Midweek Review
Focus on early stage of ‘unwinnable’ Eelam conflict over a decade after Nandikadal confrontation
Let us set the record straight, officially

Sarath Weerasekera
Retired Rear Admiral Sarath Weerasekera recently declared that in his capacity as Chairman of the Sectoral Oversight Committee on National Security he would present to President Ranil Wickremesinghe a comprehensive report on how the war was conducted.
The recent US denial of a visa to Adm. Weerasekera underlines the need to take tangible measures to safeguard the interests of serving and ex-military personnel, especially when being unfairly targeted by foreign entities with ulterior motives, like wanting to break up Sri Lanka in pursuit of their agendas.
The announcement was made at a media briefing held at the Presidential Media Centre (PMC). Sri Lanka needs to prepare an all-inclusive dossier on the war. Regardless of some retired/serving officers sharing their experience by way of books and social media, successive governments failed to compile a complete book on the conflict that didn’t belong to any service, a particular regiment or an individual.
The efforts made by individual officers to share their experience should be encouraged but the responsibility of the government is to produce an official record taking into consideration all factors.
It would be pertinent to mention that Sri Lanka is the only country on earth to betray her war-winning armed forces. The Geneva betrayal on 01 October, 2015, underscored the treachery on the part of the then shameless Yahapalana administration. Let there be a genuine effort to restore the pride of our armed forces who saved the country from anarchy in 1971, 1987-1990 and from separatist LTTE terrorism.
By Shamindra Ferdinando
Daredevil Armoured Corps officer Ranjan Wijedasa, 52, shared his battlefield experiences in Mihidan Nowu Minisa ( The man who did not get buried) launched in September this year, 15 years after the combined security forces brought the war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to a successful end. Sri Lanka proved that what had been termed an unwinnable war here and abroad could be won. The LTTE caught up in a multi-pronged offensive that involved several Divisions and Task Forces in the East and then Vanni theatre, lasting just two years and months.
The recent Hamas attack on Israel that involved groups of heavily armed men invading the Jewish state from the air, sea and ground while thousands of missiles fired from Gaza caused unprecedented death and destruction underscored Sri Lanka’s triumph over the LTTE though the circumstances cannot be compared. The Hamas offensive is a grim reminder how lapses on the part of the political-military setup could cause catastrophe of unprecedented proportions. Judging by international reportage of the latest Israel-Gaza war, there cannot be any dispute regarding the assertion that the Jewish state never expected Hamas to undertake such a large-scale offensive. In that background, let me discuss the Eelam war experienced by an officer who had served the Army at a time eradication of terrorism seemed impossible.
Thrice wounded Wijedasa, now a Brigadier, serving the National Defence College as the Senior Directing Staff, had to quit active service following the amputation of his left hand below the elbow in Aug., 1997 due to injuries suffered during offensive action at Puliyankulam. The young tank officer, in spite of being married to Ruchirani Siriwardena in May 1997, gladly joined the largest ever ground offensive Jayasikurui (Victory Assured) conducted before Eelam War IV (Aug 2006-May 2009). But, Jayasikurui meant to restore the Overland Main Supply Route (MSR) to the Jaffna peninsula had been nothing but a disaster that sent shockwaves through the then political establishment. That offensive should be examined against the backdrop of subsequent LTTE counter-offensive that at one-time threatened even Vavuniya, a strategically important town situated north of Anuradhapura.
Wijedasa had been on the staff of the then Director, Operations Brigadier Udaya Perera during Eelam War IV. One-time Sri Lanka Deputy High Commissioner in Malaysia (2009-2011) Perera, who retired in 2017, is on the US list of war criminals. That categorization has been made in Dec. 2021. Sri Lanka never made a genuine effort to counter unsubstantiated war crimes allegations, thereby facilitating the despicable Western agenda. It would be pertinent to mention that the treacherous UNP-SLFP Yahapalana administration shamelessly betrayed the war-winning military by sponsoring an accountability resolution against one’s own country because that impossible victory was attained against the LTTE by their political rival and to please the West, in early Oct. 2015 by co-sponsoring a US-led move, one of the world’s worst human rights offenders.
Let us get back to Wijedasa’s account of his fighting experience with the Armoured Corps (1991-1997) after having joined the Army in January 1990, several weeks before India pulled out her forces from the then temporarily-merged Northern and Eastern Province. The Eelam War II erupted in the second week of June 1990 while Wijedasa was undergoing training at the Diyatalawa Military Academy. Slain President Ranasinghe Premadasa allowed an LTTE build-up during a 14-month long ‘honeymoon’ with LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran that paved the way for the group to exploit the ground situation. Their experience in fighting the Indian Army had been an added advantage against isolated detachments along the Kandy-Jaffna A9 road north of Vavuniya. The Army lost Thandikulam –Elephant Pass stretch within weeks after the resumption of hostilities in the second week of June 1990. The Army Commander ended up with egg on his face. Sandhurst trained Hamilton Wanasinghe was his name (Aug. 1988-Nov. 1991). Jayasikurui was meant to regain the MSR at any cost.
