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The New Constitution and political intrigues



Excerpted from volume ii of Sarath Amunugama’s autobiography

One of the important pledges made by the UNP at the 1977 election was the abolition of the 1972 Constitution of the United Front, associated with Colvin R de Silva, and the introduction of it new constitution w ith an Executive Presidency. This far reaching proposal had been made by JRJ many years earlier in an address to the Ceylon Association for the Advancement of Science. As with all of JRJ’s proposals from the days of the Ceylon National Congress and the State Council, they were novel, well considered and designed to make a significant change in the ‘status quo’.

It was not taken seriously even by the UNP of the time which was under Dudley’s leadership. However, JRJ as usual was serious and thorough. He discussed its implications primarily with his top legal advisors led by his brother Harry and J.L. Cooray – a constitutional expert. He also consulted two scholars of constitution making – Kingsley de Silva and A.J. Wilson, both of Peradeniya University. With the requisite ffive sixths majority in Parliament he gained in 1977, the stage was set to enact the revolutionary constitutional changes he had advocated years earlier.

It was no secret that JRJ would introduce a radically new constitution for the country. He had advocated the need for a constitution with a powerful Executive Presidency both at public meetings and in Parliament. Within two months of his victory, he set up a select committee of Parliament to “consider the revision of the Constitution and other written laws as the Committee may consider necessary”. By November these changes were presented as the second amendment to the 1972 Constitution to Parliament and passed with more than a two third majority.

Consequently, JRJ took his oaths as Executive President on Independence Day February 4, 1978 on Galle Face Green. In our discussions regarding the oath taking JRJ with his usual panache said that he wanted the oath taking to be before a large gathering of the people. He proposed the Galle Face green. Our Ministry proposed that the morning ceremony be followed by a mass musical show on Galle Face Green in the evening. That was a sure way of filling the grounds and GVP Samarasinghe who chaired the preparatory meeting gave us his enthusiastic support.

To improve on the shining hour I asked the SLBC to get down the top popular singers of Hindi film songs for the musical show. This was not difficult because Hindi film makers depended on SLBC broadcasts on their India beam to popularize their products. We had a virtual monopoly of All India broadcasts. Consequently, we got down Mohammed Rafi, Mahendra Kapoor and Asha Bhosle.. The show was announced by SLBC over the airwaves.

From early morning crowds began to throng the green and JRJ’s dream of swearing in before a multitude of people was realized. He may have thought that they all came to cheer him. GVP was happy to receive accolades on our behalf for his stage arrangements. JRJ gifted the pen he used to sign the pledge to the national archives.

We in the Information Ministry had no role in planning the new constitution, unlike in the case of the 1972 constitution which I have described in Volume One. But we could comprehend the background to JRJ’s move in our informal discussions with Ministers and other Parliamentarians. The first information was that JRJ had been traumatized by the 1956 defeat of the UNP and his own defeat in the Kelaniya electorate. He had continuously represented Kelaniya for several decades from the State Council days.

Yet he had been easily defeated by R.G. Senanayake whose sole objective was to get personal revenge. In 1956 the UNP had actually won more votes than the MEP. But due to the prevailing electoral system the UNP had won only a few seats. JRJ concluded that the solution was to find away to give value to every vote through the ‘Proportional Representation’ system. PR had the added advantage in his view, that it would always provide for a strong opposition in Parliament which would prevent radical and hasty legislation. The second imperative was to strengthen the role of the Party; mainly because the UNP had been up to then the largest and best organized political party in the country. His original idea was to have an election in which the voter would only vote for a party of his choice.

On the allocation of seats depending on the number of votes polled, the relevant Party, through its Secretary, would nominate its quota of members to Parliament. To further strengthen the hold of the Party, any MP crossing over would forfeit his seat. Younger advisors Lalith and Gamini however suggested that the conferring of all powers to the Party officials would discourage their grass roots supporters who tend to gather round individual leaders. It was too heavily stacked in favour of the seniors who were not necessarily more intelligent or popular.

Accordingly the original proposal was amended to include a preferential ballot system which would enable the voter to choose three candidates from the party list. That proposal, which was adopted, came from Athulathmudali. But the biggest change was the introduction of the Executive Presidency. The Executive President would be elected on the basis of a nationwide poll. He would form a cabinet from the MPs and one of whom would be the Prime Minister whose basic responsibility would be to ensure the passage of legislation as proposed by the Cabinet led by the President.

