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Wishing Rt. Rev. V. Pathmathayalan a blessed episcopacy with strength to overcome four challenges

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Rt. Rev. Velupillai Pathmathayalan

By S. Ratnajeevan H. Hoole

DSc (Eng.) London, PhD Carnegie Mellon, IEEE Life Fellow, Chartered Engineer

In Sri Lanka, by historic coincidence, there are two Anglican Communion Churches, the Church of Ceylon (CoC) and the Jaffna Diocese of the Church of South India (JDCSI). For the new Bishop, it is appropriate to learn from the heritage, experience and challenges of both sister churches.

My protestant roots go to when my ancestor Cyrus Kingsbury, born in 1807, joined the church in 1825, soon becoming Assistant Pastor at the Tellipalai Mission. His son Edward Appukutti Kingsbury was Native Professor of Mathematics at Jaffna College. After the CSI was formed, that branch of my family joined the Anglican Church on my father’s side. I therefore take pride in the JDCSI.

Four challenges confront the new Bishop. The American Congregationalists (American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, the ABCFM) brought a strong tradition of learning with ties to American Ivy League Universities and elite liberal arts colleges. Their contribution to Jaffna is seen in eight secondary and sixty elementary CSI schools being nationalised in 1960. That weighty heritage was infused into all Christian schools as Congregationalist graduates joined the Anglican clergy (like Rev. T.P. Handy) or married into Anglican families. This heritage is hugely challenged with few Christians in our schools, whether as staff or students. Resolving this first challenge requires a political solution to the National Question to halt the bleeding of talent from Sri Lanka.

Second is the commitment to truthfulness among Christians. As a Hindu reporter remarked, “We were told that Fathers do not lie but that is no longer true.” Typifying this is that in Church archives St. John’s College was founded in 1851. However, after Tamils took over from missionaries, this date has been pushed back to 1823 to be older than Jaffna Central’s 1834. This despite the Church Missionary Society’s official history by CMS’s own priest (published by the CMS, “ONE HUNDRED YEARS in CEYLON Centenary Volume of the Church Missionary Society in Ceylon 1818-1918,” CMS Press,1922), gives 1851 as St. John’s’ founding. According to Balding, “An important high class boys’ school was begun at Chundicully in 1851, which is now known as St. John’s College.[my emphases].”

What the Johnian manipulators did was to trace the school’ origin to a school founded in Nallur by Rev. Joseph Knight. That school was shut down because of cholera in 1833. Subsequently it was moved to Chundikuly where St. John’s is in 1841. It was called the Chundikuli Seminary with no connection to Nallur. According to Balding’s record, from then to its close [note the word close] upwards of two hundred lads passed through the regular course, and seventy became converts to Christianity. Balding further states that it was on the Jubilee anniversary of the Chundikuli Seminary that the name St. John’s was given. Therefore, there is no way in which St. John’s can be connected to Nallur’s seminary which was closed in 1833.

As if to prove that they can lie as well as their rival Johnians, Centralites shifted their start date from 1834 to 1814! Central’s feat is fantastic after Central published an inch-thick Centenary Volume in 1934.

Founder Peter Percival has written to his Mission (published in Wesleyan-Methodist Magazine, 1835) that he announced the formation of a new English school in October 1834 and in a second letter that “On the 4th of November the boys assembled to the number of 186.” Central accomplished this by getting a judge, a professor and a Methodist Church President (Kathiravelupillai, Sittrampalam and Jebanesan, 1993) to write that a school at another location was the real Central College. They ignored their Centenary Volume and sealed the deal by getting President Maithripala Sirisena to issue a 200th anniversary stamp. How easy it is to create history in Sri Lanka, when politicians cannot resist any publicity!

Come March 2023 at the second century celebration of St. John’s, will Bishop Dushantha Rodrigo knowingly emblazon in concrete the lie that St. John’s is 200 years old? He knows where to find the official CMS Record at the Diocesan Library next to his office. Or is the Church so thick-skinned that it does not want to spoil the fun by studying the records? Is the Church committed to the truth?Come March, the Bishop of Colombo, Dushantha Rodrigo will cement this lie by unveiling as scheduled a plaque/tablet at St. John’s commemorating 200 years of the school! I say knowingly because 2-3 times I have spoken twice, perhaps thrice, at the Diocesan Council, before Bishops and over 300 delegates, giving all the information. They seem deaf.