Devastating losses at Puliyankulam
- Brig. Ranjan Wijedasa addressing a gathering at Rock House Armoured Corps camp, Mattakkuliya, at the launch of his memoirs (pics courtesy MoD)
At the time Wijedasa suddenly received orders to take over the command of ‘Alpha’ squadron assigned for the Jayasikurui offensive, he was preparing to leave Vavuniya to receive an appointment at the Directorate of Personnel, Army headquarters. Without referring to the Divisions that had been involved in the disastrous bids to capture fiercely defended Puliyankulam, the author described the effort made by the Armoured Corps to bring the town under its control after assaults spearheaded by the infantry failed. The operation involved the 53 Division. It included elite formations with vast experience in fighting in both eastern and northern theatres but couldn’t overcome fierce resistance offered by the enemy or thwart a series of counter attacks which paralyzed fighting Divisions.
The author recalled the devastating outcome of the battle between the Armoured Corps and LTTE units armed with Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) and the effective use of monster landmines capable of immobilizing a 40-tonne Main Battle Tank (MBT). Of the 48 tanks that had been assigned for the task, only three were able to penetrate enemy defences and reach Puliyankulam town. Each tank had been accompanied by three Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFVs) but accurate RPG attacks on one of the AFVs and the author’s T-55 MBT forced the Armoured Corps to retreat. In hindsight, the Army, at that time, lacked sufficient fighting battalions to conduct large scale offensive operations and the strategy- opening a front with the objective of restoring the MSR seemed reckless at a time the enemy could move within the vast Vanni region without hindrance.
Within 24 hours after suffering injuries, Wijedasa had been transferred from the battlefield to Vavuniya in a Bell 212, then from there to Anuradhapura in Y12 fixed wing aircraft before being airlifted to the National Hospital, Colombo.
Jayasikurui launched in May, 1997 was meant to restore overland MSR to the Jaffna peninsula as the government found it extremely difficult to maintain the sea supply route from Trincomalee to Kankesanthurai. Perhaps, author Wijedasa should have dealt with the loss of MSR soon after the LTTE resumed hostilities in the second week of June 1990. Isolated detachments along the MSR north of Vavuniya were either destroyed or vacated by the Army in quick succession as President Premadasa quickly lost control of the war, having conspired with the LTTE to oust the Indian Army.
Regardless of heavy losses, the then President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, in her capacity as the Commander-in-Chief of armed forces pressed ahead with Jayasikurui. Finally, Kumaratunga called off the offensive in early Dec. 1998 after the Army acknowledged it couldn’t sustain the offensive any longer. Maj. Gen. Asoka Jayawardena, in his capacity as the Overall Operations Commander (OOC) commanded Jayasikurui. Instead, in a bid to divert public attention from the debacle, troops were deployed to capture Oddusuddan and annex the areas covering Mankulam, Oddusuddan and Nedunkerni in the Vanni east. That, too, ended with disastrous consequences. That offensive was called Rivi Bala.
By the time Mrs. Kumaratunga won a second term at the Dec. 1999 presidential election, the LTTE had the upper hand in the northern theatre of operations. The election was conducted following a series of severe battlefield defeats leading to the worst single ever debacle suffered by the Army in April 2000. The LTTE defeated the 54 Division plus troops deployed at Elephant Pass sector that encompassed Iyakachchi and Vettilaikerni on the Mullaitivu coast. Eventually, the then Lt. Gen. Fonseka’s Army restored overland MSR in January 2009 following major battlefield success both west and east of the Kandy-Jaffna A9 road.
The reportage was subjected to military censorship. The military resorted to harsh censorship to prevent the public from knowing the actual situation. Devastating losses suffered by Armoured Corps were not allowed to be reported in the print media at a time television didn’t cover the conflict and social media never heard of. The losses suffered by the Armoured Corps remained unreported until Brig. Wijedasa went public
The LTTE allowed Rivi Bala troops to advance. Prabhakaran refrained from resisting the latest offensive that involved the 53 and 55 Divisions and some elements of the 56 Division that had been previously involved in Operation Jayasikuru, to bring back Oddusuddan under government control, situated north of Nedunkerni, as it shifted focus of offensive action to east of the A9 road. The LTTE didn’t resist as troops secured Oddusuddan, situated 14 km north of Nedunkerni.
This writer had the opportunity to visit the new frontlines at Nedunkerni-Oddusuddan on Oct. 6, 1998, along with a group of journalists when Deputy Defence Minister Anuruddha Ratwatte visited the area. Having participated at a Hindu religious ceremony at Oddusuddan, Minister Ratwatte in camouflaged battle dress was about to get into a Russian built BTR 80 armoured personnel carrier when the LTTE fired four rounds of mortars at the group. At the time of the incident, the visiting group of journalists was about two kilometers south of the scene of the attack. My senior colleague from our sister paper Divaina Sirimevan Kasthuriarachchi was among the group. The group was being moved to Oddusuddan in locally built armoured personnel carriers when the LTTE fired mortars. The convoy stopped in the middle of the road leading to Oddusuddan when the SLA fired artillery in response to the LTTE attack. The group was stuck there for more than an hour. Although Minister Ratwatte, Army chief, Lt. Gen. Daluwatte, SLN Commander, Vice Admiral Cecil Tissera, Air Force Commander, Air Vice Marshal Jayalath Weerakkody and Wanni Security Forces Commander, Maj. Gen. Lionel Balagalle miraculously escaped, the LTTE attack claimed the lives of four SLA personnel, while 42 received injuries. Three bodyguards of Minister Ratwatte were among the wounded (Anuruddha and service chiefs in narrow escape––The Island Dec. 7, 1998).
