Features
A departure from the 1995 Age of Consent Legislation
Examining Sri Lanka’s New ‘Romeo and Juliet Law’:
By Prof. M.W. Amarasiri de Silva
According to an article published in The Island newspaper on March 25, 2024, Dr. Sudarshini Fernandopulle, MP, has raised concerns about the lack of consultation with the Women Parliamentarians’ Caucus before the Justice Ministry gazetted a bill on February 9, 2024. This bill aimed to amend Chapter 19 of the Penal Code, proposing a reduction in the age of consent for sexual intercourse to 14 years. Dr. Fernandopulle emphasised that this provision directly relates to the human rights of children, with a specific focus on girls. She highlighted the profound impact such legislation could have on their lives, including implications for health and individual identity. Therefore, she stressed the importance of a cautious and sensitive approach to safeguard children’s rights and well-being.
In light of this discussion, I wish to present the findings of a study I conducted for UNICEF in 2009, demonstrating how increasing the age of marriage to 16 years has significantly reduced instances of underage sexual activities such as rape and non-consensual sex. This research underscores the critical need for comprehensive measures to protect children, particularly in matters as crucial as the age of consent.
The General Marriage Ordinance of 1907 and the Kandyan Marriage and Divorce Act of 1952 permitted child marriages. Notably, most marriages in Sri Lanka were registered, including those of children before 1995. In 1995, significant amendments were made to both these laws, effectively removing the legal sanction for marriages under 18. The legal age of marriage was raised to 18 years. Notably, the law was interpreted to disallow parental consent for marriages of children under 18 years, establishing an absolute prohibition. These legal changes also impacted the Penal Code, raising the age of sexual consent from 12 to 16 years. This adjustment in the Penal Code has direct implications for the law on rape.
The concept of “statutory rape” in criminal law, which pertains to sexual intercourse with a minor below the age of 16, became legally recognized. It’s worth noting that these legal reforms did not affect the Muslim community, as their marriage system operates under the jurisdiction of Muslim law. While the Muslim Law Research Committee proposed raising the age of marriage within the Muslim community, this recommendation has yet to be implemented. However, within the Muslim community, the existing criminal law prohibits sexual intercourse with a child wife under 12 years of age. This provision is interpreted as a form of statutory marital rape, illustrating the complexities within the legal framework concerning marriage and sexual consent across different communities in Sri Lanka.
Early Child Marriages
Early (child) marriages, defined as those occurring before the age of 18, and instances of statutory rape involving individuals under 16 years of age, disproportionately affect young girls. When a case of child marriage is reported, the male partner often faces legal consequences. In many instances, he is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment, ranging from a minimum of 10 years to a maximum of 20 years.
Court decisions frequently direct the girls involved in such marriages to correctional institutes like the Girl’s Home in Ranmuthugala. They undergo a reform and rehabilitation program typically lasting three years or less. After completing the program, they are returned home under the supervision of the Probation Officer from the respective Probation Division. This process aims to support and guide the girls as they reintegrate into society after their challenging experiences.
In cases of statutory rape, the girl in question undergoes examination by the respective Judicial Medical Officer (JMO), who then initiates a correctional program tailored to the girl’s needs. Additionally, the JMO provides crucial evidence for legal action against the perpetrators. According to the Penal Code, any instance of vaginal intercourse with a girl under 16 years old, regardless of whether it occurred within the context of a consensual marriage, romantic relationship, or otherwise, constitutes rape. Perpetrators are thereby subject to prosecution and may face rigorous imprisonment, with a minimum sentence of ten years and a maximum of 20 years.
A 2009 study revealed a significant decrease in registered marriages involving individuals under 18 years old in Sri Lanka between 1994 and 2003. This decline has been particularly pronounced following the amendment of marriage laws in 1995, which raised the legal age of marriage to 18 years. The data indicates a substantial drop from approximately 6,000 male and female individuals marrying before turning 18 in 1996 to only around 1,000 in 2003. This decline can be attributed to the legislative changes implemented in 1995 and is evident across all ethnic groups except the Muslim community.
Concerning Trend
The evidence presented in this report indicates a concerning upward trend in the incidence of early marriages and statutory rape. There are indications that these practices are on the rise, particularly in less developed districts and Divisional Secretariat divisions, areas affected by conflict, specific ethnic communities, the estate sector, and impoverished regions. Data from various agencies, including safe houses and Certified Schools for female children, suggests that the percentage of girls entering these institutions who have experienced statutory rape and consensual marriages is increasing. It’s crucial for lawmakers to consider the full spectrum of implications when drafting new legislation, especially when it concerns sensitive issues like the age of consent.
