Features
Asian Elections and Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s India visit
by Rajan Philips
2024 is election year practically everywhere. In South Asia, it is two down and two to go. Bangladesh went first in January, and the governing Awami League won the election as predicted, with the main opposition Bangladesh National Party boycotting the election and the government fielding independent candidates to avoid the embarrassment of winning uncontested seats. Pakistan had its election on February 8, and the people literally gave the finger to rebuke the military’s machinations of the election.
Unlike in Bangladesh, where the government nominated independent candidates, in Pakistan the imprisoned Imran Khan and his proscribed PTI (Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf) were forced to field their candidates as independents and were barred from using the Party’s Cricket Bat symbol. Yet they won the most seats, and they would apparently have won a clear majority but for the widely alleged manipulations in vote counting. There are continuing allegations by independent commentators that a clear victory for the PTI was stolen in the wee hours of the election night. In the aftermath of uncertainty, the former alliance of the Pakistan Muslim League of the Sharif brothers and the Bhutto-Zardari led Pakistan’s People’s Party, who ousted Imran Khan from office, is back – cobbling together yet another new government ignoring the people’s verdict.
Next up is India with the mother of all elections which will be held over two months in April and May. As things are, Prime Minister Modi is all set for a threepeat win and form a third Modi-BJP government in succession. The opposition parties are still haggling over how much of a united front opposition they can rationally build upon before it is too late. It seems already too late unless something spectacular were to happen to jolt the opposition fragments to come together to survive, let alone turn back the Modi juggernaut, or simply be run over by it as separate entities. What is more significant than the Modi threepeat is the way in which he is overhauling the character of the Indian state.
What Narendra Modi is doing now to India is what the leaders of Pakistan did to their country at the very moment of its cesarean birth – the creation of a theocratic religious state, spurning the example of India that opted for a modern secular state to overarch a deeply asecular traditional society, where religious differences were/are combustibly vulnerable to political demagoguery. We can keep writing about this till holy cows keep coming home, but the point here is that the recent and ongoing developments in Bangladesh, Pakistan and India provide an insightful South Asian backdrop to the anticipated elections in Sri Lanka, and perhaps more contextually to Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s seemingly geo-locally significant visit to New Delhi.
Sri Lanka is the fourth to go for elections in South Asia. But there was another Asian election this week, in Indonesia, the world’s fourth largest country, the third largest democracy, with the world’s largest Muslim population, and a growing economic powerhouse that is quite ahead of India in almost all economic growth measures. As in many other prospering countries, while there is impressive economic growth there is also a worrying democratic recession. In the presidential election on Wednesday (February 14), Prabowo Subianto, a former army lieutenant general of considerable notoriety under Suharto, and the current Minister of Defense under President Joko Widodo, is reported to be comfortably ahead to win in the first round without a runoff. His Vice Presidential running mate is 36 year old Gibran Rakabuming Raka, the eldest son of President Joko Widodo.
There has not been any reporting of serious voting malpractices, but pre-election shenanigans have raised concerns that the country is on the slippery slope of democratic recession. Joko Widodo and Prabowo Subianto are former rivals who faced off each other in the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections, which Joko won and Prabowo lost. They have since become allies and the highly popular Joko has gone to the extent of supporting Prabowo’s candidacy in 2024 against the nominee of his own Party (the ruling Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle), Ganjar Pranowo, thereby ensuring Pranowo’s defeat. The alleged reasons for the switch are Joko’s political desire to continue to have a say in the government, and the even stronger paternal desire to give his son a stepping stone as the new Vice President. At 36, Gibran is underage to be Vice President, but the hurdle was removed by the country’s top court with Chief Justice Anwar Usman, Joko’s brother-in-law, casting the deciding vote for his nephew. What is new, and where?
