Connect with us

Features

Managing aftermath of a cyclone

Published

on

Trail of destruction left by 1978 cyclone. (Image credit World Vision)

(Continued from last week)

Therefore, during our visit, we were continuously alert to this factor, and learnt as much as possible about quality specifications, such as protein and moisture contents, milling qualities of different classes of wheat and so on. We took down notes and collected a fair amount of relevant literature. We were however of the view that we still needed expert technical advice, and this we later obtained from a retired expert of the Canadian Wheat Board. An important part of knowledge and judgement is to help you to decide how much you do not know. Whilst the visit to the US gave us a sufficient body of knowledge about wheat, to build on, it also convinced us that the switch-over needed detailed expert advice and guidance. Therefore, it was both fortunate and timely in more than one sense.

“The Tong Joo”

September 1978, saw the inauguration of the new constitution, a hybrid of the US and French constitutions, with a strong Executive Presidency. This was overshadowed in our minds in the Food Ministry, by sinking in Galle harbour of the ship “Tong Joo” carrying valuable cargo for the Food Department. This was a period of rain and blustery weather, with strong winds. Galle was not an easy port to navigate in at the best of times due to varying depths and submerged rocks.

Therefore, it was most important to steer vessels along defined channels that did not leave much room for manoeuvre. The pilot on the “Tong Joo” erred, albeit under difficult circumstances, leading to the drifting of the ship away from the channel and foundering on some rocks.

The question was whether the whole exercise should have been attempted in the prevailing weather conditions. When we received the news the Secretary, Trade and Shipping Mr. Lakshman de Mel and I set-off for Galle during the early afternoon. The Food Commissioner and others went separately. The weather was still unsettled and very windy. Once in Galle, some of us got into a launch and journeyed towards the half sunken vessel. The ride was far from comfortable. The sea was quite rough and the fact that I couldn’t swim added to the tension. After coming back to shore, we held a preliminary inquiry. Some of the steps we took were of importance in the light of the potential legal issues to follow. The half-sunken vessel, was a feature in Galle harbour for many months.

Sometime in October 1978, I was appointed to act as Secretary to the Ministry of Trade and Shipping for a period in addition to my duties as Secretary Ministry of Food and Cooperatives. Hardly had I completed this period of added responsibility, when a double problem confronted me at about the same time, one of a personal nature, and the other of an official nature. On the personal front our son developed Hepatitis and had to be warded at Durdans hospital. On the official side, a nasty cyclone hit Batticaloa.

Cyclone

The cyclone of late November 1978 was a particularly bad one. Batticaloa was completely battered. It seriously damaged homes and buildings and uprooted thousands of trees. Hardly a coconut tree was left. The moment I realized the severity of the cyclone, listening to news reports, I called up a meeting of the senior officials of the Food and Co-operative departments. It was necessary to anticipate the volume of emergency food supplies required, and how to get these through.

Telephone lines to Batticaloa were out and the Government Agent Dixon Nilaweera, who was later to become my Additional Secretary, and still later Secretary to the Treasury, was marooned in his official bungalow the -Residency,” watching the waters rising, seeing serpents swimming in the water, and contemplating whether death was to come by drowning, snake bite or electrocution as a result of fallen electric wires. Not entirely a happy range of choices. But we were able soon to establish radio contact, using the facilities available in the Ministry of Public Administration and Home Affairs, as well as the police radio network. A serious problem was that Batticaloa was inaccessible by road or rail due to fallen trees and extensive damage to bridges, culverts and other infrastructure.

Whilst other departments and agencies of government addressed the issues of shifting fallen trees, and attending to emergency road and railworks, we decided in order to save time to load up lorries with rice, flour and sugar and position them as close as possible to the various routes into Batticaloa, so that they could proceed forward as the roads got cleared. Arrangements were made through Police headquarters, for the lorries to be parked at police stations and other secure points, and suitably guarded. Each lorry had 5-10 tons of rice, flour or sugar and had to be protected against pilferage and theft. Two days after the cyclone struck, the Secretary to the Cabinet called a major conference of Secretaries to Ministries, and Heads of several departments relevant to the relief effort to assess the overall situation and arrive at decisions. During the course of the meeting, I was instructed to load the necessary number of lorries for despatch. I informed the Cabinet Secretary, much to his surprise that loaded lorries were now close to Batticaloa, and that my request was for extra gangs and 24-hour work on road clearance and emergency road repair. This was done, and unexpectedly early scores of food lorries entered Batticaloa.

A public officer who was a resident of Batticaloa later told me that it was like a miracle to see the food lorries, many of them Food Department lorries with the huge sign of the department painted across on both sides, entering the city, so soon. He went on to say “Nobody will understand how high this boosted our morale, and what this meant for us.” He said people started clapping when they saw the lorries. Some were in tears. We in the Ministry of Food and Co-operatives did not imagine such a reaction. It was only made possible by quick reaction, responsible anticipation, close co-ordination and determined follow up. I was fortunate to have an excellent team, both in Food and in Co-operatives, who worked long hours untiringly and uncomplainingly. The personal downside of all this for me was that I was able to see very little of our son in hospital. On most days I was able to see him for about half an hour well past 9 p.m. The fact that he was in the very competent hands of Dr. Cyril Perera, one of our foremost paediatricians eased my mind somewhat.

Visit to China

In February 1979, a delegation led by Mr. Herat, the Minister of Food visited the People’s Republic of China: The members of the delegation, besides the Minister were, the Acting Food Commissioner Mr. Pulendiran; Mr. Easpharathasan of the Treasury; Mr. Sellaiah, the Deputy Chief Accountant of the Food Department; Mr. Jaya Herat, Private Secretary to the Minister; and myself. The purpose of the visit was to negotiate, renew and sign the protocol for rice under the overall umbrella of the Rubber-Rice Pact between the two countries. This visit constituted one of the senior level visits of Ministers, Deputy Ministers and senior officials periodically envisaged under the main Pact. Under these arrangements there were set periods, set levels and set protocol. It was indeed a rare privilege those days to visit China, which was closed to many foreigners.

