Midweek Review
How Premadasa turned the Official Language Policy upside down
By Kalyananda Tiranagama
Executive Director
Lawyers for Human Rights and Development
(Part I of this article appeared yesterday)
On a comparison of the provisions in JR’s 1978 Constitution and Ranasinghe Premadasa’s 16th Amendment one can clearly see how the Official Language Policy of Sri Lanka has been turned upside down through this Amendment. Let us take Article by Article and compare them:
Art. 18(1). The Official Language of Sri Lanka shall be Sinhala.
16th Amendment did not touch this Article. If this was amended it would have been too conspicuous. Leaving it untouched helped them to hoodwink the unsuspecting people with the false belief that Sinhala still remains the official language of the whole country.
Art. 18 (2). Tamil shall also be an official language.
18 (3). English shall be the link language.
Art. 19. The National Languages of Sri Lanka shall be Sinhala and Tamil.
These three Articles were also left untouched as there was no necessity to repeal or amend them to achieve their objective of replacing Sinhala as the official language. Leaving them untouched helped them to use the provisions in these Articles for achieving their objective.
Language of administration
Articles 22 (1), 22 (2) and 22 (3) in the 1978 Constitution dealing with the language of administration in the country were repealed and new Articles substituted by the 16th Amendment.
Under the 1978 Constitution, while Sinhala, The Official Language, was the language of administration throughout Sri Lanka, Tamil was also used as the language of administration in the Northern and Eastern Provinces.
After the 16th Amendment, (i) Sinhala is no longer The Official Language of Sri Lanka and Sinhala is no longer the language of administration throughout Sri Lanka. Under the 16th Amendment, (ii) Sinhala and Tamil both are languages of administration throughout Sri Lanka; (iii) Use of Sinhala as the language of administration is confined to seven provinces of Sri Lanka other than the Northern and Eastern Provinces; (iv)There is no similar limitation imposed on the use of Tamil language as the language of administration in the rest of the country, though practically Tamil is used as the language of administration in the Northern and Eastern Provinces; (v) Under the Proviso to Article 22 (1), President has power to create minority linguistic ethnic units at the Divisional Secretariat level using a language different from the language of administration in the province and direct that the language used by the linguistic minority in the District be used as the language of administration for such area.
This proviso is a very dangerous one that can be used by racist politicians of ethnic and religious minority political parties as a bargaining tool in their dealings with power-hungry political leaders in the South during election times.
As reported in the national press, during the 2005 Presidential Election, Muslim Congress of Rauff Hakeem decided to support Ranil Wickremesinghe after the latter had agreed to a 67-point list of demands including autonomy for a Muslim Region in the East. A political group working in the plantation areas extended its support to him after he had accepted 19 demands presented by them including the appointment of Tamil Grama Niladharis for estate areas and the creation of separate Divisional Secretariats for areas with a concentration of plantation workers in the South.
This is a step by step process. First, they get local government areas with a linguistic or religious majority created by removing people belonging to other communities. That is how they got four new Pradesiya Sabhas exclusively with Tamil representation in the Nuwara Eliya District at the last local government elections. Their next step is to get these Pradesiya Sabha areas declared Divisional Secretariats. After that they can take the third step of converting them into administrative units using Tamil as the language of administration of such area.
Already there have been disputes between the Tamil and Muslim communities in Kalmunai each community demanding a separate Divisional Secretariat for themselves. A few months back it was reported that Saindamaruthu had been declared a separate Municipal Council area. Under this provision there is a possibility of using even Arabic as the language of administration for some of such areas like Kattankudy/Saindamaruthu or Wilpattu.
Under Article 22 (2) the 1978 Constitution, any citizen residing anywhere in the country was entitled – (a) to receive communications from and to communicate and transact business with any official … or (b) to obtain a copy of … any official … document or a translation thereof – in either of the National Languages;
Under the 16th Amendment, (i) In any area where Sinhala is used as the language of administration a person is entitled – (a) to receive communications from and to communicate and transact business with any official …. or (b) to obtain a copy of … any official … document or a translation thereof – in either Tamil or English;
(ii) In any area where Tamil is used as the language of administration a
person is entitled – a) to exercise the rights and obtain the services referred to above in Sinhala or English ;
Under Article 22 (3) of the 1978 Constitution, a local authority in the Northern and Eastern Provinces conducting its business in either of the National Languages … is entitled to receive communications from and to communicate and transact business with any official … in such National Language.
Under Article 22 (4) of the 16th Amendment, a Provincial Council or a local authority conducting its business in Sinhala … entitled to … transact business with any official … in Sinhala and Provincial Council or a local authority conducting its business in Tamil … entitled to… transact business with any official … in Tamil.
However, a Provincial Council or a local authority, ….. transacting business with any other Provincial Council or a local authority,……functioning in an area in which a different language is used as the language of administration …. entitled to …. to communicate and transact business in English.
By the 16th Amendment, English has been raised to the level of the Official Language of Sri Lanka, or at least to the level of a national language of Sri Lanka.
