Features
Long-term generation expansion plan – Legal barrier against implementing the Electricity Act
By Dr. Janaka Ratnasiri and Eng. Parakrama Jayasinghe
A retired Professor of Electrical Engineering has claimed that “the CEB’s long-term generation expansion (LTGE) plan is the best strategy for this country to follow at this time, which is revised once or twice a year” in a write up appearing in The Island of 03.09.2020. Obviously, the learned Professor does not seem to be familiar with the CEB plan because it is not revised once or twice a year but only once in two or three years. Nor has he studied the proposals made by the CEB in relation to the current developments in the energy sector worldwide. The LTGE Plan has some importance for Sri Lanka because compliance with it has been made mandatory for capacity addition both in the Act as well as in the Power Ministry mandate.
SRI LANKA ELECTRICITY (AMENDMENT) ACT NO. 31 OF 2013
This Act, which is an amendment to the Sri Lanka Electricity Act No. 20 of 2009, governs the addition of any new power plants or expansion of existing power plants in Sri Lanka. This amendment to the Act requires that such addition of generation capacity needs to comply with the CEB’s LTGE Plan which has received the prior approval of the Public Utilities Commission of Sri Lanka (PUCSL). There are six instances in the Act where reference has been made to the CEB’s LTGE Plan making it mandatory that any new capacity addition or expansion has to meet the requirements specified in the CEB Plan.
Some extracts of sections of the Act where reference has been made to the LTGE Plan are given below.
“A transmission licensee shall, based on the future demand forecast as specified in the Least Cost Long Term Generation Expansion Plan prepared by such licensee and as amended after considering the submissions of the distribution and generation licensees and approved by the Commission, submit proposals to proceed with the procuring of any new generation plant or for the expansion of the generation capacity of an existing plant, to the Commission for its written approval”.
“Upon obtaining the approval of the Commission under subsection (2), the transmission licensee shall in accordance with the conditions of its transmission licence and in compliance with any rules that may be made by the Commission relating to procurement, call for tenders by notice published in the Gazette, to develop a new generation plant or to expand the generation capacity of an existing generation plant, as the case may be, as shall be specified in the notice”
“Upon the close of the tender, the transmission licensee shall through a properly constituted tender board, recommend to the Commission for its approval, the person who is best capable of meeting the requirements of the Least Cost Long Term Generation Expansion Plan of the transmission licensee duly approved by the Commission”, among others.
“The Commission shall be required on receipt of any recommendations of the transmission licensee, to grant its approval at its earliest convenience, where the Commission is satisfied that the recommended price for the purchase of electrical energy or electricity generating capacity meets the principle of least cost and the requirements of the Least Cost Long Term Generation Expansion Plan and that the terms and conditions of such purchase is within the accepted technical and economical parameters of the transmission licensee”.
“For the purpose of this section- “Least Cost Long Term Generation Expansion Plan” means a plan prepared by the transmission licensee and amended and approved by the Commission on the basis of the submissions made by the licensees and published by the Commission, indicating the future electricity generating capacity requirements determined on the basis of least economic cost and meeting the technical and reliability requirements of the electricity network of Sri Lanka which is duly approved by the Commission and published in the Gazette from time to time”.
MINISTRY OF POWER MANDATE
The recently established Ministry of Power has stipulated as a key mandate of the Power Ministry the following:
Meeting the electricity needs of all urban and rural communities based on the long-term generation expansion (LTGE) plan prepared by the Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB).
Among the special priority areas identified for the Power Ministry is the Implementation of the long-term generation expansion plan.
LONG-TERM GENERATION
EXPANSION PLAN
Since the Electricity Act as well as the Ministry of Power mandate require that the generation capacity addition needs to be carried out meeting the requirements of the LTGE Plan, it is necessary to examine closely what this plan is. The CEB prepares a long-term generation expansion (LTGE) plan once in two or three years outlining the least cost options of generation plants that need to be added to the system annually for the next 20 years to meet the forecasted demand. The latest plan is in respect of the period 2020 – 2039 but it is still in the draft form yet to be approved by the PUCSL as required by the Sri Lanka Electricity Act No. 31 of 2013. As such the LTGP in effect is the 2018-2037 plan which has received the written approval of the PUCSL.
