Midweek Review
How Premadasa’s ill-conceived strategies undermined Wanasinghe’s Army
A military funeral was held on the evening of June 15, 2025, at the new crematorium of the General Cemetery, Borella, to bid farewell to the late General Hamilton Wanasinghe (retd.) VSV USP ndc. Wanasinghe passed away at the Military Hospital, Narahenpita, on June 13. The eleventh commander of Sri Lanka Army (SLA), Wanasinghe was 91 at the time of his demise.
Admiral Ravindra C. Wijegunaratne did a piece on the late General, titled ‘A legendary military leader of our time’ (The Island, June 20, 2025 edition) in which the former Navy Commander discussed the late Wanasinghe’s four decades long career that included a turbulent period. Wijegunaratne’s piece is a must read. (https://island.lk/a-legendary-military-leader-of-our-time/)
The writer felt the need to discuss the political and security environment at the time Wanasinghe took over the Army, deployed in support of the police engaged in counter-terrorist operations against the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and sudden eruption of fighting in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. The southern terrorism erupted after India intervened in July 1987 to save the LTTE from annihilation in Sri Lanka’s first brigade-level ground campaign in the Vadamarachchi region.
The Army spearheaded the eradication of the JVP threat by Dec. 1989. The writer covered the hastily arranged press conference at the Operational Headquarters of the Defence Ministry on Nov. 13, 1989, to announce the arrest 0f JVP leader Rohana Wijeweera, and his execution by the Army. Whatever the silly claims made by the UNP, and other interested parties, the truth is that the JVP leader was killed by the Army. Wanasinghe had been there along with State Defence Minister Ranjan Wijeratne, IGP Ernest Perera, State Foreign Affairs Minister John Amaratunga and Defence Secretary Cyril Ranatunga (Captured at Ulapane and flown to Colombo: Rohana Wijeweera killed and cremated yesterday, The Island, Nov. 14, 1989).
The Indo-Lanka accord forced on Sri Lanka effectively confined the armed forces to their barracks during the period July 1987-March 1990. By the time India ended its controversial mission here, all bases of the security forces in the Northern and Eastern provinces had been surrounded by the LTTE and overland access to them effectively cut off.
Wanasinghe served as the commander of Army at the time Eelam War II erupted in the second week of June 1990, just four months after the withdrawal of the Indian Army. Wanasinghe’s ill-prepared Army, deployed in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, had to face the brunt of the fighting. The consequences were devastating.
President Ranasinghe Premadasa simply pursued his political strategies, at the expense of national security, and the results were catastrophic. The UNP leader’s political-military miscalculations gave the battlefield advantage to the LTTE, and leader Velupillai Prabhakaran exploited the President’s weaknesses to the hilt before he ordered the UNP leader’s assassination.
Wanasinghe succeeded Air Chief Marshal Walter Fernando as Secretary to the Ministry of Defence several weeks after President Premadasa’s assassination. Wanasinghe held that post from June 06, 1993 to February 10, 1995. Having won both parliamentary and presidential elections in 1994, Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga effected far reaching changes. In line with the People’s Alliance (PA) thinking, Kumaratunga did away with the practice of having senior retired military officers as the Secretary to the Ministry of Defence. After the introduction of the 1978 Constitution, that vital post had been held consecutively by Colonel C.A. Dharmapala, General Sepala Attygalle, General Cyril Ranatunga, Air Chief Marshal Walter Fernando and General Hamilton Wanasinghe. Kumaratunga brought in one-time head of the Elections Department, Chandrananda Silva, who served in that post from 1995 to 2001.
Let me examine the circumstances leading to Eelam War II that caused the swift overall deterioration of the ground situation, the northern battles and debilitating setbacks the Army suffered. Wanasinghe of the Artillery succeeded Engineers’ officer Lt. Gen. Nalin Seneviratne, VSV, on August 16, 1988. Wanasinghe held the top post till Nov. 15, 1991. during a violent period.
Counter-terrorist operations in South
The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) had been on the rampage in areas outside the Northern and Eastern Provinces and the Army was fully deployed to combat terrorism in the South. The crisis that engulfed the country during Wanasinghe’s tenure as the Commander of Army cannot be discussed without taking into consideration President Ranasinghe Premadasa’s response to the growing challenge posed by the LTTE and the JVP. Premadasa’s ill-conceived actions/decisions caused unprecedented mayhem.
Having won the presidential election in Dec. 1988, Premadasa ordered the release of as many as 1,800 suspected JVPers who had been detained by the military and the police. That was done soon after he took oaths at the ‘Paththirippuwa’ at the Dalada Maligawa, in Kandy, on January 2, 1989, like a Sri Lankan king of the past, raising many an eyebrow. The writer, into his third year in journalism, covered that event and what followed was nothing but tragedy.
