Features
Vexed question of Covid vaccines for very young children: Some answers from the UK
Dr. B. J. C. Perera
MBBS (Cey), DCH (Cey), DCH(Eng), MD (Paed), MRCP (UK), FRCP (Edin), FRCP(Lon), FRCPCH (UK), FSLCPaed, FCCP, Hony. FRCPCH (UK), Hony. FCGP (SL)
Specialist Consultant Paediatrician and Honorary Senior Fellow, Postgraduate Institute of Medicine, University of Colombo, Sri Lanka. Joint Editor, Sri Lanka Journal of Child Health Section Editor, Ceylon Medical Journal
The Sri Lankan government and the Ministry of Health have embarked on a committed vaccination initiative for all those over the age of 12 years in the country. Yet for all that, currently there are many questions and concerns expressed by parents of very young children regarding COVID vaccinations for their children below the age of 12 years.
As at present, there is compelling evidence from clinical trials regarding the efficacy and safety of COVID vaccines that have been tested in children under 12 years of age. The main age group on which evidence is now available is the age group of children between five to 11 years of age. However, there is no universal programme, as yet, to vaccinate these children in a global perspective. In such a scenario, we now have definitive recommendations regarding this complex question from the United Kingdom: children aged five to 11 years in a clinical risk group, or those who are household contacts of someone immunosuppressed should be offered primary course vaccination with two 10 microgram doses of the Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 vaccine. Each of the shots is one third of the adult dose as that dose has been the one that has been found to be best in research studies. This recommendation is based on the children with comorbidities to safeguard themselves and vulnerable household contacts. It is quite justifiable to get these at-risk group and a group of young children who are at risk of spreading the disease to other at-risk adults in the same household vaccinated for very valid medical reasons.
JCVI has more recently reviewed evidence on the potential impact of extending COVID-19 vaccination to other children aged five to 11. Consideration was given to the health benefits of vaccination in this age group as a whole, the potential educational benefits, and the impact on National Health Services of delivering a two-dose vaccination programme to all of around five million young children of this age group in the UK.
Then on 16 February, 2022, just a few days ago, the JCVI advised in a communique to initiate a non-urgent offer of two 10 microgram doses of the Pfizer COVID-19 vaccine to ALL children aged five to 11 years of age. It advocates that two doses should be offered with an interval of at least 12 weeks between them. The main reason for this offer is to increase the immunity of vaccinated individuals against severe COVID-19 in anticipation of a potential future wave of COVID-19.
This advice on the offer of vaccination to five- to 11-year-old children who are not in a clinical risk group is recognised by the JCVI as a one-off pandemic response. As the COVID-19 pandemic moves further towards endemicity in the UK, the JCVI will review whether in the longer term an offer of vaccination to this and other paediatric age groups continues to be advised. They further state that in all instances, the offer of vaccination must be accompanied by appropriate information to enable children, and those with parental responsibility, to provide informed consent prior to vaccination.
The JCVI also states that vaccination of children aged five to 11 who are not in a clinical risk group is anticipated to prevent just a small number of hospitalisations and intensive care admissions in this population and would also provide short-term protection against non-severe infection such as asymptomatic and mild symptomatic infections that do not require hospital-based care.
Of course, the authorities also admit that the extent of these impacts is highly uncertain. They are closely related to future levels of infection in the population in the period following vaccination, these in turn being influenced by the timing, size and severity of any future waves of infection, as well as the characteristics of any new variants that may dominate future waves of infection.
The vaccination of children aged five to 11 who are not in a clinical risk group is not expected to have an impact on the current wave of Omicron infection. The potential benefits from vaccination will apply mainly to a future wave of infection; the severer a future wave, the greater the likely benefits from vaccination. Conversely, the less severe a future wave, the smaller the likely benefits from vaccination.
In formulating the current advice for vaccinating the five- to 11-year-old children, JCVI has considered evidence on:
* Potential direct health benefits and harms
* Indirect educational impacts of vaccination
* Wider anticipated opportunity costs
In comparison to the rest of the population of older age groups, evidence indicates that children aged five to 11 are at the very lowest risk from COVID-19. Rates of hospitalisation, paediatric intensive care admissions and death are lower in this age group than in all older age groups.