Being a rolling plan updated once in two or three years, the types and capacities to be added in a given period keeps changing with the plan. Hence, a potential developer is at a loss to know which plan to follow in planning a future power plant development project. This becomes clear when the capacities recommended to be added in the three recent plans covering the periods 2015-34, 2018-37 and 2020-39 (Draft) given in Table 1 are examined. For simplicity, only the additions of large thermal power plant capacities are included in the Table.
It is seen that the 2015-34 Plan has included only coal power plants amounting to 3,200 MW up to 2034. The 2018-37 Plan, on the other hand, has included addition of 2,700 MW of coal power plants together with 1,500 MW of natural gas (NG) power plants, up to 2036. Whereas the 2020-39 Plan (Draft) has included addition of 2,100 MW of coal power plants together with 3,000 MW of NG power plants up to 2039. When the capital cost of power plants and fuel costs keep varying year to year, it is impossible to forecast accurately 20 years earlier what the cheaper option would be in 20 years hence.
ISSUES IN IMPLEMENTING
THE CEB PLAN
If the CEB Plan was implemented in 2016, by 2025, coal power of capacity 1,400 MW, including the proposed coal power plant at Sampur, needs to be built according to 2015-34 Plan. However, according to the 2018-37 Plan, 3×300 MW of coal power plants, together with 2×300 NG power plants, need to be built by 2025. On the other hand, according to the 2020-39 draft Plan, 3×300 MW of coal power plants together with 4×300 MW of NG power plants need to be built by 2025. When a plan keeps changing in this manner with so much divergent recommendations, it cannot be called a long-term plan. There is no unique recommendation for a given period for an investor to pursue. If the 2015-34 Plan decided that coal power plants are the cheap option up to 2025, how is that the 2018-37 Plan decided that NG power plants are the cheaper option for this period? This shows the weakness of the planning methodology.
If an investor wishes to build a power plant in 2015, he is required to follow the capacity additions as specified in the 2015-34 Plan and will decide to build a coal power plant. After spending the first two years on the preliminaries such as feasibility studies and environment impact studies, he finds that an updated 2018-37 Plan released in 2018 recommends NG power plants, instead. Is he then required to change his plans and start building a NG power plant instead? In view of environmental consideration, a NG power plant is always preferred to a coal power plant. It should be noted that a 300 MW coal plant will generate about 100,000 t of ash annually which is an environmental hazard.
There is also an ambiguity in applying the condition laid down in the Act that the capacity additions shall meet the requirements of the LTGE Plan. The Act does not specify whether the Plan to be applied is what is in force at the time of commencing the power plant project or what is in force at the time of commissioning the power plant. Within a matter of four to five years’ time taken to build a coal power plant, the requirements in the Plan could change widely during this period. Hence, it is essential that this be clearly specified or this condition removed altogether enabling implementation of the Act without leaving room for it to be questioned in a court of law.
DISPUTE BETWEEN THE REGULATOR AND THE LICENSEE
The Electricity Act requires that the LTGE Plan prepared by the CEB shall be approved by the regulator, PUCSL. However, the approval of the Plan for 2018-37 ran into a problem when the original draft submitted by the CEB was not approved by the PUCSL who in turn proposed an alternative Plan which was not accepted by the CEB. This dispute went dragging for over a year and settled only after the intervention of the President. Even in the case of the current draft for 2020-39, the CEB had submitted it to the PUCSL for approval last year, and is still awaiting approval. Possibly, the PUCSL may want the Plan to fall in line with the Government policy of giving priority for renewable energy sources as described in the writer’s article appearing in the The Island of 25th and 26th September.
This dispute was brought to stark reality in respect of the CEB plan 2018-2037 both by the evaluations of the PUCSL and in the submissions made during the public hearings. The blatant errors and misrepresentation sin the draft submitted by the CEB which was obviously done to force the adoption of further coal power plants ignoring the world wide rejections can be seen in the submissions made to the PUCSL during the public hearings and is available in the PUCSL web page ().
Accordingly, an amended LTGP was formally issued by the PUCSL which should be considered as the LTGP in force until such time a new plan is approved after going through the processes including the public hearings as done in the case of the 2018-2037 LTGP. The fact that the CEB refused to accept this plan and the fact that the Government decided to force the PUCSL to issue an approval for the flawed plan submitted by the CEB makes a mockery of the entire process and the role of the PUCSL as the regulator of the Electricity Sector. As such, it does not make sense to incorporate such a flawed variant plan as mandatory for capacity addition in the Act as well as in the Ministry mandate and to describe it as the best strategy. As a matter of fact, it is the worst strategy for power sector development in the country.
