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Indian Ocean zone of peace torpedoed!

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The US Navy’s torpedo attack on the Iranian frigate, IRIS Dena, on 4th March 2026, just outside Sri Lanka’s territorial waters, killed over 80 Iranian sailors. The Sri Lanka Navy rescued over 30 sailors and provided medical assistance for them in Galle while also recovering the floating corpses of the victims. Thereafter, a second Iranian naval vessel, the IRIS Bushehr, which also requested permission to dock, was permitted into Trincomalee by the Sri Lanka Navy, after separating its crew from the ship and bringing them to Colombo. A third ship, the IRIS Lavan, an amphibious landing vessel, requested to dock in the Southern Indian port of Cochin, with 183 crew, on the same day the Dena was attacked, and has been there since.

There are many aspects of these three incidents that have not been dealt with by the mainstream media, with any degree of seriousness, and warrants deeper analysis.

While the US and Iran are at war, the destruction of the frigate happened within Sri Lanka’s Exclusive Economic Zone, but outside its territorial waters within which other countries, too, have rights of navigation. That is, this was far away from the main theatre of war in West Asia. But with this unprovoked attack in the Indian Ocean, the war and its consequences have come to Sri Lanka and India’s home-turf. The Dena was taking part in the MILAN 2026 naval exercise, organised by the Indian Navy, from 15th – 25th February, 2026, in which the US was also scheduled to take part, but, interestingly, withdrew from at the eleventh hour. One of the requirements of this exercise was for participating vessels to not carry ammunition. The Dena would have ordinarily been armed with various missiles and guns, including anti-ship missiles. Since the US was also supposed to take part in the exercise, this crucial information would also have been part of the US’s knowledge.

In this sense, it was an unprovoked attack against a ship that the US Navy knew well could not have defended itself. In real terms, this is no different from the US-Israeli alliance’s bombing of the girls’ school, ‘Shajareh Tayyebeh,’ in the town of Minab, in southern Iran, on 28th February, killing 165 people who were mostly children. Again, unprovoked and even worse, defenseless. In more recent times, President Trump has blamed this attack on the Iranians themselves, and as usual, without evidence.

The US attack changes the rules of the game. This establishes that any unarmed ship – military or otherwise – is fair game to any state which has the wherewithal to attack and get away with it. The US’s usual bravado, hero-centric narratives and talk of being fair in military contexts has been typified by countless Hollywood war movies, from Rambo to Sniper. However, US Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth has clearly indicated the present reality and precedent when he noted the US would now ignore “stupid rules of engagement” and “[punch] them while they’re down.” Hegseth and the US war machine have now given Iran and anybody else who wishes to engage with the US, the same set of rules of engagement governed under the Law of the Jungle.

The sinking of the Iranian frigate, Colombo’s rescue of the victims and providing protection to the Bushehr and its crew, and India offering refuge to the IRIS Lavan and its crew but remaining silent about it until after the news on the Sri Lankan action broke out, open many questions for reflection.

All three ships had been invited by the Indian Navy to take part in an international exercise involving over 70 countries. The crew of the Dena had even paraded in the presence of the Indian President not too long before their untimely end. Having invited them to the exercise and given the hostile environment the unarmed Iranian vessels would have to face in the prevailing conditions of war, why did the Indian Navy or the country’s government not invite the Iranian ships to anchor in the relative safety of one of its harbors or even in Visakhapatnam itself where the exercise took place? This would have been a matter of political courtesy. On the other hand, did the Iranians even request such help from India except for the Lavan in the same way they asked the Sri Lankans? At the time of writing, we do not have clear answers to these crucial questions which have not been, by and large, raided in any serious way.

It is ironic that the attacks took place in a ‘zone of peace’. The resolution declaring the ‘Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace’ was initially proposed by then Prime Minister of Ceylon Sirimavo Bandaranaike at the 1964 Non-Aligned Conference and was later adopted by the UN General Assembly as Resolution 2832 (XXVI) on 16th December 1971. Although the declaration was never taken seriously by the usual bandwagon of chronically belligerent states, particularly the US and the likes of China, France, Russia, UK, etc., violence as significant as the sinking of the Dena with its death toll and environmental consequences to the countries in the region, particularly to Sri Lanka, has not happened since the declaration.