Language of Legislation:
Articles 23 of the 1978 Constitution dealing with the language of legislation was repealed and a new Article substituted by the 16th Amendment.
Art. 23 (1) of the 1978 Constitution required all laws and subordinate legislation to be enacted and published in both National Languages together with a translation in English Language.
In the event of any inconsistency between any two texts, the text in Sinhala, the Official Language prevailed.
Under Art. 23 (1) of the 16th Amendment all laws and subordinate legislation required to be enacted and published in Sinhala and Tamil together with a translation thereof in English.
Proviso – Parliament to determine at the time of enacting legislation which text to prevail in the event of any inconsistency between texts.
There is no difference in the substantive provision. Both are the same.
However there is a fundamental change in the law, as to the text that should prevail in the event of any inconsistency between any two texts.
Under the 1978 Constitution, it was the text in the Official Language that should prevail. Now there is no Official Language in the country.
Under the 16th Amendment, at the time of enacting legislation, Parliament to determine which text to prevail in the event of any inconsistency between texts.
This provision may lead to dangerous consequences if the Parliament decides the English text to prevail in the event of any inconsistency between Sinhala and English texts in the case of a vital Bill enacted by a government heavily dependent for its survival on the support of racist parties like the TNA and the SLMC.
Sometime back the whole country saw how Sumanthiran threatened and stopped Lakshma Kiriella, the Leader of the House of UNP government from continuing his speech in Parliament.
Article 22 (4) of the 1978 Constitution required all Orders, Proclamations, Rules, By-laws, Regulations and Notifications made or issued under any written law … and all other official documents including circulars and forms issued or used by any public institution or local authority, to be published in both National Languages.
There was no requirement to publish the said documents with a translation in English. Only laws and subsidiary legislation enacted by Parliament published with a translation in English.
Until 1987, there had been no Provincial Councils. Only local authorities were there. Local authorities were also required to publish by-laws, regulations, notifications … circulars and forms issued or used by them in both National Languages.
Article 23 (2) of the 16th Amendment requires all Orders, Proclamations, rules, by-laws, regulations and notifications made or issued under any written law, other than by a Provincial Council or a local authority, and the Gazette to be published in Sinhala and Tamil together with a translation thereof in English.
Under Article 23 (3) of the 16th Amendment, all Orders, Proclamations, rules, by-laws, regulations and notifications made or issued under any written law by any Provincial Council or a local authority, and all other official documents including circulars and forms issued or used by such body or any public institution or local authority, required to be published in the language used in the administration in the respective areas in which they function, together with a with a translation thereof in English.
All the documents mentioned above made or issued by any public institution, other than a Provincial Council or a local authority, need to be published in both national languages – Sinhala and Tamil, together with a translation in English.
Under the 1978 Constitution, there was no such requirement for publishing the said documents together with a translation in English.
Under the 1978 Constitution, all by-laws, regulations, notifications … circulars and forms issued or used by Local authorities were required to be published in both National Languages.
Under the 16th Amendment there is no requirement for publishing any Orders, Proclamations, rules, by-laws, regulations, notifications made or issued by any Provincial Council or a local authority, and all other official documents including circulars and forms issued or used by such body in both National Languages.
They need to be published only in the language of administration in the area in which they function, together with a with a translation thereof in English.
The language of administration in the Northern and Eastern Provinces is Tamil and when all the above mentioned official documents published only in Tamil language it will result in a grave injustice to the Sinhala people resident in the North and the East. They are being totally deprived of their language rights.
Language of Courts
Article 24 (1) of the 1978 Constitution dealing with the language of courts in the country has been repealed and a new Article substituted by the 16th Amendment.
Under Art. 24 (1) of the 1978 Constitution, Sinhala, the Official Language, was the language of courts throughout Sri Lanka and accordingly court records were maintained and proceedings conducted in the Official Language;
Tamil was also used as the language of the courts exercising original jurisdiction in the Northern and Eastern Provinces and their records kept and proceedings conducted in Tamil.
Under Article 24 (1) of the 16th Amendment, Sinhala and Tamil are the languages of courts throughout Sri Lanka and Sinhala shall be used as the language of the courts situated in all the areas of Sri Lanka except those in any area where Tamil is the language of administration. The record and proceedings shall be in the language of the court.
As Sinhala is no longer The Official Language of Sri Lanka, there is no need to maintain records and conduct proceedings in Sinhala in areas where Tamil is the language of administration.
Language of Admission to Public Service
Article 22 (5) of the 1978 Constitution dealing with the language of admission to public service in the country has been repealed and a new Article substituted by the 16th Amendment.
Under Article 22 (5) of the 1978 Constitution, a person was entitled to be examined through the medium of either of the National Languages at any examination for the admission of persons to the Public Service, Judicial Service, Local Government Service, a public corporation or a statutory institution, subject to the condition that he may be required to acquire a sufficient knowledge of the official language within a reasonable time after admission to such service, etc., where such knowledge is reasonably necessary for the discharge of his duties.