A proud father’s advice
Ranjan’s father had served the Army and retired in the rank of Captain. Having studied at Isipathana College, Colombo, where he attended the primary, Ranjan and his three brothers – one elder to him and two younger – the family moved to Mahena, a village near Warakapola, after the retirement of Captain W.A. Wijedasa in 1979. The Brigadier’s narrative of their simple way of life and the boys’ escapades captured the readers’ interest. References were made to the retired officer being recalled in 1983 in the wake of July riots following the killing of 13 soldiers at Thinnaveli, Jaffna, and the emergence of the second JVP insurrection. The enjoyable time Ranjan and his elder brother had at Minneriya Infantry Training Centre and the opportunity granted to the boys to engage in exercises meant for soldiers perhaps influenced their decision to join the Army.
At the time, Ranjan had been chosen for the prestigious Diyatalawa Military Academy, his elder brother Manjula was there. The author’s description of nearly two yearlong training there made good reading but nothing could have been as important as advice he received from his father on the day he was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant of 33 Intake of SLMA. His brother, now retired after serving the military for nearly 20 years, too, had served the Armoured Corps though the two brothers were not assigned to the same unit during the conflict.
The author quoted his father as having told him that there were various funds in the Army. “Never touch those funds. If you need money, give me a call. Don’t smear insignia with faeces by stealing money.” Unfortunately, such high morals seemed to have made no impact on the overall public service, including the armed forces if allegations traded in Parliament and outside are true. The country is in dire straits due to waste, corruption, irregularities and mismanagement. With both the private and public sectors badly affected, the armed forces and police, too, deteriorated since the conclusion of the conflict in May 2009. Corruption takes a heavy toll on post-war bankrupt Sri Lanka with the economy in such a precarious state with many complaining the difficulties were worse than the time of conflict.
Fifteen years after the end of the conflict, the government is in the process of gradually reducing the Army’s strength to 135,000 by the end of next year and 100,000 by 2030. At the time a soldier shot Velupillai Prabhakaran through the head on the banks of the Nanthikadal lagoon on the morning of May 19, 2009, the Army strength stood at approximately 205,000. The gradual reduction commenced during Mahinda Rajapaksa’s tenure as the President. By the time, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa was forced out of office, the Army strength was down to approximately 168,000. The continuing economic crisis has compelled the Wickremesinghe-Rajapaksa government to go ahead with further downsizing of the Army and by next year the strength is expected to be down to 135,000 and 100,000 six years later.
It would be pertinent to mention that the war couldn’t have been won if not for President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s approval of Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka’s call for a larger Army. From some 116,000 officers and men, while the Army was fighting on multiple fronts over a period of three years, the strength was increased to 205,000, a tremendous achievement in an environment of instability, uncertainty and political turmoil.
Brig. Wijedasa paid a glowing tribute to Field Marshal Fonseka while recalling the Sinha Regiment hero’s declaration that he wouldn’t leave the war unfinished. Fonseka gave that assurance at a time the LTTE remained a formidable fighting force with conventional fighting capacity in land, sea and even in air with a rudimentary air force, which was used to bomb Colombo on at least two occasions.
DK visits Pooneryn
Brigadier Wijedasa disclosed a hitherto unheard visit by the then Northern Commander Maj. Gen. Denzil Kobbekaduwa to isolated Pooneryn-Nagathevanthurai military base at an early stage in the author’s career. Pooneryn-Nagathevabthurai had been perhaps one of the most difficult bases to serve during the war and was the scene of one of the fiercest attacks carried out by the LTTE on the Vanni east. The Army lost hundreds of men. Kobbekaduwa, also of the Armoured Corps during the visit to Pooneryn had declared that MBTs could operate anywhere in the Pooneryn sector whereas the author dared to disagree with the deployment of such heavy equipment in boggy conditions. Kobbekaduwa seemed to have been offended by the junior officer’s suggestion and ordered the author to prepare a MBT to move from Pooneryn to Kalmunai Point a distance of about 20 kms towards the Jaffna lagoon. Wijedasa recalled how he accompanied by Lt. Colonel Chitral Punchihewa, the Commanding Officer of the infantry deployed therein left Pooneryn atop T-55 MBT and after covering a distance of about 10 km was unexpectedly bogged down. The only other MBT that had been deployed at Pooneyn was called in to pull the bogged down T- 55. The rescuer, too, had got bogged down at the same location where those assigned for the two MBTs had to remain there for three weeks until a tank recovery vehicle was brought in from Mullaithivu by ship to Trincomalee and then overland to Pooneryn to pull the T 55s.