The incident also took place within an area recent Indian foreign policy regards as its ‘neighbourhood’ under its ‘Neighbourhood First’ strategy, officially introduced in 2014. It is aimed at strengthening India’s ties with Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka guided by five basic principles which include Respect, Dialogue, Peace, Prosperity and Culture. Is it not surprising that India, with its unquestionable leadership in the region, could not prevent something this destructive in its own neighbourhood, or even offer help or protection after the naval exercise, to the beleaguered Iranians with whose country India has traditionally had a strong and long association? It is in this context that one can understand former Indian Foreign Minister Kanwal Sibal’s observation on X that “the US has ignored India’s sensitivities as the ship was in these waters because of India’s invitation.” It is disrespectful towards India, to say the least, when the country’s government has, in recent times, made herculean efforts to be included in the country club to which the US, Israel and other such nations belong.

Things look much worse against the backdrop of India’s deafening silence. For all its rhetoric, India comes off as small, insignificant and afraid in this situation which does not help if it still wishes to be taken seriously as an undisputed leader in the Global South. On the other hand, if the Indian government has completed its move in the direction of the Global North (obviously not geographically but politically) and wishes to be included within the rich, the powerful and the belligerent in the prevailing world order, then this positioning is correct. Perhaps, taken in India’s national interest, this is fair enough.

Unfortunately, however, the big boys in the ‘west’ do not still seem to consider India as an equal despite all it has to offer economically and all its efforts to be included in the big boys’ club. After all, Trump’s demand that India stop buying petroleum products from Russia, despite its cost-effectiveness, and only from US-declared sources, was accepted by India, without much resistance. Now, the US has declared that India has a window of 30 days to buy Russian oil, given the developing situation in the Strait of Hormuz because of the US-Israeli war. Unfortunately, this is not the way equals treat each other.

In this context, the following observation in the 8th March editorial of The Morning becomes pertinent and throws light on the instability and opaqueness of the region and its taken-for-granted positions of leadership in the global scheme of things: “India has, in the past, demonstrated a willingness to intervene diplomatically when foreign naval vessels, particularly those belonging to China, attempted to enter Sri Lankan ports. On several occasions, New Delhi has openly objected to Chinese research ships docking in Sri Lanka, arguing that such visits could have security implications for India.” This is not simply a reality but now standard diplomatic practice for India when dealing with Sri Lanka. As The Morning editorial further pointed out, “given that precedent, many observers are now asking a different question: why was there such silence when an American submarine was operating in close proximity to Sri Lanka and ultimately launched an attack that has transformed the region into a perceived conflict zone?

If India possesses the strategic awareness and diplomatic leverage to monitor the movements of Chinese vessels near Sri Lanka, surely it must also have been aware of the growing tensions involving the Iranian ship.”

It is into this situation that Sri Lanka has been reluctantly drawn in. Before the destruction of the Dena, the Sri Lankan government had been in contact with the frigate and Iranian officials in Colombo for 11 hours to work out how the Iranian ship could be given refuge in the country’s waters. Sri Lanka’s political Opposition in Parliament has blamed the government for the seemingly inordinate time taken to make this decision. It is during this time that the Dena was destroyed, causing mass casualties. While it would have been good if Sri Lanka acted earlier and saved more lives, things are not that simple. Sri Lanka found itself in a very difficult situation and without much local experience, or precedence, on how to deal with such conditions. After all, with a Navy, that is the smallest in the region, next to the Maldives, the country’s political leaders might have been rightly concerned that a country as belligerent as the US, with its naval assets in the ocean nearby, including the facilities in Diego Garcia merely 1776 km away might bomb Sri Lankan facilities, too.

After all, it is the belligerent and the powerful that call the shots in the existing world order, as they have done for centuries. If so, there is no way the country’s combined military could defend itself. And as has been made painfully apparent in recent years, there are no friends when push comes to shove. So, the time taken is understandable as a matter of caution, particularly when considering that Sri Lanka does not have standard operational procedures to deal with maritime emergencies of this kind. Besides, the Iranians were not invited to the area by the Sri Lankans but by Indians. The hosts by then had gone completely silent.

