Midweek Review

A forgotten episode: Black Sea Tiger raid on Colombo port

Published

4 years ago

2022/10/12

The Israeli built Dvora Fast Attack Craft (FAC) that blew up the explosives-laden Black Sea Tiger craft in the Colombo harbour. The then Ports and Shipping Minister, the late A.H.M. Ashraff, who visited the port hours after the April 1996 incident, declared that necessary counter measures were in place to thwart the suicide raid. Acquired in the 90s, the FAC is still in service.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

Having read the writer’s review of ex-Lankadeepa defence correspondent Ratnapala Gamage’s Ranabime Panhinda (Notes from the battlefront), retired Lieutenant L.S.A.N.T. Siriwardhana sought an explanation regarding the absence of at least a reference to the high profile raid on the Colombo harbour, in April 1996.

The Australia-Sri Lanka dual citizen pointed out that the unprecedented LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) foray into the heavily guarded Colombo port never received the attention it deserved.

“Ratnapala Gamage discussed the commando-style LTTE raid on the Bandaranaike International Airport, carried out in late July 2001 though he left out April 1996 raid on the Colombo port,” Siriwardhana said, asserting perhaps the media never had sufficient access to the required information.

Siriwardhana declared that he felt the need to discuss the Colombo port attack against the backdrop of Sri Lanka’s latest humiliating defeat at the Geneva-based United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC). In the absence of a comprehensive examination of the overall war, with the focus on major specific incidents and developments, successive governments failed to counter continuing propaganda against the country, and its valiant fighting men, by interested parties.

Siriwardhana said that even over 12 years after the successful conclusion of the war, the government hadn’t been able to properly record the conflict. Therefore, Sri Lanka’s failure to effectively counter propaganda and the resultant developments should be a matter of serious concern, Siriwardhana said.

LTTE issues statements from London

Following the raid on the Colombo port, on April 12, 1996, the LTTE issued two statements from its International Secretariat, situated at 211, Katherine Road, London E 6, IBU, UK. The LTTE credited the Black Sea Tigers with the attack. It also showed how the British continued to mollycoddle the terrorists, on its soil, even long after the Tigers assassinated former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, in May 1991, on all types of pretexts. The UK turned a blind eye to the assassination of President Ranasinghe Premadasa and several lawmakers. Having openly nurtured Tiger terrorists we wonder whether the UK has any right to accuse us of doing any wrong in single handedly crushing that organization, termed by none other than the US Federal Bureau of Investigation, as the most ruthless terrorist organization.

According to the LTTE statements, dated April 13 and 15, 1996, Black Sea Tigers succeeded in destroying three Fast Attack Craft (FACs) and three supply vessels, in the Colombo harbour. The writer covered the Black Sea Tiger incursion which, according to the Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA), had been detected by two minor employees. The two employees, identified as boatmen, had made the chance detection, off the Jaya Container Terminal Stage One. Swift intervention, by the Navy, led to the destruction of an explosive-laden suicide craft, close on the heels of the killing of two underwater saboteurs (LTTE frogmen, identified themselves as ‘Aiya’ (April 15, 1996, The Island). But, later, the deaths of altogether at least four underwater saboteurs were reported.

The Black Sea Tigers raided the Colombo port one year after the LTTE’s extraordinary success in the East, as it launched Eelam War III. The LTTE resumed open warfare, without any warning, with the sinking of two Shanghai Class gunboats moored at the gunboat pier at the SLN dockyard, in the Trincomalee harbour. Underwater saboteurs blasted the vessels SLNS Ranasuru and SLNS Soorya, acquired in 1991 and 1971, respectively, just hours after the LTTE quit the Norwegians arranged negotiations. The LTTE credited two men, and an equal number of women of the Black Sea Tigers, for the attack. A week later, the LTTE brought down two Avro transport aircraft over the strategic Palaly airbase, on two consecutive days. The military lost over 100 officers and men. Shoulder-fired heat-seeking missiles, acquired from the Mujahedeen, in Afghanistan, delivered stunning blows. The suicide strikes, and the introduction of missiles, stunned the Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga government.

But, the raid on the Colombo port, a year later, involved both Black Sea Tigers and an explosive-laden boat.

It was meant to cripple the economy by discouraging foreign vessels, plying international shipping lanes, calling on Colombo. Had the LTTE succeeded, Sri Lanka would have suffered irreparable damage.

It would be pertinent to mention that the LTTE targeted the Colombo port, in the aftermath of the loss of the Jaffna peninsula. Operation ‘Riviresa,’ involving three Divisions, brought back Jaffna town, and its suburbs, under government control, in the first week of Dec. 1995. Having secured the Waligamam region, by Dec. 1995, the military consolidated about 50 percent of the Thennamarachchi and Vadamaratchcy sectors, in the peninsula, by April 1996. The then President CBK’s administration had the upper hand with the entire peninsula under its control. Having launched Eelam War III, the LTTE lost Jaffna peninsula, before the end of that year, and sought to deliver a knock-out blow. The LTTE picked Colombo port to stage a spectacular attack. In spite of 24-hour surveillance, after months of reconnaissance, undertaken by Tiger intelligence operatives, the LTTE mounted the operation on April 12, 1996, as the country was preparing to celebrate the Sinhala and Tamil New Year.

