Part II

By Austin Fernando

(Former High Commissioner of Sri Lanka in India)

The title of this article may baffle the readers. I chose it knowing well that the critics of India desirous of seeing Minister Jaishankar lose would be offended.

Dr. Jaishankar, the Indian Minister of External Affairs visited Sri Lanka from 4 to 7 January on the invitation of Minister of Foreign Relations Dinesh Gunawardena hoping for nothing but victory.

The media eagerly awaited press statements. The outcomes of all high-level discussions are not included in the media statements, but observers read between the lines. This article is based on the statements covering three specific areas—devolution, development, and defense/security.

Both ministerial statements were abstract devoid of specifics, save a few on COVID-19. However, the Indian interests are craftily incorporated into ‘partnerships’, ‘infrastructure’, ‘energy’, ‘connectivity,’ ‘Lines of Credit’ ‘fisheries’, etc. Later, the media expressed Indian concerns about specific projects.

Minister Gunawardena spoke of economics, finance, trade, commerce, defense, security, fisheries, religion, and the pandemic. His was a generalized version of what had happened. Since we were not privy to what happened, there could be gaps in this article as well, written three weeks after.

Power-sharing and relationships

Minister Jaishankar in his statement mentioned, among other things:

“It is in Sri Lanka’s own interest that the expectations of the Tamil people for equality, justice, peace, and dignity within a united Sri Lanka are fulfilled. That applies equally to the commitments made by the Sri Lankan Government on meaningful devolution, including the 13th Amendment to the Constitution. The progress and prosperity of Sri Lanka will surely be advanced as a consequence.”

Here, Minister Jaishankar played proxy to the Tamil people, and displayed his concern about Sri Lanka’s “own interest.” Sri Lanka’s own interest” is multi-faceted, e. g., domestic, bilateral, multi-lateral, security, economic, diplomatic, etc. These could turn positive as well as negative. While there was much positive Indian support for Sri Lanka in the past, in 2012 India took a negative decision at the UNHRC. There is no guarantee of similar repetition. Going by the latest UNHRC report, Sri Lanka had better exercise caution.

In an article titled, ‘Crisscrossing 13A Abolition’ (The Island 13/11/2019), I wrote:

“PM Narendra Modi during President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s State Visit, like other interlocutors, said: “I am confident that the Government of Sri Lanka will carry forward the process of reconciliation, to fulfill the aspirations of the Tamils for equality, justice, peace, and respect.”

Dr. Jaishankar repeats what PM Modi has said, the only difference being he uses ‘dignity’ instead of ‘respect’. This message has been repeated by other Indians leaders as well. This message could have been conveyed by amiable High Commissioner (HC) Gopal Baglay. India may have considered it was too serious that it had to be delivered by Dr. Jaishankar himself.

In the aforesaid article, I highlighted the instances where former President Mahinda Rajapaksa, former Minister Basil Rajapaksa, Minister GL Pieris, former PM Ranil Wickremesinghe from our end, and PMs Narendra Modi, Dr. Manmohan Singh, Minister SM Krishna from the Indian end had expressed interest and commitments as regards the implementation of the 13^th Amendment. These were recalled by Minister Jaishankar as “commitments made by Sri Lanka”.

Knowing the parliamentary strength of the Sri Lankan government, and the somewhat weakened position of the Tamil Naitional Alliance (TNA) in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, where devolution was demanded vociferously, one may guess that Minister Jaishankar’s top priority would have shifted from 13A. He may have thought Tamil politics was becoming too nationalistic like Sinhala politics as evident from the election of representatives of the fringe political parties in the North. Having previously dealt with parliamentarians like CV Wigneswaran and Gajan Ponnambalam, I know they will be more vociferous than TNA Leader R. Sampanthan, whom I have associated with for decades. Probably, due to the apparent weakening of TNA, Dr. Jaishankar may have volunteered to fill the vacuum.

Anyhow, the Tamil groups have united for a common cause, as seen from the 15-1-2021 communication addressed to Member Missions of the UNHRC. This kind of cooperation may be extended to their campaign for enhanced devolution, too, but Minister Douglas Devananda or Parliamentarian Angajan Ramanathan, despite being in the government, will think twice before backing the anti-13A+ camp.

When bilateral negotiations got tough, the government may have moved faster to address Indian demands as regards 13A, Eastern Container Terminal (ECT), the Trincomalee Oil Tanks, or the Palk Bay fishing. The Presidential Media Unit (13-1-2021) gave the impression that bargaining on ECT had been tougher than what was claimed in ministerial statements. The speed at which the President’s Office proceeded to negotiate with the warring trade unions implied that its primary concern was the ECT. The 13A was secondary and the Presidential Secretariat has made no mention of it to date. Some ruling party backers are criticizing the ETC deal while attempts are being made in government quarters to defend the decision to involve Indian investment in the ECT. State Minister Nalaka Godahewa and Secretary Bandu Priyath have spoken in favour of it; State Minister Nivard Cabraal has put forth more logical arguments. But their positions are not acceptable to the trade unions.