In early 1979, China was still very much a closed Society, but we could see incipient signs of liberalization. The large mass of men and women were still dressed in the ubiquitous “Mao” blue suit, which constituted a pair of trousers and a tunic jacket. Dressed all-alike, it was sometimes not easy at a glance to distinguish men from women.

There were hardly any cars on the road, even in Beijing. But there were literally hundreds of thousands of bicycles. Everyone commuted on a bicycle. The paradox however was that although there were only very few cars, Beijing and other cities were quite noisy because of the constant blare of car horns. This was due to the thousands of cyclists on the highways. A thaw was just beginning. There were just a few people who had discarded their ‘Mao” suits and were dressed in more colourful clothing. Most of these were young people, and some young couples were bold enough to cuddle up in the parks and even steal a kiss or two in public, which we understood was unprecedented behaviour even in the recent past.

Ritual

But first we had to go through the ritual of getting into China from Hong Kong, then under British rule. We took a train to Lowu on the Chinese border. We got down at the station. We now had to cross the railway bridge on foot, and, at the other end of the bridge, we saw Chinese officials standing in order to receive us. On the Hong Kong end of the bridge was the British flag. On the Chinese end was the flag of the People’s Republic. It was quite dramatic. Our baggage was carried by porters at Lowu and handed half way over the bridge to porters on the Chinese side. So strict were the lines of demarcation of the border. Obviously, a Hong Kong porter was unable to cross the balance half of the bridge without a visa which was unobtainable.

We were warmly received by the Chinese officials and conducted to a special waiting room at the railway station on the Chinese side. Here, after the customary drinking of Chinese green tea we were served lunch at noon. At 12.30 p.m., we started on a 2 1/2 hour train journey to Canton. Here, we were greeted by officials of the local party and Municipal council and taken on a sightseeing tour to a beautiful flower exhibition and upto a mountain commanding a scenic view of the city.

At 4.15 p.m. we took off by plane on the 2 1/2 flight to Beijing. We arrived at about 7 p.m. to what was for us bitterly cold weather, with an icy cold blowing which brought tears to our eyes. We were met by the Chinese Minister of Trade Li Chiang; one of the Vice-Ministers and other officials. Our Ambassador Mr. Dias de Singhe and Embassy officials were also present. We were lodged at the huge Beijing hotel. Beijing did not have modern five star hotels during this time, and the Soviet type Beijing hotel was the best available. As in the Soviet Union, we found that the skill of heating rooms had not been mastered. Our rooms were uncomfortably overheated.

On the 28th of February at 10 a.m. the formal talks with the Chinese Minister of Trade opened in the Great Hall of the People. Minister Li Chiang was elderly, sophisticated and genial. Discussions progressed smoothly and concluded in about 1 1/2 hours. The team of senior officials, on our side led by the Acting Food Commissioner were to begin detailed talks during the afternoon with their Chinese counterparts. I was available to be consulted by them, but my task was to be with the Minister.

After our return to the hotel, we sat and discussed matters pertaining to the afternoon’s discussions. After lunch, I accompanied the Minister on a visit to the Forbidden City and the Palace Museum. At 6.30 p.m. the Chinese Minister hosted an official banquet in honour of the Minister at Beijing hotel. This was a nearly 2 1/2 hour affair with some fifteen courses. The Chinese really relax at these banquets, and there was plenty of good humour and an easy atmosphere.

On the next day, the first of March we were taken at 9 a.m. to the Museum of Chinese History and the renowned Tienanman Square. Tienanman, perhaps the largest square in the world was a square of vast proportions situated in the heart of Beijing surrounded on different sides by the Great Hall of the People; the Mao Mausoleum; Museums; the entrance to the Forbidden City and the raised area with a red walled background where Chinese leaders stand to take the salute on important national occasions.

It was both an experience and an education to spend some time seeing these places accompanied by well-informed guides. We had lunch back at the hotel, and at 2.30 p.m. listened to a briefing on food grain distribution in China. The point of interest to us was how China adequately fed such a huge population. Everywhere we went the people appeared to be well fed and healthy.

There was much discussion after the presentation. The process was complicated but it did ensure a basic ration for everyone. Writing this brings to my mind the view expressed by the well-known British economist Joan Robinson. Replying to a critic who lamented the lack of democracy in China, she replied that any society which could successfully feed nearly a billion people must have some solid virtues. The day ended with a visit to the Peking opera in the evening. It turned out to be a colourful satire on social oppression during feudal times. It was designed to heap hatred and ridicule on the pre-communist society, with a greater emphasis on ridicule, and by contrast to extol the progressive qualities of the present communist dispensation.

On the following day the 2nd at 8 a.m. the delegation was taken on a 70 k.m. drive to the Great Wall. To walk on the wall, with snow all around was an unique experience. The wall was interspersed with watchtowers at regular intervals and was broad enough to accommodate horses and chariots. After this early outing, the senior officials in our delegation went back to Beijing for the final round of negotiations on our purchase of rice.

I had the far more pleasant task of accompanying the Minister to the Ming Tombs and the Summer palace, built for the dowager Empress Tsusi. Much wealth had been lavished on its construction. It was a magnificent place with artificial lakes; huge boat like houses or retreats built of solid marble; and inside, a store-house of treasure, with bowls, vases, clocks and other numerous items built of gold, silver, jade and porcelain, some of them studded with gems. The Vice Minister was our host during this visit and we had lunch with him.

Unusual Behaviour

When we got back to the hotel during the early afternoon, Mr. Pulendiran, the Acting Food Commissioner came to see me. Joy was visible on his face. He and his colleagues had had a Successful negotiation. He breathlessly announced that the Chinese had agreed to sell the 100,000 tonnes of rice we needed at a price Of US$ 212 per metric ton. This was indeed a very favourable price. When we had our final round of discussions in Colombo with the committee headed by the Secretary to the Cabinet, the consensus was that we would be fortunate to buy at US$ 220 per metric ton. International market prices were rising, and crop availability tightening.

