Features
Human Rights and War Crimes : Sri Lanka’s ignorance matches that of US
By Daya Gamage
Foreign Service National Political Specialist (ret), US Department of State
The Capitol Building, which houses both legislative branches of the United States – and the Sri Lanka Embassy are not very far apart in Washington, DC. The Capitol Building has an office for Congresswoman, Deborah Ross, who along with another four Members submitted a resolution against Sri Lanka on 18 May (2023) to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, on the day when the 14th anniversary of the conclusion of Eelam War IV fell.
It seems that Congresswoman Ross and the Sri Lanka diplomatic corps have a serious communication gap, which allowed Ross and her staff to engage in a dialogue with a pro-Eelam organisation, the Tamil American United Political Action Committee in Raleigh, North Carolina, which she represents in the Congress, to draft a resolution and submit it to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, castigating Sri Lanka on issues of human rights and alleged war crimes; the Sri Lankan diplomats in the other building failed to remember that it was Ross who had previously submitted a resolution, against Sri Lanka on 18 May 2021, and neglected their diplomatic responsibilities.
They did not meet her to refute the ill-informed pronouncements in the 2021 resolution. Both Resolutions – 2021 and 2023 – are similar. The writings and pronouncements in the Tamil American United PAC Committee website found themselves into the Ross’ resolution of 2023, due to manoeuvrings by Murugiah Muraleetharan, the President of the association.
Then, the Sri Lankan media reported that Foreign Minister Ali Sabry had summoned the Canadian High Commissioner to ‘protest’ Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s statement that Sri Lanka had committed genocide its war with the LTTE. There were no media reports that Minister Sabry had informed the Canadian diplomat that it was the LTTE that engaged in genocidal acts, forcibly removing Muslims and Sinhalese from the LTTE-controlled Northern Province.
Minister Sabry brought it to the attention of the Canadian diplomat that since the anti-Tamil riots, in 1983, there had been no harassment of Tamils, despite the Tamil Tigers infiltrating the Sinhalese areas, in the south, and massacring Sinhalese villagers and Buddhist monks. There were no indications if Sabry told him that when the war was over, in May 2009, there were 40% (out of the national 12%) Tamils living among the Sinhalese, in the South, far away from the North and the East, and that at present about 50% Tamils are now living outside those provinces.
The State Department’s misconceptions about the final phases of the Vanni war were due to inadequate and incompetent reporting thereon by the American Embassy in Colombo. Questions about Embassy Colombo’s reporting were raised by the State Department Office of the Inspector General (OIG) during a routine assessment of Embassy operations during the period from August 2009 through September 2010. The period under review coincided with the release to Congress by the State Department’s Office of Global Criminal Justice on “Crimes Against Humanity in Sri Lanka”, which drew heavily on Embassy reporting.
OIG reports always identify weaknesses in the Embassy’s performance, but this report on Colombo was particularly critical of the political reporting section, whose personnel are inexperienced and lack proper training. The inspectors found that the American reporting officers in Colombo had not travelled adequately around the country and their reports were insufficiently analytical. No surprise the US Embassy and its Ambassador,accepted uncritically the views of the UN and other sources.
US government officials who denounce Sri Lanka for human rights violations appear to have no proper understanding of the evidentiary weaknesses of their accusations. Worse still, they apparently are ignorant or unmindful of reports by others in the USG and the organisations that attest to these empirical shortcomings. Three important reports relevant to Sri Lanka were published by reputable investigative bodies between December 2008 and September 2009—a period that bracketed the worst alleged crimes by Sri Lanka.
The first of these was produced by the Genocide Prevention Task Force co-chaired by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and former Secretary of Defence, William Cohen and convened jointly by the US Holocaust Memorial Museum, the American Academy of Diplomacy, and the United States Institute of Peace. This report noted in general terms, “When our diplomats and intelligence reporting from the post is inadequate, analysts in Washington are left to make judgments from ambiguous and frequently conflicting information and assessments.”
