Connect with us

Features

BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT?

Published

on

The killing of a Prime Minister

by Sanjiva Senanayake

(PART I)

Many people ‘know’ the conventional tale about the assassination of the Prime Minister of Ceylon, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, 62 years ago. However, they each have a slightly different take and theory about the facts, the reasons, the conspiracy theories and who ‘actually’ did it. Those then unborn or too young to have been aware of it at the time, have heard about it from older people. We have to assume that the intrinsic Lankan sense of rumour would have spiced up the details as time went by.

There is a common belief that the standards of general governance, integrity and legal processes were much higher back then, in Ceylon, than now. Bolstering this justifiable belief, adjudication was done by the Supreme Court (SC), the verdict was confirmed in the Court of Criminal Appeal and accepted by the Privy Council in London. Therefore, the predominant view continues to be that justice was served objectively and impartially.

However, there were many controversial interpretations and theories that circulated before, during and after the Bandaranaike trials. There were several aspects of the conduct of the trial and the actual evidence presented that raised questions about the guilt of the alleged assassin and, as a consequence, the guilt of the others.

Articles about those traumatic events of long ago have been published periodically, but they have progressively reverted to recounting and sometimes sensationalizing the standard version, and have not adequately addressed the many controversial questions.

This article focuses specifically on the alleged murderer and the most critical of the controversies, based on the ‘eye-witness’ evidence led at the SC trial – was Somarama proved to be the assassin beyond reasonable doubt? If there is any doubt, it opens up the possibility of a different, politically motivated conspiracy, especially since Bandaranaike was the Prime Minister during turbulent times.

THE STORY IN SUMMARY

The PM was shot several times with a revolver at his residence ‘Tintagel’ – 65, Rosmead Place – at around 10 am on September 25, 1959. Despite appearing to recover somewhat by evening following surgery, and even dictating a message to the nation from hospital, he died the next morning. The only thing Bandaranaike said about the identity of the gunman was that he was “a foolish man dressed in the robes of a monk”. This was the first major targeted political assassination in post-independence Ceylon, one that changed the future course of the country.

A Buddhist monk, Talduwe Somarama, was immediately arrested in the house, with a gun in hand, on suspicion of being the assailant. He was a hitherto low-profile Buddhist monk who was an eye specialist at the College of Indigenous Medicine in Rajagiriya.

After several days another monk, the politically powerful Mapitigama Buddharakkitha, was arrested in addition to several other individuals alleged to have assisted Buddharakkitha as part of a year-long conspiracy to kill Bandaranaike using Somarama as the assassin. Buddharakkitha, although only 38-years old, was the chief monk of the important Kelaniya Temple and, as the head of the Eksath Bhikkhu Peramuna (EBP), the most politically powerful monk in the country at the time. He was also headstrong, impulsive and confrontational – certainly not a pious monk. Although the EBP helped bring Bandaranaike to power in 1956, by 1959 Buddharakkitha was antagonistic toward the PM for being too ‘soft’ in pushing a more aggressive Sinhala Buddhist agenda. Buddharakkitha was aligned with the right-wing of the government and his antagonism toward the leftists (and vice versa) in the government was public knowledge.

After exhaustive investigations and a long trial in the SC, a special jury found both monks and H.P. Jayawardena, a close associate of Buddharakkitha, guilty of the conspiracy, and Somarama guilty of committing the murder, and all three were sentenced to death. The convictions were upheld in the Court of Criminal Appeal, but due to an inadvertent omission in intervening legislative change, Buddharakkitha and Jayawardena were sentenced to life in prison for conspiring to commit murder. An appeal to the Privy Council in London failed, and Somarama was subsequently executed.

There the matter rested and most people forgot about the details of the case with the passage of time. Other dramatic political events followed thereafter leading to an attempted coup d’etat on January 27, 1962 to overthrow the government of Bandaranaike’s widow. Resort to violence for political purposes became more prevalent from the 1970s, and targeted assassinations of political leaders more frequent.

Only two books have been written in English about the assassination; one by the late Justice A.C. Alles and the other by the late Lucian Weeramantry, who was Somarama’s counsel in the trial. It is surprising that more books and academic studies do not seem to have been published specifically about the assassination, an important event in our post-Independence history.

Justice Alles’ book provides a lot of relevant background material but, judging by assertions made and conclusions drawn, it appears to have been written on the assumption that the conspiracy allegedly planned by Buddharakkitha was true and the verdicts just, although he does refer to some questionable issues.

Weeramantry restricts himself to the procedures followed, the evidence led and the submissions made in the SC, to demonstrate that there was more than ‘reasonable doubt’ about the convictions. He argues that the prosecution of the case was politically influenced and not neutral.

