Features
The New Constitution and political intrigues
Excerpted from volume ii of Sarath Amunugama’s autobiography
One of the important pledges made by the UNP at the 1977 election was the abolition of the 1972 Constitution of the United Front, associated with Colvin R de Silva, and the introduction of it new constitution w ith an Executive Presidency. This far reaching proposal had been made by JRJ many years earlier in an address to the Ceylon Association for the Advancement of Science. As with all of JRJ’s proposals from the days of the Ceylon National Congress and the State Council, they were novel, well considered and designed to make a significant change in the ‘status quo’.
It was not taken seriously even by the UNP of the time which was under Dudley’s leadership. However, JRJ as usual was serious and thorough. He discussed its implications primarily with his top legal advisors led by his brother Harry and J.L. Cooray – a constitutional expert. He also consulted two scholars of constitution making – Kingsley de Silva and A.J. Wilson, both of Peradeniya University. With the requisite ffive sixths majority in Parliament he gained in 1977, the stage was set to enact the revolutionary constitutional changes he had advocated years earlier.
It was no secret that JRJ would introduce a radically new constitution for the country. He had advocated the need for a constitution with a powerful Executive Presidency both at public meetings and in Parliament. Within two months of his victory, he set up a select committee of Parliament to “consider the revision of the Constitution and other written laws as the Committee may consider necessary”. By November these changes were presented as the second amendment to the 1972 Constitution to Parliament and passed with more than a two third majority.
Consequently, JRJ took his oaths as Executive President on Independence Day February 4, 1978 on Galle Face Green. In our discussions regarding the oath taking JRJ with his usual panache said that he wanted the oath taking to be before a large gathering of the people. He proposed the Galle Face green. Our Ministry proposed that the morning ceremony be followed by a mass musical show on Galle Face Green in the evening. That was a sure way of filling the grounds and GVP Samarasinghe who chaired the preparatory meeting gave us his enthusiastic support.
To improve on the shining hour I asked the SLBC to get down the top popular singers of Hindi film songs for the musical show. This was not difficult because Hindi film makers depended on SLBC broadcasts on their India beam to popularize their products. We had a virtual monopoly of All India broadcasts. Consequently, we got down Mohammed Rafi, Mahendra Kapoor and Asha Bhosle.. The show was announced by SLBC over the airwaves.
From early morning crowds began to throng the green and JRJ’s dream of swearing in before a multitude of people was realized. He may have thought that they all came to cheer him. GVP was happy to receive accolades on our behalf for his stage arrangements. JRJ gifted the pen he used to sign the pledge to the national archives.
We in the Information Ministry had no role in planning the new constitution, unlike in the case of the 1972 constitution which I have described in Volume One. But we could comprehend the background to JRJ’s move in our informal discussions with Ministers and other Parliamentarians. The first information was that JRJ had been traumatized by the 1956 defeat of the UNP and his own defeat in the Kelaniya electorate. He had continuously represented Kelaniya for several decades from the State Council days.
Yet he had been easily defeated by R.G. Senanayake whose sole objective was to get personal revenge. In 1956 the UNP had actually won more votes than the MEP. But due to the prevailing electoral system the UNP had won only a few seats. JRJ concluded that the solution was to find away to give value to every vote through the ‘Proportional Representation’ system. PR had the added advantage in his view, that it would always provide for a strong opposition in Parliament which would prevent radical and hasty legislation. The second imperative was to strengthen the role of the Party; mainly because the UNP had been up to then the largest and best organized political party in the country. His original idea was to have an election in which the voter would only vote for a party of his choice.
On the allocation of seats depending on the number of votes polled, the relevant Party, through its Secretary, would nominate its quota of members to Parliament. To further strengthen the hold of the Party, any MP crossing over would forfeit his seat. Younger advisors Lalith and Gamini however suggested that the conferring of all powers to the Party officials would discourage their grass roots supporters who tend to gather round individual leaders. It was too heavily stacked in favour of the seniors who were not necessarily more intelligent or popular.
Accordingly the original proposal was amended to include a preferential ballot system which would enable the voter to choose three candidates from the party list. That proposal, which was adopted, came from Athulathmudali. But the biggest change was the introduction of the Executive Presidency. The Executive President would be elected on the basis of a nationwide poll. He would form a cabinet from the MPs and one of whom would be the Prime Minister whose basic responsibility would be to ensure the passage of legislation as proposed by the Cabinet led by the President.
