Midweek Review

The rise of the Bonapartists: A political history of post-1977 Sri Lanka – II

Published

5 years ago

2020/12/9

By Uditha Devapriya

There were three Bonapartist revolutions in post-independence Sri Lanka. The first was Ranasinghe Premadasa’s election in 1989, the second Mahinda Rajapaksa’s election in 2005 and his re-election in 2010, and the third Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s election in 2019. I consider Premadasa, Mahinda, and Gotabaya to be more Bonapartist than fascist, contrary to most accounts of them by the liberal intelligentsia. There is an important distinction to be made, as important as the distinction between the Old Right and the New Right.

A crucial difference between Bonapartism and fascism, with which Bonapartism is often conflated, is that the one responds to the public and the other regiments it. Bonapartism can deteriorate into fascism and it not infrequently does, yet its inherently populist-pluralist character deters it from doing so unless its co-option by a rightwing fringe group makes such a transformation inevitable. The latter point is important.

Here one must consider the first Bonapartist revolution, along with its impact on the Right. Mervyn de Silva called the 1988 election an event of sociological significance on account of who won it. Ranasinghe Premadasa has been called many things by many people. At the end of the day, regardless of whatever epithets or insults, he was, and remained until his passing away, a Bonapartist tied despite his populist trappings to the Right.

Yet, under Premadasa the J. R. model altered considerably. Development theorists of the Left, including Samir Amin, were by then propounding a paradigm of delinking in response to IMF enforced dependence on MNCs. This was the position taken up by the Left as well, and it was in keeping with the Soviet Union’s policy of disengagement. Regarding the latter, it must be mentioned that the intelligentsia of the Third World put forward a different strategy at the height of their influence: a bourgeois modernisation scheme, with emphasis on industrialisation. This is what Sirimavo Bandaranaike tried to adhere to.

As I have noted in my essays on the NAM to The Island, such an approach fell victim to its own contradictions, top among them the inability of bourgeois nationalist elites to take modernisation forward to its logical conclusion. Out of fashion then and out of fashion now, the bourgeoisie opted out of BOTH disengagement AND delinking.

In Premadasa they found the champion of their model: an open economy minus what the latter decried as “old style capitalism” vis-à-vis his predecessor. This, then, would be how the Bonapartist was to shed off the Old Right’s embracement of neoliberalism.

Foreign policy wise, Premadasa differed from Jayewardene’s pro-Western posturing. In 1977 Jayewardene stated that his policy of nonalignment would be “more genuine” that what it had been under his predecessor. Two years later, however, the New York Times reported his famous quote about nonalignment, the US, and the Soviet Union. With the establishment of the Greater Colombo Economic Commission (GCEC), the government tilted definitively to not just the US but also Britain and ASEAN: Motorola and Harris Corporation began building plants “with an initial employment capacity of 1,850 workers.”

Goh Chok Tong’s and Lee Kuan Yew’s visits to Sri Lanka reinforced the belief that Sri Lanka would regain its interrupted journey to becoming the Singapore of South Asia, a prospect promised by the Mahaweli Development Scheme.

This put the country at the backbenches of the pro-Western bloc in the Non-Aligned Movement: while Jayewardene courted Western European and American help, he was careful not to alienate the non-Western bloc. His warm rapport with Fidel Castro, for all the theatrics of Third World unity at the 1979 NAM Conference in Havana, belied his pro-US sympathies, as did his appointment of A. C. S. Hameed as Foreign Minister.

Less well apparent was his selection of Premadasa as an emissary of sorts to multilateral institutions. At the 1980 UN General Assembly, Premadasa called upon developed countries to shoulder their share of responsibility for underdeveloped countries. He was firm on this point: responding to a remark by Michael Littlejohns (of Reuters) that OPEC’s intransigence prevented the First World from aiding the Third, he politely but firmly contended, “You can keep on saying that, but it will do no one any good.”

It hardly need be added that after he became President, Premadasa took positions on foreign policy which contradicted some of Jayewardene’s, such as his expulsion of David Gladstone and his closure of the Israeli Special interests Section at the US Embassy; the latter act went as far as to provoke a confrontation with Stephen Solarz.

At a fundamental level, however, Premadasa’s vision remained bogged down in the IMF paradigm: Janasaviya, after all, was, despite its pro-poor leanings, funded by the World Bank. In other words, it continued to alienate the section of the middle-class – Sinhala Buddhist – which had evolved a cultural critique of neoliberalism.