It is a fascinating case with many twists and turns as well as contradictions. A critical reading of the above books is recommended to anyone who is interested in digging further into the unusual events specifically pertinent to the murder and trial. A deeper understanding of contemporary political and social developments also helps.

BACKGROUND IN BRIEF

Bandaranaike left the United National Party (UNP) in 1951 and formed the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). His party lost badly at the next general election in March 1952 and it appeared that his political career was doomed. In the meantime, political pressures by Sinhalese and Buddhist groups for affirmative action had been intensifying since Independence to redress what was perceived as historical discrimination against them from colonial times. The UNP was rather indifferent to these forces but Bandaranaike decided to channel them and was supported strongly by the ‘pancha maha balavegaya’ consisting of Buddhist monks, Ayurveda practitioners, vernacular teachers, peasants and workers.

The SLFP then formed a coalition called the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP) with a leftist party headed by Philip Gunawardena and a small party

led by W. Dahanayake, to contest the general election of April 1956. A key election slogan was ‘Sinhala-Only in 24 hours’, a potent rallying cry that meant different things to different people. The UNP too adopted the slogan prior to the election when it realised its electoral potential, but its late volte-face lacked credibility and the MEP won by a landslide.

However, the very next year, Bandaranaike initiated discussions with Tamil political leaders to provide devolution of some powers through the establishment of Regional Councils and the so-called Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact was signed in July 1957. It was a compromise on both sides, which the PM likened to the Buddha’s Middle Way, but most of the politicians of the time were focused on short-term gains and not inclined to compromise for stability and longer-term progress. There were opposition and agitation from both sides and some avoidable incidents occurred in the process. Eventually, the pact was abrogated under severe pressure in April 1958, with the EBP too playing a major role.

The antagonistic posturing did not cease and this led to one week of intense conflict at the end of May, the so-called Sinhala-Tamil riots that left long-lasting social scars. The PM’s rule was seen as weak and indecisive in bringing the riots under control and the Governor General, Sir Oliver Goonetilleke, played a major role in quelling it.

Despite all this, Bandaranaike introduced the Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act No. 28 of 1958 less than three months later in August 1958 as a compromise measure to accommodate Tamil demands regarding matters such as education, public service entrance examinations and the administration of the north and east. This too was criticized by extremists on both sides.

Ceylon in 1959, a decade after Independence but still looking for direction, was a hotbed of political turmoil. Agitations and strikes were rampant, with the constant interplay of all the emotion-rousing political forces of the time – urban vs. rural; westernized vs. nationalist; capitalist vs. socialist; Buddhist vs. Catholic; Sinhala vs. Tamil; rich vs. poor – trying to quickly carve pieces out of the emerging national pie. The old order was dying and a new one was being born.

In April 1959, Bandaranaike had a difference of opinion with the Inspector General of Police, Osmund de Silva and decided to replace him. The PM had been previously warned by various Buddhist leaders and MEP coalition partners in Parliament about a right-wing conspiracy to topple his administration with the involvement of the police and armed forces. Although Osmund de Silva was a Buddhist, all the senior Police officers next in line were not and, despite protests from within the Police, Bandaranaike decided to appoint M.W.F Abeykoon, an administrative officer from outside the Police service, angering several senior officers.

That was not all. The urban elites, more inclined to western lifestyles, accustomed to calling the shots politically and economically, and linguistically quite alienated from the masses, were becoming increasingly alarmed at the turn of events since the debacle in 1956 of their preferred political party, the UNP. The growing influence of more aggressive Sinhalese and Buddhist groups was causing concern among the established organizations and social groups.

There was an international dimension too. Despite the intense Cold War then raging, the Bandaranaike government had established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in December 1956 and signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement in 1958. The previous UNP government had recognized the People’s Republic of China in January 1950, supported China’s entry to the United Nations and entered into the historic Rubber-Rice barter agreement in 1952. The Bandaranaike government established full diplomatic relations with China in 1957.

The government’s plans to nationalize State-assisted private schools and foreign businesses such as the oil companies, and its decision in October 1957 to abrogate the Defence Pact with Britain and take back control of Trincomalee harbour and the RAF airbase at Katunayake, were all loud alarm bells.

By the latter half of 1959 the PM was into the fourth year of his five-year term, and already the coalition was fraying. The leftist faction, led by Philip Gunawardena, resigned from the government in April 1959 due to pressure from the coalition’s right wing regarding socialist measures such as the Paddy Lands Act, which included land reform. Strikes became more frequent and intense.