The then President felt that he could initiate a dialogue with the JVP by releasing its members. Unfortunately, the JVP took advantage of the situation. The then professed Marxist organisation unleashed the newly released men on their political opponents. They had extra hands to cause death and destruction. The release of JVPers was nothing but a cardinal mistake perpetrated by Premadasa.
Premadasa foolishly felt no need to consult the military top brass, or the police, regarding his bid to win over the JVP. The President went a step further, in the wrong direction. Having called for direct talks with the LTTE, the President personally handled the negotiations (May 1989 to June 1990) but obviously Velupillai Prabhakaran had other ideas. The LTTE struck just four months after Premadasa got rid of the Indian Army.
As for such erratic behaviour by President Premadasa, we have to grant that the society is partially to blame, for Premadasa was entirely a self-made man who literally survived by his instincts against many an odd, especially due to caste prejudices he had to suffer throughout his life, some imaginary no doubt like JRJ himself was plotting to make either Lalith Athulathmudali or Gamini Dissanayake his successor. The man, dubbed the 20th Century Fox, was only playing his top men against each other instead of being a threat to him. But he had clearly signalled Premadasa as his successor by appointing him the Prime Minister, but because of his inborn insecurity and the known vileness of JRJ, he did not trust him.
General Gerry de Silva, in his widely read A most noble profession, aptly described the deteriorating situation in the run up to Eelam War II. Having acknowledged that the political and military leadership had failed to recognise the rapidly emerging LTTE threat and disregarded what he called constant humiliation meted out to the armed forces and police by Tigers, the former commander asserted that politico-military hierarchy had to bear up as they didn’t want to cause friction. Wanasinghe had been the Commander of the Army, while General Cyril Ranatunga served as the Defence Secretary. Obviously, they couldn’t talk sense into Premadasa whose irrational directives were carried out by the late A.C. S. Hameed who served as the Foreign Minister at that time.
Having crushed the JVP for the second time, the Army seemed to have not anticipated a conventional type campaign against its isolated detachments in the northern theatre. The LTTE had been in a much better position in the North, having battle hardened against the Indian Army and gained valuable experience. By then, on the orders of the President, the Army had facilitated Prabhakaran to annihilate rival Tamil groups. The Tamil National Army that had been hastily formed by India, prior to their departure, and Varatharaja Perumal installed by them as the Chief Minister of the NE provincial administration, suffered irreversible losses against a series of lightning operations by the LTTE.
During President Premadasa’s honeymoon with the LTTE, the latter received at least Rs 125 mn in outright handouts from the Treasury, in addition to arms, ammunition and other requisites. The President had been so adamant in pursuing his foolish political-military strategy, even after the LTTE resumed hostilities, the UNP leader ordered the then Treasury Chief R. Paskaralingam to release funds. Paskaralingam transferred Rs 50 mn on Nov. 05, 1990, six months after Prabhakaran’s treachery. There had been altogether 16 cash transfers, with the Nov. 05, 1990, transfer being the largest single fund transfer to the LTTE.
Army caught off-guard
The LTTE destroyed the Kokkali Army detachment on the afternoon of July 13, 1990. Having unilaterally ended the 14-month long ceasefire (May 5, 1989-June 10, 1990), the LTTE swiftly gained the upper hand in the Jaffna peninsula and the Vanni, though, in the East, the group faced fierce resistance by combined security forces.
The LTTE targeted troops and police based at the Jaffna Fort at the onset of Eelam war II. It had been the LTTE’s main target in the peninsula. By the last week of June, 1990, the LTTE had been exploring ways and means of overwhelming those beleaguered security forces personnel after having cut off access to and from that base. The Army couldn’t even evacuate their wounded personnel.
A deeply embarrassed Gen. Wanasinghe had no option but to seek the help of the SLAF to evacuate those who had been wounded and trapped in the Jaffna Fort. The Army couldn’t even muster a force to mount a limited ground assault to facilitate the SLAF operation.
Wanasinghe’s predicament must be examined taking into consideration that he, at the behest of Premadasa, supervised the transfer of arms, ammunition and equipment to the LTTE to carry out attacks against the Indian Army. Now his own Army was at the receiving end of those weapons.
In an interview with the writer soon after he was told of President Premadasa’s decision to appoint him as the Commander of the Army, the then Maj. Gen. Wanasinghe discussed ways and means of improving the combat readiness of troops. A jubilant Wanasinghe revealed his plans to expand the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) to meet any eventuality, while emphasising the importance of training troops in jungle operations (Wanasinghe new Army chief––The Island Aug. 7, 1988).