The latter two reports published shortly after the end of hostilities in Sri Lanka were drafted by the US Congress’ independent investigative arm, the Government Accountability Office (GAO). The two reports disclosed very serious weaknesses in policy decisions taken at the highest levels in the State Department as a result of ambiguous and frequently conflicting information and assessments provided by overseas diplomatic missions that are ill-equipped to handle required reporting.
It should be stated here that US lawmakers in both the Senate and the House, apart from getting distorted views from the pro-Tamil Eelam lobby, draw heavily from State Department reports and analyses. Worse, the Washington-based Sri Lankan diplomats as well as Sri Lankan agencies that deal with foreign-international affairs were either blind to reality or conveniently ignored what needed to be presented to the international community (IC).
The disgraceful double-standards of Washington policymakers and lawmakers – and, of course, their overseas diplomats – in dealing with Sri Lanka’s ‘national issues’, since the advent of the separatist war in the north, and the insurrection in the south, in the 1980s, are now very broadly dealt with by two persons who worked within the US Department of State for 30 years in the area of foreign affairs. One is this writer, who is a retired Foreign Service National Political Specialist, once accredited to the Political Section of the U.S. Embassy in Colombo, and the other Dr. Robert K. Boggs, a retired Senior Foreign Service (FS) and Intelligence Officer, who served as Political Counsellor, at the Colombo Mission, with a very broad knowledge of India’s ‘role’ in Sri Lanka. Their manuscript, ‘Defending Democracy: Lessons in Strategic Diplomacy from US-Sri Lankan Relations” is nearing completion with disclosures, analyses and interpretations based on their up-close and personal knowledge and understanding how Washington used ‘double standards’ in handling its foreign relations to reduce Sri Lanka to a client state.
The USG has for years pressed for an international mechanism to judge Sri Lankan military officers for decisions they made in leading their nation’s fight against militants the USG had designated as terrorists. The USG has done this despite its stated policy of recognising “a state’s inherent right to defend itself from armed attacks, including those by non-state actors such as terrorist groups, and expects both states and non-state actors to comply with their international legal obligations.”
For decades Sri Lankan policymakers have demonstrated a poor understanding of how the American foreign policy establishment works and how they might use public diplomacy and strategic communication to counter the influence of the Tamil Diaspora. The persistent ineffectiveness of Sri Lankan diplomacy in Washington has been a major reason why in the final months of the war (March/April 2009) the USG threatened to block a $1.9 billion IMF loan in the hope of dissuading the GSL from continuing its final military campaign. The US threat proved unsuccessful (mainly for intra- governmental reasons), but the additional stress it placed on bilateral relations could have been avoided if the GSL had developed better rapport with Washington through more professional diplomacy.
A serious lack of professional diplomacy, the naive manner in which it dealt with international/foreign affairs, having absolutely no research-investigative ability, Sri Lanka couldn’t understand the following scenario to develop its own diplomatic prowess to deal with Washington:
At the time the United States was pressuring Colombo to accept “national, international, and hybrid mechanisms to clarify the fate and whereabouts of the disappeared,” the USG had not itself ratified the UN convention of 2006 requiring state party to criminalize enforced disappearances and take steps to hold those responsible to account. Despite a resolution passed by the U.S. House of Representatives on November 19, 2020 calling on the USG to ratify the international convention, this still has not happened.
America’s long history of rejecting accountability is strongly rooted in legislation. The American Service-Members Protection Act (ASPA) was an amendment to the 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act (H.R. 4775) passed in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the launch of the so-called Global War on Terror. The ASPA aims to protect U.S. military personnel and other elected and appointed officials of the government against prosecution by an international criminal court, to which the US is not a party.
Among other defensive provisions the Act prohibits federal, state and local governments and agencies (including courts and law enforcement agencies) from assisting the International Criminal Court in The Hague. It even prohibits US military aid to countries that are parties to the Court. In 2002, during the administration of Prime Minister Wickremesinghe, the GoSL signed with the US an “Article 98 Agreement,” agreeing not to hand over US nationals to the Court.