AMENDMENT TO THE ELECTRICITY ACT AND MINISTRY MANDATE
To get over the problem of the Act and the Ministry mandate not being able to meet the requirements of the LTGE Plan in view of the uncertainty of the technologies which the Plan recommends for different time periods, it is necessary to amend these two documents. The first reference to the LTGE Plan in the Electricity Act described previously says that procurement of generation capacity shall be based on “the future demand forecast as specified in the Least Cost Long Term Generation Expansion Plan”. This is in order because there is little variation in the demand for a given year between different Plans.
The rest of the references say that future capacity additions shall meet the requirements of the LTGE Plan. Since the requirements include the technology whether a coal plant or a NG plant should be installed and this changes from Plan to Plan causing the uncertainty in implementing the provisions in the Act or the Ministry mandate, it is best if these sections are amended. It is proposed that the words “meet the requirements of the LTGE Plan” appearing in the Act be amended to read “meet the demand forecasted in the LTGE Plan”, wherever the term “requirements” appear.
The Act says that “Upon obtaining the approval of the Commission the transmission licensee shall in accordance with the conditions of its transmission licence and in compliance with any rules that may be made by the Commission relating to procurement, call for tenders by notice published in the Gazette, to develop a new generation plant or to expand the generation capacity of an existing generation plant, as the case may be, as shall be specified in the notice”. Hence, it is logical to keep the fuel option open when calling tenders at the time capacity addition is required giving sufficient time for the procurement process and construction of the plant. The bids received would show which fuel option is the cheaper.
It is important to issue a set of specification with respect to performance and emissions which should be met by the plant offered. The tender should also be required to specify the levelized cost of generation including the amortized annual cost of the plant, cost of operation and maintenance and the fuel cost for generating a unit of electricity giving a formula to work out the fuel cost depending on its price in the international market. The price should also include the cost of externalties. It will be then possible to select the best and cheaper option, whether coal or gas, meeting the specifications.
It should also be noted that the Electricity Act has interpreted “least cost of generation” to mean “least economic cost of generation”. Economic cost should include the cost of damage to the environment due to emission of fly ash as well as from accumulation of about 100,000 tonnes of bottom ash annually from a 300 MW coal plant. It should also include the cost of health damage to people exposed to gaseous emissions and release of toxic substances from the plant. The current plans do not include these and if they are included, all the coal plants included in CEB’s LTGE Plans need to be changed to NG power plants as such plants do not cause emission of toxic gases or other substances.
CONCLUSION
Though the Electricity Act and the Ministry mandate stipulate that capacity additions be carried out to meet the requirements of the CEB’s LTGE Plan, practically it is not possible to follow this in view of the fact that the type of plants to be added keep changing with the Plan. It is therefore proposed that the Act as well as the Ministry mandate be amended suitably. It is also proposed that the type of plant be selected after calling tenders keeping the fuel option open a few years ahead when the capacity addition is required and not 20 s years beforehand.
It is important to recognize that the basic purpose of the LTGP is to ensure the long-term energy security of the country using means and technologies that enables realization of the least economic cost of generation, which should include the cost of externalities. As such, unless a firm binding feed in tariff over the life of the plant cannot be guaranteed via suitable tender procedure accepting the above premise, making any long term plans using numbers such as parity rate and price of coal or gas is a futile exercise.
Furthermore, the changes occurring in the energy sector practically every day which helps to realize the above objectives must constantly be factored in to the planning process. Thus, the CEB plans available currently certainly comprise the worst strategy to follow in developing the power sector in the country, as they completely ignore the very progressive advances made the world over which are of great benefit to Sri Lanka.
Features
The invisible crisis: How tour guide failures bleed value from every tourist
(Article 04 of the 04-part series on Sri Lanka’s tourism stagnation)
If you want to understand why Sri Lanka keeps leaking value even when arrivals hit “record” numbers, stop staring at SLTDA dashboards and start talking to the people who face tourists every day: the tour guides.
They are the “unofficial ambassadors” of Sri Lankan tourism, and they are the weakest, most neglected, most dysfunctional link in a value chain we pretend is functional. Nearly 60% of tourists use guides. Of those guides, 57% are unlicensed, untrained, and invisible to the very institutions claiming to regulate quality. This is not a marginal problem. It is a systemic failure to bleed value from every visitor.