Unlike other Asian countries, including Pakistan where the army calls all the shots, Sri Lanka is the only country where election timing is virtually at the discretion of its CEO, aka the Executive President. At the same time, an incumbent government’s interference in the conduct of elections would seem to have been minimized after 2015, and the first defeat of the Rajapaksas. One would hope that Mr. Ranil Wickremesinghe will not monkey with election timing anymore, and will not try to redeploy the old election dirty tricks of the UNP that go back all the way to Dedigama, long before independence, in the 1936 election to the second State Council election. The UNP was not a Party at that time, but its eventual fathers were in control of the levers of state power even under colonial rule.
AKD’s Visit
The only formal political party in Sri Lanka in 1936 was the Lanka Sama Samaja Party. By 1939, the Party was proscribed, and its leaders were jailed. They broke jail and went to India, not to escape incarceration, but to continue their revolutionary activity and join the struggle in India for freedom from colonial rule. The Indian expedition of the Old Left would be a more appropriate backdrop for commentary on the political implications of Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s visit to India than that cheap gossip in a Sunday Paper, about Lenin allegedly asking Trotsky to go even in a petticoat to procure peace at Brest Litovsk.
Many of the commentaries on the visit were also putt shots aimed at the pre-history of the NPP, or the old history of the JVP, and all of them predicated on the musings of Rohana Wijeweera about Indian Expansionism. Lionel Bopage, one of the repositories of the positive aspects of the JVP experience, has provided a useful overview of the evolution of the JVP’s position on India, but it is unlikely that the JVP’s and NPP’s media detractors would read Bopage or do their own research to provide an objective assessment of AKD’s visit to India.
One striking omission in almost all of the negative commentaries is that their negativity is singularly aimed at AKD and the JVP/NPP, and nothing much negative, if at all, has been said about the Modi government’s imperial invitation to a rising political star in India’s utmost isle. Yet I came across one amusingly innocent piece that politely accused India for its meddlesome manners especially in the matter of the Indo-Lanka Accord of 1987. There is nothing new in this, but what I found to be new is the nugget that Rohana Wijeweera apparently never stopped warning about India’s designs for Sri Lanka and that he based his premonitions on a detailed study of the Indian National Flag that includes The Ashoka Chakra or Dharma Chakra, and the Indian National Emblem that includes an adaptation of the four lions of Ashoka’s Lion Capital.
I don’t know whether Rohana Wijeweera actually said anything or believed that the use of the Chakra and the Lion in India’s national symbols is something that Sri Lankans should remain wary of. But this is the kind of nationalistic adolescence that Anura Kumara Dissanayake would hopefully help not only the JVP but also most Sri Lankans to grow out of, through the vehicle of the NPP. Thankfully, no one in the NPP is in the blabbering habit of Wimal Weerawansa, who once exhibited his high school general knowledge when he insisted in parliament that the Indian National Anthem, Tagore’s immortal rendition in Bengali, is only sung in Hindi! Those days are behind the Sri Lankan electorate, and there is much to look ahead.
Just on the question of the Chakra on the Indian Flag, there have been a few interpretations of it. Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan, the vocational Philosopher, India’s first Vice President and later President, has interpreted the Chakra as being representative of dharma and law. Prime Minister Nehru was more practical – the Chakra is symmetrical on the flag and easily reproduceable than Mahatma Gandhi’s Spinning Wheel that had been on the flag of the Congress during the independence struggle.
Sri Lankan Historian S. Arasaratnam, one of the more objective scholars of nationalism among Sri Lankan academics, has interpreted the Chakra as symptomatic of the efforts of India’s founding fathers (in the Constituent Assembly) to lift the emerging nation above the fray of its religious differences. Then comes along Modi after 75 years and plunges the country into a new temple triumphalism.
Those who ask the JVP to explain its rapprochement with India in light of its virulent opposition to the Indo Lanka accord 37 years ago, have not been consistent in asking others who too had been opposed to India in more ways than one and even long before the signing of the Indo Lanka accord.
NM Perera pithily characterized the foreign policy of DS Senanayake and the first UNP government as “Anglo mania and India phobia.” That mindset has been quite the norm in many political circles. It continued 30 years later with President Jayewardene at least until 1983. Even the SLFP has not been averse it to it despite later claims of a special relationship with the Nehru family in India.