While reducing court cases of underage sex and rape may be an intended outcome of such a law, it’s equally important to weigh the potential social, psychological, and physiological consequences.
Here are some key considerations that lawmakers should take into account:
1. Social Implications: Lowering the age of consent may shift societal norms and attitudes toward sexual behaviour among adolescents. This could lead to changes in how young people perceive relationships, intimacy, and consent, potentially influencing their behaviour in ways that may not align with their emotional or cognitive maturity.
2. Psychological Implications: Adolescents may face increased pressure to engage in sexual activities before they are emotionally or mentally ready, leading to negative psychological consequences such as trauma, regret, or confusion. Additionally, lowering the age of consent may blur boundaries between age groups, potentially exposing younger individuals to situations they are ill-prepared to handle.
3. Physiological Implications: Adolescents undergo significant physical and hormonal changes during puberty, but these changes do not necessarily correspond to the development of emotional or cognitive maturity. Lowering the age of consent without considering these differences could increase the risk of exploitation or harm to individuals who are not fully equipped to make informed decisions about their sexual health.
4. Legal Safeguards: While reducing court cases related to underage sex and rape is a valid concern, it’s important to ensure that legal safeguards are in place to protect individuals from coercion, manipulation, or abuse. This includes robust education on consent, comprehensive sex education programs, and adequate support systems for victims of sexual violence.
UN Convention
Overall, any proposed changes to the age of consent should be accompanied by thorough research, consultation with experts in fields such as psychology, sociology, and public health, and a comprehensive understanding of the potential consequences for individuals and society as a whole. Balancing legal objectives with ethical considerations is essential in crafting legislation that promotes the well-being and safety of all individuals, particularly vulnerable populations such as adolescents.
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child defines a child as any individual below the age of 18 years. Consequently, any form of sexual activity involving those under 18 years old can logically be categorized as child abuse or rape. The legal age of consent for engaging in sexual intercourse varies from one country to another. In the United States, it ranges from 16 to 18 years of age, with California setting it at 18 years.
In India, the age of consent is established at 18 years according to the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act. Before the enactment of the POCSO Act in 2012, there was no distinct age of consent defined for males, and it was determined by Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code, which outlines the definition of “rape.” The Law Commission of India advised against altering the age of consent from 18 years, noting that this age has fluctuated significantly in Indian legal history.
Initially set at ten years in 1860, it was raised to 16 years for females until 2012. The decision to increase the age of consent for females in India was informed by tragic events such as the Phulmoni case. In 1860, the age of consent for females was a mere ten years. However, following public outrage sparked by the Phulmoni case in 1891, where an 11-year-old girl died due to injuries sustained during forced sexual intercourse by her husband, the age of consent for women was raised to 12 years under Section 375. Despite the severity of the crime, the husband was convicted only of causing grievous hurt by a rash or negligent act endangering life, and he received a sentence of one year’s rigorous imprisonment. Thereafter, the age of consent was raised to 14 years in 1925 and to 16 years in 1940.
Enactment of POCSO
Before the enactment of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act in 2012, the age of consent for females in India stood at 16 years, while there was no specific age of consent defined for males. Over time, amendments to the marital rape exception outlined in Section 375 of the law have occurred. This exception has evolved from setting the age at ten years in 1860 to 15 years by 2012.
Sri Lanka is considering lowering the age of consent for sexual intercourse to 14 years. This proposed statutory change raises concerns about potential significant negative consequences. While there has been some debate on the matter, it is widely acknowledged that establishing a minimum age limit for sexual consent is crucial. It is essential to recognize that children under the age of 14 lack both the cognitive development and emotional maturity necessary to make informed decisions about their sexual behaviour.
Lowering the legal age of sexual consent would result in the decriminalisation of a significant number of underage individuals engaging in sexual intercourse. The arguments against such a legal amendment are summarized and demonstrated to lack validity. This proposal is not merely contrary to popular opinion but is widely viewed as absurd. In 2013, when Professor John Ashton, then President of the Faculty of Public Health, Royal Colleges of Physicians, Liverpool, England, suggested reducing the age of consent from 16 years to 15 or 14 years, the proposal was promptly rejected by representatives from both the government and the opposition. Even Prime Minister David Cameron referred to the suggestion as “offensive.”
