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Midweek Review

Focus on early stage of ‘unwinnable’ Eelam conflict over a decade after Nandikadal confrontation

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The author hands over a copy Mihidan Nowu Minisa to Defence Secretary retired Gen. Kamal Gunaratne

Let us set the record straight, officially

Sarath Weerasekera

Retired Rear Admiral Sarath Weerasekera recently declared that in his capacity as Chairman of the Sectoral Oversight Committee on National Security he would present to President Ranil Wickremesinghe a comprehensive report on how the war was conducted.

The recent US denial of a visa to Adm. Weerasekera underlines the need to take tangible measures to safeguard the interests of serving and ex-military personnel, especially when being unfairly targeted by foreign entities with ulterior motives, like wanting to break up Sri Lanka in pursuit of their agendas.

The announcement was made at a media briefing held at the Presidential Media Centre (PMC). Sri Lanka needs to prepare an all-inclusive dossier on the war. Regardless of some retired/serving officers sharing their experience by way of books and social media, successive governments failed to compile a complete book on the conflict that didn’t belong to any service, a particular regiment or an individual.

The efforts made by individual officers to share their experience should be encouraged but the responsibility of the government is to produce an official record taking into consideration all factors.

It would be pertinent to mention that Sri Lanka is the only country on earth to betray her war-winning armed forces. The Geneva betrayal on 01 October, 2015, underscored the treachery on the part of the then shameless Yahapalana administration. Let there be a genuine effort to restore the pride of our armed forces who saved the country from anarchy in 1971, 1987-1990 and from separatist LTTE terrorism.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

Daredevil Armoured Corps officer Ranjan Wijedasa, 52, shared his battlefield experiences in Mihidan Nowu Minisa ( The man who did not get buried) launched in September this year, 15 years after the combined security forces brought the war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to a successful end. Sri Lanka proved that what had been termed an unwinnable war here and abroad could be won. The LTTE caught up in a multi-pronged offensive that involved several Divisions and Task Forces in the East and then Vanni theatre, lasting just two years and months.

The recent Hamas attack on Israel that involved groups of heavily armed men invading the Jewish state from the air, sea and ground while thousands of missiles fired from Gaza caused unprecedented death and destruction underscored Sri Lanka’s triumph over the LTTE though the circumstances cannot be compared. The Hamas offensive is a grim reminder how lapses on the part of the political-military setup could cause catastrophe of unprecedented proportions. Judging by international reportage of the latest Israel-Gaza war, there cannot be any dispute regarding the assertion that the Jewish state never expected Hamas to undertake such a large-scale offensive. In that background, let me discuss the Eelam war experienced by an officer who had served the Army at a time eradication of terrorism seemed impossible.

Thrice wounded Wijedasa, now a Brigadier, serving the National Defence College as the Senior Directing Staff, had to quit active service following the amputation of his left hand below the elbow in Aug., 1997 due to injuries suffered during offensive action at Puliyankulam. The young tank officer, in spite of being married to Ruchirani Siriwardena in May 1997, gladly joined the largest ever ground offensive Jayasikurui (Victory Assured) conducted before Eelam War IV (Aug 2006-May 2009). But, Jayasikurui meant to restore the Overland Main Supply Route (MSR) to the Jaffna peninsula had been nothing but a disaster that sent shockwaves through the then political establishment. That offensive should be examined against the backdrop of subsequent LTTE counter-offensive that at one-time threatened even Vavuniya, a strategically important town situated north of Anuradhapura.

Wijedasa had been on the staff of the then Director, Operations Brigadier Udaya Perera during Eelam War IV. One-time Sri Lanka Deputy High Commissioner in Malaysia (2009-2011) Perera, who retired in 2017, is on the US list of war criminals. That categorization has been made in Dec. 2021. Sri Lanka never made a genuine effort to counter unsubstantiated war crimes allegations, thereby facilitating the despicable Western agenda. It would be pertinent to mention that the treacherous UNP-SLFP Yahapalana administration shamelessly betrayed the war-winning military by sponsoring an accountability resolution against one’s own country because that impossible victory was attained against the LTTE by their political rival and to please the West, in early Oct. 2015 by co-sponsoring a US-led move, one of the world’s worst human rights offenders.

Let us get back to Wijedasa’s account of his fighting experience with the Armoured Corps (1991-1997) after having joined the Army in January 1990, several weeks before India pulled out her forces from the then temporarily-merged Northern and Eastern Province. The Eelam War II erupted in the second week of June 1990 while Wijedasa was undergoing training at the Diyatalawa Military Academy. Slain President Ranasinghe Premadasa allowed an LTTE build-up during a 14-month long ‘honeymoon’ with LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran that paved the way for the group to exploit the ground situation. Their experience in fighting the Indian Army had been an added advantage against isolated detachments along the Kandy-Jaffna A9 road north of Vavuniya. The Army lost Thandikulam –Elephant Pass stretch within weeks after the resumption of hostilities in the second week of June 1990. The Army Commander ended up with egg on his face. Sandhurst trained Hamilton Wanasinghe was his name (Aug. 1988-Nov. 1991). Jayasikurui was meant to regain the MSR at any cost.

