Features
Battling the Tea Board and vested trade interests
“Tea Hub” was a toxic proposal that would have hurt pure Ceylon tea
(Excerpted from the Merrill. J. Fernando autobiography)
My fervent appeals to the Tea Board for assistance to local brand builders to develop own brands were, as I said earlier, supported by Victor Santiapillai. My strategy proposal to launch ‘Dilmah’ in Australia as a fully Sri Lankan-owned tea brand was the first such initiative presented to the Tea Board. The Board was enthusiastic and voted the funds I solicited – approximately Australian Dollars 300,000 (Rs. 5.9 million then).
However, the Secretariat bureaucracy, without consulting me, submitted a paper proposing that my project, and all future projects, should be funded on 50/50 basis, between the Board and the exporter. This was, actually, a great blow to my plans, as a tea bagging project is an enormously costly exercise, requiring extensive investment in plant and machinery.
The opposition to my project from the Secretariat is demonstrated by one single fact; the Dilmah initiative went before the Funding Committee – consisting of Government nominees of the Board – no less than 21 times, before it was approved! The many projects which were approved at a single sitting disappeared from view within a short space of time. The Dilmah project, approved so grudgingly by this Funding Committee, is the only such initiative still in successful operation.
Finally, following comprehensive clarifications on brand building and launching expenditure submitted by me to the Tea Board, supported by Santiapillai, as I have mentioned earlier in this chapter, it was agreed that such costs would be shared on an equal basis by the EDB, Tea Board, and Dilmah. Despite the delayed approval, my project continued to be plagued by the tardiness and active opposition by key members of the Secretariat.
The Tea Board share of the promotional costs was unduly delayed, causing me and my distributor in Australia serious embarrassment. Dr. Wickrema Weerasooria, then High Commissioner for Sri Lanka in Australia, had to intervene several times on my behalf with the Chairman of the SLTB, though his appeals were stifled by the Secretariat. At no stage in these painful exercises did I appeal for assistance to the Plantations Minister, Major Jayawickrema, who had ceased to be my father-in-law 12 years previously.
Today, Dilmah carries the message of Pure Ceylon Tea to over 100 countries worldwide. Had I succumbed to the animosity generated against the Dilmah project at the outset, today there would not be one locally-owned label, selling successfully in overseas markets dominated by multinationals. As opposed to that, over the decades the Tea Board has invested millions of dollars, fruitlessly, in a multiplicity of tea promotional projects, but Dilmah remains the only success story, proving beyond doubt that my company was the right partner then for the EDB/SLTB project, to represent Pure Ceylon Tea in an overseas market.
More conflict
One of the main reasons for my numerous conflicts with the long-established trade bodies was their general resistance to change and to my insistence on a more proactive approach from those bodies. The industry in Sri Lanka, on account of its vulnerability to both internal and external dynamics consumption patterns, international financial upheavals, regional conflicts and many more is a highly-volatile system. Our trade governance and regulatory bodies seemed to be entrenched in an archaic mindset, with a singular inability, or reluctance, to offer proactive responses to predictable market disruptions. The tendency seemed to be to jealously guard the status quo.
Once, in a move to change the entrenched ‘clubbiness’ of the CTTA, we enabled the election of Lofty Wijeratne, then a Director of Carsons, as Chairman. Despite requests from many members of the trade, I steadfastly refused to consider the position myself. Lofty, too, was subject to many pressures from vested interests within. I recall a request he made to me, obviously due to compulsion from established
brokers, not to support Ajit Chitty’s application for a tea broker’s license. I disagreed and persisted in my support of Ajit, as I was of the firm view that the trade should encourage the emergence of more local companies. Finally, Ajit entered the broking fraternity with Eastern Brokers and made a very good thing of it.
I am also aware that during this period, when I was involved with numerous issues impacting on the interests of the local exporter, CTTA representatives had been instructed by the relevant British masters to oppose any and all of my initiatives and proposals. In the many years of its existence, the CTTA has, on the whole, done a reasonable job in protecting and fostering industry interests. However, my view is that the constant pressures brought on it by a wide spectrum of industry-related parties and entities has, in recent decades, prevented it from a strict and objective pursuit of its mandate.