Dealing with the situation of the second ship, the Bushehr has also not been easy. As the Sri Lankan President noted in his press conference on 5th March, the docking request for the Bushehr was “described as a visit to enhance cooperation.” Further as he noted, “as everyone knows, a cooperation visit does not take place in such a manner; it requires extensive formal procedures. Therefore, we were studying those procedures.” Obviously, the Iranians were attempting to minimise the military nature of their ships and gain access to Sri Lankan ports on a pretext such as technical difficulties rather than directly making it clear that they needed protection in a situation of war. But this pretext is to fulfill a technical legal requirement. It is very likely that the Iranians were trying to use the practices of customary international law and 1907 Hague Convention (XIII) based upon the principle of force majeure (unavoidable accident or superior force), providing for humanitarian exceptions to the strict prohibition against using the waters of neutral countries.

It is to the credit of the Sri Lankan government that it acted decisively, soon after the Dena was destroyed, by rapidly dispatching its Navy to conduct rescue and recovery operations and also by separating the crew of 208 from the Bushehr and dispatching them to two different harbours. By doing so, Sri Lanka, perhaps unknowingly, has come up with operational procedures that can be used in situations like this in the future. That is, ensuring that the crew and the ship were no longer militarily engaged and under direct Sri Lankan control rather than the Iranians and, therefore, hopefully not a target of yet another US attack. While the Dena rescue was ongoing, the Indian Navy had issued a list of actions it had taken, including naming the types of vessels and aircraft it had dispatched to aid in the search but never mentioning the US attack. If the intention was to show that they were not sitting idly by, this was too little and too late. The Lankan Navy, despite its size, is perfectly capable of running a rescue operation of this kind in its own backyard after years of experience throughout the civil war. Besides, there is no indication that the Sri Lankan Navy had asked for outside help.

Intriguingly, all this while there was no news from the Indian Navy or its government of the Lavan requesting to dock in Cochin as early as 28th February or that it had in fact reached that harbour on 5th March and its crew accommodated in Indian naval facilities which was the right thing to do. All this information literally trickled out only after the destruction of the Dena, the rescue of its survivors and safeguarding of the Bushehr and its crew by the Sri Lankans had hit international headlines with considerable positivity. It almost seems as if the Indian Navy and its government were waiting to see the potential consequences of the Sri Lankan action, prior to making their own action known, despite already having done what was right.

The Sri Lankan President was also at pains to reiterate the neutrality of the country for obvious reasons. After all, if the current war situation is to be considered even superficially, the clearest point it makes is that the world’s most powerful countries are led by mad men with no sense of ethics or empathy. As he noted, “our position has been to safeguard our neutrality while demonstrating our humanitarian values.” He further noted, “amidst all this, as a government, we have intervened in a manner that safeguards the reputation and dignity of our country, protects human lives and demonstrates our commitment to international conventions. That intervention is currently ongoing … We do not act in a biased manner towards any state, nor do we submit to any state … we firmly believe that this is the most courageous and humanitarian course of action that a state can take.” The government also has been cautious to be guided by customary international law, the 1907 Hague Convention (XIII) as well as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea as subsequent declarations have indicated. After a long time, Sri Lankan action with global consequences sounds both statesmanlike and very Buddhist.

Here, I agree with the President without reservation. This is the only way Sri Lanka could have acted in this situation in a world of relative inaction and a regional context marked by uncomfortable silence.

This is a good illustration of independence and statesmanship by a small state even under very difficult conditions. Hopefully, the government will continue on this path in other instances, too, that is, not to “submit to any state” despite pressure and provocation. It must become a necessary part of Sri Lanka’s international and national policy framework governing all actions.



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Regime change and the vacuum:Strategic lessons of Iraq and Libya

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Post-Gaddafi Civil war: the rebellion triggered by the arab spring of 2011 soon toppled the regime of Muammar Gaddafi. the power vacuum created by Gaddafi’s ouster has been exploited by local actors, as well as extraneous actors, with the only intention of making libya a war theatre for proxy wars and political disintegration

by Col. (R) Nalin Herath

There is a question that the international community must periodically ask itself: What happens to a State after its regime has been ousted?

The question is particularly relevant when examining Iraq and Libya. Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi were authoritarian rulers. Their governments were associated with political repression, human-rights violations and the suppression of political opposition. None of this should be ignored or excused. But recognising the failures of authoritarian rule does not prevent us from asking another, equally important strategic question:

Did the removal of these regimes adequately prepare for what came next?

The experience of Iraq and Libya suggests that removing a ruler is considerably easier than replacing the political, administrative and security architecture around that ruler.