There are numerous compelling arguments against such a change. This proposal could have far-reaching implications for other areas where the rights of young people are unfairly restricted. Across all jurisdictions in the UK, the existing laws dictate that the age of consent for any form of sexual activity is 16 years for both males and females, regardless of their sexual orientation or the gender of their partner(s).
In the United States, engaging in sexual activity with a person under the age of 16 is considered an offense. However, Home Office guidance in the USA clarifies that there is no intention to prosecute teenagers under 16 if both parties consent and are of similar ages. Additionally, it is unlawful for an individual aged 18 or older to engage in sexual activity with a person under 18 if the older person holds a position of trust, such as a teacher or social worker, as such conduct constitutes an abuse of trust. There is no evidence to suggest that the legal minimum age of sexual consent in a country correlates with the sexual behavior of young people.
A change in the law is often argued to potentially lead to an increase in younger children engaging in inappropriate sexual activity. However, there is a notable lack of evidence supporting this claim. Much of the available evidence suggests that the current legal framework has minimal impact on the sexual behavior of young individuals. For instance, data collected between 2010 and 2012 indicates that 31% of British males and 29% of British females had experienced full sexual intercourse before reaching the age of 16. Comparatively, fifty years earlier, only 15% of males and 4% of females reported engaging in sexual intercourse before this age. Remarkably, there had been no alteration in the law concerning heterosexual intercourse during this time period. Furthermore, a study examining the reasons for sexual abstinence among American school students found that the law was not commonly cited as a factor influencing their decision to abstain from sexual activity.
Young people aged 14 years typically lack the cognitive maturity necessary to assess the risks associated with engaging in sexual activity. There is substantial evidence suggesting that 14-year-olds does not possess the cognitive capacity to evaluate risks and benefits, comparable to individuals aged 21. Furthermore, concerns regarding emotional maturity are often raised, supported by neuroscientific findings indicating significant changes in the adolescent brain throughout the teenage years and beyond. Research highlights the differential development of subcortical limbic systems relative to top-down control systems during adolescence, suggesting that teenagers may not be physiologically equipped to make decisions regarding risk-taking.
Despite these findings, relying solely on indirect evidence may be imprudent, especially when more directly relevant studies indicate that the inexperience of youth rather than biological limitations contributes to their vulnerability in risky situations.
The prevalence of sexually transmitted infections and teenage pregnancies among 15–17-year-olds remains substantial. Additionally, many young people, particularly girls, report distressing sexual experiences, with a significant number regretting their first sexual encounter. Most important is to facilitate the provision of appropriate sex education to children and adolescents, enabling them to make informed decisions. Furthermore, it would ease the delivery of sexual health services to this age group, alleviating concerns about inadvertently supporting illegal activity.
It will not escape the notice of the discerning reader that the principles and evidence presented here extend beyond the realm of sexual consent to various other areas where the legal standing of minors is debatable. Sri Lanka needs research into adolescent sexuality before setting up age of consent for sexual inter course. We do not know what percentage of children under 14 and 16 years of age are involved in sexual activity. What percentage of teenagers get pregnant, and subject to rape and sexual misconduct. A study conducted on early marriage in the Batticaloa District shows that the amendments to the marriage law in 1995 that increased the age of marriage to 18 years has actually reduced the incidence of registered marriages in all categories of persons, except the Muslims who were not covered under the new law. It has actually reduced the incidence of teenage pregnancies and rapes.
Due to lack of data, which is a result of poor data collection procedures and
coordination among service providers in Sri Lanka it is hard to comment on the prevalence or patterns of early marriages, statutory rape or teenage sexual activity. The 2009 study based on data available with safe houses and certified schools finds that statutory rape is increasing in the country, particularly in the rural sectors and less developed districts, despite the increase of age of consent to 16 years in 1995 amendments to the law.
There is a significant shortage of data regarding the prevalence and patterns of early marriages and statutory rape in Sri Lanka. Specifically, there is a lack of information concerning the demographics involved, such as ethnicity, age, geographical distribution, and socioeconomic status of families. Furthermore, there is a notable absence of research on the psychological and health impacts, as well as the effects on education and human rights, associated with early marriage and rape.
Moreover, there is a notable absence of studies or data shedding light on the factors contributing to the high rates of early marriages and rape in communities experiencing significant stress, residing in impoverished areas, or belonging to specific ethnic enclaves. At the national level, marriage data are not categorized to distinguish early marriages involving individuals under 18.
Despite the prevalence of issues such as teenage pregnancies, suicides among young individuals, and early onset of menstruation in these populations, there has been insufficient investigation into the interconnections between these issues in the context of Sri Lanka.