The Invisible Workforce
The May 2024 “Comprehensive Study of the Sri Lankan Tour Guides” is the first serious attempt, in decades, to map this profession. Its findings should be front-page news. They are not, because acknowledging them would require admitting how fundamentally broken the system is. The official count (April 2024): SLTDA had 4,887 licensed guides in its books:
* 1,892 National Guides (39%)
* 1,552 Chauffeur Guides (32%)
* 1,339 Area Guides (27%)
* 104 Site Guides (2%)
The actual workforce: Survey data reveals these licensed categories represent only about 75% of people actually guiding tourists. About 23% identify as “other”; a polite euphemism for unlicensed operators: three-wheeler drivers, “surf boys,” informal city guides, and touts. Adjusted for informal operators, the true guide population is approximately 6,347; 32% National, 25% Chauffeur, 16% Area, 4% Site, and 23% unlicensed.
But even this understates reality. Industry practitioners interviewed in the study believe the informal universe is larger still, with unlicensed guides dominating certain tourist hotspots and price-sensitive segments. Using both top-down (tourist arrivals × share using guides) and bottom-up (guides × trips × party size) estimates, the study calculates that approximately 700,000 tourists used guides in 2023-24, roughly one-third of arrivals. Of those 700,000 tourists, 57% were handled by unlicensed guides.
Read that again. Most tourists interacting with guides are served by people with no formal training, no regulatory oversight, no quality standards, and no accountability. These are the “ambassadors” shaping visitor perceptions, driving purchasing decisions, and determining whether tourists extend stays, return, or recommend Sri Lanka. And they are invisible to SLTDA.
The Anatomy of Workforce Failure
The guide crisis is not accidental. It is the predictable outcome of decades of policy neglect, regulatory abdication, and institutional indifference.
1. Training Collapse and Barrier to Entry Failure
Becoming a licensed National Guide theoretically requires:
* Completion of formal training programmes
* Demonstrated language proficiency
* Knowledge of history, culture, geography
* Passing competency exams
In practice, these barriers have eroded. The study reveals:
* Training infrastructure is inadequate and geographically concentrated
* Language requirements are inconsistently enforced
* Knowledge assessments are outdated and poorly calibrated
* Continuous professional development is non-existent
The result: even licensed guides often lack the depth of knowledge, language skills, or service standards that high-yield tourists expect. Unlicensed guides have no standards at all. Compare this to competitors. In Mauritius, tour guides undergo rigorous government-certified training with mandatory refresher courses. The Maldives’ resort model embeds guide functions within integrated hospitality operations with strict quality controls. Thailand has well-developed private-sector training ecosystems feeding into licensed guide pools.
2. Economic Precarity and Income Volatility
Tour guiding in Sri Lanka is economically unstable:
* Seasonal income volatility: High earnings in peak months (December-March), near-zero in low season (April-June, September)
* No fixed salaries: Most guides work freelance or commission-based
* Age and experience don’t guarantee income: 60% of guides are over 40, but earnings decline with age due to physical demands and market preference for younger, language-proficient guides
* Commission dependency: Guides often earn more from commissions on shopping, gem purchases, and restaurant referrals than from guiding fees
The commission-driven model pushes guides to prioritise high-commission shops over meaningful experiences, leaving tourists feeling manipulated. With low earnings and poor incentives, skilled guides exist in the profession while few new entrants join. The result is a shrinking pool of struggling licensed guides and rising numbers of opportunistic unlicensed operators.
3. Regulatory Abdication and Unlicensed Proliferation
Unlicensed guides thrive because enforcement is absent, economic incentives favour avoiding fees and taxes, and tourists cannot distinguish licensed professionals from informal operators. With SLTDA’s limited capacity reducing oversight, unregistered activity expands. Guiding becomes the frontline where regulatory failure most visibly harms tourist experience and sector revenues in Sri Lanka.