He was essentially a manager of Parliamentary affairs whom Premadasa derisively said was ‘no more than a peon’. Thus, the legislature is brought in as an accessory to the Executive President who any way had the power to dissolve parliament after one year of its term. The President also appointed the senior judges and the Judicial and Public Service Commissions. It was a constitution in which the President is supreme.
The Constitutional scholar A.J. Wilson called it a ‘Gaullist Constitution’ though in reality it was an amalgam of the French and American Executive Presidential systems. The concentration of powers in the hands of the President was its primary objective. It alarmed the Opposition precisely because of that. As Dr. N.M. Perera, himself a constitutional expert, said “What if the President goes mad?” thereby highlighting the danger of an individualistic approach to the use, or abuse, of State power.
Some safeguards were included no doubt but, as we saw later, they were insufficient. At the base of this transformation however was the five sixths majority that JRJ had obtained in the 1977 election. The new constitution with PR was designed to ensure that it did not happen again. It did because President Gotabaya Rajapaksa managed to win nearly a two third majority in Parliamentary election of 2020.
JRJ with his long political experience and commitment to Parliamentary values may have hoped to tailor a constitution which could promote quick economic growth while maintaining basic human rights. But a series of unfortunate decisions led to a sense of bitterness in the Opposition that did not auger well for a consensual approach which was necessary if the new Constitution was not to descend to autocracy.
Parliament
The 1977 Parliament was like no other. The long-standing balance between the Government and the Opposition did not prevail. For the first time the Parliamentary Opposition could not be considered a government in waiting. Also for the first timer the Leader of the Opposition was not a Sinhalese. The Sirimavo regime was routed in 1977 because JRJ had cunningly removed all the props of the SLFP-led United Front. The Left, particularly the LSSP and the CP, were alienated from Mrs. B And after bringing a damning no—confidence motion against her personally, they formed their own Left Alliance. At the hustings they criticized Mrs. B and the SLFP more than the UNP. The Left even promoted a breakaway group of SLFPers, including Mrs. B’s relative, Nanda Ellawela, to join them, which added to the misery of the PM.
Then JRJ deftly neutralized the JVP. Wijeweera and his top leadership who were languishing in prison, struck a deal whereby they would be released after a UNP victory. Reciprocally, the JVP then attacked Mrs. B thinking that by sinking the SLFP they could sweep up the anti-UNP votes and become the main opposition in the country. After isolating Mrs. Bandaranaike, JRJ made overtures through Colombo Tamil businessmen to the TULF These businessmen were smarting under the austerity measures of the SLFP regime and its promotion of favourite Sinhala Mudalalis.
Finally he reached out to disgruntled SLFPers like R.S. Perera, Maithripala Senanayake and Kalugalle who had been attacked by the UK returned Anura Bandaranaike. Anura was angry that JRJ’s offer to get him to Parliament unopposed from a Rajarata seat was sabotaged by Maitripala and his supporters. All these maneuvers worked and the SLFP was decimated. The SLFP defeat was so decisive that they trailed behind the TULF in numbers in the opposition. As a result, Amithalingam, the TULF leader was made the Leader of the Opposition and Mrs. B was made to eat humble pie. There was mounting criticism of her rule from within the party. She had to expend her energy in keeping the warring SLFP groups together. To make matters worse her son and favourite, Anura turned against her.
Inherent Problems
In retrospect all these maneuvers may be seen as a JRJ exercise in overkill. He had, by trying to be too smart, created an environment which came back to haunt him later, particularly during his second term. By marginalizing Mrs. B and the SLFP he pushed them to an extreme Sinhala nationalist position. Their only concern then became to wrong foot JRJ and his policies at any cost. By making Amirthalingam the Leader of the Opposition, JRJ provided him with many facilities to peddle a separatist line which added to the fears of the Sinhalese.
This soured ethnic relations even further. JRJ’s solution was to promote Cyril Mathew as the voice of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism within his Cabinet. Mathew went on the rampage alienating not only the Tamils but also middle of the road Sinhalese who wanted to settle the ethnic issue peacefully. Since Mathew was Esmond’s friend I knew through him that it was JRJ who was behind his outbursts. But the net result of these stratagems was a rapid worsening of ethnic relations in the country.
To make matters worse Mrs. B used her considerable influence with Indira Gandhi to paint the new Government as Anti-Indian and Pro-American. Unfortunately for Sri Lanka this was a time when there was a radical shift in Indian foreign policy wherein Indira Gandhi adopted a theory of ‘Bharat as a regional hegemon’. Indian strategic think tanks were promoting a concept of the ‘Indian sphere of influence’. The open economy and globalization that JRJ and Ronnie turned to was interpreted as a ‘test case’ and a challenge to Indian interests in the region.
