Midweek Review

Vanni war and Israel-Gaza conflict: Funding catastrophes

Published

2 years ago

2023/11/1

Four-wheel drive double cabs with anti-aircraft guns captured during Vanni offensive. The LTTE procured these vehicles in 2003-2004 with the support of the then government of Sri Lanka (pics courtesy SLA)

The utterly duped Sri Lanka government had no qualms in bending backwards to appease the LTTE in so many ways believing the so-called peace facilitators to the bitter end, despite the LTTE violating virtually all CFA rules.

Viking peace facilitators took the Lankan leaders on right royal ride by making them believe in the Tigers to the bitter end. A case in point is the payments made by the then government in respect of an undisclosed number of brand new four-wheel drive double cabs acquired by the LTTE from Toyota Lanka (Pvt.) Ltd. According to a letter sent by S. Pulieedevan of the LTTE Peace Secretariat, dated
January 26, 2004, to Bradman Weerakoon, the Secretary to Premier Ranil Wickremesinghe, the government had paid Customs duty, surcharge, excise Duty, PAL, VAT and BTT for those double cabs. The LTTE only paid the CIF value of the vehicles. During the Vanni battles, the Army captured double cabs mounted with anti-aircraft guns. These double cabs could have been among the vehicles acquired from Toyota Lanka. What really baffled the public is that the LTTE received such special status even 10 months after it quit the negotiating table.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

The creation of Hamas now fighting Israel can be easily compared with the formation of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and other Tamil groups in the late 70s. Hamas is an Arabic acronym for Islamic Resistance Movement.

Hamas and the LTTE were meant to undermine the elected representatives of the Palestinians, and the Tamil speaking community, respectively. That was one of the primary objectives of those who initially sponsored Hamas and the LTTE and other Tamil groups which gave up separatist agenda during Ranasinghe Premadasa’s tenure as the President (Jan. 02, 1989, to May Day, 1993).

Later objectives of the sponsors and strategies of Hamas and the LTTE changed over the years as they rapidly expanded, drawing funding from many other sources. Both groups achieved conventional status, and the losses they inflicted on governments were an indication of their military prowess. When Israel, the founding benefactor of Hamas, stopped funding it, regional powers, opposed to the Jewish State, stepped in, in a big way.

The LTTE went to the extent of killing Rajiv Gandhi who, in his capacity as the Indian Premier, forced Sri Lanka to accept the deployment of the Indian Army here (July 1987-March 1990) to impose a solution that suited New Delhi’s overall strategy at that time. Gandhi was killed in May 1991 by an LTTE suicide bomber during an election rally in Tamil Nadu. During the IPKF deployment here the LTTE humiliated India by killing over 1,300 officers and men whereas Hamas stunned Israel with an unprecedented Oct. 07 attack after a spate of large scale attacks/confrontations over the years. Israel fought three wars with Hamas in 2009, 2012 and 2014 and the current conflict is so far the worst.

Last week The Island dealt with some of the issues at hand in an article titled Vanni war and Israel-Gaza conflict: similarities and differences. The writer felt the need to discuss the Indian financial package that helped turn a Sri Lankan armed group into one of the world’s most sophisticated fighting machines. But soon after India halted funding terrorism here, the LTTE expanded its vast network of revenue sources here and overseas. One of its new-found sponsors happened to be the government of Sri Lanka.

Before we further discuss the LTTE funding/revenue sources, it would be pertinent to mention how Israel facilitated the growth of Hamas to undermine the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and faction, Fatah.

Brig. Gen. Yitzhak Segev, who had been the Israeli military governor in Gaza in the early 1980s, is on record as having told the New York Times that he had helped finance the Palestinian Islamist movement as a counterweight to the PLO and Fatah.

New York Times quoted the retired Brig. General as having disclosed how the military government funded Hamas through mosques. Number of others had commented on the Israeli funding for Hamas. Perhaps one of the most significant statements pertaining to the Jewish state’s affiliation with Hamas was made by Avner Cohen, one-time Israeli religious affairs official who served the Gaza administration for over two decades. Wall Street Journal in 2009 quoted Cohen as having declared: “Hamas, to my great regret, is Israel’s creation.” That was the year Israel fought its first war with Hamas. Cohen has revealed the warning he issued to the Israeli government in the mid-80s over its divide-and-rule strategy in the occupied region. The Wall Street Journal quoted the Israeli as having said: “I … suggest focusing our efforts on finding ways to break up this monster before this reality jumps in our face.”

The US, the UK, France or EU didn’t find fault with Hamas at the time Israel promoted Hamas at the expense of the PLO and Fatah. Israel is paying a very heavy price for what can be called a strategic miscalculation in their policy.

Jayantha Dhanapala on states sponsoring terrorism

Over a year after the successful conclusion of the war against the LTTE, the late Jayantha Dhanapala, one-time UN Under-Secretary-General for the Office for Disarmament Affairs from 1998-2003, appeared before the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission. Dhanapala, the career diplomat, who has had diplomatic postings in London, Beijing, Washington DC, New Delhi and Geneva and also performed ambassadorial duties in Geneva accredited to the UN from 1984-1987 and in Washington DC from 1995-1997 addressed the entire gamut of issues on Aug. 25, 2010.

