Opinion
Devolution and Comrade Anura
By Austin Fernando
(Former Secretary to the President)
About ten months ago, among other things, I informally discussed the devolution of power with Anura Kumara Dissanayake, who was an MP at the time. The consequences of his low-priority approach to devolution, as predicted then, were reflected in the presidential election results in the North and the East. Perhaps, there were other reasons also for the low level of popular support for him over there. Now that he is the President of 23 million Sri Lankans, he must consider the presidential election results in the North and the East as a guide. Probably, the Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar has already reminded him of that.
Sri Lankan politicians’ mood changes
The policies of Sri Lankan politicians on power sharing are characterized by inconsistencies. Former Ministers Basil Rajapaksa and Prof. G.L. Peiris promised Indians the implementation of the 13th Amendment (13A). Though Namal Rajapaksa has specifically rejected the devolution of Land and Police powers, President Mahinda Rajapaksa promised “13A+,” including those. In Delhi, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa said 13A could not be implemented “against the wishes and feelings of the majority (Sinhala) community.” But he had solemnly declared that he would uphold and defend the Constitution, of which 13A is an integral part! The Indian political leaders’ policy on the devolution here has remained consistent.
We have conveniently forgotten that during the Oslo Peace Talks on 05 December 2002, the Sri Lankan delegation led by G. L. Peiris and the LTTE delegation led by Anton Balasingham agreed to “explore a solution founded on the principle of internal self-determination in areas of historical habitation of the Tamil-speaking peoples, based on a federal structure, within a united Sri Lanka.”
“Federal,” “areas of historical habitation,” and “internal self-determination” are anathema to many Southern politicians and not understood by civilians. Today, Ranil Wickremesinghe and Pieris will certainly dissociate themselves from the Oslo Declaration.
Wickremesinghe, who supported the passage of 13A and appurtenant legislations, was Prime.
Minister (PM) when the Oslo Declaration was made. But now he is unwilling to devolve police powers to Provincial Councils (PCs). Gotabhaya Rajapaksa informed Indians that he must “look at weaknesses and strengths of 13A.” Had he said so as an inexperienced President in 2019, it would have been tolerable, but he said so after 22 months in office. It reflected a lack of knowledge of governance systems on his part or something up his sleeve.
Evolution of 13A
In this background, it is appropriate, to reflect the evolution of 13A to evaluate it as against what was demanded in the name of devolution.
Sri Lanka came under pressure to devolve power following Black July (1983) and the beginning of the armed conflict. The contention that the Indians wished for Sri Lanka’s division through devolution is not true. India has always respected our sovereignty and territorial integrity owing to its experience with conflicts in Mizoram, Nagaland, etc.
On 01 March 1985, President J. R. Jayewardene personally sought Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s intervention to prevent the movement of armed terrorists from India and Sri Lankans seeking refuge in India. On 01 December 1985, the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) presented its proposals for devolution to Gandhi in a bid to pressure Sri Lanka to agree to power-sharing.
The salient features of the proposal were as follows:
• Sri Lanka—”Ilankai” be a union of states,
• Amalgamated Northern and Eastern Provinces, a ‘Tamil Linguistic State’, which cannot be altered without their consent,
• Parliament reflecting ethnic proportion shall be empowered to make laws under “List 1″ for Defense, Foreign Affairs, Currency, Posts / Telecommunications, Immigration/Emigration, Foreign trade/Commerce, Railways, Airports /Aviation, Broadcasting/Television, Customs, Elections, and Census only, • List 2” had all other subjects, inclusive of Law and Order, Land, etc., with the State Assembly possessing law-making powers, • Any person resident in Sri Lanka, on 1st November 1981, who is not a foreigner shall be a Sri ankan citizen, • No Resolution or Bill affecting any “nationality” should be passed by Parliament without the agreement of that “nationality,” (The term ‘nationality’ is misleading.)
• The State Assembly to be empowered to levy taxes, cess/fees, and mobilize loans/grants,
• Special provisions for Indian Tamils,
• The elected members are to be given enhanced powers, • Upgrading the judicial system, e.g. Provincial High Court to Appeal Court, and, • Muslim rights to be cared for.