Due to the failure on the part of the Army to evacuate the wounded and send in reinforcements to Jaffna fort, the SLAF was asked to launch an unprecedented operation to airlift the wounded. The unparalleled operation was codenamed ‘Eagle.’
Premadasa’s ill-fated policy of appeasement had weakened the armed forces to such an extent the military top brass were in a permanent state of flux.
The SLAF, too, had been under heavy pressure to mount a rescue operation. It would be pertinent to mention here that the SLAF didn’t have the capability to demolish LTTE positions, situated close to the Jaffna Fort, to enable helicopters to land in the fort. The government hadn’t felt the need to acquire jets, dedicated helicopter gunships or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to facilitate a complicated operation.
Sri Lanka paid attention to enhance firepower only after the LTTE took the upper hand in the North. The SLAF acquired supersonic jets (Chinese F7 and FT 7) in 1991, Kfirs in 1996 and MiG 27s in 2000. The SLAF took delivery of helicopter gunships (Mi 24s) in 1995 and UAVs the following year.
The SLAF initially scheduled Operation Eagle for July 4, 1990. At the eleventh hour, the SLAF advanced the operation by 24 hours. The SLAF decided to mount the operation at 4 a.m. on July 3, 1990.
With the Jaffna fort having been under siege for 21 days, the Army top brass felt it was only a matter of days before the LTTE fought its way into the Dutch built fortress. In fact, many senior officers had given up hope of saving those trapped in the Jaffna fort, when the SLAF took up the daunting task and carried it out successfully. The SLAF achieved success in the wake of two earlier abortive missions.
The then Air Force Commander, Air Vice Marshal Terrence Gunawardena and the late Group Capt. Anselm Peiris, who functioned as the mission commander, too, had been present at Ratmalana when a fixed wing aircraft, carrying the wounded, touched down there at 8 a.m. (Dramatic rescue of injured men from Jaffna Fort––The Island – July 4, 1990).
Soon after the conclusion of the rescue mission, President Premadasa visited thr SLAF headquarters to thank the officers involved in the rescue mission.
No one dared to challenge Premadasa when he ordered the Army to surrender to the LTTE at the onset of Eelam War II.
Although the daring rescue mission boosted the morale of the Army, it didn’t stop the rapid deterioration of the ground situation in the northern region. The LTTE was on the offensive, with the Army struggling to counter the growing threat on all major bases in the Jaffna peninsula and the Vanni region. Officers and men had been thoroughly demoralised and as a result, desertions were extremely high in spite of troops making some headway in the Eastern Province. But, even in the Eastern Province, the Army had suffered some stunning setbacks as the LTTE brought in experienced units in to the battle.
Having quickly taken the upper hand in the Batticaloa District, the LTTE mounted attacks on Kinniya, Uppuveli and Muttur police stations. The LTTE quickly overran Kinniya, though the police at Muttur repulsed the attack with the support of troops based at the adjoining Army detachment. As the Army feared those defending Muttur could not manage the situation on their own, the Army top brass authorised a special operation to relieve them. The then Lt. Commander Lakshman Illangakoon, Commanding Officer of the landing craft ‘Kandula,’ was tasked to ferry troops necessary for the operation.
Chaos in the East
Unfortunately, the operation went awry though the Navy managed to land a contingent of commandos, led by Maj. A. M. Arshad, close to brown rock point, east of Muttur, in the early hours of June 14, 1990. Having allowed the commandos to come ashore without a fight, the LTTE ambushed them a little distance away from the landing point, killing 40. Six commandos, who had survived the ambush, escaped in a boat and drifted for several weeks in the Indian Ocean, though only four managed to reach the beaches of Bangkok in early August 1990. They told how two of their colleagues died during the uncharted journey. At the time of his untimely death, Arshad was to marry the then State Housing Minister Imithiaz Bakeer Markar’s sister (Four commandos escape Tigers, land in Bangkok––The Island Aug. 9, 1990).
Arshad was a distinguished and much admired old boy of Balangoda Central College, according to the then Navy Spokesman Commander Kosala Warnakulasuriya (currently southern commander. He holds the rank of Rear Admiral). For many, Arshad was an inspiring figure, like Colonel Fazly Laphir, Commanding Officer of the 1 Special Forces Regiment, who, too, died in another disastrous rescue mission in July 1996
Exactly a month after the resumption of hostilities with the massacre of over 600 police officers and men after they were ordered to be surrendered to the Tigers by the Premadasa regime, Wanasinghe placed Maj. Gen. Denzil Kobbekaduwa in charge of operations in the Northern region. The situation on the ground had deteriorated to such an extent, Kobbekaduwa’s appointment as the Northern Commander didn’t make any difference. The LTTE had built fortifications around all camps in the Jaffna peninsula as well as in the Vanni. Prabhakaran brazenly took advantage of his ‘honeymoon’ with President Premadasa to build gun positions around bases. The LTTE also moved into positions abandoned by the Indian army.
