Opinion

A mandate rendered in blood

Published

4 years ago

2022/04/25

By Anura Gunasekera

Chaminda Lakshan, an unarmed 41-year-old father of two, a member of a group of anguished citizens, waiting for days for a meagre fuel ration, at a price they could ill afford, was shot dead by the police, at Rambukkana, on the 19 April.

He joins a long list of citizens, who have been murdered on government order, simply because they dared to protest against the institutionalised suppression of democratic dissent, or for voicing genuine grievances or unpalatable truths; about a dozen journalists, from Subramanium Sughirdharajan, in January 2006, to Isapriya, in May 2009, three civilians, including a child of 14, who took to the streets to plead for uncontaminated drinking water (Rathupaswela – August 2013), 22-year-old Roshen Shanka (Katunayake – May 2011) who, along with thousands of other workers, protested when government proposals undermined the security of the Employees’ Provident Fund, and fisherman, Anthony Warnakulasooriya (Chilaw – Feb 2012), protesting against a fuel price hike. Let us also not forget the Welikada jail massacre of November 2012 which ended in the death of 27 prisoners, some reportedly executed at point blank range; bear in mind the Aluthgama incident (June- 2014) which ended with four deaths, many wounded and enormous loss of property and assets; add to that around dozen custodial deaths of suspected criminals, under transparently ridiculous, identical circumstances, which strain public credulity; collectively, a grim litany of extra-judicial killings, in all societies viewed as a violation of a citizen’s most basic right.

Most such episodes have been followed by highly sanitized media announcements, lately often delivered by Senior Police Spokesman, the bland Ajith Rohana, SDIG, exonerating the agents of any excesses and, even before the initiation of an investigation, portraying such killings as justifiable acts of self-defence, or the exercise of suitable force. Invariably, in the absence of any witnesses, other than the agents of the State responsible for the deaths, or the reluctance of witnesses to volunteer information because of fear of reprisal, the inquiring magistrate is compelled to concur with the perpetrators’ version. During his official statement on the Rambukkana incident, DIG Rohana casually slipped in the rider that the victim Lakshan had two court cases against him, as if to suggest that in this case execution was merited. Perhaps, it escaped his mind that many members of the current Parliament have been at some point of time, or still are, accused in various cases. That includes both the President and the Prime Minister.

All of the above killings coincide with Rajapaksa periods of governance, elder brother Mahinda as President and sibling Gotabaya as Secretary of Defence and, most recently, with Gotabaya as President and Mahinda as Prime Minister. Significantly, there were no such killings between January 2015 and October 2019, during the Yahapalanaya regime. It was inefficient but did not silence dissent with murder. Its incompetence may have been a causative factor in the 2019 Easter Sunday carnage but that needs a separate writing.

As is to be expected, none of the perpetrators in the mentioned killings have been brought to justice. In this instance Prasanna Ranatunga, newly appointed Minister of Public Security, speaking in Parliament, was quick to justify the killing, on the grounds that had the police not opened fire to prevent the fuel bowser being set alight, at least 300 people would have died, though it is yet to be established whether the protesters actually attempted to set the bowser on fire.

The investigation into the incident, from the very first step, has been fraught with doubt as to its impartiality. The first “A-report”- detailing an incident which does not necessarily involve a crime – was rejected by the Kegalle Magistrate, Wasana Navaratne, as the incident involved a killing. The subsequent hastily prepared “B-report” was censured by her as it carried unacceptable alterations and deletions.

There are eyewitnesses to the incident, who allege that live rounds had been directed against citizens fleeing the scene; one eyewitness declared on TV, in the presence of Sarath Fonseka, MP, a number of local Buddhist priests and other people, at the funeral house of the late Lakshan, that the police had threatened to string him up by his feet if he gave evidence at the inquiry. The same man repeatedly alleged that the secretary of a ruling party MP had been involved in orchestrating events, creating the conditions which led to the shooting. The alleged intensity of the firing – against unarmed civilians – and the nature of the orders given to the shooters, suggest that the firing was not a minimum-force deterrent to possible violence, but driven by an intention to kill.

There are also allegations that the police set a three-wheeler on fire. Members of the Buddhist clergy present at the protest site claim that the interaction between the protesters and the Rambukkana police personnel on duty had been absolutely cordial, but the turmoil had been created by a contingent from the Kegalle police, led by SSP Keerthiratne.

Addressing Parliament later in the day, Sarath Fonseka quite categorically declared that SSP Keerthiratne had been responsible for the escalation of the incident and that he had been under the influence of liquor at that time. If the above information is correct it sullies the general conduct of the police, which has demonstrated commendable restraint in the recent islandwide protests.