Danger of confusing regime change with State reconstruction

A state is more than its leader. It consists of institutions, security forces, civil servants, courts, political structures, infrastructure, economic systems and, perhaps most importantly, an accepted monopoly over the legitimate use of force. When an authoritarian system has concentrated enormous power around one individual, removing that individual can expose weaknesses that were previously hidden. The strategic mistake is to assume that once the dictator has gone, a democratic and stable state will naturally emerge. History does not support such an assumption. The aftermath of Iraq demonstrates this particularly clearly. Following the 2003 invasion, the Coalition Provisional Authority issued Order No. 2, formally dissolving the Iraqi Ministry of Defence and the Iraqi Army, among other security institutions. A US congressional report later documented the enormous consequences of this decision, including the disappearance of hundreds of thousands of military personnel from the institutional framework of the state. Whatever the intentions behind the decision, the strategic consequence was that an established security structure had to be rebuilt while the country was simultaneously experiencing political upheaval and growing violence. That is a dangerous combination.

Iraq: Removing the structure before building the replacement

Saddam Hussein’s government was unquestionably authoritarian. It also reflected a complicated sectarian and political structure in which members of the Sunni minority occupied disproportionate positions of power despite being a demographic minority. But the question for strategic planners should not simply be whether Saddam deserved to remain in power. The question should have been:

What institutional structure would replace the system once he was removed?

An army can be politically controlled without being politically representative. A bureaucracy can serve an authoritarian government while still providing essential state functions. A security institution can be reformed without necessarily being destroyed. The distinction between reforming institutions and eliminating institutions is therefore critical. The post-2003 experience demonstrated the consequences of institutional disruption. Security vacuums contributed to insurgency and instability, while the process of rebuilding Iraq’s security forces took place amid an increasingly deteriorating security environment. The lesson is not that authoritarian institutions should never be reformed. The lesson is that state capacity should not be casually destroyed without a credible replacement.

Libya: prosperity, authoritarianism and institutional fragility

Libya presents an even more complicated case. Gaddafi’s government was authoritarian and deeply personalised. Political freedom was severely restricted, and the security apparatus was deliberately structured around regime survival. Yet Libya, under Gaddafi, also used substantial oil revenues to fund education, healthcare, infrastructure and social services. World Bank data from around the end of the Gaddafi era show life expectancy reaching approximately 75 years by 2011, skilled attendance at birth at 100 percent and measles immunisation at 98 percent. This does not prove that Gaddafi’s system was politically legitimate. It demonstrates something different: economic and social outcomes can coexist with authoritarian political structures.

The Great Man-Made River illustrates the scale of Libya’s investment ambitions. The World Bank described the project as one of the world’s largest engineering schemes, involving thousands of kilometres of planned pipelines to transport water from deep desert aquifers toward the populated coastal belt. The original project was estimated at approximately US$ 25 billion over several phases. Again, this should not become nostalgia for dictatorship. It should become a lesson in state capacity.

What happened after Gaddafi?

The post-2011 experience is perhaps the clearest illustration of the vacuum problem. Libya did not simply move from dictatorship to a consolidated democratic state. Instead, competing armed groups, political factions and institutions emerged. A UN economic and social affairs analysis concluded that the fall of the Gaddafi regime exposed weak state institutions and that the post-Gaddafi period was characterised by the proliferation of armed militias and institutional fragmentation.

The World Bank has similarly described how the security vacuum allowed armed groups to expand, while attempts to integrate them into the formal security apparatus produced a hybrid system in which state institutions and powerful armed groups operated alongside one another. This is the heart of the lesson. The consequences of regime change were also evident in Libya. The 2012 Benghazi attack, later portrayed in 13 Hours: The Secret Soldiers of Benghazi, illustrated the security vacuum that emerged after Gaddafi’s fall. The collapse of central authority allowed militias and competing armed groups to fill the space left by weakened state institutions. The lesson is clear: removing a regime may achieve military victory, but without a credible plan to rebuild the state, victory can quickly become a security vacuum.

When the state withdraws, something else occupies the space. If the replacement is not a legitimate national institution, the vacuum can be filled by militias, tribes, ideological movements, criminal networks or competing political authorities. The vacuum does not remain empty.