In summary, the complexities of setting the age of sexual consent highlight larger questions regarding the rights and obligations of minors within society. Through a commitment to evidence-based strategies and an understanding of adolescent development, policymakers can work towards establishing a legal structure that prioritizes the well-being and rights of young people. It’s important to emphasize that decisions regarding the age of consent should not be solely influenced by the frequency of court cases involving teenage sexual behavior, nor should they be swayed by political expediency. Any alterations to this law should be grounded in careful consideration of its societal implications and the protection of vulnerable individuals, rather than serving as a tool for political maneuvering.
Features
Theocratic Iran facing unprecedented challenge
The world is having the evidence of its eyes all over again that ‘economics drives politics’ and this time around the proof is coming from theocratic Iran. Iranians in their tens of thousands are on the country’s streets calling for a regime change right now but it is all too plain that the wellsprings of the unprecedented revolt against the state are economic in nature. It is widespread financial hardship and currency depreciation, for example, that triggered the uprising in the first place.
However, there is no denying that Iran’s current movement for drastic political change has within its fold multiple other forces, besides the economically affected, that are urging a comprehensive transformation as it were of the country’s political system to enable the equitable empowerment of the people. For example, the call has been gaining ground with increasing intensity over the weeks that the country’s number one theocratic ruler, President Ali Khamenei, steps down from power.
That is, the validity and continuation of theocratic rule is coming to be questioned unprecedentedly and with increasing audibility and boldness by the public. Besides, there is apparently fierce opposition to the concentration of political power at the pinnacle of the Iranian power structure.
Popular revolts have been breaking out every now and then of course in Iran over the years, but the current protest is remarkable for its social diversity and the numbers it has been attracting over the past few weeks. It could be described as a popular revolt in the genuine sense of the phrase. Not to be also forgotten is the number of casualties claimed by the unrest, which stands at some 2000.
Of considerable note is the fact that many Iranian youths have been killed in the revolt. It points to the fact that youth disaffection against the state has been on the rise as well and could be at boiling point. From the viewpoint of future democratic development in Iran, this trend needs to be seen as positive.
Politically-conscious youngsters prioritize self-expression among other fundamental human rights and stifling their channels of self-expression, for example, by shutting down Internet communication links, would be tantamount to suppressing youth aspirations with a heavy hand. It should come as no surprise that they are protesting strongly against the state as well.
Another notable phenomenon is the increasing disaffection among sections of Iran’s women. They too are on the streets in defiance of the authorities. A turning point in this regard was the death of Mahsa Amini in 2022, which apparently befell her all because she defied state orders to be dressed in the Hijab. On that occasion as well, the event brought protesters in considerable numbers onto the streets of Tehran and other cities.
Once again, from the viewpoint of democratic development the increasing participation of Iranian women in popular revolts should be considered thought-provoking. It points to a heightening political consciousness among Iranian women which may not be easy to suppress going forward. It could also mean that paternalism and its related practices and social forms may need to be re-assessed by the authorities.
It is entirely a matter for the Iranian people to address the above questions, the neglect of which could prove counter-productive for them, but it is all too clear that a relaxing of authoritarian control over the state and society would win favour among a considerable section of the populace.
However, it is far too early to conclude that Iran is at risk of imploding. This should be seen as quite a distance away in consideration of the fact that the Iranian government is continuing to possess its coercive power. Unless the country’s law enforcement authorities turn against the state as well this coercive capability will remain with Iran’s theocratic rulers and the latter will be in a position to quash popular revolts and continue in power. But the ruling authorities could not afford the luxury of presuming that all will be well at home, going into the future.
Meanwhile US President Donald Trump has assured the Iranian people of his assistance but it is not clear as to what form such support would take and when it would be delivered. The most important way in which the Trump administration could help the Iranian people is by helping in the process of empowering them equitably and this could be primarily achieved only by democratizing the Iranian state.
It is difficult to see the US doing this to even a minor measure under President Trump. This is because the latter’s principal preoccupation is to make the ‘US Great Once again’, and little else. To achieve the latter, the US will be doing battle with its international rivals to climb to the pinnacle of the international political system as the unchallengeable principal power in every conceivable respect.
That is, Realpolitik considerations would be the main ‘stuff and substance’ of US foreign policy with a corresponding downplaying of things that matter for a major democratic power, including the promotion of worldwide democratic development and the rendering of humanitarian assistance where it is most needed. The US’ increasing disengagement from UN development agencies alone proves the latter.