This led to a special concern in the fate of the Tamils particularly as Indira Gandhi, pushed into the opposition, wished to play the ‘Tamil Nadu’ card in the increasingly murky political atmosphere of the time. This was particularly ironic because the northern dominated Indian Government had just emerged from a grueling linguistic conflict with its southern states which resisted the imposition of Hindi as the national language over Tamil and other regional languages. This conflict between the North and South of India had been resolved with the acceptance of the notion of ‘linguistic states’ – a development which did not go unnoticed by the Sri Lankan Tamils.
While JRJ’s tactics were Applauded by the UNP, the country was slipping step by step into a quagmire of regional misunderstandings and domestic ethnic conflict which finally destabilized the country for three decades and blunted the trajectory of economic growth which had started with much promise in 1977. The new President could not see it coming. Nor did his advisors and our Foreign Ministry which was still dominated by the ‘Anti-Indianist’ officials. As Gabriel Marques has written “It is easy to start a war but it is not easy to stop one.” Sri Lanka was on the slippery slope to an ethnic war.
Tension was intensified with the deprivation of the civic rights of Mrs. B, Felix and several senior officials. Whatever may have been the reasons given for this decision, which was facilitated by the Government’s steamroller majority in Parliament, it was clear that there were other, and less altruistic, motives for this drastic move. One obvious need was to eliminate the prospect of Mrs. B being JRJ’s rival at the next Presidential election. Since under the new constitution a President could have two terms of office, JRJ was the automatic choice of the UNP for the election due in 1983. Mrs. B would equally have been the automatic choice of the SLFP as his rival.
Without her the SLFP would be at a disadvantage since it had no other leader of her stature. The numerous aspirants to succeed her began to fight with each other. At that time the talk in town was that there was something more personal in JRJ’s insistence on depriving his rival of her civic rights. The President believed, it was said, that Mrs. B had deliberately ordered the arrest of his only son Ravi during the early days of the 1971 JVP uprising. Ravi was an Olympic level marksman and it was not difficult for rumor mongers to convince her that he had a hand in training insurgents in the use of firearms.
A few days later, after JRJ had made representations, Ravi was released. But it was said that he harbored a grudge because “my son was forced eat out of a tin plate”. Since I was in Temple Trees in April 1971, as I have described in Volume One of my Autobiography, I knew personally that Mrs. B had at that time, no grudge against JRJ or Ravi and she quickly released him after she was informed of his arrest and Police clearance was obtained. But in the poisoned atmosphere of the time facts did not matter and revenge was high on the agenda.
I too felt that it was not proper to deprive the former PM of her civic rights. Many prevailed on my friend minister Gamini Dissanayake to try and stop this misadventure. Among those who advised Gamini were many Kandyans who said that Mrs. B did not deserve this treatment. At that time Gamini was cannily wooing the Kandyans in Colombo who were it considerable number. JRJ, in a typical sleight of hand, sought to put this matter before Cabinet. Gamini was requested by many to intervene in Cabinet on Mrs. B’s behalf.
He, on the other hand faced a dilemma because he knew that JRJ was the author of this convoluted scenario and would not be pleased if his cabinet paper was challenged. Gamini, who did not want to alienate the supporters of Mrs B decided to have a top secret meeting with Hector Kobbekaduwa who at that time was living in Aloe Avenue. Unfortunately for him, Gamini Athukorale, at that time a UNP Junior minister, also lived in Aloe Avenue and spotted Minister Dissanayake sneaking into Kobbekaduwa’s house. The following day he reported this to JRJ, who was furious.
He even spoke to his friends about removing Gamini from the Cabinet on grounds of breaching Cabinet confidentiality. That night Gamini came to my house at Siripa road in a panic. He told me that I could help him by persuading my Minister Anandatissa to defend him at the Cabinet meeting and also raise his voice against JRJ’s proposal. By this time Amanda had told me that he too was unhappy about this move. So it was not difficult for me to approach him on Gamini’s behalf. When I spoke to him, I got the feeling that the canny Gamini, fighting for his political life, had got others also to influence my Minister. The upshot was that Ananda made a strong case on Mrs. B’s behalf at the Cabinet meeting.
Though he and Gamini were out voted, JRJ noted that there was resistance especially because many other Ministers kept silent during the discussion. He made up with Gamini and good relations were re-established; but Mrs. B was stripped of her civic rghts. There is a postscript to this episode. Mrs. B was grateful to Gamini for his gesture and would treat him with great courtesy when he and I saw her during our DUNF days. In the days of the Premadasa impeachment she had absolute confidence in Gamini and allowed her party to join Lalith and Gamini in their reckless bid to take revenge from Premadasa.