In this milieu, there were many disparate groups that could have had reasons to eliminate Bandaranaike, and perhaps get a bonus by pinning the blame on Buddharakkitha to neutralize a powerful, antagonistic group such as the EBP and the growing direct involvement of Buddhist monks in politics.

THE SHOOTING

Unlike today, firearms were not easily available and targeted political killings were extremely rare. The level of security considered necessary was quite basic and Bandaranaike himself was not keen on too many guards. Access to his residence was freely available during the morning to all and sundry. The shooting at close quarters happened on the verandah of the PM’s private residence with at least 30 people in the immediate vicinity.

Somarama was seated at one end of the outside verandah. There was another monk (Niwanthidiye Ananda) seated about 10 feet away from Somarama and more to the centre of the verandah, near the entrance to the corridor that led from the front porch into the interior of the house. Several others were standing around including a teacher named Gunaratne who was opposite Ananda.

The PM first spoke with Ananda and gave him some instructions. He then moved along the verandah toward Somarama and, as he bent and worshipped him in greeting, a gunshot was heard. Bandaranaike cried out in pain, turned and tried to run back into the house. Further shots were heard, and the PM was hit in the chest and abdomen. Altogether he was hit by four bullets, the first one glancing his left wrist and three entering his torso as he staggered into the house. Gunaratne, who should have had a clear view of the shooting, was also shot in the neck area by a fifth bullet as Bandaranaike stumbled past him to escape into the house along the central corridor.

In the utter confusion that followed, Somarama followed the PM into the house carrying a revolver and was then assaulted by several people who came from other parts of the house before he could say anything. In the melee the revolver went off once, the last bullet, but no one was hurt. The World War I vintage revolver, in rather poor condition, that had been used was recovered by the police.

Somarama’s version was that someone dressed in robes shot repeatedly at the PM from the garden just below the verandah, threw the revolver on to the verandah and then ran off toward the road. He then involuntarily picked up the gun and followed the PM into the house to hand it over to someone responsible.

In the meantime, PC Samarakoon, who was the sentry at the main gate, rushed to the house and shot at Somarama, injuring him in the thigh and groin area. The PM was sent to hospital by car and, soon after that, DIG Sidney de Zoysa, who had a prior appointment to meet the PM, arrived and took control of the chaotic situation. In fact, de Zoysa passed the PM’s car going toward the hospital on his way to the house, but didn’t realise the injured PM was in it. Some time after de Zoysa’s arrival, a bleeding Somarama in obvious pain was, for some inexplicable reason, despatched to the Harbour Police station on the other side of the city and detained there for around two hours before being taken to hospital where he underwent an operation to remove one of his testicles.

The firing of the first five bullets was rapid and probably took less than 10 seconds, since the PM was also moving away. The despatch of the PM by car and the arrival of Sidney de Zoysa would probably have happened within 10-15 minutes thereafter.

It seems, at first glance, to be a straightforward case. The alleged assailant, the weapon, the victim and witnesses were all readily available, and it happened in the heart of Colombo, in a narrow space, in broad daylight. On the face of it, only the motive and the possible involvement of others had to be discerned. But in political murders things are not always what they seem.

THE LEGAL PROCESS

Buddharakkitha and Jayawardena were arrested on October 14, 1959 and held in remand custody, along with Somarama. Following intensive investigations by the police, the magisterial inquiry started on December 14, 1959, less than three months after the murder, and went on until July 27, 1960. At the end of the almost seven month-long hearings, five people were named to stand trial in the SC.

1. Mapitigama Buddharakkitha thero

2. H.P. Jayawardena

3. Anura de Silva

4. Talduwe Somarama thero

5. Newton Perera

All the accused were to be charged with conspiracy to murder the PM, and the fourth with murder as well. The indictment read as follows:

That between the 25th of August, 1958, and the 26th of September, 1959, at Kelaniya, Wellampitiya, Rajagiriya, Colombo and other places within the jurisdiction of this Court, you did agree to commit or abet or act together with the common purpose of committing or abetting an offence, to wit, the murder of Solomon West Ridgeway Dias Bandaranaike, and that you are thereby guilty of the offence of conspiracy to commit or abet the said offence of murder, in consequence of which conspiracy the said offence of murder was committed, and that you have thereby committed an offence punishable under section 296 read with sections 113B and 102 of the Penal Code.

It specifically mentioned a date 13 months earlier (August 25, 1958) as the origin of the conspiracy. This was the date on which the PM, on the advice of senior technocrats of the Ministry of Finance, decided not to award a shipping contract to a company in which Buddharakkitha’s brother had a significant interest. The direct implication is that Buddharakkitha’s resentment due to this act was the trigger for a year-long conspiracy that led to the assassination.