As nuggets go, James Manor in his biography of SWRD Bandaranaike, The Expedient Utopian, recounts an anecdote from the 1930s, when Lord Mountbatten was stationed in Kandy and Nehru was visiting the island. Mountbatten suggested to one of SWRD Bandaranaike’s sisters that they should invite the visiting Indian leader for tea at Horagolla. Pat came the rebuff, “we do not sup with coolies.” That was more ignorance than snobbery, but the nugget would go down well in Modi circles in today’s India.
As well, as political analysis goes, one of the academic theses on the Indo Lanka Accord has been that the accord severed the linkages between the Sri Lankan state establishment and the social base of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism. The argument continued that what was ruptured in 1987 was restored only after 2005 when Mahinda Rajapaksa became President, thanks to the not so hidden hand support of the LTTE. Yet it has been a truism among Sinhala ultranationalists that Mahinda Rajapaksa is the only authentic Sinhala nationalist leader because everyone else was compromised by English.
Now that the Rajapaksas are gone, and the Supreme Court has ruled why, there might be revisitations of the old thesis. One hypothesis could be that the tragedy of the Rajapaksas is that they were used as dummies by others, who were otherwise political nobodies, for ventriloquistic claims on everything from nationalism to the economy, and from central banking to organic fertilizer.
As I wrote recently, the peacefully involuntary departure of the Rajapaksas has created the biggest vacuum to be filled in this election year. Anura Kumara Dissanayake has emerged as the most likely contender to fill that void, but in altogether different, and hopefully positive, ways. His trip to Delhi enhances that assessment, and even expectations, except for those who hold against Mr. Dissanayake the sins of his predecessors but will not subject any other political leader to such a demanding postmortem.
Features
Tusker Kavantissa’s death exposes Sri Lanka’s wildlife conservation crisis
by Prof. Ranjith Bandara,
Emeritus Professor, University of Colombo
This article examines why community exclusion, excessive bureaucratic control, unequal distribution of conservation benefits, weak institutional accountability, and short-sighted political leadership continue to undermine wildlife conservation in Sri Lanka.
The death of Tusker Kavantissa is more than the loss of one of Sri Lanka’s most remarkable wild elephants. It exposes uncomfortable questions about how we protect our natural heritage, how conservation decisions are made, and why repeated warnings have failed to produce meaningful reforms. His death should compel us to examine not only what happened to one extraordinary animal, but also the deeper weaknesses in our wildlife conservation system.
Tusker Kavantissa, one of Sri Lanka’s most prominent wild tuskers, died on 16 October, 2026, after receiving veterinary treatment for an injury, reportedly caused by gunfire. Although the wound had shown some improvement, his health subsequently deteriorated. The precise cause of death requires confirmation through a proper post-mortem examination. Nevertheless, the circumstances raise serious questions about preventive protection, wildlife management, and institutional preparedness.
The wider picture is equally disturbing. According to recently reported figures, Sri Lanka has lost an average of approximately 402 elephants and 138 people annually, since 2019, due to human–elephant conflict. These figures reflect a continuing national tragedy affecting both wildlife and rural communities.
What Sri Lanka faces today is not merely a wildlife conservation problem. It is also a crisis of environmental governance, shaped by institutional weaknesses, political decisions, and the failure to recognise the economic and social realities of conservation.
Conservation without communities
One of the fundamental weaknesses of our conservation approach is that local communities are often treated as subjects of regulation rather than partners in conservation. They are expected to bear the risks, respect restrictions, and cooperate with government programmes, yet their influence over decisions affecting their lives remains limited.
For rural families living alongside wild elephants, conservation is not an abstract environmental objective. It directly affects their safety, agricultural income, property, and everyday lives.