The World rice market was extremely sensitive, and quite different for instance to the Wheat market. In the case of wheat, there was generally a surplus of around 100 million metric tonnes available fortrading in the market in a given year, but, in the case of rice, general availability at that time was only around 12-14 million tonnes, because of high domestic consumption in the rice eating countries. Aggravating this issue was the state oftraditional rice exporting countries such as Cambodia and Vietnam, due to war and the aftermath of war.

Under these circumstances our delegation had done exceptionally well in getting the price they did. Mr. Pulendiran now wanted to close the negotiation, and the Chinese had wanted an immediate answer. Having warmly congratulated Mr. Pulendiran, I told him, I would let him have my decision later in the evening. He thought I had taken leave of my senses. He repeated the price advantage to us and said that he would be most embarrassed not to conclude matters immediately since the Chinese were waiting for a prompt answer. I advised him to put the whole blame on me, and if necessary to tell his counterparts that his Secretary was somewhat eccentric and also very slow to decide.

I emphasized that it was most important that he himself appears in a good light with his Chinese counterparts and that no feeling of respect or friendship for me should prevent him from telling them that he thought his Secretary was crazy. A much befuddled colleague left my room. The reason I decided on this course of action was the friendship and Understanding that I had struck up with the Chinese Vice Minister. He had been to Sri Lanka before, and we had got on very well at the discussions. Protocol-wise a Vice Minister on the Chinese side was equal to a Secretary to a Ministry on the Sri Lanka side.

Therefore, when he came to Colombo, the two banquets in his honour had to be hosted by Mr. Lakshman de Mel as Secretary to the Ministry of Trade and Shipping and myself as Secretary to the Ministry of Food and Co-operatives. But because of the long course of friendly dealings between our two Ministries and relevant departments and those agencies on the Chinese side, Lakshman and I decided to invite our two Ministers to the two dinners hosted by us in honour of the Chinese Vice Minister. Protocol-wise, the Ministers could not have hosted the dinner to a Vice Minister, but they could, if they so wished attend as our guests. This in fact was what both the Ministers Mr. Lalith Athulathmudali, Minister of Trade and Shipping and Mr. S.B. Herat, my Minister decided to do. This was a special gesture by the two Ministers, who were present at both dinners to the Vice-Minister as guests of the two Secretaries. This was deeply appreciated by him and the Chinese side. I was able to renew this friendship on this current visit, and I knew that I would meet him later in the evening at the return banquet hosted by our Minister in honour of the Chinese Minister.

I wanted to have a personal word with him on the price. The banquet was hosted at the Peihai Park Restaurant which was part of an old Palace, with a lake now frozen with ice, outside. When the Vice-Minister came in, I took him to a side. He spoke English and direct conversation was no problem. I was aware, from the newspapers that he had been involved the previous day, as a member of the Chinese delegation having talks with the visiting United States Secretary to the Treasury. I therefore inquired whether the talks were going well. He said, “Yes” and added “But America new friend, you, old friend.” I inquired whether I could discuss something as an “Old friend.” He said “Of course.” I then referred to the rice price. He interrupted me saying, “You have got very good price.” I said, “Yes,” and that it was a good price, but that I was now speaking to him at a personal level.

I rapidly briefed him on some of our problems, including the Foreign Exchange situation and the fact that our Minister had come to China for the first time. I concluded by saying, “Please see whether You could reduce the price by one dollar more.” A larger request would have been completely unrealistic. He said he was not sure, and that we had already obtained a good price, but that he would try, and let us know the following morning. After dinner, I briefed the Minister and the Food Commissioner of what I had done. Both were naturally pleased, and Mr. Pulendiran might have regretted the few dubious glances, he directed at me during the course of the evening. The next day, he came to me and announced excitedly that the price had been reduced by one US dollar. The hundred thousand dollars so saved amounted at the then prevailing exchange rate to about Rs. 2.5 million, a considerable sum of money at the time.

My salary at the time amounted to a little over Rs. 5000 per month. Calculated on this basis the saving would have covered my salary, if at this level, for my entire expected stay of about 35 years in the public service! This reduction also exemplified the spirit of goodwill and co-operation that existed between our two countries. The Minister was extremely pleased. He wanted to include me by name in his Cabinet paper, on the part dealing with the rice negotiations. I had to spend some time prevailing upon him not to do so. I had to remind him that our system works on the basis of Ministers getting both the credit and the blame depending on the diligence and the quality of work of their officials, and that It would be vulgar to have my name put in there. In any case, I said that I was drafting the Cabinet paper and there would be no such reference. The Minister reluctantly agreed, muttering something about telling the President.

On the next day the 3rd which was a Saturday, we were the beneficiaries of a fascinating experience. Our hosts took us to see a part of Beijing’s underground air raid shelter complex. There were an amazing series of underground tunnels, practically below every shop. All the tunnels were inter-connected, with some leading out of the city. They were quite spacious, with kitchens, independent sources of power, etc. In a relatively small area, these tunnels could take in around 10,000 people within about 6 minutes.

These tunnels were elaborate, and furnished with all the facilities including mini hospitals and medical centres. They were virtually a city underground. From here, we were taken to the Temple of Heaven, where the Emperors used to go to pray for a good harvest, and to pray to the earth and the sky. We got back to the hotel for a late lunch. At 5 p.m. the Minister and delegation called on the Vice Prime Minister Mr. Kumu. We had an hour’s cordial conversation, mainly on Sri Lanka-China relations. In the evening, we rounded off the day with a leisurely dinner at the Ambassador’s residence, where we were able to unwind. This was home.