The defence counsel made a request for a Special Jury at the start of the SC trial due to the highly politically-charged nature of the case. They requested that government employees should be excluded but, in the end, the Foreman of the English-speaking jury was a public servant. As a matter of interest, six members were Christians and the seventh was a Buddhist, and all were from Colombo. However, the integrity of the members of the jury was never questioned.

During the SC trial it became apparent that the third accused was an insignificant character and he was finally acquitted unanimously. It was not clear why he was charged at all, or placed ahead of the alleged murderer Somarama, if there was indisputable evidence against Somarama.

Newton Perera, a police officer, allegedly procured the revolver and ammunition used in the killing. He was also accused of training Somarama to shoot, but this was not established. He was subsequently found not guilty in the SC with the jury divided five to two.

The SC trial commenced seven months later, on February 22, 1961 before Justice T.S. Fernando, and went on till May 12, 1961. The government retained George Chitty QC, a prominent criminal defence lawyer from the private Bar, to lead the prosecution in the SC, by-passing the Attorney General’s Department. The Deputy Solicitor General, A.C.M. Ameer, who was the prosecutor in the Magistrate’s Court, resigned in protest.

There were criticisms that the prosecutor for the State focused more on getting judgements against the accused who were charged, rather than seeking the truth via a broader inquiry to get to the bottom of who actually killed the PM of the country, and why. Some of the defence counsel, including Phineas Quass QC, who came over from the UK to defend Buddharakkitha and Jayawardena, also alluded to this during the trial.

The prosecution did not call Gunaratne who was in a perfect position to see the shooting at close quarters. Neither did the prosecution call key witnesses DIG Sidney de Zoysa or any of the senior (Gazetted) police officers who investigated the case. De Zoysa was called instead by Weeramantry, Somarama’s counsel. There was a lot of evidence led by the prosecution that did not appear to have relevance. The government even paid to bring down a ‘witness’ from the UK (Bruno Perera), who only served to distract attention. He was reprimanded and fined by the Judge at the end of the trial.

The seven members of the Special Jury were the final arbiters of the judgement rather than the Judge. They would have had a tedious task in assessing the oral evidence, unravelling the many counsel’s interventions and addresses, absorbing the Judge’s directions on points of law, and then arriving at a decision in a short while. In those non-computerized days, the jury had to rely only on what they heard in the courts almost every day for 55 days and make a decision on a matter of life and death, without the advantage of printed transcripts of evidence. A total of 97 witnesses testified and the typed record of the proceedings ran into 3,536 pages.

(Note: typed transcripts of the day’s proceedings were, however, made available to the Judge and counsel the following day)

TO BE CONTINUED …..



Continue Reading
Advertisement
Click to comment

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Features

Export diversification: Missing the wood for the trees – Part I

Published

on

Export of Jackfruit

by Gomi Senadhira

A few recent news items prompted me to write this article. The first was in the Sinhala newspaper Divaina on jackfruits, which said that out of the 280 million jackfruits produced in Sri Lanka, only 80 million were consumed. Does this mean the rest, 200 million fruits, are just wasted every year? However, other available reports estimate that about 70% of the production is consumed and only 30 percent is wasted. Whatever the exact number, we know a substantially large number of jackfruits go to waste. The second was a more recent article in an English paper on cinnamon exports: it states that Sri Lanka is targeting US$ 300 million in cinnamon export earnings this year and aiming for annual export earnings of US$ 500 million by 2030!

Good sense

These news items reminded me of another article I read in The Island a few years ago. It was by Dr. Upatissa Pethiyagoda, a well-known Sri Lankan scientist, diplomat, and writer, about a chance encounter he had with former Prime Minister Wijayananda Dahanayake (WD) in the early 1970s at a Perera & Sons outlet in Kollupitiya, where both had stopped for iced coffee, In those days, politicians, even former prime ministers, walked around without bodyguards and could be spotted at coffee shops, like P&S, in CTB buses or on trains. After learning that Dr. Pethiyagoda was a senior researcher at the Tea Research Institute, Dahanayake quipped that Sri Lanka should focus on five key crops: paddy, sugarcane, pasture grass, coconut, and jack (kos). Dr Pethiyagoda further adds “The unsophisticated wisdom of WD still haunts. Being self-reliant in basic foodstuffs is very respectable and a base for true national pride. A Canadian slogan in support of their (salmon) fishery was “We eat what we can and can what we can’t” or the Thai advertisement line, accompanying a tantalising picture of a fruit basket was “We have got it, come and get it”. Capturing tourism and horticulture simultaneously!”