I was told that Mrs. B cried when she heard of Gamini’s death. This episode also created an enmity between Gamini and Athukorale which persisted up till the former’s death. Premadasa cashed in on this enmity and appointed Athukorale as the successor Minister to Gamini in the Mahaweli Ministry. Athukorale immediately began a witch hunt and wanted to implicate Wickrema Weerasooria in a land deal, but he was not successful. Later in the Gamini–Ranil conflict in the UNP, Athukorale became Ranil’s chief supporter. But here again he failed because Gamini beat Ranil by one vote in the leadership contest. Then Ranil and Athukorale tried hard to sabotage Gamini’s Presidential bid.
Features
Theocratic Iran facing unprecedented challenge
The world is having the evidence of its eyes all over again that ‘economics drives politics’ and this time around the proof is coming from theocratic Iran. Iranians in their tens of thousands are on the country’s streets calling for a regime change right now but it is all too plain that the wellsprings of the unprecedented revolt against the state are economic in nature. It is widespread financial hardship and currency depreciation, for example, that triggered the uprising in the first place.
However, there is no denying that Iran’s current movement for drastic political change has within its fold multiple other forces, besides the economically affected, that are urging a comprehensive transformation as it were of the country’s political system to enable the equitable empowerment of the people. For example, the call has been gaining ground with increasing intensity over the weeks that the country’s number one theocratic ruler, President Ali Khamenei, steps down from power.
That is, the validity and continuation of theocratic rule is coming to be questioned unprecedentedly and with increasing audibility and boldness by the public. Besides, there is apparently fierce opposition to the concentration of political power at the pinnacle of the Iranian power structure.
Popular revolts have been breaking out every now and then of course in Iran over the years, but the current protest is remarkable for its social diversity and the numbers it has been attracting over the past few weeks. It could be described as a popular revolt in the genuine sense of the phrase. Not to be also forgotten is the number of casualties claimed by the unrest, which stands at some 2000.
Of considerable note is the fact that many Iranian youths have been killed in the revolt. It points to the fact that youth disaffection against the state has been on the rise as well and could be at boiling point. From the viewpoint of future democratic development in Iran, this trend needs to be seen as positive.
Politically-conscious youngsters prioritize self-expression among other fundamental human rights and stifling their channels of self-expression, for example, by shutting down Internet communication links, would be tantamount to suppressing youth aspirations with a heavy hand. It should come as no surprise that they are protesting strongly against the state as well.
Another notable phenomenon is the increasing disaffection among sections of Iran’s women. They too are on the streets in defiance of the authorities. A turning point in this regard was the death of Mahsa Amini in 2022, which apparently befell her all because she defied state orders to be dressed in the Hijab. On that occasion as well, the event brought protesters in considerable numbers onto the streets of Tehran and other cities.
Once again, from the viewpoint of democratic development the increasing participation of Iranian women in popular revolts should be considered thought-provoking. It points to a heightening political consciousness among Iranian women which may not be easy to suppress going forward. It could also mean that paternalism and its related practices and social forms may need to be re-assessed by the authorities.
It is entirely a matter for the Iranian people to address the above questions, the neglect of which could prove counter-productive for them, but it is all too clear that a relaxing of authoritarian control over the state and society would win favour among a considerable section of the populace.
However, it is far too early to conclude that Iran is at risk of imploding. This should be seen as quite a distance away in consideration of the fact that the Iranian government is continuing to possess its coercive power. Unless the country’s law enforcement authorities turn against the state as well this coercive capability will remain with Iran’s theocratic rulers and the latter will be in a position to quash popular revolts and continue in power. But the ruling authorities could not afford the luxury of presuming that all will be well at home, going into the future.
Meanwhile US President Donald Trump has assured the Iranian people of his assistance but it is not clear as to what form such support would take and when it would be delivered. The most important way in which the Trump administration could help the Iranian people is by helping in the process of empowering them equitably and this could be primarily achieved only by democratizing the Iranian state.
It is difficult to see the US doing this to even a minor measure under President Trump. This is because the latter’s principal preoccupation is to make the ‘US Great Once again’, and little else. To achieve the latter, the US will be doing battle with its international rivals to climb to the pinnacle of the international political system as the unchallengeable principal power in every conceivable respect.
That is, Realpolitik considerations would be the main ‘stuff and substance’ of US foreign policy with a corresponding downplaying of things that matter for a major democratic power, including the promotion of worldwide democratic development and the rendering of humanitarian assistance where it is most needed. The US’ increasing disengagement from UN development agencies alone proves the latter.