4. Male-Dominated, Ageing, Geographically Uneven Workforce
The guide workforce is:
* Heavily male-dominated: Fewer than 10% are women
* Ageing: 60% are over 40; many in their 50s and 60s
* Geographically concentrated: Clustered in Colombo, Galle, Kandy, Cultural Triangle—minimal presence in emerging destinations
This creates multiple problems:
* Gender imbalance: Limits appeal to female solo travellers and certain market segments (wellness tourism, family travel with mothers)
* Physical limitations: Older guides struggle with demanding itineraries (hiking, adventure tourism)
* Knowledge ossification: Ageing workforce with no continuous learning rehashes outdated narratives, lacks digital literacy, cannot engage younger tourist demographics
* Regional gaps: Emerging destinations (Eastern Province, Northern heritage sites) lack trained guide capacity
1. Experience Degradation Lower Spending
Unlicensed guides lack knowledge, language skills, and service training. Tourist experience degrades. When tourists feel they are being shuttled to commission shops rather than authentic experiences, they:
* Cut trips short
* Skip additional paid activities
* Leave negative reviews
* Do not return or recommend
The yield impact is direct: degraded experiences reduce spending, return rates, and word-of-mouth premium.

2. Commission Steering → Value Leakage
Guides earning more from commissions than guiding fees optimise for merchant revenue, not tourist satisfaction.
This creates leakage: tourism spending flows to merchants paying highest commissions (often with foreign ownership or imported inventory), not to highest-quality experiences.
The economic distortion is visible: gems, souvenirs, and low-quality restaurants generate guide commissions while high-quality cultural sites, local artisan cooperatives, and authentic restaurants do not. Spending flows to low-value, high-leakage channels.
3. Safety and Security Risks → Reputation Damage
Unlicensed guides have no insurance, no accountability, no emergency training. When tourists encounter problems, accidents, harassment, scams, there is no recourse. Incidents generate negative publicity, travel advisories, reputation damage. The 2024-2025 reports of tourists being attacked by wildlife at major sites (Sigiriya) with inadequate safety protocols are symptomatic. Trained, licensed guides would have emergency protocols. Unlicensed operators improvise.
4. Market Segmentation Failure → Yield Optimisation Impossible
High-yield tourists (luxury, cultural immersion, adventure) require specialised guide-deep knowledge, language proficiency, cultural sensitivity. Sri Lanka cannot reliably deliver these guides at scale because:
* Training does not produce specialists (wildlife experts, heritage scholars, wellness practitioners)
* Economic precarity drives talent out
* Unlicensed operators dominate price-sensitive segments, leaving limited licensed capacity for premium segments
We cannot move upmarket because we lack the workforce to serve premium segments. We are locked into volume-chasing low-yield markets because that is what our guide workforce can provide.
The way forward
Fixing Sri Lanka’s guide crisis demands structural reform, not symbolic gestures. A full workforce census and licensing audit must map the real guide population, identify gaps, and set an enforcement baseline. Licensing must be mandatory, timebound, and backed by inspections and penalties. Economic incentives should reward professionalism through fair wages, transparent fees, and verified registries. Training must expand nationwide with specialisations, language standards, and continuous development. Gender and age imbalances require targeted recruitment, mentorship, and diversified roles. Finally, guides must be integrated into the tourism value chain through mandatory verification, accountability measures, and performancelinked feedback.
The Uncomfortable Truth
Can Sri Lanka achieve high-value tourism with a low-quality, largely unlicensed guide workforce? The answer is NO. Unambiguously, definitively, NO. Sri Lanka’s guides shape tourist perceptions, spending, and satisfaction, yet the system treats them as expendable; poorly trained, economically insecure, and largely unregulated. With 57% of tourists relying on unlicensed guides, experience quality becomes unpredictable and revenue leaks into commission-driven channels.
High-yield markets avoid destinations with weak service standards, leaving Sri Lanka stuck in low-value, volume tourism. This is not a training problem but a structural failure requiring regulatory enforcement, viable career pathways, and a complete overhaul of incentives. Without professionalising guides, high-value tourism is unattainable. Fixing the guide crisis is the foundation for genuine sector transformation.
The choice is ours. The workforce is waiting.
This concludes the 04-part series on Sri Lanka’s tourism stagnation. The diagnosis is complete. The question now is whether policymakers have the courage to act.
For any concerns/comments contact the author at saliya.ca@gmail.com
(The writer, a senior Chartered Accountant and professional banker, is Professor at SLIIT, Malabe. The views and opinions expressed in this article are personal.)
Features
Recruiting academics to state universities – beset by archaic selection processes?
Time has, by and large, stood still in the business of academic staff recruitment to state universities. Qualifications have proliferated and evolved to be more interdisciplinary, but our selection processes and evaluation criteria are unchanged since at least the late 1990s. But before I delve into the problems, I will describe the existing processes and schemes of recruitment. The discussion is limited to UGC-governed state universities (and does not include recruitment to medical and engineering sectors) though the problems may be relevant to other higher education institutions (HEIs).