I do not know why WD advocated promoting jack instead of tea. Yet, 50 years later, while we are trying to expand cinnamon exports into an already saturated market, the global market for jackfruit has become larger than the market for Ceylon cinnamon. Hence, the slogans quoted by Dr Pethiyagada are more than appropriate to promote jackfruit exports.

“We eat what we can and can what we can’t”

Globally, the demand for jackfruit has rapidly increased in recent years due to its appeal to vegan, vegetarian, and health-conscious consumers. However, it is difficult to grasp the size of the global market for jackfruit through import/export statistics, as jackfruit doesn’t have a specific standalone customs code. Customs data, even at the HS eight-digit level, groups jackfruit along with several other tropical fruits. Hence, the numbers given in this article are from various reports available on the Internet. Although the numbers presented in those reports vary, trade dynamics point to a multi-billion-dollar global market for jackfruit which has already reached USD 2.8 billion in 2025 and is likely to reach USD 5.2 billion by 2034. This market is largely dominated by jackfruit processed products (including canned, frozen, and dried items). The market for fresh jackfruit hovers around USD 500 million a year.

“We have got it, come and get it”

With around 300,000 tons of exports annually, Thailand is the leading exporter of jackfruits, closely followed by Vietnam. Interestingly, the value of jackfruit exports from Vietnam has increased remarkably from “… just $3 million in 2015 to an impressive $236.8 million in 2023. ” The South Asian countries are also emerging as leading jackfruit exporters. India exported over 26 million kg (26,000 tons) of jackfruit valued at approximately US$40 million during the 2023-2024 fiscal year. The annual exports from Bangladesh fluctuated between 1000 to 2000 metric tons during the recent years. In contrast, jackfruit exports from Sri Lanka are estimated to be around 20 to 30 metric tons per month, which are mainly in processed form.

Main markets for jackfruits are in North America, Europe, Gulf countries, China, and Australia. Key markets for fresh jackfruits are Gulf countries and China. The governments of the main exporting countries intervene proactively to develop these markets for their exporters. For example, during the visit of the Bangladesh Prime Minister Tarique Rehaman to China in June 2026, one of the MoUs signed was on jackfruit. Based on this MoU, Bangladesh is targeting 500 to 1,000 tons of exports to China during the next year.

Gulf market for fresh jackfruits

As the global demand for jackfruit increases, the demand for fresh jackfruit has also risen in the Gulf countries. The Indian and Bangladeshi exporters have already successfully exploited this market. However, due to perishability and the limited shelf life of fresh jackfruits, exporters from India and Bangladesh rely on air shipments for quicker delivery. Yet, as whole jackfruits are heavy with a high waste-to-edible ratio (thick rind and core), air freighting whole fruit is economically inefficient. Hence, exports are mainly in semi-processed form.

A game changer – export of fresh jackfruits by sea

This brings me to another article published early this month in Bangladesh; it says a Dhaka-based export company shipped 3.5 tons of fresh jackfruits to Dubai by sea in May this year. Though the shipment took over 26 days to reach its destination, the quality of the jackfruit remained intact. If that is so, then it is a game changer. Sea freight from Colombo to Dubai, I believe, takes only 4 to 8 days for a direct port-to-port journey, compared to 26 days from Bangladesh. Hence, exporting jackfruits and other fruits and vegetables by sea to GCC markets from Sri Lanka would be much more efficient and cost-effective.

With its plentiful supply and a lucrative market in close proximity in the Gulf countries, it is difficult to understand how Sri Lanka has not managed to capture a significant share of the market in the GCC, given that Sri Lanka began to export fruits and vegetables into that market long before Bangladesh, Thailand, or Vietnam.

(The writer can be reached at senadhiragomi@gmail.com)

Continue Reading

Features

Insights from Chieftains of Uva: Genealogy of two Kandyan Families – Part II

Published

on

Reflections on Kandyan Genealogical Studies:

by Sena Thoradeniya

(Part I of this article appeared in The Island of 19 August 2026)

In the Kandyan territories, genealogical studies have been largely caste based on only those who belong to the so-called upper stratum – the highest echelon of the Govigama caste. Even within this group, attention is reserved for ancient office holders, illustrious figures, and socially prominent members, while non-office holders, side branches, and ordinary kin are omitted. Sub divisions of the Govigama caste, as well as families belonging to the so-called depressed castes, are almost entirely omitted. One reason for this stigmatisation lies in the absence of competition for caste supremacy within the Kandyan regions, unlike in the “low country” areas. This silences the presence of non-elite Kandyans. However, oral genealogies, folk traditions, palm-leaf manuscripts, and colonial records preserve the names of less prominent members.