Under Article 22 (5) the 16th Amendment, a person is entitled to be examined through the medium of either Sinhala or Tamil or a language of his choice at any examination for the admission of persons to the Public Service, Judicial Service, Provincial Public Service, Local Government Service or any public institution, subject to the condition that he may be required to acquire a sufficient knowledge of Tamil or Sinhala as the case may be, within a reasonable time after admission to such service, etc., where such knowledge is reasonably necessary for the discharge of his duties.
a. removed the requirement of persons seeking admission to the Public Service, Judicial Service, Provincial Public Service, Local Government Service or any public institution being examined through the medium of either of the National Languages – Sinhala or Tamil;
Now the applicant has the choice of deciding the language he is to be examined. It may be English or even Arabic.
In fact, this has been brought for the purpose of opening the public service to those students of International Schools who receive their education in English medium and who do not know either Sinhala or Tamil.
b. removed the requirement of persons joining the Public Service acquiring a sufficient knowledge of the official language within a reasonable time after admission to such service;
Now, there is no requirement of any public servant in the North and the East acquiring any knowledge of Sinhala language; He has only to acquire knowledge of the language as is reasonably necessary for the discharge of his duties – that is Tamil.
Midweek Review
Staying relevant in a changing media landscape
The sinking of an Iranian frigate in India’s backyard, closer to Sri Lanka’s southern coast, in early March this year, a few days after the eruption of war after the unprovoked Israeli-US attack on Iran, posed quite a significant challenge for India and Sri Lanka. They grappled with the escalating situation. No one wanted to blame the US for the death of over 100 unarmed Iranian Navy personnel.
By Shamindra Ferdinando
Reference was made at the Media Fest 2026 to the false claim regarding the resignation of Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe at the height of protests in Colombo, in July, 2022, to highlight the failure on the part of the non-traditional media to report the developing situation accurately.
The fictitious claim received the attention during the second session of Media Fest 2026, organised by the Sri Lanka-India Media Friendship Association (SLIMFA) on 11 July, 2026, at the Taj Samudra. The panel consisted of Ashok Malik, Nisthar Cassim (President, SLIMFA), Vimukthi Karunarathne, Jamila Hussain and Robert Anthony. It was moderated by Kalani Kumarasinghe.
The panel paid attention to the challenge the traditional media, particularly the print, faced in covering the well-orchestrated campaign, especially with foreign inputs to oust President Gotabaya Rajapaksa. Essentially, the finger was pointed at the non-traditional media for being inaccurate, hasty and irresponsible. Reference was also made to the recent Negombo Prison riot, that claimed the lives of 31, to stress the importance of the traditional media as the preferred or truthful news provider.
The stimulating discussion took place after Malik, the former policy advisor/additional secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs of India, dealt with holistic media strategy. Malik, who had been a frequent visitor to Colombo over the years, had served the Ministry of External Affairs during the violent crisis in Colombo. Malik had been with the Ministry from October 2019 to August 2022, the month Wickremesinghe received the parliamentary backing to succeed forcefully ousted Gotabaya Rajapaksa through extra parliamentary means.
The SLIMFA was inaugurated in May 2024 under the patronage of the Indian High Commission. The first ever Media Fest was held also at the Taj Samudra over a period of two days, in April, 2025. Indian High Commissioner in Colombo, Santosh Jha, was present throughout the programme held on 11 July. This year’s focus was on the theme ‘Staying Relevant in a Changing World.’
The two other sessions were addressed by Editor Asian News International, Ms. Smita Prakash, and Managing Editor, India Today Ms Marya Shakil. They dealt with trust, truth and the battle for credibility and the shifting of the audience, respectively. Their perspectives facilitated an exciting dialogue with the panelists and members of the audience making useful contributions.
Passing reference was made to the West Asia conflict that disrupted global energy markets in March, following the unprovoked Israeli-US attack on Iran, as well as the conclusion of Sri Lanka’s successful war against separatist terrorist, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), in May, 2009. Prakash found fault with the Western media coverage of India while Indika Sakalasooriya, Communications Manager at SLYCAN Trust, emphasised that in spite of accusations directed at others, there had been occasions traditional media, too, could be faulted for deceiving the world.
Sakalasooriya cited the high profile accusations directed at Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, by the Western media, regarding their purported Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) project to justify the March 2003 invasion of that country. The US-led coalition caused massive destruction. The Western powers hanged Hussein after what amounted to a kangaroo court trial.
It would have been better if Sakalasooriya mentioned how the US propagated lies to build a case against Iraq, particularly against the backdrop of false accusations that have surfaced directed at Iran to justify the Febuary 28, 2026, unprovoked attack on that nation with a proud history.
In a speech in Cincinnati, Ohio, on 7 October, 2002, US President George W. Bush confidently declared that Iraq “possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons. It is seeking nuclear weapons.”