Devastating losses at Puliyankulam

At the time Wijedasa suddenly received orders to take over the command of ‘Alpha’ squadron assigned for the Jayasikurui offensive, he was preparing to leave Vavuniya to receive an appointment at the Directorate of Personnel, Army headquarters. Without referring to the Divisions that had been involved in the disastrous bids to capture fiercely defended Puliyankulam, the author described the effort made by the Armoured Corps to bring the town under its control after assaults spearheaded by the infantry failed. The operation involved the 53 Division. It included elite formations with vast experience in fighting in both eastern and northern theatres but couldn’t overcome fierce resistance offered by the enemy or thwart a series of counter attacks which paralyzed fighting Divisions.

The author recalled the devastating outcome of the battle between the Armoured Corps and LTTE units armed with Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) and the effective use of monster landmines capable of immobilizing a 40-tonne Main Battle Tank (MBT). Of the 48 tanks that had been assigned for the task, only three were able to penetrate enemy defences and reach Puliyankulam town. Each tank had been accompanied by three Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFVs) but accurate RPG attacks on one of the AFVs and the author’s T-55 MBT forced the Armoured Corps to retreat. In hindsight, the Army, at that time, lacked sufficient fighting battalions to conduct large scale offensive operations and the strategy- opening a front with the objective of restoring the MSR seemed reckless at a time the enemy could move within the vast Vanni region without hindrance.

Within 24 hours after suffering injuries, Wijedasa had been transferred from the battlefield to Vavuniya in a Bell 212, then from there to Anuradhapura in Y12 fixed wing aircraft before being airlifted to the National Hospital, Colombo.

Jayasikurui launched in May, 1997 was meant to restore overland MSR to the Jaffna peninsula as the government found it extremely difficult to maintain the sea supply route from Trincomalee to Kankesanthurai. Perhaps, author Wijedasa should have dealt with the loss of MSR soon after the LTTE resumed hostilities in the second week of June 1990. Isolated detachments along the MSR north of Vavuniya were either destroyed or vacated by the Army in quick succession as President Premadasa quickly lost control of the war, having conspired with the LTTE to oust the Indian Army.

Regardless of heavy losses, the then President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, in her capacity as the Commander-in-Chief of armed forces pressed ahead with Jayasikurui. Finally, Kumaratunga called off the offensive in early Dec. 1998 after the Army acknowledged it couldn’t sustain the offensive any longer. Maj. Gen. Asoka Jayawardena, in his capacity as the Overall Operations Commander (OOC) commanded Jayasikurui. Instead, in a bid to divert public attention from the debacle, troops were deployed to capture Oddusuddan and annex the areas covering Mankulam, Oddusuddan and Nedunkerni in the Vanni east. That, too, ended with disastrous consequences. That offensive was called Rivi Bala.

By the time Mrs. Kumaratunga won a second term at the Dec. 1999 presidential election, the LTTE had the upper hand in the northern theatre of operations. The election was conducted following a series of severe battlefield defeats leading to the worst single ever debacle suffered by the Army in April 2000. The LTTE defeated the 54 Division plus troops deployed at Elephant Pass sector that encompassed Iyakachchi and Vettilaikerni on the Mullaitivu coast. Eventually, the then Lt. Gen. Fonseka’s Army restored overland MSR in January 2009 following major battlefield success both west and east of the Kandy-Jaffna A9 road.

The reportage was subjected to military censorship. The military resorted to harsh censorship to prevent the public from knowing the actual situation. Devastating losses suffered by Armoured Corps were not allowed to be reported in the print media at a time television didn’t cover the conflict and social media never heard of. The losses suffered by the Armoured Corps remained unreported until Brig. Wijedasa went public

The LTTE allowed Rivi Bala troops to advance. Prabhakaran refrained from resisting the latest offensive that involved the 53 and 55 Divisions and some elements of the 56 Division that had been previously involved in Operation Jayasikuru, to bring back Oddusuddan under government control, situated north of Nedunkerni, as it shifted focus of offensive action to east of the A9 road. The LTTE didn’t resist as troops secured Oddusuddan, situated 14 km north of Nedunkerni.

This writer had the opportunity to visit the new frontlines at Nedunkerni-Oddusuddan on Oct. 6, 1998, along with a group of journalists when Deputy Defence Minister Anuruddha Ratwatte visited the area. Having participated at a Hindu religious ceremony at Oddusuddan, Minister Ratwatte in camouflaged battle dress was about to get into a Russian built BTR 80 armoured personnel carrier when the LTTE fired four rounds of mortars at the group. At the time of the incident, the visiting group of journalists was about two kilometers south of the scene of the attack. My senior colleague from our sister paper Divaina Sirimevan Kasthuriarachchi was among the group. The group was being moved to Oddusuddan in locally built armoured personnel carriers when the LTTE fired mortars. The convoy stopped in the middle of the road leading to Oddusuddan when the SLA fired artillery in response to the LTTE attack. The group was stuck there for more than an hour. Although Minister Ratwatte, Army chief, Lt. Gen. Daluwatte, SLN Commander, Vice Admiral Cecil Tissera, Air Force Commander, Air Vice Marshal Jayalath Weerakkody and Wanni Security Forces Commander, Maj. Gen. Lionel Balagalle miraculously escaped, the LTTE attack claimed the lives of four SLA personnel, while 42 received injuries. Three bodyguards of Minister Ratwatte were among the wounded (Anuruddha and service chiefs in narrow escape––The Island Dec. 7, 1998).