Given the above foreign policy proclivities it is highly unlikely that the Iranian people would be assisted in any substantive way by the Trump administration. On the other hand, the possibility of US military strikes on Iranian military targets in the days ahead cannot be ruled out.
The latter interventions would be seen as necessary by the US to keep the Middle Eastern military balance in favour of Israel. Consequently, any US-initiated peace moves in the real sense of the phrase in the Middle East would need to be ruled out in the foreseeable future. In other words, Middle East peace will remain elusive.
Interestingly, the leadership moves the Trump administration is hoping to make in Venezuela, post-Maduro, reflect glaringly on its foreign policy preoccupations. Apparently, Trump will be preferring to ‘work with’ Delcy Rodriguez, acting President of Venezuela, rather than Maria Corina Machado, the principal opponent of Nicolas Maduro, who helped sustain the opposition to Maduro in the lead-up to the latter’s ouster and clearly the democratic candidate for the position of Venezuelan President.
The latter development could be considered a downgrading of the democratic process and a virtual ‘slap in its face’. While the democratic rights of the Venezuelan people will go disregarded by the US, a comparative ‘strong woman’ will receive the Trump administration’s blessings. She will perhaps be groomed by Trump to protect the US’s security and economic interests in South America, while his administration side-steps the promotion of the democratic empowerment of Venezuelans.
Features
Silk City: A blueprint for municipal-led economic transformation in Sri Lanka
Maharagama today stands at a crossroads. With the emergence of new political leadership, growing public expectations, and the convergence of professional goodwill, the Maharagama Municipal Council (MMC) has been presented with a rare opportunity to redefine the city’s future. At the heart of this moment lies the Silk City (Seda Nagaraya) Initiative (SNI)—a bold yet pragmatic development blueprint designed to transform Maharagama into a modern, vibrant, and economically dynamic urban hub.
This is not merely another urban development proposal. Silk City is a strategic springboard—a comprehensive economic and cultural vision that seeks to reposition Maharagama as Sri Lanka’s foremost textile-driven commercial city, while enhancing livability, employment, and urban dignity for its residents. The Silk City concept represents more than a development plan: it is a comprehensive economic blueprint designed to redefine Maharagama as Sri Lanka’s foremost textile-driven commercial and cultural hub.
A Vision Rooted in Reality
What makes the Silk City Initiative stand apart is its grounding in economic realism. Carefully designed around the geographical, commercial, and social realities of Maharagama, the concept builds on the city’s long-established strengths—particularly its dominance as a textile and retail centre—while addressing modern urban challenges.
The timing could not be more critical. With Mayor Saman Samarakoon assuming leadership at a moment of heightened political goodwill and public anticipation, MMC is uniquely positioned to embark on a transformation of unprecedented scale. Leadership, legitimacy, and opportunity have aligned—a combination that cities rarely experience.
A Voluntary Gift of National Value
In an exceptional and commendable development, the Maharagama Municipal Council has received—entirely free of charge—a comprehensive development proposal titled “Silk City – Seda Nagaraya.” Authored by Deshamanya, Deshashkthi J. M. C. Jayasekera, a distinguished Chartered Accountant and Chairman of the JMC Management Institute, the proposal reflects meticulous research, professional depth, and long-term strategic thinking.
It must be added here that this silk city project has received the political blessings of the Parliamentarians who represented the Maharagama electorate. They are none other than Sunil Kumara Gamage, Minister of Sports and Youth Affairs, Sunil Watagala, Deputy Minister of Public Security and Devananda Suraweera, Member of Parliament.
The blueprint outlines ten integrated sectoral projects, including : A modern city vision, Tourism and cultural city development, Clean and green city initiatives, Religious and ethical city concepts, Garden city aesthetics, Public safety and beautification, Textile and creative industries as the economic core
Together, these elements form a five-year transformation agenda, capable of elevating Maharagama into a model municipal economy and a 24-hour urban hub within the Colombo Metropolitan Region
Why Maharagama, Why Now?
Maharagama’s transformation is not an abstract ambition—it is a logical evolution. Strategically located and commercially vibrant, the city already attracts thousands of shoppers daily. With structured investment, branding, and infrastructure support, Maharagama can evolve into a sleepless commercial destination, a cultural and tourism node, and a magnet for both local and international consumers.
Such a transformation aligns seamlessly with modern urban development models promoted by international development agencies—models that prioritise productivity, employment creation, poverty reduction, and improved quality of life.