Farmers frequently possess valuable knowledge about elephant movements, vulnerable locations, seasonal changes, and practical protection measures. Yet conservation interventions are sometimes designed without adequately considering this experience.
When decisions are imposed from above, communities may feel excluded from programmes they are expected to support. This weakens trust, reduces cooperation, and ultimately undermines conservation outcomes.
We must recognise that protecting elephants and protecting farmers are not conflicting objectives. Both are essential. A conservation policy that safeguards wildlife while neglecting human security cannot be considered successful.
The real challenge is to replace conservation imposed on communities with conservation undertaken alongside them. Meaningful participation requires more than consultation meetings. Communities must have a genuine role in planning, implementing, monitoring, and evaluating conservation activities.
Bureaucratic authority versus public accountability
Wildlife conservation requires strong institutions, professional expertise, and effective regulations. However, excessive bureaucratic control can become an obstacle when administrative authority takes precedence over practical outcomes.
Decision-making in Sri Lanka’s conservation system remains heavily dependent on central institutions. Administrative procedures, overlapping responsibilities, and limited coordination can delay responses to urgent problems.
More importantly, excessive centralisation can discourage local innovation and prevent communities from contributing practical solutions.
When administrative authority becomes more important than results, conservation risks becoming an exercise in controlling people rather than protecting nature.
This criticism should not be confused with questioning the dedication of frontline wildlife officers and veterinarians. Many work under difficult conditions with limited resources. The efforts undertaken to save Tusker Kavantissa deserve recognition.
However, individual commitment cannot compensate indefinitely for institutional weaknesses.
We must ask whether our conservation institutions have the capacity to identify risks early, protect vulnerable animals, coordinate emergency responses, and evaluate the effectiveness of their interventions.
Public accountability should, therefore, extend beyond compliance with administrative procedures to measurable conservation outcomes.
Who bears costs, and who receives benefits?
Perhaps the most neglected dimension of wildlife conservation in Sri Lanka is the unequal distribution of its economic costs and benefits.
Wild elephants contribute substantially to tourism, biodiversity, cultural heritage, and the country’s international image. Their conservation generates benefits enjoyed by society as a whole.
Yet the financial and personal costs are concentrated among rural communities living within elephant habitats.
A study published in 2023, involving 300 farming households in southern Sri Lanka, revealed a striking imbalance. Although these households lived near two national parks, none received economic benefits from tourism. Meanwhile, 57 percent had experienced elephant-related crop damage.
The findings raise a fundamental economic question: if the entire country benefits from elephant conservation, why should a relatively small and vulnerable section of society bear a disproportionate share of its costs?
Conservation cannot remain economically sustainable when its benefits are widely enjoyed but its costs are concentrated among those least able to bear them.
A separate study, published in 2024, involving 439 affected farming households, examined the possibility of financing compensation through tourism revenue. It demonstrated the potential for tourism-based financial mechanisms to support human–elephant coexistence.
The policy implications are significant
A proportion of wildlife tourism revenue could be directed towards affected communities through transparent benefit-sharing arrangements. Such measures could support compensation, village protection, local employment, community enterprises, and agricultural improvements.
However, financial compensation alone is insufficient. The 2023 study also indicated that fear of elephants and concerns about crop damage strongly influenced community attitudes. People must feel safe in their homes and farms, not merely receive payment after suffering losses.
Equitable benefit-sharing is, therefore, more than an act of generosity. It is an economic and social requirement for sustainable conservation.
Political decisions and absence of long-term vision
The weaknesses in wildlife conservation cannot be attributed solely to public officials. Political leadership must accept its share of responsibility.
Poor land-use planning, habitat fragmentation, obstruction of elephant movement corridors, and development decisions that inadequately consider environmental consequences have contributed to human–elephant conflict.
Political decisions made for immediate gains can create environmental and economic costs lasting for decades.
Another weakness is the preference for visible, short-term interventions.
Constructing electric fences, relocating elephants, and launching emergency operations can attract considerable publicity. However, such interventions should be evaluated according to their effectiveness, not their visibility.