On the other hand, the descendants of clan leaders, such as the Vidana Maha Durayas, Maha Balitiyannas, Maha Hulawaliyas, Mulacharis, and chiefs of Halu Apullana Henayas, do not seek to record their genealogies as all their ancestral roots have been uprooted and obliterated. In such a context, they have acquired new names, new identities, and fashion a new genealogy as their point of departure. The erasure of older identities forces these families to reconstruct a new lineage.

The only exception within my private collection is “Great Royal Artificer of the Kandyan Kingdom: Devendra Mulachari” by D. D. M. Waidyasekera (2017), which records the architectural works of the master craftsman, chiefly responsible for the design of the Paththirippuwa, Walakulu Bemma, and Mangul Maduwa.

The names of hundreds of master craftsmen and other artificers have been carefully recorded, yet their works remain largely obscure, without their corresponding works save the creations of a few celebrated Sittaras. This creates an inconsistency in cultural memory as in pre-Kandyan days.

In theory, elders are often the custodians of memory, transmitting genealogies across generations, providing names, relationships, anecdotes, and related details that written records are not available, although the memory may be selective and biased influenced by various factors. Today such elders are rare, even within our traditional villages. With the passing of elders, the cultural and historical memory tied to ancient villages was obliterated. I can illustrate this with numerous examples taken from my village.

More often genealogical records, especially those produced by descendants of noble families, are not impartial records. They conceal historical truths such as collaboration with colonial expeditions, capture of the last King, betrayal during 1818 and 1848 uprisings as some Kandyan chiefs sided with the British during the 1818 and 1848 uprisings, and their servility to British colonial rulers as junior partners in the administration. Their descendants too later held high office under colonial rule, but genealogical records often present only illustrious service. But modern historians, colonial records, and oral traditions unravel these tainted facts. Some descendants of freedom fighters who were executed or transported to the Isle of France, sometimes rose to prominence under the British.

Although genealogical writers are not historians, they can and do omit vital information if they tarnish family prestige. They can consult archival records, oral traditions, and colonial documents to augment their studies. This writer suggests a combination of all sources as explained at the beginning of this essay.

It is true that the line between genealogical study and historical research is less rigid or open. Both genealogists and researchers may use the same sources, but the distinction lies in the purpose and the method. The primary aim of genealogy is to trace lineage, kinship ties and family continuity. It is basically descriptive and compilatory, but it needs critical assessments. Genealogy becomes research when the genealogist moves beyond compiling sources, and analyzing and interpreting them, situating family history in a wider historical process.

In Kandyan genealogical studies, clashes and serious discrepancies between family records, oral traditions, colonial writings, and modern historical scholarship are common. The problem is how to weigh them against one another looking for convergences. Discrepancies arise when genealogical writers adhere to their own records for family pride or myth making, without consulting other sources, without following a more balanced approach, and allowing the reader to formulate independent perspectives. Failure to engage multiple sources perpetuates partial inquiry rather than historical inquiry.

Wanniachy faithfully traces the ancestry of the Taldena family from the era of King Devanam Piyatissa, drawing upon family history, oral tradition, and two folk poems. Yet his account remains narrowly confined, for he pays little attention to other archival sources, colonial writings, and modern historical scholarship. Works such as Paul E. Pieris’s “Sinhale and the Patriots, 1815–1818” (1950/1995), Tennakone Wimalananda’s “The Great Rebellion of 1818” (1963), are conspicuously absent from his study. Although colonial records remain largely inaccessible to the general public, the writings of modern historians reach a wider audience.

Wimalananda records that Taldena Mohottala, a chieftain of Viyaluwa, saw his house ransacked and destroyed by the British troops during the uprising of 1818. In ancient times, a Mohottala, was a scribe, a secretary, whose main function was collecting and sending the King’s and Dissave’s revenue. Mohottalas of Uva also assumed far greater powers by reason of the distance from the capital, Kandy.

The English dismembered the ancient Uva Maha Disawa, under the almost independent authority of a Maha Disava and created six Disavas, of which one was Oya Palatha.

Paul E. Pieris says that Taldena in recognition of his good work for the British, demanded the post of Disava of Oya Palatha. Owing to his collaboration with the colonial administration, he was appointed Acting Dissava of Oya Palatha. Taldena however, again fell under suspicion, was kept under detention at the Barrier Guard and the British administration thought advisable to remove him from Badulla. As he was ill under detention he could not be removed to Colombo as ordered. He was removed from his position of Oya Palata Disava and was called upon to deposit his valuables at the Badulla Kachcheri, as security for his good behaviuor. On depositing his valuables with the Agent, he was released from detention.