In the absence of, on the one hand, a strong trade union driven Left movement, and on the other hand an equally strong radical youth movement – both decimated by Premadasa and Jayewardene – the Oppositional space gravitated to a nationalist-populist vacuum. What remained of the amorphous Mahajana Pakshaya (SLMP) gravitated either to the UNP (Ossie Abeygunasekera) or to the People’s Alliance (Chandrika Kumaratunga).

Premadasa courted considerable support among sections of the middle-class as well as the petty bourgeoisie, including artists and the clergy (as seen in the latter’s act of siding with his government after Gamini and Lalith launched their campaign against him). Yet in one respect he remained a part Bonapartist and not a total one: his inability to respond to the cultural critique of his politico-economic paradigm.

This widened a vacuum, filled by the Jathika Chintanaya; the latter’s evolution from an intellectual to a political movement, from Nalin de Silva and Gunadasa Amarasekara to S. L. Gunasekara and Champika Ranawaka, has been charted many times before by several commentators. All that needs to be noted here is that in the absence of a political critique of neoliberalism, especially in the face of neoliberalism’s consolidation by the People’s Alliance under Chandrika Kumaratunga, the cultural critique gained ground.

What helped that critique gain even more ground was the capitulation of the Left to the neoliberal line of the SLFP, as well as the dismantling of the state by the first Kumaratunga government. The latter point is significant, for unlike J.R. and Premadasa Kumaratunga set about rolling back the state while opening up the economy.

As Dayan Jayatilleka has suggested, the cooption of the Kumaratunga regime by NGOs and the new “civil society” did much to provoke the Sinhala nationalist lobby. Incensed, the latter sought a third force. In the absence of a viable Left alternative – for Kumaratunga’s first term was marked by the deterioration of the Left within the People’s Alliance – the critique of neoliberalism soon became a monopoly of cultural revivalists.

It must be noted that the SLFP-PA’s rightward shift did not transpire in a vacuum. After a decade of Reaganomics and Thatcherism, the Democrats in the US and the Labourites in Britain embraced what they euphemistically called “Third Way Centrism”, discarding their Marxist roots while embracing a neoliberal line. In Bill Clinton and Tony Blair, the new SLFP thus had its Western archetypes to look up to, and to emulate.

Jayatilleka has argued that the SLFP-PA’s turn to the right was pragmatist. I disagree: it ended up decimating the Left, something not even three UNP administrations could do and something which paved the way for the nationalist lobby to gain in strength and numbers despite its convoluted, contradictory positions on the economy.

Indeed, the contents of the latter’s economic programme revealed its contradictions: the Sihala Urumaya Manifesto of 2000, to give a sampling, rejected a closed economy while rejecting neoliberalism, acknowledging that while “going back to a closed economy” was “unthinkable” it would, in stark contrast to its opposition to neoliberalism, avail itself “of the opportunities thrown up by globalisation.” Viewed this way, even Nalin de Silva’s campaign against Coca-Cola at the Kelaniya University in the 1990s seems to me more of a cultural rather than a political attack on globalisation; Sinhala nationalism of the petty bourgeois sort, after all, decries neoliberalism and, paradoxically, critiques Sirimavo Bandaranaike’s economic policies for having destroyed the “Sinhala businessman.”

In addition to strengthening the Sinhala nationalist lobby, by axing or relegating to the background the Left faction of the SLFP Kumaratunga not only moved her party to the neoliberal Right, she compelled the UNP to do the same as well.

Surprising as it may seem now, the UNP under Ranil Wickremesinghe originally opposed Kumaratunga over several sensitive issues, such as the proposed Federal Package. In the second CBK presidency, however, the UNP did a volte-face on those same issues. Ironically that time around it was left to Kumaratunga to rein in Wickremesinghe over his overtures to the peace lobby: at the very moment he landed in Washington after “brokering” a peace deal with the LTTE, she took over three Ministries and sacked him. That did not, however, incline her government automatically to oppose the peace lobby, as her experiment with P-TOMS (despite the opposition of the JVP) later showed.

The first Bonapartist revolt had taken place against the backdrop of an extreme Left uprising and widening discontent with an authoritarian rightwing presidency. A considerable section of the middle-class had voted for Premadasa despite their scepticism, but another section – Sinhala Buddhist nationalist – remained alienated from him.

The second Bonapartist revolt, on the other hand, took place against the backdrop of deepening neoliberalism, a rollback of the state unparalleled even by J. R. Jayewardene’s standards, and the internationalisation of a conflict the Sinhala Buddhist nationalist middle-class wanted a military, not a political, solution to. Since the Left could not, owing to the bottlenecks imposed on it, come up with a proper critique of these issues, it was left to the Jathika Chintanaya and its offshoots to so do from a cultural vantage point.