A proud father’s advice

Ranjan’s father had served the Army and retired in the rank of Captain. Having studied at Isipathana College, Colombo, where he attended the primary, Ranjan and his three brothers – one elder to him and two younger – the family moved to Mahena, a village near Warakapola, after the retirement of Captain W.A. Wijedasa in 1979. The Brigadier’s narrative of their simple way of life and the boys’ escapades captured the readers’ interest. References were made to the retired officer being recalled in 1983 in the wake of July riots following the killing of 13 soldiers at Thinnaveli, Jaffna, and the emergence of the second JVP insurrection. The enjoyable time Ranjan and his elder brother had at Minneriya Infantry Training Centre and the opportunity granted to the boys to engage in exercises meant for soldiers perhaps influenced their decision to join the Army.

At the time, Ranjan had been chosen for the prestigious Diyatalawa Military Academy, his elder brother Manjula was there. The author’s description of nearly two yearlong training there made good reading but nothing could have been as important as advice he received from his father on the day he was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant of 33 Intake of SLMA. His brother, now retired after serving the military for nearly 20 years, too, had served the Armoured Corps though the two brothers were not assigned to the same unit during the conflict.

The author quoted his father as having told him that there were various funds in the Army. “Never touch those funds. If you need money, give me a call. Don’t smear insignia with faeces by stealing money.” Unfortunately, such high morals seemed to have made no impact on the overall public service, including the armed forces if allegations traded in Parliament and outside are true. The country is in dire straits due to waste, corruption, irregularities and mismanagement. With both the private and public sectors badly affected, the armed forces and police, too, deteriorated since the conclusion of the conflict in May 2009. Corruption takes a heavy toll on post-war bankrupt Sri Lanka with the economy in such a precarious state with many complaining the difficulties were worse than the time of conflict.

Fifteen years after the end of the conflict, the government is in the process of gradually reducing the Army’s strength to 135,000 by the end of next year and 100,000 by 2030. At the time a soldier shot Velupillai Prabhakaran through the head on the banks of the Nanthikadal lagoon on the morning of May 19, 2009, the Army strength stood at approximately 205,000. The gradual reduction commenced during Mahinda Rajapaksa’s tenure as the President. By the time, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa was forced out of office, the Army strength was down to approximately 168,000. The continuing economic crisis has compelled the Wickremesinghe-Rajapaksa government to go ahead with further downsizing of the Army and by next year the strength is expected to be down to 135,000 and 100,000 six years later.

It would be pertinent to mention that the war couldn’t have been won if not for President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s approval of Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka’s call for a larger Army. From some 116,000 officers and men, while the Army was fighting on multiple fronts over a period of three years, the strength was increased to 205,000, a tremendous achievement in an environment of instability, uncertainty and political turmoil.

Brig. Wijedasa paid a glowing tribute to Field Marshal Fonseka while recalling the Sinha Regiment hero’s declaration that he wouldn’t leave the war unfinished. Fonseka gave that assurance at a time the LTTE remained a formidable fighting force with conventional fighting capacity in land, sea and even in air with a rudimentary air force, which was used to bomb Colombo on at least two occasions.

DK visits Pooneryn

Brigadier Wijedasa disclosed a hitherto unheard visit by the then Northern Commander Maj. Gen. Denzil Kobbekaduwa to isolated Pooneryn-Nagathevanthurai military base at an early stage in the author’s career. Pooneryn-Nagathevabthurai had been perhaps one of the most difficult bases to serve during the war and was the scene of one of the fiercest attacks carried out by the LTTE on the Vanni east. The Army lost hundreds of men. Kobbekaduwa, also of the Armoured Corps during the visit to Pooneryn had declared that MBTs could operate anywhere in the Pooneryn sector whereas the author dared to disagree with the deployment of such heavy equipment in boggy conditions. Kobbekaduwa seemed to have been offended by the junior officer’s suggestion and ordered the author to prepare a MBT to move from Pooneryn to Kalmunai Point a distance of about 20 kms towards the Jaffna lagoon. Wijedasa recalled how he accompanied by Lt. Colonel Chitral Punchihewa, the Commanding Officer of the infantry deployed therein left Pooneryn atop T-55 MBT and after covering a distance of about 10 km was unexpectedly bogged down. The only other MBT that had been deployed at Pooneyn was called in to pull the bogged down T- 55. The rescuer, too, had got bogged down at the same location where those assigned for the two MBTs had to remain there for three weeks until a tank recovery vehicle was brought in from Mullaithivu by ship to Trincomalee and then overland to Pooneryn to pull the T 55s.

Regardless of orders issued by the Northern Commander in this regard, other officers senior to Wijedasa at that time had found fault with him for the fiasco. However, Lt. Col. Punchihewa had taken the responsibility for the incident thereby saved Wijedasa from being tainted. Wijedasa recollected Punchihewa’s sacrifice with love and gratitude while revealing the death of his savior in a landmine blast that ripped apart his Land rover speeding towards Kalmunai Point. What is really poignant in Punchihewa’s death is that the Lt. Col. had stopped on his way to Kalmunai Point after seeing Wijedasa at the helipad with another officer and inquired what they were doing in the hot sun. The incident underscored the senior officer’s humanitarian qualities amidst a brutal war.

Brigadier Wijedasa’s memoirs is a must read for those really interested in the conflict and how the military absorbed the youth. It would be the responsibility of the top brass to ensure the young officers and men learn from the past as it were. Wijedasa’s memoirs Mihidan Nowu Minisa can be purchased from Design Waves Private Ltd. Tel 011 2150 100 (www.designwaves.lk)



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Midweek Review

A victory that can never be forgotten

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President Mahinda Rajapaksa at the Matara victory parade, in 2014, held to mark the eradication of the LTTE.