In addition, the high level of likely prior natural infection in this age group of children can be expected to contribute towards their natural immunity against reinfection. There are some data to suggest that natural immunity may last longer than vaccine-induced immunity against non-severe infection.
There is good evidence that the Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 paediatric vaccine induces a strong immune response to vaccination. The currently available vaccine was developed based on the original wild-type SARS-CoV2 virus and is less well-matched to the Omicron variant. Therefore, while the current vaccine provides good protection against non-severe infection due to the wild type, Alpha and Delta variants, protection against non-severe infection due to the Omicron variant is less good and is anticipated to be of relatively shorter duration.
JCVI has considered evidence on the educational impact of COVID-19 on children aged five to 11 years, and how the vaccination of children might mitigate these impacts. A major reason contributing towards a loss in education during the Omicron wave is the absence from school due to self-isolation in the event of SARS-CoV2 infection amongst pupils. Because most infections are mild, the duration of absence from school is likely to be mostly determined by existing self-isolation policies, rather than the duration of symptoms severe enough to require time away from school for illness recovery. However, firm data to confirm this observation are lacking.
For vaccination to have a substantial impact on absence from school, persistent high levels of vaccine-induced protection against non-severe infection are required. However, with respect to highly transmissible variants such as Delta and Omicron, currently available COVID-19 vaccines provide good protection against non-severe infections for only a limited period of time.
Estimates of the balance between absence from school due to vaccine-related reactions compared to absence prevented through reductions in infection vary depending on the likely future incidence of infection.
A day after the release of the JCVI recommendations, the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health (RCPCH) of the United Kingdom acknowledged that the JCVI had given careful consideration to the assessment of the benefits and risks of vaccinating the healthy five- to 11-year-old children. The RCPCH goes on to state that it is a priority that five–11-year-olds who are deemed to be at risk of COVID infection or who are living with family members who are immunosuppressed, receive this vaccine. The COVID vaccine has been certified as safe by the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Authority (MHRA) of the UK, and that the RCPCH would encourage all those who are eligible to have the vaccine to consider doing so. They seem to be very supportive of the advice provided by the JCVI.
The RCPCH further states that delivering a vaccination programme to five–11-year-olds will require careful planning to ensure a favourable experience for children. Finding child-friendly vaccination sites, staffed with appropriately trained professionals, will be important and should facilitate equal access to all children which is the key to avoiding disadvantaging some families. Governments should develop information and materials that are parent-and-carer friendly, and suitable for children, to facilitate their decision making.
These initiatives and considerations undertaken by the UK agencies have a significant potential impact on the situation in our country. The UK recommendations are very sound on a scientific basis. The local authorities in our Ministry of Health and the Sri Lanka College of Paediatricians need to take cognizance of all considerations that have gone into such carefully considered advice from the UK. We should seriously consider this age group of all children of the five- to 11-year-old age group including the at-risk youngsters for vaccination against COVID-19. It would help allay anxiety on the part of parents of young children of that age group. However, once implemented, it should not be a reason to assume a blasé attitude and run around, disregarding health guidelines including physical distancing, wearing of masks and repeated washing of hands.
(This article incorporates details from a direct communication from Dr Camilla Kingdon, President, Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health of the United Kingdom.)
Features
BRICS upholds inclusive growth; re-affirms South-South cooperation
A principal highlight of the recently concluded BRICS 2026 summit in New Delhi was the grouping’s unambiguous championing of the empowerment of ordinary people everywhere. This was yet another notable coming together of Southern governments over matters of common concern alright but it was the grouping’s people-oriented thinking that struck the impartial commentator as particularly important this time around.
The latter accent merits underscoring in view of the widespread perception that Southern oriented international organizations, such as the Non-aligned Movement (NAM), have had their day, so to speak. However the BRICS summit not only re-affirmed NAM principles but gave proof of its willingness to complement the main undertakings of NAM. Accordingly, causes such as South-South cooperation, international economic and social equity, multilateralism, international peace and the need to uphold the current UN-centred world order received resounding and fresh emphasis.