The US President then vowed that Hussein had to be stopped. “The Iraqi dictator must not be permitted to threaten America and the world with horrible poisons and diseases and gases and atomic weapons,” international news agencies quoted President Bush as having said.
The truth is that the mainstream media, whatever the accusations directed at social media platforms now, then played ball with respective governments in support of their narrow political-military-economic objectives as always. The British and US media, however much they publicly proclaim to be independent, then blindly propagated the lie that Iraq posed an immediate threat to them and, therefore, had to be dealt with.
Perhaps none of those in the relevant panel moderated, by Chief Executive Officer of Advocata Institute, Dhananath Fernando, remembered how Ranil Wickremesinghe, in his capacity as Prime Minister, justified the US invasion. Addressing the UN General Assembly in September, 2003, well over a year after the US failure to find evidence of the WMD project, Wickremesinghe described the US as a reluctant ‘world policeman’ forced to intervene in Iraq due to the failure on the part of the US to deal with Iraq.
Reportage of July 2022 events
An intense social media campaign backed the violent protest campaign here against President Gotabaya Rajapaksa. Then US Ambassador Julie Chung issued several statements on Twitter (now X) warning the government and the military against using force to bring protests to an end. Interested parties exploited her interventions to intensify pressure on the government. The situation eventually turned so bad, Chung had to finally warn the public that accounts impersonating her were spreading misinformation and fake tweets. The US Embassy here, on multiple occasions, urged the public to verify information on the official US Embassy and verified X accounts. But during that chaotic period, the public was so drunk on misinformation, weren’t bothered at all regarding the accuracy and the vast majority was not interested in verifying statements.
The reference to false claims about Wickremesinghe’s resignation, during the panel discussion, should have attracted comments and observations for obvious reasons. Both the US and India have been accused of backing the operation that compelled President Gotabaya Rajapaksa to leave office.
President Wickremesinghe, in June, 2024, claimed that pressure was brought on him to resign in the immediate aftermath of protesters setting ablaze his Kollupitiya private residence on 9 July, 2022. The declaration was made at a function in London to mark the 40th anniversary of the International Democrats Union (IDU).
Prof. Sunanda Maddumabandara, who served as the Senior Advisor (Media) to President Ranil Wickremesinghe (July 2022 to September 2024) in late 2025 declared that the then Indian High Commissioner in Colombo, Gopal Baglay, asked Speaker Mahinda Yapa Abeywardena to take over as the interim president. Maddumabandara contradicted previous claims that it was US Ambassador Chung who intervened on behalf of the regime change project. Prof. Maddumabandara’s revelations in “Aragalaye Balaya” (The Power of the Aragalaya) launched in the presence of both Wickremesinghe and Abeywardena didn’t receive the media attention. Interestingly both traditional and non-traditional media conveniently ignored the author’s claim. Abeywardena remained silent though he must have told the author what transpired between him and Baglay, now New Delhi’s High Commissioner in Australia.
Those who constantly targeted Chung over her support to the anti-Gotabaya Rajapaksa campaign turned a blind eye to Prof. Maddumabandara’s shocking disclosure. The author quoted Abeywardena as having revealed that Baglay promised to bring the blockade on the Speaker’s official residence to an immediate end if he agreed to accept the Presidency. But, Wickremesinghe had strenuously refused to step down though, following a meeting chaired by Abeywardena, a section of the media reported that he would resign.
Sri Lanka lacked the political will to inquire into external interventions that led to the fall of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s government. Abeywardena, who revealed direct intervention and how intense pressure was brought on him, did absolutely nothing to activate an investigation. Wickremesinghe, who succeeded Gotabaya Rajapaksa in July, 2022, refrained from launching an inquiry. Having fully backed the campaign against Rajapaksa, Wickremesinghe ended up in the President’s Office. Therefore, his decision to keep quiet is understandable.
The Wickremesinghe-Rajapaksa government terminated a case filed by SLPP parliamentarians against the failure on the part of the government to protect their property.
The JVP-led NPP that won both the presidential and unbeatable 2/3 majority at the parliamentary elections, in 2024, simply forgot the case of foreign interventions. Since the change of government in September, 2024, Sri Lanka has entered into new partnerships with India and the US. The public is totally in the dark as to what they are.
The finalisation of seven MoUs between India and Sri Lanka, in April, 2025, and the subsequent sale of controlling stake in the strategic Colombo Dockyard Limited (CDL) to Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited, affiliated with the Indian Defence Ministry, raised the Indo-Lanka relations to a higher level. The inclusion of a MoU on Defence underscored the bilateral relationship, while India stepped-up assistance to the Sri Lankan military. The recent donation of military stores, estimated to be worth USD 5.5 mn in support of the 1,000-plus Lankan contingent for Haiti, deployment under UN command, as authoritative sources confirmed recently, that agreements in their entirety could not be disclosed under any circumstances thereby underscoring India’s status. The reference was clearly aimed at the controversy that the seven MoUs, including the one on defence, hadn’t been revealed to the public, and the Parliament, too, remained in the dark.