When the British dominated every aspect of the tea industry, there was no dissent or conflict of interest, as there was tacit agreement that the CTTA and every other trade-related body was committed to the protection of British interests. The Chamber of Commerce too was not free of this type of internal manipulation and inbuilt politicking. One year I was appointed to the committee of the Chamber. At my very first meeting, a very senior member with strong interests in banking brought in a related issue which was not on the agenda. My objection to the discussion of this item, on those very grounds, was accepted and the matter was dropped immediately.
Within two weeks, Suneetha Jayawickreme, who was then Secretary of the Chamber, called me to advise that a regulation of the Chamber precluded two individuals from the same group of companies from serving on the committee simultaneously. He pointed out that Jayasingham of Harrisons & Crossfield and I were both on the Harrisons Travel Services Board, and that in compliance with the Chamber stipulation, I should resign. I immediately did so, without even waiting for a written confirmation of the discussion. I was actually amused that interested parties had used a legitimate convention, though the association was tenuous, to ease out an individual who was, obviously, not prepared to toe the general line.
I must also state that the criticisms I have leveled against all these boards is in connection with their administration and trajectories as of the early 1970s and across the ’80s. That era is now history, though the consequences of both inaction and misdirected strategies of that time were long-term impediments to the development of the country’s tea export trade. The thinking within those entities is far more balanced and enlightened now, the Tea Exporter’s Association excluded, for reasons which I will explain in a subsequent chapter.
An attempted reconciliation
When a group of traders decided that their parochial interests should supersede industry welfare in its totality, and sought to launch the Tea Exporters’ Association (TEA), I believe that all traders, without exception, supported the move. Several senior members invited me to join but I refused, giving them very good reasons for my opposition to it. One of the members was the late Michael de Zoysa, then Managing Director of Lipton and for many years a prime mover in the CTTA.
He and I frequently disagreed with each other on a number of important trade-related issues. After his retirement from Lipton also he approached me on several occasions and tried to persuade me to join the TEA, on the grounds that the trade was now thinking differently and that they would like to consider my views seriously and work together for common goals.
At first I refused to engage in any discussion on the matter but, finally, after several personal approaches by Michael, I agreed to meet a six-member team of trade representatives led by him. During his years at Lipton, our frequently-conflicting views on common trade-related issues had led to a certain frostiness in our relationship, although we had known each other for years.
I appreciated that as a senior manager of a multinational trader, which he had joined straight from school, he was obliged to guard its interests which, however, were generally inconsistent with those of the local exporter of a locally-owned brand. Things between us changed substantially after his retirement, though, and our relationship became more relaxed, particularly because, once freed from the professional obligation of serving the narrow interests of a multinational, he was able to take a more objective and liberal view of the trade.
Fate, however, does not respect human motives or human plans. Tragically, Michael died suddenly and, instead of chairing the meeting that was scheduled to be held at my home on September 30, 2019, I attended his funeral on that day. Along with Michael, the possibility of a reunification of divergent tea trade interests was also laid to rest. Despite our differences, we treated each other with respect, as we were both men with strong opinions on subjects that were also our passion.
The tea hub – a toxic proposal
In my view, in no other concept or proposal, is the venality of many of our tea traders and their submissiveness to colonial and multinational domination, as clearly demonstrated, as in the arguments that have been offered in support of the ‘Tea Hub’ hypothesis. In essence, the Tea Hub concept is an initiative to import cheap Black Tea to Sri Lanka, for blending with our tea and for re-export thereafter. The component of cheap, imported tea in the blend, would reduce the cost of the resulting export and improve the profit margin of the local packer. This concept has a long history.
The cloud in the horizon
In 1979, the then Minister of Trade, the late Lalith Athulathmudali, visited the Rotterdam factory of Van Rees, a multinational trader. It was a centre for the bulking, blending, and packaging of cheap tea from multiple auction centres, sold thereafter in the Netherlands and various other European markets. Minister Athulathmudali, ignorant of the background realities of the local trade, had been deeply impressed by the scale of the Van Rees operation and, on his return, strongly advocated the setting up of a similar facility in Sri Lanka. When his views were made public, I vehemently objected to the proposal, giving reasons for my stance.
Athulathmudali was adamant but, fortunately, the then President, J. R. Jayewardene, summoned me, obtained my views, and immediately decided to shelve the idea. To the best of my recollection that was the first public airing of the Tea Hub concept. Since then, from time to time, the proposal has surfaced, on the initiative of traders who believe that selling Ceylon Tea cheap is the way forward.