(Excerpted from In the Pursuit of Governance, autobiography of MDD Pieris)



Continue Reading
Click to comment

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Features

Rebuilding Sri Lanka for the long term

Published

on

President Dissanayake chairing a disaster management meeting

The government is rebuilding the cyclone-devastated lives, livelihoods and infrastructure in the country after the immense destruction caused by Cyclone Ditwah. President Anura Kumara Dissanayake has been providing exceptional leadership by going into the cyclone affected communities in person, to mingle directly with the people there and to offer encouragement and hope to them. A President who can be in the midst of people when they are suffering and in sorrow is a true leader. In a political culture where leaders have often been distant from the everyday hardships of ordinary people, this visible presence would have a reassuring psychological effect.

The international community appears to be comfortable with the government and has been united in giving it immediate support. Whether it be Indian and US helicopters that provided essential airlift capacity or cargo loads of relief material that have come from numerous countries, or funds raised from the people of tiny Maldives, the support has given Sri Lankans the sense of being a part of the world family. The speed and breadth of this response has contrasted sharply with the isolation Sri Lanka experienced during some of the darker moments of its recent past.

There is no better indicator of the international goodwill to Sri Lanka as in the personal donations for emergency relief that have been made by members of the diplomatic corps in Sri Lanka. Such gestures go beyond formal diplomacy and suggest a degree of personal confidence in the direction in which the country is moving. The office of the UN representative in Sri Lanka has now taken the initiative to launch a campaign for longer term support, signalling that emergency assistance can be a bridge to sustained engagement rather than a one-off intervention.

Balanced Statement

In a world that has turned increasingly to looking after narrow national interests rather than broad common interests, Sri Lanka appears to have found a way to obtain the support of all countries. It has received support from countries that are openly rivals to each other. This rare convergence reflects a perception that Sri Lanka is not seeking to play one power against another, and balancing them, but rather to rebuild itself on the basis of stability, inclusiveness and responsible governance.

An excerpt from an interview that President Dissanayake gave to the US based Newsweek magazine is worth reproducing. In just one paragraph he has summed up Sri Lankan foreign policy that can last the test of time. A question Newsweek put to the president was: “Sri Lanka sits at the crossroads of Chinese built infrastructure, Indian regional influence and US economic leverage. To what extent does Sri Lanka truly retain strategic autonomy, and how do you balance these relationships?”

The president replied: “India is Sri Lanka’s closest neighbour, separated by about 24 km of ocean. We have a civilisational connection with India. There is hardly any aspect of life in Sri Lanka that is not connected to India in some way or another. India has been the first responder whenever Sri Lanka has faced difficulty. India is also our largest trading partner, our largest source of tourism and a significant investor in Sri Lanka. China is also a close and strategic partner. We have a long historic relationship—both at the state level and at a political party level. Our trade, investment and infrastructure partnership is very strong. The United States and Sri Lanka also have deep and multifaceted ties. The US is our largest market. We also have shared democratic values and a commitment to a rules-based order. We don’t look at our relations with these important countries as balancing. Each of our relationships is important to us. We work with everyone, but always with a single purpose – a better world for Sri Lankans, in a better world for all.”

Wider Issues

The President’s articulation of foreign relations, especially the underlying theme of working with everyone for the wellbeing of all, resonates strongly in the context of the present crisis. The willingness of all major partners to assist Sri Lanka simultaneously suggests that goodwill generated through effective disaster response can translate into broader political and diplomatic space. Within the country, the government has been successful in calling for and in obtaining the support of civil society which has an ethos of filling in gaps by seeking the inclusion of marginalised groups and communities who may be left out of the mainstream of development.

Civil society organisations have historically played a crucial role in Sri Lanka during times of crisis, often reaching communities that state institutions struggle to access. Following a meeting with CSOs, at which the president requested their support and assured them of their freedom to choose, the CSOs mobilised in all flood affected parts of the country, many of them as part of a CSO Collective for Emergency Response. An important initiative was to undertake the task of ascertaining the needs of the cyclone affected people. Volunteers from a number of civil society groups fanned out throughout the country to collect the necessary information. This effort helped to ground relief efforts in real needs rather than assumptions, reducing duplication and ensuring that assistance reached those most affected.

The priority that the government is currently having to give to post-cyclone rebuilding must not distract it from giving priority attention to dealing with postwar issues. The government has the ability and value-system to resolve other national problems. Resolving issues of post disaster rebuilding in the aftermath of the cyclone have commonalities in relation to the civil war that ended in 2009. The failure of successive governments to address those issues has prompted the international community to continuously question and find fault with Sri Lanka at the UN. This history has weighed heavily on Sri Lanka’s international standing and has limited its ability to fully leverage external support.

Required Urgency

At a time when the international community is demonstrating enormous goodwill to Sri Lanka, the lessons learnt from their own experiences, and the encouraging support they are giving Sri Lanka at present, can and must be utilised. The government under President Dissanayake has committed to a non-racist Sri Lanka in which all citizens will be treated equally. The experience of other countries, such as the UK, India, Switzerland, Canada and South Africa show that problems between ethnic communities also require inter community power sharing in the form of devolution of power. Countries that have succeeded in reconciling diversity with unity have done so by embedding inclusion into governance structures rather than treating it as a temporary concession.

Sri Lanka’s present moment of international goodwill provides a rare opening to learn from these experiences with the encouragement and support of its partners, including civil society which has shown its readiness to join hands with the government in working for the people’s wellbeing. The unresolved problems of land resettlement, compensation for lost lives and homes, finding the truth about missing persons continue to weigh heavily on the minds and psyche of people in the former war zones of the north and east even as they do so for the more recent victims of the cyclone.