This story is not complete without mentioning that Jaffna College, a school by the JDCSI, claims a start date of 1823 when in fact according to Letters of Sydney Bunker, President of Jaffna College, the Seminary founded in 1823 was closed in 1833 and that what now goes as Jaffna College was established in 1872. But that is another story.

What is clear is that the churches – Anglican (including the JDCSI) and Methodist – have lost their reputation for upholding the truth. The Girls’ schools by the Missions seem to practice the moral imperative of the eighth of the ten commandments not to bear false witness.

Unbelievable though it is, the Church of Ceylon’s Eucharistic Prayer Book has only 9 commandments, the missing commandment being not to misuse the name of God. The prayerbook also gives prayers stating that God has no holiness. Unbelievably the Liturgical Commission of the Church, despite a near unanimous resolution from the Council, declared in writing that they unanimously state there is no need to change the Tamil prayerbook. The vast majority on the Commission cannot read Tamil. The one who led the writing, a classmate at St. John’s who failed, is good at cinema songs which goes for proficiency in Tamil.

The third challenge is Church unity. The other Protestant churches advocate unity as so imperative that articles of faith can be jettisoned in unity’s favour. So, a Catholic-leaning Protestant will give up his view of holy communion involving real presence of Christ and concelebrate with a Methodist who thinks it is only a memorial and throw the left-over elements to the crows. Another example is that Methodists use something like Portello for wine which they prohibit, whereas Anglicans use real wine as Jesus did. At Bishop Dhilo Canagasabey’s consecration, in a fit of oneness, church heads were invited into the sanctuary and the Methodist head too was pressured. As I watched intently, when the cup was passed around, the Methodist Head looked to his left and right as if to see who was watching and quickly drank the wine. Unity must not pressure people into being what they are not. The challenge before the new Bishop to ensure that unity involves pluralism, not coercion.

Indeed, the time is coming when Sri Lanka has to go for a peace deal. As the only Tamil church, the JDCSI must be ready to put forward solutions to our ethnic problems and must not be silenced by unity just as the corrections to the Tamil Liturgy are being callously suppressed by Sinhalese nationalists in the Church of Ceylon seeing Tamils as coolies commanding no heed.

Indeed, if unity is over-arching, why are the Anglicans pushing the smaller Protestants but not the Roman Catholics? I believe it is because if unity is with Roman Catholics, Anglicans will be swamped, but with other Protestants, Anglicans will rule the roost. So, My Lord Bishop, watch it!

The fourth challenge is democracy. When it was pointed out that Anglican archdeacons and bishops have been stealing endowment funds to buy themselves cars, councilors were too scared to object. Two Bishops had been bought cars at Rs. 50 lakhs each; and for archdeacons at Rs. 100 lakhs. One was leased a van at Rs. 900,000 a month for a year. The problem was that the Diocesan Constitution requires Diocesan Council approval before using endowment funds for capital expenditures.

For sure that approval would not have been given, considering that most Councilors from outside Colombo are poor. So that crucial vote was not put to the Council. The purchase of cars in the millions from endowment funds was theft because it was not authorised.

Now why did no one object? Why was the negligent auditor who approved it renewed even after the Council was apprised? I believe it is because of the fear priests have of being transferred out of Colombo or being refused a transfer to Colombo where a birthday party might get a huge cash gift, a car from the parish and admission to prestigious schools for the children. Once the priest makes his mind known, the parishioners in Council from his parish also keep quiet. The diocese becomes silent. The ability to raise questions is an integral part of democracy.

My Lord Bishop, you must show that you are committed to integrity and would welcome questioning by the people to advance honesty and love within the Church. If you, My Lord, democratize the church, the first three challenges too would be simultaneously addressed.

God bless you!



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Opinion

What BNP should keep in mind as it assumes power

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PM Tarique Rahman

BNP rightly deserves our congratulations for winning a decisive victory in the 13th parliamentary election. This outcome reflects an unequivocal mandate that is both politically and historically significant. Coming as it does at a critical point in Bangladesh’s democratic journey, this moment marks more than a change of government; it signals a renewed public resolve to restore democratic norms, accountability, and institutional integrity.