Successful counter-attack

Siriwardhana, who had been the Command Operations Room officer (West) of SLNS Rangala, on the day of the Black Sea Tiger foray, made available to the writer the correspondence he had with Navy headquarters, as well as the Office of the President, pertaining to the incident. In addition to them, there were other documents that dealt with the issue.

Interestingly, the correspondence had taken place two years after the attack on the Colombo port, after Navy headquarters announced awarding of the ‘Rana Wickrama Padakkama’ (gallantry medal) to Lieutenant Commander L.R.N.A. Wijetunga, who had joined the crew of Dvora (P441) that destroyed the explosives-laden Black Sea Tiger boat, tasked to destroy one of the vessels in the harbour.

Siriwardhana challenged the awarding of gallantry award to Wijetunga, who had been the Duty Staff Officer (DSO) (West) at the time of the attack. Why did Wijetunga take the risk of a ‘Dvora ride’ at the time the Colombo port was under attack? What made him skip his primary task of taking control of the Command Operations Room? Instead, Wijetunga, who had been the senior most officer at the scene, boarded the Dvora contrary to his primary responsibility. Did Wijetunga shirk his primary responsibility? But, did he voluntarily risk his life by joining the Dvora crew facing a possible suicide attack?

At the time of the attack, four top officers, responsible for the Western Command, hadn’t been available. Commander Western Naval Area Commodore H.R. Amaraweera, Deputy Area Commander, Captain S.P.F. Wijeratne, Commanding Officer, SLNS, Rangala and Executive Officer, SLNS Rangala, hadn’t been available. Therefore, DSO Wijetunga had been the senior most officer responsible for taking counter measures. Perhaps, he felt confident in joining the Dvora crew, leaving the counter-attack in the hands of Lieutenant Siriwardhana who, efficiently, manned the Command Operations Room. In hindsight, the counter-attack couldn’t have been handled in a better way.

Lieutenant Siriwardhana, in a letter dated Sept. 23, 1998, addressed to the then Commander of the Navy, raised the issue, while categorically denying his intention was to secure a medal.

Having joined the Navy, through the Kotelawela Defence Academy (KDA) Intake IX, as an Officer Cadet, Siriwardhana served as an Electrical Officer and left the service, in 1999, due to an injury suffered playing rugger for the KDA and the Navy. Siriwardhana migrated to Australia in 2012. In spite of leaving the country, Siriwardhana pursued the matter, even after Gotabaya Rajapaksa won the presidency at the Nov. 2019 election.

A bid to deceive Navy

Lieutenant L.S.A.N.T.
Siriwardhana

The Black Sea Tiger operation got underway, on April 11, at 7.40 pm, with an anonymous call to the Command Operations Room that sea pirates were planning to board a merchant vessel, outside the Colombo harbour. The call was received by Siriwardhana, who had been, manning the Command Operations Room, at SLNS Rangala. Siriwardhana, however, felt that the caller was making an attempt to trick the Navy to deploy available vessels to track down sea pirates, and, thereby, would have facilitated the Black Sea Tiger operation. Siriwardhana based his assessment on the basis of specific information pertaining to (1) expected arrival of Lanka Asitha, carrying the multi-role Kfir ground attack aircraft. The fighter aircraft were to be unloaded at the Jaya Container Terminal (JCT). The aircraft were the first fighter jets acquired by Sri Lanka since the 1991 acquisition of Chinese fighters (2) Mercs Hendala, another merchant vessel, was being loaded with military hardware, at the Bandaranaike quay. The north-bound cargo was for troops engaged in operations in the Jaffna peninsula (3) SLNS Shakthi (Landing Ship Tank), too, was being loaded at the Rangala pier number 1 with military cargo for troops deployed in the North and (4) another vessel was discharging LP gas near the guide pier.

Anticipating a possible LTTE bid to infiltrate harbour defenses, Siriwardhana, in his capacity as the Command Operations Room officer, having alerted the DSO, regarding the anonymous call received, deployed two lightly armed locally-built Inshore Patrol Craft (IPCs) at the two entrances to the Colombo harbour. The officers-in-charge were told not to chase any suspicious moving craft in the vicinity. The sailor, at the radar watch, and other units assigned for the unenviable task of guarding the harbour, too, were alerted. At 8 pm, April 11, Siriwardhana handed over the Command Operations Room responsibilities to the next officer. Siriwardhana returned to the station at 4 am, on the following day, April 12, and was told of the withdrawal of one IPC. That left one IPC with the daunting task of meeting unforeseen threats. According to Siriwardhana, the sentry at the pilot station, detected the underwater movement and brought the development to his notice at 5.45 am, though the SLPA, at that time,claimed the initial detection was made by two of its minor employees. One cannot deny the ambiguity therein, but regardless of who received the credit for the detection, the Navy cannot, under any circumstances, absolve itself of the responsibility for security at ports.