Unresolved grievances do not disappear with time. They resurface periodically, often in moments of political transition or social stress, undermining national cohesion. The government needs to ensure sustainable solutions not only to climate related development, but also to ethnic peace and national reconciliation. The government needs to bring together the urgency of disaster recovery with the long-postponed task of political reform as done in the Indonesian province of Aceh in the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami for which it needs bipartisan political support. Doing so could transform a national tragedy into a turning point for long lasting unity and economic take-off.

by Jehan Perera

Continue Reading

Features

A wake-up call for stronger preparedness and coordination

Published

on

Impact of Cyclone Ditwah (Image courtesy PTI)

Lessons from Ditwah:

Fifteen days after Cyclone Ditwah tore through the country, the floodwaters have receded and the immediate shock has given way to reflection. As of December 14, 2025, the bodies recovered from landslides have been laid to rest, survivors, whose homes were wiped out, are sheltered in Suraksha centres, and daily life has begun to inch forward. Roads, nearly 80 percent of them, have been reopened, power and water restored, and communities, through individual resolve and collective effort, have cleared homes and roads, even as heaps of damaged belongings still line the roadsides. Now, as the initial dust settles, the nation stands at a critical moment: beyond recovery, it is time to confront the deeper structural weaknesses laid bare by Ditwah.

Cyclone Ditwah has emerged as a defining test for Sri Lanka, both for the newly elected NPP government, facing its first major natural disaster, and for a nation still recovering from the economic collapse of 2022 and navigating the constraints of an IMF bailout programme. The storm not only challenged the country’s disaster-response machinery but also revealed the resilience of its people, the strengths of its leadership, and the gaps that must be urgently addressed as climate-related catastrophes become increasingly frequent.

Presidential Leadership in Times of National Crisis

From the earliest hours of the cyclone’s impact, President Anura Kumara Dissanayaka took an active and visible role in directing the government machinery. His rapid mobilisation of state institutions, technical agencies, and the Armed Forces helped Sri Lanka confront a multi-layered and complex emergency that spanned damaged roads, disrupted power lines, unsafe water supplies, landslides, and widespread displacement. The administration’s coordination, during these initial hours, set the tone for what became one of the most intensive emergency-response efforts in recent years. Mobilising and coordinating government institutions solely through presidential initiative is not an ideal administrative practice. A resilient state must, instead, ensure that its institutions are structurally prepared to act seamlessly when disaster strikes, closing the systemic gaps exposed by Cyclone Ditwah.

The President’s visits to all affected districts strengthened on-the-ground coordination by bringing together district coordinating committees, public officials, political representatives, and community organisations to align relief and reconstruction with local realities, while also helping to identify bottlenecks and clarify institutional responsibilities. However, these same district-level meetings exposed serious shortcomings in disaster governance: weak inter-agency communication, unclear response mandates, gaps in early-warning systems, and uneven political leadership at the local level. In several instances, critical information failed to reach the right actors in time, and some elected representatives were slow to engage, prompting the President to direct provincial governors to personally assess landslide-prone areas—underscoring the urgent need for a more robust, integrated disaster-management framework and stronger local political participation during crises.

Cyclone Ditwah serves as a powerful reminder that Sri Lanka must prepare better, long before the next storm arrives. Effective disaster response depends not only on the commitment of the central government and security forces but also on pre-trained communities and seamless cooperation between agencies at every administrative tier. This article seeks to contribute to a constructive national conversation on the lessons learned from Cyclone Ditwah. The intention is not to assign blame but to highlight the insights necessary to build a more resilient, better-coordinated system capable of protecting lives and livelihoods in the face of future disasters.

Equally notable was the spontaneous civic mobilisation that unfolded across the country. Communities self-organised to clear debris, distribute food, assist vulnerable families, and provide temporary shelter, demonstrating a deep social solidarity that often surfaces during national crises. In many affected districts, local volunteers were the first to reach remote or isolated areas, complementing government and military operations.

Rethinking Responses to Recurrent Climate Emergencies

Sri Lanka is no stranger to weather-related disasters, and Cyclone Ditwah is neither the first nor the last event the nation will confront. Over the past decade alone, the country has endured floods, landslides, droughts, and cyclones of varying intensity. These recurring emergencies underscore an undeniable truth: climate-related shocks are now a structural part of Sri Lanka’s future, demanding a disaster-management system that is agile, integrated, and continuously updated.

After the devastation of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, Sri Lanka invested significant effort in building its institutional infrastructure for disaster risk reduction. Agencies were established, frameworks were drafted, and early-warning mechanisms were introduced with the hope of preventing a repeat of such a tragedy. Yet the experience of Cyclone Ditwah has revealed that many of these institutions have become moribund—functioning in isolation, following outdated protocols, and lacking the coordination needed for an effective national response. While the systems technically exist, they are not fully aligned with the mission they were created to serve. Too many agencies operate within narrowly defined mandates and fail to communicate or integrate their work with related entities. This siloed approach weakens the overall national response and limits the ability of institutions to mobilise collectively when disaster strikes.

Once again Ditwah highlighted the need for reliable early-warning system that requires constant technological upgrading. A robust interface between technology and institutional networks is essential. Advanced and accessible communication technologies—early-warning systems, mobile alerts, satellite data, and community-level dissemination platforms— should play a crucial role in transforming timely information into effective action. Timely alerts, data-sharing mechanisms, communication networks, and community-level outreach must keep pace with global standards and evolving climatic threats. The gaps observed during Cyclone Ditwah indicate that Sri Lanka’s early warning systems need stronger digital infrastructure, better interoperability, and clearer channels for dissemination to all communities, especially those in vulnerable zones. Disaster risk management cannot rely solely on community participation.

Building a Disaster Management Architecture

Sri Lanka gained independence in 1948 in the aftermath of the devastating island-wide floods in 1947. Since then, the country has repeatedly faced severe natural disasters—particularly windstorms and floods—in 1957, 1964, 1969, 1976, 1986, and 1989. Yet, despite this long and painful history, no single, dedicated institutional mechanism existed, within the state, to manage disaster-related activities, until the mid-1990s. Responsibility for disaster response remained fragmented across multiple agencies, largely operating under the broad and limited mandate of social services.