The Jayewardene Government rejected the proposal out of hand. The TULF again addressed Gandhi (17-1-1986), incorporating more sensitive issues such as ‘traditional homelands,’ demographic imbalance, etc. Jayewardene steadfastly advocated a military solution and the war was dubbed as “genocide” by former Indian Minister B.R. Bhagat and several Lok Sabha members. The latter demanded punitive interventions such as ‘crushing Sri Lanka in 24 hours” (Sri Kolandaivelu on 29-4-1985), and Sri Gopalaswamy on 13-5-1985, asking India “to undertake every possible means, including military interventions.”
Gandhi would have been satisfied with the Sri Lankan proposals of 09 July 1986, prepared after consulting Minister P. Chidambaram, which fitted the Sri Lankan constitutional basics. There were ‘Notes’ incorporated into the proposals on PCs, law and order, and land settlements inclusive of land alienation under the Mahaweli Project, with allottees identified based on ethnicity. On 30 Sept.,
1986, the TULF responded to India in detail to the government’s proposals, adding more propositions.
Gandhi was mindful of Lok Sabha’s demands. He vented frustration in Lok Sabha and abroad (e.g. Harare). Efforts to project him and India as weak exasperated him and drove him to get tough. On 02 June 1987, he threatened to send a flotilla with ‘humanitarian assistance’, and on 04 June 1987, Indian Aircraft violated Sri Lanka’s airspace and carried out aid drops in the North. No superpower stood with us on this blatant violation. No wonder Jayewardene agreed to sign an Accord and follow up by introducing 13A.
After the signing of the Accord, the Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF) were deployed in Sri Lanka.
Lt. General A. S. Kalkat, in an interview with Nithin Ghokle, has admitted that the deployment of the Indian army here was a mistake. Jaishankar (one-time political adviser to the IPKF- 1988-1990), has said in his ‘The India Way,’ that it was a ‘misadventure.’ We are aware of the IPKF’s ‘mistakes’ and ‘misadventures’ like the Valvettithurai Massacre of 64 persons on 02 August 1989, and more, best known to Kalkat and Jaishankar. Importantly, the IPKF operations instilled fear, especially conditioning Tamil people’s minds to search for whatever possible solution.
Concurrently, as explained by then-Indian Foreign Secretary A. P. Venkateswaran, Jayewardene met Gandhi in mid-November 1986 in Bangalore, along with Ministers Natwar Singh, Chidambaram, and himself, and Jayewardene allegedly ‘pleaded’ with Gandhi to send the Indian Army to prevent his government from collapsing, due to the JVP attacks in the South, and LTTE in the North. It was his sheer desperation that drove Jayewardene to opt for the Accord and 13A. After this meeting, Gandhi sent Chidambaram and Natwar Singh to Colombo knowing our vulnerability.
On 19 December 1986, they submitted the “emerged” proposals. The salient points were as follows:
* The Eastern Province to be demarcated minus Sinhala majority Ampara Electorate.
* A PC was to be established for the new Eastern Province.
* Earlier discussed institutional linkages to be refined for Northern and Eastern PCs. The
intention would have been to merge later under a second-stage constitutional development.
* Sri Lanka was willing to create a Vice Presidency for a specified term.
* The five Muslim parliamentarians from the Eastern Province may be invited to India to discuss matters of mutual concern.
The foregoing demands show how India tried to match the Tamils’ interest, vis-a-vis the wishes of the majority community.
Military operations continued provoking India, which threatened to abandon its intervenor role on 09 February 1987, unless Colombo pursued a political solution. Jayewardene responded on 12 February 1987, insinuating calming down on military actions, promoting negotiation and administration, and paving the release of persons in custody. This was how India reacted when rubbed wrongly.
Under successive governments, PCs were weakened by the withdrawal of powers and lacked cooperation. This may have led Jaishankar to address President Dissanayake, whose party is considered averse to 13A. This is the perception of the Tamil MPs, who have recently sought US Ambassador Julie Chung’s intervention for correction. Such aversion to PCs is hard to overcome as evident from an NPP’s public statement that devolution will not include Land and Police powers. It said so close on the heels of Jaishankar’s request that 13A be fully implemented.
Flashback to 1986
The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) stalwart, Jaswant Singh posed seven questions in Lok Sabha on 13 May 1986, based on the situation in Sri Lanka. They are relevant even today.
* What is the Indian stand in the debate on devolution and delegation?
* Where do India and Sri Lanka stand on the Northern and Eastern Provinces merger?
* What is the stand on land use by the Indian Government, the Government of Sri Lanka, and
the Tamil groups?
* What is the status of the language?