Besides, President Premadasa had ordered the Army to vacate some of its bases, including strategically positioned troops at Valvettithurai and Point Pedro. The Army could not either reinforce or vacate besieged bases at Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu, Kokavil, Manakulam, Mullaitivu and Jaffna fort.
The Army top brass felt that an urgent offensive was needed to rescue troops in bases vulnerable to an LTTE onslaught. But, the overall planning was chaotic in the absence of a cohesive strategy to decipher the LTTE stratagem. In hindsight, the LTTE was obviously bent on smashing Army bases, situated along the Kandy-Jaffna A9 main road, between Kokavil and Jaffna fort. The Army top brass obviously failed to realise the danger posed by the massive LTTE build-up in the Vanni. Had they realised the threat on the main overland supply route to Jaffna, they would have acted swiftly and decisively. Unfortunately, the Army lacked the wherewithal to reinforce bases situated along the A9. While the Army was engaged in counter insurgency operations against the JVP, in support of the police, the LTTE (July 1987- Feb/March 1990), received much needed retraining. Having crushed the Indian-sponsored TNA in a series of lightning operations, the Tigers had collected a massive arsenal supplied by India, on top of the huge arsenal of weapons supplied by President Premadasa.
Immediately after Maj. Gen. Kobbekaduwa assumed the northern command on July 11, 1990, the LTTE overran the isolated Kokavil detachment, established to protect a Rupavahini tower there. In spite of the detachment being under attack for almost a month, the Army top brass failed to reinforce those defending the base. Lieutenant S.U. Aladeniya of the Sinha Regiment (Second Volunteer battalion) fought to the end, though he was given an opportunity to withdraw at an early stage of the battle.
Refusing to abandon the base, leaving behind casualties, Aladeniya finally urged the Army to pound his own base with long range artillery. Aladeniya was one of the few to receive the Parama Weera Vibhushana (PWV) posthumously, for his gallantry. Army Headquarters pathetically failed to reinforce the Kokavil detachment, comprising two platoons, in spite of Aladeniya calling for reinforcements. They also ran out of ammunition. About 50 volunteers went down fighting at Kokavil. None of their bodies were recovered. Some of the captured volunteer Sinha Regiment personnel are believed to have been executed. Two soldiers who escaped by crawling through the LTTE cordon, managed to reach the Army base at Mankulam, situated north of Kokavil. According to them, those captured were burnt alive.
The rest is history.
By Shamindra Ferdinando
Midweek Review
At the edge of a world war
In September 1939, as Europe descended once more into catastrophe, E. H. Carr published The Twenty Years’ Crisis. Twenty years had separated the two great wars—twenty years to reflect, to reconstruct, to restrain. Yet reflection proved fragile. Carr wrote with unsentimental clarity: once the enemy is crushed, the “thereafter” rarely arrives. The illusion that power can come first and morality will follow is as dangerous as the belief that morality alone can command power. Between those illusions, nations lose themselves.
His warning hovers over the present war in Iran.
The “thereafter” has long haunted American interventions—after Afghanistan, after Iraq, after Libya. The enemy can be dismantled with precision; the aftermath resists precision. Iran is not a small theater. It is a civilization-state with a geography three times larger than Iraq. At its southern edge lies the Strait of Hormuz, narrow in width yet immense in consequence. Geography does not argue; it compels.
Long before Carr, in the quiet anxiety of the eighteenth century, James Madison, principal architect of the Constitution, warned that war was the “true nurse of executive aggrandizement.” War concentrates authority in the name of urgency. Madison insisted that the power to declare war must rest with Congress, not the president—so that deliberation might restrain impulse. Republics persuade themselves that emergency powers are temporary. History rarely agrees.
Then, at 2:30 a.m., the abstraction becomes decision.
Donald Trump declares war on Iran. The announcement crosses continents before markets open in Asia. Within twenty-four hours, Ali Khamenei, who ruled for thirty-seven years, is killed. The President calls him one of history’s most evil figures and presents his death as an opening for the Iranian people.
In exile, Reza Pahlavi hails the moment as liberation. In less than forty-eight hours, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps collapses under overwhelming air power. A regime that endured decades falls swiftly. Military efficiency appears absolute. Yet efficiency does not resolve legitimacy.
The joint strike with Israel is framed as necessary and pre-emptive. Retaliation follows across the Gulf. The architecture of energy trade becomes fragile. Shipping routes are recalculated. Markets respond before diplomacy finds its language.