I also recall that in late 1988, R. M. B. Senanayake, former civil servant and then General Manager of Jafferjee Brothers, in a newspaper article, suggested that whenever Ceylon Tea prices move up, exporters should be permitted to import cheaper tea for blending, in place of Tea. My reaction to it then was consternation, that a man who -lave known better should publicly advocate a policy with such potential for damage to the local tea industry.
New developments
On August 1, 2011, the trade members of the Tea Council of the Sri Lanka Tea Board, acting on behalf of the Tea Exporters’ Association submitted to the Tea Council of which I was then Chairman proposal to lift the existing restrictions on the importation of Orthodox Black Tea. Whilst as Chairman of the council I did not express my opinion on the matter, I refuted the proposal in my personal capacity as an exporter and in the larger interests of the tea industry the country.
In the many adverse opinions that were expressed regarding my position on this issue, and of my subsequent vocal and active opposition to the proposal, what was conveniently ignored by all my opponents was that liberalization of Black Tea imports would be greatly advantageous to my own label, ‘Dilmah’. With the global outreach of that brand and the marketing and distribution network which reinforced its overseas sales in over 100 countries, I stood to gain more than any other local exporter by the liberalization of Black Tea importation.
The provision to import specialty tea, not traditionally manufactured locally, is permitted by statute. If I recall rightly, such importation was first permitted in 1981 and the relevant conditions revised in 1994. The 1981 provision was withdrawn when Montague Jayawickrema, then Minister of Plantations, on a visit to Egypt with a trade delegation, ascertained for himself that exporters had been blending cheap Chinese tea with Ceylon Tea in order to reduce the blend cost and were providing the Egyptian market with a very low quality product, which was being perceived by the consumer as Ceylon Tea.
Ironically, that is a perfect example of the proposed methodology of the Tea Hub and, also, its likely outcome. There is no argument against the limited facilities available to the serious exporter for the importation of specialty tea such Darjeeling, select Assams, or other non-traditional varieties, not normally produced in this country. It is a legitimate and acceptable strategy used by exporters to widen their export product portfolio. Such teas are, invariably, far more costly on an average than Ceylon Tea and the Government permits imports of such varieties without restriction.
The annual importation of specialty tea is around five million kg per year, equivalent to two percent of the average annual Black Tea production of Sri Lanka, and is a volume which has no impact on the local industry. A Tea Hub is of immense attraction to the multinational trader or the local exporter, who packs on his behalf. It will enable the former to source his product at low cost, with zero investment in infrastructure, as that will be provided by his local servant at the latter’s cost.
Foreign label owners have no loyalty, either to the country of operation, the operation itself, or even to the consumer. He is motivated entirely by the bottom line and when appropriate, he will move out to another location which is able to serve his needs at a lower cost. This is an inevitable progression and can be illustrated with real-life examples.
Flawed logic
In their support of the Tea Hub proposal, the TEA submitted a wide range of arguments, all virtuously clothed to project an image of potential advantages to the local tea industry, when the actual intent was simply lowering the cost of their export blend.
One of the major planks of the TEA platform has been the totally unsupported premise, that the Tea Hub would soon result in growing the present annual export value of Ceylon Tea, from USD 1.2 billion to USD 5 billion. This hypothesis was never supported by either strategy, complementing arithmetic, or a financially-verifiable equation, and still remains a pathetic piece of wishful thinking. One of their primary concerns is that the high value of Ceylon Tea is an impediment to the servicing of international markets, and that the local opponents of the concept should not be apprehensive, that importation of cheap tea would devalue equivalent grades at the Colombo Auction.
Such arguments defy the simplest concepts of product supply, demand, and price dynamics, and do not merit an elaborate rebuttal. The Tea Hub proposal is based on plain self-delusion, garnished by unverifiable and statistically-unsupportable assumptions. A favourite theory of many economists and marketing consultants with absolutely no practical knowledge of the local tea industry in its totality is based on the feeble assumption that Sri Lankans are not capable of building brands and, therefore, the best option is to reduce Pure Ceylon Tea to the status of a commodity, or a raw material, for branding and value addition elsewhere.