Minister Gunawardena has not mentioned the 13A or devolution as if he had not heard Dr. Jaishankar properly! However, I believe that Dr. Jaishankar would not have incorporated the matter into his statement without a discussion with his Sri Lankan counterpart thereon. Alternatively, there could have been an understanding that each party would ‘mind its priorities,’ and this may explain non-congruence. But will India remain silent on 13A?

If Dr. Jaishankar’s visit had been aimed at discussing the 13A, one of the reasons for it may have been calling for the abolition of the Provincial Council system. If the composition of the Romesh de Silva Committee, some of whose members are openly critical of 13A, is anything to go by, then its proposals may not be in favour of retaining the 13A. However, the question is whether this legislation, introduced 38 years ago, should be allowed to go unrevised, given the socio-political changes the country has undergone.

The TNA has handed over its proposals to this Committee. It is pushing for 13A Plus, to all intents and purposes, historically referring to promises and standpoints as regards power-sharing, even referring to the pre-Independence era. If such powers are devolved to the PCs, there could be extensive support even from the Southerners as these propositions vastly expand the existing devolution package. Nevertheless, India may have sought to address any attitude of negativism toward the TNA demands.

At a recent virtual meeting between PM Mahinda Rajapaksa and PM Modi, the latter insisted: “Sri Lanka must implement its 13th constitutional amendment to achieve peace and reconciliation” and requested our Government to work towards realizing the expectations of Tamils for equality, justice, peace, and dignity.” Dr. Jaishankar has reiterated the keywords in PM Modi’s statement.

Minister Jaishankar’s insistence that the 13A is a prerequisite for ethnic reconciliation may be consequent on demands made by some Sinhala politicians, and Buddhist clergy for its abolition, irrespective of their possible effects on the JRJ-Rajiv Accord and the Indo-Lanka agreement on Kachchativu.

Secondly, even the postponement of the PC elections due to Covid-19 may be viewed as a prelude to the abolition of the 13-A, signifying a dignified scrapping. Dr. Jaishankar must have wondered why the PC polls had been postponed after the successful conclusion of a general election. Therefore, he may have tested the government’s intentions regardless of the legal obstacles to the conduct of the PC polls now.

The postponement of the PC polls could also be due to other factors such as the government’s poor performance in controlling the pandemic, the frustration of the repatriated workers, economic woes of the workforce caused by lockdowns, etc., protests by the Buddhist monks who supported the SLPP at previous elections and the grievances of the farming community such as shortage of fertilizer and failed pest control. But India must have thought of making its stance on the 13A known to Sri Lanka as speculation is rife that the PC system is to be scrapped.

Thirdly, Dr. Jaishankar is under Indian domestic pressures too, especially from Tamil Nadu, which considers the 13A and the JRJ-Rajiv Accord as the constitutional basis and the central means to addressing the Tamil aspirations. The State level pressures were heightened recently with a statement by DMK’s T R Balu, just before Tamil Nadu election season, requesting PM Modi “to ensure that the PC system remains intact.”

Tamil Nadu’s political influence on India could be gauged from the Sri Lankan government’s volte-face on the Jaffna University memorial issue. The rebuilding of the demolished monument commenced after Dr. Jaishankar had left. Simply speaking, PM Modi wants to accommodate the South Indian Tamil sentiments as part of the BJP electoral strategy.

Minister Jaishankar would have been cautious in demanding the enhancement of the powers of the PCs following the Article 370 (of the Indian Constitution) episode in August 2019 where the Indian rulers withdrew shared power from Kashmir. When queried, India bluntly declared that it was an ‘internal affair of India’. The possibility of receiving a similar response from Colombo may have been on Minister Jaishankar’s mind, but such hesitancy was not reflected in his statement. Perhaps, he would have been briefed by the TNA on representations to the Romesh de Silva Committee and the Missions of UNHRC member states and acting confidently.

Two crucial issues as regards power-sharing are police and land powers. The government is highly likely to circumnavigate them when the new Constitution is written. The Indians are aware of this. In Kashmir, land powers have been taken over by the center now. India may have thought Sri Lanka would follow suit. However, Dr. Jaishankar would have known that the TNA would ask for more.

India’s concerns are growing against the background of China’s Ladakh interventions in its northern boundary and the emerging maritime issues in the Indian Ocean Region. Therefore, maybe New Delhi does not want trouble in South India and across the Palk Strait. This issue has been heightened with China investing in the Colombo Port City and already having substantial control over the Hambantota Port. India cannot allow Sri Lanka to further slip into China’s sphere of influence. This would have invariably a burning issue troubling Dr. Jaishankar; this is discussed in Part II of this article.

The political changes in the US should also be taken into consideration. The Joe Biden administration in the US seems to be pro-India as could be seen from statements the new President has made and the inclusion of a considerable number of people of Indian origin in his administration. Further, Samantha Power entering a high position in his administration may revert certain aspects of administrative issues, and the Indian support might become necessary for Sri Lanka especially considering the US India Strategic Partnership in action. Hence what President Gotabaya Rajapaksa mentioned about geopolitics is true.

These will influence decision-making on the 13A or business deals.