In 2000, Dinesh Gunawardena’s Mahajana Eksath Peramuna joined the People’s Alliance. At the 2000 parliamentary election Gunawardena contested and retained his seat; he would do the same at the 2001 parliamentary election, becoming Minister for Transport and rescuing the SLTB from the moribund state to which it had deteriorated by then.

Gunawardena’s ideology – an impeccable blend of socialism and popular nationalism, not unlike his father’s – provided an impetus to a revolt within the SLFP. That revolt culminated in 2004 when an overwhelming majority of the party stood behind Mahinda Rajapaksa’s bid as party candidate for the presidential election. Mahinda revived Bonapartism in Sri Lankan politics thereafter, becoming an heir of sorts to Premadasa; not for no reason, after all, does Dayan Jayatilleka often compare the two with one another.

Where Rajapaksa differed from Premadasa was the acceptance he won among the Jathika Chintanaya ideologues and the Hela Urumaya MPs, as well as the Left (the Old Trotskyite-Communist and the JVP). Not that their tactics and objectives converged totally; the Hela Urumaya for instance sought a wider post-war political agenda than the Jathika Chintanaya. Champika Ranawaka thus campaigned for Rajapaksa in 2005 and 2010 on the understanding that once they achieved their primary aim, the ending of the war, they would enact reforms that would free the public sector from the inefficiencies and the culture of corruption which two and a half decades of untrammelled privatisation had pushed it to.

When he and Rajapaksa disagreed over the direction the latter took towards the end of his second presidency, Ranawaka not only had to leave the government, he had to leave it while being forced to shed his nationalist credentials. In a big way, that says a lot about how Rajapaksa stole the nationalist light from its original torchbearers.

Today, Ranawaka is caught adrift: on the one hand the Sinhala nationalist crowd attacks him as a renegade, while on the other ethnic minorities distrust him over his past. This was summed up at the recent parliamentary polls: despite being given the No 1 preferential vote for the Samagi Jana Balavegaya in Colombo, Ranawaka came second from last to Mano Ganesan; the Sinhala middle-class vote which he coveted went to the Pohottuwa, while the SJB vote trifurcated between the Premadasa Central Colombo bloc, Harsha de Silva’s suburban middle-class bloc, and the Rahuman-Ganesan minority bloc.

In other words, Rajapaksa has become not just a Bonapartist but a total Bonapartist, unlike his predecessor from the UNP. He remained so long after the JVP and the Hela Urumaya left his coalition, and one can argue he remains so even now. As for Gotabaya Rajapaksa and whether he has become a more right-leaning Bonapartist than his brother: well, it’s been a year, and a lot can happen in four years. No assessment of the Gotabaya presidency can be undertaken until it reaches its end. On the face of it, it hasn’t even begun to climb up to its peak. On the legacy it leaves behind will historians be able to record what is, to me at least, the third Bonapartist revolution in Sri Lanka. Until then, we will have to wait.

(The writer can be reached at udakdev1@gmail.com)

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Midweek Review

Opp. MP’s hasty stand on US air strikes in Nigeria and Sri Lanka’s foreign policy dilemma

Published

22 hours ago

2026/01/14

Sahan Weerasooriya

Somaliland's President Abdirahman Abdullahi Mohamed (right), posing for a photograph with Israel's Foreign Minister Gideon Saar, at the Presidential Palace in Hargeisa (Pic released by the Somaliland Presidential Office on 06 January, 2026)

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland on 26 December, 2025, couldn’t have taken place without US approval. The establishment of full diplomatic ties with Somaliland, a breakaway part of Somalia, and Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar’s visit to that country, drew swift criticism from Somalia, as well as others. Among those who had been upset were Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and the African Union.

The US-backed move in Africa didn’t receive public attention as did the raid on Venezuela. But, the Somaliland move is definitely part of the overall US global strategy to overwhelm, undermine and belittle Russia and China.

And on the other hand, the Somaliland move is a direct challenge to Türkiye, a NATO member that maintains a large military presence in Somalia, and to Yemen based Houthis who had disrupted Red Sea shipping, in support of Hamas, in the wake of Israeli retaliation over the 07 October, 2023, raid on the Jewish State, possibly out of sheer desperation of becoming a nonentity. The Israeli-US move in Africa should be examined taking into consideration the continuing onslaught on Gaza and attacks on Lebanon, Iran, Syria, Yemen, and Qatar.