Particularly encouraging for those espousing Southern development concerns was the stressing of the historic ‘Bandung Principles’ in the New Delhi Declaration which crowned the summit deliberations. As is known, it was the ‘Bandung Spirit’ of 1955 that paved the way for the establishment of NAM and South-South cooperation in a major way. As such the ‘Spirit’ was primary in helping to reshape international development discourse and in giving it a pro-people bent. That is, development correctly conceived was birthed.
The New Delhi Declaration said in this regard: ‘We recall the 1955 Asian-African Conference in Bandung, Indonesia that proclaimed general principles, including equality, independence, non-intervention and mutual benefit. We stress that the Bandung Spirit serves as a reference in the pursuit of a fairer, more inclusive, and representative multilateral system.’
‘Geopolitics’ was not glossed over or ignored in New Delhi, but it is quite forgotten by some sections of opinion in particularly Sri Lanka that BRICS, while being an important Southern counter-balance in terms of power to the global North is also essentially about international economic growth with equity. The New Delhi summit helped to put right this conceptual imbalance in what groupings such as BRICS ought to be thinking and doing.
Even more precisely, people should be at the heart of development and in the exertions and preoccupations of international organizations claiming to represent the South. Southern governments equipped with economic and military might in particular remain important but it is people’s empowerment that ought to be the overriding consideration.
The latter concerns help stress the cruciality of democratic development since it is the latter that facilitates best the well being of people. Unfortunately, BRICS happens to be top-heavy with authoritarian governments that could deliver economic growth but not equity. It is fully representative, participatory governance that could best deliver to the people their essential needs and not totalitarian governments.
This is a complex dilemma for BRICS. It could be resolved somewhat by admitting more and more pro-people, democratic states into the BRICS fold to counter-balance the power and influence of authoritarian states. At present among the principal BRICS countries it’s only India that meets most of the criteria for democratic development.
Hopefully, more and more Southern democracies would see it fit to join BRICS in consideration of the latter’s potential to be a prime ‘economic powerhouse’ of the world. Equally hopefully, people’s empowerment in the true sense would come to be valued as a crucial merit for BRICS membership. It is relevant to stress that the fulfillment of the fundamental rights of a people is integral to their complete empowerment.
A grave negative fallout from the Trump administration’s current militarism is that more and more states world wide would come to value military heft over people’s empowerment. Consequently, the preference for military power could lead to countries wanting BRICS membership for the wrong reasons. That is, security through collective armed might would come to matter over all else and the world would be rendered an increasingly ‘dangerous place’.
But thinking people would expect from BRICS a more responsible role in world affairs and prefer to have from it inspirational guidance in democratic development, correctly understood.
A commitment by BRICS at the summit of considerable importance to world peace that should not be underplayed is its commitment to the UN system and the strengthening of International Law. The relevant quote from the Declaration spoke of BRICS’ ‘Commitment to strengthening multilateralism and multi-polarity and upholding International Law, including the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations.’
Coming at a time when the UN is seen by some as a spent force, lacking effectiveness, the above endorsement of the UN Charter and International Law is of crucial significance. This amounts to solidly upholding the post World War Two order despite current largely rhetorical assertions that it is fast unraveling.
While UN reform remains a compelling necessity, the endorsement of the UN-centred order holds out the possibility of some of the BRICS heavyweights, who are currently acting in violation of International Law, eventually getting back to conduct that would be more in keeping with the requirements of International Law.
The UN could put these developments to constructive use by redoubling its efforts to work out diplomatic solutions to the current conflicts and wars that are showing no signs of being receptive to fresh peace efforts.
Two of these theatres of conflict are the Middle East and the Ukraine. While the US, Israel, Russia and Iran would need to be engaged by the UN with exceptional persuasive power to sort out the conflicts where they have come to feature directly and indirectly, the relevant BRICS members’ commitments to world peace and multilateralism could be used as instruments of moral pressure perhaps to induce them to get onto the path of peaceful conflict resolution.
The wide consensus among the BRICS powers amounts to their scoring a significant political victory over the US and its allies. Their espousal of international peace and the UN Charter exposes the US as being at cross purposes with peace-oriented and democratic sections world wide. Specifically, the moral and intellectual poverty of the Trump administration is being revealed glaringly.