US policy was based on an inadequate understanding of the underlying causes of the civil war in Sri Lanka—an understanding that does not include inter-caste tensions within the Tamil community, the political obduracy of upper caste elites, unwilling to adapt to the post-Independence democratic order, the origins and dynamics of two competing nationalisms, demographic and economic pressures in an island state, and the imperative in a young democratic system of policies to expand economic opportunity to the disadvantaged majority within both the Sinhalese and Tamil communities.
There has been a perverse lack of appreciation internationally of the threat that an autocratic, criminal, terrorist organisation posed to the security of the great majority of Sri Lankans including Tamils. Tragically, Washington’s simplistic perception of an ethnic majority oppressing a ‘righteously rebellious’ minority prolonged the bloodshed, alienated a historically reliable partner, weakened a beleaguered democracy, and strengthened the influence of US antagonists in the region.
Washington ignored or glossed over the complex skein of factors that dominated ethnic politics for decades. (To be continued)
Features
Relief without recovery
The escalating conflict in the Middle East is of such magnitude, with loss of life, destruction of cities, and global energy shortages, that it is diverting attention worldwide and in Sri Lanka, from other serious problems. Barely four months ago Sri Lanka experienced a cyclone of epic proportions that caused torrential rains, accompanied by floods and landslides. The immediate displacement exceeded one million people, though the number of deaths was about 640, with around 200 others reported missing. The visual images of entire towns and villages being inundated, with some swept away by floodwaters, evoked an overwhelming humanitarian response from the general population.
When the crisis of displacement was at its height there was a concerted public response. People set up emergency kitchens and volunteer clean up teams fanned out to make flooded homes inhabitable again. Religious institutions, civil society organisations and local communities worked together to assist the displaced. For a brief period the country witnessed a powerful demonstration of social solidarity. The scale of the devastation prompted the government to offer generous aid packages. These included assistance for the rebuilding of damaged houses, support for building new houses, grants for clean up operations and rent payments to displaced families. Welfare centres were also set up for those unable to find temporary housing.
The government also appointed a Presidential Task Force to lead post-cyclone rebuilding efforts. The mandate of the Task Force is to coordinate post-disaster response mechanisms, streamline institutional efforts and ensure the effective implementation of rebuilding programmes in the aftermath of the cyclone. The body comprises a high-level team, led by the Prime Minister, and including cabinet ministers, deputy ministers, provincial-level officials, senior public servants, representing key state institutions, and civil society representatives. It was envisaged that the Task Force would function as the central coordinating authority, working with government agencies and other stakeholders to accelerate recovery initiatives and restore essential services in affected regions.
Demotivated Service
However, four months later a visit to one of the worst of the cyclone affected areas to meet with affected families from five villages revealed that they remained stranded and in a state of limbo. Most of these people had suffered terribly from the cyclone. Some had lost their homes. A few had lost family members. Many had been informed that the land on which they lived had become unsafe and that they would need to relocate. Most of them had received the promised money for clean up and some had received rent payments for two months. However, little had happened beyond this. The longer term process of rebuilding houses, securing land and restoring livelihoods has barely begun. As a result, families who had already endured the trauma of disaster, now face prolonged uncertainty about their future. It seems that once again the promises made by the political leadership has not reached the ground.
A government officer explained that the public service was highly demotivated. According to him, many officials felt that they had too much work piled upon them with too little resources to do much about it. They also believed that they were underpaid for the work they were expected to carry out. In fact, there had even been a call by public officials specially assigned to cyclone relief work to go on strike due to complaints about their conditions of work. This government official appreciated the government leadership’s commitment to non corruption. But he noted the irony that this had also contributed to a demotivation of the public service. This was on the unjustifiable basis that approving and implementing projects more quickly requires an incentive system.
Whether or not this explanation fully captures the situation, it points to an issue that the government needs to address. Disaster recovery requires a proactive public administration. Officials need to reach out to affected communities, provide clear information and help them navigate the complex procedures required to access assistance. At the consultation with cyclone victims this was precisely the concern that people raised. They said that government officers were not proactive in reaching out to them. Many felt they had little engagement with the state and that the government officers did not come to them. This suggests that the government system at the community level could be supported by non-governmental organisations that have the capacity and experience of working with communities at the grassroots.