Given the above foreign policy proclivities it is highly unlikely that the Iranian people would be assisted in any substantive way by the Trump administration. On the other hand, the possibility of US military strikes on Iranian military targets in the days ahead cannot be ruled out.
The latter interventions would be seen as necessary by the US to keep the Middle Eastern military balance in favour of Israel. Consequently, any US-initiated peace moves in the real sense of the phrase in the Middle East would need to be ruled out in the foreseeable future. In other words, Middle East peace will remain elusive.
Interestingly, the leadership moves the Trump administration is hoping to make in Venezuela, post-Maduro, reflect glaringly on its foreign policy preoccupations. Apparently, Trump will be preferring to ‘work with’ Delcy Rodriguez, acting President of Venezuela, rather than Maria Corina Machado, the principal opponent of Nicolas Maduro, who helped sustain the opposition to Maduro in the lead-up to the latter’s ouster and clearly the democratic candidate for the position of Venezuelan President.
The latter development could be considered a downgrading of the democratic process and a virtual ‘slap in its face’. While the democratic rights of the Venezuelan people will go disregarded by the US, a comparative ‘strong woman’ will receive the Trump administration’s blessings. She will perhaps be groomed by Trump to protect the US’s security and economic interests in South America, while his administration side-steps the promotion of the democratic empowerment of Venezuelans.
Features
Silk City: A blueprint for municipal-led economic transformation in Sri Lanka
Maharagama today stands at a crossroads. With the emergence of new political leadership, growing public expectations, and the convergence of professional goodwill, the Maharagama Municipal Council (MMC) has been presented with a rare opportunity to redefine the city’s future. At the heart of this moment lies the Silk City (Seda Nagaraya) Initiative (SNI)—a bold yet pragmatic development blueprint designed to transform Maharagama into a modern, vibrant, and economically dynamic urban hub.
This is not merely another urban development proposal. Silk City is a strategic springboard—a comprehensive economic and cultural vision that seeks to reposition Maharagama as Sri Lanka’s foremost textile-driven commercial city, while enhancing livability, employment, and urban dignity for its residents. The Silk City concept represents more than a development plan: it is a comprehensive economic blueprint designed to redefine Maharagama as Sri Lanka’s foremost textile-driven commercial and cultural hub.
A Vision Rooted in Reality
What makes the Silk City Initiative stand apart is its grounding in economic realism. Carefully designed around the geographical, commercial, and social realities of Maharagama, the concept builds on the city’s long-established strengths—particularly its dominance as a textile and retail centre—while addressing modern urban challenges.
The timing could not be more critical. With Mayor Saman Samarakoon assuming leadership at a moment of heightened political goodwill and public anticipation, MMC is uniquely positioned to embark on a transformation of unprecedented scale. Leadership, legitimacy, and opportunity have aligned—a combination that cities rarely experience.
A Voluntary Gift of National Value
In an exceptional and commendable development, the Maharagama Municipal Council has received—entirely free of charge—a comprehensive development proposal titled “Silk City – Seda Nagaraya.” Authored by Deshamanya, Deshashkthi J. M. C. Jayasekera, a distinguished Chartered Accountant and Chairman of the JMC Management Institute, the proposal reflects meticulous research, professional depth, and long-term strategic thinking.
It must be added here that this silk city project has received the political blessings of the Parliamentarians who represented the Maharagama electorate. They are none other than Sunil Kumara Gamage, Minister of Sports and Youth Affairs, Sunil Watagala, Deputy Minister of Public Security and Devananda Suraweera, Member of Parliament.
The blueprint outlines ten integrated sectoral projects, including : A modern city vision, Tourism and cultural city development, Clean and green city initiatives, Religious and ethical city concepts, Garden city aesthetics, Public safety and beautification, Textile and creative industries as the economic core
Together, these elements form a five-year transformation agenda, capable of elevating Maharagama into a model municipal economy and a 24-hour urban hub within the Colombo Metropolitan Region
Why Maharagama, Why Now?
Maharagama’s transformation is not an abstract ambition—it is a logical evolution. Strategically located and commercially vibrant, the city already attracts thousands of shoppers daily. With structured investment, branding, and infrastructure support, Maharagama can evolve into a sleepless commercial destination, a cultural and tourism node, and a magnet for both local and international consumers.
Such a transformation aligns seamlessly with modern urban development models promoted by international development agencies—models that prioritise productivity, employment creation, poverty reduction, and improved quality of life.