Dhanapala dealt with the contentious issue of governments sponsoring terrorism with the focus on the Indian funding of the LTTE. Perhaps, Dhanapala may not have taken President Ranasinghe Premadasa’s funding and arming of the LTTE into consideration. Let me reproduce what the erudite former diplomat Dhanapala who served as the head of the Norwegian-funded Secretariat for Coordinating Peace Process (SCOPP 2004-2005) declared before the LLRC: “Now I think it is important for us to expand that concept to bring in the culpability of those members of the international community who have subscribed to the situation that has caused injury to the civilians of a nation. I talk about the way in which terrorist groups are given sanctuary; are harboured; are supplied with arms and training by some countries with regard to their neighbours or with regard to other countries. We know that in our case this happened, and I don’t want to name countries, but even countries who have allowed their financial procedures and systems to be abused in such a way that money can flow from their countries in order to buy the arms and ammunitions that cause the deaths, the maiming and the destruction of property in Sri Lanka are to blame and there is therefore a responsibility to protect our civilians and the civilians of other nation States from that kind of behaviour on the part of members of the international community, and I think this is something that will echo with many countries in the Non-Aligned Movement where Sri Lanka has a very respected position and where I hope we will be able to raise this issue.”

The writer covered the LLRC proceedings for The Island throughout the sittings held at the Lakshman Kadirgamar Institute (LKI) named after the much-respected Foreign Minister slain by the LTTE. Actually, Dharnapala’s statement, regardless of its importance, never received the government attention it deserved. In fact, the government simply ignored it. The then Rajapaksa government was more preoccupied in playing politics with the accountability issue than addressing the concerns of the Tamil speaking people and the Western powers who had to woo the vociferous Tamil Diaspora for their local vote bank.

Dhanapala not only dealt with India but underscored the responsibility of Western powers who allowed the LTTE to raise funds in their countries to wage war here. The sinking of nearly a dozen floating LTTE arsenals over the years in Indian waters, Sri Lankan waters, and on the high seas, revealed the extent of the funding available to the LTTE. The LTTE had a range of weapons, including heavy artillery, shoulder fired anti-aircraft missiles, anti-tank missiles, underwater equipment and fast boats. Acquisition of such an arsenal couldn’t have been done without unlimited funds. The group had so much funds it hired foreigners and went to the extent of making an attempt to bribe a US State Department official.

Nearly 15 years after the war, only India knows how much the Gandhi governments spent on establishing a massive terrorist project in Sri Lanka. In fact, the LTTE demanded compensation from India to cover up losses the group suffered in the wake of the 1987 Indo-Lanka peace accord. The LTTE wanted compensation for the denial of its right to tax people living in areas under its control and those who entered that region.

It would be pertinent to mention that India spent not only on the LTTE but also on nearly half a dozen Tamil groups, including the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) and the Tamil National Army (TNA) that was formed in the wake of India’s decision to withdraw its troops from the then temporarily merged Northern and Eastern Provinces after the Premadasa government asked them to leave unceremoniously.

How Sri Lanka funded LTTE

During the war, the then Opposition MP Bandula Gunawardena, in his own hand writing, released a statement that dealt with payments made to the LTTE at the behest of President Ranasinghe Premadasa. Lawmaker Gunawardena who now served the Wickremesinghe-Rajapaksa Cabinet, disclosed that the Treasury made the largest single payment months after the eruption of Eelam War II in the second week of June 1990. According to the document issued by MP Gunawardena, the first payment had been made on August 09, 1989, a couple of months after the LTTE initiated talks with Premadasa while the Indian Army was deployed here. Altogether, there had been 15 payments of Rs 5 mn each on 15 separate occasions, with the largest and the final payment of Rs 50 mn paid on Nov. 05, 1990.

At the time of these payments, R. Paskaralingam had been the Secretary to the Treasury and he couldn’t have resisted the orders issued by the President. Premadasa also had no hesitation in issuing a large stock of T-56 assault rifles and ammunition to the LTTE. His administration also issued weapons to other Tamil groups. Perhaps, Sri Lanka should officially acknowledge the type and the amount of weapons issued to Tamil groups and the funds paid to them.

Let me remind the reader that the last and the largest payment was made many months after the LTTE executed several hundred surrendered policemen in the East after they were ordered to do so by the then government and overran isolated Army detachments along the Kandy-Jaffna road, north of Omanthai. As a result, the Army lost the overland Main Supply Route (MSR) route to Jaffna. The MSR was restored in January 2009, nearly 19 years after the military suffered defeat in the Vanni.

During the conflict, successive governments accepted the LTTE’s right to tax people living in areas they controlled. Those entering the region under its control, too, were taxed.

But following the signing of a one-sided Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) with the LTTE in Feb. 2002. arranged by the Norwegian facilitators ,unknown to many, including then Commander in Chief President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, the then government did away with all restrictions. Overnight, the government accepted a region under exclusive control of the LTTE where the group denied the right of other Tamil political parties to engage in political activity. The LTTE was granted special status. The government paved the way for the LTTE to receive substantial foreign funding and also bring in a range of equipment through the Bandaranaike International Airport (BIA) without checks.

Funding for LTTE radio

Only Hamas really knows what it did with funds received from Israel. Similarly, only the LTTE knows what it really did with funds received from Sri Lanka during the conflict. Let me examine one incident during the 2002-2003 period that involved Sri Lanka, Norway and the LTTE on the basis of disclosure made by Bradman Weerakoon, the then Secretary to Premier Ranil Wickremesinghe, regarding the agreement on an LTTE proposal to install and operate an FM station in Kilinochchi.

Weerakoon, in an article titled ‘Initiating and Sustaining the Peace Process: Origins and Challenges’ included in ‘Negotiating Peace in Sri Lanka: Efforts, Failures and Lessons’ discussed the circumstances under which the equipment had been brought into the country, with the support of the Norwegians. Weerakoon described the agreement on the FM station as a confidence building measure.