Political leadership should be judged not by the number of conservation programmes announced, but by the lives protected, conflicts prevented, and long-term improvements achieved.
There is also a serious problem of policy continuity. Conservation cannot be governed according to electoral cycles or changing political priorities.
Elephant habitats, migration patterns, and ecological processes do not change with governments. Successful conservation, therefore, requires consistent national commitments extending beyond individual political administrations.
Without such continuity, public investment may be wasted while the underlying problems remain unresolved.
Problem is not always a lack of policy
Sri Lanka’s conservation crisis cannot be explained simply by a shortage of scientific knowledge or policy recommendations.
In many instances, the greater challenge lies in translating available knowledge into coordinated, adequately funded, and politically supported action.
The National Action Plan for the Mitigation of Human–Elephant Conflict, prepared in 2020, proposed a science-based approach that emphasised community participation, protection of villages and agricultural land, and more effective conflict-management strategies.
Yet an important question remains: how much of this plan has been implemented successfully?
Have implementation difficulties arisen from inadequate resources, weak institutional coordination, administrative resistance, or insufficient political commitment?
An independent assessment of the plan’s implementation would help identify these obstacles and establish clear responsibilities.
We must also recognise that a substantial proportion of Sri Lanka’s wild elephants live outside protected areas. Attempting to confine all elephants within national parks and forest reserves is, therefore, neither realistic nor sustainable.
Effective conservation requires land-use policies informed by elephant ecology, settlement patterns, agricultural needs, and the practical realities of human–wildlife coexistence.
A sound policy that remains largely unimplemented offers little protection to either elephants or people.
Towards more responsible conservation system
Sri Lanka needs a fundamental change in how wildlife conservation is governed.
Four priorities deserve immediate attention.
First, local communities must become genuine partners in conservation management, with meaningful responsibilities and decision-making opportunities.
Second, conservation benefits must be distributed more fairly. Wildlife tourism should contribute directly to protecting the livelihoods and safety of communities that bear conservation costs.
Third, existing national conservation plans should be independently reviewed to identify implementation gaps and establish a realistic timetable for corrective action.
Fourth, conservation institutions must become more accountable for measurable outcomes, including reductions in human deaths, elephant mortality, crop losses, and property damage.
These reforms require cooperation among wildlife, forestry, agriculture, land, irrigation, and local government institutions.
They also demand political leadership willing to prioritise long-term results over short-term publicity.
For exceptional animals, such as Tusker Kavantissa, improved risk monitoring, preventive protection, and timely veterinary responses are particularly important. However, conservation should not be limited to protecting a few well-known animals.
Every wild elephant has ecological value, just as every person living alongside elephants has an equal right to safety.
The objective must be a system that protects both.
Lesson tusker Kavantissa leaves behind
The death of Tusker Kavantissa should not become another moment of national sorrow that gradually fades from public memory. It should mark a turning point in how Sri Lanka approaches wildlife conservation.
A proper investigation into his death is essential. Equally important is an honest examination of the conservation system within which such tragedies continue to occur.
The real challenge is not choosing between people and elephants. It is creating a system in which both can coexist safely, and where the responsibilities, costs, and benefits of conservation are shared fairly.
This requires more than scientific expertise and stronger regulations. It demands accountable institutions, meaningful community participation, economic fairness, and political leadership guided by a clear long-term vision.
Our greatest failure would not be the loss of Tusker Kavantissa alone. It would be allowing the same weaknesses in our conservation system to claim more lives while we continue to avoid the reforms that could prevent them.
Features
Equality before the Law as foundation of Sri Lanka’s recovery
by Jehan Perera
The government appears set to overcome the first major challenge to one of its foundational principles. It has faced down demands from sections of the Buddhist clergy and opposition parties to release Ven. Galagodaatte Gnanasara from his prison sentence for contempt of court.