How recruitment happens currently in SL state universities
Academic ranks in Sri Lankan state universities can be divided into three tiers (subdivisions are not discussed).
* Lecturer (Probationary)
– recruited with a four-year undergraduate degree. A tiny step higher is the Lecturer (Unconfirmed), recruited with a postgraduate degree but no teaching experience.
* A Senior Lecturer can be recruited with certain postgraduate qualifications and some number of years of teaching and research.
* Above this is the professor (of four types), which can be left out of this discussion since only one of those (Chair Professor) is by application.
State universities cannot hire permanent academic staff as and when they wish. Prior to advertising a vacancy, approval to recruit is obtained through a mind-numbing and time-consuming process (months!) ending at the Department of Management Services. The call for applications must list all ranks up to Senior Lecturer. All eligible candidates for Probationary to Senior Lecturer are interviewed, e.g., if a Department wants someone with a doctoral degree, they must still advertise for and interview candidates for all ranks, not only candidates with a doctoral degree. In the evaluation criteria, the first degree is more important than the doctoral degree (more on this strange phenomenon later). All of this is only possible when universities are not under a ‘hiring freeze’, which governments declare regularly and generally lasts several years.
Problem type 1
– Archaic processes and evaluation criteria
Twenty-five years ago, as a probationary lecturer with a first degree, I was a typical hire. We would be recruited, work some years and obtain postgraduate degrees (ideally using the privilege of paid study leave to attend a reputed university in the first world). State universities are primarily undergraduate teaching spaces, and when doctoral degrees were scarce, hiring probationary lecturers may have been a practical solution. The path to a higher degree was through the academic job. Now, due to availability of candidates with postgraduate qualifications and the problems of retaining academics who find foreign postgraduate opportunities, preference for candidates applying with a postgraduate qualification is growing. The evaluation scheme, however, prioritises the first degree over the candidate’s postgraduate education. Were I to apply to a Faculty of Education, despite a PhD on language teaching and research in education, I may not even be interviewed since my undergraduate degree is not in education. The ‘first degree first’ phenomenon shows that universities essentially ignore the intellectual development of a person beyond their early twenties. It also ignores the breadth of disciplines and their overlap with other fields.
This can be helped (not solved) by a simple fix, which can also reduce brain drain: give precedence to the doctoral degree in the required field, regardless of the candidate’s first degree, effected by a UGC circular. The suggestion is not fool-proof. It is a first step, and offered with the understanding that any selection process, however well the evaluation criteria are articulated, will be beset by multiple issues, including that of bias. Like other Sri Lankan institutions, universities, too, have tribal tendencies, surfacing in the form of a preference for one’s own alumni. Nevertheless, there are other problems that are, arguably, more pressing as I discuss next. In relation to the evaluation criteria, a problem is the narrow interpretation of any regulation, e.g., deciding the degree’s suitability based on the title rather than considering courses in the transcript. Despite rhetoric promoting internationalising and inter-disciplinarity, decision-making administrative and academic bodies have very literal expectations of candidates’ qualifications, e.g., a candidate with knowledge of digital literacy should show this through the title of the degree!
Problem type 2 – The mess of badly regulated higher education
A direct consequence of the contemporary expansion of higher education is a large number of applicants with myriad qualifications. The diversity of degree programmes cited makes the responsibility of selecting a suitable candidate for the job a challenging but very important one. After all, the job is for life – it is very difficult to fire a permanent employer in the state sector.
Widely varying undergraduate degree programmes.
At present, Sri Lankan undergraduates bring qualifications (at times more than one) from multiple types of higher education institutions: a degree from a UGC-affiliated state university, a state university external to the UGC, a state institution that is not a university, a foreign university, or a private HEI aka ‘private university’. It could be a degree received by attending on-site, in Sri Lanka or abroad. It could be from a private HEI’s affiliated foreign university or an external degree from a state university or an online only degree from a private HEI that is ‘UGC-approved’ or ‘Ministry of Education approved’, i.e., never studied in a university setting. Needless to say, the diversity (and their differences in quality) are dizzying. Unfortunately, under the evaluation scheme all degrees ‘recognised’ by the UGC are assigned the same marks. The same goes for the candidates’ merits or distinctions, first classes, etc., regardless of how difficult or easy the degree programme may be and even when capabilities, exposure, input, etc are obviously different.