Annually, we produce around 300 million kg of tea and sell all of it at the Colombo Auction, at the highest average price of any auction centre. On an average, we are generally around USD 1 higher than the second highest auction centre, Nairobi. With their wide-ranging arguments for a Tea Hub, that is the real issue that its proponents wish to address; the relatively high auction price in Colombo. The trader who is exporting a cheap commodity at Rs. 500 – Rs. 600 per kg is unable to compete with the local entrepreneur who is exporting a genuine good quality Ceylon Tea, with value added, at Rs. 1,000 per kg or more.
Even the Tea Hub proponents agree that Pure Ceylon Tea is of the finest quality. It does not require marketing expertise to conclude that a product which justifiably claims to be the best in quality must then be marketed at a commensurate price. That is an argument which any consumer will accept. For instance, there there are markets for both `Plonk’ and for high quality wine, with a massive price differential between the two. The Unique Selling Point of the former is price, whilst that of the latter is quality, which is where quality Ceylon Tea belongs.
Another argument that the Tea Hub offers is the increase of export volume, through importation and re-export after blending. Judging the effectiveness of an export operation by volume alone is a serious mistake, as it distorts realities. What is relevant is not the volume and foreign exchange earned, but the contribution to actual value. Heavy exports of bulk tea and crudely-presented small packs, meant for cheap markets, bring little or no return to the exporter.
Those are simply services provided to the multinational trader, by the local packer, with marginal corresponding benefits to the country of production. Value addition to the home-grown product, in the country of origin, is the only strategy which will ensure that all those in the commercial chain, from the farmer to the exporter, reap equitable benefits.
Features
The significance of “Control” in foreign relations
Foreign Relations are all about “Control” particularly in the context of Relations between Major Powers such as the USA, China and India and small sovereign States such as Sri Lanka. While in the case of such relations, benefits to both parties are inevitable, the need to do so is invariably driven by the national interests of the Major Powers because their interests far outweigh those of small States. This mismatch of interests is what calls for “Control” of relations by Major Powers
The advice to Sri Lanka by Foreign Relations experts thus far has been to balance challenges arising from such Relations, not realising that the compulsions driven by the interests of Major Powers are such that balancing by itself does not have the needed capabilities to overcome the consequences arising from Major Power Rivalries; a fact evidenced by the recent Middle East war.
For instance, the need for the USA to strengthen the capabilities of the Sri Lankan Navy is driven by the strategic location of Sri Lanka since it is the gateway to the Indo-Pacific. Notwithstanding such motivations, it cannot be denied that the infrastructure provided to Sri Lanka’s Navy was handy to meet internal challenges as it was during the final stages of the Armed Conflict to destroy arsenals of the LTTE out at sea and the capacity to meet both external and internal threats to and within Sri Lanka.
Similarly, one of China’s primary interests is its Belt and Road Initiative. Towards this end, China has established a solid foot print in Sri Lanka by building and owning solid infrastructure projects for 99 years and more, if it is in China’s interest. However, although benefits from such projects cannot be denied, the open question is whether their scale was established to suit China’s interests or sought by Sri Lanka to suit Sri Lanka’s interests. For instance, the offer to build a 200,000 barrels a day Refinery by Sinopec of China has more to do with serving China’s interests, in view of the decision by the Sri Lankan Government to expand the Refinery at Sapugaskanda to 100,000 barrels a day.
In the case of India, the issues are more complex arising from Sri Lanka’s proximity to India, the cultural and historical heritage shared by both and the presence of the Tamil community in both countries. Consequently, India is extremely conscious of the need to keep a sharp eye and “Control” developments taking place in Sri Lanka in respect of Sri Lanka’s relations with Major Powers. This concern is driven by the notion that the territorial security of India is dependent on Sri Lanka’s Relations with Major Powers; a concern that arises from India’s past territorial history where the territory of India was transformed from a motley group of Princely States into one unified sub-continent and then partitioned into two Nation States under the British Raj. Consequently, the present territory of India has been in existence only since its independence from Colonial Rule in 1947. Hence, the fear of history repeating itself is driven by internal compulsions and by external interventions.