Dvora confronts Black Sea Tiger craft

Responding to the warning from the sentry at the pilot station, Siriwardhana dispatched two smaller patrol craft to the area where underwater movements were alleged to have taken place. The looming threat was also brought to the notice of the DSO (West). Then one of the two patrol craft confirmed the presence of a diver to Siriwardhana and proceeded to use explosives against the target. As the Navy eliminated the underwater threat, the sailor at the radar point had brought to the notice of his superior that an unauthorized boat was making a bid to enter the harbour through the northern entrance. Siriwardhana, struggling to cope up with the new threat, directed two patrol craft though one of them lacked the main armament. The two boats, and the sailor at the sentry, engaged the boat as Black Sea Tigers fired Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs).

However, Dvora P 441, that had been moored at the Rangala pier, had immediately intervened without being directed by the Command Operations Room. Siriwardhana, in his Sept. 23, 1998. letter acknowledged the timely intervention made by the Dvora. Siriwardhana stated: “Then I realized that P 441(Dvora) had gone for assistance and subsequently heard a loud explosion, learnt that the terrorist boat had been destroyed by the Dvora.” The LTTE craft is believed to have been manned by at least five persons.

The then Lt. D.K.P. Dassanayake, Staff Officer, Harbour Defence (later Navy spokesman) had commanded the Dvora in the absence of its Commanding Officer Lt. Commander Manoj Jayasuriya. A salvo from the Dvora blew up the enemy craft. The blast indicated that it had been laden with high explosives. In addition to Dassanayake, the second-in-command of the Dvora Lt. Nalina Dayananada had been onboard the vessel but can the Navy justify Wijetunga joining the crew at the expense of his given task.

Oil tanker ‘ARMA,’ moored at the North pier, car carrier SINGHA ACE at the guide pier, SEA LAND ENDEAVOUR docked at the Jaya Container Terminal 1 pier, and NEDLOYED OBRIDJAN berthed at the Queen Elisabeth Quay, were damaged as a result of RPGs and other weapons fired by Black Sea Tigers.

Perhaps the LTTE had inside information regarding the arrival of four Kfirs and the unloading of a large stock of artillery shells and mortars. The Army warehouse, within the harbour, was one of the key targets whereas there were other ships and assets. The Navy recovered bodies/parts of bodies of four terrorists though six were believed to have been involved in the operation. The boat, laden with explosives, was to enter the port, following near simultaneous attacks carried out by the six infiltrators. But, the chance detection of underwater saboteurs, and the ensuing blasts, prompted Black Sea Tigers, operating the explosives laden boat, to enter the port.

P 441 had been tasked on that particular day to meet any eventuality. Had there been a minute delay, on the part of Dassanayake in taking the Dvora out, the consequences would have been catastrophic. But, P 441 wouldn’t have made a difference if not for the detection made by the sentry at the pilot station, according to the Navy. However, for some reason, the Navy deliberately failed to ascertain the circumstances leading to the detection and the counter-attack. Some officers expressed disgust and disappointment and, at least one, protested.

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Midweek Review

Unexpected focus on ‘pieces of tin’ worn by military men

Published

3 days ago

2026/07/8

Sahan Weerasooriya

Maj. Lalith Jayasinghe with Kaushalya on his wedding day. Jayasinghe, receipient of Sri Lanka's highest military honour, has been credited with unprecedented raids behind the enemy lines. He died in late November, 2008, in the Vanni east.

Second Lieutenant S.U. Aladeniya, the first recipient of the Parama Weera Vibhushanaya, died fighting the LTTE in the second week of July, 1990. The young commanding officer of the isolated Kokavil Army detachment refused an opportunity to leave his wounded colleagues. Instead, he chose to set an extraordinary example. The fate of the Kokavil detachment, as well as the unprecedented military debacle that forced the Army to vacate the Kandy–Jaffna A9 road, north of Vavuniya, in 1990, happened due to the late President Ranasinghe Premadasa’s folly. Premadasa trusted the LTTE to such an extent, he ordered several hundred police officers, in the East, to surrender to appease the LTTE. The rest is history.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

Additional Solicitor General Dileepa Peiris recently questioned in court as to why retired Air Force officer Shantha Jayathilake appeared in court wearing armed forces medals.

The highly decorated war hero Flight Lieutenant Jayathilake represented himself under Section 260 of the Criminal Procedure Code in the trial of Maj. Gen. Suresh Sallay, the alleged mastermind of the 2019 Easter Sunday carnage.

During his submission, Dileepa Pieris looked at the medals worn by the retired officer and said: “He comes wearing pieces of tin.”