The upgrading of the LTTE propaganda arm took place following the closure of Vanni Sevaya and restrictions on the Army with regard to dissemination of security related news. (Vanni Sevawa catered especially for the armed forces, police and Sinhala civilians living in the area)

Having described the installation of the new equipment as a confidence building measure, Weerakoon inadvertently exposed the despicable LTTE strategy. Had it been a genuinely confidence building measure, the LTTE would have discussed their move to establish an FM station before ordering the equipment.

Weerakoon discussed in considerable detail how the LTTE had conducted the transaction with the help of the Norwegians. Weerakoon said: “The Political headquarters of the LTTE in a letter to the PM’s Office on Oct. 1, 2002, informed the government that it had purchased a new FM transmitter, which they would like to bring to Vanni to be used in their dissemination campaign about the peace process. The equipment had already been purchased by them in Singapore at a cost of USD 93,265 and was on the way by sea. The letter requested customs clearance and duty free importation and no delay.”

Weerakoon also revealed how the Norwegians utilized their diplomatic status to clear the LTTE cargo duty free by substituting itself as the consignee of the goods. But once the Norwegians handed over the goods to the LTTE through SCOPP (Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process), the SCOPP became liable for duty amounting to Rs. 3 mn, which according to Weerakoon, was paid with funds made available by Norway to the SCOPP. Weerakoon estimated the annual donations received by SCOPP from Norway at Rs. 12 mn.

Weerakoon admitted that the LTTE had informed the government of its move, while the cargo was on its way to Colombo and the Norwegians stepped in at the right moment to have the equipment delivered to the LTTE.

A treacherous government ordered the Army to transport the equipment from Colombo port to Omanthai and hand them over to the LTTE, while their Vanni Sevaya remained closed.

While Weerakoon referred to Norwegian funds being utilised to pay for import duty, the then Director General of SCOPP, Dr. John Gooneratne claimed using funds received from Sweden. The revelation is made in a letter Gooneratne wrote to Treasury Chief, Charitha Ratwatte. The letter dated Jan. 16, 2004, referred to the role played by the Prime Minister’s Office in carrying out the controversial transaction.

Wouldn’t it be interesting to know, at least now, who actually paid duty for the LTTE equipment?

Funding through government

Sri Lanka obviously believed the LTTE wouldn’t accept a political solution and the group couldn’t be defeated on the battlefield. Therefore, the group granted the opportunity to tax the people in the North and East, whereas Western powers turned a blind eye to massive fund raising projects undertaken by the LTTE in Europe, the US and Canada as well as other countries. How much did the LTTE spend on acquiring and operating a fleet of large ships to store arms, ammunition and equipment in the high seas and transfer weapons as and when required?

The LTTE brazenly used the CFA to secure funds even from the international community. The then government fully cooperated with the LTTE strategy.

Former respected MP Rajiva Wijesinha, during his tenure as Secretary General of SCOPP, and during the initial phase of the Vanni offensive that was launched in March 2007, made a shocking revelation regarding funds received by the LTTE. In response to Prof. Jayadeva Uyangoda’s criticism of the SCOPP, Prof. Wijesinha issued a statement titled ‘Sri Lanka’s civil society organizations: Shady techniques and bribes to the Tigers?’

Wijesinha dealt with hitherto unknown funding operations arranged by the UNP government in support of the peace process facilitated by the CFA. One of the grants-UNDP project worth USD 600,000 signed by Bradman Weerakoon who was also the Commissioner General for the Coordination of Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation as well as the External Resources Department raised eyebrows.

Wijesinha expressed surprise at the signing of the agreement on Dec 19, 2003 amidst deepening political turmoil caused by President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga suspending Parliament. She also sacked three ministers and brought the Army on to the streets of Colombo. However, what Prof. Wijesinha didn’t say that by then the LTTE had quit the negotiating table. Why did the government authorize such a huge amount of UNDP funds for the so-called LTTE Peace Secretariat nine months after the LTTE suspended its participation in the Norwegian arranged talks? Prof. Wijesinha pointed out that the UNDP funding was made available to the LTTE just months ahead of the general election. Did the UNDP realize what it was doing?

The LTTE-backed Tamil National Alliance (TNA) recorded its best performance at the general election held in early April, 2004. The Parliament conveniently forgot what the EU polls observation mission said about the LTTE helping the TNA to secure over 20 seats in the Northern and Eastern Provinces by stuffing ballot boxes. This was against the backdrop of the devastating split in the LTTE caused by Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan alias Karuna Amman, one-time commander of LTTE formations which thwarted Operation Jayasikurui in the Vanni theatre in 1997/1998 period.

The writer intended to discuss the funding made available by various interested parties, including governments to those who promoted the peace process involving the LTTE over a period of time.

The Hamas attack on Israel should influence Sri Lanka to examine various aspects of the conflict that was brought to an end through military means-an effort so far unmatched by any country since the end of World War II.

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Midweek Review

2019 Easter Sunday carnage in retrospect

Published

6 days ago

2026/04/8

Sahan Weerasooriya

November 21, 2019: President Gotabaya Rajapaksa meets Archbishop of Colombo, His Eminence Malcolm Cardinal Ranjith at the Bishop House where he requested the Church to nominate a representative for the Presidential Commission of Inquiry (PCoI) probing the Easter Sunday carnage.