US – SRI LANKA RELATIONS
Against the background of Geopolitical interests presented above, Sri Lanka adopted the Policy of Neutrality in 2019 and this Government continues to exercise and live by its Internationally recognised principles, as it did when Sri Lanka denied landing rights to US Aircraft during the Middle East conflict. Sri Lanka’s Foreign Minister stated that Sri Lanka was “always neutral” when he met the US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs to convey Sri Lanka’s appreciation for the assistance rendered to procure fuel during the Middle East crisis and for the maritime vessels and aircraft gifted to Sri Lanka (Daily News, June 23, 2026).
In the meantime, The Island has reported that the “US declares SLN its Indo-Pacific Partner” (June 25, 2026). A statement issued by the US Embassy in Colombo quotes the Assistant Secretary of State as having stated: “Today, we announced the delivery of US satellite communication technology to the Sri Lankan Navy, our Indo-Pacific partner: This secure, real-time connection—representing a transformational upgrade for the Sri Lankan Navy-– will be available aboard their entire fleet of offshore patrol vessels…” (Ibid).
There is no doubt whatsoever that these assets would collectively boost the capabilities of the SL Navy to “strengthen maritime domain awareness, improve operational coordination, support emergency response, help interdict vessels engaged in illicit trafficking etc.” (Ibid). However, the unilateral declaration by US that the SL Navy is a “Indo-Pacific Partner” of the US has NO validity unless such a declaration has the approval of the SL Government. Furthermore, such an approval by the SL Government would compromise its Policy of Neutrality to which the country has pledged.
Therefore, the declaration should be accompanied with a caveat, that being, that the partnership should NOT extend to the entirety of the Indo-Pacific but be limited to Sri Lanka’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEC). It is only then that the SL Government is Internationally entitled to exercise its rights as a Neutral State, namely, to protect its territory under the UN Law of the Sea. Furthermore, considering the extent of Sri Lanka’s EEC in relation to the extent of the Indian Ocean, the Partnership would be proportionate.
CHINA – SRI LANKA RELATIONS
China’s interest is to consolidate its interests in its Belt and Road Initiative. Towards this end it has attempted to exercise “Control” over Sri Lanka by offering infrastructure projects of a scale that benefits China rather than Sri Lanka as evidenced by the example of the offer by Sinopec Refinery cited above. This example demonstrate that Sri Lanka should be faulted for accepting projects offered without question and when questioned, based on local evaluations of scale to meet Sri Lankan needs as in the case of the existing Refinery at Sapugaskanda, the scale of projects become significantly less. The lesson to be learnt from this experience is that no project offered should be accepted without question in respect of its suitability to Sri Lanka in all respects, if Sri Lanka is not to become a victim of self-inflicted debt traps.
INDIA –SRI LANKA RELATIONS
How India “Controls” Sri Lanka is by making Sri Lanka politically and economically vulnerable and dependent on India, not only through physical connectivity, but also by being a handmaiden in internal political arrangements where power is devolved to Provinces that are a threat to Sri Lanka’s territorial integrity (13th Amendment) and also by focusing development that benefit the Tamil community in Sri Lanka. The end result is to keep relations between communities in Sri Lanka on the “boil”, much against the interests of Sri Lanka to function as a united Nation State.
The proposal to connect Sri Lanka with India with under-water pipelines to transfer petroleum products from the Middle East and Power Grids would make Sri Lanka vulnerable and dependent on India as Germany was with Natural Gas from Russia when Nord-Stream I and II were sabotaged. Similarly, the road access through a Land Bridge connecting India and Sri Lanka would legalize access between the two countries that today takes place illegally because of the disparity in wages and livelihoods.
Despite such possible outcomes, there is a concerted effort by individuals and a body of NGOs who are of the opinion that it is in the best interests of Sri Lanka for Sri Lanka to hitch its wagons to the rising star of India. Others are grateful to India as the first responder to Sri Lanka at times of need, mindless of the weekly destruction of Sri Lanka’s marine resources etc. caused by thousands of fishing boats from India resorting to illegal fishing practices whose value over the years are beyond assessment.
CONCLUSIION
The reason for the recent conflict in the Middle East is all about “Control” of Nation States by Major Powers in pursuit of their Geopolitical interests. The need to “Control” Sri Lanka by the US is because of Sri Lanka’s location to the Indo-Pacific and by China because Sri Lanka is a vital link to its Belt and Road Initiative. On the other hand, Relations with India are influenced and guided by India’s obsession with the sustainability of its territorial integrity because that is what makes India a Major Power. The survival of Sri Lanka in such a complex background depends on how astutely Sri Lanka protects its Policy of Neutrality.