* What is the stand on Law and Order?
* What is the time frame for reaching a solution?
* What is the Indian Government’s stand on the foreign threats emerging in the context of the Sri Lankan issues?
If Jaswant Singh were alive today, he would either join the critical Lok Sabha Members or question PM Modi and Jaishankar why the Accord has not been implemented. Jaishankar’s reminder to President Dissanayake would have been due to his frustration stemming from:
* 13A being “paralyzed” by partial implementation, and delayed elections.
* The demerger of the North and the East legally
* The delay in devolving land and police powers
* The language issue has not been fully resolved despite constitutional guarantees
* Absence of a timeframe for a solution, even after crushing the Tigers in 2009, and,
* Increasing threat to India, especially from China.
Parallelly, the field situations have changed. Military operations have ceased. Public attention has been shifted from conflict to human rights and humanitarian concerns, returning refugees, and reconciliation. 13A has been internationalized owing to the incorporation thereof into UNHRC Resolutions by Mahinda Rajapaksa and Wickremesinghe in 2009 and 2015 respectively. Intense lobbying by Diaspora groups has also contributed to this situation. These are daunting challenges before President Dissanayake. 13A is only one of them.
What is in store?
As seen above, the 13A has trudged a rough path to be accepted domestically or in India. Parliamentarians resigned, opposition politicians and Bhikkus protested on roads against it and violence was experienced. If the rejected proposals had been accepted the consequences would have been disastrous. However, devolution has come to stay and is viewed as a ‘Made-in-India’ solution.
President Dissanayake must be prepared for negotiations with relevant parties on devolution and hence needs to study India’s experience with devolution. For instance, on the devolution of land powers, Dissanayake can refer to how the Indian government changed Jammu Kashmir rules allowing the center to release lands to Indians to attract development/investment. They permitted even non-residents to own immovable property in Jammu and Kashmir and transfer agricultural land for non-agricultural purposes. India considered changes as her “internal affairs”, which may not be acceptable to them if we say so on 13A!
PM Modi has declared that such abrogation brought about security, dignity, and opportunity for all communities that had been deprived of development, and helped eliminate corruption. If he wishes, President Dissanayake can make similar reasoning to bolster his arguments concerning devolution.
Indians also have asymmetrical administration in the Himachal and Uttarakhand States but do not apply that to Jammu-Kashmir, which we also could duplicate. However, asymmetrical devolution is extremely complex and warrants serious legal attention.
It is now up to President Dissanayake’s legal and administrative experts to propose how to
incorporate propositions concerning devolution into the proposed new Constitution. India might compromise on devolution and concentrate more on economic and humanitarian rights interventions. Such attitudinal change is the need of the hour.
Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval, a respected negotiator/strategist, recognised even by Chinese President Xi Jinping in Kazan, has advised Tamil politicians to negotiate with a winnable candidate and secure Tamil aspirations through negotiations. His wise counsel was not heeded by some Tamil politicians, who, while rejecting 13A, demanded a federal system with self-determination powers for Tamils, which is a non-starter. By reminding President Dissanayake of the need to implement 13A after Doval’s visit, New Delhi sent a clear message concerning Sri Lanka: that it does not consider self-determination or a federal system as a solution.
Hence, Tamil politicians also must revise their approach in light of the aforesaid message. Based on Jaswant Singh’s queries and current political trends, if Tamil groups reject 13A, a new power-sharing mechanism sans federalism must be proposed. Perhaps, the new Constitution promised by Dissanayake may offer an alternative to bring about nation-building, with equality, dignity, justice, self-respect, and inclusivity, through a political process. They are the crux of Tamil demands.
Some believe that devolution can be achieved through Local Government Authorities in contravention of international norms of devolution and the Principle of Subsidiarity. Additionally, making all political parties think out of the box is a formidable challenge. Yet, consensual decision-making is needed to ensure the sustainability of any mechanism.
Meera Srinivasan of The Hindu has said:
“Despite India’s known support to the Mahinda Rajapaksa administration in defeating the LTTE in 2009, sections among the Sri Lankan southern population remain India-sceptics, wary of the big neighbour, who ‘interfered’ in Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict, ‘sided with Tamils’. They resist India’s commenting on power devolution or conduct of elections to PCs and oppose any Indian role in developing national assets.”