Regardless of orders issued by the Northern Commander in this regard, other officers senior to Wijedasa at that time had found fault with him for the fiasco. However, Lt. Col. Punchihewa had taken the responsibility for the incident thereby saved Wijedasa from being tainted. Wijedasa recollected Punchihewa’s sacrifice with love and gratitude while revealing the death of his savior in a landmine blast that ripped apart his Land rover speeding towards Kalmunai Point. What is really poignant in Punchihewa’s death is that the Lt. Col. had stopped on his way to Kalmunai Point after seeing Wijedasa at the helipad with another officer and inquired what they were doing in the hot sun. The incident underscored the senior officer’s humanitarian qualities amidst a brutal war.
Brigadier Wijedasa’s memoirs is a must read for those really interested in the conflict and how the military absorbed the youth. It would be the responsibility of the top brass to ensure the young officers and men learn from the past as it were. Wijedasa’s memoirs Mihidan Nowu Minisa can be purchased from Design Waves Private Ltd. Tel 011 2150 100 (www.designwaves.lk)
Midweek Review
How massive Akuregoda defence complex was built with proceeds from sale of Galle Face land to Shangri-La
The Navy ceremonially occupied its new Headquarters (Block No. 3) at the Defence Headquarters Complex (DHQC) at Akuregoda, Battaramulla, on 09 December, 2025. On the invitation of the Commander of the Navy, Vice Admiral Kanchana Banagoda, the Deputy Minister of Defence, Major General Aruna Jayasekara (Retd) attended the event as the Chief Guest.
Among those present were Admiral of the Fleet Wasantha Karannagoda, the Defence Secretary, Air Vice Marshal Sampath Thuyacontha (Retd), Commander of the Army, Lieutenant General Lasantha Rodrigo, Commander of the Air Force, Air Marshal Bandu Edirisinghe, Inspector General of Police, Attorney-at-Law Priyantha Weerasooriya and former Navy Commanders.
With the relocation of the Navy at DHQC, the much-valued project to shift the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and Headquarters of the war-winning armed forces has been brought to a successful conclusion. The Army was the first to move in (November 2019), the MoD (May 2021), the Air Force (January 2024) and finally the Navy (in December 2025).
It would be pertinent to mention that the shifting of MoD to DHQC coincided with the 12th anniversary of bringing back the entire Northern and Eastern Provinces under the government, on 18 May, 2009. LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran was killed on the following day.
The project that was launched in March 2011, two years after the eradication of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), suffered a severe setback, following the change of government in 2015. The utterly irresponsible and treacherous Yahapalana government halted the project. That administration transferred funds, allocated for it, to the Treasury, in the wake of massive Treasury bond scams perpetrated in February and March 2015, within weeks after the presidential election.
Maithripala Sirisena, in his capacity as the President, as well as the Minister of Defence, declared open the new Army Headquarters, at DHQC, a week before the 2019 presidential election. Built at a cost of Rs 53.3 bn, DHQC is widely believed to be the largest single construction project in the country. At the time of the relocation of the Army, the then Lt. Gen. Shavendra Silva, the former Commanding Officer of the celebrated Task Force I/58 Division, served as the Commander.
Who made the DHQC a reality? Although most government departments, ministries and armed forces headquarters, were located in Colombo, under the Colombo Master Plan of 1979, all were required to be moved to Sri Jayewardenepura, Kotte. However successive administrations couldn’t go ahead with the massive task primarily due to the conflict. DHQC would never have been a reality if not for wartime Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa who determinedly pursued the high-profile project.
The absence of any reference to the origins of the project, as well as the significant role played by Gotabaya Rajapaksa at the just relocated Navy headquarters, prompted the writer to examine the developments related to the DHQC. The shifting of MoD, along with the Armed Forces Headquarters, was a monumental decision taken by Mahinda Rajapaksas’s government. But, all along it had been Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s determination to achieve that monumental task that displeased some within the administration, but the then Defence Secretary, a former frontline combat officer of the battle proved Gajaba Regiment, was not the type to back down or alter his strategy.
GR’s maiden official visit to DHQC
Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who made DHQC a reality, visited the sprawling building in his capacity as the President, Defence Minister and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces on the morning of 03 August, 2021. It was Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s maiden official visit to the Army Headquarters, located within the then partially completed DHQC, eight months before the eruption of the externally backed ‘Aragalaya.’ The US-Indian joint project has been exposed and post-Aragalaya developments cannot be examined without taking into consideration the role played by political parties, the Bar Association of Sri Lanka, media, as well as the weak response of the political leadership and the armed forces. Let me stress that a comprehensive probe should cover the period beginning with the Swiss project to humiliate President Gotabaya Rajapaka in November, 2019, by staging a fake abduction, and the storming of the President’s House in July 2022. How could Sri Lanka forget the despicable Swiss allegation of sexual harassment of a female local employee by government personnel, a claim proved to be a blatant lie meant to cause embarrassment to the newly elected administration..