India paid USD 52.96 mn for Japan’s Onomichi Dockyard, previously the majority owner of the Colombo Dockyard.
Terrorists/gunmen
Altogether there were three panels moderated by Dilrukshi Handuneththi, Kalani Kumarasinghe and Dhananath Fernando and some of the panelists questioned the way Western media covered major events. One pointed out how the Indian media couldn’t immediately report the assassination of Indian Premier India Gandhi on 31 October, 1984, as they couldn’t do so until the President made an official statement regarding the killing of a sitting PM, whereas the Western media didn’t have such obstacles.
The despicable western media practice of describing terrorists as gunmen and militants were also mentioned. Unfortunately, no one bothered to remind the audience of the India-led terrorist project that destroyed Sri Lanka, caused the deaths of nearly 1,500 Indian soldiers and her son Rajiv Gandhi, former Prime Minister, as well. The writer, at one point, felt the need to remind the gathering of the need to discuss issues in Sri Lanka context.
Ms Smita Prakash, in her thought-provoking address, discussed the challenge the mainstream Indian media faced in reporting ‘Operation Sindoor’ following the terrorist attack on Pahalgam on 22 April, 2025. India directly blamed Pakistan and launched large-scale offensive action on 7 May. The gathering was told that similar challenges were experienced in covering the unprecedented war between Israel-US combine against Iran this year.
When the new West Asia war erupted, India found the situation quite embarrassing, particularly against the backdrop of Prime Minister Narendra Modi visiting Tel Aviv, just days before the attack on Tehran. India remained silent for several days before Foreign Secretary, Vikram Misri, on 5 March, signed the condolence book at the Iranian Embassy, in Delhi, on behalf of the Government of India. Misri offered condolences on the death of the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Over a week later India had no option but to get in touch with the Iranian leadership to secure energy supplies amidst turmoil over disruption of services. The Indian media coverage of the West Asia war obviously took into consideration the developing situation at home as the Modi government carefully navigated the crisis situation. Towards the end of the major confrontations before Iran and US agreed on a ceasefire, the US attacked three vessels crewed by Indians in the Hormuz strait.
Both traditional and non-traditional media have to deal with social media platforms where users can post messages, images and videos. US President Donald Trump shared posts on his social media platform Truth Social on a regular basis that made all other media irrelevant. The impact of the US President’s posts made a huge impact during the West Asia war as he continuously bypassed all official channels to go directly to the people. His regular posts caused uncertainty, increased tensions and undermined efforts to deal with the developing situations, sensibly.
Following recent exchanges and Iranian vows to avenge the death of their Supreme leader, President Trump wrote in a post on his Truth Social account:”1,000 missiles are locked and loaded and aimed at the Islamic Republic of Iran, with thousands more to immediately follow, should the Iranian government act on its threat.” He then signed off the post with the phrase “praise be to Allah”, which he also did in a post threatening Iran last April.
Perhaps, SLIMFA-arranged discussions should have paid attention to the impact of social media platforms in the hands of world leaders and governments. All countries (governments), regardless of their size and influence, use social media to advance their agenda. There is no need for breaking news on television channels or news flash in print media as they can directly go to the public.
The unprecedented transformation of the media landscape, in the wake of proliferation of social media with both governments as well as big business at the receiving end, sometimes. Platforms have emerged as central hubs for global news. The reportage of the West Asia war, as well as other developments at global level, proved the advent of social media and the dependence of major news agencies on social media platforms.
The Western media coverage of the Russia-Ukraine war repeatedly exposed their bias. The UK’s BBC declined to visit the site of a Ukrainian drone attack on a student dormitory in Starobelsk in the Lugansk Republic, in May this year. The CNN, too, declared its inability to join the visit arranged by Russia. One need not be an expert to understand their response as the world knows the Ukraine is being used by Western powers for war with Russia, a claim not denied by them.
Drop in voter enthusiasm
Top award-winning journalist Marya Shakil explained the devastating impact of the smartphone on the Indian electorate.
Recalling her coverage of elections in the Uttar Pradesh, in 2017, the two-time recipient of the prestigious Ramnath Goenka Award for Politics and Government asserted that the younger generation, now addicted to smartphones, may not be interested in politics. Shakil based her claim largely on a boy she found aimlessly scrolling near a political rally and covering election in Bihar last year.
Having displaced a range of figures to prove the continuing decline in the traditional media, Shakil engaged the audience in an exciting conversation that underscored the responsibility on the part of the traditional media to address the issues at hand and face challenges. She reiterated that regardless of expansion and massive profits accrued by non-traditional media, including influencers, at the expense of the traditional media, the latter still remained trustworthy.
Shakil’s assertion regarding declining voter interest, as shown by that boy she ran into during Uttar Pradesh polls coverage. must be examined taking into how smartphones can be a destructive tool. During the discussions, references were made to the violent overthrow of governments in Pakistan (April, 2022), Bangladesh (August, 2024) and Nepal (September, 2025) though Sri Lanka (July, 2024) was not mentioned in that particular context. However, Jamila Hussain referred to the challenging task of covering the campaign against President Gotabaya Rajapaksa.