Rationale for Transformation
Maharagama has long held a strategic advantage as one of Sri Lanka’s textile and retail centers. With proper planning and investment, this identity can be leveraged to convert the city into a branded urban destination, a sleepless commercial hub, a tourism and cultural attraction, and a vibrant economic engine within the Colombo Metropolitan Region. Such transformation is consistent with modern city development models promoted by international funding agencies that seek to raise local productivity, employment, quality of life, alleviation of urban poverty, attraction and retaining a huge customer base both local and international to the city)
Current Opportunity
The convergence of the following factors make this moment and climate especially critical. Among them the new political leadership with strong public support, availability of a professionally developed concept paper, growing public demand for modernisation, interest among public, private, business community and civil society leaders to contribute, possibility of leveraging traditional strengths (textile industry and commercial vibrancy are notable strengths.
The Silk City initiative therefore represents a timely and strategic window for Maharagama to secure national attention, donor interest and investor confidence.
A Window That Must Not Be Missed
Several factors make this moment decisive: Strong new political leadership with public mandate, Availability of a professionally developed concept, Rising citizen demand for modernization, Willingness of professionals, businesses, and civil society to contribute. The city’s established textile and commercial base
Taken together, these conditions create a strategic window to attract national attention, donor interest, and investor confidence.
But windows close.
Hard Truths: Challenges That Must Be Addressed
Ambition alone will not deliver transformation. The Silk City Initiative demands honest recognition of institutional constraints. MMC currently faces: Limited technical and project management capacity, rigid public-sector regulatory frameworks that slow procurement and partnerships, severe financial limitations, with internal revenues insufficient even for routine operations, the absence of a fully formalised, high-caliber Steering Committee.
Moreover, this is a mega urban project, requiring feasibility studies, impact assessments, bankable proposals, international partnerships, and sustained political and community backing.
A Strategic Roadmap for Leadership
For Mayor Saman Samarakoon, this represents a once-in-a-generation leadership moment. Key strategic actions are essential: 1.Immediate establishment of a credible Steering Committee, drawing expertise from government, private sector, academia, and civil society. 2. Creation of a dedicated Project Management Unit (PMU) with professional specialists. 3. Aggressive mobilisation of external funding, including central government support, international donors, bilateral partners, development banks, and corporate CSR initiatives. 4. Strategic political engagement to secure legitimacy and national backing. 5. Quick-win projects to build public confidence and momentum. 6. A structured communications strategy to brand and promote Silk City nationally and internationally. Firm positioning of textiles and creative industries as the heart of Maharagama’s economic identity
If successfully implemented, Silk City will not only redefine Maharagama’s future but also ensure that the names of those who led this transformation are etched permanently in the civic history of the city.
Voluntary Gift of National Value
Maharagama is intrinsically intertwined with the textile industry. Small scale and domestic textile industry play a pivotal role. Textile industry generates a couple of billion of rupees to the Maharagama City per annum. It is the one and only city that has a sleepless night and this textile hub provides ready-made garments to the entire country. Prices are comparatively cheaper. If this textile industry can be vertically and horizontally developed, a substantial income can be generated thus providing employment to vulnerable segments of employees who are mostly women. Paucity of textile technology and capital investment impede the growth of the industry. If Maharagama can collaborate with the Bombay of India textile industry, there would be an unbelievable transition. How Sri Lanka could pursue this goal. A blueprint for the development of the textile industry for the Maharagama City will be dealt with in a separate article due to time space.
It is achievable if the right structures, leadership commitments and partnerships are put in place without delay.
No municipal council in recent memory has been presented with such a pragmatic, forward-thinking and well-timed proposal. Likewise, few Mayors will ever be positioned as you are today — with the ability to initiate a transformation that will redefine the future of Maharagama for generations. It will not be a difficult task for Saman Samarakoon, Mayor of the MMC to accomplish the onerous tasks contained in the projects, with the acumen and experience he gained from his illustrious as a Commander of the SL Navy with the support of the councilors, Municipal staff and the members of the Parliamentarians and the committed team of the Silk-City Project.
Voluntary Gift of National Value
Maharagama is intrinsically intertwined with the textile industry. The textile industries play a pivotal role. This textile hub provides ready-made garments to the entire country. Prices are comparatively cheaper. If this textile industry can be vertically and horizontally developed, a substantial income can be generated thus providing employment to vulnerable segments of employees who are mostly women.
Paucity of textile technology and capital investment impede the growth of the industry. If Maharagama can collaborate with the Bombay of India textile industry, there would be an unbelievable transition. A blueprint for the development of the textile industry for the Maharagama City will be dealt with in a separate article.