Coordinated suicide attacks targeted three churches—St. Anthony’s in Colombo, St. Sebastian’s at Katuwapitiya and Zion Church in Batticaloa—along with popular tourist hotels Shangri-La, Kingsbury, and Cinnamon Grand. No less a person than His Eminence Archbishop of Colombo Rt. Rev. Malcolm Cardinal Ranjith is on record as having said that the carnage could have been averted if the Yahapalana government shared the available Indian intelligence warning with him. Yahapalana Minister Harin Fernando publicly admitted that his family was aware of the impending attack and the warning issued to senior police officers in charge of VVIP/VIP security is evidence that all those who represented Parliament at the time knew of the mass murder plot. Against the backdrop of Indian intelligence warning and our collective failure to act on it, it would be pertinent to ask the Indians whether they knew the Easter Sunday operation was to facilitate Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s victory at the 2019 presidential poll. Perhaps, a key to the Easter Sunday conspiracy is enigma Sara Jasmin (Tamil girl from Batticaloa converted to Islam) whose husband Atchchi Muhammadu Hasthun carried out the attack on St. Sebastian’s Church, Katuwapitiya

By Shamindra Ferdinando

Pivithuru Hela Urumaya (PHU) leader Udaya Gammanpila’s Pasku Praharaye Mahamolakaru Soya Yema (Searching for the mastermind behind the Easter Sunday attacks) inquired into the 2019 April 21 Easter Sunday carnage. The former Minister and Attorney-at-Law quite confidently argued that the mastermind of the only major post-war attack was Zahran Hashim, one of the two suicide bombers who targeted Shangri-la, Colombo.

Gammanpila launched his painstaking work recently at the Sambuddhathva Jayanthi Mandiraya at Thummulla, with the participation of former Presidents Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who had been accused of being the beneficiary of the Easter Sunday carnage at the November 2019 presidential election, and Maithripala Sirisena faulted by the Presidential Commission of Inquiry (PCoI) that probed the heinous crime. Rajapaksa and Sirisena sat next to each other, in the first row, and were among those who received copies of the controversial book.

PCoI, appointed by Sirisena in September, 2019, in the run-up to the presidential election, in its report submitted to President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, in February, 2020, declared that Sirisena’s failure as the President to act on ‘actionable intelligence’ exceeded mere civil negligence. Having declared criminal liability on the part of Sirisena, the PCoI recommended that the Attorney General consider criminal proceedings against former President Sirisena under any suitable provision in the Penal Code.

PCoI’s Chairman Supreme Court Judge Janak de Silva handed over the final report to President Rajapaksa on February 1, 2021 at the Presidential Secretariat. Gotabaya Rajapaksa received the first and second interim reports on 20 December and on 2 March, 2020, respectively.

The Commission consists of the following commissioners: Justice Janak De Silva (Judge of the Supreme Court and Chairman of the Commission), Justice Nissanka Bandula Karunarathna (Judge of the Court of Appeal), Justice Nihal Sunil Rajapakse (Retired Judge of the Court of Appeal), Bandula Kumara Atapattu (Retired Judge of the High Court) and Ms W.M.M.R. Adikari (Retired Ministry Secretary).

H.M.P. Buwaneka Herath functioned as the Secretary to the PCoI.

It would be pertinent to mention that the Archbishop of Colombo Malcolm Cardinal Ranjith, declined an opportunity offered by President Rajapaksa to nominate a person for the PCoI. The Church leader asserted such a move would be misconstrued by various interested parties. Both the former President and Archbishop of Colombo confirmed that development soon after the presidential election.

Having declared its faith in the PCoI and received assurance of the new government’s intention to implement its recommendations, the Church was taken aback when the government announced the appointment of a six-member committee, chaired by Minister Chamal Rajapaksa, to examine the PCoI and recommend how to proceed. That Committee included Ministers Johnston Fernando, Udaya Gammanpila, Ramesh Pathirana, Prasanna Ranatunga and Rohitha Abeygunawardena.

The Church cannot deny that their position in respect of the Yahapalana government’s pathetic failure to thwart the Easter Sunday carnage greatly influenced the electorate, and the SLPP presidential candidate Gotabaya Rajapaksa directly benefited. Alleging that the Archbishop of Colombo played politics with the Easter Sunday carnage, SJB parliamentarian Harin Fernando, in June 2020, didn’t mince his words when he accused the Church of influencing a decisive 5% of voters to back Gotabaya Rajapaksa. At the time that accusation was made about nine months before the PCoI handed over its report, President Rajapaksa and the Archbishop of Colombo enjoyed a close relationship.

The Church raised the failure on the part of the government to implement the PCoI’s recommendations six months after President Rajapaksa received the final report.

The National Catholic Committee for Justice to Eastern Sunday Attack Victims, in a lengthy letter dated 12 July 2021, demanded the government deal with the following persons for their failure to thwart the attacks. The Committee warned that unless the President addressed their concerns alternative measures would be taken. The government ignored the warning. Instead, the SLPP adopted delaying tactics much to their disappointment and the irate Church finally declared unconditional support for the US-India backed regime change project.

Sirisena and others

On the basis of the 19th Chapter, titled ‘Accountability’ of the final report, the Committee drew President Rajapaksa’s attention to the following persons as listed by the PCoI: (1) President Maithripala Sirisena (2) PM Ranil Wickremesinghe (3) Defence Secretary Hemasiri Fernando (4) Chief of National Intelligence Sisira Mendis (5) Director State Intelligence Service Nilantha Jayawardena.

The 20th Chapter, titled ‘Failures on the part of law enforcement authorities’ in the Final report (First Volume), identified the following culprits ,namely IGP Pujith Jayasundera, SDIG Nandana Munasinghe (WP), Deshabandu Tennakoon (DIG, Colombo, North), SP Sanjeewa Bandara (Colombo North), SSP Chandana Atukorale, B.E.I. Prasanna (SP, Director, Western province, Intelligence), ASP Sisira Kumara, Chief Inspector R.M. Sarath Kumarasinghe (Acting OIC, Fort), Chief Inspector Sagara Wilegoda Liyanage (OIC, Fort)., Chaminda Nawaratne (OIC, Katana), State Counsel Malik Azeez and Deputy Solicitor General Azad Navaavi.