He was essentially a manager of Parliamentary affairs whom Premadasa derisively said was ‘no more than a peon’. Thus, the legislature is brought in as an accessory to the Executive President who any way had the power to dissolve parliament after one year of its term. The President also appointed the senior judges and the Judicial and Public Service Commissions. It was a constitution in which the President is supreme.

The Constitutional scholar A.J. Wilson called it a ‘Gaullist Constitution’ though in reality it was an amalgam of the French and American Executive Presidential systems. The concentration of powers in the hands of the President was its primary objective. It alarmed the Opposition precisely because of that. As Dr. N.M. Perera, himself a constitutional expert, said “What if the President goes mad?” thereby highlighting the danger of an individualistic approach to the use, or abuse, of State power.

Some safeguards were included no doubt but, as we saw later, they were insufficient. At the base of this transformation however was the five sixths majority that JRJ had obtained in the 1977 election. The new constitution with PR was designed to ensure that it did not happen again. It did because President Gotabaya Rajapaksa managed to win nearly a two third majority in Parliamentary election of 2020.

JRJ with his long political experience and commitment to Parliamentary values may have hoped to tailor a constitution which could promote quick economic growth while maintaining basic human rights. But a series of unfortunate decisions led to a sense of bitterness in the Opposition that did not auger well for a consensual approach which was necessary if the new Constitution was not to descend to autocracy.


The 1977 Parliament was like no other. The long-standing balance between the Government and the Opposition did not prevail. For the first time the Parliamentary Opposition could not be considered a government in waiting. Also for the first timer the Leader of the Opposition was not a Sinhalese. The Sirimavo regime was routed in 1977 because JRJ had cunningly removed all the props of the SLFP-led United Front. The Left, particularly the LSSP and the CP, were alienated from Mrs. B And after bringing a damning no—confidence motion against her personally, they formed their own Left Alliance. At the hustings they criticized Mrs. B and the SLFP more than the UNP. The Left even promoted a breakaway group of SLFPers, including Mrs. B’s relative, Nanda Ellawela, to join them, which added to the misery of the PM.

Then JRJ deftly neutralized the JVP. Wijeweera and his top leadership who were languishing in prison, struck a deal whereby they would be released after a UNP victory. Reciprocally, the JVP then attacked Mrs. B thinking that by sinking the SLFP they could sweep up the anti-UNP votes and become the main opposition in the country. After isolating Mrs. Bandaranaike, JRJ made overtures through Colombo Tamil businessmen to the TULF These businessmen were smarting under the austerity measures of the SLFP regime and its promotion of favourite Sinhala Mudalalis.

Finally he reached out to disgruntled SLFPers like R.S. Perera, Maithripala Senanayake and Kalugalle who had been attacked by the UK returned Anura Bandaranaike. Anura was angry that JRJ’s offer to get him to Parliament unopposed from a Rajarata seat was sabotaged by Maitripala and his supporters. All these maneuvers worked and the SLFP was decimated. The SLFP defeat was so decisive that they trailed behind the TULF in numbers in the opposition. As a result, Amithalingam, the TULF leader was made the Leader of the Opposition and Mrs. B was made to eat humble pie. There was mounting criticism of her rule from within the party. She had to expend her energy in keeping the warring SLFP groups together. To make matters worse her son and favourite, Anura turned against her.

Inherent Problems

In retrospect all these maneuvers may be seen as a JRJ exercise in overkill. He had, by trying to be too smart, created an environment which came back to haunt him later, particularly during his second term. By marginalizing Mrs. B and the SLFP he pushed them to an extreme Sinhala nationalist position. Their only concern then became to wrong foot JRJ and his policies at any cost. By making Amirthalingam the Leader of the Opposition, JRJ provided him with many facilities to peddle a separatist line which added to the fears of the Sinhalese.

This soured ethnic relations even further. JRJ’s solution was to promote Cyril Mathew as the voice of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism within his Cabinet. Mathew went on the rampage alienating not only the Tamils but also middle of the road Sinhalese who wanted to settle the ethnic issue peacefully. Since Mathew was Esmond’s friend I knew through him that it was JRJ who was behind his outbursts. But the net result of these stratagems was a rapid worsening of ethnic relations in the country.