Let me get back to the DHQC project. The war-winning Mahinda Rajapaksa government laid the foundation for the building project on 11 May, 2011, two years after Sri Lanka’s triumph over the separatist Tamil terrorist movement. The high-profile project, on a 77-acre land, at Akuregoda, Pelawatta, was meant to bring the Army, Navy, and the Air Force headquarters, and the Defence Ministry, to one location.
President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s visit to Akuregoda would have definitely taken place much earlier, under a very different environment, if not for the eruption of the Covid-19 pandemic, just a few months after his victory at the November 2019 election. The worst post-World War II crisis that had caused devastating losses to national economies, the world over, and delivered a staggering blow to Sri Lanka, heavily dependent on tourism, garment exports and remittances by its expatriate workers.
On his arrival at the new Army headquarters, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa was welcomed by General Shavendra Silva, who also served as the Chief of Defence Staff. Thanks to the President’s predecessor, Maithripala Sirisena, the then Maj. Gen Shavendra Silva was promoted to the rank of Lt. Gen and appointed the Commander of the Army on 18 August, 2019, just three months before the presidential poll. The appointment was made in spite of strong opposition from the UNP leadership and US criticism.
President Gotabaya Rajapaksa hadn’t minced his words when he publicly acknowledged the catastrophe caused by the plunging of the national income and the daunting challenge in debt repayment, amounting to as much as USD 4 bn annually.
The decision to shift the tri-forces headquarters and the Defence Ministry (The Defence Ministry situated within the Army Headquarters premises) caused a media furor with the then Opposition UNP alleging a massive rip-off. Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa reiterated his commitment to the project. If not for the change of government in 2015, the DHQC would have been completed during Mahinda Rajapaksa’s third term if he was allowed to contest for a third term successfully. Had that happened, Gotabaya Rajapaksa wouldn’t have emerged as the then Opposition presidential candidate at the 2019 poll. The disastrous Yahapalana administration and the overall deterioration of all political parties, represented in Parliament, and the 19th A that barred Mahinda Rajapaksa from contesting the presidential election, beyond his two terms, created an environment conducive for Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s emergence as the newly registered SLPP’s candidate.
Shangri-La move
During the 2019 presidential election campaign, SLPP candidate Gotabaya Rajapaksa strongly defended his decision to vacate the Army Headquarters, during Mahinda Rajapaksa presidency, to pave the way for the Shangri-La Hotel in Colombo. Shangri-La was among the hotels targeted by the Easter Sunday bombers – the only location targeted by two of them, including mastermind Zahran Hashim.
President Gotabaya Rajapaksa is on record as having said that vacation of the site had been in accordance with first executive President J.R. Jayewardene’s decision to move key government buildings away from Colombo to the new Capital of the country at Sri Jaywardenepura. Gotabaya Rajapaksa said so in response to the writer’s queries years ago.
Gotabaya Rajapaksa said that a despicable attempt was being made to blame him for the Army Headquarters land transaction. “I have been accused of selling the Army Headquarters land to the Chinese.”
Rajapaksa explained that Taj Samudra, too, had been built on a section of the former Army Headquarters land, previously used to accommodate officers’ quarters and the Army rugger grounds. Although President Jayewardene had wanted the Army Headquarters shifted, successive governments couldn’t do that due to the war and lack of funds, he said.
President Maithripala Sirisena and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe declared open Shangri-La Colombo on 16 November, 2017. The Hong Kong-based Shangri-La Asia invited Gotabaya Rajapaksa for dinner, the following day, after the opening of its Colombo hotel. Shangri-La Chairperson, Kuok Hui Kwong, the daughter of Robert Kuok Khoon Ean, was there to welcome Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who had cleared the way for the post-war mega tourism investment project. Among those who had been invited were former President Mahinda Rajapaksa, former External Affairs Minister Prof. G.L. Peiris, former Presidential Secretary Lalith Weeratunga, and President’s Counsel Gamini Marapana, PC.
The Cabinet granted approval for the high-profile Shangri-La project in October 2010 and the ground-breaking ceremony was held in late February 2012.
Rajapaksa said that the Shangri-La proprietor, a Chinese, ran a big operation, based in Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore. Another parcel of land was given to the mega ITC hotel project, also during the previous Rajapaksa administration. ITC Ratnadipa, a super-luxury hotel by India’s ITC Hotels, officially opened in Colombo on April 25, 2024
Following the change of government in January 2015, the remaining section of the Army headquarters land, too, was handed over to Shangri-La.
Gotabaya Rajapaksa emphasised that the relocation of the headquarters of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, as well as the Defence Ministry, had been part of JRJ’s overall plan. The change of government, in January 2015, had caused a serious delay in completing the project and it was proceeding at a snail’s pace, Rajapaksa said. Even Parliament was shifted to Kotte in accordance with JRJ’s overall plan, Gotabaya Rajapaksa said, explaining his move to relocate all security forces’ headquarters and Defence Ministry into one complex at Akuregoda.
Acknowledging that the Army Headquarters had been there at Galle Face for six decades, Rajapaksa asserted that the Colombo headquarters wasn’t tactically positioned.