When Jayathilake objected to the ASG’s remark, Magistrate Pasan Amarasena warned the ex-officer not to interrupt proceedings. Then Peiris said that he couldn’t see Jayathilake’s medals properly. Jayathilake is the recipient of Weewa Wickrema Vibhushanaya (WWV), the second highest gallantry medal awarded to Sri Lankan military. The PWV is the highest gallantry decoration that can be received by a living military man. Jayathilake who joined the Air Force in 1989 at the height of the JVP-led insurgency, retired in 1999, and was also the recipient of the Rana Sura Padakkama (RSP).

Senior President’s Counsel Maithree Gunaratne, who represented Sallay in court, said: “The problem is not with your eyes, but with the red-tinted glasses you are wearing. You wore blue-tinted glasses for a while, and now you wear red-tinted glasses, so the gallantry medals, earned with blood, sweat, and tears for the country, look like pieces of tin to you”

Gunaratne requested that Pieris’s comments on the ex-officer be formally recorded in court records. This happened in the Fort Magistrate’s court on 2 July, 2026. The court proceedings caused controversy with various interested parties expressing differing views on Jayathilake wearing medals to a courtroom.

Some found fault with him for wearing medals while others strongly backed him. The issue at hand received social media attention. Obviously some sought political advantage at the expense of the government and the Attorney General’s Department. Others lambasted the former State Intelligence Service (SIS) Chief Sallay (2029-2024) for causing unnecessary developments. However, the gallantry medals worn by military, both officers and men, cannot be ridiculed by anyone, regardless of his/her position in the society. Gallantry medals remind the country of immense and untold sacrifices made by the military, during the war, and any attempt to dilute them should be strongly opposed.

Those who silently backed or publicly take action against war-winning Army Chief General (retd.) Sarath Fonseka, in 2010, after his defeat at the 2010 January presidential election, shouldn’t see the incident at the Fort Magistrate court as an opportunity.

Although Sri Lanka has been deeply divided over investigations into the conduct of armed forces during the war and after, no issue caused controversy like the arrest of Sallay, a post-war head of the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) over the 2019 Easter Sunday carnage. Sallay served as the Director of State Intelligence Service (SIS) from 2019 to 2024 before President Anura Kumara Dissanayake replaced him. Perhaps President Gotabaya Rajapaksa shouldn’t have brought Sallay as Director, SIS, contrary to the practice of SIS always being headed by a senior police officer or he was quite right in bringing in a serving military officer with a proven intelligence track record, knowing the shameful behaviour of responsible top police officers in the run up to the Easter Sunday suicide attacks, despite there having been adequate advance intelligence warnings to prevent them.

The intervention made by the retired Air Force officer triggered an unexpected reaction from the Attorney General’s top representative and the subsequent continuing controversy influenced The Island to discuss the awarding of gallantry medals, namely Parama Weera Vibhushanaya (PWV), the highest, followed by Weera Wickrema Vibhushanaya (WWV), Rana Wickrema Padakkama (RWP) and Rana Sura Padakkama (RSP). The fourth medal, Weeradhara Vibhushanaya, is awarded for bravery, regardless of the risks to one’s own life, but for voluntary interventions outside the battlefield.

Bravery of an exceptional kind

During the war, Sri Lanka awarded 32 PVWs posthumously. The Army, Navy and Air Force shared 29, 2 and 1, respectively. The PVW is awarded to all ranks of armed forces, both regular and volunteer, for individual acts of bravery in the face of enemy, disregarding the risks to one’s own life. Of the 32 recipients of the PVW, the extraordinary case of Maj. J.A.L. Jayasinghe (Lalith Jayasinghe), posthumously promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, captured unprecedented public attention.

On many occasions, PWVs were awarded posthumously for sacrifices made in defensive action, while the armed forces were responding to enemy action. However, Lalith had initiated action deep within the enemy-held territory and his efforts reflected the overall military strategy.

The 29 recipients consisted of 27 Army: Second Lieutenant S.U Aladeniya, Lance Corporal (LC) Y.G.G. Kularatne (Hasalaka Gamini), Second Lt. K.W.T. Nishshanka, Staff Sgt. H.P.B. Gunasekera, LC W.I.M. Seneviratne, Lt. Col. A.F Lafir, Capt. G.S. Jayanath, Maj. J.A.L. Jayasinghe, Maj. K.A. Gamage, Capt. U.G.A.S. Samaranayake, H.G.M.K.I. Megawarna, Sgt H.G.S. Bandara, Corporal P.N. Suranga, Corporal P.M.N. Pushpakumara, Corporal D.N\M.S. Chandrasiri Bandara, LC K. Chandana, Private R.M.D.M. Ratnayake, LC A.M.M.P. Abeysinghe, recruit A.M.B.H.G. Abeyratne Banda, private T.G.R. Dayananda, Lt. P.N. Punsiri, Second Lt W.D. Jayathilake, Sgt. K.G.N.L.R. Perera, Corporal K.P.D.T. Gunasekera, LC H.A. Nilantha Kumara, LC S.V.A.M. Pushpamal. Navy: Lt. J.L.D.S. Wijetunga, Petty Officer K.G. Shantha and Air Force: Squadron Leader T.D.S. Silvapulle.