To make matters worse Mrs. B used her considerable influence with Indira Gandhi to paint the new Government as Anti-Indian and Pro-American. Unfortunately for Sri Lanka this was a time when there was a radical shift in Indian foreign policy wherein Indira Gandhi adopted a theory of ‘Bharat as a regional hegemon’. Indian strategic think tanks were promoting a concept of the ‘Indian sphere of influence’. The open economy and globalization that JRJ and Ronnie turned to was interpreted as a ‘test case’ and a challenge to Indian interests in the region.

This led to a special concern in the fate of the Tamils particularly as Indira Gandhi, pushed into the opposition, wished to play the ‘Tamil Nadu’ card in the increasingly murky political atmosphere of the time. This was particularly ironic because the northern dominated Indian Government had just emerged from a grueling linguistic conflict with its southern states which resisted the imposition of Hindi as the national language over Tamil and other regional languages. This conflict between the North and South of India had been resolved with the acceptance of the notion of ‘linguistic states’ – a development which did not go unnoticed by the Sri Lankan Tamils.

While JRJ’s tactics were Applauded by the UNP, the country was slipping step by step into a quagmire of regional misunderstandings and domestic ethnic conflict which finally destabilized the country for three decades and blunted the trajectory of economic growth which had started with much promise in 1977. The new President could not see it coming. Nor did his advisors and our Foreign Ministry which was still dominated by the ‘Anti-Indianist’ officials. As Gabriel Marques has written “It is easy to start a war but it is not easy to stop one.” Sri Lanka was on the slippery slope to an ethnic war.

Tension was intensified with the deprivation of the civic rights of Mrs. B, Felix and several senior officials. Whatever may have been the reasons given for this decision, which was facilitated by the Government’s steamroller majority in Parliament, it was clear that there were other, and less altruistic, motives for this drastic move. One obvious need was to eliminate the prospect of Mrs. B being JRJ’s rival at the next Presidential election. Since under the new constitution a President could have two terms of office, JRJ was the automatic choice of the UNP for the election due in 1983. Mrs. B would equally have been the automatic choice of the SLFP as his rival.

Without her the SLFP would be at a disadvantage since it had no other leader of her stature. The numerous aspirants to succeed her began to fight with each other. At that time the talk in town was that there was something more personal in JRJ’s insistence on depriving his rival of her civic rights. The President believed, it was said, that Mrs. B had deliberately ordered the arrest of his only son Ravi during the early days of the 1971 JVP uprising. Ravi was an Olympic level marksman and it was not difficult for rumor mongers to convince her that he had a hand in training insurgents in the use of firearms.

A few days later, after JRJ had made representations, Ravi was released. But it was said that he harbored a grudge because “my son was forced eat out of a tin plate”. Since I was in Temple Trees in April 1971, as I have described in Volume One of my Autobiography, I knew personally that Mrs. B had at that time, no grudge against JRJ or Ravi and she quickly released him after she was informed of his arrest and Police clearance was obtained. But in the poisoned atmosphere of the time facts did not matter and revenge was high on the agenda.

I too felt that it was not proper to deprive the former PM of her civic rights. Many prevailed on my friend minister Gamini Dissanayake to try and stop this misadventure. Among those who advised Gamini were many Kandyans who said that Mrs. B did not deserve this treatment. At that time Gamini was cannily wooing the Kandyans in Colombo who were it considerable number. JRJ, in a typical sleight of hand, sought to put this matter before Cabinet. Gamini was requested by many to intervene in Cabinet on Mrs. B’s behalf.

He, on the other hand faced a dilemma because he knew that JRJ was the author of this convoluted scenario and would not be pleased if his cabinet paper was challenged. Gamini, who did not want to alienate the supporters of Mrs B decided to have a top secret meeting with Hector Kobbekaduwa who at that time was living in Aloe Avenue. Unfortunately for him, Gamini Athukorale, at that time a UNP Junior minister, also lived in Aloe Avenue and spotted Minister Dissanayake sneaking into Kobbekaduwa’s house. The following day he reported this to JRJ, who was furious.