By Neville Ladduwahetty
Features
“Sir”: A prefix or a suffix in Sri Lanka?
The word “Sir” is classically and linguistically associated with Great Britain and His Majesty’s English Language. As an esteemed prefix, it generally refers to a Knight, but very strictly speaking, that is perhaps a rather narrow and restricted synonym. While a Knight of the British Empire is the most common type of knight people encounter today, Great Britain actually has several different orders of knighthood, as well as an ancient rank that does not belong to any such order at all.
When someone is dubbed a knight in Britain and referred to as “Sir” X, Y or Z, they generally fall into one of three categories. The first is a Knight Bachelor, undoubtedly the oldest rank. This is the most common form of knighthood awarded for public service, arts, or science. In that context, one should think of Sir Elton John, Sir Paul McCartney, or Sir Ian McKellen. It is not a part of an explicit “Order”, like that of the British Empire. It is the oldest mechanical form of knighthood, dating back to the 13th century under King Henry III. The recipients are simply styled as Sir, followed by the first name, such as Sir Ian, without any post-nominal letters like KBE or OBE attached to the end of their name.
The second is a Knight Commander of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire (KBE). This is a specific group, established relatively recently in 1917 by King George V, to fill a gap for rewarding civilian and military effort during World War I. To qualify to be called “Sir” within this specific order, a man must be appointed as a Knight Commander (KBE) or a Knight Grand Cross (GBE).
The third is a group of Chivalric Orders, the so-called Elite and Ancient Orders. Several highly exclusive, ancient orders of knighthood sit much higher in precedence than the Order of the British Empire. These include the Most Noble Order of the Garter, the pinnacle of British honours founded in 1348, and scrupulously limited to the Monarch, the Prince of Wales, and only 24 other companion members. Then there is the Most Ancient and Most Noble Order of the Thistle, the highest chivalric honour in Scotland. The last of this group is the Most Honourable Order of the Bath; typically awarded to high-ranking military officers and senior civil servants.
The Summary Rule of this entire scenario is that every Knight of the British Empire (KBE) is a British Knight, but not every British Knight is a Knight of the British Empire. If you see a modern British knight who does not have military or diplomatic ties, odds are high that they are actually a Knight Bachelor.
With reference to the title of this presentation, now for the flip side of this, as we see things in our region of the globe. In Great Britain, it is the standard form of address to refer to a Knight as Sir John, Sir Ian etc. However, in Sri Lanka, as well as in the Indian sub-continent, very often people use the word “Sir” as a suffix or a postfix to honour someone and frequently use “X Sir”; the name followed by the word “Sir” as a suffix or postfix.
It is a fascinating linguistic oddity, and Sri Lanka is definitely not alone in this, and most definitely, we are second to none in that outlook. While using “Sir” as a suffix or postfix (e. g., De Silva Sir, Nihal Sir) completely cartwheels over the standard British etiquette, where “Sir” must strictly prefix a first name. This charming practice of using it as a suffix is actually widespread across South Asia and parts of Southeast Asia. It is a classic example of dialectal crossbreeding, where local grammatical structures and cultural norms go to the extent of rewriting even the rules of the standard English as a language.
In a very broad sense, this phenomenon is very definitely seen in the Indian Subcontinent (E.g. Sri Lanka, India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan and Pakistan). This is arguably where the “Name + Sir” phenomenon is largest and perhaps even the strongest. Across Sri Lanka, India and Bangladesh, you will constantly hear people refer to superiors, teachers, or public figures as Karu Sir, Vijay Sir, Sachin Sir, Shahrukh Sir, or Ahmad Sir, etc.
Then there is the Indian “Ji” Factor: In Indian languages like Hindi or Punjabi, it is a strict cultural taboo to call an elder or a superior by their bare name. People naturally append the respectful suffix “Ji” (e. g., Gandhi-ji, Sharma-ji). It is then no surprise at all that when switching to English, the Indian mind seamlessly swaps the local suffix Ji for the English honorific Sir, thereby turning Vijay-ji into Vijay Sir.