Rationale for Transformation
Maharagama has long held a strategic advantage as one of Sri Lanka’s textile and retail centers. With proper planning and investment, this identity can be leveraged to convert the city into a branded urban destination, a sleepless commercial hub, a tourism and cultural attraction, and a vibrant economic engine within the Colombo Metropolitan Region. Such transformation is consistent with modern city development models promoted by international funding agencies that seek to raise local productivity, employment, quality of life, alleviation of urban poverty, attraction and retaining a huge customer base both local and international to the city)
Current Opportunity
The convergence of the following factors make this moment and climate especially critical. Among them the new political leadership with strong public support, availability of a professionally developed concept paper, growing public demand for modernisation, interest among public, private, business community and civil society leaders to contribute, possibility of leveraging traditional strengths (textile industry and commercial vibrancy are notable strengths.
The Silk City initiative therefore represents a timely and strategic window for Maharagama to secure national attention, donor interest and investor confidence.
A Window That Must Not Be Missed
Several factors make this moment decisive: Strong new political leadership with public mandate, Availability of a professionally developed concept, Rising citizen demand for modernization, Willingness of professionals, businesses, and civil society to contribute. The city’s established textile and commercial base
Taken together, these conditions create a strategic window to attract national attention, donor interest, and investor confidence.
But windows close.
Hard Truths: Challenges That Must Be Addressed
Ambition alone will not deliver transformation. The Silk City Initiative demands honest recognition of institutional constraints. MMC currently faces: Limited technical and project management capacity, rigid public-sector regulatory frameworks that slow procurement and partnerships, severe financial limitations, with internal revenues insufficient even for routine operations, the absence of a fully formalised, high-caliber Steering Committee.
Moreover, this is a mega urban project, requiring feasibility studies, impact assessments, bankable proposals, international partnerships, and sustained political and community backing.
A Strategic Roadmap for Leadership
For Mayor Saman Samarakoon, this represents a once-in-a-generation leadership moment. Key strategic actions are essential: 1.Immediate establishment of a credible Steering Committee, drawing expertise from government, private sector, academia, and civil society. 2. Creation of a dedicated Project Management Unit (PMU) with professional specialists. 3. Aggressive mobilisation of external funding, including central government support, international donors, bilateral partners, development banks, and corporate CSR initiatives. 4. Strategic political engagement to secure legitimacy and national backing. 5. Quick-win projects to build public confidence and momentum. 6. A structured communications strategy to brand and promote Silk City nationally and internationally. Firm positioning of textiles and creative industries as the heart of Maharagama’s economic identity
If successfully implemented, Silk City will not only redefine Maharagama’s future but also ensure that the names of those who led this transformation are etched permanently in the civic history of the city.
Voluntary Gift of National Value
Maharagama is intrinsically intertwined with the textile industry. Small scale and domestic textile industry play a pivotal role. Textile industry generates a couple of billion of rupees to the Maharagama City per annum. It is the one and only city that has a sleepless night and this textile hub provides ready-made garments to the entire country. Prices are comparatively cheaper. If this textile industry can be vertically and horizontally developed, a substantial income can be generated thus providing employment to vulnerable segments of employees who are mostly women. Paucity of textile technology and capital investment impede the growth of the industry. If Maharagama can collaborate with the Bombay of India textile industry, there would be an unbelievable transition. How Sri Lanka could pursue this goal. A blueprint for the development of the textile industry for the Maharagama City will be dealt with in a separate article due to time space.
It is achievable if the right structures, leadership commitments and partnerships are put in place without delay.
No municipal council in recent memory has been presented with such a pragmatic, forward-thinking and well-timed proposal. Likewise, few Mayors will ever be positioned as you are today — with the ability to initiate a transformation that will redefine the future of Maharagama for generations. It will not be a difficult task for Saman Samarakoon, Mayor of the MMC to accomplish the onerous tasks contained in the projects, with the acumen and experience he gained from his illustrious as a Commander of the SL Navy with the support of the councilors, Municipal staff and the members of the Parliamentarians and the committed team of the Silk-City Project.
Voluntary Gift of National Value
Maharagama is intrinsically intertwined with the textile industry. The textile industries play a pivotal role. This textile hub provides ready-made garments to the entire country. Prices are comparatively cheaper. If this textile industry can be vertically and horizontally developed, a substantial income can be generated thus providing employment to vulnerable segments of employees who are mostly women.
Paucity of textile technology and capital investment impede the growth of the industry. If Maharagama can collaborate with the Bombay of India textile industry, there would be an unbelievable transition. A blueprint for the development of the textile industry for the Maharagama City will be dealt with in a separate article.