Many an eyebrow was raised over Opposition MP Dr. Kavinda Jayawardana’s solo backing for the recent US air strikes in Nigeria.

The Gampaha District Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB) lawmaker handed over a letter to the US Embassy here last week applauding US President Donald Trump’s order to bomb Nigeria on Christmas Day. The letter was addressed to President Trump

( https://island.lk/kavinda-lauds-us-president-trumps-actions-to-protect-christians-in-nigeria/)

The former UNPer who had been in the forefront of a high-profile campaign demanding justice for the 2019 Easter Sunday terror victims, in an obvious solo exercise praised Trump for defending the Nigerian Christian community. The US bombing targeted Islamic State Terrorists (ISIS) operating in that country’s northwest, where Muslims predominate.

The only son of the late UNP Minister Dr. Jayalath Jayawardana, he seemed to have conveniently forgotten that such military actions couldn’t be endorsed under any circumstances. Against the backdrop of Dr. Jayawardana’s commendation for US military action against Nigeria, close on the heels of the murderous 03 January US raid on oil rich Venezuela, perhaps it would be pertinent to seek the response of the Catholic Church in that regard.

President Trump, in a wide-ranging interview with the New York Times, has warned of further strikes in case Christians continued to be killed in the West African nation. International media have disputed President Trump’s claim of only the Christians being targeted.

Both Christians and Muslims – the two main religious groups in the country of more than 230 million people – have been victims of attacks by radical Islamists.

The US and the Nigerian government of President Bola Tinubu reached a consensus on Christmas Day attacks. Nigeria has roughly equal numbers of Christians – predominantly in the south – and Muslims, who are mainly concentrated in the north.

In spite of increasingly volatile global order, the Vatican maintained what can be comfortably described as the defence of the national sovereignty. The Vatican has been critical of the Venezuelan government but is very much unlikely to throw its weight behind US attacks on that country and abduction of its President and the First Lady.

Dr. Jayawardana’s stand on US intervention in Nigeria cannot definitely be the position of the main Opposition party, nor any other political party represented in Parliament here. The National People’s Power (NPP) government refrained from commenting on US attacks on Nigeria, though it opposed US action in Venezuela. Although the US and Nigeria have consensus on Christmas Day attacks and may agree on further attacks, but such interventions are very much unlikely to change the situation on the ground.

SL on US raid

Let me reproduce Sri Lanka’s statement on US attacks on Venezuela, verbatim:

“The Government of Sri Lanka is deeply concerned about the recent developments in Venezuela and is closely monitoring the situation.

Sri Lanka emphasises the need to respect principles of international law and the UN Charter, such as the prohibition of the use of force, non-intervention, peaceful settlement of international disputes and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states.

Sri Lanka attaches great importance to the safety and well-being of the people of Venezuela and the stability of the region and calls on all parties to prioritize peaceful resolution through de-escalation and dialogue.

At this crucial juncture, it is important that the United Nations and its organs such as the UN Security Council be seized of the matter and work towards a peaceful resolution taking into consideration the safety, well-being and the sovereign rights of the Venezuelan people.”

That statement, dated 05 January, was issued by the Foreign Affairs, Foreign Employment and Tourism Ministry. Almost all political parties, represented in Parliament, except one-time darling of the LTTE, Illankai Thamil Arasu Kadchi (ITAK), condemned the US attacks on Venezuela and threats on Cuba, Colombia and Iran. The US is also targeting China, Russia and even the European Union.

Dr. Jayawardana requested coverage for his visit to the US Embassy here to hand over his letter, hence the publication of his ‘love’ letter to President Trump on page 2 of the 09 January edition of The Island.

There had never been a previous instance of a Sri Lankan lawmaker, or a political party, endorsing unilateral military action taken by the US or any other country. One-time Western Provincial Council member and member of Parliament since 2015, Jayawardana should have known better than to trust President Trump’s position on Nigeria. Perhaps the SJBer felt that an endorsement of US action, allegedly supportive of the Nigerian Catholic community, may facilitate his political agenda. Obviously, the Opposition MP endorsed US military action purely for domestic political advantage. The lawmaker appears to have simply disregarded the growing criticism of US actions in various parts of the world.

The German and French response to US actions, not only in Venezuela, but various other regions, as well, underscore the growing threat posed by President Trump’s agenda.

French President Emmanuel Macron and German leader Frank-Walter Steinmeier have sharply condemned US foreign policy under Donald Trump, declaring, respectively, that Washington was “breaking free from international rules” and the world risked turning into a “robber’s den”.