In Hong Kong, a very specific variation of this exists within the police force and civil service. Influenced by decades of British administration, mixed with Cantonese naming customs, junior officers and the public address superiors by their surname followed by “Sir”, such as “Wong-Sir” or “Chan-Sir“. There is even a universal colloquial generic term, “Ah-Sir“, used commonly to address male police officers or teachers.
In the Philippines, while the syntax is slightly different, the sheer density of “Sir/Madam, Ma’am” usage matches that of Sri Lanka. Filipinos deeply value hierarchical courtesy. While they might say “Sir Jason“, it is incredibly common to use “Sir” almost like a pronoun or a mid-sentence suffix punctuation mark when addressing superiors, bosses, or clients, to ensure that respect is suitably maintained conscientiously.
The mismatch between British English and South/Southeast Asian English comes down to how different native cultures view status and intimacy. In South Asia, especially in Sri Lanka, there is the Linguistic Tradition of the suffix, where an extension in the nation’s own language is inserted into a word to enhance its status. In languages like Sinhala (-thuma / –mahathmaya), in Tamil (-ayyah / –avargal), and in Hindi (-ji), respect is always attached to the end of a name. It simply means that forcefully bringing a sleek word that implies social deference to the front, like Sir John, feels syntactically peculiar or even inappropriate to a native speaker of these local languages.
The “First Name Dilemma” is another type of rather quaint occurrence. In the West, calling your boss simply “John” is seen as a gesture that is egalitarian, free and open. In South Asia, calling an elder or superior by their first name feels somewhat jarringly rude. Conversely, using just “Mr Perera” can also feel too cold, official and even distant. “Perera Sir” or “Silva Sir” strikes the perfect culturally mitigatory concession, as it maintains a warm, personal connection by using the surname while also overtly and safely conveying a layer of professional public respect by adding the word “Sir” as a suffix or a postfix.
Yet for all that, it is worth noting that fundamentally, all languages are symbolic expressions of human thought and human intelligence. Whether expressed as spoken, written or sign language, all dialects are means of human communication. The type of words like “Sir” that we use in the English Language and the real context in which they are used indicate our thoughts in our human intellect. When they are used appropriately, they reflect our commitment to uninhibited respect and even admiration. While the British people and even their Monarch might feel quite a bit confused to hear someone called “Perera Sir”, right across Sri Lanka and its neighbouring nations. Yet for all that, it is simply the most natural and fusion technique to bridge and integrate traditional deference and admiration with modern expressive English.
by Dr B. J. C. Perera
Specialist Consultant Paediatrician and Honorary Senior Fellow,
Postgraduate Institute of Medicine, University of Colombo, Sri Lanka.
An independent freelance correspondent.
Features
The Murder Room
Tales of Mystery and Suspense – 8
The Murder Room gets its title from a room of that name in a museum dedicated to Victorian memorabilia, including famous murders, which are featured in that room. But the first murder in the story occurs outside, when one of the trustees, who had been against renewing the lease of the building – which would have meant the museum having to close – is set on fire when he comes to the museum late one evening to pick up the car in which he went away for weekends. This was a regular habit, and the murderer had obviously lain in wait, with a can of petrol, and set him on fire.
I took several books with me when I went to England earlier this year, but as usual I read hardly any of them, finding enough and more of interest in the shelves of those I stayed with. My first stop was at New College, where, as on several previous occasions I stayed in what is known as the Bishop’s Room, on the topmost storey of the Warden’s Lodgings. Sadly, I shall not stay there again, for my friend who has been Warden there for a decade now, Miles Young, retires this year.
The bookshelves there have much of interest though on the last couple of occasions I have concentrated on the detective stories, which Miles says are not his, but came with the house. The second I read this time was by the generally workmanlike P. D. James, whose Adam Dalgliesh is in the long line of whimsical but efficient detectives that has Hercule Poirot at its head. Though I had not been impressed by the one novel I read, featuring James’ female detective, Dalgliesh, I liked it, and this novel confirmed my affection.
The Murder Room
gets its title from a room of that name in a museum dedicated to Victorian memorabilia, including famous murders, which are featured in that room. But the first murder in the story occurs outside, when one of the trustees, who had been against renewing the lease of the building – which would have meant the museum having to close – is set on fire when he comes to the museum late one evening to pick up the car in which he went away for weekends. This was a regular habit, and the murderer had obviously lain in wait, with a can of petrol, and set him on fire.