J.A.A.S Ranasinghe
Productivity Specialist and Management Consultant
(The writer can becontacted via Email:rathula49@gmail.com)
Features
Reading our unfinished economic story through Bandula Gunawardena’s ‘IMF Prakeerna Visadum’
Book Review
Why Sri Lanka’s Return to the IMF Demands Deeper Reflection
By mid-2022, the term “economic crisis” ceased to be an abstract concept for most Sri Lankans. It was no longer confined to academic papers, policy briefings, or statistical tables. Instead, it became a lived and deeply personal experience. Fuel queues stretched for kilometres under the burning sun. Cooking gas vanished from household shelves. Essential medicines became difficult—sometimes impossible—to find. Food prices rose relentlessly, pushing basic nutrition beyond the reach of many families, while real incomes steadily eroded.
What had long existed as graphs, ratios, and warning signals in economic reports suddenly entered daily life with unforgiving force. The crisis was no longer something discussed on television panels or debated in Parliament; it was something felt at the kitchen table, at the bus stop, and in hospital corridors.
Amid this social and economic turmoil came another announcement—less dramatic in appearance, but far more consequential in its implications. Sri Lanka would once again seek assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
The announcement immediately divided public opinion. For some, the IMF represented an unavoidable lifeline—a last resort to stabilise a collapsing economy. For others, it symbolised a loss of economic sovereignty and a painful surrender to external control. Emotions ran high. Debates became polarised. Public discourse quickly hardened into slogans, accusations, and ideological posturing.
Yet beneath the noise, anger, and fear lay a more fundamental question—one that demanded calm reflection rather than emotional reaction:
Why did Sri Lanka have to return to the IMF at all?
This question does not lend itself to simple or comforting answers. It cannot be explained by a single policy mistake, a single government, or a single external shock. Instead, it requires an honest examination of decades of economic decision-making, institutional weaknesses, policy inconsistency, and political avoidance. It requires looking beyond the immediate crisis and asking how Sri Lanka repeatedly reached a point where IMF assistance became the only viable option.
Few recent works attempt this difficult task as seriously and thoughtfully as Dr. Bandula Gunawardena’s IMF Prakeerna Visadum. Rather than offering slogans or seeking easy culprits, the book situates Sri Lanka’s IMF engagement within a broader historical and structural narrative. In doing so, it shifts the debate away from blame and toward understanding—a necessary first step if the country is to ensure that this crisis does not become yet another chapter in a familiar and painful cycle.
Returning to the IMF: Accident or Inevitability?
The central argument of IMF Prakeerna Visadum is at once simple and deeply unsettling. It challenges a comforting narrative that has gained popularity in times of crisis and replaces it with a far more demanding truth:
Sri Lanka’s economic crisis was not created by the IMF.
IMF intervention became inevitable because Sri Lanka avoided structural reform for far too long.
This framing fundamentally alters the terms of the national debate. It shifts attention away from external blame and towards internal responsibility. Instead of asking whether the IMF is good or bad, Dr. Gunawardena asks a more difficult and more important question: what kind of economy repeatedly drives itself to a point where IMF assistance becomes unavoidable?
The book refuses the two easy positions that dominate public discussion. It neither defends the IMF uncritically as a benevolent saviour nor demonises it as the architect of Sri Lanka’s suffering. Instead, IMF intervention is placed within a broader historical and structural context—one shaped primarily by domestic policy choices, institutional weaknesses, and political avoidance.
Public discourse often portrays IMF programmes as the starting point of economic hardship. Dr. Gunawardena corrects this misconception by restoring the correct chronology—an essential step for any honest assessment of the crisis.
The IMF did not arrive at the beginning of Sri Lanka’s collapse.
It arrived after the collapse had already begun.
By the time negotiations commenced, Sri Lanka had exhausted its foreign exchange reserves, lost access to international capital markets, officially defaulted on its external debt, and entered a phase of runaway inflation and acute shortages.
Fuel queues, shortages of essential medicines, and scarcities of basic food items were not the product of IMF conditionality. They were the direct outcome of prolonged foreign-exchange depletion combined with years of policy mismanagement. Import restrictions were imposed not because the IMF demanded them, but because the country simply could not pay its bills.
From this perspective, the IMF programme did not introduce austerity into a functioning economy. It formalised an adjustment that had already become unavoidable. The economy was already contracting, consumption was already constrained, and living standards were already falling. The IMF framework sought to impose order, sequencing, and credibility on a collapse that was already under way.