Wimalananda further notes that the Taldena family established marital ties with families in the Batticaloa District. A native of Pottuvil, Mutu Banda’s relative, Sama Kumarihamy alias Ramath, married G. B. Taldena; her second husband was Mutukumaru Murugesu Pillai, and their daughter was Madduma Kumarihamy.

The ancient Maha Disava of Uva was further divided. In my series of articles on the Kandyan chieftains under British rule, I have noted that in 1908 Charles Taldena was appointed Gravets Muhandiram of Kandy by J. P. Lewis, Government Agent of the Central Province. In his report, Lewis observed that this office, as had always been the case, was once again entrusted to a Kandyan, whereas previously it had been conferred upon a “lowcountry” official.

In Chapter Four of his booklet, Wanniachy turns to the history and genealogy of the Mullegama family. Though Mullegama does not belong to Uva, the family is linked to the Taldenas through intermarriage, as he explains. Mullegama itself is a village in Harispattuwa, situated about two kilometers off from the Ambatenna junction along the Kandy–Matale road. In tracing the lineage of the Mullegamas, Wanniachy relies closely on A. C. Lawrie’s Gazetteer of the Central Province of Ceylon (1898).

Mullegama, once Dissava of Wellassa and Dissava of Navayodun Korale supported the British expedition. Yet in 1818, British troops plundered his residence at Wellassa, seizing his most treasured possessions, among them gifts from Sri Vickrema, an elephant, and two horses, which were later sold in Badulla, says Paul E. Peiris. During the Uva uprising, he provided the British with valuable intelligence, and in recognition of his services he was subsequently appointed as Siyapattuwe Adhikaram, a post created by Sri Vickrema, an ironic reward for loyalty despite the plundering.

Lawrie records that the estate of the Mullegama Maha Nilame was divided, and that one grandson sold his share to Moormen of Akurana. He further notes that all the walawwa lands were eventually sold, with a Moorman of Akurana purchasing part of the walawwa, repairing it, and residing there. The pathetic decline of the Mullegama estates is poignantly reflected in Asoka M. Herath’s Sinhala novel Nindagama (2002), a symbolic resonance of the literary echo of dispossession.

I am acutely aware that independent researchers and genealogists of Kandyan families often incur the displeasure of presentday descendants, for the facts they uncover are seldom palatable. Their inquiries reveal that certain ancestors occupied the lower rungs of the royal administration yet later attained high office under the British through collaboration with the colonial regime. Such revelations, though historically significant, provoke resentment among descendants who prefer to sustain more exalted narratives of lineage. This genealogical selectivity perpetuates sanitised family histories and conceals the complexities of colonial collaboration.

In Kandyan genealogical studies compiled by kinsmen, attention is almost exclusively bestowed upon the illustrious figures who once served the king. Their descendants, even those living today, are relegated to mere entries in family trees, noted with their matrimonial alliances. Wanniachy’s book is no exception.

Why does this occur? By highlighting only those ancestors who held office or enjoyed distinction, families reinforced their claims to nobility and social standing. Descendants, unless they themselves attained prominence, were recorded routinely since their presence served only continuity but not prestige.

I thought it necessary to highlight certain technical shortcomings of the book. In the present publishing climate, design has become a matter of considerable importance. Proper book design requires attention to margins, chapter titles, and other elements of presentation. Moreover, the volume carries no ISBN, indicating that it has not been registered with the National Library. This omission prevents the work from being catalogued in the Sri Lanka National Archives, the Museum Library, the National Library, and the University of Peradeniya Library and diminishes its archival value. Another notable deficiency is the absence of the author’s address and contact information. (Concluded)

Continue Reading

Features

22nd Amendment: Proof of the pudding will be in the eating

Published

on

Superior Courts Complex

by Jehan Perera

It appears that the die has been cast on the 22nd Amendment. The government appears unshaken in its determination to ensure its passage into law. From the government’s perspective, the 22nd Amendment and associated legislation, by increasing the tenure of all judges by two years, will give them the extra time to complete their existing cases. This will do away with the need to change judges midstream and have complex legal cases go back to the beginning, which has too often been the case. The completion of these cases will be to the benefit of the victims who have waited for decades for justice in some cases. It will also be to the government’s benefit as many of the wrongdoers are those in the political opposition. In the past, human rights and democracy activists, not to mention lawyers in the field, have bemoaned the manner in which court cases have got delayed for a variety of reasons, including judges being promoted or transferred midstream or reaching the age of retirement.