The election came after years of severe distrust in the electoral process, questions over legitimacy, and institutional strain, so the poll’s successful conduct has reinforced trust in the process as well as the principle that governments derive authority from the consent of the governed. For quite some time now, Bangladesh has faced deep polarisation, intolerance, and threats to its democratic foundations. Regressive and anti-democratic tendencies—whether institutional, ideological, or political—risked steering the country away from its foundational goals. BNP’s decisive victory can therefore be interpreted as a call to reverse this trajectory, and a public desire for accountable, forward-looking governance rooted in liberal democratic principles.

However, the road ahead is going to be bumpy, to put it mildly. A broad mandate alone cannot resolve deep-rooted structural problems. The BNP government will likely continue to face economic challenges and institutional constraints for the foreseeable future. This will test its capacity and sincerity not only to govern but also to transform the culture of governance in the country.

Economic reform imperatives

A key challenge will be stabilising the economy, which continues to face mounting pressures: growth has decelerated, inflation has eroded people’s purchasing power, foreign exchange reserves remain low, and public finances are tight. External debt has increased significantly in recent years, while the tax-to-GDP ratio has fallen to historically low levels. State-owned enterprises and the banking sector face persistent structural weaknesses, and confidence among both domestic and international investors remains fragile.

The new government should begin by restoring macroeconomic discipline. Containing inflation will need close coordination across ministries and agencies. Monetary policy must remain cautious and credible, free from political interference, while fiscal policy should prioritise stability rather than expand populist spending.

Tax reform is also unavoidable. The National Board of Revenue requires comprehensive modernisation, digitalisation, and total compliance. Broadening the tax base, especially by bringing all high-income groups and segments of the informal economy into the formal system, is crucial. Over time, reliance on indirect taxes such as value-added tax and import duties should be reduced, paving the way for a more progressive direct tax regime.

Banking sector reform is equally crucial. Proper asset quality reviews and regulatory oversight are necessary to rebuild confidence in the sector. Political patronage within the financial institutions must end. Without a resilient financial system, private investment cannot recover. As regards growth, the government should focus on diversifying exports beyond ready-made garments and deepening integration into regional value chains. Attracting foreign direct investment will depend on regulatory predictability and improvements in logistics and energy reliability. Ambitious growth targets must be matched by realistic implementation capacity.

Political Challenges

Distrust among political actors, partly fuelled by fears of retribution and violence, is a reality that may persist. BNP will face pressure from its supporters to act quickly in addressing perceived injustices, but good governance demands restraint. If the new government resorts to or tolerates exclusion or retaliation, it will risk perpetuating the very cycle it has condemned.

Managing internal party discipline will also be crucial, as a large parliamentary majority can sometimes lead to complacency or factional rivalry. Strong leadership will be required to maintain unity while allowing constructive internal debate. BNP must also rebuild trust with minority communities and vulnerable groups. Elections often heighten anxieties among minorities, so a credible commitment to equal citizenship is crucial. BNP’s political maturity will also be judged by how it treats or engages with its opponents. In this regard, Chairman Tarique Rahman’s visits to the residences of top opposition leaders on Sunday marked a positive gesture, one that many hope will withstand the inevitable pressures or conflicts over governance in the coming days.

Strengthening democratic institutions

A central promise of this election was to restore democracy, which must now translate into concrete institutional reforms. Judicial independence needs constant safeguarding. Which means that appointment, promotion, and case management processes should be insulated from political influence. Parliamentary oversight committees must also function effectively, and the opposition’s voice in parliament must be protected.

Electoral institutions also need reform, particularly along the lines of the July Charter. Continued credibility of the Election Commission will depend on transparency, professional management, and impartiality. Meanwhile, the civil service must be depoliticised. Appointments based on loyalty rather than merit have long undermined governance in the country. So the new administration must work on curtailing the influence of political networks to ensure a professional, impartial civil service. Media reform and digital rights also deserve careful attention. We must remember that democratic consolidation is built through institutional habits, and these habits must be established early.

Beyond winner-takes-all

Bangladesh’s politics has long been characterised by a winner-takes-all mentality. Electoral victories have often resulted in monopolisation of power, marginalising opposition voices and weakening checks and balances. If BNP is serious about democratic renewal, it must consciously break with this tradition. Inclusive policy consultations will be a good starting point. Major economic and constitutional reforms should be based on cross-party dialogue and consensus. Appointments to constitutional bodies should be transparent and consultative, and parliamentary debates should be done with the letter and spirit of the July Charter in mind.