The IGP has declared to the Human Rights Commission that he had not instructed the local police to open fire on the protesters. The initial inquiry into the incident which, ridiculously, had been handled by the Rambukkana Police, has now been entrusted to the CID. In totality, the sequence of events is very similar to previous investigations, under similar circumstances, across successive regimes, wherever the State authorities have been clearly seen to exceed their remit. Everything points to a classic cover-up strategy, very common to the Sri Lanka police and not uncommon in fascist regimes in other parts of the world. Victims retract complaints, witnesses develop amnesia, witnesses die, or disappear along with evidence, and crime scenes are sanitized immediately after an incident, obliterating leads and preventing any meaningful detective investigation.

In the meantime, a gazette notification has been issued, on the instructions of the President, deploying the Tri-Forces to maintain public order in 25 specified districts. Surprisingly, there has been no public comment on a development which, in the context of the ongoing turmoil, is akin to throwing dynamite into a fire.

The above is another perfect example of Gotabaya Rajapakse’s inflexible mind-set, in which there is no space for basic common sense, the logical measuring of options, or the evaluation of different points of view; that which is collectively largely responsible for the current state of the nation.

It is the narrow mindset of an ill-informed military man, that the exercise of authority is most effective when delivered through the barrel of a gun. Political power is defined as a key ingredient in the glue that holds a nation together, and that which enables control. But when abused, as we have seen the world over, leads to aggressive civil reaction and revolution; Sri Lanka today is the textbook case of South Asia, if not of all Asia.

The character and integrity of a regime in power is reflected best in the way it treats its ordinary citizens, the poor, the marginalised and the vulnerable, ensuring that those classes enjoy the same rights and access to basic needs and facilities, and, most importantly, to justice, as much as the economically, socially and politically privileged. The worth of a nation, especially in a multicultural society, is best measured by the manner in which it treats its minorities. Our government, and previous regimes as well, have failed on the first count and our nation has failed itself in the second. But now the opportunity has come to right both wrongs. The current regime can, and should, accept the verdict of the people and let go of governance. The nation, in the wonderful unity it has shown in the recent demonstrations against a government which has lost legitimacy, has demonstrated its potential to heal and to bridge the racial and religious divisions, which successive rulers have leveraged in order to gain power. For the first time since Independence in 1948, Sri Lanka, always a fractured polity, has in its gravest hour become a nation.

In the face of nationwide rejection why must Gotabaya be so obdurate? He is not a career politician but a man levered into power through the convergence of fortuitous circumstances; the voters’ disillusionment with an inept “Yahapalanaya”, the adulatory support of a large segment of the Sangha, combined with brother Mahinda’s fervent desire to have a Rajapaksa at the helm, until the launching pad is secure for son Namal to compete for the presidency, or the premiership. The other factor is that for those who have blatantly abused power- “malfeasance in office” for so long, there is a personal danger in letting go of the reins. That is equally true for the political lackeys and fellow travellers who have benefited from the rulers’ generosity and condonation of outright corruption, considerations which compel that group to maintain the benefactor in power. That much is obvious if one considers the most ardent of the Rajapaksa supporters in Parliament. In the event of a Rajapaksa family demise, they have much more to lose than power and position.

If even at this late stage Gotabaya Rajapaksa can drag himself out from the dark cavern that is his mind and, with the constitutional power still at his command, catalyze the change that the nation is desperately seeking, he can yet avert a catastrophe and emerge from the present chaos with a semblance of dignity. A structured exit will enable an orderly reconstruction. If not, he and the Rajapaksa family, and the nation as well, will be consumed in the inferno that will surely follow.

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Opinion

Microfinance and Credit Regulatory Authority Act 2026 fails all affacted communities

Published

21 hours ago

2026/03/10

Sahan Weerasooriya

A protest against exploitation by microfinance companies

The Microfinance and Credit Regulatory Authority Bill was passed into law by the Parliament of Sri Lanka on 4 March. According to Deputy Minister of Finance and Planning Dr. Anil Jayantha, the main object of the Act is to establish an Authority to “license and supervise the under-regulated microfinance and moneylending sector, aiming to protect borrowers from exploitation and ensure financial stability”.

However, the Yukthi Collective is saddened and disappointed that a government which pledged to take “measures to alleviate the burden of predatory microfinance loans with high interest rates on women” (NPP Manifesto, 2024: Page no. 44), will now add to their unbearable weight.