Ven Gnanasara is best known as the general secretary of the Bodu Bala Sena, a nationalist Sinhala grouping. The government seemed unfazed by a protest march organised by Buddhist monks and the opposition parties and its supporters organised an even bigger march to support the government’s position. It is notable that the general population did not get involved in either march in any substantial number. The issue has now become a test of whether the government will uphold its commitment to apply the law equally, irrespective of a person’s position or status, even when doing so brings it into conflict with a powerful constituency.
The case has a specific legal history. Ven. Gnanasara was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment by the Court of Appeal in 2018 for contempt of court in a case involving former military personnel where he disrupted the proceedings. The Supreme Court rejected his appeal in 2018. Former President Maithripala Sirisena subsequently granted him a presidential pardon in 2019. Last month, the Supreme Court invalidated that pardon. The initial demand by Buddhist monks and their lay supporters was that Ven. Gnanasara should be permitted to wear his Buddhist robes when appearing in public before the courts. The government has indicated its willingness to examine the procedures governing the treatment of Buddhist monks in prison, in consultation with the relevant religious authorities. However, the initial demand has now been escalated into a demand for a presidential pardon.
One of the central promises of the National People’s Power (NPP) during its election campaign two years ago was to apply the law equally to all. This commitment has shaped the government’s approach to allegations of corruption and criminality involving individuals who previously wielded political power. The NPP government was swept into power on a wave of antipathy towards those in previous governments who were perceived to have abused their positions for private gain. The economic collapse Sri Lanka experienced in 2022, and the hardships endured across society, remain vivid in the public memory. The past two years have seen the government pursuing those accused of corruption and other offences. Several high-ranking members of previous governments have faced arrest and legal proceedings and been sentenced to jail.
Religious Concerns
The ability of opposition parties to mobilise widespread resistance against proceedings involving their leaders has been limited, as much of the general population continues to favour accountability for past financial crimes. However, the case of Ven. Gnanasara is different. It does not concern allegations of financial corruption, but the relationship between religious authority, the courts and the law of the land. This is where the distinction between respecting religious traditions and upholding the law becomes crucial. There is a sense among sections of the general population that Buddhist monks should not be treated on a par with others and that requiring Ven. Gnanasara to appear in court without his robes was unjust and contrary to the national ethos. Such sentiments reflect the special place Buddhism occupies in Sri Lanka’s history and society. Sinhala Buddhist nationalism has been a potent political force throughout the country’s history, drawing on a heritage that extends back more than two millennia. The question is whether respect for Buddhism needs to also entail the exemption of individual monks from the ordinary requirements of the law and thereby treat them differently.
The challenge would be to accommodate legitimate religious concerns through rational and lawful procedures without allowing religious status to become a source of legal privilege. The government has been amenable to addressing the issue of monastic robes, but has so far resisted the demand to release Ven. Gnanasara through a new pardon. President Anura Kumara Dissanayake and government members have made it clear that the government would not bend the law to accommodate any individual. They have taken the position that any shortcomings in existing rules should be addressed by changing the rules through proper procedures, rather than by making an exception for a particular individual. If the government holds its position, it will demonstrate that its commitment to the rule of law extends even to constituencies that have historically enjoyed considerable political influence.
This is important not only for the country’s democratic institutions but also for its economic future. Sri Lanka is seeking to recover from its economic collapse and establish the foundations for sustained growth. The International Monetary Fund’s analysis of Sri Lanka’s governance weaknesses has repeatedly emphasised the economic costs of corruption and institutional deficiencies. Its 2024 analysis of governance and growth concluded that comprehensive and coherent reforms could bring significant macroeconomic benefits. The IMF’s 2025 assessment also highlighted the importance of sustained governance reforms in unlocking the country’s growth potential. Investors, both domestic and foreign, need confidence that public institutions function according to predictable rules, that contracts and property rights are protected, and that political connections or social status will not determine how the law is applied.