It is measured in the price of petrol in Colombo. In the bus fare in Karachi. In the rising cost of cooking gas in Dhaka. It is heard in the anxious voice of a migrant worker in Doha calling home to Kandy, asking whether contracts will be renewed, whether flights will continue, whether wages will be delayed. It is calculated in foreign reserves already strained, in currencies that tremble at rumor, in budgets forced to choose between subsidy and solvency.
Zaara was the breadwinner of her house in Sri Lanka. Her husband had been unemployed for years. At last, he secured an opportunity to travel to Israel as a foreign worker—like many Sri Lankans who depend on employment in the Middle East. It was to be their turning point: a small house repaired, debts reduced, dignity restored.
Now she lowers her eyes when she speaks. For Zaara, geopolitics is not theory. It is fear measured in distance—between a construction site abroad and a village waiting at home.
The war in Iran has shattered calculations that once felt practical. Nations like Sri Lanka now require strategic foresight to navigate unfolding realities. Reactive responses—whether to natural disasters or external shocks like this conflict—can cripple economies far faster than gradual pressures. Disruptions to energy imports, migrant remittances, and foreign reserves show how distant wars ripple into daily lives.
War among great powers is debated in think tanks. Its consequences are lived in markets—and in quiet kitchens where uncertainty sits heavier than hunger.
The conflict does not unfold in isolation. It enters the strategic calculus of China and Russia, both attentive to precedent. Power projected beyond the Western hemisphere reshapes perceptions in the Eastern theater. Iran’s transformation intersects directly with broader alignments. In 2021, Beijing and Tehran signed a twenty-five-year strategic agreement. By 2025, China was purchasing the majority of Iran’s exported oil at discounted rates. Energy underwrote strategy. That continuity has been disrupted. Yet strategic relationships do not vanish; they adjust.
In Winds of Change, my new book, I reproduce Nicholas Spykman’s 1944 two-theater confrontation map—Europe and the Pacific during the Second World War. Spykman distinguished maritime power from amphibian projection. Control of the Rimland determined balance. Then, the United States fought across two vast theaters. Today, Europe remains unsettled through Ukraine, the Pacific simmers over Taiwan and the South China Sea, Latin America remains sensitive, and the Middle East has been abruptly transformed. The architecture of multi-theater tension reappears.
At this juncture, the reflections of Marwan Bishara acquire weight. America’s ultimate power, he argues, resides in deterrence, not in the habitual use of force. Power, especially when shared, stabilizes. Force, when used with disregard for international law, breeds instability and humiliation. Arrogance creates enemies and narrows judgment. It is no surprise that many Americans themselves believe the United States should not act alone.
America’s strength does not rest solely in its military reach. Its economy constitutes roughly one-third of global output and generates close to 40 percent of the world’s research and development. Structural power—economic, technological, institutional—has historically underwritten deterrence. When force becomes the primary instrument, influence risks becoming coercion.
The United States now confronts simultaneous pressures across continents. The Second World War demonstrated the capacity to sustain multi-theater engagement; the post-9/11 wars revealed the exhaustion that follows prolonged intervention. Iran, larger and geopolitically deeper, presents a scale that cannot be resolved by air power alone.
Carr’s “thereafter” waits patiently. Military victory may be swift; political reconstruction is slow. Bishara reminds us that deterrence sustains stability, while force risks unraveling it.
At the edge of a potential world war, the decisive question is not who strikes first, but who restrains longest.
History watches. And in places far from the battlefield, mothers wait for phone calls that may not come.
Asanga Abeyagoonasekera is a Senior Research Fellow at the Millennium Project, Washington, D.C., and the author of Winds of Change: Geopolitics at the Crossroads of South and Southeast Asia, published by World Scientific
Midweek Review
Live Coals Burst Aflame
Live coals of decades-long hate,
Are bursting into all-consuming flames,
In lands where ‘Black Gold’ is abundant,
And it’s a matter to be thought about,
If humans anywhere would be safe now,
Unless these enmities dying hard,
With roots in imperialist exploits,
And identity-based, tribal violence,
Are set aside and laid finally to rest,
By an enthronement of the principle,
Of the Equal Dignity of Humans.
By Lynn Ockersz
Midweek Review
Saga of the arrest of retired intelligence chief
Retired Maj. Gen. Suresh Sallay’s recent arrest attracted internatiattention. His long-expected arrest took place ahead of the seventh anniversary of the bombings. Multiple blasts claimed the lives of nearly 280 people, including 45 foreigners. State-owned international news television network, based in Paris, France 24, declared that arrest was made on the basis of information provided by a whistleblower. The French channel was referring to Hanzeer Azad Moulana, who earlier sought political asylum in the West and one-time close associate of State Minister Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan aka Pilleyan. May be the fiction he wove against Pilleyan and others may have been to strengthen his asylum claim there. Moulana is on record as having told the British Channel 4 that Sallay allowed the attack to proceed with the intention of influencing the 2019 presidential election. The French news agency quoted an investigating officer as having said: “He was arrested for conspiracy and aiding and abetting the Easter Sunday attacks. He has been in touch with people involved in the attacks, even recently.”
