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Editorial

Banking on IMF bailout

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All indications are that the executive board of the International Monetary Fund will sign off tomorrow on the $2.9 billion bailout package its staff worked out with Sri Lanka in September. President Ranil Wickremesinghe can no doubt claim credit for clinching a deal on which work began at the height of the island’s economic crisis.

Ministers and government politicians are already trumpeting the impending success. They see it as a way out of the unprecedented financial crisis precipitated by their own SLPP administration. There is no argument that the country was pushed into bankruptcy following the foolish tax and agricultural policies of Gotabaya Rajapaksa who, together with the country, paid a high price for his folly.

With all that murky water under the Kelani bridge, the real question is whether nine tranches of $300 million spread over 48 months can revive Sri Lanka’s economy and deliver the reliefs promised by Ranil Wickremesinghe.

No sooner the Executive board signs off on the bail out, the IMF is likely to release its first tranche. That may appear like loose change in the scheme of international finance – the bailout of Credit Suisse last week was reportedly $53.7 billion, about two thirds of Sri Lanka’s GDP.

Media Minister Bandula Gunawardana is on record saying that it is not the amount of the bailout, but the signal that Sri Lanka’s economy is now under IMF supervision that will give confidence to lenders and potential investors. Some of the currently frozen bilateral funding, especially from Japan, could be made available, but will any private capital rush in where prudent investors fear to tread? Will creditors who bought into Sri Lanka’s oft repeated boast that it had never defaulted on its foreign obligations think of putting their money in Sri Lanka after the unprecedented sovereign default of April 2022? At the time, Sri Lanka’s external debt was $46 billion according to revised government figures.

The IMF deal was based on the strict understanding that Sri Lanka’s creditors agree to restructure the debt in such a way it will fit into the “Debt Substantiability Analysis” carried out by the Washington-based lender of last resort. What does this really mean? How much of a haircut will bilateral lenders agree to? Will the private creditors, also known as the International Sovereign Bond (ISB) holders, agree to the same terms? Out of Sri Lanka’s foreign debt, more than 50 percent is owned by private creditors.

It is common knowledge by now that getting the IMF bailout was held up for months mainly because of a delay in securing “financial assurances” from China which accounts for 52 percent of Sri Lanka’s bilateral credit. Whether one likes it or not, China can still make or break the deal.

Those who believe in a quick recovery after the expected good news from the IMF tomorrow would do well to realize that it’s a long way to Tipperary. The “financial assurances” must now be negotiated, and actual numbers established. How much Sri Lanka can pay back in the next four years? President Wickremesinghe in his candid statement to parliament on March 7 made it clear that Sri Lanka on its own does not have the capacity to payback 6.0 to 7.0 billion dollars annually till the end of 2029.

As a leader with little or no political base, except the fickle support of the SLPP, can Wickremesinghe steer the course? Sri Lanka has had 16 programs (aka bailouts) from the IMF since 1965. Sri Lanka’s track record with the Fund is not inspiring. Apart from being a repeat offender, Sri Lanka has completed only nine out of the 16 programs. In the early days, not drawing down the funds allocated to the island could have been taken as a good sign – an indication that the country was able to get out of the woods even ahead of schedule.

But the last program in 2016 clearly underlined the policy instability that has plagued the country. The program was almost on track when Gotabaya Rajapaksa jettisoned the IMF without completing it. Gotabaya Rajapaksa can also take credit for pushing the country to the abyss by spurning the concessionary credit of Japan and scuttling the multi-billion-dollar Light Rail Transit (LRT) project. A minimum $1.5 billion investment he spurned with another $480 million grant from the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) of the United States.

By the end of next year, Sri Lanka will have to face a presidential election and the outcome of that will decide if the country has the courage to keep up the reforms. Even before that, trade union pressure will test the government’s resolve to remain with the IMF deal. Wickremesinghe can also call a parliamentary election anytime of his choosing if he wants to test the public mood which doesn’t appear to favour him or his governing partner the SLPP.

Austerity is never popular but demonstrating that the rulers are also leading frugal lifestyles is necessary to win public confidence. This is woefully lacking. Those who think that an IMF bailout alone will be a quick fix to all Sri Lanka’s economic woes must think again.



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Editorial

Beyond tragedy that shook the nation’s conscience

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Saturday 6th June, 2026

Tuesday’s tragedy at Anguruwatota, where a fire engulfed an elders’ home, claiming 13 lives and seriously injuring several others, has shaken the conscience of the nation. Equally shocking are the allegations that the residents of the care centre had been mistreated; among them were persons with disabilities, and some of them had been restrained with chains, according to eyewitnesses. The police have said they found the charred body of a resident in chains. It has now been revealed that the care home was not registered. The question is why the authorities did not take any legal action against it.