Meeting public expectations

The scale of public expectations now is naturally immense. Citizens want economic relief, employment opportunities, necessary institutional reforms, and improved governance. Managing these expectations will be quite difficult. Many reforms will not yield immediate results, and some may impose short-term costs. So, it is imperative to ensure transparent communication about the associated timelines, trade-offs, and fiscal constraints.

Anti-corruption efforts must be credible and monitored at all times. Measures are needed to strengthen oversight institutions, improve transparency in public procurement, and expand digital service delivery to reduce opportunities for rent-seeking. Governance reform should be systematic, not selective or politically driven. Tangible improvements are urgently needed in public service delivery, particularly in health, education, social protection, and local government.

Finally, a word of caution: BNP’s decisive victory presents both opportunities and risks. It can enable bold reforms but it also carries the danger of overreach. The key deciding factor here is political judgment. The question is, can our leaders deliver based on the mandate voters have given them? (The Daily Star)

Dr Fahmida Khatun is an economist and executive director at the Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD). Views expressed in the article are the author’s own.

Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

by Fahmida Khatun

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Opinion

Why religion should remain separate from state power in Sri Lanka: Lessons from political history

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Religion has been an essential part of Sri Lankan society for more than two millennia, shaping culture, moral values, and social traditions. Buddhism in particular has played a foundational role in guiding ethical behaviour, promoting compassion, and encouraging social harmony. Yet Sri Lanka’s modern political history clearly shows that when religion becomes closely entangled with state power, both democracy and religion suffer. The politicisation of religion especially Buddhism has repeatedly contributed to ethnic division, weakened governance, and the erosion of moral authority. For these reasons, the separation of religion and the state is not only desirable but necessary for Sri Lanka’s long-term stability and democratic progress.

Sri Lanka’s post-independence political history provides early evidence of how religion became a political tool. The 1956 election, which brought S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike to power, is often remembered as a turning point where Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism was actively mobilised for political expedience. Buddhist monks played a visible role in political campaigning, framing political change as a religious and cultural revival. While this movement empowered the Sinhala-Buddhist majority, it also laid the foundation for ethnic exclusion, particularly through policies such as the “Sinhala Only Act.” Though framed as protecting national identity, these policies marginalised Tamil-speaking communities and contributed significantly to ethnic tensions that later escalated into civil conflict. This period demonstrates how religious symbolism, when fused with state power, can undermine social cohesion rather than strengthen it.

The increasing political involvement of Buddhist monks in later decades further illustrates the risks of this entanglement. In the early 2000s, the emergence of monk-led political parties such as the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) marked a new phase in Sri Lankan politics. For the first time, monks entered Parliament as elected lawmakers, directly participating in legislation and governance. While their presence was justified as a moral corrective to corrupt politics, in practice it blurred the boundary between spiritual leadership and political power. Once monks became part of parliamentary debates, policy compromises, and political rivalries, they were no longer perceived as neutral moral guides. Instead, they became political actors subject to criticism, controversy, and public mistrust. This shift significantly weakened the traditional reverence associated with the Sangha.

Sri Lankan political history also shows how religion has been repeatedly used by political leaders to legitimise authority during times of crisis. Successive governments have sought the public endorsement of influential monks to strengthen their political image, particularly during elections or moments of instability. During the war, religious rhetoric was often used to frame the conflict in moral or civilisational terms, leaving little room for nuanced political solutions or reconciliation. This approach may have strengthened short-term political support, but it also deepened ethnic polarisation and made post-war reconciliation more difficult. The long-term consequences of this strategy are still visible in unresolved ethnic grievances and fragile national unity.

Another important historical example is the post-war period after 2009. Despite the conclusion of the war, Sri Lanka failed to achieve meaningful reconciliation or strong democratic reform. Instead, religious nationalism gained renewed political influence, often used to silence dissent and justify authoritarian governance. Smaller population groups such as Muslims and Christians in particular experienced growing insecurity as extremist groups operated with perceived political protection. The state’s failure to maintain religious neutrality during this period weakened public trust and damaged Sri Lanka’s international reputation. These developments show that privileging one religion in state power does not lead to stability or moral governance; rather, it creates fear, exclusion, and institutional decay.