Rajapaksa blamed the inordinate delay in the completion of the Akuregoda complex on the Treasury taking hold of specific funds allocated for the project.
Over 5,000 military workforce

Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s maiden visit to DHQC on 3 August, 2021. General
Shavendra Silva is beside him
Major General Udaya Nanayakkara had been the first Director, Project Management Unit, with overall command of approximately 5,000 tri-forces personnel assigned to carry it out. The Shangri-La transaction provided the wherewithal to implement the DHQC project though the change of government caused a major setback. Nanayakkara, who had served as the Military Spokesman, during Eelam War IV, oversaw the military deployment, whereas private contractors handled specialised work such as piling, AC, fire protection and fire detection et al. The then MLO (Military Liaison Officer) at the Defence Ministry, Maj. Gen Palitha Fernando, had laid the foundation for the project and the work was going on smoothly when the Yahapalana administration withheld funds. Political intervention delayed the project and by September 2015, Nanayakkara was replaced by Maj Gen Mahinda Ambanpola, of the Engineer Service.
In spite of President Sirisena holding the Defence portfolio, he couldn’t prevent the top UNP leadership from interfering in the DHQC project. However, the Shangri-La project had the backing of A.J.M. Muzammil, the then UNP Mayor and one of the close confidants of UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe. Muzammil was among those present at the ground breaking ceremony for Shangri-La held on 24th February, 2012 ,with the participation of Minister Basil Rajapaksa.
Having identified the invaluable land, where the Army Headquarters and Defence Ministry were situated, for its project, Shangri-La made its move. Those who had been aware of Shangri-La’s plans were hesitant and certainly not confident of their success. They felt fearful of Defence Secretary Rajapaksa’s reaction.
But, following swift negotiations, they finalised the agreement on 28 December, 2010. Lt. Gen. Jagath Jayasuriya was the then Commander of the Army, with his predecessor General Fonseka in government custody after having been arrested within two weeks after the conclusion of the 2010 26 January Presidential poll.
Addressing the annual Viyathmaga Convention at Golden Rose Hotel, Boralesgamuwa, on 04 March, 2017, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, perhaps for the first time publicly discussed his role in the Shangri-La project. Declaring that Sri Lanka suffered for want of, what he called, a workable formula to achieve post-war development objectives, the war veteran stressed the pivotal importance of swift and bold decision-making.
Gotabaya Rajapaksa explained how the government had acted swiftly, and decisively, to attract foreign investments though some such efforts were not successful. There couldn’t be a better example than the government finalising an agreement with Shangri-La Hotels, he declared.
Declaring that the bureaucratic red tape shouldn’t in any way be allowed to undermine investments, Rajapaksa recalled the Chairman/CEO of Shangri-La Hotels and Resorts, Robert Kuok Khoon Ean, wanting the Army Headquarters land for his Colombo project. In fact, the hotels chain, at the time, had proposed to build hotels in Colombo, Hambantota and Batticaloa, and was one of the key investors wanting to exploit Sri Lanka’s success in defeating terrorism.
“Khoon-Ean’s request for the Army Headquarters land caused a serious problem for me. It was a serious challenge. How could I shift the headquarters of the war-winning Army? The Army had been there for six decades. It had been the nerve centre of the war effort for 30 years,” said Rajapaksa, who once commanded the First Battalion of the Gajaba Regiment (1GR)
Rajapaksa went on to explain how he exploited a decision taken by the first executive president J.R. Jayewardene to shift the Army Headquarters to Battaramulla, many years back. “Within two weeks, in consultation with the Secretary to the Finance Ministry, Dr. P.B. Jayasundera, and the Board of Investment, measures were taken to finalise the transaction. The project was launched to shift the Army, Navy and Air Force headquarters to Akuregoda, Pelawatte, in accordance with JRJ’s plan.”
The Hong Kong-based group announced the purchase of 10 acres of state land, in January 2011. Shangri-La Asia Limited announced plans to invest over USD 400 mn on the 30-storeyed star class hotel with 661 rooms.
The hotel is the second property in Sri Lanka for the leading Asian hospitality group, joining Shangri-La’s Hambantota Resort & Spa, which opened in June 2016.
Rajapaksa said that the top Shangri-La executive had referred to the finalisation of their Colombo agreement to highlight the friendly way the then administration handled the investment. Shangri-La had no qualms about recommending Sri Lanka as a place for investment, Rajapaksa said.
The writer explained the move to shift the Army Headquarters and the Defence Ministry from Colombo in a lead story headlined ‘Shangri-La to push MoD, Army Hq. out of Colombo city: Army Hospital expected to be converted into a museum’ (The Island, 04 January, 2011).
Yahapalana chaos
In the wake of the January 2015 change of government, the new leadership caused chaos with the suspension of the China-funded Port City Project, a little distance away from the Shangri-La venture. Many an eyebrow was raised when the then Finance Minister Ravi Karunanayake declared, in March, 2015, that funds wouldn’t be made available to the DHQC project until the exact cost estimation of the project could be clarified.