He even spoke to his friends about removing Gamini from the Cabinet on grounds of breaching Cabinet confidentiality. That night Gamini came to my house at Siripa road in a panic. He told me that I could help him by persuading my Minister Anandatissa to defend him at the Cabinet meeting and also raise his voice against JRJ’s proposal. By this time Amanda had told me that he too was unhappy about this move. So it was not difficult for me to approach him on Gamini’s behalf. When I spoke to him, I got the feeling that the canny Gamini, fighting for his political life, had got others also to influence my Minister. The upshot was that Ananda made a strong case on Mrs. B’s behalf at the Cabinet meeting.

Though he and Gamini were out voted, JRJ noted that there was resistance especially because many other Ministers kept silent during the discussion. He made up with Gamini and good relations were re-established; but Mrs. B was stripped of her civic rghts. There is a postscript to this episode. Mrs. B was grateful to Gamini for his gesture and would treat him with great courtesy when he and I saw her during our DUNF days. In the days of the Premadasa impeachment she had absolute confidence in Gamini and allowed her party to join Lalith and Gamini in their reckless bid to take revenge from Premadasa.

I was told that Mrs. B cried when she heard of Gamini’s death. This episode also created an enmity between Gamini and Athukorale which persisted up till the former’s death. Premadasa cashed in on this enmity and appointed Athukorale as the successor Minister to Gamini in the Mahaweli Ministry. Athukorale immediately began a witch hunt and wanted to implicate Wickrema Weerasooria in a land deal, but he was not successful. Later in the Gamini–Ranil conflict in the UNP, Athukorale became Ranil’s chief supporter. But here again he failed because Gamini beat Ranil by one vote in the leadership contest. Then Ranil and Athukorale tried hard to sabotage Gamini’s Presidential bid.

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Where are Sri Lanka’s economists?



By Uditha Devapriya

Asoka Bandarage’s Colonialism in Sri Lanka (first published in 1983) follows a long line of books on the impact of British land policies in Ceylon. The best of these books remains S. B. D. de Silva’s The Political Economy of Underdevelopment, first published by Routledge in 1982. De Silva, easily one of Sri Lanka’s finest economists – though he would have detested the genericness of such honorifics – died five years ago. His death went by almost unnoticed. But in every book that has been written and every effort that has been undertaken to appraise the country’s impoverishment at the hands of British colonialism, one notices his influence, his life’s work.

De Silva came from a generation of economists – among his contemporaries he counted were G. V. S. de Silva, H. A. de S. Gunasekara, and Gamani Corea – who remained, to their last day, profoundly concerned about the plight of their country and of the masses. They were all convinced – and none more convinced than S. B. D. – that Sri Lanka’s future lay in industrialisation, or more specifically production. Taking the famous example of the pin from Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations – a tract that is regurgitated in toto by Sri Lankan economists today – he contended that Sri Lanka had failed to grow: it made and sold garments, but did not even manufacture a pin. In every aspect and in every corner, Sri Lanka remained dependent on imports.

A small state located to the south of a regional hegemon, in an ocean that remains heavily contested by a wide array of superpowers and major powers, cannot thrive without industry. Contrary to those economists who offer solutions in the form of liberalising or liberating the economy – the question can be asked, liberated from whom, or what? – S. B. D. de Silva’s generation did not limit themselves to abstract theorising. They were moved, on the contrary, by practical considerations – as all thinkers and economists must – and they were convinced that before undertaking any major reform, they had to first ascertain their impact on all sectors. They did not shy away from attacking or critiquing policy orthodoxies, because they knew that before everything, policies must work. If they did not, or if they risked destabilising the country and its society, there was no point pursuing them.

Indeed, all of them questioned these orthodoxies, and none with as much zest as S. B. D. His work targeted two assumptions – that Sri Lanka’s plantation sector was modern, and that Sri Lanka’s capitalists were progressive minded – and effectively debunked both. That the country’s plantation sector is stagnating today is evident enough: the situation is so bad that when the previous regime mandated a Rs 250 hike in daily wages, no fewer than 20 companies went to courts, seeking to quash the decision. Value addition has declined in the sector since the 1980s, and much of the money spent by companies has been on marketing and advertising. Yet, instead of addressing and arresting these declines, Sri Lanka’s capitalists seem content in letting things continue. This is the gist of The Political Economy of Underdevelopment: that unless those who can reverse stagnation steps in, Sri Lanka will continue to shrink, to remain the economic basket-case it has been for a long time.