J.A.A.S Ranasinghe
Productivity Specialist and Management Consultant
(The writer can becontacted via Email:rathula49@gmail.com)
Features
Reading our unfinished economic story through Bandula Gunawardena’s ‘IMF Prakeerna Visadum’
Book Review
Why Sri Lanka’s Return to the IMF Demands Deeper Reflection
By mid-2022, the term “economic crisis” ceased to be an abstract concept for most Sri Lankans. It was no longer confined to academic papers, policy briefings, or statistical tables. Instead, it became a lived and deeply personal experience. Fuel queues stretched for kilometres under the burning sun. Cooking gas vanished from household shelves. Essential medicines became difficult—sometimes impossible—to find. Food prices rose relentlessly, pushing basic nutrition beyond the reach of many families, while real incomes steadily eroded.
What had long existed as graphs, ratios, and warning signals in economic reports suddenly entered daily life with unforgiving force. The crisis was no longer something discussed on television panels or debated in Parliament; it was something felt at the kitchen table, at the bus stop, and in hospital corridors.
Amid this social and economic turmoil came another announcement—less dramatic in appearance, but far more consequential in its implications. Sri Lanka would once again seek assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
The announcement immediately divided public opinion. For some, the IMF represented an unavoidable lifeline—a last resort to stabilise a collapsing economy. For others, it symbolised a loss of economic sovereignty and a painful surrender to external control. Emotions ran high. Debates became polarised. Public discourse quickly hardened into slogans, accusations, and ideological posturing.
Yet beneath the noise, anger, and fear lay a more fundamental question—one that demanded calm reflection rather than emotional reaction:
Why did Sri Lanka have to return to the IMF at all?
This question does not lend itself to simple or comforting answers. It cannot be explained by a single policy mistake, a single government, or a single external shock. Instead, it requires an honest examination of decades of economic decision-making, institutional weaknesses, policy inconsistency, and political avoidance. It requires looking beyond the immediate crisis and asking how Sri Lanka repeatedly reached a point where IMF assistance became the only viable option.
Few recent works attempt this difficult task as seriously and thoughtfully as Dr. Bandula Gunawardena’s IMF Prakeerna Visadum. Rather than offering slogans or seeking easy culprits, the book situates Sri Lanka’s IMF engagement within a broader historical and structural narrative. In doing so, it shifts the debate away from blame and toward understanding—a necessary first step if the country is to ensure that this crisis does not become yet another chapter in a familiar and painful cycle.
Returning to the IMF: Accident or Inevitability?
The central argument of IMF Prakeerna Visadum is at once simple and deeply unsettling. It challenges a comforting narrative that has gained popularity in times of crisis and replaces it with a far more demanding truth:
Sri Lanka’s economic crisis was not created by the IMF.
IMF intervention became inevitable because Sri Lanka avoided structural reform for far too long.
This framing fundamentally alters the terms of the national debate. It shifts attention away from external blame and towards internal responsibility. Instead of asking whether the IMF is good or bad, Dr. Gunawardena asks a more difficult and more important question: what kind of economy repeatedly drives itself to a point where IMF assistance becomes unavoidable?
The book refuses the two easy positions that dominate public discussion. It neither defends the IMF uncritically as a benevolent saviour nor demonises it as the architect of Sri Lanka’s suffering. Instead, IMF intervention is placed within a broader historical and structural context—one shaped primarily by domestic policy choices, institutional weaknesses, and political avoidance.
Public discourse often portrays IMF programmes as the starting point of economic hardship. Dr. Gunawardena corrects this misconception by restoring the correct chronology—an essential step for any honest assessment of the crisis.
The IMF did not arrive at the beginning of Sri Lanka’s collapse.
It arrived after the collapse had already begun.
By the time negotiations commenced, Sri Lanka had exhausted its foreign exchange reserves, lost access to international capital markets, officially defaulted on its external debt, and entered a phase of runaway inflation and acute shortages.
Fuel queues, shortages of essential medicines, and scarcities of basic food items were not the product of IMF conditionality. They were the direct outcome of prolonged foreign-exchange depletion combined with years of policy mismanagement. Import restrictions were imposed not because the IMF demanded them, but because the country simply could not pay its bills.
From this perspective, the IMF programme did not introduce austerity into a functioning economy. It formalised an adjustment that had already become unavoidable. The economy was already contracting, consumption was already constrained, and living standards were already falling. The IMF framework sought to impose order, sequencing, and credibility on a collapse that was already under way.
Seen through this lens, the return to the IMF was not a freely chosen policy option, but the end result of years of postponed decisions and missed opportunities.