The moral authority of religion itself has also suffered as a result of political entanglement. Traditionally, Buddhist monks were respected for their distance from worldly power, allowing them to speak truth to rulers without fear or favour. However, when monks publicly defend controversial political decisions, support corrupt leaders, or engage in aggressive nationalist rhetoric, they risk losing this moral independence. Sri Lankan political history demonstrates that once religious figures are seen as aligned with political power, public criticism of politicians easily extends to religion itself. This has contributed to growing disillusionment among younger generations, many of whom now view religious institutions as extensions of political authority rather than sources of ethical guidance.

The teachings of the Buddha offer a clear contrast to this historical trend. The Buddha advised rulers on ethical governance but never sought political authority or state power. His independence allowed him to critique injustice and moral failure without compromise. Sri Lanka’s political experience shows that abandoning this principle has harmed both religion and governance. When monks act as political agents, they lose the freedom to challenge power, and religion becomes vulnerable to political failure and public resentment.

Sri Lanka’s multi-religious social structure nurtures divisive, if not separatist, sentiments. While Buddhism holds a special historical place, the modern state governs citizens of many faiths. Political history shows that when the state appears aligned with one religion, minority communities feel excluded, regardless of constitutional guarantees. This sense of exclusion has repeatedly weakened national unity and contributed to long-term conflict. A secular state does not reject religion; rather, it protects all religions by maintaining neutrality and ensuring equal citizenship.

Sri Lankan political history clearly demonstrates that the fusion of religion and state power has not produced good governance, social harmony, or moral leadership. Instead, it has intensified ethnic divisions, weakened democratic institutions, and damaged the spiritual credibility of religion itself. Separating religion from the state is not an attack on Buddhism or Sri Lankan tradition. On the contrary, it is a necessary step to preserve the dignity of religion and strengthen democratic governance. By maintaining a clear boundary between spiritual authority and political power, Sri Lanka can move toward a more inclusive, stable, and just society one where religion remains a source of moral wisdom rather than a tool of political control.

In present-day Sri Lanka, the dangers of mixing religion with state power are more visible than ever. Despite decades of experience showing the negative consequences of politicised religion, religious authority continues to be invoked to justify political decisions, silence criticism, and legitimise those in power. During recent economic and political crises, political leaders have frequently appeared alongside prominent religious figures to project moral legitimacy, even when governance failures, corruption, and mismanagement were evident. This pattern reflects a continued reliance on religious symbolism to mask political weakness rather than a genuine commitment to ethical governance.

The 2022 economic collapse offers a powerful contemporary example. As ordinary citizens faced shortages of fuel, food, and medicine, public anger was directed toward political leadership and state institutions. However, instead of allowing religion to act as an independent moral force that could hold power accountable, sections of the religious establishment appeared closely aligned with political elites. This alignment weakened religion’s ability to speak truthfully on behalf of the suffering population. When religion stands too close to power, it loses its capacity to challenge injustice, corruption, and abuse precisely when society needs moral leadership the most.

At the same time, younger generations in Sri Lanka are increasingly questioning both political authority and religious institutions. Many young people perceive religious leaders as participants in political power structures rather than as independent ethical voices. This growing scepticism is not a rejection of spirituality, but a response to the visible politicisation of religion. If this trend continues, Sri Lanka risks long-term damage not only to democratic trust but also to religious life itself.

The present moment therefore demands a critical reassessment. A clear separation between religion and the state would allow religious institutions to reclaim moral independence and restore public confidence. It would also strengthen democracy by ensuring that policy decisions are guided by evidence, accountability, and inclusive dialogue rather than religious pressure or nationalist rhetoric. Sri Lanka’s recent history shows that political legitimacy cannot be built on religious symbolism alone. Only transparent governance, social justice, and equal citizenship can restore stability and public trust.