Although Jayasinghe paid the supreme sacrifice, while serving the Special Forces, he had been a proud member of the Gemunu Watch (GW). GW veteran Maj. Gen. K.B. Egodawele in his Hewayekuge Mathaka Satahan (Memories of a soldier), first launched in 2012, declared that Jayasinghe had been among four GW personnel, namely Captain U.G.A.S. Samaranayake, Captain H.P.M.K. Meghawardena and Corporal D.M.A.M. Pushpakumara to receive the PWV, posthumously.

All of them received the highest gallantry award for actions on the Vanni east region during Eelam War IV (2006 August to 2009 May).

Jayasinghe’s wife Kaushalya accepted the PVW on 19 May, 2012, at the annual Victory Day parade. Maj. Gen. Kamal Gunaratne read the awardee’s official citation. Kaushalya had been five months pregnant at the time Jayasinghe mounted a raid deep inside the LTTE-held territory in the Vanni east region. Gunaratne, the wartime General Officer Commanding (GoC) of the 53 Division declared that Jayasinghe had been in command of an LRRP (Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol)/Deep Penetration Unit tasked to eliminate LTTE leaders. That unit had moved about 40 kms into the enemy held territory in Oddusuddan and was positioned alongside the Mankulam-Oddusuddan road to kill LTTE leaders, on 26 November, 2008.

Suddenly, Jayasinghe had fallen sick but joined other members of the LLRP to fight the enemy after fierce fighting erupted between the two sides. In spite of having an opportunity to retreat, Jayasinghe, hero of many previous battles, suffered grievous injuries during the battle and succumbed to his injuries.

Jayasinghe had been an extraordinary soldier and was the recipient of the second highest gallantry medal, WWV, on three or four occasions. In one such occasion, Jayasinghe had received two WWVs at one ceremony and recalled retired Maj. Gen. Dhammi Hewage, who received the RSP at the same event. Hewage spoke admirably about what he called high risk and extraordinary LRRP operations undertaken by Jayasinghe over a period of time. Let me give you an opportunity to know more about Hewage whose no holds barred examination of the Army during the war received public attention ( https://island.lk/a-special-forces-officers-narrative/)

Those who risked their lives to earn battlefield recognition played a significant role in transforming the armed forces, particularly the Army. Gallantry medals had been earned by armed forces officers and men in various circumstances but the deadly LRRP strikes, deep within the LTTE held territory, made quite a difference in the overall direction of the war. Those who operated in enemy territory in a way functioned as suicide cadres/units as the probability of them being intercepted by the LTTE was very high. But, regardless of severe risks, they ventured out of government-held areas to infiltrate deep inside enemy held territory to carry out operations. The LRRP team, led by Jayasinghe, is a case in point.

Clandestine operations received public attention in the run-up to the 2001 December parliamentary election when UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe all of a sudden alleged that the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) was planning to assassinate him. Within weeks after the UNP victory at the parliamentary election, the UNP unleashed the police on the DMI. The police raided the DMI safe house at Millennium City, Athurugiriya. In spite of Army Chief, the late Lt. Gen. Lionel Balagalle, personally assuring the UNP that there was absolutely no basis for such claims, Wickremesinghe was not prepared to change his political strategy. He gave Minister John Amaratunga in charge of police the go ahead for planned action.

The January 2, 2002, raid led to the arrest of Captain Mohamed Nilam, Staff Sgt. P. Ananda Udulagama, Staff Sergeant I. Edirisinghe Jayamanne, Corporal H.M. Nissanka Herath, Lance Corporal H. Mohamed Hilmy and an LTTE operative identified as Niyaz/Subashkaran. Others involved in that particular operation had been living in the East and were called into join operations, depending on the requirement. On the instructions of Lt. Gen. Balagalle, those tasked with carrying out attacks on selected targets received the opportunity to train under Special Forces instructors from Maduru Oya. They underwent training at the Panaluwa Test Firing Range, where firing special weapons was a key element in the training schedule.

In a bid to ensure secrecy, those operatives mostly operated on their own, and had their own arsenal, which included a range of weapons, including claymore mines. In fact, those involved in such operations functioned on a need-to-know basis. Even senior DMI officials, as well as the Army top brass, except a few, hadn’t been aware of what was going on. Even the then powerful Deputy Defence Minister, the late Anuruddha Ratwatte, hadn’t been told of the Millennium City safe-house, though he knew of the ongoing hits behind enemy lines.

Shortly after the exposure of the DMI operation, Balagalle met Premier Wickremesinghe to explain the secret operations undertaken against the LTTE. The Army chief had been accompanied by officials, including Hendarawithana, while one-time Attorney General Tilak Marapana, National List MP holding the Defence portfolio, and Minister Milinda Moragoda, too, were present.