Unfortunately, for some reason – for some not entirely unknowable reason – Sri Lanka’s economic sphere has been penetrated by influential think-tanks and ideological interests which have strayed from this approach. To put it bluntly, we no longer find economic thinkers who are ready to question policy orthodoxy, who can point out the fallacies of pursuing it, who, indeed, can show just how incompatible the needs of the country are with the implementation of such orthodoxies. When the country was urged to reduce its food subsidies in the mid-1960s, Gamani Corea, then despatched to represent Sri Lanka at the World Bank, argued that given the tiny military the country possessed at the time, welfare remained an important stabilising influence: to reduce them now, he argued, would be to incur higher defence expenditures later. If it’s impossible to think of economists today, basking in their think-tank-doms, making such statements, it’s because there aren’t any.

In the foreign policy sphere, the likes of S. B. D. and Gamani belonged to that breed of intellectuals who were convinced that Sri Lanka’s future lay in the Global South. Both Corea and de Silva hailed from elite and middle-class backgrounds, yet both saw and accepted the practicality of following these principles. Their intellectual descendants today – if they can be called as such – remain, as S. B. D. himself observed, beholden to powerful interest groups, to external funding and patronage. In such a context, it is easy to understand why policies which have failed in the West, which the West is abandoning in favour of full-scale industrialisation, are still being touted, still being promoted, still being idealised, in countries like ours: because they are easier to market in places where intellectuals and policymakers, not to mention officials, accept them without question.

The solutions prescribed by these interest groups remain predictable and utterly bland: from tweaking labour laws to privatising State corporations, from floating the rupee to closing State-owned factories, these reforms have been promoted for as long as one can remember. Yet it remains intriguing, if not perplexing, as to the relevance of such policies to countries which have never, since independence, grown as much as they should have. How relevant, indeed, are they to the affluent economies of the West, which are rejecting them on the grounds that, in the words of a former US Economic Advisor, the State “had to step in” where benefits no longer flow from “the individualised decisions of those looking only at their private bottom lines”?

Or to restate the question: how relevant are these policies at all? Free market orthodoxy, or market fundamentalism, of the sort advocated by Colombo’s economic circles today, no longer holds ground. It was rightly critiqued by the likes of S. B. D. de Silva, who saw such reforms as serving the role of maintaining if not entrenching the financial establishment, with hardly any benefits at all for the key stakeholders who mattered: the people of the country.

There is an obvious paradox here. On the one hand the world is waking up to the harsh reality that austerity will not put food on their fable, that if a country is to survive it must pursue industrialisation and ensure self-sufficiency in critical sectors, food being an obvious priority. On the other hand, multilateral agencies, even those whose mandate is to provide aid and assistance, are selectively enforcing such measures in the Global South, while not bothering to pursue them in the more affluent Global North.

In this context, it is interesting to note what US trade representative said in defence of the Biden administration’s pursuit of protectionism and of a trade war in the chips and semiconductor sector with China. When asked by Foreign Policy magazine as to whether such policies were at odds with the US’s advocacy of free and open markets elsewhere, she replied,

“There is a direct through line between the state and expression in the economy. And that is a really important aspect of another shared challenge we have with our European friends and other partners around the world in terms of a sustainable path to economic growth and development. In a version of globalization where the field is not level, we are having to figure out how to adapt.”

Countries like the US will always tweak the rules and break with orthodoxy, because it serves their interests to do so. It is questionable as to why Sri Lanka cannot do the same. To rephrase that famous adage by Munidasa Cumaratunga, a country which does not produce even a pin cannot be said to prosper, and a country which excludes production from its priorities cannot hope to prosper at all. 70 years ago, Joan Robinson pondered whether Sri Lanka’s trade unions would ever witness capitalists willing to share the fruits of their enterprises with them. 70 years later. we ponder whether Sri Lanka will ever see economists and thinkers willing to think beyond policy orthodoxy, willing to think, not of external interests, but of the country they live in, and the people they live with.