The other two trustees, his brother and his sister, obviously benefited from his death, for they promptly renewed the lease. The employees of the museum also clearly benefited, for they had all found some sort of refuge here. These included the caretaker/cleaner, who lived in a cottage on the premises, a manager who was unpaid but used the place for his research, the receptionist, who also looked after the flat at the museum which was used by the sister, and two volunteers plus a gardener’s boy.
The caretaker, Tally, came across the fire before discovery had been intended, for an evening class everyone knew she went to on Fridays had been cancelled. On her way in she was knocked off her bicycle by a speeding car, the driver of which stopped to make sure she was safe, before speeding off again. She manages then to summon everyone else, including Dalgliesh, who had visited the museum for the first time a few days earlier, brought by a friend who relished its strange attractions.
The museum has to be closed for a few days while investigations are carried out, but in the course of them the friend brings some transatlantic visitors, and when they are in the Murder Room a chest (in which a body had been supposed to have been hidden in Victorian times) is opened, and a body found there. That murder, the autopsy indicated, had taken place around the time of the first murder.
The body was that of a girl who had attended a finishing school part-owned by the Dupayne sister. When Tally, by chance, sees the man who had knocked her down, and identifies him as a Lord who was known for his philanthropy, Dalgliesh realises that there are wheels within wheels here. The Lord confesses that he belonged to a group that met for promiscuous sex in the flat, and that he had planned to meet the girl there but she had not turned up.
Lord Martlesham, when the girl failed to appear, thought he should get away after the fire broke out. It was then that he had bumped into Tally, and his stopping to make sure she was all right indicated that he could not have been the murderer. Dalgliesh then deduced that the murderer had seen the girl at the window of the murder room, from which she must have seen the preparations for the murder. That was why she too had been killed.
Dalgliesh then has a fair idea of who the murderer was, but in waiting for proof, he leaves room for yet another murder to happen. For Tally, who had been mulling over something said on the night of the murder, asking about the petrol that caused the fire, realized that she had not mentioned petrol herself. This happened on her way back to her cottage, and not having a phone herself she goes into the museum to call, and then gets back to her cottage and locks herself in.
But then she hears her cat howling and goes out to find him strung up. She cuts him down, but when she goes back to the cottage the murderer is waiting and knocks her down. That happens in the section called The Third Victim, but this is in fact a boy on a motorbike knocked down by the speeding car of the escaping murderer. So Dalgliesh is able to effect an arrest when he turns up as summoned, and fortunately is in time to resuscitate Tally and send her to hospital.
The reason for the murder and the identity of its perpetrator are then fairly straightforward, though the background to the second murder introduces an element of loose living that contrasts with the Victorian age, or at least the image it projected – undercut though that is by the murders highlighted in the Murder Room with their sexual overtones.
And there is another louche element in the adventures of the gardener’s boy, who lives with a Major who is homosexual, though he declares, truthfully it seems, that he was not attracted at all to the boy but had given him shelter because of his vulnerability. He is generally charming, but capable of rages, in one of which he knocked down the major, though he was forgiven. He had taken shelter with Tally, who was fond of him but decided she preferred to live alone, which was why she had sent him away the day before she was attacked.
The murdered brother was a psychiatrist, and it turns out that the mysterious weekends he spent away from his London home were spent at country inns, where he took long walks to clear his mind of the demons his practice kept bringing into it. His profession also contributed to his death, in addition to his standing in the way of the museum continuing to exist, for one of his patients, connected to the murderer, had set fire to herself.
Solid plotting, with all the loose ends tied up, of incidents and the bizarre cast of characters.
-
News6 days agoLAWASIA warns against ad hoc initiative to increase judges’ retirement ages
-
Features5 days agoClimate action to bring South Asia together
-
News5 days agoChamuditha to seek removal of injunction on Youtube programme
-
Features7 days agoPeople’s Bank expands digital banking network with 125th cheque deposit kiosk
-
News2 days agoSLAF conducts successful rescue mission under UN command in Central African Republic
-
News2 days agoCIABOC to question Harak Kata on Rs. 200 mn bribery allegation
-
News5 days agoCPRP alleges another death in custody, seeks protection for witness
-
Midweek Review4 days agoH’tota port’s strategic status remains focal point of geopolitical scrutiny