“Except for Minister Moragoda, the others obviously didn’t realise what we were doing. They acted as if we were conspiring to do away with the political leadership so as to undermine the Norwegian initiative,” a source familiar with the dynamics of the project said. “We quickly realised we were up against a government, which simply wanted to negotiate a deal with the LTTE at any cost. The LTTE and the Norwegians exploited the situation to the hilt.”

Success in the East

Hitting the enemy in the area under its control had been Balagalle’s idea. The DMI hadn’t been successful in its first and the second attempts to take two specific targets. The targeted area had been Batticaloa south and the first and the second operations were mounted on 18 July 2001 and 12 September 2001. But both actions went awry and the targeted men identified as Jim Kelly (commander of Jeyanthan regiment) and Jeevan escaped death.

But, they succeeded on 17 September 2001. Operatives carried out a successful attack on ‘Major’ Mano Master, who was at that time in charge of the communications network in the Ampara-Batticaloa area.

But immediately after the UNP’s victory, the government terminated all such operations. The treacherous government betrayed those who risked their lives for the country. Ex-LTTEers and others who worked for the Army were exposed and the LTTE hunted them down. Scores of men were killed. Some were tortured and killed.

Apart from Mano Master, the secret raids claimed the lives of Batticaloa District Intelligence Head Lt. Col Nizam and Capt. Thevathasan.

Among those killed in the north were LTTE Air Wing Head Col. Shankar (Vaithilingam Sornalingam) and Sea Tiger Deputy Commander Lt. Col Kangai Amaran.

S.P. Thamilselvan, his Deputy Major S. Thangan, Vavuniya Special Commander Col. Jeyam and Deputy Military Chief Col. Balraj were believed to have been targeted in the North but escaped. In the East, among those who escaped targeted killings, were Col. Karuna, Karikalan, Jim Kelly and Intelligence Chief Lt. Col. Ramanan.

In spite of the LTTEers, particularly its leaders on a heightened state of alert, the Army ambushed Karikalan’s vehicle on 18 October, 2001. The destruction of the vehicle fuelled speculation of Karikalan’s demise, with a section of the media reporting him killed in a special operation. Shortly before the attack on Karikalan’s vehicle, the Army intercepted a radio conversation between Karikalan and his wife, a medical doctor by profession, serving in the Northern Province. “She simply begged him to leave Batticaloa and take refuge in the North to avoid the Army’s deep penetration operations,” a source familiar with LRRP operations told the writer many years ago.

The Army struck again on 26 November, 2001. ‘Major’ Swarnaseelan and ‘Captain’ Devadas were eliminated in the Pulipanjikkal area. It was the last operation before the December 5 General Election.

The UNP terminated the operation. But, the Army revived the strategy after the eruption of hostilities in 2005.

It would be pertinent to mention that hit and run attacks, deep within the LTTE held territory, troubled them to such an extent, they took up the issue with Norway. Fearing a relentless campaign, the LTTE got Norway to include LRRP operations in their negotiations, leading to a one-sided Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) signed in February 2002 by the Wickremesinghe regime. That CFA revealed the existence of a secret Army project to target the LTTE in their own area. The CFA called for termination of LRRP operations.

Three PVWs

Lieutenant J.L.D.S. Wijetunga was the first Navy recipient of the Parama Weera Vibhushanaya (PWV), Sri Lanka’s highest gallantry award given posthumously. Wijetunga, Commanding Officer of the Israeli built Dvora Fast Attack Craft (FAC), maneuvered his vessel to intercept an explosives-laden Sea Tiger suicide boat approaching a troop transport ship off Point Pedro on 30 March, 1996. Wijetunga, in spite of knowing his action was suicidal, went ahead with the risky maneuver that saved the lives of a large contingent of off duty servicemen on their way to Trincomalee from Kankesanthurai (KKS).

The Navy earned its second PWV on 1 November, 2008, off Point Pedro, during the Eelam war IV. A Petty Officer of elite Special Boat Squadron K.G. Shantha rammed an explosives-laden Sea Tiger suicide craft with his Arrow boat (Z-142 ). Shantha and his three SBS colleagues were blasted to smithereens, though their action saved an Inshore Patrol Craft (IPC) carrying a dozen SBS personnel.

Wing Commander T.D.S. Silvapulle received the nation’s highest gallantry award PWV for attacking Sea Tiger boats firing at Army defences south-east of Elephant Pass on 19 December, 1999. Silvapulle, flying a Mi 24 helicopter gunship in adverse weather conditions, regardless of the threat posed by surface-to-air missiles, engaged the enemy craft. Silvapulle compelled the enemy to flee but was hit during the confrontation. His individual act of gallantry was recognized in 2012, four years after the eradication of the LTTE. The then President Mahinda Rajapaksa conferred the PWV at a ceremony held on 19 May, 2012. Maj. Lalith Jayasinghe received his PWV at the same ceremony.