A decisive institutional shift began in 1994 with the establishment of the National Disaster Management Centre (NDMC) by President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, under the Ministry of Social Welfare. The NDMC was tasked with coordinating disaster preparedness, mitigation, emergency response, recovery, and long-term rehabilitation and development. It also initiated the development of a comprehensive legal and policy framework for disaster management. By 2000, the NDMC had completed draft versions of the Disaster Management Bill and the National Disaster Management Plan. However, these initiatives stalled and were never formally adopted following the change of government in 2001.

The catastrophic human, economic, and social consequences of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami starkly exposed the limitations of this incomplete framework and underscored the urgent need for a systematic and comprehensive approach to disaster management. In response, disaster preparedness was elevated to a national priority, and on 10 February, 2005, a bipartisan Parliamentary Select Committee was appointed. Its mandate was to examine gaps in preparedness revealed by the Tsunami of 26 December, 2004, assess the absence of effective early-warning mechanisms, and recommend measures to strengthen institutional readiness and reduce the impact of future natural disasters.

The Parliamentary Select Committee met 28 times and produced a wide-ranging report within a short span, marking a decisive policy moment in Sri Lanka’s approach to disaster management. Its findings laid bare deep structural weaknesses in hazard mapping and risk assessment, preparedness, early-warning systems, mitigation, emergency response, and public awareness. Acting on these recommendations, Parliament enacted the Sri Lanka Disaster Management Act, No. 13 of 2005—finally providing a legal foundation for coordinated disaster governance.

The Disaster Management Act of 2005 brought forward significant changes in the institutional framework for disaster management. It created the National Council for Disaster Management (NCDM), a high-level political body, chaired by the President, with the Prime Minister as Vice Chair, and established the Disaster Management Centre (DMC) as the country’s lead implementing agency. The DMC was mandated to coordinate disaster risk reduction at national and sub-national levels, supported by Disaster Management Committees at district and divisional levels. A dedicated Cabinet Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights followed in 2006, later streamlined as the Ministry of Disaster Management in 2010. On paper, this architecture promised coherence, authority, and reach.

Parallel to the setting up of new institutional framework for disaster management, the process of disaster management policy planning and policy formulation has taken a new turn. ‘The Disaster Management Policy of 2010’, prepared by DMC, in 2010, was adopted as the main policy line for disaster management. Furthermore, DMC developed ‘The National Disaster Management Plan of 2013-2017’(NDMP) in 2014 as the overall guiding document covering intended activities of the major phases–mitigation, preparedness, emergency operations and post disaster activities, such as relief, recovery and reconstruction. Training, public awareness and education are also covered in the above phases. It envisaged a multi-sector approach in which involvement of NGOs and CBOs are expected to translate policies into tangible action. Further, in 2014, NCDM approved the Sri Lanka Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (SLCDMP) for 2014-2018 to reduce disaster and climate risks by minimising impacts on people, properties, and the economy. SLCDMP also presented a comprehensive roadmap to improve capacity of local level operators by institutionalising local level support in its planning. It was prepared by the National Disaster Management Coordinating Committee (NDMCC), a multi-stakeholder national platform, established in November 2007 who also plays a key role in implementing disaster risk reduction strategies in the country. This is a clear manifestation of confusion and duplication of disaster management work.

Technological and informational capacities improved with the establishment of a Disaster Information System in 2008, supported by UNDP, and the gradual rollout of nationwide early-warning systems. Responsibility for hazard monitoring was formally vested in the Meteorological Department and the Geological Survey and Mines Bureau, operating through the Disaster Management Centre’s Emergency Operations Centre. While these developments marked genuine progress, their effectiveness has remained uneven in practice. International partners, such as UNDP, have produced extensive analyses and recommendations, but ultimate responsibility of implementation rests with domestic institutions. The core problem lies not in the absence of information, but in weak implementation, limited inter-agency cooperation, and persistent administrative inaction.

Fragmented Institutions and the Cost of Poor Coordination

At the heart of these shortcomings are deeper features of Sri Lanka’s political and administrative culture. Disaster management has frequently been treated as a politically advantageous domain—offering visibility and access to state resources—resulting in its fragmentation across multiple ministries and agencies. This dispersion undermines integrated planning, weakens accountability, and hampers coordination precisely when speed and clarity are most critical. The consequences of inadequate preparedness, poor inter-agency coordination, and inconsistent public messaging have repeatedly emerged during major crises. This was evident in the MV X-Press Pearl disaster in May 2021, where information on hazardous cargo damage was not shared across agencies. Similarly, the lack of inter-agency communication was a prominent issue during Cyclone Ditwah in December 2025.

Technological and informational capacities improved with the establishment of a Disaster Information System in 2008, supported by UNDP, and the gradual rollout of nationwide early-warning systems. Responsibility for hazard monitoring was formally vested in the Meteorological Department and the Geological Survey and Mines Bureau, operating through the Disaster Management Centre’s Emergency Operations Centre. However, their effectiveness has remained uneven in practice.

International partners, such as UNDP and other multi-lateral agencies, have produced extensive analyses and recommendations, but ultimate responsibility of implementation rests with domestic institutions. The core problem lies not in the absence of information and recommendations , but in weak implementation, limited inter-agency cooperation, and persistent administrative inaction.

NGOs: Critical Actors with Structural Limits

Another critical dimension of Sri Lanka’s disaster-management landscape is the prominent role played by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and, to a lesser extent, private-sector institutions across almost every phase of the disaster-management cycle. Their contribution is especially visible at the community level, where state reach is often limited. It is, however, important to distinguish between spontaneous voluntary community action and the more structured, project-driven modes of operation, typical of NGOs. This distinction does not diminish the importance of NGOs; rather, it helps clarify both their strengths and their limitations within a national disaster-management framework.