Terrorism question

There is another uncomfortable issue. Authoritarian regimes frequently suppress political and armed movements through coercive security systems. When those systems disappear abruptly, previously contained organisations can find new operating space. This does not mean that dictatorship is an appropriate method of counterterrorism. It means that counterterrorism cannot be separated from State capacity. The international community therefore needs to distinguish between defeating a particular terrorist organisation and maintaining the institutional conditions that prevent multiple armed actors from competing for power. The destruction of one regime does not automatically eliminate the forces that created insecurity. Sometimes it creates an environment in which those forces multiply.

Strategic mistake: winning the war but losing the peace

Military intervention can have a clearly defined operational objective. State reconstruction does not. A military campaign may successfully remove a government in weeks or months. Building legitimate institutions can take decades.This creates a fundamental strategic asymmetry. The shorter the planning horizon for intervention, the greater the danger of a long-term vacuum. The international community therefore needs to think beyond the first question: How do we remove the regime?

It must ask: Who governs the country the next morning? Who controls the borders? Who controls the security forces? Who pays government employees? Who maintains electricity, water and hospitals? Who protects critical infrastructure? Who administers justice? Who prevents armed groups from becoming alternative governments? Who provides political legitimacy? And perhaps most importantly: Who possesses the authority to enforce the decisions of the new state? If there are no convincing answers, regime change is only the beginning of the problem.

The lesson should not be that the United States or its allies should never intervene. Nor should it be that Saddam Hussein or Muammar Gaddafi should be rehabilitated as models of governance. The lesson is more practical. Regime change must never be confused with state-building.

Before dismantling an established political order, external powers need a credible understanding of the institutions that will replace it. Security-sector reform should normally distinguish between individuals who must be removed and institutions that must be preserved. A national army may need reform. A ministry may need restructuring. A security service may need accountability and civilian oversight. But destroying institutional capacity without having an operational replacement can create consequences far beyond the original objective.

Wider geopolitical lesson

The consequences of Iraq and Libya did not remain within their borders. State fragmentation affects neighbouring countries, migration, organised crime, arms trafficking, terrorism, energy markets and regional power competition. In today’s interconnected world, a failed transition in one country can become a security problem for an entire region. That is why intervention planning should include not only military objectives but also political, economic, humanitarian and security-sector objectives. The most important planning document may therefore not be the operational plan for removing the regime. It may be the plan for Day One after the regime has disappeared.

History should not be written as a simple choice between dictatorship and democracy. The real strategic challenge is more complicated. Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi were dictators. Their governments committed serious abuses, and their populations had legitimate grievances. But the failures of authoritarian rule do not automatically justify the destruction of state institutions without a credible plan for rebuilding them. The experience of Iraq and Libya demonstrates a fundamental principle of international security: A political vacuum is not neutral space. Someone will fill it. If legitimate national institutions cannot fill that space, armed groups, sectarian interests, extremist organisations or foreign-backed factions may do so. The ultimate lesson for the United States, its allies and the wider international community is therefore straightforward:

Removing a regime may win the immediate battle. Building a legitimate, functioning and secure state determines whether the intervention succeeds in the long term. The world should learn to ask not only “How do we remove the dictator?”. It must also ask:

“What happens to the country when he is gone?”

That may be the most important strategic question of all.

(The writer is the Secretary General of the Ceylon Chamber of Shipping, former Director General of the Institute of National Security Studies (INSS), and former Spokesman of the Ministry of Defence. He is also a Non-Resident Fellow at the London Dialogue. His areas of expertise include international relations, geopolitics, maritime affairs, national security, economic policy, and strategic governance. He is a consultant at JITT Group and a member of World Pace Board.).

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‘Death at the Sign of the Rook’

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Tales of Mystery and Suspense – 23

By Prof. Rajiva Wijesinha

As I have noted with regard to the adventures of John Rebus, I am indebted to Dinali Fernando and her husband Steve for whole hosts of thrillers. The latter strongly recommended Kate Atkinson when I borrowed four books. I wondered about this, for I had not been too impressed with her debut novel, Behind the Scenes at the Museum, which was amongst the entries I had to judge for the Eurasian section of the Commonwealth Writing Prize. Two decades later, I had forgotten what it had been about.

But I am glad Steve persuaded me to read her. Kate Atkinson is distinctively British, and Death at the Sign of the Rook is set in a country house and the surrounding village, and seems a modern descendant of the laidback Agatha Christies I so much enjoy.