Ultimately, the future of Sri Lanka depends on learning from both its past and present. Protecting religion from political misuse is not a threat to national identity; it is a necessary condition for ethical leadership, democratic renewal, and social harmony in a deeply diverse society.

by Milinda Mayadunna

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Opinion

NPP’s misguided policy

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Balangoda Kassapa Thera

Judging by some recent events, starting with the injudicious pronouncement in Jaffna by President Anura Kumara Dissanayake and subsequent statements by some senior ministers, the government tends to appease minorities at the expense of the majority. Ill-treatment of some Buddhist monks by the police continues to arouse controversy, and it looks as if the government used the police to handle matters that are best left to the judiciary. Sangadasa Akurugoda concludes his well-reasoned opinion piece “Appeasement of separatists” (The island, 13 February) as follows:

“It is unfortunate that the President of a country considers ‘national pride and patriotism’, a trait that every citizen should have, as ‘racism’. Although the President is repeating it like a mantra that he will not tolerate ‘racism’ or ‘extremism’ we have never heard him saying that he will not tolerate ‘separatism or terrorism’.”

It is hard to disagree with Akurugoda. Perhaps, the President may be excused for his reluctance to refer to terrorism as he leads a movement that unleashed terror twice, but his reluctance to condemn separatism is puzzling. Although most political commentators consider the President’s comment that ‘Buddhist go to Jaffna to spread hate’ to be callous, the head of an NGO heaped praise on the President for saying so!

As I pointed out in a previous article, puppet-masters outside seem to be pulling the strings (A puppet show? The Island, 23 January) and the President’s reluctance to condemn separatism whilst accusing Buddhists of spreading hatred by going to Jaffna makes one wonder who these puppeteers are.

Another incident that raises serious concern was reported from a Buddhist Temple in Trincomalee. The police removed a Buddha statue and allegedly assaulted Buddhist priests. Mysteriously, the police brought back the statue the following day, giving an absurd excuse; they claimed they had removed it to ensure its safety. No inquiry into police action was instituted but several Bhikkhus and dayakayas were remanded for a long period.

Having seen a front-page banner headline “Sivuru gelawenakam pahara dunna” (“We were beaten till the robes fell”) in the January 13th edition of the Sunday Divaina, I watched on YouTube the press briefing at the headquarters of the All-Ceylon Buddhist Association. I can well imagine the agony those who were remanded went through.

Ven. Balangoda Kassapa’s description of the way he and the others, held on remand, were treated raises many issues. Whether they committed a transgression should be decided by the judiciary. Given the well-known judicial dictum, ‘innocent until proven guilty’, the harassment they faced cannot be justified under any circumstances.

Ven. Kassapa exposed the high-handed actions of the police. This has come as no surprise as it is increasingly becoming apparent as they are no longer ‘Sri Lanka Police’; they have become the ‘NPP police’. This is an issue often editorially highlighted by The Island. How can one expect the police to be impartial when two key posts are held by officers brought out of retirement as a reward for canvassing for the NPP. It was surprising to learn that the suspects could not be granted bail due to objections raised by the police.

Ven. Kassapa said the head of the remand prison where he and others were held had threatened him.

However, there was a ray of hope. Those who cry out for reconciliation fail to recognise that reconciliation is a much-misused term, as some separatists masquerading as peacemakers campaign for reconciliation! They overlook the fact that it is already there as demonstrated by the behaviour of Tamil and Muslim inmates in the remand prison, where Ven. Kassapa and others were kept.

Non-Buddhist prisoners looked after the needs of the Bhikkhus though the prison chief refused even to provide meals according to Vinaya rules! In sharp contrast, during a case against a Sri Lankan Bhikkhu accused of child molestation in the UK, the presiding judge made sure the proceedings were paused for lunch at the proper time.

I have written against Bhikkhus taking to politics, but some of the issues raised by Ven. Kassapa must not be ignored. He alleges that the real reason behind the conflict was that the government was planning to allocate the land belonging to the Vihara to an Indian businessman for the construction of a hotel. This can be easily clarified by the government, provided there is no hidden agenda.

It is no secret that this government is controlled by India. Even ‘Tilvin Ayya’, who studied the module on ‘Indian Expansionism’ under Rohana Wijeweera, has mended fences with India. He led a JVP delegation to India recently. Several MoUs or pacts signed with India are kept under wraps.

Unfortunately, the government’s mishandling of this issue is being exploited by other interested parties, and this may turn out to be a far bigger problem.

It is high time the government stopped harassing the majority in the name of reconciliation, a term exploited by separatists to achieve their goals!

By Dr Upul Wijayawardhana

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