NGO engagement is particularly valuable in Community-Based Disaster Risk Management (CBDRM), where sustained local participation is essential. Through CBDRM initiatives, NGOs help Disaster-Risk Communities identify, analyse, and monitor risks, develop locally appropriate mitigation strategies, and strengthen coping capacities. Many international humanitarian organisations coordinate their work through the UN Humanitarian Country Team, while several local initiatives demonstrate the transformative potential of community-centred action. The Community Tsunami Early-Warning Centre (CTEC) in Peraliya, established with the support of two foreign donors and a Sri Lankan medical doctor, is a notable example. Equipped with round-the-clock internet-linked computers receiving real-time alerts from the US Geological Survey, CTEC has built a network of 30 focal points across the Galle District, each comprising 10 village representatives—illustrating how informed communities can play a frontline role in risk mitigation.

The Sarvodaya Community Disaster Risk Management Centre in Moratuwa further underscores the constructive role NGOs can play. Sarvodaya has worked to establish disaster-management committees linked with government district-level officers, strengthening coordination between communities and the state. In partnership with LIRNEasia, it has also developed early-warning systems designed to deliver alerts directly to households. With more than 50,000 community-based organisations, Sri Lanka possesses a potentially powerful grassroots network capable of making a decisive impact on disaster preparedness, response, and recovery. These organisations have been tasked with identifying vulnerable groups within their communities and ensuring their protection during emergencies—a role they performed actively in the aftermath of the 2004 Tsunami.

Yet, despite this potential, Sri Lankan NGOs, as a sector, suffer from persistent structural weaknesses. Many remain heavily dependent on international donor funding and tend to become inactive once external financing diminishes. Over time, this has led to cycles of intense activity during high-profile disasters, followed by organisational stagnation and decline. Unless NGO engagement is better integrated into long-term national planning, supported by stronger domestic institutional linkages and sustainable funding mechanisms, their contribution will remain episodic rather than transformative.

Early Warning Systems: From Forecasting to Community Action

The recent experience of Cyclone Ditwah has once again underscored the critical importance of effective early warning systems in mitigating the impact of natural disasters. Sri Lanka’s vulnerability to such events was starkly evident during the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. The first tsunami waves hit the eastern coast of Sri Lanka at approximately 6.40 a.m. on 26th December, about one hour and forty minutes after the earthquake. A secondary wave struck approximately 20 minutes later. The western coastal area was hit by the tsunami waves much later. The tsunami hit the southern coastal city of Hambantota at about 9.10 a.m. and Peraliya on the south-western coast, where the train tragedy took place, at 10.10 a.m., three and a half hours after the first wave, the tsunami hit the eastern coast of Sri Lanka. If an emergency disaster early-warning communication system were in place, at least a part of the human disaster on the Western coast could have been avoided. More than two decades later, Ditwah revealed that preparedness remains inadequate, and simply issuing statements from government agencies is insufficient. Early warnings must be actively communicated to communities, accompanied by clear action plans implemented by relevant authorities, to ensure people are informed, prepared, and able to respond effectively to impending disasters.

A landslide

Cultural and Ethnic Sensitivity in Disaster Response

One of the most important lessons highlighted by Cyclone Ditwah is the critical need for inclusivity and sensitivity in a multi-ethnic, post-conflict society like Sri Lanka. Emerging from the ashes of a devastating ethnic conflict, the country must ensure that national unity and ethnic harmony remain central to every policy and action, especially during crises. Ditwah revealed that some state institutions are not yet fully equipped to operate effectively in a multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic environment. Crucial notices and statements were, at times, released solely in Sinhala, in violation of the language policy enshrined in the Constitution. While practical administrative challenges may exist, it is the responsibility of political leadership to ensure that these requirements are addressed proactively. When vital information fails to reach communities in their own languages during emergencies, those communities would experience alienation and discrimination, with potentially grave consequences. In a multi-ethnic, post-conflict society, sensitivity to ethno-political dynamics is not optional—it is imperative across all phases of disaster management: preparedness, emergency response, and post-disaster recovery.

The real challenge begins now, and Sri Lanka cannot afford complacency. Resettling displaced and vulnerable communities is a formidable task that demands more than community goodwill—government institutions must bear the brunt of these responsibilities. Piles of spoiled food and debris left unattended in cities can quickly create serious public health hazards, underscoring the need for swift and organised action. With the North-Eastern Monsoon approaching, the country must be prepared for any eventuality.

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance and Its Geopolitical Dimensions

Sri Lanka did not stand alone in the wake of Ditwah. The country received substantial international assistance—not only in emergency humanitarian relief, but also in expertise, equipment, and resources for recovery and reconstruction. This support reflects the goodwill Sri Lanka continues to command globally, while also underscoring the need for credible and efficient domestic systems capable of coordinating effectively with foreign partners. At the same time, emergency relief is never geopolitically neutral. Sri Lanka must therefore approach foreign disaster assistance with a clear understanding of its national interests—without retreating into a besieged mentality. Instead, the challenge is to manage geopolitical competition to our advantage through an approach of omni-enmeshment: engaging all major powers simultaneously through dense networks of cooperation, institutions, and partnerships, creating mutual stakes and reducing the likelihood of strategic pressure or conflict.

Rethinking Development Strategies under Climate Stress

Beyond immediate relief, Cyclone Ditwah forces us to rethink the development model we are pursuing. Decades of deforestation and unplanned urban expansion have amplified the country’s vulnerability: between 1990 and 2010, Sri Lanka lost an average of 24,500 hectares of forest per year, totaling nearly 21 percent of its forest cover (Sri Lanka Forest Information and Data, The Rainforest S.). Forests once absorbed and regulated rainwater, but their loss has accelerated floods, triggered landslides, and intensified droughts, while impervious urban surfaces exacerbate flash flooding. The country is now paying the price for these environmental and planning failures, making comprehensive, forward-looking strategies a matter of urgent necessity.