In situations such as this the government needs to think about ways of motivating public officials to do more rather than less. It needs to identify legitimate incentives that reward initiative and performance. These could include special allowances for those working in disaster affected areas, recognition and promotion for officers who successfully complete relief and reconstruction work, and the provision of additional staff and logistical support so that the workload is manageable. Clear targets and deadlines, with support from the non-governmental sector, can also encourage officials to act more proactively. When government officers feel supported and recognised for the extra effort required, they are more likely to engage actively with affected communities and ensure that assistance reaches those who need it most.
Political Solutions
Under the prevailing circumstances, however, the cyclone victims do not know what to do. The government needs to act on this without further delay. Government policy states that families can receive financial assistance of up to Rs 5 million to build new houses if they have identified the land on which they wish to build. But there is little freehold land available in many of the affected areas. As a result, people cannot show government officials the land they plan to buy and, therefore, cannot access the government’s promised funds. The government needs to address this issue by providing a list of available places for resettlement, both within and outside the area they live in. However, another finding at the meeting was that many cyclone victims whose lands have been declared unsafe do not wish to leave them. Even those who have been told that their land is unstable feel more comfortable remaining where they have lived for many years. Relocating to an unfamiliar area is not an easy decision.
Another problem the victims face is the difficulty of obtaining the documents necessary to receive compensation. Families with missing members cannot prove that their loved ones are no longer alive. Without official confirmation they cannot access property rights or benefits that would normally pass to surviving family members. These are problems that Sri Lanka has faced before in the context of the three decade long internal war. It has set up new legal mechanisms such as the provision of certificates of absence validated by the Office on Missing Persons (OMP) in place of death certificates when individuals remain missing for long periods. The government also needs to be sensitive to the fact that people who are farmers cannot be settled anywhere. Farming is not possible in every location. Access to suitable land and water is essential if farmers are to rebuild their livelihoods. Relocation programmes that fail to take these realities into account risk creating new psychological and economic hardships.
The message from the consultation with cyclone victims is that the government needs to talk more and engage more directly with affected communities. At the same time the political leadership at the highest levels need to resolve the problems that government officers on the ground cannot solve. Issues relating to land availability, legal documentation and livelihood restoration require policy decisions at higher levels. The challenge to the government to address these issues in the context of the Iran war and possible global catastrophe will require a special commitment. Demonstrating that Sri Lanka is a society that considers the wellbeing of all its citizens to be a priority will require not only financial assistance but also a motivated public service and proactive political leadership that reaches out to those still waiting to rebuild their lives.
by Jehan Perera
Features
Supporting Victims: The missing link in combating ragging
A recent panel discussion at the University of Peradeniya examined the implications of the Supreme Court’s judgement on ragging, in which the Court recognised that preventing ragging requires not only criminal penalties imposed after an incident occurs but also systems and processes within universities that enable victims to speak up and receive support. Bringing together perspectives from law, university administration, psychology and students, the discussion sought to understand why ragging continues to persist in Sri Lankan universities despite the existence of legal prohibitions. While the discussion covered legal and institutional dimensions, one theme emerged clearly: addressing ragging requires more than laws and disciplinary rules. It requires institutions that are capable of supporting victims.
Sri Lanka enacted the Prohibition of Ragging and Other Forms of Violence in Educational Institutions Act No. 20 of 1998 following several tragic incidents in universities, during the 1990s. Among the most widely remembered is the death of engineering student S. Varapragash at the University of Peradeniya in 1997. Incidents such as this shocked the country and revealed the consequences of allowing violent forms of student hierarchy to persist. The 1998 Act marked an important legal intervention by recognising ragging as a criminal offence. The law introduced severe penalties for individuals found guilty of engaging in ragging or other forms of violence in educational institutions, including fines and imprisonment.
Despite the existence of this law for nearly three decades, prosecutions under the Act have been extremely rare. Incidents continue to surface across universities although most are not reported. The incidents that do reach university administrations are dealt with internally through disciplinary procedures rather than through the criminal justice system. This suggests that the problem does not lie solely in the absence of legal provisions but also in the ability of victims to come forward and pursue complaints.