The PCoI named former Minister and leader of All Ceylon Makkal Congress Rishad Bathiudeen, his brother Riyaj, Dr Muhamad Zulyan Muhamad Zafras and Ahamad Lukman Thalib as persons who facilitated the Easter Sunday conspiracy, while former Minister M.L.A.M. Hisbullah was faulted for spreading extremism in Kattankudy.

Major General (retd) Suresh Sallay, who is now in remand custody, under the CID, for a period of 90 days, in terms of the prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) ,was not among those named by the PCoI. Sallay, who served as the head of the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI/from 2012 to 2016) was taken into custody on 25 February and named as the third suspect in the high profile investigation. (Interested parties propagated that Sallay was apprehended on the basis of UK’s Channel 4 claim that the officer got in touch with would-be Easter Sunday bombers, including Zahran Hashim, with the help of Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan, alias Pilleyan. However, Pilleyan who had been arrested in early April 2025 under PTA was recently remanded by the Mount Lavinia Magistrate’s Court, pending the Attorney General’s recommendations in connection with investigations into the disappearance of a Vice Chancellor in the Eastern Province in 2006. There was absolutely no reference to the Easter Sunday case)

The Church also emphasised the need to investigate the then Attorney General Dappula de Livera’s declaration of a ‘grand conspiracy’ behind the Easter Sunday carnage. The Church sought answers from President Rajapaksa as to the nature of the grand conspiracy claimed by the then AG on the eve of his retirement.

Sallay was taken into custody six years after the PCoI handed over its recommendations to President Rajapaksa and the appointment of a six-member parliamentary committee that examined the recommendations. The author of Pasku Praharaye Mahamolakaru Soya Yema, Gammanpila, the only lawyer in the six-member PCoI, should be able to reveal the circumstances that committee came into being.

Against the backdrop of the PCoI making specific recommendations in respect of the disgraced politicians, civilian officials and law enforcement authorities over accountability and security failures, the SLPP owed an explanation regarding the appointment of a six-member committee of SLPPers. Actually, the SLPP owed an explanation to Sallay whose arrest under the PTA eight years after Easter Sunday carnage has to be discussed taking into consideration the failure to implement the recommendations.

Let me briefly mention PCoI’s recommendations pertaining to two senior police officers. PCoI recommended that the AG consider criminal proceedings against SDIG Nandana Munasinghe under any suitable provision in the Penal Code or Section 82 of the Police Ordinance (Final report, Vol 1, page 312). The PCoI recommended a disciplinary inquiry in respect of DIG Deshabandu Tennakoon. The SLPP simply sat on the PCoI recommendations.

Following the overthrow of President Rajapaksa by a well-organised Aragalaya mob in July 2022, the SLPP and President Ranil Wickremesinghe paved the way for Deshabandu Tennakoon to become the Acting IGP in November 2023. Wickremesinghe went out of his way to secure the Constitutional Council’s approval to confirm the controversial police officer Tennakoon’s status as the IGP.

Some have misconstrued the Supreme Court ruling, given in January 2023, as action taken by the State against those named in the PCoI report. It was not the case. The SC bench, comprising seven judges, ordered Sirisena to pay Rs 100 mn into a compensation fund in response to 12 fundamental rights cases filed by families of the Easter Sunday victims, Catholic clergy and the Bar Association of Sri Lanka. The SC also ordered ex-IGP Pujith Jayasundara and former SIS head Nilantha Jayawardene to pay Rs. 75m rupees each, former Defence Secretary Hemasiri Fernando Rs. 50 million and former CNI Sisira Mendis Rs. 10 million from their personal money. All of them have been named in the PCoI report. As previously mentioned, Maj. Gen. Sallay, who headed the SIS at the time of the SC ruling that created the largest ever single compensation fund, was not among those faulted by the sitting and former justices.

Initial assertion

The Archbishop of Colombo, in mid-May 2019, declared the Easter Sunday carnage was caused by local youth at the behest of a foreign group. The leader of the Catholic Church said so in response to a query raised by the writer regarding a controversial statement made by TNA MP M. A. Sumanthiran. The Archbishop was joined by Most Ven Ittapane Dhammalankara Nayaka Thera of Kotte Sri Kalyani Samagri Dharma Maha Sangha Sabha of Siyam Maha Nikaya. They responded to media queries at the Bishop’s House, Borella.

The Archbishop contradicted Sumanthiran’s claim that the failure on the part of successive governments to address the grievances of minorities over the past several decades led to the 2019 Easter Sunday massacre.

Sumanthiran made the unsubstantiated claim at an event organised to celebrate the first anniversary of the Sinhala political weekly ‘Annidda,’ edited by Attorney-at-Law K.W. Janaranjana at the BMICH.

The Archbishop alleged that a foreign group used misguided loyal youth to mount the Easter Sunday attacks (‘Cardinal rejects TNA’s interpretation’, with strap line ‘foreign group used misguided local youth’, The Island, May 15, 2019 edition).

Interested parties interpreted the Easter Sunday carnage in line with their thinking. The writer was present at a special media briefing called by President Sirisena on 30 April, 2019 at the President’s House where the then Northern Province Governor Dr. Suren Raghavan called for direct talks with those responsible for the Easter Sunday massacre. One-time Director of the President’s Media Division (PMD) Dr. Raghavan emphasised that direct dialogue was necessary in the absence of an acceptable mechanism to deal with such a situation. Don’t forget Sisisena had no qualms in leaving the country a few days before the attacks and was away in Singapore when extremists struck. Sirisena arrived in Singapore from India.

