refused to accommodate him in Wickremesinghe’s Cabinet. The President also left out Wasantha Karannagoda and Roshan Goonetilleke. Sirisena appointed them Admiral of the Fleet and Marshal of Air Force, respectively, on 19, Sept. 2019, in the wake of him failing to secure the required backing to contest the Nov. 2019 presidential election.

Wickremesinghe’s UNP repeatedly appealed on behalf of Fonseka in vain to Sirisena. At the 2020 general election, Fonseka switched his allegiance to Sajith Premadasa and contested under the SJB’s ‘telephone’ symbol and was elected from the Gampaha district. Later, following a damaging row with Sajith Premadasa, he quit the SJB as its Chairman and, at the last presidential election, joined the fray as an independent candidate. Having secured just 22,407 votes, Fonseka was placed in distant 9th position. Obviously, Fonseka never received any benefits from support extended to the 2022 Aragalaya and his defeat at the last presidential election seems to have placed him in an extremely difficult position, politically.

Let’s end this piece by reminding that Fonseka gave up the party leadership in early 2024 ahead of the presidential election. Senaka de Silva succeeded Fonseka as DP leader, whereas Dr. Asosha Fernando received appointment as its Chairman. The DP has aligned itself with the NPP. The rest is history.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

Midweek Review

Strengths and weaknesses of BRICS+: Implications for Global South

Published

2 days ago

2026/02/25

Sahan Weerasooriya

The 16th BRICS Summit, from 22 to 24 October 2024 in Kazan, was attended by 24 heads of state, including the five countries that officially became part of the group on 1 January: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, Egypt and Ethiopia. Argentina finally withdrew from the forum after Javier Milei’s government took office in 2023.

In the end, it changed its strategy and instead of granting full membership made them associated countries adding a large group of 13 countries: two from Latin America (Bolivia and Cuba), three from Africa (Algeria, Nigeria, Uganda) and eight from Asia (Belarus, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Thailand, Turkey, Uzbekistan and Vietnam). This confirms the expansionary intent of the BRICS, initiated last year and driven above all by China, which seeks to turn the group into a relevant multilateral forum, with focus on political than economic interaction, designed to serve its interests in the geopolitical dispute with the United States. This dispute however is not the making of China but has arisen mainly due to the callous bungling of Donald Trump in his second term in office.

China has emerged as the power that could influence the membership within the larger group more than its rival in the region, India. Obviously, the latter is concerned about these developments but seems powerless to stop the trend as more countries realize the need for the development of capacity to resist Western dominance. India in this regard seems to be reluctant possibly due to its defence obligations to the US with Trump declaring war against countries that try to forge partnerships aiming to de-dollarize the global economic system.

The real weakness in BRICS therefore, is the seemingly intractable rivalry between China and India and the impact of this relationship on the other members who are keen to see the organisation grow its capacity to meet its stated goals. China is committed to developing an alternative to the Western dominated world order, particularly the weaponization of the dollar by the US. India does not want to be seen as anti-west and as a result India is often viewed as a reluctant or cautious member of BRICS. This problem seems to be perpetuated due to the ongoing border tensions with China. India therefore has a desire to maintain a level playing field within the group, rather than allowing it to be dominated by Beijing.

Though India seems to be committed to a multipolar world, it prefers focusing on economic cooperation over geopolitical alignment. India thinks the expansion of BRICS initiated by China may dilute its influence within the bloc to the advantage of China. India fears the bloc is shifting toward an anti-Western tilt driven by China and Russia, complicating its own strong ties with the West. India is wary of the new members who are also beneficiaries of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. While China aims to use BRICS for anti-Western geopolitical agendas, India favors focusing on South-South financial cooperation and reforming international institutions. Yet India seems to be not in favour of creating a new currency to replace the dollar which could obviously strengthen the South-South financial transactions bypassing the dollar.

Moreover, India has explicitly opposed the expansion of the bloc to include certain nations, such as Pakistan, indicating a desire to control the group’s agenda, especially during its presidency.

In this equation an important factor is the role that Russia could play. The opinion expressed by the Russian foreign minister in this regard may be significant. Referring to the new admissions the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has said: “The weight, prominence and importance of the candidates and their international standing were the primary factors for us [BRICS members]. It is our shared view that we must recruit like-minded countries into our ranks that believe in a multipolar world order and the need for more democracy and justice in international relations. We need those who champion a bigger role for the Global South in global governance. The six countries whose accession was announced today fully meet these criteria.”

The admission of three major oil producing countries, Saudi Arabia, Iran and UAE is bound to have a significant impact on the future global economic system and consequently may have positive implications for the Global South. These countries would have the ability to decisively help in creating a new international trading system to replace the 5 centuries old system that the West created to transfer wealth from the South to the North. This is so because the petro-dollar is the pillar of the western banking system and is at the very core of the de-dollarizing process that the BRICS is aiming at. This cannot be done without taking on board Saudi Arabia, a staunch ally of the west. BRICS’ expansion, therefore, is its transformation into the most representative community in the world, whose members interact with each other bypassing Western pressure. Saudi Arabia and Iran are actively mending fences, driven by a 2023 China-brokered deal to restore diplomatic ties, reopen embassies, and de-escalate regional tensions. While this detente has brought high-level meetings and a decrease in direct hostility rapprochement is not complete yet and there is hope which also has implications, positive for the South and may not be so for the North.

Though the US may not like what is going on, Europe, which may not endorse all that the former does if one is to go by the speech delivered by the Canadian PM in Brazil recently, may not be displeased about the rapid growth of BRICS. The Guardian UK highlighted expert opinion that BRICS expansion is rather “a symbol of broad support from the global South for the recalibration of the world order.” A top official at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Caroline Kanter has told the daily, “It is obvious that we [Western countries] are no longer able to set our own conditions and standards. Proposals will be expected from us so that in the future we will be perceived as an attractive partner.” At the same time, the bottom line is that BRICS expansion is perceived in the West as a political victory for Russia and China which augurs well for the future of BRICS and the Global South.

Poor countries, relentlessly battered by the neo-liberal global economy, will greatly benefit if BRICS succeeds in forging a new world order and usher in an era of self-sufficiency and economic independence. There is no hope for them in the present system designed to exploit their natural resources and keep them in a perpetual state of dependency and increasing poverty. BRICS is bound to be further strengthened if more countries from the South join it. Poor countries must come together and with the help of BRICS work towards this goal.

by N. A. de S. Amaratunga