India and the Tamil political establishment may adapt to this Sinhala mindset. The upcoming parliamentary election is expected to enable the NPP to form a government. If so, it will be timely to change narratives, without risking the redirection of the government’s political allegiances elsewhere. India should be cautious. Change should be achieved through wider consultations and agreements.
From Bhandari to Vikram Mistri, and Rajeev Gandhi to Narendra Modi, Indians also have acted like their Sri Lankan counterparts in managing the national question here, as evident from Sri Lanka’s failure to implement the 13A fully for 37 years, and India’s failure to convince Sri Lanka of the need to use 13A to solve the national question.
Today India has to deal with a Sri Lankan leader, who is different from predecessors. It is hoped that Jaishankar and others will be able to persuade him to get to the genuine track to explore a solution for the national question. Good luck to Ministers Subrahmanyam Jaishankar and Vijitha Herath, Secretaries Vikram Mistri and Aruni Wijewardane, and High Commissioners Santhosh Jha and Kshenuka Senevirathe!
Opinion
Defeat of Terrorism and Triumph of Hypocrisy – another view
This is regarding the editorial of The Island on 19 May 2026, titled “Defeat of Terrorism- Triumph of hypocrisy”.
I fully agree with the Editor when he says that Terrorism needs to be eliminated in all its forms and manifestations. Terrorism is generally defined as “massacring innocents to achieve a political aim”. Whether the cause for terrorism is justifiable or not, terrorism per se, cannot be justified and thus, should be eliminated.
However, I have different views with the rest of the editorial.
The editor says what Rajapaksas did to the country was like saving a damsel in distress and abusing her thereafter. Elaborating the same, he says that Rajapaksas have thought leadership to defeat terrorism was a special license to do as they pleased and sought to politicise and monopolise war victory to accelerate their dynasty building projects. He continues to say that the post war Mahinda Rajapaksa (MR) admininstration became a government of Rajapaksas by the Rajapaksas and for Rajapaksas. In short, the implication was that MR, after defeating LTTE, has done nothing except furthering his and his family’s political interests.
MR, even during the critical period in the war against LTTE, handled the economy professionally. There was an upward trend in SL economy from 2005–2009 showing GDP growth from 24.4 billion dollars in 2005 to 42.5 billion dollars in 2009, doubling the 2005 GDP. During 2010–2015 showed Sri Lanka’s strongest economic performance with the economy growing from US $ 56.7 billion to US $ 80.6 billion.
The annual growth rate was over 7.4%, per capita income more than tripled (from US $ 1200 to over US $ 3,600) elevating SL to lower-middle income status. National poverty level declined significantly, dropping from over 15% in 2006 to below 7% by 2012. Unemployment declined to 4 %. Transport and energy sectors received a significant boost. Massive power generation projects such as Norochcholai coal power plant and Upper Kothmale Hydro power plant were completed.
The expansion of Colombo port, development of Hambantota port, Mattala International Airport and building of expressways (Southern and Colombo-Katunayake) greatly improved the country’s transportation capacity and brought SL clear to a goal of being a dynamic Maritime and Aviation Hub.
The above statistics of the Central Bank does not prove the fact that Rajapaksas only looked after their interests after the war. Hence the proverbial “Damsel” that the editor was referring to, was not abused as he claimed, but had been looked after very well.
Excesses may have happened and it happens everywhere in every field. But the fact remains that MR defeated the most ruthless terrorist organisation in the world and developed the country with roads, rails, ports, airports, expressways, bridges, power plants, stadiums etc. which deserves appreciation.
The editor then says MR suffered a humiliating electoral defeat in 2015, again came to power in 2019, but mismanaged the economy, indulged in corruption and bankrupted the country. That too is far from the truth.
The foreign exchange crisis that culminated in 2002 was not due to mismanagement /corruption of Gotabaya Rajapaksa (GR) government but mainly due to excessive foreign borrowings during 2015-2019. By 2019 Nov, the economy was already in a precarious state, with the IMF itself warning that SL was highly vulnerable to external shocks.
The editorial never mentions Covid 19, the worst global pandemic the GR government had to face. During this period the government revenue fell by approx. Rs 534 billion. (revenue lost from import restriction of motor vehicles, Covid lockdown and closure of liquor shops were Rs 136 billion, 323 billion and 75 billion respectively.) At the end of the MR regime in 2014, the outstanding ISBs were US $ 5.3 billion and the reserves were US $ 8.2 billion. By the time GR came to power, the outstanding ISBs were US $ 15.2 billion and the reserves were US $ 7.6 billion. In 2020-2021, the GR government did not issue any ISBs but settled them in time.