A Long IMF Relationship, Short National Memory
Sri Lanka’s engagement with the IMF is neither new nor exceptional. For decades, governments of all political persuasions have turned to the Fund whenever balance-of-payments pressures became acute. Each engagement was presented as a temporary rescue—an extraordinary response to an unusual storm.
Yet, as Dr. Gunawardena meticulously documents, the storms were not unusual. What was striking was not the frequency of crises, but the remarkable consistency of their underlying causes.
Fiscal indiscipline persisted even during periods of growth. Government revenue remained structurally weak. Public debt expanded rapidly, often financing recurrent expenditure rather than productive investment. Meanwhile, the external sector failed to generate sufficient foreign exchange to sustain a consumption-led growth model.
IMF programmes brought temporary stability. Inflation eased. Reserves stabilised. Growth resumed. But once external pressure diminished, reform momentum faded. Political priorities shifted. Structural weaknesses quietly re-emerged.
This recurring pattern—crisis, adjustment, partial compliance, and relapse—became a defining feature of Sri Lanka’s economic management. The most recent crisis differed only in scale. This time, there was no room left to postpone adjustment.
Fiscal Fragility: The Core of the Crisis
A central focus of IMF Prakeerna Visadum is Sri Lanka’s chronically weak fiscal structure. Despite relatively strong social indicators and a capable administrative state, government revenue as a share of GDP remained exceptionally low.
Frequent tax changes, politically motivated exemptions, and weak enforcement steadily eroded the tax base. Instead of building a stable revenue system, governments relied increasingly on borrowing—both domestic and external.
Much of this borrowing financed subsidies, transfers, and public sector wages rather than productivity-enhancing investment. Over time, debt servicing crowded out development spending, shrinking fiscal space.
Fiscal reform failed not because it was technically impossible, Dr. Gunawardena argues, but because it was politically inconvenient. The costs were immediate and visible; the benefits long-term and diffuse. The eventual debt default was therefore not a surprise, but a delayed consequence.
The External Sector Trap
Sri Lanka’s narrow export base—apparel, tea, tourism, and remittances—generated foreign exchange but masked deeper weaknesses. Export diversification stagnated. Industrial upgrading lagged. Integration into global value chains remained limited.
Meanwhile, import-intensive consumption expanded. When external shocks arrived—global crises, pandemics, commodity price spikes—the economy had little resilience.
Exchange-rate flexibility alone cannot generate exports. Trade liberalisation without an industrial strategy redistributes pain rather than creates growth.
Monetary Policy and the Cost of Lost Credibility
Prolonged monetary accommodation, often driven by political pressure, fuelled inflation, depleted reserves, and eroded confidence. Once credibility was lost, restoring it required painful adjustment.
Macroeconomic credibility, Dr. Gunawardena reminds us, is a national asset. Once squandered, it is extraordinarily expensive to rebuild.
IMF Conditionality: Stabilisation Without Development?
IMF programmes stabilise economies, but they do not automatically deliver inclusive growth. In Sri Lanka, adjustment raised living costs and reduced real incomes. Social safety nets expanded, but gaps persisted.
This raises a critical question: can stabilisation succeed politically if it fails socially?
Political Economy: The Missing Middle
Reforms collided repeatedly with electoral incentives and patronage networks. IMF programmes exposed contradictions but could not resolve them. Without domestic ownership, reform risks becoming compliance rather than transformation.
Beyond Blame: A Diagnostic Moment
The book’s greatest strength lies in its refusal to engage in blame politics. IMF intervention is treated as a diagnostic signal, not a cause—a warning light illuminating unresolved structural failures.
The real challenge is not exiting an IMF programme, but exiting the cycle that makes IMF programmes inevitable.
A Strong Public Appeal: Why This Book Must Be Read
This is not an anti-IMF book.
It is not a pro-IMF book.
It is a pro-Sri Lanka book.
Published by Sarasaviya Publishers, IMF Prakeerna Visadum equips readers not with anger, but with clarity—offering history, evidence, and honest reflection when the country needs them most.
Conclusion: Will We Learn This Time?
The IMF can stabilise an economy.
It cannot build institutions.
It cannot create competitiveness.
It cannot deliver inclusive development.
Those responsibilities remain domestic.
The question before Sri Lanka is simple but profound:
Will we repeat the cycle, or finally learn the lesson?
The answer does not lie in Washington.
It lies with us.
By Professor Ranjith Bandara
Emeritus Professor, University of Colombo
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