This does not amount to a condemnation of the people of the US perse. It is just that some of them have voted quite unwisely. As a first step towards correcting this situation they could make good use of the upcoming mid term elections to register their strong disapproval of the Trump administration and the political extremists among the US Right. Course correction is not impossible.
Features
Not I — We: A new uniform will mean nothing if the person inside it is left behind
by Mahil Dole
Senior Superintendent of Police (Retd.)
Sri Lanka Police has just marked 160 years. The parades were in order. The sentence that should have followed them has not been written with enough force. A police service that is pulled by politics, rewarded for individual glory and tried every night on social media cannot protect a country that is now a maritime hinge for international narcotics and financial crime. The political authority must decide, not in a speech, but in conduct, whether this force belongs to the law or to the loudest faction of the week.
That is not a plea. It is a warning.
The political hierarchy and the police hierarchy now agree that the service needs a new outlook, beginning with the uniform. The cut and the kit are not yet settled. That conversation is overdue. Criminals have moved into containers, encrypted apps and international logistics. An officer equipped for a quieter decade is less able to detect, and less able to come home.
Sophistication of kit is essential. Body-worn cameras, communications and protective equipment that match the threat are not luxuries. They keep a policeman alive.
If the first decision of this compact is only what the officer will wear, the wrapping will be modern and the person untouched. The priority is not a new silhouette. It is a different person inside the uniform.
The officer is a human being
He and she is a product of this complicated society. The fractures that run through the village, the school and the social-media feed run through the recruit. Communal suspicion, religious identity and ethnic memory are not checked at the armoury gate. The question treated as delicate is operational: is this officer mentally geared for ordinary crime and for communal, religious and ethnic conflict?
What is his stand if he belongs to one community and is sent into a dispute involving another? How will the parties look at him? How will the media frame the first photograph? That decides whether a crowd sees the law or “the other side.” We are all Sri Lankans. The sentence is easy on a Police Day banner. It is hard at a junction when rumour is already ahead of the patrol.
Every officer, from constable to gazetted rank, must be trained for these issues as deliberately as for a baton. Not one lecture at Katukurunda: recurring, scenario-based work on mixed neighbourhoods, mixed complainants, and keeping personal faith out of the method of work. The media will hunt the communal angle; parties to a conflict will hunt the ethnic one. The only answer that holds is an officer whose first identity on duty is Sri Lankan and whose first loyalty is the law.
That is “We.” Assuming the uniform dissolves identity is how a single incident becomes a national story.
What they have been is not what they can remain
From the 1866 ordinance this service has been the state’s civilian arm, colonial order-keeping, post-independence law and order, then a wartime partner that buried its dead beside the armed forces. Specialised units were built for terrorism, organised crime and financial intelligence. The same institution was used as a residual army, a political instrument and a promotion marketplace. Loyalty too often attached to a person, not to the law. Easter Sunday made the price visible. So did every file that moved, or stalled, according to who was in office.
A history of sacrifice does not excuse a present of capture. It makes the capture more shameful.
What they are today
On paper the force is large, some 79,000 authorised, 609 stations. On the ground it is thin. More than 4,300 officers have left since 2020. Vacancies exceed 30,000. Shifts of twelve to eighteen hours are still treated as normal. Distress is still logged as discipline rather than welfare. That is waste, not toughness.
Crime has two faces, and both strike national security. Gang violence over narcotics still produces shootings. Sri Lanka also sits on feeder routes moving Afghan and Pakistani product toward other markets. Harbour and high-sea detections in the hundreds of kilograms are no longer rare. Ice hidden in towels at Colombo Port; heroin pulled from multi-day trawlers; scam compounds and frozen assets in the billions of rupees, these are not “ordinary crime.” They buy influence and fund the next consignment.
The third battlefield is information. Reels and anonymous accounts impersonate officers, launder rumour as fact, and reward the man who seeks a following. Inside the service the culture still teaches “I”: my file, my photograph, my briefing. Rank is being treated as a prize. It is a trust.
The container that became a campaign
Late August 2026, officers opened containers at the Colombo International Container Terminal and recovered some 463 to 472 kilograms of crystal methamphetamine, concealed in towels, originating from Pakistan and valued in the billions of rupees. Suspects including foreign nationals were arrested. The United States DEA publicly associated itself with the intelligence. The criminal case sits with the Central Crime Investigation Bureau.