The decision to maintain debt servicing was not just about protecting the country’s image in financial markets but to ensure critical health and humanitarian support including vaccines, medicines, and essential supplies continued to flow into the country during the worst global health crisis in the country.
It’s a pity that the public who remained silent when foreign debt was piling up, launched an Aragalaya to expel the leader who settled the debts without obtaining fresh loans. Was it hypocrisy or treason?
The claim that the tax reduction implemented in Dec 2019 caused a significant loss of revenue was also not correct. When economic activity is deliberately halted by a global pandemic, with borders shut, businesses closed, citizens confined to their residences, production at the lowest, no tax rate high or low, can generate revenue from transactions that are simply not occurring.
The economic downfall was not due to mismanagement or corruption but due to the promulgation of bankruptcy (debt standstill) by Central Bank (CB) on the advice of former CB governor Dr. Indrajth Coomaraswamy and consultant Prof. Shantha Devaraja. That decision undermined the on-going efforts to stabilise the economy. I consider allowing such an announcement was a mistake done by GR. It halted IMF staff level already agreed loan, Indian Credit Line of US $ 3 billion and suspended WB and ADB loans. Also, China had to halt the loans already requested as China Secure (the government insurance company) could not insure loans to a bankrupt country.
The reserves were carefully used by GR to buy vaccines giving priority to human lives, and due to lack of foreign exchange, procurement of gas and fuel was critically effected. In the final stages there was an organised campaign by saboteurs to steal and hoard fuel. The JVP members publicly appealed to Sri Lankans abroad not to send any dollars to the country. A hate campaign was carried out against the Rajapaksas.
A protest called Aragalaya was held at Galle face. The entire episode was a grand conspiracy to oust GR, who was sworn in as the President at Ruwanwelisaya, the great symbol of Sinhalese Buddhist culture. Black Vesak lanterns, ridiculing Buddhist sacred symbols, insulting the Mahanayakas, anti-unitary slogans and glorifying federalism and free biriyani for the entire crowd by “unknown” sponsors were ample evidence of its hidden agenda.
Aragalaya, which forcibly took over the Presidential Secretariat, was obviously illegal. The other mistake done by GR was to allow protesters to operate without chasing them away using force if necessary. Finally, GR, the Commander in Chief of the three forces, left the country without hurting anyone.
The editor says that Rajapaksas squandered an opportunity that presented itself after the war to bring about national reconciliation and defeat LTTE ideology politically. He says reconciliation has become a victim of hypocrisy.
MR, after the war, launched a large number of development projects in the North constructing roads, bridges, grounds, schools, hospitals, etc. All the roads were carpeted. During the period 2010-2012 the growth rate in Jaffna was 22% compared to 7% in the rest of the country. That was the first step he took towards reconciliation.
Reconciliation needs an equal contribution from both sides. Unfortunately, the goodwill shown and the enormous economic support provided by MR were never reciprocated by the Tamil politicians. MR held PC elections (without abolishing 13A even with two-thirds majority in parliament) and allowed them to elect their own leaders. That was the second step towards reconciliation.
Mr. C. V. Vigneswaran studied at Royal college and Colombo Law College, became a Magistrate, High Court judge, a judge in the Court of Appeal and in the Supreme Court. Having lived among Sinhalese for more than 65 years, after being elected as the Chief Minister in the Northern Province, he declared that the Sinhalese had no right to live in Jaffna. Every year he returned most of the funds allocated for Northern development back to the Treasury without utilising it fully, to indicate that there was no support from the government. That was how Tamil politicians contributed towards reconciliation.
After 2009, hundreds of Tamil students in the North have become doctors, engineers, lawyers, top government officials, etc., due to unhindered education. The civilians who suffered under LTTE facing abductions, paying ransom, etc., now live in peace without any fear. Most of the Tamils have migrated to areas outside the North and the East. More than 52% of the Tamils are now living among Sinhalese without any problem. Main businesses in Colombo are dominated by the Tamils. What else is required Mr. Editor for the so-called reconciliation? Granting a separate state on a platter?
With all the above, the Tamils in the North annually commemorate the very person who made their lives miserable for 30 years. How would the Sinhalese feel when they see the terrorists who killed pregnant women, monks, infants, devotees being garlanded and felicitated in the North every year?