Media quoted Karunanayake as having said “Presently, this project seems like a bottomless pit and we need to know the depth of what we are getting into. From the current state of finances, allocated for this project, it seems as if they are building a complex that’s even bigger than the Pentagon!”
The insinuating declaration was made despite them having committed the blatant first Treasury bond scam in February 2015 that shook the Sirisena-Wickremesinghe administration to its core.
In June 2016, Cabinet spokesperson, Dr. Rajitha Senaratne, announced the suspension of the Akuregoda project. Citing financial irregularities and mismanagement of funds, Dr. Senaratne alleged that all Cabinet papers on the project had been prepared according to the whims and fancies of Gotabaya Rajapaksa.
The then Minister Karunanayake spearheaded the campaign against the DHQC project alleging, in the third week of January, 2015, that Rs 13.2 billion, in an account maintained at the Taprobane branch of the Bank of Ceylon had been transferred to the Consolidated Fund of the Treasury. The matter was being investigated as the account belonged to the Ministry of Defence, he added. The Finance Minister stressed that the MoD had no right to maintain such an account in violation of regulations and, therefore, the opening of the account was being investigated. The Minister alleged that several illegal transactions, including one involving Samurdhi, had come to light. He estimated the Samurdhi transaction (now under investigation) at Rs. 4 billion.
Having undermined Shangri-La and the DHQC projects, the UNP facilitated the expansion of the hotel project by releasing additional three and half acres on a 99-year lease. During the Yahapalana administration, Dayasiri Jayasekera disclosed at a post-Cabinet press briefing how the government leased three and a half acres of land at a rate of Rs. 13.1 mn per perch whereas the previous administration agreed to Rs 6.5 mn per perch. According to Jayasekera the previous government had leased 10 acres at a rate of Rs 9.5 mn (with taxes) per perch.
The bottom line is that DHQC was built with Shangri-La funds and the initiative was Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s whose role as rock solid wartime Secretary of Defence to keep security forces supplied with whatever their requirements could never be compared with any other official during the conflict.
By Shamindra Ferdinando
Midweek Review
The Hour of the Invisible
Picking-up the pieces in the bashed Isle,
Is going to take quite a long while,
And all hands need to be united as one,
To give it even a semblance of its former self,
But the more calloused and hardy the hands,
The more suitable are they for the task,
And the hour is upon us you could say,
When those vast legions of invisible folk,
Those wasting away in humble silent toil,
Could stand up and be saluted by all,
As being the most needed persons of the land
By Lynn Ockersz
Features
Handunnetti and Colonial Shackles of English in Sri Lanka
“My tongue in English chains.
I return, after a generation, to you.
I am at the end
of my Dravidic tether
hunger for you unassuaged
I falter, stumble.”
– Indian poet R. Parthasarathy
When Minister Sunil Handunnetti addressed the World Economic Forum’s ‘Is Asia’s Century at Risk?’ discussion as part of the Annual Meeting of the New Champions 2025 in June 2025, I listened carefully both to him and the questions that were posed to him by the moderator. The subsequent trolling and extremely negative reactions to his use of English were so distasteful that I opted not to comment on it at the time. The noise that followed also meant that a meaningful conversation based on that event on the utility of learning a powerful global language and how our politics on the global stage might be carried out more successfully in that language was lost on our people and pundits, barring a few commentaries.
Now Handunnetti has reopened the conversation, this time in Sri Lanka’s parliament in November 2025, on the utility of mastering English particularly for young entrepreneurs. In his intervention, he also makes a plea not to mock his struggle at learning English given that he comes from a background which lacked the privilege to master the language in his youth. His clear intervention makes much sense.
The same ilk that ridiculed him when he spoke at WEF is laughing at him yet again on his pronunciation, incomplete sentences, claiming that he is bringing shame to the country and so on and so forth. As usual, such loud, politically motivated and retrograde critics miss the larger picture. Many of these people are also among those who cannot hold a conversation in any of the globally accepted versions of English. Moreover, their conceit about the so-called ‘correct’ use of English seems to suggest the existence of an ideal English type when it comes to pronunciation and basic articulation. I thought of writing this commentary now in a situation when the minister himself is asking for help ‘in finding a solution’ in his parliamentary speech even though his government is not known to be amenable to critical reflection from anyone who is not a party member.
The remarks at the WEF and in Sri Lanka’s parliament are very different at a fundamental level, although both are worthy of consideration – within the realm of rationality, not in the depths of vulgar emotion and political mudslinging.
The problem with Handunnetti’s remarks at WEF was not his accent or pronunciation. After all, whatever he said could be clearly understood if listened to carefully. In that sense, his use of English fulfilled one of the most fundamental roles of language – that of communication. Its lack of finesse, as a result of the speaker being someone who does not use the language professionally or personally on a regular basis, is only natural and cannot be held against him. This said, there are many issues that his remarks flagged that were mostly drowned out by the noise of his critics.
Given that Handunnetti’s communication was clear, it also showed much that was not meant to be exposed. He simply did not respond to the questions that were posed to him. More bluntly, a Sinhala speaker can describe the intervention as yanne koheda, malle pol , which literally means, when asked ‘Where are you going?’, the answer is ‘There are coconuts in the bag’.