Similar issues are faced when we consider postgraduate qualifications, though to a lesser degree. In my discipline(s), at least, a postgraduate degree obtained on-site from a first-world university is preferable to one from a local university (which usually have weekend or evening classes similar to part-time study) or online from a foreign university. Elitist this may be, but even the best local postgraduate degrees cannot provide the experience and intellectual growth gained by being in a university that gives you access to six million books and teaching and supervision by internationally-recognised scholars. Unfortunately, in the evaluation schemes for recruitment, the worst postgraduate qualification you know of will receive the same marks as one from NUS, Harvard or Leiden.
The problem is clear but what about a solution?
Recruitment to state universities needs to change to meet contemporary needs. We need evaluation criteria that allows us to get rid of the dross as well as a more sophisticated institutional understanding of using them. Recruitment is key if we want our institutions (and our country) to progress. I reiterate here the recommendations proposed in ‘Considerations for Higher Education Reform’ circulated previously by Kuppi Collective:
* Change bond regulations to be more just, in order to retain better qualified academics.
* Update the schemes of recruitment to reflect present-day realities of inter-disciplinary and multi-disciplinary training in order to recruit suitably qualified candidates.
* Ensure recruitment processes are made transparent by university administrations.
Kaushalya Perera is a senior lecturer at the University of Colombo.
(Kuppi is a politics and pedagogy happening on the margins of the lecture hall that parodies, subverts, and simultaneously reaffirms social hierarchies.)
Features
Talento … oozing with talent
This week, too, the spotlight is on an outfit that has gained popularity, mainly through social media.
Last week we had MISTER Band in our scene, and on 10th February, Yellow Beatz – both social media favourites.
Talento is a seven-piece band that plays all types of music, from the ‘60s to the modern tracks of today.
The band has reached many heights, since its inception in 2012, and has gained recognition as a leading wedding and dance band in the scene here.
The members that makeup the outfit have a solid musical background, which comes through years of hard work and dedication
Their portfolio of music contains a mix of both western and eastern songs and are carefully selected, they say, to match the requirements of the intended audience, occasion, or event.
Although the baila is a specialty, which is inherent to this group, that originates from Moratuwa, their repertoire is made up of a vast collection of love, classic, oldies and modern-day hits.
The musicians, who make up Talento, are:
Prabuddha Geetharuchi:
(Vocalist/ Frontman). He is an avid music enthusiast and was mentored by a lot of famous musicians, and trainers, since he was a child. Growing up with them influenced him to take on western songs, as well as other music styles. A Peterite, he is the main man behind the band Talento and is a versatile singer/entertainer who never fails to get the crowd going.
Geilee Fonseka (Vocals):
A dynamic and charismatic vocalist whose vibrant stage presence, and powerful voice, bring a fresh spark to every performance. Young, energetic, and musically refined, she is an artiste who effortlessly blends passion with precision – captivating audiences from the very first note. Blessed with an immense vocal range, Geilee is a truly versatile singer, confidently delivering Western and Eastern music across multiple languages and genres.
Chandana Perera (Drummer):
His expertise and exceptional skills have earned him recognition as one of the finest acoustic drummers in Sri Lanka. With over 40 tours under his belt, Chandana has demonstrated his dedication and passion for music, embodying the essential role of a drummer as the heartbeat of any band.
Harsha Soysa:
(Bassist/Vocalist). He a chorister of the western choir of St. Sebastian’s College, Moratuwa, who began his musical education under famous voice trainers, as well as bass guitar trainers in Sri Lanka. He has also performed at events overseas. He acts as the second singer of the band
Udara Jayakody:
(Keyboardist). He is also a qualified pianist, adding technical flavour to Talento’s music. His singing and harmonising skills are an extra asset to the band. From his childhood he has been a part of a number of orchestras as a pianist. He has also previously performed with several famous western bands.
Aruna Madushanka:
(Saxophonist). His proficiciency in playing various instruments, including the saxophone, soprano saxophone, and western flute, showcases his versatility as a musician, and his musical repertoire is further enhanced by his remarkable singing ability.
Prashan Pramuditha:
(Lead guitar). He has the ability to play different styles, both oriental and western music, and he also creates unique tones and patterns with the guitar..
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