In those externally backed protest operations against democratically elected governments, sections of the media, both traditional (print/electronic) and non-traditional, played significant roles. Sri Lanka is not an exception. President Gotabaya Rajapaksa didn’t realise what was going on until it was too late. If not for the intervention made by the Navy at the 11th hour, the President and the First Lady could have been trapped at the President’s House when protesters took control of it.
It would be pertinent to mention what Indian National Security Advisor (NSA) Ajith Doval said about the overthrow of governments. Speaking at the Sardar Patel Memorial Lecture, in New Delhi, on 31 October, 2025, Doval attributed recent political instability and “non-constitutional regime changes” in neighbouring countries to deficiencies in governance.
Declaring that the quality of governance is the fundamental determinant of political stability, Doval, who held at influential post since 2014, when the BJP formed government, stressed: “The rise and fall of empires, monarchies, oligarchies, aristocracies, or democracies is, in essence, a history of their governance.”
Commenting on political upheavals in the region, Doval declared: “In the recent cases of regime change through non-constitutional methods in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and others, these were actually cases of bad governance. And that is how governance matters.” Is it his opinion that it is India’s sole right to decide what is good governance and bad governance in the region?
Doval’s opinion cannot be examined without taking into consideration their partnership with the US as well as joint US-Japan-India-Australia (Quad) response to the Chinese challenge. Years ago, Gotabaya Rajapaksa disclosed how Doval demanded the cancellation of all major Chinese projects here, including the handing over of the Hambantota Port to China on a 99-year-lease and the Colombo Port City project.
Although India failed to disrupt major Chinese projects here, New Delhi has consolidated its position in Sri Lanka. Taking control of the CDL, as well as the inauguration of the Colombo West International Terminal (CWIT), in April, 2025, boosted their position here. The consortium operating the $800 million CWITT includes India’s Adani Ports & SEZ Ltd, John Keels and the Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA).
The irony is that the JVP, once opposed to everything and anything connected to Delhi, has ended up in a cozy relationship with Modi’s India and got close to the US in a manner that no one believed possible a decade ago.
Midweek Review
Remote health monitoring: A practical digital solution for dengue burden
Sri Lanka is once again facing a significant dengue challenge. With rising numbers of suspected and confirmed cases reported across the country, especially during the rainy season, dengue has become not only a public health concern but also a major pressure point for the hospital system. In many affected districts, outpatient departments, emergency treatment units and medical wards are crowded with patients who need assessment, blood investigations and close observation.
Dengue is a disease that can change rapidly. A patient who appears stable in the early days of fever may enter a critical stage within a short period. This is why doctors are cautious, and why many patients are advised to return repeatedly for review. However, in a lower-middle-income country such as Sri Lanka, where public hospitals already function with limited beds, staff shortages and high patient loads, depending only on hospital-based care during an outbreak is not sustainable.
As a specialist in Health Informatics, I believe Sri Lanka needs a practical remote health monitoring system to support dengue care. Such a system can help identify patients who truly need admission, while safely monitoring stable patients at home. This will reduce unnecessary hospital overcrowding and allow hospital resources to be used for patients who are seriously ill.
Not every patient diagnosed with dengue needs immediate admission. Some patients are clinically stable but still require close monitoring, especially during the critical phase of the illness. At present, many such patients are sent home with advice to return if they develop warning symptoms. While this is clinically reasonable, it places a heavy responsibility on families, and danger signs may be missed or recognized late.
A remote monitoring system can close this gap. Once a patient is diagnosed with dengue at a hospital, clinic or laboratory, the patient can be registered into a digital platform. Basic details such as age, day of fever, symptoms, risk factors, etc can be entered. Based on this information, patients can be categorized into low-risk, moderate-risk or high-risk groups according to national clinical guidance.
Patients who are suitable for home care can then be followed up through structured phone calls, SMS, WhatsApp-based forms or a simple mobile application. They or their caregivers can report temperature, pulse, blood pressure if available, vomiting, abdominal pain, dizziness, bleeding symptoms, urine output, fluid intake, and general well-being.
These data can be monitored by a dedicated panel of doctors through a centralized digital dashboard, allowing timely clinical review and appropriate decision-making. Such a system is not intended to replace existing clinical care, but to strengthen the health system by supporting early identification of at-risk patients, improving follow-up, and reducing the unnecessary burden on already crowded hospitals.
Depending on the severity, the patient can be advised to visit the nearest hospital, referred to the area Medical Officer of Health, or connected to an ambulance service. This creates a safer pathway from home to hospital before the condition becomes critical.
The same system can also be used for patients discharged from the hospital. A few days of remote follow-up after discharge can provide reassurance, detect late complications, and reduce unnecessary readmissions.