That is a success. It should have been protected as a success.
Instead, an internal process review, ordered by the Inspector General into how information moved between bureaux, was translated on social media into another story: that the IGP and Senior DIG Ranmal Kodituwakku were being “chambered” over the detection. An Opposition MP warned, correctly, that putting the officers who delivered the raid under a public microscope will teach the service the wrong lesson.
State the distinction without apology. A criminal file is about the network and the money. A process file is about timelines and chain of custody. A blog is neither. Collapsing a Senior DIG’s recorded statement into “the hierarchy is in the dock” is not accountability. It is a gift to those who packed the towels. After a half-tonne interdiction, a process review is normal; leaking it as a morality play is not. Complete the inquiry on the record. If negligence is found, deal with it. If not, say so. Half-spoken files let rumour colonise the institution.
Training, technology and a mind that can bear the load
The IGP and the hierarchy must stop treating training as a calendar ornament. Immediate programmes are required, not next year’s paper.
First
, the evolving issues: communal and religious tension, narrative operations, child and women protection, financial and cyber crime, harbour interdiction, the law of arrest.
Second
, the technologies: digital evidence, data protection under the Personal Data Protection Act, disciplined open-source work, body-worn cameras that protect the public and officers alike.
Third
, mental health as operational infrastructure, counselling an Inspector can use without becoming a Legal Division case, and early recognition of burnout before it becomes a headline.
Incentives must follow: allowances for certified competencies, promotion credit for courses applied, not for attendance photographs. Asking for sophistication at the port with no path to acquire it is theatre.
A new uniform that can carry a camera, worn by an officer unprepared for the society he polices, is a costume. The station, the cell, the unseen hour Look next at where this officer lives and works. Many stations are old, congested and unhygienic. Living standards on duty are low. You cannot demand a different person in the uniform and house him as if he were expendable.
Cells are a particular failure of command. Too many sit out of sight of the men on duty. They are dilapidated. What happens inside goes unnoticed until a death, an assault or an escape. That is a design of our own buildings, not a secret of the underworld. A cell that cannot be seen cannot be defended in court or in conscience. Refurbish, fix sightlines, monitor what the Constitution requires, and treat an escape as a failure of supervision before it becomes a press note.
These are not welfare extras. They are the conditions under which evidence is kept, suspects are held, and officers decide whether the job is still worth the family cost.
The health of the officer is the health of the public
One of the first duties of the hierarchy is the health of the policeman and his family. A sick officer with a sick child is not “uncommitted.” He is a risk to himself, to the next raid, and to the citizen at the counter. Police hospitals are few. Officers in rural stations cannot reach them in time. The IGP should not wait for a building programme. Speak to the health authorities now. Arrange priority access for officers and their families at government hospitals. Dedicated wards or reserved beds are not a privilege class. They are the minimum owed to people sent into harm, and into other people’s crises, at every hour.
Good health is a good mind. A good mind is good care for the people. No uniform compensates for an officer who has not slept, has not been treated, and cannot reach a Police hospital.
What they must be tomorrow
The country does not need more decoration. It needs a service the public can approach without fear and that no politician can casually redirect: intelligence-led against networks that threaten the state; digitally capable and legally bounded; trained for communal heat as well as narcotics; housed and treated as human beings; collectively minded. We hold the ground, not I cleared the file.
The constable at the junction and the analyst tracing a hawala chain are the same institution. National security is not a specialist’s private property.
To the policymakers and the political authority
You have agreed with the Police hierarchy on a new outlook. Use it for more than cloth.
Independence is not the IGP’s personal autonomy. It is the institution’s ability to apply the law without fear or favour, and still answer to the law. You cannot have that and also have a Police summoned, transferred or publicly undermined according to the needs of the week.
Appointment and removal of the Inspector General must remain a process, not patronage. The National Police Commission must exercise its powers over promotions, transfers and discipline without being hectored from the gallery. Cabinet sets policy and budget. It does not choose Tuesday’s suspect. Comment from the House on the guilt of named officers while a file is open is not oversight. It is interference under another name.