The new Act, as virtually all legislation enacted by Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s government, is a legacy of the anti-working class Ranil Wickremesinghe regime. It evades the root causes of the microfinance trap, and ignores debt justice for women borrowers.

It fails in understanding the connections between household debt and public debt. The vicious cycle of national debt is sustained by lack of growth in economic activity because of poor access to affordable credit.

It fails to make equal representation of women mandatory in the new Authority. If representatives of women borrowers and their self-run organisations are not present in the regulatory body, how will its members know of their lived experiences and make decisions that value women’s unpaid and paid contributions to sustaining life?

System Change

Millions of indebted households voted for the NPP with hope and expectation of ‘system change’. But instead of honouring its manifesto promise to them, the government has let them down in the law-making process; as well as the focus and substance of the new Act.

It is appalling that NPP parliamentarians, including some of its women members, appear not to have read and understood the bill they enacted into law, nor spoke to the rural credit community providers in their electorates for their views.

Predatory lending exists in the formal and informal sectors. Within this ecosystem, the Act fails to understand, identify, and prohibit predatory lending and recovery practices. It is a cover for the Central Bank’s failure to properly regulate ‘Licensed Finance Companies’ in the interests of citizens.

The biggest offenders are the big finance companies, in which some parliamentarians are deposit-holders. Therefore, some lawmakers benefit from excess profitmaking through exploitative practices, at the expense of poor mostly rural women.

Where law reform should discipline the bullies and thugs in credit delivery, it will instead wipe out, through over-regulation, community-based and managed lenders such as death donation societies, farmer associations, and urban and rural women’s collectives, which have been a lifeline for vulnerable working-class women and a defence from harmful recovery practices.

Structural Adjustment Programmes

The motivation for this new law are the market- and capital- friendly structural reforms insisted by International Financial Institutions; not the concerns and needs of those at the mercy of predatory lenders.

From the Microfinance Act 2016, to the 2023 version of the Ranil Wickremesinghe regime, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) through its loans has been a promoter of these regressive reforms.

The 2026 Act, with some changes suggested by the Supreme Court in 2024 and hardly any of the changes demanded by affected communities, has been moved forward by the NPP government in line with ADB loan conditionalities.

The path of de-regulation for banking, finance, trade, and investment; and over-regulation of poor people’s savings and credit institutions, smacks of the bias to big capital, which the NPP in opposition once criticised.

Reforms needed

The financial and banking reforms we want to see are to make credit from state banks and public funds accessible and affordable to women producers in agriculture and micro and small business operators; with decent wages and social protection for workers; that improve household opportunity for a dignified livelihood and decent lives.

Yukthi is a forum supporting working people’s movements and people’s struggles for democracy and justice in Sri Lanka.

by Yukthi Collective

Opinion

Illegal Bus Halt at Gate Number 11 of NHSL

Published

2 days ago

2026/03/9

Thilina Walpola

There is an unofficial bus halt at Gate Number 11 of the National Hospital at the 90-degree bend at the Prof. Nandadasa Kodagoda Mawatha (Old Norris Canal Road) which creates traffic jams at peak hours. Especially at the school opening and closing times at Carey College and hospital visiting hours.

Prospective passengers stand by the bend and then the busses stop suddenly on the middle of the road. The motorcycle in the picture is put into danger. The next bus halt is a few yards further near Carey College and Medical College Junction.

The problem is that illegal practices such as these, end up as approved procedure in our neck of the woods!

It must be nipped in the bud.

G. Fernando

Opinion

Naval hostilities close to a neutral coastal state: Legal assessment of a submarine attack on an Iranian warship near Sri Lanka

Published

2 days ago

2026/03/9

Thilina Walpola

SLN rescue operation to save the IRIS Dena survivors of the US submarine attack. (Handout picture from the government of Sri Lanka)

A submarine attack on an Iranian destroyer proximate to Sri Lanka represents more than a discrete naval engagement; it signals a potential horizontal escalation of conflict into the wider Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Historically, confrontations between Iran and Western powers have been largely confined to the Persian Gulf and adjacent regional waters. A strike near Sri Lanka, however, shifts the operational theatre from a semi-enclosed regional sea into the open Indian Ocean. This globally vital maritime space encompasses critical trade routes, energy supply corridors, and strategically sensitive naval zones.

This geographic expansion carries multiple strategic implications. First, it demonstrates the long-range maritime strike capabilities and blue-water operational reach of the belligerent forces. Second, it functions as a form of deterrence signalling, conveying a willingness to project force beyond traditional conflict zones. Third, it widens the theatre of operations, increasing the probability of third-party entanglement and amplifying regional instability.