Sensitive Issue
Sri Lanka has long sought the leap towards prosperity that has proved elusive under successive governments. Economic reform alone will not achieve it. The connection between the rule of law and economic prosperity is direct. Businesses are more likely to invest when they can expect disputes to be resolved fairly, public resources to be managed transparently and regulatory decisions to be made on rational grounds. No country can achieve a durable economic take-off if its institutions are perceived to operate according to political favour, inherited privilege or communal pressure. Sri Lanka cannot afford to return to a political culture in which powerful interests are shielded from accountability while ordinary citizens bear the costs.
Changing a political culture that has evolved over the decades if not centuries is a difficult undertaking, particularly in a country where political leaders have long relied on religious and communal identities to consolidate their support. It requires not only firmness but also sensitivity, dialogue and a willingness to reform laws and institutions where genuine deficiencies exist. The present controversy offers an opportunity to demonstrate that these objectives need not be in conflict. The government can respect the Buddhist clergy’s concerns about the treatment of monks in prison while refusing to grant an individual an exemption from a judicial sentence. It can recognise the importance of Buddhism to the country while maintaining that no religious or political authority stands above the law.
The question is whether national traditions and ethos are interpreted in ways that strengthen justice, responsibility and social harmony, or invoked to defend privileges that undermine them. The country needs a transformation in public expectations from privilege to accountability, from communal claims to equal citizenship, and from personal discretion to institutions governed by law.
The government’s handling of the case involving Ven. Gnanasara is therefore about more than one monk or one sentence. This particular case will determine whether the government can build a system in which no government, religious authority or politically influential individuals can place themselves beyond the law. A just society must be able to honour both its traditions and its commitment to equality before the law.
Features
Lure of old hometown too hard to resist
Lanka was his homeland, and now it’s Australia, based in Sydney. But for legendary performer Roger Menezes, the lure of his old hometown is just too hard to resist — and he keeps coming this way, ever so often!
Roger is in town at the moment — his fourth trip for this year alone! In fact, for the last few years, he has been checking out Sri Lanka on a very frequent basis.
This time, he says, he will be here for just two weeks, as he has heavy commitments, Down Under, as a performer.
On the 24th of this month, he will be seen in action at Broadway Dehiwela, celebrating their second anniversary. It’s a homecoming of sorts, as he was the very first artiste to perform live at this venue, on their opening night!
He goes back to Sydney in November for an early Christmas party, and will be back, in Colombo, in December, for more performances, with a pre-New Year’s Eve party at the Broadway, on 30th December.
Roger says he also takes the opportunity, whenever he visits Sri Lanka, to soak in the beauty of our country, especially the serene scenes away from the hustle and bustle of Colombo!

Roger Menezes: Fourth trip for this year
Roger Menezes is truly a remarkable talent, and it is always a sheer pleasure to look into the careers of musicians who have left such a lasting, indelible mark on Sri Lanka’s rich musical heritage.
Known for his signature “hits and memories” performance style — a nostalgic, heart-warming blend of jazz, pop, and classic rock — he remains a foundational figure of Sri Lanka’s golden era of music.
He was deeply integrated into Colombo’s swinging 1960s and 70s music scene.
He played drums for iconic groups like The Savages, Thunderbirds, and Fireflies, played guitar for Sam the Man, and joined the legendary band The Jetliners as their keyboardist, saxophonist, and guitarist (additionally recording bass guitar tracks). He also fronted his own much-loved ensemble, Roger and the Webs.
He migrated to Sydney, Australia, in the early ’70s and the legend only grew.
In Australia, he founded the highly successful corporate and event bands Eastern Spice and Stay Tuned (alongside his wife Cheryl and family). Under his leadership, Stay Tuned was heavily involved in providing entertainment for corporate functions, organised by the Sydney 2000 Olympic Committee. The group also headlined the New Year’s Eve festivities at Sydney’s iconic Centrepoint Tower for five consecutive years!
Today, he is widely celebrated as a highly adaptive one-man band, simultaneously navigating vocals, keyboards, guitar, saxophone, and drums — a one-man orchestra who truly does it all!
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