The Director of the gutted elders’ home has been remanded and the police will press charges against him. However, the Anguruwatota tragedy is not a problem that should be addressed in isolation. It should be examined in the context of a wider socio-economic issue.

There are other elders’ homes across the country, and they number about 250, according to media reports. They are run by a mix of government institutions, provincial councils, religious organisations, NGOs, and private operators. Some of them are reportedly under-resourced, and poorly-regulated. These institutions can accommodate only a fraction of the country’s elderly population needing assistance. Most of them, however, are basic residential care facilities rather than fully developed geriatric care centres, often functioning more as shelters than as medically supported long-term care institutions, which the country badly needs.

Sri Lanka has already reached a rapidly ageing phase of its demographic transition, with the proportion of citizens above 60 years increasing. About 18 out of every 100 Sri Lankans are aged 60 or above. This proportion has risen sharply from about 12.4% in 2012. It is doubtful whether successive governments have addressed this issue adequately, much less formulated a strategy to face challenges arising from an ageing population. This shift has placed increasing pressure on many families that are struggling to make ends meet and therefore cannot provide full-time care for their elderly members and relatives. Hence the need for policymakers to intensify their focus on structured elderly care for those without family support or social security.

While action is taken to ensure that the existing elders’ homes are run properly, it is incumbent upon policymakers to devise ways and means of facing the problems associated with an ageing population. Experts have pointed out that a national elderly care strategy to address these issues need to integrate several components. First, it should strengthen community-based care models that allow elders to remain in their homes for as long as possible, supported by home visits, mobile health services, and social workers. Second, it should develop a graded system of care homes, ranging from basic shelters to medically supported nursing facilities, all under proper regulatory supervision. It was a chronic lack of oversight and poor regulation that led to the Anguruwatota tragedy. Third, local government authorities should be formally involved in identifying vulnerable elders, coordinating welfare benefits, and ensuring minimum care standards at community level. Fourth, financial protection mechanisms such as social pensions, subsidised care, and public-private partnerships should be expanded to reduce the burden on low-income families.

It is hoped that Tuesday’s tragedy will jolt politicians and policymakers into addressing the long-felt need for a coherent national strategy to enable the elderly to spend their twilight years in comfort and dignity.

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Editorial

Emperor’s new clothes

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Friday 5th June, 2026

The Opposition’s propaganda mill is in overdrive, manufacturing various stories about a split in the JVP-NPP government. Mighty governments collapse not because their political enemies regain lost ground and turn the tables on them. They fall largely because the arrogance of power blinds their leaders to reality while their members dare not speak truth to power. Government members sing hosannas to their leaders and even defend the latter’s wrongdoing, committing collective political hara-kiri in the process. The incumbent JVP-NPP government has its fair share of acolytes who try to defend the indefensible.

Former Public Security Minister Sarath Weerasekera (SW), in his response to a recent editorial in this newspaper, has sought to lay the blame for the failure of the Gotabaya Rajapaksa (GR) government on others. In his letter published on the opposite page, today, he insists that the Rajapaksas had the national interest at heart. He implies that they never engaged in dynastic politics, and the 2022 economic crisis was due to factors other than the mismanagement of the economy.

The economy went into a tailspin during the GR government not solely due to the economic consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic and the repayment of foreign loans obtained by the Yahapalana government. Economists have pointed out that the pandemic did not cause bankruptcy on its own, but it acted as a major trigger that exposed pre-existing weaknesses such as high debt, weak foreign reserves, and overdependence on exports and tourism. All governments pay back loans obtained by their predecessors.

The GR government should have sought IMF help at the first signs of trouble. One may recall that acting on Central Bank (CB) advice, the Mahinda Rajapaksa (MR) government (2005-2010) secured IMF assistance and managed an emerging forex crisis, which would have derailed the war effort. If the GR government had heeded CB advice and taken action to increase tax revenue and shore up the country’s foreign currency reserves with IMF help, the 2022 economic crisis could have been averted.

Sri Lanka had to opt for a soft default and seek IMF assistance in 2022. The choice it had was between a soft default and a hard default, which would have ruined its chances of borrowing from external sources again. Sri Lanka was bankrupt, and that fact had to be announced.

The UPFA and SLPP administrations during MR’s second presidential term (2010-2015) and GR’s presidency (2019-2022) were in fact governments of the Rajapaksas by the Rajapaksas for the Rajapaksas. In the GR government, the number of key ministries held by the Rajapaksas increased to five. The share of government expenditure linked to the ministries controlled by them was more than 50% between 2010 and 2015 and between 2019 and 2022, according to political commentators. The other members of the MR government (2010-2015) became so disgruntled that a group of prominent UPFA MPs including ministers voted with their feet in 2014, and General Secretary of the SLFP Maithripala Sirisena went on to challenge MR in the 2015 presidential contest and secure the presidency. As many as 41 SLPP MPs broke ranks with the GR government in early 2022.