He spoke from a prepared text which his staff must have put together for him. However, it was far off the mark from the questions that were being directly posed to him. The issue here is that his staff appears to have not had any coordination with the forum organisers to ascertain and decide on the nature of questions that would be posed to the Minister for which answers could have been provided based on both global conditions, local situations and government policy. After all, this is a senior minister of an independent country and he has the right to know and control, when possible, what he is dealing with in an international forum.
This manner of working is fairly routine in such international fora. On the one hand, it is extremely unfortunate that his staff did not do the required homework and obviously the minister himself did not follow up, demonstrating negligence, a want for common sense, preparedness and experience among all concerned. On the other hand, the government needs to have a policy on who it sends to such events. For instance, should a minister attend a certain event, or should the government be represented by an official or consultant who can speak not only fluently, but also with authority on the subject matter. That is, such speakers need to be very familiar with the global issues concerned and not mere political rhetoric aimed at local audiences.
Other than Handunnetti, I have seen, heard and also heard of how poorly our politicians, political appointees and even officials perform at international meetings (some of which are closed door) bringing ridicule and disastrous consequences to the country. None of them are, however, held responsible.
Such reflective considerations are simple yet essential and pragmatic policy matters on how the government should work in these conditions. If this had been undertaken, the WEF event might have been better handled with better global press for the government. Nevertheless, this was not only a matter of English. For one thing, Handunnetti and his staff could have requested for the availability of simultaneous translation from Sinhala to English for which pre-knowledge of questions would have been useful. This is all too common too. At the UN General Assembly in September, President Dissanayake spoke in Sinhala and made a decent presentation.
The pertinent question is this; had Handunetti had the option of talking in Sinhala, would the interaction have been any better? That is extremely doubtful, barring the fluency of language use. This is because Handunnetti, like most other politicians past and present, are good at rhetoric but not convincing where substance is concerned, particularly when it comes to global issues. It is for this reason that such leaders need competent staff and consultants, and not mere party loyalists and yes men, which is an unfortunate situation that has engulfed the whole government.
What about the speech in parliament? Again, as in the WEF event, his presentation was crystal clear and, in this instance, contextually sensible. But he did not have to make that speech in English at all when decent simultaneous translation services were available. In so far as content was concerned, he made a sound argument considering local conditions which he knows well. The minister’s argument is about the need to ensure that young entrepreneurs be taught English so that they can deal with the world and bring investments into the country, among other things. This should actually be the norm, not only for young entrepreneurs, but for all who are interested in widening their employment and investment opportunities beyond this country and in accessing knowledge for which Sinhala and Tamil alone do not suffice.
As far as I am concerned, Handunetti’s argument is important because in parliament, it can be construed as a policy prerogative. Significantly, he asked the Minister of Education to make this possible in the educational reforms that the government is contemplating.
He went further, appealing to his detractors not to mock his struggle in learning English, and instead to become part of the solution. However, in my opinion, there is no need for the Minister to carry this chip on his shoulder. Why should the minister concern himself with being mocked for poor use of English? But there is a gap that his plea should have also addressed. What prevented him from mastering English in his youth goes far deeper than the lack of a privileged upbringing.
The fact of the matter is, the facilities that were available in schools and universities to learn English were not taken seriously and were often looked down upon as kaduwa by the political spectrum he represents and nationalist elements for whom the utilitarian value of English was not self-evident. I say this with responsibility because this was a considerable part of the reality in my time as an undergraduate and also throughout the time I taught in Sri Lanka.
Much earlier in my youth, swayed by the rhetoric of Sinhala language nationalism, my own mastery of English was also delayed even though my background is vastly different from the minister. I too was mocked, when two important schools in Kandy – Trinity College and St. Anthony’s College – refused to accept me to Grade 1 as my English was wanting. This was nearly 20 years after independence. I, however, opted to move on from the blatant discrimination, and mastered the language, although I probably had better opportunities and saw the world through a vastly different lens than the minister. If the minister’s commitment was also based on these social and political realities and the role people like him had played in negating our English language training particularly in universities, his plea would have sounded far more genuine.
If both these remarks and the contexts in which they were made say something about the way we can use English in our country, it is this: On one hand, the government needs to make sure it has a pragmatic policy in place when it sends representatives to international events which takes into account both a person’s language skills and his breadth of knowledge of the subject matter. On the other hand, it needs to find a way to ensure that English is taught to everyone successfully from kindergarten to university as a tool for inclusion, knowledge and communication and not a weapon of exclusion as is often the case.
This can only bear fruit if the failures, lapses and strengths of the country’s English language teaching efforts are taken into cognizance. Lamentably, division and discrimination are still the main emotional considerations on which English is being popularly used as the trolls of the minister’s English usage have shown. It is indeed regrettable that their small-mindedness prevents them from realizing that the Brits have long lost their long undisputed ownership over the English language along with the Empire itself. It is no longer in the hands of the colonial masters. So why allow it to be wielded by a privileged few mired in misplaced notions of elitism?
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