The betrayal of the armed forces in October, 2015, at the Geneva-based Human Rights Council, by the treacherous Sirisena-Wickremesinghe regime, underscored the mentality of those who wielded political power. The calling of gallantry medals ‘pieces of tin’ reminded the country of the pathetic and disgraceful state of affairs.

Midweek Review

Poor, little upper-middle income country

Published

3 days ago

2026/07/8

Sahan Weerasooriya

“Sri Lanka has been ranked among the least happy countries in the latest World Happiness Report 2026…standing alongside Ethiopia”- The Sunday Island March 2026

Sri Lanka was officially declared an Upper-Middle Income country by the World Bank in July 2026, regaining the classification it had in 2019.

On the 30th of June, the IMF delegation meeting the President at the Presidential Secretariat praised the government: “…IMF praised the government’s economic programme and noted that Sri Lanka has made greater progress than many other countries implementing IMF-supported programmes. The delegation commended the government for maintaining macroeconomic stability despite a series of external shocks and for remaining firmly committed to its reform agenda…” (Presidential Media Division, 30 June 2026)

Meanwhile, a UN-backed World Happiness Report 2026 compiled by the Wellbeing Research Centre at the University of Oxford, ranked Sri Lanka 134th out of 147 nations. A daily newspaper which ran the story on the 19th of March 2026, added that the report showed that “Sri Lanka has slipped one place from its 133rd ranking in 2025, now standing alongside Ethiopia. The country also trails behind its South Asian neighbours, with India ranked 116th, Pakistan and Bangladesh positioned significantly higher.”

Good News, Bad News

The Upper-Middle Income classification was declared by the World Bank during the Yahapalana government in July 2019. 6 months later, the Yahapalana government was swept out at elections.

Only 2 years later, in April 2022, the country was declared bankrupt, and by July that year the newly elected President was toppled by a people’s uprising for the first time in the country’s history.

To fill the vacuum, an unlikely combination of an unelected MP from the Opposition who was made President by the Parliament and an unpopular government that had barely survived the uprising, governed the country together. It was massively defeated by the people only 2 years later in 2024, despite ‘stabilising’ the economy.

An Upper-Middle Income status may give the impression of a prosperous people, but prosperous people are not an unhappy people. The World Bank report 2026 (World Bank, Sri Lanka Development Update) notes the anomaly: “the recovery is unfinished and has not translated into widespread improvements in welfare.”

The report adds:

* Real output remains below 2018 levels.

* Although poverty is projected to decline in 2025, it remains double the 2019 levels.

* Vulnerability remains high with an additional 10 percent of the population living just above the poverty line.

* Malnutrition continues to be elevated.

* The labour market recovery is slow with real wages and labor force participation well below 2019 levels.

The World Bank’s Poverty and Equity Brief (October 2025) sheds further light:

* Poverty is projected at 22.3-22.4 percent in 2025 and around 20 percent until 2027 without stronger inclusive growth.

* Real earnings remain below pre-crisis levels.

So, are Top of the Class in the IMF index and almost Bottom of the Class in the Happiness Index related?

As a friend who is a highly-placed economist explained to me, if people are poorer, undernourished, indebted, and insecure after stabilisation, then reserves, inflation, and primary balances alone cannot be relied on to judge the next IMF programme. Sri Lanka needs a national programme whose success metric is household recovery, jobs, nutrition, and productive capacity.

From the praise heaped on the President and this government’s strong leadership by the IMF for their performance thus far, sticking closely to the IMF conditionalities, we can only infer that things for the unhappy citizens will hardly get better as they negotiate the 18th IMF programme.

The AKD administration doesn’t haggle on behalf of the people. They see the rewards of that approach in fiscal consolidation and macroeconomic stability. This however, is not the only kind of stability they have to bear in mind, given recent history.

By the People, But Not for the People?

The new or renewed (from July 2019) ‘Upper-Middle Income’ classification has served to remind people where the government has failed, been weak, as much as where it has been strong and succeeded. The economy in the abstract is better off, but the majority of the people who gave the government a two thirds majority, are much worse off in material reality.

To return to my top economist friend, she explained that Sri Lanka should not reject fiscal discipline, but it must own the design of fiscal adjustment. The country needs a fairer tax mix, better tax administration, public investment discipline, and protection of health, education, nutrition, and climate-resilient infrastructure. Otherwise, fiscal discipline becomes socially brittle and growth-reducing.

The direction she recommended is hardly where the government is heading. The World Bank warns that the on-going reliance on regressive indirect taxes could worsen the poverty outlook, while the primary expenditure ceiling of 13 percent of GDP can constrain public investment and service delivery.

A leading financial daily (6 July) reported that at the CA Sri Lanka’s 5th Annual Economic and Tax Symposium, both the Government’s tax policies and the Inland Revenue Department (IRD) “came under sustained criticism from leading private sector tax professionals”. Gajma & Co. Senior Partner N.R. Gajendran argued that “…higher revenues had come largely from imposing a heavier burden on existing taxpayers rather than widening the tax base.”