****
Suresh Sallay of the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) received the wrath of Yahapalana Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, in 2016, over the reportage of what the media called the Chavakachcheri explosives detection made on March 30, 2016. Premier Wickremesinghe found fault with Sallay for the coverage, particularly in The Island. Police arrested ex-LTTE child combatant Edward Julian, alias Ramesh, after the detection of one suicide jacket, four claymore mines, three parcels containing about 12 kilos of explosives, to battery packs and several rounds of 9mm ammunition, from his house, situated at Vallakulam Pillaiyar Kovil Street. Chavakachcheri police made the detection, thanks to information provided by the second wife of Ramesh. Investigations revealed that the deadly cache had been brought by Ramesh from Mannar (Detection of LTTE suicide jacket, mines jolts government: Fleeing Tiger apprehended at checkpoint, The Island, March 31, 2016).
The then Jaffna Security Forces Commander, Maj. Gen. Mahesh Senanayake, told the writer that a thorough inquiry was required to ascertain the apprehended LTTE cadre’s intention. The Chavakachcheri detection received the DMI’s attention. The country’s premier intelligence organisation meticulously dealt with the issue against the backdrop of an alleged aborted bid to revive the LTTE in April 2014. Of those who had been involved in the fresh terror project, three were killed in the Nedunkerny jungles. There hadn’t been any other incidents since the Nedunkerny skirmish, until the Chavakachcheri detection.
Piqued by the media coverage of the Chavakachcheri detection, the Sirisena-Wickremesinghe administration tried to silence the genuine Opposition. As the SLFP had, contrary to the expectations of those who voted for the party at the August 2015 parliamentary elections, formed a treacherous coalition with the UNP, the Joint Opposition (JO) spearheaded the parliamentary opposition.
The Criminal Investigation Department (CID) questioned former External Affairs Minister and top JO spokesman, Prof. G.L. Peiris, over a statement made by him regarding the Chavakachcheri detection. The former law professor questioned the legality of the CID’s move against the backdrop of police declining to furnish him a certified copy of the then acting IGP S.M. Wickremesinghe’s directive that he be summoned to record a statement as regards the Chavakachcheri lethal detection.
One-time LTTE propagandist Velayutham Dayanidhi, a.k.a. Daya Master, raised with President Maithripala Sirisena the spate of arrests made by law enforcement authorities, in the wake of the Chavakachcheri detection. Daya Master took advantage of a meeting called by Sirisena, on 28 April, 2016, at the President’s House, with the proprietors of media organisations and journalists, to raise the issue. The writer having been among the journalists present on that occasion, inquired from the ex-LETTer whom he represented there. Daya Master had been there on behalf of DAN TV, Tamil language satellite TV, based in Jaffna. Among those who had been detained was Subramaniam Sivakaran, at that time Youth Wing leader of the Illankai Thamil Arasu Kadchi (ITAK), the main constituent of the now defunct Tamil National Alliance. In addition to Sivakaran, the police apprehended several hardcore ex-LTTE cadres (LTTE revival bid confirmed: TNA youth leader arrested, The Island April 20, 2016).
Ranil hits out at media
Subsequent inquiries revealed the role played by Sivakaran in some of those wanted in connection with the Chavakachcheri detection taking refuge in India. When the writer sought an explanation from the then TNA lawmaker, M.A. Sumanthiran, regarding Sivakaran’s arrest, the lawyer disowned the Youth Wing leader. Sumanthiran emphasised that the party suspended Sivakumaran and Northern Provincial Council member Ananthi Sasitharan for publicly condemning the TNA’s decision to endorse Maithripala Sirisena’s candidature at the 2015 presidential election (Chava explosives: Key suspects flee to India, The Island, May 2, 2016).
Premier Wickremesinghe went ballistic on May 30, 2016. Addressing the 20th anniversary event of the Sri Lanka Muslim Media Forum, at the Sports Ministry auditorium, the UNP leader castigated the DMI. Alleging that the DMI had been pursuing an agenda meant to undermine the Yahapalana administration, Wickremesinghe, in order to make his bogus claim look genuine, repeatedly named the writer as part of that plot. Only Wickremesinghe knows the identity of the idiot who influenced him to make such unsubstantiated allegations. The top UNPer went on to allege that The Island, and its sister paper Divaina, were working overtime to bring back Dutugemunu, a reference to war-winning President Mahinda Rajapaksa. A few days later, sleuths from the Colombo Crime Detection Bureau (CCD) visited The Island editorial to question the writer where lengthy statements were recorded. The police were acting on the instructions of the then Premier, who earlier publicly threatened to send police to question the writer.