US threat to annex Greenland at the expense of Denmark, a founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) ,and the grouping itself, has undermined the post WWII world order to such an extent, the developing crisis seems irreversible.

Focus on UAE

Indian Army Chief Gen. Upendra Dwivedi visited the United Arab Emirates on 05 and 06 January. His visit took place amidst rising tension on the Arabian Peninsula, following the Saudi-led military coalition launching air attacks on Yemen based Southern Transitional Council (STC) whose leader Aidarous al-Zubaid was brought to Abu Dhabi.

In the aftermath of the Saudi led strikes on Yemen port, held by the STC, the UAE declared that it would withdraw troops deployed in Yemen. The move, on the part of UAE, seems to be meant to de-escalate the situation, but the clandestine operation, undertaken by that country to rescue a Saudi target, appeared to have caused further deterioration of Saudi-UAE relations. Further deterioration is likely as both parties seek to re-assert control over the developing situation.

From Abu Dhabi, General Dwivedi arrived in Colombo on a two-day visit. Like his predecessors, General Dwivedi visited the Indian Army memorial at Pelawatte, where he paid respects to those who paid the supreme sacrifice during deployment of the Indian Army here – 1987 July to 1990 March. That monument is nothing but a testament to the foolish and flawed Indian policy. Those who portray that particular Indian military mission as their first major peace keeping operation overseas must keep in mind that over half a dozen terrorist groups were sponsored by India.

Just over a year after the end of that mission, one of those groups – the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) -assassinated Congress leader Rajiv Gandhi, the former Premier who sent the military mission here.

India never accepted responsibility for the death and destruction caused by its intervention in Sri Lanka. In fact, the Indian action led to an unprecedented situation when another Sri Lankan terrorist group PLOTE (People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam) mounted a raid on the Maldives in early Nov. 1988. Two trawler loads of PLOTE cadres were on a mission to depose Maldivian President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom on a contract given by a disgruntled Maldivian businessman. India intervened swiftly and brought the situation under control. But, the fact that those who had been involved in the sea-borne raid on the Maldives were Indian trained and they left Sri Lanka’s northern province, which was then under Indian Army control, were conveniently ignored.

Except the LTTE, all other major Tamil terrorist groups, including the PLOTE, entered the political mainstream in 1990, and over the years, were represented in Parliament. It would be pertinent to mention that except the EPDP (Eelam People’s Democratic Party) all other Indian trained groups in 2001 formed the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), under the leadership of Illankai Thamil Arasu Kadchi (ITAK), to support the separatist agenda in Parliament. Sri Lanka’s triumph over the LTTE, in May 2009, brought that despicable project to an end.

The Indian Army statement on General Dwivedi’s visit here, posted on X, seemed like a propaganda piece, especially against the backdrop of continuing controversy over the still secret Indo-Lanka Memorandum of Understanding on defence that was entered into in April last year. Within months after the signing of the defence MoU, India acquired controlling stake of the Colombo Dockyard Ltd., a move that has been shrouded in controversy.

Indian High Commissioner Santosh Jha’s response to my colleague Sanath Nanayakkara’s query regarding the strategic dimension of the India–Sri Lanka Defence Cooperation Agreement following the Indian Army Chief’s recent visit, the former was cautious in his response. Jha asserted that there was “nothing beyond what is included” in the provisions of the pact, which was signed by President Anura Kumara Dissanayake and has generated controversy in Sri Lanka due to the absence of public discourse on its contents.

Framing the agreement as a self-contained document focused purely on bilateral defence cooperation, Jha said this reflected India’s official position. By directing attention solely to the text of the agreement, the High Commissioner indicated that there were no unstated strategic calculations involved, aligning with the Sri Lankan Foreign Minister’s recent clarification that the pact was not a military agreement but one that dealt with Indian support.

Nanayakkara had the opportunity to raise the issue at a special media briefing called by Jha at the IHC recently.

Julie Chung departs

The US attack on Venezuela, and the subsequent threats directed at other countries, including some of its longtime allies, should influence our political parties to examine US and Indian stealthy interventions here, leading to the overthrowing of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, in July 2022.

The US Embassy in Colombo recently announced that Julie Chung, who oversaw the overthrowing of Gotabaya Rajapaksa, would end her near four-year term. Former Indian High Commissioner in Colombo Gopal Baglay, who, too, played a significant role in the regime change project, ended his term in December 2023 and took up position in Canberra as India’s top diplomat there.