The tragic reminders; the cases of Varapragash and Pasindu Hirushan
Varapragash, a first-year engineering student at the University of Peradeniya, was forced by senior students to perform extreme physical exercises as part of ragging, resulting in severe internal injuries and acute renal failure that ultimately led to his death. In 2022, the courts upheld the conviction of one of the perpetrators for abduction and murder. The case illustrates not only the brutality of ragging but also how long and difficult the path to justice can be for victims and their families. Even when victims speak about their experiences, they may not always disclose the full extent of what they have endured. In the case of Varapragash, the judgement records that the victim told his father that he was asked to do dips and sit-ups. Varapragash’s father had testified that it appeared his son was not revealing the exact details of what he had to endure due to shame.
More than two decades after the death of Varapragash, the tragedy of ragging continues. The 2025 Supreme Court judgement arose from the case of Pasindu Hirushan, a 21-year-old student of the University of Sri Jayewardenepura, who sustained devastating head injuries at a fresher’s party, in March 2020, after a tyre sent down the stairs by senior students struck him. He became immobile, was placed on life support, and returned home only months later. If the Varapragash case exposed the deadly consequences of ragging in the 1990s, the Pasindu Hirushan case demonstrates that universities are still failing to prevent serious violence, decades after the enactment of the 1998 Act. It was against this background of continuing institutional failure that the Supreme Court issued its Orders of Court in 2025. Among the key mechanisms emphasised by the judgement is the establishment of Victim Support Committees within universities.
Why do victims need support?
Ragging in universities can take many forms, including verbal humiliation, physical abuse, emotional intimidation and, in some instances, sexual harassment. While all forms of ragging can have serious consequences, incidents involving sexual harassment often present additional barriers for victims who wish to come forward. Victims may hesitate to complain due to weak institutional mechanisms, fear of retaliation, or uncertainty about whether their experiences will be taken seriously. In many cases, those who speak out are confronted with questions that shift attention away from the alleged misconduct and onto their own behaviour: why did s/he continue the conversation?; why did s/he not simply disengage, if the harassment occurred as claimed?; why did s/he remain in the environment?; or did his/her actions somehow encourage the accused’s behaviour? Such responses illustrate how easily victims can be subjected to a second layer of scrutiny when they attempt to report incidents. When individuals anticipate disbelief, minimisation or blame, silence may appear safer than disclosure. In such circumstances, the presence of a trusted institutional body, capable of providing guidance, protection and support, become critically important, highlighting the need for effective Victim Support Committees within universities.
What Victim Support Committees must do
As expected by the Supreme Court, an effective Victim Support Committee should function as a trusted institutional mechanism that places the safety and dignity of victims at the centre of its work. The committee must provide a safe and confidential point of contact through which victims can report incidents of ragging without fear of intimidation or retaliation. It should assist victims in understanding and pursuing available complaint procedures, while also ensuring their immediate protection where there is a risk of continued harassment. Recognising the psychological harm ragging may cause, the committee should facilitate access to counselling and emotional support services. At a practical level, it should also help victims document incidents, record statements, and preserve evidence that may be necessary for disciplinary or legal proceedings. The committee must coordinate with university authorities to ensure that complaints are addressed promptly and responsibly, while maintaining strict confidentiality to protect the identity and well-being of those who come forward. Beyond responding to individual cases, Victim Support Committees should also contribute to broader awareness and prevention efforts, within universities, helping to create an environment where ragging is actively discouraged and students feel safe to report incidents. Without such support, the process of pursuing justice can become overwhelming for individuals who are already dealing with the emotional impact of abuse.
Making Victim Support Committees work
According to the Orders of Court, these committees should include representatives from the academic and non-academic staff, a qualified counsellor and/or clinical psychologist, an independent person, from outside the institution, with experience in law enforcement, health, or social services, and not more than three final-year students, with unblemished academic and disciplinary records, appointed for fixed terms. Further, universities must ensure that committees consist of individuals who possess both expertise and genuine commitment in areas such as student welfare, psychology, gender studies, human rights and law enforcement, in line with the spirit of the Supreme Court’s directions, rather than consisting largely of ex officio positions. If treated as routine administrative positions, rather than responsibilities requiring specialised knowledge, sensitivity and empathy, these committees risk becoming symbolic rather than functional.