There are, however, many differences in that we have a policeman who can go rogue, like Rebus, with again a female sidekick who has a mind of her own, again like Rebus. But Jackson Brodie has retired and set up as a private investigator, while Reggie, a young lady, is still in the police.

There is a lesbian couple living in the converted dairy of the manor house, as has occurred in Agatha Christie too, in A Murder is Announced. But they are peripheral to the story, unlike Ben, the brother of one of them who left the army after losing a leg in Afghanistan. When he turns up at the Manor House to shelter from a snowstorm, along with its chatelaine, Lady Milton, he is asked to answer the door as various characters turn up, including Jackson and Reggie, who then starts fantasising about him.

The others who turn up are two couples, one from America, who have paid for a murder weekend at the hotel. The family is impoverished, and has sold lots of pictures to survive, but most recently a Turner had been stolen, almost certainly by Lady Milton’s housekeeper Sophie, who vanished one night along with the picture. Reggie had been involved in that investigation, but there had been no trace of either picture or young lady.

Jackson Brodie suspects a connection between that theft and the one he has been called in to investigate, which has not been reported to the police. The picture hung opposite the bed of an old woman whose carer vanished after she died, along with it. Her children, adopted twins, have asked Jackson to investigate and also try to trace the carer, though he suspects something strange in that they did not go to the police.

Kate Atkinson

Brodie, in studying the stolen art, is also struck by the disappearance of a Rembrandt from a house in Scotland, along with a member of the cleaning staff. He thinks the three women might be the same one.

But Brodie’s assumption that the three women who vanished when valuable pictures did were identical would not have helped except that Beatrice, as she was also called, kept turning up, including to the funeral home where the old lady’s body was kept. And then that picture turned up, in the village church, and was found by the local vicar, Simon Cate, whose life story is also a prominent feature of the novel. He was an aspiring actor but then smitten by faith, and became a priest, but in time he lost his faith. His wife left him after the death of their son, and he is now in this backwater, where he feels he is of no use to anyone. But he has a great feel for living beings, and his most successful service has been one in which he blessed pets. And he was deeply concerned about the bees that Ben looks after for his sister and her wife.

He too staggers into the manor house in the midst of the storm, in which everyone concerned loses their way comprehensively. But amongst those Ben lets in is a man in a tracksuit with cuts and bruises, who then vanishes after he has been led to a bedroom, when Ben went in search of brandy. We soon work out that it is the escaped murderer about whom Reggie has been alerted.

Simon also turns up, through the back door, carrying the picture and also a gun, for he has found the dead body of one of his parishioners when he went to her house in search of his mobile phone. She had been shot and he had picked up the gun he found there. But he could not tell the police, for though he called he had lost his voice, and for the last few days had communicated only through writing.

This chaotic mix of characters at the manor house is further complicated by the group of players putting on the murder mystery play though some members have either cried off or died before reaching the venue. So, there is much doubling up and confusion over who is an actor and who is not.

The grand now largely empty rooms of the manor house, and its various odd passages and multiple doors, make it a splendid set for the lunacy that runs on and on. Reggie finds herself in a pantry Atkinsonwith a dead body, though this turns out to be the nanny who fell down the stairs and was put there by Lady Milton’s younger son. And there is high drama on the roof when the murderer nearly kills Ben, but he is saved by Reggie, and when he tries to kill Brody with an axe, he is shot by Beatrice, who has been the maid who served at the dinner before the murder mystery play, and explains to Brody how she has managed all her thefts.

And then in the melee, she vanishes on a motorbike, along with the daughter of the old lady’s adopted daughter, the only person who seemed to grieve at the funeral, and to whom the old lady had left her house in a codicil to her will, which her children have not known about. She leaves the picture to the carer, but it is brought to Simon Cate as he lies in hospital, recovering from a heart attack which adds confusion to the play.

Wonderfully convoluted, but all very clear, despite the headlong pace of the book and its shifts from one scene to another, from one character to another (or rather combinations of them) and from one-time span to another. A writer and a detective well worth looking out for. e more books by her on Dinali’s shelves.

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Safety, security and teamwork in aviation

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Indian Captain Smit Machchhar injured in the cockpit attack

by Capt. (Ret.).G.A. Fernando, MBA

There are three essential components to a commercial airline operation: safety, security and teamwork.