Where are these economists? Where are these thinkers? Five years after the passing of Sri Lanka’s last great economist and one of its last great thinkers, these questions remain unanswered. The writing is on the wall, but no one appears to be aware of it. Not even those foundations and think-tanks which so ubiquitously display the names of these intellectuals, which claim to speak on behalf of their legacy, yet which end up maintaining the same narratives their forbearers tried so hard and valiantly to question, reform, and make more relevant to their people. This is what it is, and it should be called out as such: it is a tragedy, a national tragedy.

The writer is an international relations analyst, researcher, and columnist who can be reached at

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Hoffmann gets involved in the over 100-year old Wild Life and Nature Protection Society



RL Spittel with Veddah people

Excerpted from the authorized biography of Thilo Hoffmann by Douglas. B. Ranasinghe

One year in the early 1950s the Wildlife Protection Society of Ceylon held its Annual General Meeting at the Galle Face Hotel in Colombo. ‘Thilo went as a visitor, and watched the proceedings. He met the President of the Society, C. E. Norris, and intimated to him that he wished to join the society.

Norris promised to send an enrollment form, but it never came. The Society had no office in Colombo, and without an address it was almost impossible to contact it. Both President and Secretary were up-country planters who ran its affairs from their estate offices.

After years of trying Thilo eventually managed to become a member. He was soon asked to join the General Committee, which at the time included several prominent personalities such as Dr R. L. Spittel, Sam Elapata Sr., E. B. Wikramanayake QC, R. L. Poulier and D. B. Ellepola.

Thilo Hoffmann became the Treasurer of the Society in 1961, then was its Honorary Secretary for seven years from 1962, and finally its President for a record continuous period of eleven years from 1968 to 1979.

Some of the last Britishers in the Society did not like him. It seemed that they resented his ascendancy. They referred to him as ‘the little Swiss’, where the adjective did not apply to his build, which was about the same as most of them. One was the editor of the Society’s magazine, Loris. When Thilo Hoffmann was given the Conservation Award for the year 1965 – presented by the Soil Conservation Society and sponsored by Selwyn Samaraweera – this man wrote a critical editorial titled ‘Medals for the Meritorious’. That upset Dr Spittel, who put him in his place and obtained his resignation.

Later, things changed, as Thilo Hoffmann progressed with his ‘bridging’ function. On the occasion of a District Meeting in Kandy, Dr Nihal Karunaratne humorously referred to the time he joined the Society when he was often “the only black bugger there”. Thilo responded, to everyone’s amusement, “And now I am the only white bugger here!”

Developing and leading

When Thilo accepted the honorary job of Secretary, the office of the Society, and its single employee, Sam Rajendran, had to move to Colombo. A tiny cubicle was rented at the Friend-in-Need Society at No. 171 General Lake’s Road. Here, a small desk, a chair, some files and less than Rs 500 in cash – the total assets of the Society – were installed, with Rajendran as clerk-in- charge.

Two years later, with the Society growing, more space was needed for’ its office. A shop in Bogala Building at Upper Chatham Street close to Baurs building was taken on rent. This was used for a short period. In 1964 the office was moved to Chaitya Road, opposite the new lighthouse. This was done on Thilo’s initiative. The premises were secured for the Society by him.

The small, unoccupied structure there had been used during the last World War by an Army dhoby and belonged to the Army. The only other building along the newly constructed road, then named Marine Drive, was the Ceylon Light Infantry Headquarters, which is now part of the Navy Headquarters.

The structure was improved and enlarged from time to time, and a wall built around the premises. An article by Sam Elapata Jr. in Loris, reproduced as Appendix III, describes Thilo’s involvement in this.

For the first time, the Society had a regular place to work in, and to hold the monthly committee meetings, even the general meetings, and to house its library – started by Thilo – and files, thus serving as a central rallying point for all members. It remained the headquarters of the Society for 34 years. Recalling his early days Thilo says:

“I was young, inexperienced in public speaking and shy. I attended my first half-yearly meeting (at Kurunegala, I think) as Hony. Secretary in the role as I saw it: organizer and recorder but not active participant. The President, ‘Ted’ Norris was discussing a possibly controversial subject (I cannot remember what). When he had finished there was silence, and so he just ordered me to speak. I was, of course, not prepared, and it was the first time I spoke before a public audience, not in my mother tongue, and with a strong Swiss accent. But it did not go too badly and that gave me confidence.”