The country is in deepening turmoil over the theft of USD 2.5 mn from the Treasury. The Treasury affair has placed the arrogant NPP in an embarrassing position. The controversial release of 323 red-flagged containers from the Colombo Port, in addition to two carrying narcotics and the coal scam that forced Energy Minister Kumara Jayakody to resign, has eroded public confidence though the NPP pretends otherwise.

Suspicious deaths of a Finance Ministry official, suspended over the Treasury heist of USD 2.5 million, and ex-SriLankan Airlines CEO Kapila Chandrasena shouldn’t distract the government and the Opposition from marking victory over terrorism.

But, the country, under any circumstances, shouldn’t forget to celebrate Sri Lanka’s greatest post-independence achievement. Dinesh Udugamsooriya, a keen follower of conflict and post-Aragalaya issues, insists that those who cherish the peace achieved should raise the national flag in honour of the armed forces.

The armed forces paid a huge price to preserve the country’s unitary status. Those who represent Parliament and outside waiting for an opportunity to return to Parliament must keep in their minds, unitary status is non-negotiable, under any circumstances, and such efforts would be in vain.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

Sri Lanka celebrates, next week, the eradication of the bloodthirsty separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) as a conventional threat to the survival of this nation, at least in our hearts, even if the authorities dampen any celebrations. The armed forces brought the war to a successful conclusion on 18 May, 2009. The body of undisputed leader of the LTTE, Velupillai Prabhakaran, was found on the banks of the Nanthikadal lagoon, on the morning of 19 May, less than 24 hours after the ground forces declared the end of operations in the Vanni theatre.

The LTTE’s annihilation is Sri Lanka’s greatest post-independence achievement. Whatever various interested parties, pursuing different agendas say, the vast majority of people accept the eradication of the LTTE’s conventional military capacity as the armed forces’ highest achievement.

Sri Lanka’s triumph cannot be discussed without taking into consideration how the Indian-trained LTTE, who also went on to fight the New Delhi’s Army deployed here, in terms of the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord, signed in July, 1987, giving it an unforgettable hiding. The Indian misadventure here cost them the lives of nearly 1,500 officers and men. Just over a year after the Indian pullout, in March, 1990, the LTTE assassinated Rajiv Gandhi who, in his capacity as the Prime Minister, deployed the Indian Army here. But India launched the Sri Lanka destabilisation project during Indira Gandhi’s premiership.

Western powers, the now decimated United National Party (UNP), Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), and an influential section of the media, propagated the lie that the LTTE couldn’t be defeated. But, the United People’s Freedom Party (UPFA), under President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s resolute leadership, sustained a nearly three-year long genuine sustained offensive that brought the entire Northern and Eastern regions back under government control.

The UNP relentlessly hindered the war against the LTTE. UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe, hell-bent on undermining the military campaign, had no qualms in questioning the military strategy. The former Prime Minister went to the extent of sarcastically questioning the culmination of the military campaign in the East with the capture of Thoppigala (Baron’s cap) in the second week of July, 2007, calling it just a rock outcrop with no significance. Believing the military lacked the strength to continue with the campaign, Wickremesinghe publicly ridiculed the Thoppigala success. The then Brigadier Chagie Gallage, the pint-sized human dynamo, provided critical leadership to the highly successful Eastern campaign that deprived the LTTE the opportunity to compel the armed forces to commit far larger strength to the region. We clearly recall how he went to announce the prized capture from his forward base, that afternoon, driving his own jeep, dressed as a soldier wearing a cap, with his second in command seated by his side, obviously not to fall victim to any sniper hiding in the surrounding jungles.

The likes of Ravi Karunanayaka, Lakshman Kiriella, Dr. Rajitha Senaratna and the late Mangala Samaraweera demeaned such successes by contributing to a vicious political campaign that dented public confidence in the armed forces. Then Lt. General Sarath Fonseka’s Army needed a massive boost, not only to sustain the relentless advance into the enemy territory, but to hold onto and stabilise areas brought under government control. But the viciousness of these critics were such that Samaraweera had the gall to say that Fonseka was not even fit to lead the Salvation Army.

The Opposition campaign was meant to deter the stepped up recruitment campaign that enabled the Army to increase its strength from 116,000 to over 205,000 at the end of the campaign. In spite of disgraceful Opposition attempts to cause doubts, regarding the military campaign among the public, with backing from Western vultures, who were all for LTTE success, the Rajapaksa government maintained the momentum.

President Rajapaksa had a superb team that ensured the government confidently met the daunting challenge. That team included Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa, Vice Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda, Lt. General Sarath Fonseka, Air Marshal Roshan Goonetileke and the then Chief of National Intelligence (CNI) Maj. General Kapila Hendawitharana. There were also the likes of Rear Admiral Sarath Weerasekera, who returned from retirement to transform the once ragtag Home Guards into a worthy back-up to the military, as the Civil Defence Force, at critical places/junctures.

The then Governor of the Central Bank, Ajith Nivard Cabraal, played a significant role in overall government response to the challenge. The then presidential advisor MP Basil Rajapaksa’s role, too, should be appreciated and Prof. Rajiva Wijesinghe as well as Minister Mahinda Samarasinghe contributed to counter the false propaganda campaigns directed at the country. Whatever the shortcomings of the Mahinda Rajapaksa-led UPFA may have had, the armed forces couldn’t have succeeded if the resolute political leadership he provided, with his team of brothers, failed both in and outside Parliament. That is the undeniable truth.