Seen through this lens, the return to the IMF was not a freely chosen policy option, but the end result of years of postponed decisions and missed opportunities.
A Long IMF Relationship, Short National Memory
Sri Lanka’s engagement with the IMF is neither new nor exceptional. For decades, governments of all political persuasions have turned to the Fund whenever balance-of-payments pressures became acute. Each engagement was presented as a temporary rescue—an extraordinary response to an unusual storm.
Yet, as Dr. Gunawardena meticulously documents, the storms were not unusual. What was striking was not the frequency of crises, but the remarkable consistency of their underlying causes.
Fiscal indiscipline persisted even during periods of growth. Government revenue remained structurally weak. Public debt expanded rapidly, often financing recurrent expenditure rather than productive investment. Meanwhile, the external sector failed to generate sufficient foreign exchange to sustain a consumption-led growth model.
IMF programmes brought temporary stability. Inflation eased. Reserves stabilised. Growth resumed. But once external pressure diminished, reform momentum faded. Political priorities shifted. Structural weaknesses quietly re-emerged.
This recurring pattern—crisis, adjustment, partial compliance, and relapse—became a defining feature of Sri Lanka’s economic management. The most recent crisis differed only in scale. This time, there was no room left to postpone adjustment.
Fiscal Fragility: The Core of the Crisis
A central focus of IMF Prakeerna Visadum is Sri Lanka’s chronically weak fiscal structure. Despite relatively strong social indicators and a capable administrative state, government revenue as a share of GDP remained exceptionally low.
Frequent tax changes, politically motivated exemptions, and weak enforcement steadily eroded the tax base. Instead of building a stable revenue system, governments relied increasingly on borrowing—both domestic and external.
Much of this borrowing financed subsidies, transfers, and public sector wages rather than productivity-enhancing investment. Over time, debt servicing crowded out development spending, shrinking fiscal space.
Fiscal reform failed not because it was technically impossible, Dr. Gunawardena argues, but because it was politically inconvenient. The costs were immediate and visible; the benefits long-term and diffuse. The eventual debt default was therefore not a surprise, but a delayed consequence.
The External Sector Trap
Sri Lanka’s narrow export base—apparel, tea, tourism, and remittances—generated foreign exchange but masked deeper weaknesses. Export diversification stagnated. Industrial upgrading lagged. Integration into global value chains remained limited.
Meanwhile, import-intensive consumption expanded. When external shocks arrived—global crises, pandemics, commodity price spikes—the economy had little resilience.
Exchange-rate flexibility alone cannot generate exports. Trade liberalisation without an industrial strategy redistributes pain rather than creates growth.
Monetary Policy and the Cost of Lost Credibility
Prolonged monetary accommodation, often driven by political pressure, fuelled inflation, depleted reserves, and eroded confidence. Once credibility was lost, restoring it required painful adjustment.
Macroeconomic credibility, Dr. Gunawardena reminds us, is a national asset. Once squandered, it is extraordinarily expensive to rebuild.
IMF Conditionality: Stabilisation Without Development?
IMF programmes stabilise economies, but they do not automatically deliver inclusive growth. In Sri Lanka, adjustment raised living costs and reduced real incomes. Social safety nets expanded, but gaps persisted.
This raises a critical question: can stabilisation succeed politically if it fails socially?
Political Economy: The Missing Middle
Reforms collided repeatedly with electoral incentives and patronage networks. IMF programmes exposed contradictions but could not resolve them. Without domestic ownership, reform risks becoming compliance rather than transformation.
Beyond Blame: A Diagnostic Moment
The book’s greatest strength lies in its refusal to engage in blame politics. IMF intervention is treated as a diagnostic signal, not a cause—a warning light illuminating unresolved structural failures.
The real challenge is not exiting an IMF programme, but exiting the cycle that makes IMF programmes inevitable.
A Strong Public Appeal: Why This Book Must Be Read
This is not an anti-IMF book.
It is not a pro-IMF book.
It is a pro-Sri Lanka book.
Published by Sarasaviya Publishers, IMF Prakeerna Visadum equips readers not with anger, but with clarity—offering history, evidence, and honest reflection when the country needs them most.
Conclusion: Will We Learn This Time?
The IMF can stabilise an economy.
It cannot build institutions.
It cannot create competitiveness.
It cannot deliver inclusive development.
Those responsibilities remain domestic.
The question before Sri Lanka is simple but profound:
Will we repeat the cycle, or finally learn the lesson?
The answer does not lie in Washington.
It lies with us.
By Professor Ranjith Bandara
Emeritus Professor, University of Colombo
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