The NP Governor made the declaration though none of the journalists present sought his views on the post-Easter Sunday developments.

During that briefing, in response to another query raised by the writer, Army Commander Lt. Gen. Mahesh Senanayake disclosed that the CNI refrained from sharing intelligence alerts received by the CNI with the DMI. Brigadier Chula Kodituwakku, who served as Director, DMI, had been present at Sirisena’s briefing and was the first to brief the media with regard to the extremist build-up leading to the Easter Sunday attacks.

The collapse of the Yahapalana arrangement caused a security nightmare. Frequent feuds between Yahapalana partners, the UNP and the SLFP, facilitated the extremists’ project. The top UNP leadership feared to step in, even after Justice Minister Dr. Wijeyadasa Rajapaksha issued a warning in Parliament, in late 2016, regarding extremist activities and some Muslim families securing refuge in countries dominated by ISIS. Instead of taking tangible measures to address the growing threat, a section of the UNP parliamentary group pounced on the Minister.

The UNP felt that police/military action against extremists may undermine their voter base. The UNP remained passive even after extremists made an abortive bid to kill Thasleem, Coordinating Secretary to Minister Kabir Hashim, on 8 March 2019. Thasleem earned the wrath of the extremists as he accompanied the CID team that raided the extremists’ facility at Wanathawilluwa. The 16 January 2019 raid indicated the deadly intentions of the extremists but PM Wickremesinghe was unmoved, while President Sirisena appeared clueless as to what was going on.

Let me reproduce the PCoI assessment of PM Wickremesinghe in the run-up to the Easter Sunday massacre. “Upon consideration of evidence, it is the view of the PCoI that the lax approach of Mr. Wickremesinghe towards Islamic extremists as the Prime Minister was one of the primary reasons for the failure on the part of the then government to take proactive steps towards tackling growing extremism. This facilitated the build-up of Islam extremists to the point of the Easter Sunday attack.” (Final report, Vol 1, pages 276 and 277).

The National Catholic Committee for Justice to Easter Sunday Attack Victims, in its letter dated 12 July, 2021, addressed to President Rajapaksa, questioned the failure on the part of the PCoI to make any specific recommendations as regards Wickremesinghe. Accusing Wickremesinghe of a serious act of irresponsibility and neglect of duty, the Church emphasised that there should have been further investigations regarding the UNP leader’s conduct.

SLPP’s shocking failure

The SLPP never made a serious bid to examine all available information as part of an overall effort to counter accusations. If widely propagated lie that the Easter Sunday massacre had been engineered by Sallay to help Gotabaya Rajapaksa win the 2019 presidential poll is accepted, then not only Sirisena and Wickremesinghe but all law enforcement officers and others mentioned in the PCoI must have contributed to that despicable strategy. It would be interesting to see how the conspirators convinced a group of Muslims to sacrifice their lives to help Sinhala Buddhist hardliner Gotabaya Rajapaksa to become the President.

Amidst claims, counter claims and unsubstantiated propaganda all forgotten that a senior member of the JVP/NPP government, in February 2021, when he was in the Opposition directly claimed Indian involvement. The accusation seems unfair as all know that India alerted Sri Lanka on 4 April , 2019, regarding the conspiracy. However, Asanga Abeygoonasekera, in his latest work ‘Winds of Change’ questioned the conduct of the top Indian defence delegation that was in Colombo exactly two weeks before the Easter Sunday carnage. Abeygoonasekera, who had been a member of the Sri Lanka delegation, expressed suspicions over the visiting delegation’s failure to make reference to the warning given on 4 April 2019 regarding the plot.

The SLPP never had or developed a strategy to counter stepped up attacks. The party was overwhelmed by a spate of accusations meant to undermine them, both in and outside Parliament. The JVP/NPP, in spite of accommodating Mohamed Yusuf Ibrahim, father of two Easter Sunday suicide bombers Ilham Ahmed Ibrahim (Shangila-la) and Imsath Ahmed Ibrahim (Cinnamon Grand), in its 2015 National List was never really targeted by the SLPP. The SLPP never effectively raised the possibility of the wealthy spice trader funding the JVP to receive a National List slot.

The Catholic Church, too, was strangely silent on this particular issue. The issue is whether Mohamed Yusuf Ibrahim had been aware of the conspiracy that involved his sons. Another fact that cannot be ignored is Attorney-at-Law Hejaaz Hizbullah who had been arrested in April 2020 in connection with the Easter Sunday carnage but granted bail in February 2022 had been the Ibrahim family lawyer.

Hejaaz Hizbullah’s arrest received international attention and various interested parties raised the issue.

The father of the two brothers, who detonated suicide bombs, was granted bail in May 2022.

Eric Solheim, who had been involved in the Norwegian-led disastrous peace process here, commented on the Easter Sunday attacks. In spite of the international media naming the suicide bombers responsible for the worst such atrocity Solheim tweeted: “When we watch the horrific pictures from Sri Lanka, it is important to remember that Muslims and Christians are small minorities. Muslims historically were moderate and peaceful. They have been victims of violence in Sri Lanka, not orchestrating it.”

That ill-conceived tweet exposed the mindset of a man who unashamedly pursued a despicable agenda that threatened the country’s unitary status with the connivance of the UNP. Had they succeeded, the LTTE would have emerged as the dominant political-military power in the Northern and Eastern Provinces and a direct threat to the rest of the country.