Yes, the editor was correct. Reconciliation has become a victim of hypocrisy.
Retired Rear admiral (Dr) Sarath Weerasekera VSV RWP USP
Former Public Security Minister
Opinion
IMF’s failure to tackle corruption in Sri Lanka
Anti-corruption and governance reforms are central pillars of Sri Lanka’s $2.9 billion bailout agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This was the first time in Asia that an IMF programme was explicitly linked to a comprehensive anti-corruption diagnostic and specific legislative measures.
At the press conference announcing the deal, Senior Mission Chief Peter Breuer said that the IMF had emphasised that anti-corruption and governance reforms are central pillars of the programme. He added that the IMF would subject Sri Lanka to a comprehensive governance diagnostic exercise, making it the first Asian economy to undergo such an exercise, which will assess corruption and governance vulnerabilities in Sri Lanka and provide prioritised and sequenced recommendations. “Sri Lanka will be the first country in Asia to undergo a governance diagnostic exercise by the IMF. We look forward to further engagement and collaboration with stakeholders and civil society organisations on this critical reform area,” the IMF official said.
An extract from the Technical Assistance Report on Governance Diagnostic Assessment, Sri Lanka (September 30, 2023) is as follows; “The report highlights immediate and short-term measures to address key corruption issues, as well as structural reforms that require more time and resources but are essential to strengthen governance and initiate lasting change. The recommendations are designed as a coherent approach to improving governance through a focus on: clarity of authority and responsibility for core functions; financial and operational independence of essential accountability and law enforcement institutions; transparency in government practices and performance, especially relating to the planning, spending, and accounting for the use of public funds and assets; inclusive, accessible, and rule-based means to enforce private agreements and challenge official behaviour; and efficient mechanisms for making information public and holding organisations and individuals to account for their performance and behaviour”.
Further, the agreement required Sri Lanka to implement several specific, actionable measures to curb corruption vulnerabilities:
New Anti-Corruption Legislation: The government passed the landmark Anti-Corruption Act in 2023, which expanded the powers of the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC), required electoral candidates and officials to declare their assets, and introduced protections for whistleblowers.
Fiscal and Procurement Reforms: The IMF programme included commitments to improve public financial management, increase tax transparency, and advance public procurement laws to eliminate political interference and cronyism in government contracts.
The IMF Executive Board is supposed to continuously track these anti-corruption and governance benchmarks during its periodic programme reviews to ensure compliance. The IMF officials’ last visit to Sri Lanka was from March 26th to April 9th when they reviewed the progress of the programme, decided that it was going well and approved the release of the final tranche. Their statement did not carry any reference to the activities of the government regarding control of corruption.
The Letter of Intent submitted by the government at the conclusion of the review becomes relevant under these circumstances. It was officially released on May 29, 2026. One of the critical undertakings by the government, according to the Letter of Intent, relates to cost-recovery pricing, the government has reaffirmed its commitment to maintaining cost-recovery pricing for fuel and electricity.
Going by available communications, apparently the IMF has not inquired into what caused the increase of cost of production of electricity. Cost of electricity production has gone up due to increased use of diesel, as low quality coal is not producing the required amounts. The coal that has been recently imported has been found to be of low quality and the government has said the losses due to this misadventure will not be shifted to the people. The irregularities in the coal procurement process that has happened recently is no secret, the Auditor General’s report has pointed out the flaws in the said procedure. Ironically, the IMF programme highlights the need to have fool proof procurement and tender procedures, and emphasises “holding organisations and individuals to account for their performance and behaviour” as the above quoted Technical Assistance Report mentions, yet it is silent on this matter showing its lack of responsibility. And it wants cost-recovery pricing for electricity! This may be taken as proof that the IMF is not very much concerned about the plight of the poor.
Further, these policies and recommendations of the IMF may substantiate the accusations made by left oriented organisations that the IMF insists on austerity measures, often at the expense of welfare expenditure, in order to serve neoliberalism. The clauses on corruption control in its agreement with the government appear to be mere lip service and window dressing. If no follow-up action is taken on these requirements, such clauses have no meaning and serve no useful purpose. If it is a responsible organisation, the IMF should have called for an impartial inquiry into the coal procurement procedure, for it is mandated to ensure transparency and integrity in these procedures. Moreover, if it is concerned about the welfare of the public it should not have asked for cost-recovery pricing of electricity when the reason for the increased cost could be corruption. Instead of going into the matter of corruption the IMF asks the government to recover the losses from the people. Cannot it think of a fairer means of recovering these losses instead of burdening the already impoverished people?