He continues: “In the course of time I learnt to speak freely in public, and occasionally I even enjoyed it. But generally I had to give myself a push. This was also the case when I had to meet powerful VIPs, such as Ministers, Prime Ministers and Presidents. My basic shyness never left me, although most people have perceived me quite differently.

“Of political and other VIPs I got to know very many in the course of my work for conservation, and a few became friends, such as Ministers Edwin Hurulle and Nissanka Wijeyeratne, Lalith Athulathmudali and also D. B. Wijetunge, who became President of Sri Lanka.”

Gradually, through purposeful and relentless work, Thilo Hoffmann built up and furthered the Society, as no one before or after him. Similarly he served its cause. Knowledge, understanding, enthusiasm and self-discipline are some of the characteristics which have made him a successful conservationist. But mainly it was his perseverance, his tenacity, which brought results. As long as there was a glimmer of hope, he would put forward again and again his ideas and proposals, never letting up, with memos, reminders and personal meetings with anyone from the Prime Minister or President downward, who would be in a position to bring a project to a successful end.

His style of work was entirely based on his own involvement. He would himself do all the hard work, investigations and field work, write reports and memos, push and cajole. Any memo from the Society submitted to any authority during the period he was Secretary or President was written by him. The fact that he knew what he was speaking and writing about, based on his intimate and detailed knowledge of the country, was a prerequisite to his success.

The Society and its General Committee would provide the necessary backing and background. He found that there were few others who could be relied upon to perform major tasks with the personal involvement, discipline and perseverance required. Hoffmann never took up extreme positions, always keeping a balanced mind and advocating reasonable and realistic solutions. He could readily see and understand contrary viewpoints as well as external constraints, e.g. political though not personal. In this he is notably different from present day `super-activists’ and ‘greens’, who in his opinion “polarize to extreme positions and exaggeration, often based on ignorance, even ill-will and mischief”.

Day-to-day problems were dealt with by correspondence or direct intervention. Thilo’s application and promptness in such matters are described in the last Chapter. There were many cases of poaching, not only by villagers but by well-to-do hunters. There was illegal timber felling, and clearing.

Complaints and reports from members had to be looked into. This often led to unpleasantness and frustration, such as in cases of drunken engine drivers ploughing their trains into elephant herds crossing the railway line at night in the Polonnaruwa area.

Once, two student members, a local and a German, verbally reported a serious case of misbehaviour and shooting by an Air Force training group in the Lahugala Sanctuary. Thilo wrote a letter. An ‘inquiry’ was held by a senior officer. The incident was denied, and Thilo was asked to apologize. When he requested the two members to confirm their report in writing both refused! The foreigner is today a professor, and organizes seminars and writes papers about Sri Lanka – like so many others, says Thilo, who use the island for easy pickings.

The institution of District Representative (“DR”) had been created in 1962, when Thilo was Secretary. The DR had to have at least two meetings per year in his District. There were DRs in many areas, including Jaffna, Ampara, Ratnapura, Kandy, Kurunegala, Puttalam, and Udawalawe. They were sent the minutes of the monthly committee meetings. Thus the members in the Districts were informed of the activities of the Society. At Udawalawe the DR was Gamini Punchihewa, and at Ratnapura it was Bennie Abeyratne, a close friend of the Hoffmanns.

Talks, film shows and discussions were regularly organized. Members and friends got together in this manner, which was a great help to Thilo in the promotion of the objects and ideas of the Society, the enrolment of new members, and to obtain support for Society activities. Thilo attended most of these meetings, which were often held in planters’ clubs, and were followed by social gatherings of members, office-bearers and guests. Mae Hoffmann’s 16 mm wildlife movie was a big attraction. A gift to the Society’s membership drive, it was shown in public over and over again, even in distant places such as Embilipitiya (Udawalawe), Passara and Inginiyagala (Gal Oya).

Jungle bungalows owned and run by the Society for members, an old proposal, were promoted. As a matter of principle, these had to be outside National Parks. Dr Uragoda in his book (see Chapter III, above) says: “In the mid 1950s the first attempts to obtain leases of crown land for building bungalows were made. After much difficulty and plenty of spade work especially by the Honorary Secretary, Mr. T. W. Hoffmann, the Society managed to obtain leases of crown land near Wilpattu and Yala.”