Greater transparency in the appointment process could strengthen the credibility of these committees. Universities could invite expressions of interest from individuals with relevant expertise and demonstrated commitment to supporting victims. Such an approach would help ensure that the committees benefit from the knowledge and dedication of those best equipped to fulfil this role.
The Supreme Court judgement also introduces an important safeguard by giving the University Grants Commission (UGC) the authority to appoint members to university-level Victim Support Committees. If exercised with integrity, this provision could help ensure that these committees operate with greater independence. It may also help address a challenge that sometimes arises within institutions, where individuals, with relevant expertise, or strong commitment to addressing issues, such as violence, harassment or student welfare, may not always be included in institutional mechanisms due to internal administrative preferences. External oversight by the UGC could, therefore, create opportunities for such individuals to contribute meaningfully to Victim Support Committees and strengthen their effectiveness.
Ultimately, the success of the recent judgement will depend not only on the directives it issued, the number of committees universities establish, or the number of meetings they convene, or other box-checking exercises, but on how sincerely those directives are implemented and the trust these committees inspire among students and staff. Laws can prohibit ragging, but they cannot by themselves create environments in which victims feel safe to speak. That responsibility lies with institutions. When universities create systems that listen to victims, support them and treat their experiences with seriousness, universities will become places where dignity and learning can coexist.
(Udari Abeyasinghe is attached to the Department of Oral Pathology at the University of Peradeniya)
Kuppi is a politics and pedagogy happening on the margins of the lecture hall that parodies, subverts, and simultaneously reaffirms social hierarchies.
by Udari Abeyasinghe
Features
Big scene … in the Seychelles
Several of our artistes do venture out on foreign assignments but, I’m told, most of their performances are mainly for the Sri Lankans based abroad.
However, the group Mirage is doing it differently and they are now in great demand in the Seychelles.
Guests patronising the Lo Brizan pub/restaurant, Niva Labriz Resort, in the Seychelles, is made up of a wide variety of nationalities, including Russians, Chinese, French and Germans, and they all enjoy the music dished out by Mirage, and that is precisely why they are off to the Seychelles … for the fifth time!
The band is scheduled to leave this month and will be back after three weeks, but their journey to the Seychelles will continue, with two more assignments lined up for 2026.
In August it’s a four-week contract, and in December another four-week contract that will take in the festive celebrations … Christmas and the New Year.

Donald’s birthday
celebrations
According to reports coming my way, it is a happening scene at the Lo Brizan pub/restaurant, Niva Labriz Resort, whenever Mirage is featured, and the band has even adjusted its repertoire to include local and African songs.
They work three hours per day and six days per week at the Lo Brizan pub/restaurant.

Donald Pieries:
Leader, vocalist,
drummer
Led by vocalist and drummer Donald Pieries, many say it is his
musical talents and leadership that have contributed to the band’s success.
Donald, who celebrated his birthday on 07 March, at the Irish Pub, has been with the group through various lineup changes and is known for his strong vocals.
He leads a very talented and versatile line up, with Sudham (bass/vocals), Gayan (lead guitar/vocals), Danu (female vocalist) and Toosha (keyboards/vocals).
Mirage performs regularly at venues like the Irish Pub in Colombo and also at Food Harbour, Port City.
-
Business7 days agoBOI launches ‘Invest in Sri Lanka’ forum
-
News6 days agoHistoric address by BASL President at the Supreme Court of India
-
Sports6 days agoThe 147th Royal–Thomian and 175 Years of the School by the Sea
-
Sports7 days agoRoyal start favourites in historic Battle of the Blues
-
News7 days agoCEBEU warns of operational disruptions amid uncertainty over CEB restructuring
-
Features7 days agoIndian Ocean zone of peace torpedoed!
-
Life style3 days agoFrom culture to empowerment: Indonesia’s vision for Sri Lanka
-
News6 days agoPower sector reforms jolted by 40% pay hike demand