Sri Lanka already has a strong public health network, including hospitals, MOH offices, public health inspectors and dengue control units. What is needed now is better digital coordination. A low-cost, well-designed remote monitoring system can connect patients, doctors, hospitals and emergency services in a timely manner.
Dengue prevention will always depend on mosquito control, clean environments and community participation. But during an outbreak, timely information can save lives. Remote health monitoring offers Sri Lanka a practical way to protect patients, reduce hospital pressure and deliver the right care at the right time.
by Dr. Harsha Jayakody
Board-certified specialist in Health Informatics
MBBS (Sri Lanka), MBA in Health Admin (Malaysia), MSc in Biomedical Informatics (Sri Lanka), MD in Health Informatics (Sri Lanka)
Midweek Review
The sordid tale of theft and tragedy at Finance Ministry
The latest deplorable revelations in the Committee on Public Finance (COPF) report ‘The Fraud Linked to Cybercrime in the US Dollar 2.5 Million Debt Repayment to Australia’, presented to parliament on July 10th tells a tale of irresponsibility, incompetence and disregard for the most important of tasks that are bestowed on a Ministry that is of paramount importance to a country striving to come out of a serious economic crisis.
Every new crisis adds a burden on the backs of the innocent citizens paying for the sins of those who caused it. This time, as in other times, the crisis was caused by those who sit high above the citizenry, governing the country or running its affairs; by those who perpetrated the fraud deliberately, and no less by those who enabled it through incompetence, inattention and perhaps ignorance.
The incredible ease with which the shameful theft of 2.5 million US Dollars occurred in the Ministry of Finance reveals that this theft was facilitated by a series of lapses by those in charge of its processes, as COPF discovered, and was most certainly avoidable.
Ten fraudulent transactions had been allowed to pass through the precincts of the Finance Ministry and the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, before it was discovered that they were the unwitting pawns in a straightforward cybercrime. Two institutions that ordinary citizens hold in high trust and esteem had their pockets picked in broad daylight.
Transition Errors
This whole unsavoury affair starts with a transition.
In order to better manage foreign debt, the government, “in keeping with international standards”, decided to institute a new unit to take care of all things to do with foreign debt within the Ministry of Finance. It is called the Public Debt Management Office (PMOD). It took away those duties from the Central Bank (CBSL), which handled the tasks earlier.
COPF says that “the fraud linked to cybercrime under consideration happened within this process.” It certainly did.
The process of transition from CBSL to PMOD had holes the size of 2.5 million US dollars. And the irresponsible handling of this transition has so far led to the death of a young bureaucrat, so let’s not treat this casually or lightly. Those who undertook to oversee this process to a successful finish must surely examine their own part in this tragic story.
Non-Actions Have Consequences
The transition took 18 months. November 2024 to March 2026. Long enough to ensure that the CBSL had passed on its processes, training and experience to a new team at the PMOD to a satisfactory standard.
One wouldn’t think that an old and respected institution with what we assume were its tested systems and processes, passing on its expertise to a brand-new unit specifically set up to deal with an important set of tasks, would get it wrong. But it did.
COPF was not happy:
* The Committee found no document that provided a detailed guideline or terms of reference for this complex, multifaceted transition process involving multiple institutions.
* There are no KPIs available to judge whether the transition was completed in an adequate manner.
* Even the guidelines that govern the operations of the PDMO were only published on 19 September 2025, 10 months after the establishment of the office.
* The MoU between the CBSL and PDMO on their areas of collaboration was only signed on 9 March 2026, almost at the end of the official transition period.
It looks like there was inadequate planning from the very start. Every mistake, every slipshod move, every skipping of essential steps in the process, is what the citizen ends up paying for, and even dying for.
The COPF report shows a 4-step CBSL process through which debt repayments transit, from receiving and checking invoices to confirming payment details through to the final payment.
Each is carried out by a separate section.
Each stage is part of an internal controls system, where important checks are carried out to prevent errors and/or fraud.
After the transition to PDMO, there seems to have been a serious lack of internal controls with the checks necessary to prevent fraud.
The COPF specifically faults the PDMO for not securing its IT infrastructure:
* PDMO’s outdated IT system which “left it at complete risk of cyberattacks”.
* Shortfalls in IT infrastructure and cybersecurity measures at the MoF, including the ERD, were highlighted in a comprehensive audit carried out by KPMG…in December 2024.
* Fraud linked to cybercrime in question commenced in mid-November 2025, only a month after the server system stopped receiving Microsoft security updates.
Early Warnings
The COPF report highlights the fact that early in January 2026 a cybersecurity threat was discovered during a debt repayment to be made to the Export-Import (EXIM) Bank of India:
“When CBSL attempted to make payment to the account details provided by the PDMO, with JP Morgan as intermediary, the payment was rejected by JPMorgan’s Global Fraud Prevention Operations team. Contact was made by PDMO officials with an EXIM Bank of India team, allowing the MoF to confirm that fraudulent payment instructions had been provided.”