Both Chung and Baglay have been accused of egging on the putsch directly by urging Aragalaya time Speaker Mahinda Yapa Abeywardena, on 13 July, 2022, to take over the presidency. Former Minister Wimal Weerawansa and top author Sena Thoradeniya, in their comments on Aragalaya accused Chung of unprecedented intervention, whereas Prof. Sunanada Maddumabanadara found fault with Baglay for the same.

The US Embassy, in a statement dated 07 January, 2026, quoted the outgoing US Ambassador as having said: “I have loved every moment of my time in Sri Lanka. From day one, my focus has been to advance America’s interests—strengthening our security partnerships, expanding trade and investment, and promoting education and democratic values that make both our nations stronger. Together, we’ve built a relationship that delivers results for the American people and supports a free, open, and secure Indo-Pacific.”

The Embassy concluded that statement reiterating the US commitment to its partnership with Sri Lanka and to build on the strong foundation, established during Ambassador Chung’s nearly four-year tenure.

Sri Lanka can expect to increasingly come under both US and Indian pressure over Chinese investments here. It would be interesting to see how the NPP government solves the crisis caused by the moratorium on foreign research vessel visits, imposed in 2024 by the then President Ranil Wickremesinghe. The NPP is yet to reveal its position on that moratorium, over one year after the lapse of the ban on such vessels. Wickremesinghe gave into intense US and Indian pressure in the wake of Chinese ship visits.

In spite of US-India relations under strain due to belligerent US actions, they are likely to adopt a common approach here to undermine Sri Lanka’s relations with China. But, the situation is so dicey, India may be compelled to review its position. The US declaration that a much-anticipated trade deal with India collapsed because Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi hasn’t heeded President Trump’s demand to call him.

This was revealed by US Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick in the ‘All-In Podcast’ aired on Thursday, 08 January. The media quoted Indian spokesman Randhir Jaiswal as having said on the following day: “The characterisation of these discussions in the reported remarks is not accurate.” Jaiswal added that India “remains interested in a mutually beneficial trade deal between two complementary economies and looks forward to concluding it.”

Sri Lanka in deepening dilemma

Sri Lanka, struggling to cope up with post-Aragalaya economic, political and social issues, is inundated with foreign policy issues.

The failure on the part of the government and the Opposition to reach consensus on foreign policy challenges/matters has further weakened the country’s position. If those political parties represented in Parliament at least discussed matters of importance at the relevant consultative committee or the sectoral oversight committee, lawmaker Jayawardana wouldn’t have endorsed the US bombing of Nigeria.

Sri Lanka and Nigeria enjoy close diplomatic relations and the SJB MP’s unexpected move must have caused quite a controversy, though the issue at hand didn’t receive public attention. Regardless of the US-Nigerian consensus on the Christmas Day bombing, perhaps it would be unwise on the part of Sri Lanka to support military action at any level for obvious reasons.

Sri Lanka taking a stand on external military interventions of any sort seems comical at a time our war-winning military had been hauled up before the Geneva Human Rights Council for defending the country against the LTTE that had a significant conventional military capacity in addition to being “the most ruthless terrorist organisation” as it was described by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation. The group capitalised on experience gained in fighting the Indian Army during 1987 July-1990 March period and posed quite a threat. Within five months after the resumption of fighting, in June 1990, the LTTE ordered the entire Muslim population to leave the predominantly Tamil northern province.

No foreign power at least bothered to issue a statement condemning the LTTE. MP Jayawardana’s statement supporting US military action in support of Christian community should be examined in Sri Lanka’s difficult battle against terrorism that took a very heavy toll. Perhaps, political parties represented in Parliament, excluding those who still believe in a separatist project, should reexamine their stand on Sri Lanka’s unitary status.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

Midweek Review

Buddhist Iconography

Published

22 hours ago

2026/01/14

Sahan Weerasooriya

A Buddha statue from Mathura with a single curl, 2nd cent. CE

Seeing a new kind of head ornament on a recent reproduction of the iconic Avukana Buddha statue, made me ponder how the Enlightened One would have looked in real life, and what relationship that may or may not have with Buddhist iconography. Obviously, there is no record or evidence of any rendering of the Buddha made by an artist who saw him alive, but there are a few references to his appearance in the Pali Sutta Pitaka, that affirms, as he himself has said, Buddha was nothing other than a human being, albeit an extraordinarily intelligent one (Dhammika 2021).