Thus, the question arises whether the IMF is a tool of imperialism. Many critics, particularly in the Global South, argue that the IMF functions as an instrument of financial imperialism or neo-colonialism. Structural Adjustment Programmes of the IMF ties its emergency loans to strict conditions like austerity, privatisation, and deregulation. Critics argue these demands dismantle local welfare systems, strip developing nations of their sovereignty, and open their markets to exploitation by multinational corporations. Further, the wealthy nations, particularly the United States and European powers, hold the majority of voting shares and effectively control the institution, dictating economic policy to weaker states. Critics claim that IMF-mandated currency devaluations artificially lower the cost of raw materials and natural resources in developing countries, benefiting wealthy creditor nations which amount to resource extraction.
Another matter of concern is that the interest rate for IMF loans to Sri Lanka, contrary to common belief that it is concessionary, is 5% which is pretty high and may be unbearable to a poor country like Sri Lanka. The country was in a woeful state in 2022 and was forced to declare bankruptcy, and seek IMF assistance. If we seriously examine the cause of this economic disaster, we will see that it was due to the economic policies the country had been following since independence. We import more than we export and take loans to meet the shortfall. This practice has gone on and on and is continued at present. No government, including the present one, despite its left leaning claims, had attempted to correct this colossal mistake. Our debt burden is frightening, less said about it the better.
The obvious solution to this problem would have been to achieve self-sufficiency in our essential needs, like food, and reduce reliance on imports. Most of our needs in food and other essentials could be locally produced. The IMF may not recommend such a course of action. It would want us to remain a poor country, struggling in the vicious cycle of import-export-debt quagmire.
by N. A. de S. Amaratunga
Opinion
When the decisive vote changes hands: Sri Lanka’s next electoral shift may already be underway
In the summer of 1789, as the French Revolution gathered momentum, delegates of the National Assembly assembled in Versailles to debate the future of France. The seating arrangement inside the chamber was not planned to shape political vocabulary for centuries to come. Yet it did. Those who favoured sweeping political change, greater equality, and the dismantling of inherited privilege gravitated to the left side of the hall. Those who defended the monarchy, established institutions, and traditional social hierarchies took their seats on the right. What began as a matter of convenience soon became a political metaphor. More than two centuries later, we still speak of the “left” and the “right” to describe competing visions of society.
Since then, the terms have evolved and acquired different meanings across countries and historical periods. Yet, the broad distinction remains remarkably durable. Ideologies associated with the left generally place greater emphasis on social, political, and economic equality, often advocating a more active role for the state in addressing disparities and expanding collective welfare. Ideologies associated with the right tend to place greater value on tradition, market mechanisms, authority, and various forms of social hierarchy, arguing that stability and prosperity emerge from preserving established institutions and incentives. Most political movements, of course, occupy positions somewhere between these poles, combining elements of both traditions in different proportions.
Few elections have altered the course of Sri Lankan politics as dramatically as the general election of 1977. Sweeping to power with an unprecedented five-sixths majority in Parliament, the United National Party ushered in a new political and economic era under the leadership of J. R. Jayewardene. He would later become the country’s first Executive President under a constitutional framework that vested extensive powers in the office. The changes that followed reflected a decisive move towards market-oriented reforms and a political outlook that leaned more to the right than anything Sri Lanka had previously experienced.
Yet even a political machine as formidable as the UNP’s could not hold power indefinitely. After nearly seventeen years of dominance, its grip on the electorate weakened. In 1994, the pendulum swung once again, bringing Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga. The victory was widely interpreted as a return to a more socially conscious and centre-left political vision.
What followed was not merely a change of government but the emergence of a recurring pattern in Sri Lankan political landscape. Since 1994, governments of varying compositions and personalities have risen to power with crucial support from parties and constituencies positioned on the left of the political spectrum. Whether through formal coalitions, strategic alliances, or ideological influence, the left has often provided the decisive electoral weight needed to secure victory. In many cases, without that support, the arithmetic of power would have looked very different.