Principled opposition to 22nd Amendment is articulated in terms of the ad hoc and sudden emergence of the amendment. Those who advance this argument have expressed concern that extending judges’ tenure could create a sense of indebtedness to the government and weaken judicial independence. They would prefer the extension of judges’ tenure to be part of a comprehensive package of constitutional reforms that would apply across the board to other sectors of the public service and, ideally, find its place in the new constitution that the NPP promised in its election manifesto. The question is one of timing. Public opinion surveys carried out regularly have shown that the vast majority of people consider that corruption and criminality at high levels need to be brought to an end as soon as possible. They want accountability to become real rather than remain an unfulfilled promise. The public mood today is that the era of impunity must finally end.

Investigations by law enforcement agencies into the misdeeds of politicians in the past have too often come to naught due to the lack of political will on the part of successive governments. But on this occasion there is a manifest expression of such political will, as witnessed in the seemingly endless series of corruption and criminality cases being uncovered and exposed week by week and month by month. It is equally predictable that those under investigation will seek to challenge the legitimacy of this process. Some will perceive the prosecutions as essentially being in the nature of political revenge rather than lawful accountability and argue along those lines. Others will seek to rally public opinion by questioning the independence of the institutions involved. These reactions should surprise no one. But they make it all the more important that the credibility of the institutions through which accountability is pursued be safeguarded.

Safeguard Change

There is an old saying that society is a mule, not a horse. A horse may respond to repeated use of the spurs, but a mule, if driven too hard, may throw its rider off altogether. The proverb captures an important truth about governing societies. History offers many examples of societies that succeeded in exposing wrongdoing but failed to build reconciliation afterwards. The greatest danger is not merely that the guilty will protest their innocence. That is to be expected. The greater danger is that punishment itself becomes the principal language of politics. When that happens, each change of government carries with it the expectation that today’s judgments will tomorrow be revisited, reversed or avenged.

The electoral verdicts of 2024 that swept the NPP into power brought an entirely new group of political leaders to the fore. This transition needs to take place with care to ensure that polarisation and civil conflict are contained rather than intensified. The post-22nd Amendment period will therefore require something more than legal correctness. It will require political sagacity. Accountability needs to be seen in the light of strengthening the legitimacy of institutions rather than becoming sidetracked into another arena of political contestation. If justice comes to be seen as merely the continuation of politics by legal means, even deserving convictions of wrongdoers may lose public confidence on which long lasting justice depends.

Troubling in this context has been the conduct of some opponents of the amendment. They have not only attacked the government leadership for taking forward the 22nd Amendment. They have also launched personal attacks on judges and cast sweeping aspersions on the judiciary itself. Ironically, in seeking to discredit the courts before they deliver their judgments, they risk undermining the very institution they claim to defend. The lawyers who have united against the 22nd Amendment have every right and duty to raise constitutional concerns. Opposition politicians have every right to criticise legislation. But both also carry a responsibility not to erode public confidence in the judiciary through speculative accusations that prejudge the integrity of judges before they have acted. Such argumentation weakens an institution that belongs to the entire country, not to any government or opposition.

Real Test

Sri Lanka is emerging from decades of violent conflict and deep political polarization. Too often in our history, one government’s triumph has become the next government’s point of demonization as in the once widely used phrase of the “17 year curse” by the successor government. Institutions rebuilt today must therefore survive tomorrow’s transfer of power. They must earn the confidence not only of those who celebrate today’s victories, but also of those who will one day sit in opposition. Institutions that command confidence across political divides need to become stronger and not weaker than the governments that created them.

The national challenge is no longer simply whether accountability will be pursued. It is whether accountability will restore faith in the law by ending a culture of impunity that for too long protected the powerful while denying justice to victims. The country has waited too long for that moment. It must not now be compromised by unnecessary political confrontation or irresponsible attacks on the courts. Ultimately, the strongest answer to the critics of the 22nd Amendment will not come from government ministers or parliamentary speeches. It will need to come from the judges themselves.

The extension of the tenure of members of the judiciary will place an even greater obligation upon them to demonstrate, through every judgment they deliver, that they are truly independent, impartial and beholden to no political authority. If they uphold the law without fear or favour, they will expose the predictions of the doomsayers as unfounded. Those in the legal profession, media, civil society and politics should likewise recognise that criticism of judicial decisions must not become an assault on the institution of the judiciary itself. The greatest service that all sides can render Sri Lanka at this moment is to strengthen the people’s faith that justice belongs equally to every citizen and that no one, however powerful, stands above the law.

Continue Reading

Trending