Beyond its immediate military and strategic dimensions, the incident raises complex legal questions under both jus ad bellum—the body of law governing the use of force between states—and jus in bello, encompassing international humanitarian law applicable to armed conflict at sea. The central questions addressed in this paper are:

a. Lawfulness of Force:

Whether the use of force against the Iranian warship was lawful under the United Nations Charter, including considerations of self-defence and Security Council authorisation.

b. Compliance with International Humanitarian Law:

Whether the attack adhered to the principles and norms of international humanitarian law governing naval warfare, including the lawfulness of the target, proportionality, distinction, and obligations toward shipwrecked personnel.

c. Neutrality and Coastal State Rights:

Whether Sri Lanka’s rights and obligations as a neutral coastal state were violated, particularly within its territorial sea and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

d. Operational and Geostrategic Implications:

The broader implications of conducting military operations within or near neutral maritime zones, and the interplay between legal permissibility, maritime security, environmental obligations, and regional stability.

These questions form the analytical framework that will guide the discussion throughout this paper, providing a structured lens for examining the legal, humanitarian, and strategic dimensions of the incident.

Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello:

Legality of the Use of Force

The legality of a submarine attack against a commissioned warship during an armed conflict must be assessed within a structured framework of international law comprising the jus ad bellum regime under the United Nations Charter, the corpus of international humanitarian law (IHL), and customary principles of naval warfare as reflected in the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea.

At the threshold level, the UN Charter governs the lawfulness of the use of force between states. Article 2(4) establishes a general prohibition on the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, subject only to narrow exceptions. These exceptions include the inherent right of self-defence under Article 51 and actions authorised by the United Nations Security Council under Chapter VII.

Accordingly, if an Iranian warship were torpedoed by a submarine, the attacking state would be required to demonstrate that the action was undertaken either pursuant to a valid claim of self-defence, necessitated by an armed attack or imminent threat, or as part of an already existing international armed conflict. Absent such justification, the attack could constitute an unlawful use of force in violation of the Charter’s collective security framework.

Where an international armed conflict is already in existence, the analysis shifts from jus ad bellum to Jus in bello, namely the rules governing the conduct of hostilities.

Jus in bello

: Naval Warfare and Attack Against an Iranian Naval Ship

Where an international armed conflict exists between the United States and Iran, the analysis shifts to jus in Bello. Commissioned warships form part of a state’s armed forces and constitute lawful military objectives. Under customary naval warfare law, as reflected in the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, enemy warships may be attacked, including by submarine-launched torpedoes, without prior warning. An Iranian destroyer operating as part of Iran’s navy would therefore constitute a legitimate military objective in principle.

However, the legality of a torpedo attack by a United States submarine remains subject to the foundational principles of international humanitarian law, including distinction, proportionality, military necessity, and precautions in attack. The principle of distinction requires that the target be military in nature; proportionality prohibits attacks expected to cause incidental harm excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage; and military necessity demands that the force employed be directed toward achieving a legitimate military objective.

These obligations are particularly significant in maritime theatres characterised by dense commercial traffic, such as the sea lanes south of Sri Lanka. Incidental harm to neutral merchant vessels, offshore installations, or third-state interests must therefore be carefully assessed in relation to the anticipated concrete and direct military advantage.Submarine warfare, though technologically sophisticated and strategically consequential, remains subject to these enduring normative constraints, which seek to balance operational effectiveness with humanitarian considerations in the maritime domain.

Customary humanitarian law further requires that feasible measures be taken to search for and rescue the shipwrecked, wounded, and dead following an engagement. In this respect, any action by the Sri Lanka Navy to rescue surviving sailors and recover bodies from the destroyed vessel represents a prudent and legally consonant exercise of humanitarian responsibility. Such conduct reflects long-standing maritime tradition and aligns with the duties recognised under the law of armed conflict and the broader law of the sea, without compromising Sri Lanka’s neutral status.

Sri Lanka’s Legal Position Concerning the Torpedoed Iranian Vessel

Sri Lanka’s legal position is largely determined by the maritime location in which the submarine attack occurred. Should the hostilities have taken place within Sri Lanka’s territorial sea, defined as extending up to 12 nautical miles from the baseline, such conduct would constitute a breach of Sri Lanka’s sovereignty and a violation of the law of neutrality, which forbids belligerent states from engaging in hostilities within neutral waters and imposes a duty on the coastal state to prevent such actions within its jurisdiction. In that circumstance, Sri Lanka would be entitled to issue a diplomatic protest and potentially pursue reparative claims.