He said that “When taxes become excessive and unbearable, and it is not coming from the widening of the base, it is coming from the same taxpayer, it erodes expenditure capabilities, it erodes saving capabilities, and it erodes investment capabilities,” warning that “sustained over-taxation ultimately weakens consumption, investment, and long-term economic growth.”

Sri Lanka has already lost a large number of skilled professionals who migrated in droves in the last two years. Factum reports (April 2026) that the annual departures for foreign employment have hovered above the 310,000 mark. This includes Healthcare Professionals (Doctors, nurses), Academics and Researchers (including 80-90% of State University graduates), Technologists and Engineers.

Will the Lawyers be next? The Island editorial of 6 July 2026 strongly supports the stand that the BASL has taken, (endorsed by the Colombo Law Society, Colombo High Court Lawyers Association, LAWASIA and the Commonwealth Lawyers Association) opposing the government’s effort to move a constitutional amendment to extend the retirement age of judges of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal, denouncing political interference in the judiciary and urging the government to avoid a Zimbabwean crisis.

None of this makes for a happy citizen, stability notwithstanding.

By the People, for the Creditors

So, what of all those promises made with such passion to do better than all previous governments since Independence in 1948?

The World Food Programme has this to report:

* Households unable to meet essential food needs increased from 14 percent in 2024 to 20 percent in 2026.

* If price trends continue, another 1.3 million people could be unable to afford essential food needs, including nearly 300,000 urban poor.

* Child nutrition remains worrying: stunting 10.1 percent, wasting 8.6 percent, and underweight 16.1 percent. (WFP, Food Security Under Pressure)

Economists warn that a programme that ‘stabilises’ the economy while households sell assets, cut food, reduce education and health spending, and slide into coping strategies, i.e., de-stabilises the household economy and lives, will not be socially, politically or developmentally sustainable.

Those who care for the people recommend that Sri Lanka’s own programme must place adaptive social protection, nutrition, and livelihoods at the very centre.

The promised re-negotiation of the 17th IMF package to make the necessary economic recovery less taxing (pun intended) for the people, less painful, and more sustainable overall, never happened. The government acted as if it was elected by the People for the Creditors.

We have been warned that Sri Lanka’s shift toward commercial borrowing and ISBs changed the debt-risk profile, with ISBs carrying high interest rates and short maturities. The government’s promised negotiations didn’t resemble anything like what was expected by the people, and went the way of the ISB holders who celebrated the victory in Canary Wharf toasting our President in absentia.

IMF Country Report No 26/111 indicates that even after restructuring, debt sustainability risks remain high. Public debt is projected at around 100.1 percent of GDP in 2026, with central government gross financing needs at 19.8 percent of GDP.

Economists remind us that Sri Lanka’s recent graduation to the Upper Middle-Income classification means that we will have to pay more in debt repayments as per the macro-linked bond of the debt restructuring settlement with the creditors.

IMF 18, going on 19?

Who’d have thought it? In the last 77 years, the most pro-people, pro-poor administration has certainly not been the AKD government. There were much better ones, even during the 30 year war, when policies were more enlightened and served the people; were undertaken with confidence and determination, and some still continue to provide the foreign exchange to pay for subsequent errors of judgment. And with the courage of their convictions and confidence in their capacity to deliver, those leaders didn’t feel the need to postpone any elections.

Stabilisation was an immediate necessity. But my economist friend spoke for us all when she told me “Sri Lanka cannot stabilise its way to prosperity. It should not risk turning emergency discipline into a permanent development model”.

With the current state of play, is that what we are looking at? There is little evidence that this administration has the capacity to design an independent programme, not subject to the whims and fancies of IFIs, but as my friend put it, “our own programme: fiscally responsible, socially protective, production-oriented, climate-resilient, and politically owned. The IMF can support that programme, but it cannot be the programme.”

An unhappy people is surely as much of an indicator of the real health of the economy, as the Gross National Income per capita calculated in US dollars by the World Bank. A Sunday newspaper quoted a young economist, Rehana Thowfeek, co-founder/director at Arutha Research, who says: “There is no point in celebrating becoming an upper-middle-income country while 1 in 4 of our people is in poverty, two out of every 5 Sri Lankans cannot afford a healthy diet and 1 out of 3 of our children under 5 years is malnourished.”

This is not a situation that should be allowed to prevail by an allegedly pro-people government, or indeed any government that has been granted the privilege to govern, through the people’s vote. The planning, the policy choices are all in the hands of the government. Will they choose a better path?

People are not unhappy because they are too mean to acknowledge what a wonderful job this government is doing, and give praise to this administration like the IMF at the Presidential Secretariat. It is because they are in pain, they are suffering, they are hungry, they cannot pay the bills, and they are looking at a future where none of these things are going away, but is set to get much worse, as the government slouches towards its next IMF programme and the next debt repayment.