During the 2006-2009 campaign, the UNP twice tried to defeat the UPFA Budget, thereby hoping to bring the war to an abrupt end. Th utterly contemptible move to defeat the UPFA Budget ultimately caused a split in the JVP with a section of the party switching its allegiance to President Rajapaksa to save the day.

Amidst political turmoil and both overt and covert Western interventions, the armed forces pressed ahead with the offensive. It would be pertinent to mention that the Vanni campaign began in March, 2007, a couple of months before the armed forces brought the eastern campaign to an end.

Vanni campaign

The Army launched the Vanni campaign in March, 2007. The 57 Division that had been tasked with taking Madhu, and then proceeding to Kilinochchi, faced fierce resistance. The principal fighting Division suffered significant casualties and progress was slow. An irate Fonseka brought in Maj. Gen. Jagath Dias as General Officer Commanding (GoC) of the 57 Division to advance and consolidate areas brought under control.

The Army expanded the Vanni campaign in September, 2007. The Task Force 1 (later 58 Division) launched operations from the Mannar ‘rice bowl’. Fonseka placed Gallage in command of that fighting formation but was replaced by the then Brigadier Shavendra Silva, as a result of a medical emergency.

The Army gradually took the upper hand in the Vanni west while the LTTE faced a new threat in the Vanni east with the newly created 59 Division, under Brigadier Nandana Udawatta, launching offensive action in January, 2008. Having launched its first major action in the Weli Oya region, that Division fought its way towards Mullaitivu, an LTTE stronghold since 1996.

The 53 (Maj. Gen. Kamal Gunaratne) and 55 (Brig. Prasanna Silva) Divisions, deployed in the Jaffna peninsula, joined the Vanni offensive, in late 2008, as the TF 1 fought its way to Pooneryn, turned right towards Paranthan, captured that area and then hit Elephant Pass and rapidly advanced towards Kilinochchi. The TF 1 and 57 Division met in Kilinochchi and the rest is history.

Once the Army brought Kilinochchi under its control, in January, 2009, the LTTE lost the war. The raising of the Lion flag over Kilinochchi meant that the entire area, west of the Kandy-Jaffna A9 road, had been brought under government control. By then the LTTE had lost the sea supply route, between Tamil Nadu and Mannar region. The LTTE was surrounded by several fighting formations in the Vanni east while the Navy made an unprecedented achievement by cordoning off the Mullaitivu coast that effectively cut them off on all sides.

During the final phase of the naval action, they captured Sea Tiger leader Soosai’s wife, Sathyadevi, and her children Sivanesan Mani Arasu and Sivanesan Sindhu. Spearheaded by the elite Fourth Fast Attack Flotilla, the Navy conducted a sustained campaign, with spectacular success in the high seas, and, by late 2008, the Navy dominated the waters around the country.

The sinking of floating LTTE warehouses, with the intelligence provided by the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) and the US Pacific Command, after the Americans decided to speed up the inevitable, and a campaign, directed at operations across the Palk Strait, weakened the LTTE. By early January, 2009, the LTTE had lost its capacity to carry out mid-sea transfers, and the use of Tamil Nadu fishing trawlers to bring in supplies, and it was only a matter of time before the group surrendered or faced the consequences.

Although Tamil Diaspora still believed in the LTTE launching a massive counter attack on the Vanni east front and the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), under the leadership of the late R. Sampanthan, worked hard to halt the offensive, President Rajapaksa declared that the offensive wouldn’t be called off. President Rajapaksa had the strength to resist the combined pressure brought on him by the West and the UN until the armed forces delivered the final blow.

The despicable efforts made by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to block IMF funding for Sri Lanka is in the public domain. Clinton was obviously trying to please the Tamil Diaspora. The US made that attempt as the ground offensive was on the last phase against the backdrop of the international community suspending relief supply ships to Puthumathalan.

The IMF provided the much required funding to Sri Lanka, regardless of Clinton’s intervention.

A targeted assassination

The Air Force conducted a strategic campaign against the LTTE while providing support to both the Army and the Navy. Despite limited resources, the Air Force pulverised the enemy and high profile target assassination of S.P. Thamilselvan, in his Kilinochchi hideout, in early November, 2007, shook the LTTE leadership. The deployment of a pair of jets (Kafir and MiG 27), on the basis of intelligence provided by the DMI and backed by UAV footage, to carry out a meticulous strike on Thamilselvan’s Kilinochchi hideout, caused unprecedented fear among the LTTE.

Current Defence Secretary, Sampath Thuyakontha, in his capacity as the Commanding Officer of No 09 Squadron, played a vital role in action against the LTTE. Thuyakontha earned the respect of all for landing behind enemy lines in support of LRRP (Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol).

As the Army advanced on the Vanni east front, thousands of LTTE cadres gave up their weapons, threw away their trade mark cyanide capsules and surrendered. Their defences crumbled and even hardcore cadres surrendered, regardless of the warning issued by Prabhakaran. By the time the armed forces concluded clearing operations, over 12,000 LTTE cadres were in government custody. Although those who couldn’t stomach Sri Lanka’s victory over the LTTE propagated lies regarding the rehabilitation programme, the ordinary Tamil people appreciated the project.