Yet it is equally important to recognise what Sri Lanka has not become. Despite the enduring influence of left-wing thought, the country has never embraced an uncompromising far-left political project. Instead, successive governments have largely occupied a centre-left space, balancing market economics with welfare commitments, nationalism with social reform, and political pragmatism with egalitarian aspirations. The result has been a political landscape where power changes hands, parties rise and fall, and personalities dominate headlines, but the centre of gravity remains remarkably leftist. Sri Lanka’s electorate has repeatedly rewarded those who speak the language of social justice, even while stopping short of endorsing political extremes.
One possible explanation for this enduring centre-left tendency lies not in political parties themselves, but in the cultural formation of the electorate. For much of the period between the 1960s and the liberalisation of the economy in 1977–78, Russian literature occupied a prominent place in Sri Lanka’s reading culture. Affordable translations of the works of writers such as Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Gorky, Chekhov and Pushkin circulated widely among students, teachers and ordinary readers. Alongside their literary value, these works exposed generations of Sri Lankans to questions of social justice, class inequality, collective responsibility and the moral obligations of society toward the vulnerable.
By the early 1990s, the generation that had grown up reading this literature had come of age politically. As they entered the electorate in larger numbers, they helped shape the contours of public opinion. Their voting preferences did not necessarily favour revolutionary socialism or radical left-wing politics. Rather, they appeared to support governments that combined commitments to welfare, social protection and egalitarian ideals with the practical realities of governing a developing nation. In this sense, the centre-left orientation that has characterised much of Sri Lanka’s political landscape since 1994 may owe as much to the country’s literary and intellectual culture as to the strategies of political parties themselves.
Yet there is an apparent paradox at the heart of this story. While successive governments often drew legitimacy from centre-left political ideals, their economic policies frequently moved in a different direction. Confronted by fiscal constraints, global economic pressures and shifting geopolitical realities, they operated within an international economic order largely shaped by market-oriented principles. Institutions such as the International Monetary Fund exerted considerable influence over economic policymaking, encouraging reforms associated more closely with liberalisation, fiscal discipline and market efficiency than with traditional left-wing economics.
It was thus a balancing act that defined Sri Lankan governance for decades after 1994: governments elected on promises of social justice and collective welfare, yet compelled to pursue economic strategies shaped by the imperatives of a global market economy. Politically, the country remained centre-left. Economically, it often travelled along a more market-oriented path.
Sri Lanka may have settled its political direction for the next few years, but the next truly decisive moment may arrive closer to 2030. By then, the composition of the electorate will have changed once again. A growing share of voters will belong to Generation Z and Generation Alpha, generations whose intellectual and cultural worlds differ markedly from those that came before them.
If the electorate that emerged in the 1990s was shaped, in part, by the values encountered in Russian literature and a reading culture that emphasised questions of social responsibility, collective welfare and inequality, the generations now entering political maturity have been formed by a different landscape altogether. Their influences are increasingly digital, global and instantaneous, are shaped more by algorithms and by social media feeds, content creators and transnational cultural currents. Many have grown up in a world where entrepreneurship, individual success, innovation and market-driven solutions occupy a far more visible place in public discourse.
This generational shift is unfolding alongside broader transformations in global politics. Across much of the world, including major powers such as the United Kingdom and the United States, contemporary political movements that emphasise markets, national interests, economic competitiveness, and stronger state authority have gained momentum. Whether these trends will find a lasting echo in Sri Lanka remains a question that deserves careful attention, not merely as an electoral matter, but as one intertwined with some of the defining challenges of our time.
Today, concerns of national sovereignty, security, strategic influence and even soft power are increasingly mediated through economic strength and market performance. Nations are judged not only by their political ideals but also by their ability to compete, innovate and secure their place within an interconnected global economy. Sri Lanka, still navigating the aftermath of economic crisis and charting its future development path, finds itself at the centre of these debates.
Against this backdrop, if the decisive vote is gradually passing from a generation shaped by the books that once filled the nation’s shelves to one shaped by the screens that now fill its hands, the question therefore does not simply become who will win the next election. It is whether the intellectual and cultural influences that shaped Sri Lanka’s centre-left political consensus can retain their hold on a new electorate formed by different experiences, different technologies, and different aspirations.
If every era is ultimately defined by the stories it tells itself, what story is the next generation of Sri Lankan voters already beginning to write? Will it move the centre of gravity towards a more market-oriented, centre-right vision? The answer may well determine not only the outcome of future elections, but the ideological direction of Sri Lanka itself.
By Viran Maddumage PhD (Reading), Macquarie University,
and Sanduni Rathnayake, AAL
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