Midweek Review

War with Iran and unravelling of the global order – I

Published

6 days ago

2026/04/8

Sahan Weerasooriya

At present, the world stands in the midst of a transitional and turbulent phase, characterised by heightened uncertainty and systemic flux, reflecting an ongoing transformation of the modern global order. The existing global order, rooted in the US hegemony, shows unmistakable signs of decay, while a new and uncertain global system struggles to be born. In such moments of profound transformation, as Antonio Gramsci observed, morbid symptoms proliferate across the body politic. From a geopolitical perspective, the intensifying coordinated aggression of the United States and Israel against Iran is not merely a regional crisis, but an acceleration of a deeper structural transformation in the international order. In this context, the conduct of Donald Trump appears less as an aberration and more as a morbid symptom of a declining US-led global order. As Amitav Acharya argues in The Once and Future World Order (2025), the emerging global order may well move beyond Western dominance. However, the pathway to that future is proving anything but orderly, shaped instead by disruption, unilateralism, and the unsettling symptoms of a system in transition.

Origins of the Conflict

To begin with, the origins and objectives of the parties to the present armed confrontation require unpacking. In a sense, the current Persian Gulf crisis reflects a convergence of long-standing geopolitical rivalries and evolving security dynamics in the Middle East. The roots of tension between the West and the Middle East can be traced back to earlier historical encounters, from the Persian Wars of classical antiquity to the Crusades of the medieval period. A new phase in the region’s political trajectory commenced in 1948 with the establishment of Israel—widely perceived as a Western enclave within the Arab world—and the concurrent displacement of approximately 700,000 Palestinians from their homeland. Since then, Israel has steadily consolidated and expanded its territory, a process that has remained a persistent source of regional instability. The Iranian Revolution introduced a further layer of complexity, fundamentally reshaping regional alignments and ideological contestations. In recent years, tensions between Israel and the United States on one side and Iran on the other have steadily intensified. The current phase of the conflict, however, was directly triggered by coordinated U.S.–Israeli airstrikes on both civilian and military targets on 28 February 2026, which, as noted in a 2 April 2026 statement by 100 international law experts from leading U.S. universities, constituted a clear violation of the UN Charter and International Humanitarian Law (IHL).

Objectives and Strategic Aims

Israel’s strategic objective appears to be directed toward the systematic and total destruction of Iran’s military, nuclear, and economic capabilities, driven by the perception that Iran remains the principal obstacle to its security and its pursuit of regional primacy. Israel was aware that Iran did not possess a nuclear weapon at the time; however, its nuclear programme remained a subject of international contention, with competing assessments regarding its ultimate intent and potential for weaponisation.

The United States, for its part, appears to be pursuing more targeted political and strategic objectives, including eventual transformation of Iran’s current political regime. Washington has long regarded the Iranian leadership as fundamentally antagonistic to U.S. interests in the Middle East. In this context, the United States may seek to enhance its strategic leverage over Iran, including in relation to its substantial oil and gas resources, a point underscored in recent statements by Donald Trump. It must be noted, however, successive U.S. administrations since 1979 have avoided direct large-scale military confrontation with Iran, preferring instead a combination of sanctions, diplomatic pressure, and indirect military engagement.

The positions of other Arab states in the Persian Gulf are shaped by a combination of security calculations, sectarian considerations, and broader geopolitical alignments. While several Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members, notably Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, have expressed tacit support for measures that counter Iranian regional influence, their involvement remains calibrated to avoid direct military confrontation. Their position is informed by the belief that Iran provides backing to militant non-state actors, including Hezbollahs in the West Bank and the Houthis in Southern Yemen, which they view as destabilising forces in the region. These states are balancing competing priorities: the desire to curb Iran’s power projection, maintain strong security and economic ties with the United States, and preserve domestic stability. At the same time, countries such as Oman and Qatar have adopted more neutral or mediating stances, emphasizing diplomatic engagement and conflict de-escalation.

Militarily, Iran is not positioned to match the combined military capabilities of U.S.–Israeli forces. Nevertheless, it retains significant asymmetric leverage, particularly through its capacity to influence global energy flows. Control over critical maritime chokepoints, most notably the Strait of Hormuz, provides Tehran with a potent strategic instrument to disrupt global oil supply. Iranian leadership appears to view this leverage as a key pressure point, designed to compel global economic actors to push Washington and Tel Aviv toward a cessation of hostilities and a negotiated settlement. In this context, attacks on oil and gas infrastructure, shipping routes, and supply lines constitute central components of Iran’s survival strategy. As long as the conflict persists and energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz remain disrupted, the resulting instability is likely to generate severe repercussions across the global economy, increasing pressure on the United States to halt military operations against Iran.

Now entering its fifth week, the conflict continues to flare intensely, characterised by sustained and intensive aerial operations. Joint U.S.–Israeli strikes have reportedly destroyed substantial elements of Iran’s air and naval capabilities, as well as critical military and economic infrastructure. Nevertheless, Iran has retained the capacity to conduct guided missile strikes within Israel and against selected U.S. economic, diplomatic, and military assets across the Middle East, including reported long-range attacks on the U.S. facility at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, approximately 4,000 kilometers from Iranian territory. Initial U.S. and Israeli strategic calculations—anticipating that a decisive initial strike and the targeted killing of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei would precipitate regime collapse and popular uprising—have not materialized. On the contrary, the destruction of civilian facilities has strengthened anti-American sentiment and reinforced domestic support for the Iranian leadership. While Iran faced initial setbacks on the battlefield, it has achieved notable success in the international media front, effectively shaping global perceptions and advancing its propaganda objectives. By the fifth week, Tehran’s asymmetric strategy has yielded tangible results, including the downing of two U.S. military aircraft, F15E Strike Eagle fighter jet and A10 Thunderbolt II (“Warthog”) ground-attack aircraft , signaling the resilience and operational efficacy of Iran’s military power.