C.V. Wigneswaran, in his capacity as the Chief Minister of the Northern Province, called for a US investigation into the death of ex-LTTE cadres in government custody. The retired Supreme Court judge sought to consolidate his political power by alleging the Army executed surrendered men by injecting them with poison. The then Yahapalana government failed to take action against Wigneswaran who claimed over 100 deaths among ex-combatants.

Instead of initiating legal action, the war-winning Rajapaksa government rehabilitated them. Even after the change of government, in 2015, the rehabilitation project continued. Almost all of them had been released and, since the end of war, the members of the defeated LTTE never tried to reorganise, though some Diaspora elements made an attempt.

The LTTE’s demise brought an end to the use of child soldiers. Those who demand justice for Tamils, killed during the war, conveniently forget that forcible recruitment of children, by the LTTE, also ended in May, 2009. Struggling to overcome severe manpower shortage, amidst mounting battlefield losses, the LTTE abducted Tamil children, from the early ’90s, to be press-ganged into their cadre.

Although the UN and ICRC sought a consensus with the LTTE, way back during Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga’s tenure as the President, to cease forced recruitment of children, they couldn’t achieve the desired results. The much publicised UN-ICRC projects failed. The LTTE continued with its despicable abduction of children. The LTTE never stopped child recruitment and, depending on the ground situation, it carried out forced recruitment drives. The signing of the Norwegian arranged Ceasefire Agreement (CFA), too, failed to halt forced child recruitment.

The Darusman report that accused the military of killing over 40,000 civilians during the last phase of the war revealed that the LTTE tried to recruit children as it was about to collapse.

The TNA, or any other like-minded group here or abroad, never urged the LTTE to give up civilian shields and stop recruiting children, though they realised Prabhakaran could no longer change the outcome of the war. Norway, and those who still believed in a negotiated ‘settlement’ in a bid to prevent the annihilation of the group, desperately tried to convince Prabhakaran to give up civilian shields.

A note, dated February 16, 2009, sent to Basil Rajapaksa, by Norwegian Ambassador Tore Hattrem, expressed concern over the fate of those who had been trapped in the Vanni east. Hattrem’s note to Basil Rajapaksa revealed Norway’s serious concern over the LTTE’s refusal to release the civilians.

The following is the Norwegian note, headlined ‘Offer/Proposal to the LTTE’, personally signed by Ambassador Hattrem: “I refer to our telephone conversation today. The proposal to the LTTE on how to release the civilian population, now trapped in the LTTE controlled area, has been transmitted to the LTTE through several channels. So far, there has been, regrettably, no response from the LTTE and it doesn’t seem to be likely that the LTTE will agree with this in the near future.”

In the aftermath of the Anandapuram debacle in the first week of April, 2009, the LTTE lost its fighting capacity to a large extent. The loss of over 600 cadres marked the collapse of the organisation’s conventional fighting capacity.

The LTTE sought an arrangement in which it could retain its remaining weapons and start rebuilding the group again. President Rajapaksa emphasised that only an unconditional surrender could save the group’s remaining cadre. The President refused to recognise an area under the LTTE’s control. The CFA, signed by Wickremesinghe and Prabhakaran, in February, 2002, recognised a vast area under the LTTE control. The CFA gave unparalleled recognition to the terrorist group and that was exploited by them to the hilt.

NPP’s dilemma

During his controversial May Day address this year, President Anura Kumara Dissanayake declared that only the armed forces and police could carry arms. Dissanayake warned that no one else could retain weapons.

President Dissanayake’s declaration is of pivotal importance as the armed forces and police twice crushed JVP-led insurgencies, in 1971 and 1987-1990. Dissanayake is the leader of the JVP and the NPP, two political parties recognised by the Election Commission.

Dissanayake, who is also the Minister of Defence and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, caused controversy last year when the government announced that the President wouldn’t attend the 16th annual war heroes’ commemoration ceremony at War Heroes’ Memorial, in Sri Jayawardenepura Kotte.

That announcement triggered massive backlash. The government rescinded its earlier decision. Having received an unprecedented endorsement from the northern and eastern electorates, both at presidential and parliamentary polls in September and November, 2024, respectively, President Dissanayake seemed to have been somewhat reluctant to join the national celebration.

Yahapalana leaders President Maithripala Sirisena and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe succumbed to Tamil Diaspora and Western pressures to do away with the 2016 annual armed forces Victory Day parade. That treacherous move followed them betraying the war-winning armed forces at the Geneva-based United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in October, 2015.

They co-sponsored accountability resolution, introduced by the US in terms of an understanding with the LTTE’s sidekick. Sirisena and Wickremesinghe forgot that the TNA recognised the LTTE as the sole representative of the Tamil speaking people, in 2001, thereby setting the stage for Eelam War IV. Sampanthan’s outfit, the Illankai Thamil Arasu Kadchi (ITAK)-led TNA, showed its true colours when it joined the UNP-JVP led initiative to defeat Mahinda Rajapaksa. Having accused the war-winning Army Commander, Sarath Fonseka, of unpardonable war crimes, the TNA, along with the UNP-JVP combine, backed Fonseka at the 2010 presidential election. The South rejected Fonseka and he lost the race by a staggering 1.8 mn votes which late JVP leader Somawansa Amarasinghe foolishly called a computer ‘jilmart’, a newly coined word of our fake Marxists. Fonseka’s indefensible declaration, in the run-up to the 2010 presidential election that the celebrated 58 Division executed surrendered LTTE cadres, didn’t do him any good. President Rajapaksa never explained why the US’ unofficial contradiction of Fonseka’s claim was never used cleverly to counter unsubstantiated war crimes allegations, along with Lord Naseby disclosures made in October, 2017.