Before enlightenment, Siduhath Gotama was described as having black hair and a beard. One account describes him as “handsome, of fine appearance, pleasant to see, with a good complexion and a beautiful form and countenance” (D.I,114). Venerable Ananda has said, “It is wonderful, truly marvelous how serene is the good Gotama’s presence, how clear and radiant is his complexion. Just as golden jujube fruit in the autumn is clear and radiant … so too is the good Gotama’s complexion” (A.I,181). If Venerable Ananda’s comparison is correct, Gotama must have been of what is called ‘Wheatish’ complexion common in present-day North India, which is described as typically falling between fair and dusky complexions, exhibiting a light brown hue with golden or olive undertones (Fitzpatrick scale Type III to VI).

The Buddha is also described as a slim tall person; slim, perhaps, as a result of practising asceticism before enlightenment and spartan life thereafter. As he aged, he also suffered from back pain and other ailments, according to Sutta Pitaka.

Artists’ imagination

We need not argue that the depictions of the Buddha we see across countries, in various media, are the imaginations of the artists influenced by their local cultures and traditions. The potentially controversial aspect regarding Buddhist iconography is the depiction of his hair, which is almost universal. There are several references in the Sutta Pitaka, where various Brahmin youths derogatorily referred to the Buddha as “bald-pated recluse” (MN 81). There is no reason to believe that he would have been any different from the rest of the Bhikkhus who had and have clean shaven heads. In fact, when King Ajatasattu visited the Buddha for the first time, he had trouble identifying the Buddha from the rest of the sangha, and an attendant had to help the king.

In early Buddhist art, the Buddha was represented by the wheel of dhamma, Bodhi tree, throne, lotus, the footprints, or a parasol. For example, in the carvings of Sanchi temple built in the third century BCE, the Buddha is depicted by some of these symbols, but never in human form. Depiction of the Buddha in human form has started around the first century CE in two places, Gandhara and Mathura. In both places, the Buddha is depicted with hair, and not as a “bald-pated recluse” the way the Sutta Pitaka depicts him.

Figure 1. Bimaran Casket

No scholarly agreeement

So, the question is who started this artistic trend, was it the Gandhara artists under the Greek influence or the Mathura artists following their own traditions? There is no scholarly agreement on this; Western scholars think it was the Greek influence that made presenting the Buddha in human form while Ananda Coomaraswamy presents another theory (Coomaraswamy 1972).

The earliest dateable representation of the Buddha in human form is found on the Bimaran casket found during the exploration of a stupa near Bimaran, Afghanistan in 1834. It has been dated to the first century CE using the coins found along with it, that also depict and refer to the Buddha by name in Greko-Bactrian. This reliquary, a gold cylinder embossed with figures and artwork, is on display at the British Museum (Figure 1). Under the Hellenistic influence, it must have been natural for the Gandhara artists to represent a revered or divine figure in human form; Greeks have been doing it for millennia. The standing Buddha figure is depicted wearing the hair in the form of a knot over the crown. In other carvings from the same period, most male figures are shown with the same hair style. Also, it appears that both Spartan men and women tied their hair in a knot over the crown of the head, known as the “Knidian hairstyle” (Wikipedia). The Gandhara sculpture is famous for the Hellenistic style of realism (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Gandhara statue from 1-2
century CE

Coomaraswamy’s reasoning

Coomaraswamy reasons that the Bhakti movement – the loving devotion of the followers towards the deities, is the reason for the emergence of Buddha figure in Mathura. We cannot say for sure if the Gandhara art induced the Mathura artists to break away from their tradition of aniconic symbolism. What is clear is that they have been influenced by the trend to elevate religious leaders to divinity, to impress the followers and compete or to outdo the practices of other religions. This tradition, which predates the Buddha, has introduced the concept of the thirty-two characteristics or marks of great personalities.

It is this trend that has introduced divine interventions and other mysticisms to Buddhism and culminated in famous poems as Asvagosha’s Buddhacharithaya and exegeses as Lalithavistara a few centuries later and continues to date. Instead of following realism as the Gandhara artists did, Mathura artists have followed this tradition and incorporated the thirty-two characteristics of a great person into their representation of the Buddha figure.

Some of these marks are described as “… there is a protuberance on the head, this is, for the great man, the venerable Gotama, a mark of a great man; the hair bristles, his bristling hair is blue or dark blue, the color of collyrium, turning in curls, turning to the right; the tuft of hair between the eyebrows on his forehead is very white like cotton; he is golden in color, has skin like gold; eyes very blue, like sapphires; under the soles of his feet there are wheels, with a thousand rims and naves, complete in every way…(DN 30, M 91). Thus, the tradition of adding the protuberance referred to as Usnisha to Buddha statues started.