In response to police queries about Sallay passing information to the media regarding the Chavakachcheri detection and subsequent related articles, the writer pointed out that the reportage was based on response of the then ASP Ruwan Gunasekera, AAL and Sumanthiran, as had been reported.
Wickremesinghe alleged, at the Muslim media event, that a section of the media manipulated coverage of certain incidents, ahead of the May Day celebrations.
In early May 2016 Wickremesinghe disclosed that he received assurances from the police, and the DMI, that as the LTTE had been wiped out the group couldn’t stage a comeback. The declaration was made at the Lakshman Kadirgamar Institute for International Relations and Strategic Studies (LKIIRIS) on 3 May 2016. Wickremesinghe said that he sought clarifications from the police and the DMI in the wake of the reportage of the Chavakachcheri detection and related developments (PM: LTTE threat no longer exists, The Island, May 5, 2016).
The LTTE couldn’t stage a comeback as a result of measures taken by the then government. It would be a grave mistake, on our part, to believe that the eradication of the LTTE’s conventional military capacity automatically influenced them to give up arms. The successful rehabilitation project, that had been undertaken by the Rajapaksa government and continued by successive governments, ensured that those who once took up arms weren’t interested in returning to the same deadly path.
In spite of the TNA and others shedding crocodile tears for the defeated Tigers, while making a desperate effort to mobilise public opinion against the government, the public never wanted the violence to return. Some interested parties propagated the lie that regardless of the crushing defeat suffered in the hands of the military, the LTTE could resume guerilla-type operations, paving the way for a new conflict. But by the end of 2014, and in the run-up to the presidential election in January following year, the situation seemed under control, especially with Western countries not wanting to upset things here with a pliant administration in the immediate horizon. Soon after the presidential election, the government targeted the armed forces. Remember Sumanthiran’s declaration that the ITAK Youth Wing leader Sivakaran had been opposed to the TNA backing Sirisena at the presidential poll.
The US-led accountability resolution had been co-sponsored by the Sirisena-Wickremesinghe duo to appease the TNA and Tamil Diaspora. The Oct. 01, 2016, resolution delivered a knockout blow to the war-winning armed forces. The UNP pursued an agenda severely inimical to national interests. It would be pertinent to mention that those who now represent the main Opposition, Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB), were part of the treacherous UNP.
Suresh moved to Malaysia
The Yahapalana leadership resented Sallay’s work. They wanted him out of the country at a time a new threat was emerging. The government attacked the then Justice Minister Dr. Wijeyadasa Rajapakshe, PC, who warned of the emerging threat from foreign-manipulated local Islamic fanatics on 11 Nov. 2016, in Parliament. Rajapakshe didn’t mince his words when he underscored the threat posed by some Sri Lanka Muslim families taking refuge in Syria where ISIS was running the show. The then government, of which he was part o,f ridiculed their own Justice Minister. Both Sirisena and Wickremesinghe feared action against extremism may cause erosion of Muslim support. By then Sallay, who had been investigating the deadly plot, was out of the country. The Yahapalana government believed that the best way to deal with Sallay was to grant him a diplomatic posting. Sally ended up in Malaysia, a country where the DMI played a significant role in the repatriation of Kumaran Pathmanathan, alias KP, after his arrest there.
Having served the military for over three cadres, Sallay retired in 2024 in the rank of Major General. Against the backdrop of his recent arrest, in connection with the ongoing investigation into the 2019 Easter Sunday carnage, The Island felt the need to examine the circumstances Sallay ended up in Malaysia at the time. Now, remanded in terms of the Prevention of terrorism Act (PTA), he is being accused of directing the Easter Sunday operation from Malaysia.
Pivithuru Hela Urumaya leader and former Minister Udaya Gammanpila has alleged that Sallay was apprehended in a bid to divert attention away from the deepening coal scam. Having campaigned on an anti-corruption platformm in the run up to the previous presidential election, in September 2024, the Parliament election, in November of the same year, and local government polls last year, the incumbent dispensation is struggling to cope up with massive corruption issues, particularly the coal scam, which has not only implicated the Energy Minister but the entire Cabinet of Ministers as well.
The crux of the matter is whether Sallay actually met would-be suicide bombers, in February 2018, in an estate, in the Puttalam district, as alleged by the UK’s Channel 4 television, like the BBC is, quite famous for doing hatchet jobs for the West. This is the primary issue at hand. Did Sallay clandestinely leave Malaysia to meet suicide bombers in the presence of Hanzeer Azad Moulana, one-time close associate of State Minister Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan, aka Pilleyan, former LTTE member?