Sri Lanka’s failure to properly defend the armed forces is nothing but an insult to them. They saved the country from the JVP twice, and Indian trained over half a dozen terrorist groups, finally bringing the largest and the deadliest of them, the LTTE, down to its knees, on the banks of the Nanthikadal lagoon.

The armed forces shouldn’t hesitate to remember their glorious victory over terrorism. Since the change of government in September, 2024, the armed forces refrained from at least mentioning their battlefield achievements. At the last Independence Day, the armed forces shockingly mentioned their role in the Ditwah cyclone recovery efforts as their main achievement, to please the political masters, who themselves have been lackeys of the West, while outwardly professing to be Marxists, the latter line they have already conveniently dropped for all purposes. The armed forces shouldn’t play NPP politics but explain the situation to the current dispensation. The failure on the part of armed forces to erase their proud achievements against terrorism, out of their press releases/narratives, look rather stupid.

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Midweek Review

A Novel, a Movie and a Play

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Drawing a Thread through Loss and Creativity in Shakespeare’s Life

William Shakespeare [1556-1616] is generally regarded as the greatest playwright and poet in the English language. Notwithstanding the universal appeal and the timelessness of his work, very little is known about his inner-self. Despite his profound understanding of the human condition, evident in his remarkable works of drama and poetry, the origin of his psychological insights – formed long before formal theories of the mind emerged – remain unknown, often loosely ascribed to an innate gift. The thematic and philosophical dimensions of his work are often said to be influenced by the classics of the ‘ancient world’ such as Ovid’s Metamorphosis.

The bestselling novel, Hamnet, by Maggie O’Farrell is a confluence of fact and fiction. The award-winning movie, by the same name, is an adaptation of the novel, its screenplay co-written by Maggie O’Farrell and Chloe Zhao, the director. The central theme of the novel and the movie is the devastating impact of the death of Shakespeare’s son, Hamnet, in 1596, at an early age of eleven, and the sensitive portrayal of the grieving process of the family, inviting the audience to reflect on the proposition that Shakespeare channelled his personal grief into writing Hamlet, the play, four years later.

Mourning and melancholy take centre stage in Hamlet prompting a probable link between William Shakespeare’s own emotional world and his artistic imagination. Interestingly, the names Hamnet and Hamlet were used interchangeably during the Elizabethan era, adding weight to the speculation.

The movie matches the imaginative and descriptive brilliance of the novel. The narrative unfolds against the backdrop of Stratford-upon-Avon and its environs and its inhabitants of Elizabethan England, finally shifting to London and the Globe Theatre. The film won eight nominations at the 98th Academy Awards, including best picture, best director for Zhao, and best actress for Jessie Buckley, who immortalises Anne Hathaway, [‘Agnes’] Shakespeare’s wife, through whom the real face of family grief is portrayed. Shakespeare [nameless] remains ‘silent’ and virtually ‘back-stage’ in London preoccupied with the playhouse, the players and the plays.

Many Shakespeare scholars have speculated about a probable link between the death of Hamnet Shakespeare and the writing of Hamlet, his Magnum Opus:

“No one can say for certain how the death of Shakespeare’s son affected him, but it is hard not to notice that in the years following Hamnet’s death Shakespeare wrote a play obsessed with fathers and sons, grief, and the persistence of the dead.” [James Shapiro]

“Hamnet’s death must have been a devastating blow…..and the shadow of that loss may well lie behind the profound meditations on mortality in Hamlet.” [Park Honan]

“The death of Hamnet is the most plausible personal event to have touched Shakespeare deeply in these years, and it is tempting to hear an echo of that loss in the grief that permeates Hamlet.” [Germaine Greer]

That echo is clearly heard in Act 4, scene 5 in Hamlet:

He is dead and gone, lady,

He is dead and gone;

At his head a grass-green turf,

At his heels a stone.

Yet, in the play, a son loses his father, and the circumstance of the loss is different. Hamlet mourns the sudden death of his father, king Hamlet, he idolised. The young prince is faced with a complex emotional challenge as the late king’s brother, Claudius, usurper to the throne, marries the widowed queen, denying the young prince of his lawful right to sovereignty. The process of mourning is weighed down by the profound significance of the personal loss to the prince and being bereft of any trusting relationships to share his grief – mourning turning to melancholy.

Shakespeare’s greatest tragedy, Hamlet, has gained unremitting interest of audiences, universally over four hundred years, and has been open to divergent appraisal. Any commentary on the play without an exploration of the psyche of its protagonist, prince Hamlet, would be as the popular cliché goes, ‘like Hamlet without the prince of Denmark!’ Hamlet is the longest of all Shakespearean plays, with the least amount of action, but with the most amount of spoken word, mainly by prince Hamlet, which includes his soliloquies [solo locution: self-discourse] that opens the door to his inner self, inviting in by Hamlet himself: “pluck out the heart of my mystery”.

In the first of his soliloquies, Hamlet reveals his affliction with melancholy. He describes the world as worthless, wishes he is dead, contemplates suicide but regrets that God does not sanction such self-destruction. “O, that this too too solid flesh would melt/ Thaw and resolve itself into dew/ O, that the Everlasting had not fixed/ His cannon ‘gainst self-slaughter. O, God, God/ Seem to me all the uses of this world!’