If you want an apolitical Police, stop using internal inquiry as a factional weapon and social media as a substitute bench. Different treatment of files is the old disease. Naming it only when the officer is someone you dislike is the same disease.
Then fund what a new uniform implies: immediate training, habitable stations, cells that can be seen, and a health arrangement with the Ministry of Health that does not leave a rural sergeant’s family outside the gate. Announcing kit and withholding living conditions is not reform. It is dressing the service for a photograph.
The public has a part. Distinguish error from crime. Cooperate with the officer who is fair; demand consequences where he is not. In conflict, look at the uniform as the law, not as a census of name, faith or village. Do not outsource judgement to an anonymous account.
The stand It is not I. It should be We.
A new uniform will not make an officer Sri Lankan. Training, health, housing, an apolitical file, and a command that treats him as a human being might. A service that thinks in individual glory will be outrun by networks that think in systems. A political class that thinks in capture will keep receiving detections and wondering why the pipeline never closes. A country that argues about the cloth while the person inside it is exhausted, untrained for communal fire, and unseen in a dilapidated cell block is not preparing for tomorrow. It is rearranging the wardrobe.
The law cannot serve two masters. Neither can the uniform, old or new.
(This analysis is offered in the interest of national security, institutional reform, and public safety)
Mahil Dole, SSP (Retd.), served as Deputy Director in charge of the Counter-Terrorism Desk of the State Intelligence Service and later as Intelligence Coordinator to the Inspector General of Police. He is a former Member of the Sri Lanka Wakfs Board and author of Security Beyond Enforcement: Practical Approaches for a Safer Nation. Email – mahildole54@gmail.com
Features
The Miss World 2026 scene …
History was made under the lights on 05th September, as Joheirry Mola Dominguez, of the Dominican Republic, was crowned Miss World 2026 by outgoing queen Suchata Chuangsri of Thailand at April 2nd Square in Nha Trang, Vietnam.
It is only the second Miss World title for the Dominican Republic; 44 years after Mariasela Álvarez’s win in 1982. Reports described it as an “emotional and historic moment” for the nation.
Joheirry, 24, beat 110 other delegates to take the crown.
A dedicated educator and community advocate, she holds a degree in Business Management and Administration from Universidad Iberoamericana. She is Founder and President of “Voices of Tomorrow”, an initiative expanding access to English education for children in vulnerable communities. She also teaches Literature and Social Studies in English, and works as a correspondent for Univision New York’s Ventana a Quisqueya.

Her advocacy won hearts
It was her advocacy that won hearts.
“My Beauty With a Purpose is to take English programmes to kids in vulnerable communities,”
she said at the Grand Final. “Because I believe that when they know this language, the opportunities, the doors that can open to their life, it’s huge. English is a tool that will stay with them and benefit them for the rest of their lives.”
Spain’s Elisabeth Reynés finished 1st Runner-Up, while Malaysia’s Taanusiya Chetty, also winner of Beauty With a Purpose, took 2nd Runner-Up.
The Top 6 included Vietnam’s Le Nguyen Bao Ngoc, Eritrea’s Snit Habteab, and South Africa’s Romanda Hombir.
The 75th Anniversary edition, hosted for the first time in Vietnam, was a spectacle before 20,000 spectators. Staged on a 110+ meter outdoor platform by Nha Trang beach, the square was lit up with huge LED screens and high-power sound.
Even heavy rain during the Americas & Caribbean segment couldn’t dampen spirits. Umbrellas and raincoats popped up and the show resumed 15 minutes later. Nobody left. That’s dedication.
With 111 ambassadors, cultural dances, ao dai performances, and the seaside backdrop, officials called it a celebration of beauty, talent, confidence, and social responsibility.
With 20,000 people, rain or shine, screaming, cheering, live-streaming, waving flags… it was, indeed, pure Miss World magic.
For Sri Lanka, Prathibha Liyanaarachchi did not make the Top 40 at the 73rd Miss World Festival, but she reached the finalist stages of four fast-track events — Top Model, Talent, Sports, and Beauty With a Purpose.

Miss World magic: The square was lit up with huge LED screens and high-power sound
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