Aragalaya,

which crippled the Rajapaksa rule, began as a genuine, leaderless protest campaign against economic hardships, especially prolonged fuel shortages and power cuts. Some political forces infiltrated it subsequently, but it was losing steam when a group of SLPP goons set upon peaceful protesters at Galle Face in May 2022, and triggered a spree of retaliatory violence, which led to the ouster of the Rajapaksas, and paved the way for the 2024 regime change.

As for reconciliation, a retired Major General known for his distinguished military career and respected leadership, writing under a pseudonym––‘Old Soldier’––recently had this to say in his letter critical of the way the government handled this year’s War Heroes’ commemoration, which was the topic of the editorial comment under discussion: “Reparations are claimed by the winners in wars between nations. After civil conflicts there should be reconciliation. There should be no humiliation. When will commemoration of the dead be national in Sri Lanka?”

If the SLPP is to make a comeback, its leaders and their apologists must shed their aversion to self-criticism. The same applies to their equally self-righteous counterparts in other Opposition parties.

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Editorial

Another game of chicken

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Thursday 4th June, 2026

The government has locked horns with private bus operators, who are demanding a fare hike amidst soaring fuel prices. The former has rejected the fare hike demand out of hand, claiming that it is unfair. President of the Lanka Private Bus Owners’ Association Gemunu Wijeratne has threatened to launch a bus strike unless a fare increase is granted forthwith. He has claimed that there is legal provision for the annual bus fare revision due in July to be advanced. The government and the irate private bus owners are now playing a game of chicken.

School vehicle operators have warned that they will have to increase fees. Trishaw owners have also demanded a fare hike. Container truck operators have already increased freight charges by 5% to offset surging operating expenses, primarily driven by higher diesel prices, inflated costs of tyres and spare parts.

A brutal one-two combination—fuel price hikes and rupee depreciation—has sent all vehicle owners, save a few, to the canvas, so to speak. The prices of spare parts, lubricants and tyres have also skyrocketed. It is only natural that transport operators are demanding fare revisions. The government should stop making political statements and address the issues facing the transport sector. The public cannot take any more shocks, and another fare hike is something everyone needs like a hole in the head. It may not be feasible to grant the bus operators’ request for a fuel subsidy, but the government may be able to help them lower costs in some other way.

It will not be possible to overcome Sri Lanka’s balance of payments woes, strengthen the rupee and shore up foreign currency reserves without a proper strategy to reduce the national fuel bill, which accounts for more than 20% of the total value of imports. President Anura Kumara Dissanayake has pointed out that the country’s monthly fuel import expenditure has surged nearly six-fold. Driven by escalating tensions in West Asia, the fuel import bill rose from USD 98 million in February to USD 522 million in May, according to him. There is no gainsaying that drastic measures need to be adopted to reduce fuel consumption urgently. However, increasing fuel prices is not the only way to achieve this goal.

A country does not need a government to curtail the demand for fuel through price hikes. The JVP-NPP administration should be able to strategise to reduce fuel consumption through other means if it is to be considered worth its salt. Minister Anura Karunathilake and Ceylon Petroleum Corporation Chairman D. J. A. S Rajakaruna have gone on record as saying that action will be taken to have the QR-based fuel rationing system strictly regulated. Why didn’t the government care to do so earlier? If the fuel quota system is to be effective, the practice of motorists sharing the QR codes must be brought to an end. If the national fuel consumption has reached an unmanageable level, as President Dissanayake has said, will the government explain why fuel quotas were increased.

President Dissanayake and his government should learn from India’s efforts to reduce fuel consumption and adopt a top-down national austerity approach to conserve foreign exchange amidst external economic pressures. India’s strategy emphasises reducing official fuel use, adopting digital alternatives to travel, and promoting public transportation to manage energy consumption. After all, the JVP-led NPP came to power, promising austerity measures, which it must now adopt to curtail state expenditure while reducing the burgeoning import bill.

The JVP-NPP government is slow in responding to emergencies. Its disaster response following the landfall of Cyclone Ditwah was woefully tardy. It ignored warnings and waited until the country’s fuel reserves were almost depleted to introduce the QR-based rationing. It cannot wish away the threat of a private bus strike. It must get the bus owners around the table and have a serious discussion on how to resolve the transport sector woes instead of bellowing rhetoric.

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