Hamlet’s anguish is expressed as: ‘This goodly frame, the earth’ is no more than a ‘Sterile promontory’; ‘this majestical roof fretted with golden fire’; the heavens, ‘a foul and pestilent congregation of vapours’; and man, ‘the paragon of animals’, a quintessence of dust’, his mind ‘an unweeded garden/ That grows to seed.’ – Hamlet’s melancholic thought with depressive and nihilistic content expressed in philosophical terms.

But his anguish is best depicted in his fourth soliloquy [Act 3, Scene1] arguably, the most quoted piece of verse in all Shakespeare: ‘To be, or not to be’ – about life and death. He questions, ‘whether ‘tis nobler in the mind to suffer/ The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune/ Or take arms against a sea of troubles/ and by opposing, end them’. What happens after death? Is it a peaceful sleep or nightmare? Do we end our miseries by putting ourselves to the ‘quietus’ with a dagger, and enter that ‘undiscovered country’ from which ‘no traveller returns’, or put up with our problems? ‘Conscience makes cowards of us all’ and make us procrastinate.

In his soliloquies Hamlet reveals his affliction with melancholy. He wishes that his body would melt away, describes the world as worthless and contemplates suicide – negative cognitions about the self, the environment and the future, characteristic of severe mood disturbance – but regrets that God does not sanction such self-destruction.

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Grief is a universal human experience following loss, characterised by sadness, at times mixed with anger and guilt, and frequently transient in nature. Depending on the perceived significance [‘meaningfulness’] of the loss and the absence of a sharing or confiding relationship, grief may become prolonged, with a potential to become pathological.

In a seminal paper published in 1917, Sigmund Freud [1856 – 1939], argued that there are two different responses to loss – ‘Mourning and Melancholia’. His contribution remains the basis for understanding unconscious grief in psychoanalytic thought.

Freud describes mourning as a natural way to respond to losing something or someone significant. It is a transitory process, potentially transforming, albeit painful. In mourning the loss of a loved one, the bereaved gradually withdraws the emotional energy – ‘libido’ – from ‘the lost object’, and the emotional investment is redirected to an ‘alternate object’ or pursuit. Throughout this process the ‘self’ remains intact, allowing the person to heal by integrating the loss into life. In psychology, this process in which a person unconsciously redirects unacceptable or distressing impulses into socially acceptable or constructive activities is called sublimation – a concept introduced by Sigmund Freud and later developed further by his daughter Anna Freud. Instead of expressing the impulse directly, the energy behind it is transformed into something positive or productive – an ‘ego defence’.

On the other hand, Freud described melancholia as a persistent state that stays within the ‘unconscious’ – the repressed aspect of the mind, while the person feels trapped in unresolved emotions which jeopardises their mental and physical well-being.

Shakespeare lost a child, the only son, Hamnet, still in his formative years. The playwright had no option but to leave his family in his birthplace of Stratford-upon-Avon, and return to London after burying his son to continue his work at the playhouse. The significance of the loss to the father would, no doubt, have been profound, as the Greek historian Herodotus fittingly proclaimed, “No one that has lost a child knows what it is to lose a child”.

In the novel, and as depicted in the movie, Agnes [Anne Hathaway] travels to London to meet her husband. Unknown to him she stands with the audience at the Globe Theatre to watch Hamlet, the play, while Shakespeare remains backstage. As O’Farrell poignantly writes in her novel, “Hamlet, here on this stage, is two people, the young man alive, and the father dead. He is both alive and dead. Her husband [Shakespeare] has brought him back to life, in the only way he can”. “She stretches out a hand as if to acknowledge them, as if to feel the air between the three of them, as if to pierce the boundary between audience and players, between real life and play”.

Many literary scholars speculate that Shakespeare in mourning gave voice to his grief through Hamlet, the play’s introspective protagonist, who takes to the stage with melancholic expression. There are others who dispute this view, arguing that Hamlet is a product of his creative genius that transcends any autobiographical explanation. While Hamnet, the novel, and its film adaptation do not assert a direct historical link, they suggest an association between the playwright’s personal loss and his artistic creation. The notion that Shakespeare sublimated his grief into creating the iconic stage work remains suggestive, yet unprovable, but reveals an important ‘therapeutic strategy’ [sublimation] in dealing with loss. Nevertheless, through Hamlet, he gives enduring expression to a universal human condition – grief – that resonates across time.

Moreover, from an aesthetic point of view, a work of art can truly be called Art – whether encountered on the page, the screen, or the stage – when it invites reflection or evokes emotion. The thread that runs through the novel, the movie and the play tend to reinforce that notion.

By Dr. Siri Galhenage, Psychiatrist [Retd]
sirigalhenage@gmail.com

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Midweek Review

The Dignity of the Female Head

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You’ve been at it these long hours,

Sweeping the sidewalks of the big city,

And scrubbing floors of public toilets,

All the while wiping the sweat off your brow,

And waiting eagerly for departure time,

To get to your comfy nest in the teeming slum,

And see the eyes of your waiting kids,

Light up with love at your sight,

Their hands searching you for sweets,

And such moments of family joy,

Are for you and other women of dignity,

What is seriously meant by Liberation,

But this is lost on grandstanding rulers,

Who know not the spirit of shared living,

Nor the difference between a home and a house.

By Lynn Ockersz

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