Buddhist traditions in different forms

This practice has been adopted by all Buddhist traditions in different forms. The highly effective outcome of incorporating these great marks into the statuary is that it has created a globally recognisable symbol that is independent of the artist’s skills, cultural affiliation or the medium used. Without such distinct features, we would have difficulty in distinguishing the depictions of the Enlightened One from those of other monks or other religious leaders such as Mahaveera. Nevertheless, in addition to its spiritual aspect, Buddhist iconography has been a flourishing art form, which has allowed human talent and ingenuity to thrive over millennia.

Let us not forget that artistic expression is a fundamental right. Interestingly, the curly hair on the Buddha statues made the early European Indologists to think that the Buddha was an African deity (Allen 2002).

Sri Lankan Buddhist art

Sri Lankan Buddhist art is said to be related to Amaravathi style; all Sri Lankan statues are depicted with curling hair bristles turning to right. The presence and prominence of the usnisha on local statues vary depending on the period. Toluvila statue, prominently displayed at the National Museum, is considered the earliest dateable statue in Sri Lanka. It is dated to 3rd or 4th century CE, has a less prominent usnisha and lacks the elongated ear lobes; it is said to be influenced by the Mathura school.

Since Dambulla temple dates to third century BCE, one wonders if the magnificent reclining statue in Cave 1 could be earlier than the Toluvila statue. There are several bronze statues from Anuradhapura period without usnisha. Towards late Anuradhapura period, usnisha is beginning to be replaced with rudimentary Siraspatha, which represents a flame. This addition evolved over time and became a very prominent feature during the Kandyan period and replaced the traditional usnisha completely (Figure 3).

Figure 3. Kandyan era statue with
Siraspatha

Incomparable workmanship

Then the question is how does the Avukana statue, which belongs to the early Anuradhapura period, have a siraspatha that is not compatible with the style of the period or the incomparable workmanship of the statue itself? I have come across two explanations. According to the Sinhala Encyclopedia, the original siraspatha was destroyed and a cement replacement was installed in recent times, likely in the early 20th century.

The other version is that the statue never had a siraspatha like many other contemporary stone statues. For example, the Susseruwa (Ras Vehera) statue, which is identical in style, and likely a contemporary work, does not have a siraspatha. During the Buddhist revival, a group of devotees from a Southern town felt that the lack of a siraspatha on such a great statue as a major deficiency, and they ceremoniously installed the crude cement ornament seen today.

This raises the question: which is more valuable, preservation and protection of archeological treasures or reconstruction to meet modern expectations and standards? For example, what would have been more impressive, the Mirisavetiya Stupa as it was found before the failed reconstruction attempts, or the current version that is indistinguishable from modern concrete constructs? Even though, one can assume it was done in good faith. What if the Mihintale Kanthaka Chetiya were covered under brick and concrete to convert into a finished product? Would it increase or decrease its archeological value?

Differences between reality and iconography

None of that should matter in following the Buddha Dhamma. In theory. However, when the influence of Buddhist iconography is deeply rooted in devotee’s mind, it is impossible to imagine the Buddha as a normal human being, with or without a clean-shaven head and a brown complexion. The failure to see the difference between reality and iconography or art, poetry, and literature can be detrimental as it could distort the fact that Dhamma is the truth discovered by a human being, and it is accessible to any human, here and now. That is responsible, at least in part, for the introduction of mysticism, myths, and beliefs that are rapidly sidelining of Dhamma.

How often do we think of Enlightened One as a humble mendicant who roamed the Ganges Valley barefoot, in the beating sun, and resting at night on the folded outer robe spread under a tree. Sadly, iconography and other associated myths have driven us too far away from reality and Dhamma.

Up until I was six years old, we lived in a place up in the Balangoda hills that had a kaolin (kirimeti) deposit. The older students in the school used it for various handcrafts, but for the youngsters, it was playdough, even though we had never heard of that term. After witnessing an artist working on a Buddha statue at the local temple, my friend Bandara and I made Buddha statues of all types and sizes. If any of them were to survive for a few thousand years at the site where the schools stood, future archaeologists may wonder if a primitive tribe existed there (of course carbon dating will show otherwise). Like that, looking at some of the thousands of statues that pop up on every street corner, the purpose of which varies, sometimes I wonder if they were made by a civilisation that was yet to finesse the art of sculpture or by kids having access to kirimeti. No wonder birds take liberty to exercise their freedom of expression.

by Geewananda Gunawardana