Lessons from Ditwah and the Path Forward

Cyclone Ditwah is more than a weather event—it is a wake-up call that Sri Lanka must strengthen its resilience against future disasters. Fragmented responsibility, weak inter-agency coordination, and inconsistent communication are vulnerabilities that put lives and livelihoods at risk. We are compelled to face the challenges posed by extreme weather events repeatedly in the future. Learning and applying the lessons of Cyclone Ditwah is crucial for political leaders, state institutions, NGOs, and communities alike. Only by building a culture of preparedness, accountability, and coordination can the nation shift crisis response from reactive improvisation to proactive, life-saving action.

Prof. Gamini Kerawella can be accessed through keerawellag@gmail.com

by Prof. Gamini Keerawella

Continue Reading

Features

The reality facing Sri Lankans, govt. and Opposition

Published

on

The Malimawa government has been in power only for about one year. So, we cannot say that they are not competent or able to develop the country, or that they are corrupt or less corrupt compared to the Yahapalanaya or the Rajapaksa Regimes whose records within their initial years were “not dissimilar”.

The Yahapalanaya Govt., and the Rajapakasa government in their initial years (and in fact throughout) had to face various natural and other disasters.

In 2005 Rajapaksas were still dealing with the December 2004 Tsunami, and the onslaught of the LTTE, attempted assassinations of Fonseka and Gota, followed by the Mavil Aru sluice gate closure and the launching of the Eelam war IV.  Key natural disasters during their period included the following.

2006 Floods: Sri Lanka experienced floods during both the first inter-monsoon season and the second inter-monsoon season.

2008 Floods: More flood events were recorded, particularly in November, affecting thousands of people.

2010 Floods: Heavy monsoon rains in May caused flash floods, high winds, and landslides across 13 districts.

January 2011 Floods: This was a major event where heavy monsoon rains affected an estimated 1.8 million people and destroyed vast amounts of agricultural land, including rice fields.  President Rajapaksa could not visit the affected areas due to the severity of the floods.

2012 Drought and Floods: A drought starting in late 2011 and lasting through 2012 dried water reservoirs and safe drinking water availability for around 1.8 million people. This was followed by floods.

2013 and 2014 Landslides and Floods: These years saw more heavy rainfall, floods and landslides killing dozens of people due to early-warning system failures. A major landslide occurred in October 2014 in Meeriyabedda. This was also a period when Ven. Ratana, Dr. Channa Jayasumana and others were becoming very active in undermining the agricultural sector with their hair-brained ideas.

 The government established the Disaster Management Act of 2005, No. 13.  It helped to better prepare for such events, although implementation faced challenges.

When Yahapanaya came to power, the tropical Storm Roanu brought heavy monsoon rains and caused the worst flooding in Sri Lanka in 25 years. The disasters resulted in over 100 deaths, left many missing, affected nearly half a million people, and damaged over 58,000 houses. The economic damage was substantial, particularly to agriculture and infrastructure. Then the

A second major disaster occurred in May 2017, worsened by the precursor to Cyclone Mora. This disaster affected 15 districts, killed over 200 people, and displaced hundreds of thousands.

Today, the country is in dire straits after the Ditwah cyclone. Curiously enough, the Malimawa faced with Ditwah did not implement the Disaster management mechanism (2005, Act.13) set up in 2005.

Today the Malimawa hands are tied down by the IMF agreements that they have been forced to accept (and here there was no other option as no country came forward to provide an over-arching loan). So, Sri Lanka is like a log caught by the forces of international trade and carried along by the current, with no independent strength of its own (because of JRJ’s open economy which boosted the wealth, but at the same time squashed the rise of local industries).

A significant worry is that the Malimawa government has not launched or even proposed any long-term development projects of any consequence, except for mere cursory statements at the manifesto level. This is the worrying thing that Sri Lankans need to look at.

However, it could be argued that the current government SHOULD be encouraged to stay in power (instead of pulling it down) because elections are very costly, disruptive, and even if a new government comes in, they still have to follow the IMF and World-Bank dictated policies that hit Sri Lanka after the declaration of bankruptcy during Gotabhaya’s time.

It could also be argued that if the Malimaawa continues to govern, then it will mess things up even more. If that be so, it may ensure their doom in the next round of elections.

A new government at any time will take another year or even more to learn the ropes, and one may ask if the country could afford that. Public opinion seems to hold that the old leaders (of the UNP, SLFP, or Pohottuwa) are now like spent tea, rotten, useless, and cannot and should not be brought back, even though the strong corruption charges leveled at them by the Malimawa leaders during the election have not led to court cases. The leaders in waiting, like Sajith or Namal, are not yet seen to be inspiring the public in any significant way.

People who can influence the government should try to help it launch some long-term projects that could fall into place as the IMF-controlled period wanes. This is true, irrespective of which government is in power, given the current circumstances facing Sri Lanka.

That is, there are things that the private sector alone cannot do, that only a government can do.

For instance, (i) Planning to achieve self-sufficiency in energy by developing alternative energies, biofuels etc. (ii) Planning to achieve self-sufficiency in basic food stuffs, establishing an infrastructure for their distribution and sale. (iii) Exploitation of critical minerals available in the country but requiring significant capital investments and overcoming complex environmental issues. (iv) Re-development of infrastructure (power grid, roads, high-speed railways instead of the old snail rails of the British era), taking account of the fact that the country must be ready for future weather disasters of much higher magnitude than Ditwah. This last need is presumably being considered by the government right now, and one may say it will take months to do new land surveys of the damage and create new plans. Finding the money may take longer. However, the plans must come before the funding.

Is the Malimava government capable of rising to the occasion, or has it lost the compass and is drifting in the doldrums, is a question that one cannot easily answer. Unfortunately, the general levels of optimism and enthusiasm of the public towards the government seem to have decreased significantly and the government must wake up to the reality.

By Chandre Dharmawardana 
chandre.dharma@yahoo.ca

Continue Reading

Trending