By contrast, as the engagement took place within Sri Lanka’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), the analysis is more nuanced under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The EEZ confers sovereign rights for resource exploitation rather than full sovereignty, and prevailing state practice accepts that military operations, including naval manoeuvres, are not per se unlawful in another state’s EEZ. While such an engagement would not automatically breach international law, it would nonetheless generate significant security concerns, including risks to navigational safety, potential environmental damage, and heightened regional instability. Should the sinking result in oil discharge, hazardous material release, or debris affecting shipping lanes, obligations under UNCLOS to protect and preserve the marine environment would be engaged.

Although the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development does not explicitly regulate armed conflict, its principles highlight an increasing expectation for states to protect the environment during hostilities. Similarly, UNCLOS mandates that states protect and preserve the marine environment. Consequently, should the sinking of the Iranian destroyer cause an oil spill, the release of hazardous materials, or navigational hazards, specific environmental liabilities would be triggered. Strategically, a submarine strike near Sri Lanka signals more than a discrete tactical engagement. It reflects the projection of great-power naval capabilities into a strategically sensitive maritime space through which a substantial proportion of global trade transits.

Sri Lanka occupies a pivotal geostrategic position astride the principal East–West Sea Lines of Communication linking Gulf energy supplies, East Asian manufacturing centres, and European markets via the Suez Canal. A substantial proportion of global container traffic transits south of the island, rendering these waters acutely sensitive to instability. Even a limited naval engagement can elevate war-risk insurance premiums, disrupt commercial routing, and indirectly affect port operations in Colombo and Hambantota.

From a jus ad bellum perspective, geographic expansion does not in itself render hostilities unlawful; yet it complicates assessments of necessity and proportionality and increases the risk of escalation affecting neutral states.

The torpedoing of an Iranian naval vessel in maritime zones proximate to Sri Lanka necessitates a carefully layered legal assessment situated at the confluence of jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and the law of the sea. As this paper has demonstrated, the legality of the incident ultimately turns on four interrelated determinations:

(a) whether a lawful basis for the use of force existed under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, grounded in self-defence;

(b) whether the attack complied with the principles of distinction, proportionality, and military necessity under international humanitarian law;

(c) whether the engagement occurred within Sri Lanka’s territorial sea, thereby infringing its sovereignty and violating the law of neutrality; and

(d) whether the obligations owed to survivors, shipwrecked personnel, and the marine environment were respected in accordance with the law of armed conflict at sea and relevant maritime conventions.

If the attack did not occur within Sri Lanka’s territorial sea, it would not amount to a violation of sovereignty or a breach of the law of neutrality capable of engaging state responsibility on that ground.

By contrast, where the engagement occurred beyond the territorial sea whether within the Exclusive Economic Zone or on the high seas prevailing interpretations of the law of naval warfare, reinforced by consistent state practice, suggest that the operation may be regarded as legally defensible, provided that the cumulative requirements of necessity, proportionality, distinction, and humanitarian obligation were satisfied.

Nevertheless, legal permissibility does not equate to strategic prudence. The deployment of a United States submarine to conduct kinetic operations in proximity to a neutral coastal state within the Indian Ocean underscores the increasingly complex convergence of naval power projection, humanitarian norms, environmental obligations, and coastal state rights within the contemporary maritime domain.

Even where consistent with international law, the extension of submarine warfare into the wider Indian Ocean carries destabilising implications for regional security, commercial shipping, and the safety of neutral coastal states situated along critical sea lines of communication. The geographic expansion of hostilities into this maritime space heightens the risks of miscalculation, escalation, and unintended third-party involvement.

For Sri Lanka, the incident underscores the delicate equilibrium between maintaining neutrality, safeguarding maritime security, and upholding the international legal order. The actions undertaken by the Sri Lanka Navy in conducting rescue and recovery operations for surviving sailors and deceased personnel reflect the discharge of well-established humanitarian duties under international law and exemplify responsible conduct at sea.

Ultimately, this episode illustrates the increasingly complex convergence of naval power projection, international humanitarian norms, and coastal state rights within the contemporary maritime domain. In an era marked by intensifying great-power competition and expanding operational reach in the Indian Ocean, the preservation of legal clarity, strategic restraint, and respect for neutral maritime spaces remains essential to sustaining regional stability and safeguarding the integrity of the international maritime order.

by REAR ADMIRAL (RTD.) JAGATH RANASINGHE
VSV, USP, psc, MSc (DS) Mgt, MMaritimePol (Aus),
PG Dip in CPS, DIP in CR, FNI (Lond), Former Govt Fellow GCSP