The Military Industrial Complexes and ProIsrael Lobby

Why did the United States initiate military action against Iran at this particular juncture? Joe Kent, who resigned in protest over the war, stated that available intelligence did not indicate an imminent Iranian capability to produce a nuclear weapon or pose an immediate threat to the United States. This assessment raises important questions about the stated objective of dismantling Iran’s nuclear programme, suggesting that it may have served to obscure broader strategic and economic considerations underpinning the intervention. To understand the timing and rationale of the U.S. intervention in the Persian Gulf, it is therefore necessary to examine the influence of two powerful domestic pressure groups: the military–industrial complex and the pro-Israel lobby.

The influence of the U.S. military–industrial complex on American foreign policy is most clearly manifested through the institutionalized “revolving door” between defense corporations and senior positions within the U.S. administration. Over the past two decades, key figures such as Lloyd Austin (Secretary of Defence, 2021–2025), a former board member of Raytheon Technologies, Mark Esper (Secretary of Defence 2019–2020), who previously served as a senior executive at the same firm, and Patrick Shanahan (2019) from Boeing exemplify the direct movement of personnel from industry into the highest levels of strategic decision-making. This circulation is complemented by influential policy actors such as Michèle Flournoy (Under Secretary of Defence Under President Obama) and Antony Blinken (Secretary of State 2021 to 2025, Deputy Secretary of State 2015 to 2017), whose engagement with consultancies like WestExec Advisors further blurs the boundary between public policy and private defense interests. This pattern appears to persist under the present Trump administration, where the interplay between defense industry interests and strategic policymaking continues to shape procurement priorities and threat perceptions. Consequently, the military–industrial complex operates not merely as an external pressure group but as an internalized component of the policy process, shaping U.S. foreign policy in ways that align strategic objectives with the structural and commercial interests of the defense sector. Armed conflicts may also generate substantial commercial opportunities, as increased military spending often translates into expanded profits for defense contractors.

The influence of the pro-Israel lobby on U.S. foreign policy is best understood as a dense network of advocacy organisations, donors, policy institutes, and political actors that shape both elite consensus and decision-making within successive administrations. At the center of this network is the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, widely regarded as one of the most effective lobbying organisations in Washington, which works alongside a broader constellation of groups and donors to sustain bipartisan support for Israel. This influence is reinforced through the presence of senior policymakers and advisors with strong ideological or institutional affinities toward Israel, including Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu, whose close political alignment has translated into consistent diplomatic and strategic backing. Policy decisions—ranging from the recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital to continued military assistance—reflect not only geopolitical calculations but also the domestic political salience of pro-Israel advocacy within the United States. Consequently, the pro-Israel lobby operates not merely as an external pressure group but as an embedded force within the policy ecosystem, shaping U.S. foreign policy in ways that sustain a strong and often unconditional commitment to Israeli security and strategic interests. A fuller explanation of U.S. policy toward Iran emerges when the influence of both the military–industrial complex and the pro-Israel lobby is considered together. These two forces, while distinct in composition and motivation, converge in reinforcing a strategic outlook that prioritises the identification of Iran as a central threat and legitimizes the use of coercive military instruments.

Global Economic Fallout

After five weeks of sustained conflict, the trajectory of the war suggests that Iran’s strategy of resilience and asymmetric resistance is yielding tangible effects. While the United States, alongside Israel, has inflicted significant damage on Iran’s economic and military infrastructure, it has not succeeded in eroding Tehran’s capacity—or resolve—to continue the conflict through unconventional means. At the same time, Washington appears to be encountering increasing difficulty in bringing the war to a decisive conclusion, even as signs of strain emerge in its relations with key European allies. Most importantly, the repercussions of the conflict are no longer confined to the battlefield: the unfolding crisis has generated a widening economic shock that is reverberating across global markets and supply chains. It is this broader international economic impact of the war that now warrants closer examination.

The Persian Gulf conflict is rapidly sending shockwaves through the global economy. At the forefront is the energy sector: even partial disruptions to oil and gas exports from the region are driving prices sharply higher, placing severe pressure on energy-importing economies in Europe and Asia and fueling inflation worldwide. Maritime trade is also under strain, as heightened risk prompts longer shipping routes, increased freight rates, and rising war-risk premiums. These disruptions ripple through global supply chains, pushing up the cost of goods far beyond the energy sector.

Insurance costs for shipping and aviation are soaring as large zones are designated high-risk or even excluded from coverage, further elevating transport costs and pricing out smaller operators. Together, these pressures constitute a systemic economic shock: industrial production costs rise, supply chains fragment, and trade volumes contract, stressing manufacturing, logistics, and consumption simultaneously.

The cumulative effect is already slowing global growth. Major economies such as the EU, China, and India face slower expansion, while import-dependent states risk recession. Trade-driven sectors are contracting, reinforcing a scenario of high inflation and stagnating growth. Air travel is also impacted, with restricted airspace, higher fuel prices, and elevated insurance premiums driving up ticket costs and lengthening travel routes. Rising energy prices, logistics bottlenecks, and increased production costs are pushing up food prices and cost-of-living pressures, potentially forcing central banks into tighter monetary policy and slowing growth further.

Finally, global manufacturing—from chemicals and plastics to agriculture—is experiencing ripple effects as supply chain disruptions intensify shortages and price increases. The conflict in the Persian Gulf is thus not only a regional security crisis but also a catalyst for broad, interconnected economic disruptions that are reverberating across markets, trade networks, and everyday life worldwide.

(To be continued)