Aviation and teamwork at the ‘sharp’ end of a commercial aircraft, i.e. the flight deck, is unique. Unlike many other teams, it may be quite literally the first and the last time a particular combination of small teams of two, three, or four individual airmen (or women) will fly together. Sometimes even in the same airline that employs them.

Therefore, to make conditions safe and practical, while understanding and trusting tech other, they have to rely on a series of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), and ‘Normal’ and ‘Emergency’ checklists for every conceivable situation. That is, to be able to do the right things, and do things right. In fact, there is a saying in aviation to the effect that ‘if you make a mistake in aviation, be original and make a new one’.

To ensure that safety standards are constantly maintained, airline pilots’ proficiency is tested every six months, in simulators, under the supervision of examiners from the civil aviation regulator. In Sri Lanka that organisaton is the Civil Aviation Authority-Sri Lanka (CAASL). Three simulator checks are conducted every 12 months in keeping with the tenet that ‘practice makes perfect’. A pithy adage not confined to the world of aviation warns that ‘prior preparation prevents piss-poor performance’.

The simulator exercises include rejected takeoffs, including in cross-wind situations, landings, engine fires and/or engine failures from a variety of causes, cabin pressurisation failure, precision and non-precision approaches, and landings in bad visibility – amongst other conditions that could be expected in actual flight.

In addition, a flight in a real airplane, on a regular passenger service under the supervision of an examiner from the airline, is undertaken to ensure that the company’s standard practices and procedures are carried out and maintained as prescribed in the airline’s manuals. These publications are in turn approved by the national regulator.

Crash axe

Finally, flight crew members must take a written test annually, on emergency equipment locations and procedures, with 90% as the pass mark.

Since the mid-1980s it has been mandatory for airline pilots to undertake a Crew Resource Management (CRM) programme once every two years. This training essentially emphasises what to do and what not to do to, in a specific emergency situation, or even during normal operations, to make the team cohesive and effective. During the course, the CRM facilitators discuss recent incidents and accidents that have occurred. Results of those events are recorded and could be retrieved, when necessary, by the official aviation bodies.

Not unexpectedly, it is demanding on a pilot to fulfill these requirements on a regular basis throughout his/her career, along with presenting for a bi-annual medical examination, all with the objective of retaining one’s licence to operate an aircraft. It may not be understood, therefore, by persons outside the aviation industry, or even some working in other aspects of an airline organisation, that it is often the passion for flight that keeps many pilots doing what they do to earn a living.

Security

Another important factor is the challenge of maintaining security in all aspects of airline operations, not least in the cockpit. The challenges are many, with new ones surfacing almost every day. It is therefore essential to be always prepared for the activities and ‘methods’ of perpetrators seeking to wreak evil on an aircraft and its occupants. As it is impossible for any airline or national security organisation to cover all aspects, systematic management of risks to effect a safe outcome becomes imperative.

Flydubai Incident

In the recent Flydubai incident of 30 September, 2026, a first officer (co-pilot) attacked the captain of the flight with a crash axe to accomplish his sinister motives, into which investigations are continuing. For the time being, it prompts the questions: should the crash axe be easily accessible to the flight crew? Or even be there at all? I believe it is a case of assessing the greater risk.

With regard to that event, and the circumstances that led to it, other deterrents could have been applied more thoroughly. For example, more thorough screening of pilots’ and other crewpersons’ backgrounds, with emphasis on their mental health, ideological affiliations and previous employment history. Separately, during a time of conflict in the Middle East, should Flydubai have even been operating between Dubai and Tel Aviv? Notwithstanding that cost-cutting and profit maximisation are key aims of any business, an airline’s apparent failure to conduct adequate psychological profiling of flight crew members, while continuing to operate ‘profitable’ routes, regardless of potential danger, can only be regarded and condemned as greed and disregard for human lives.

( Captain. Fernando, RCyAF, SLAF, Air Ceylon, Air Lanka, Singapore Airlines (SIA), SriLankan Airlines, Former Chief Pilot, Air Lanka Boeing 737, Former Deputy Chief Pilot, Lockheed L 1011, Former Crew Resource Management (CRM) Facilitator, SIA, Former Deputy Director (Air Operations) CAASL, Former President, Aircraft Owners and Operators Association Sri Lanka (AOAOASL), President, The Colombo Flying Club, Representative for Aviation, Organisation of Professional Associations (OPA), Hony, and Member Sri Lanka Society of Transport and Logistics.)

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