The details of the attempted fraud are an exact copy of the one that succeeded later with the Australian payment, which failed in the case of India:
“Payment was then made to the correct account, verified through communication with the EXIM Bank of India. This suspicious activity was reported to the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and SL-CERT on 9th January 2026. The ERD IT Officer’s complaint to SL-CERT mentioned that the suspected fraudulent email address used the domain eximbenkindia.in (while the correct domain appears to be eximbankindia.in).”
This was not the end of it. There was more!
When the cybersecurity threat regarding the Indian payment was reported to the Secretary of the Treasury triggering an investigation by the Director General of the ERD, a veritable treasure trove of fraudulent emails was discovered:
“Payment instructions received via email for several other due payments, including for payments to the United Kingdom (USD 1,294,605.99), Germany (EUR 4,059,987.81) and Belgium (EUR 60,974.88) were further identified as fraudulent.”
What would have happened if not for the JP Morgan team in India? Would these also have gone through, to a thieving scammer? In the event, the report says:
“UK was suspended immediately. Communications initiated by the suspicious party were identified and investigative authorities were alerted. The payment related to Belgium was made to the correct account.”
That’s two saved. What happened to the German payment of Euro 4,059,987.81? Did we pay it to a scammer?
So, it is in the process of verifying these fraudulent payment details that the Ministry of Finance was “alerted on 23rd March 2026 to communications from Export Finance Australia of non-receipt of debt repayments due in previous months.”
The report reproduces the email exchanges on the same set of Australian invoices from 3 different email addresses:
* @exportfinance.gov.au
* @exportfinance-au.com
* @exportfinanceau.com
The communications from these different email accounts were on-going from October 2025, but the fraud was discovered only in March 2026. By then the damage was done. Payments had already been made to the fraudulent account.
This is especially worrying because the COPF report says that after the debt restructure in October 2025, “The MoF officials said in Committee that the existing account details for Export Finance Australia repayments had not been changed in the revised agreement.”
The COPF makes the important observation that the system of internal controls at the MoF are grossly inadequate, citing one example:
“The final payment authorisation within MoF has historically been done by a Director with authority over the Debt Servicing function, at ERD and now PDMO, without any verification process by more senior officials, highlighting weak internal controls.”
The report lists some measures that have been taken by the MoF to prevent any recurrence. However, they add:
“These measures pertain to establishing and strengthening internal controls and ensuring basic cybersecurity within the Ministry of Finance. They should have been in place as a baseline…”
Me Sir? No Sir, Not I Sir!
The views expressed by both the MoF and the CBSL as to who was responsible for these blunders make interesting reading because they reveal more about them than they realize.
COPF says that at the 8th June discussions:
“The Ministry of Finance was of the view that the CBSL should have been more vigilant and taken proactive measures…CBSL was of the view that there was no legal responsibility under the FTRA for its role as banker to the government.”
The practiced passing of the buck between these two institutions is unsavoury, if revealing. Shouldn’t they have carried out an immediate review of their own conduct to discover where each might have failed, individually and together?
The AG has concurred with the CBSL in its view regarding CBSL’s legal responsibility. However, since CBSL had been doing the job until now, had undertaken the training of the new team and transition of the processes, they had a professional responsibility to ensure that adequate systems were in place to mitigate the risks that they, rather than a brand-new team, were far more experienced at identifying.
Isn’t it fair and reasonable to expect that the CBSL would regard it as their responsibility to give adequate training which includes the right internal controls and monitoring, and to see the process through to implementation to their total satisfaction?
As for the MoF, COPF says:
“The MoF was of the view that during the period in which the PDMO officials created the SSIs for the repayments on fraudulent invoices in November 2025, PDD-CBSL officials continued to oversee the process.”
Why did the MoF think they were ready to takeover from the CBSL and run the show, when they admitted to COPF that “PDMO staff did not have a proper understanding of international fund transfer processes and AML concerns, which limited their ability to act upon limited information provided by CBSL staff on such matters.” Shouldn’t they have dealt with this before they went ‘live’, as it were?
It gets even more alarming when the CBSL tells COPF that
* “internal controls within the MoF for payment verification are dysfunctional”
* “CBSL cannot ensure verification through its payments process, acknowledging that even the CBSL PDD would have failed to prevent a fraud linked to cybercrime in such a scenario.”
What were the Ministers doing, while their systems got so dysfunctional that according to CBSL, a fraud couldn’t have been prevented?
What happened in this inadequately conceived and planned transition resulted in more than a substantial financial loss. The MoF suspended 4 officials pending investigations into the fraud. One of those officials, Ranga Rajapaksa, an Assistant Director of the External Resources Department (ERD) was found dead on April 30, 2026, at his residence in Kuliyapitiya. A post-mortem ruled the death a suicide.
[Sanja de Silva Jayatilleka was a member of the team that transitioned GlaxoSmithKline UK’s Financial Services from Britain to India, overseeing the training, testing, final transitioning and post-transition support of the Compliance and Control function.]
by Sanja de Silva Jayatilleka
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