The British channel raised this issue with Sallay, in 2023, at the time he served as Director, State Intelligence (SIS). Sallay is on record as having told Channel 4 Television that he was not in Sri Lanka the whole of 2018 as he was in Malaysia serving in the Sri Lankan Embassy there as Minister Counsellor.
Therefore, the accusation that he met several members of the National Thowheeth Jamaath (NTJ), including Mohamed Hashim Mohamed Zahran, in Karadipuval, Puttalam, in Feb. 2018, was baseless, he has said.
The intelligence officer has asked the British television station to verify his claim with the Malaysian authorities.
Responding to another query, Sallay had told Channel 4 that on April 21, 2019, the day of the Easter Sunday blasts, he was in India, where he was accommodated at the National Defence College (NDC). That could be verified with the Indian authorities, Sallay has said, strongly denying Channel 4’s claim that he contacted one of Pilleyan’s cadres, over, the phone and directed him to pick a person outside Hotel Taj Samudra.
According to Sallay, during his entire assignment in Malaysia, from Dec. 2016 to Dec. 2018, he had been to Colombo only once, for one week, in Dec. 2017, to assist in an official inquiry.
Having returned to Colombo, Sallay had left for NDC, in late Dec. 2018, and returned only after the conclusion of the course, in November 2019.
Sallay has said so in response to questions posed by Ben de Pear, founder, Basement Films, tasked with producing a film for Channel 4 on the Easter Sunday bombings.
The producer has offered Sallay an opportunity to address the issues in terms of Broadcasting Code while inquiring into fresh evidence regarding the officer’s alleged involvement in the Easter Sunday conspiracy.
The producer sought Sallay’s response, in August 2023, in the wake of political upheaval following the ouster of Gotabaya Rajapaksa, elected at the November 2019 presidential election.
At the time, the Yahapalana government granted a diplomatic appointment to Sallay, he had been head of the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI). After the 2019 presidential election, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa named him the Head of SIS.
The Basement Films has posed several questions to Sallay on the basis of accusations made by Hanzeer Azad Moulana.
In response to the film producer’s query regarding Sallay’s alleged secret meeting with six NTJ cadres who blasted themselves a year later, Sallay has questioned the very basis of the so called new evidence as he was not even in the country during the period the clandestine meeting is alleged to have taken place.
Contradictory stands
Following Sajith Premadasa’s anticipated defeat at the 2019 presidential election, Harin Fernando accused the Catholic Church of facilitating Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s victory. Fernando, who is also on record as having disclosed that his father knew of the impending Easter Sunday attacks, pointed finger at the Archbishop of Colombo, Rt. Rev Malcolm Cardinal Ranjith, for ensuring Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s victory.
Former President Maithripala Sirisena, as well as JVP frontliner Dr. Nalinda Jayathissa, accused India of masterminding the Easter Sunday bombings. Then there were claims of Sara Jasmin, wife of Katuwapitiya suicide bomber Mohammed Hastun, being an Indian agent who was secretly removed after the Army assaulted extremists’ hideout at Sainthamaruthu in the East. What really had happened to Sara Jasmin who, some believe, is key to the Easter Sunday puzzle.
Then there was huge controversy over the arrest of Attorney-at-Law Hejaaz Hizbullah over his alleged links with the Easter Sunday bombers. Hizbullah, who had been arrested in April 2020, served as lawyer to the extremely wealthy spice trader Mohamed Yusuf Ibrahim’s family that had been deeply involved in the Easter Sunday plot. Mohamed Yusuf Ibrahim had been on the JVP’s National List at the 2015 parliamentary elections. The lawyer received bail after two years. Two of the spice trader’s sons launched suicide attacks, whereas his daughter-in-law triggered a suicide blast when police raided their Dematagoda mansion, several hours after the Easter Sunday blasts.
Investigations also revealed that the suicide vests had been assembled at a factory owned by the family and the project was funded by them. It would be pertinent to mention that President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s government never really bothered to conduct a comprehensive investigation to identify the Easter Sunday terror project. Perhaps, their biggest failure had been to act on the Presidential Commission of Inquiry (PCoI) recommendations. Instead, President Rajapaksa appointed a six-member committee, headed by his elder brother, Chamal Rajapaksa, to examine the recommendations, probably in a foolish attempt to improve estranged relations with the influential Muslim community. That move caused irreparable damage and influenced the Church to initiate a campaign against the government. The Catholic Church played quite a significant role in the India- and US-backed 2022 Aragalaya that forced President Rajapaksa to flee the country.
Interested parties exploited the deterioration of the national economy, leading to unprecedented declaration of the bankruptcy of the country in April 2022, to mobilie public anger that was used to achieve political change.
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