Thilo and the Assistant Secretary, Lalith Senanayake chose the two locations after several visits to the areas. Money was collected for putting up the buildings. The Volkart Foundation of Switzerland, no doubt on Thilo’s persuasion, made a handsome contribution of Rs 5,000 to the fund. The Wilpattu bungalow was opened to members on December 1, 1967 and the Yala bungalow on December 31, 1969. Much later, a Society bungalow was built by the boundary of the Udawalawe National Park.

At Lahugala the unused Irrigation Department circuit bungalow was managed for some time by the Society for the benefit of visiting members and guests. It was situated on the bund of the large, picturesque tank, where visitors are sure to see elephants at almost any time of the year. The area, formerly a Sanctuary, is now a National Park.

When Hoffmann took over as Secretary the number of members was less than 500, and the Society’s total assets, as mentioned, amounted to a few hundred rupees. There was no library and no proper office. Most of the members were planters, with a few of the urban elite thrown in. The Society was just ticking over, although it had in the course of time had some remarkable individuals as members and office-bearers: see the paper by Thilo in Loris titled ‘The WNPS of Ceylon: Some Historical Reflections on the Occasion of its 75th Anniversary.”

.At the end of his time as President the Society had over 5,000 members, assets worth many lakhs, and had become a force to be reckoned with.

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An autobigraphy of a remarkable self-made billionaire



Merill J. Fernando with his two sons and grandchildren.

The story of Ceylon Teamaker: MERRIL. J. FERNANDO

by Manik de Silva

Merril J. Fernando’s recently published autobiography would be considered by many to be best story of its kind coming out in recent times, if not all time, of the life and times of a business leader in Sri Lanka. Similar volumes published in recent years that come readily to mind are the life and career stories of C.P. (Chari) de Silva of Aitken Spence, Ken Balendra of John Keells, Hemaka Amarasuriya of Singer and Rienzie Weeraratne of Unilever.

Undoubtedly many more resources have been poured into this production than to its predecessors. The result is spectacular both in appearance and substance. Over 200 interesting photographs scattered throughout the well-designed volume, makes reading its 400+ pages easy. The reader cannot but be impressed about MJF’s meticulous record keeping that is a feature of the book; also the author’s deliberate decision not to pull back his punches aimed at some prominent figures in the country, many of them now dead.

Merril Fernando, undoubtedly, is the best known face in Sri Lanka’s tea industry. He’s not the biggest producer or exporter of tea in the country. But his Dilmah brand, coined from the names of his two sons, Dilhan and Malik, is also the best known Sri Lankan-owned brand worldwide. Few would know until they read the book that the original brand name was Dilma, The ‘h’ was added later to give it added punch as recommended by advertising professionals in Australia; nor would many know that Fernando served four years as a seminarian at St. Aloysius Seminary in Borella (“I was very unhappy and frequently reduced to tears”). Training a youth who had his sights on the legal profession to be a catholic priest was forced on him by his parents to whom he couldn’t say “No” at that point of time in his life and the prevailing culture.

Also that very early in his working life when he was training as a tea taster at Heath and Co., a hard to get opportunity then when that work was largely a preserve on the British, that he broke away to take up a job offer in the U.S. multinational, Mobil Oil. Fernando says the terms offered were “quite attractive,” and the offer too good to turn down at age 22-years with about Rs. 1,500 monthly on the table. He admits a “distressing lack of responsibility in suddenly abandoning my trainee tea taster programme.” Although he enjoyed the work the work at Mobil and was good at it, he says “the business was open to and driven by bribery” and he returned to tea at AF Jones, a small firm run by a British father and his two sons.

A condition of that employment was that he had to train in London at his own expense. In arranging his training slot, the head of a British firm here wrote to a friend in London recommending MJF (letter reproduced in the book) raising an interesting points about Merril (1) ” His general appearance and ways of doing business have always struck me as displaying a certain amount of integrity, which is more than I can say for most of his brethren” The second was “I have made it perfectly plain to him that in the UK there are no bottle washers or Tea Boys to wait on learners and practically all the messy work has to be done by the learners themselves.”

Fernando started at AF Jones, a company he was to later acquire, as an Assistant Tea Taster at Rs. 750 a month in May 1955. His UK experiences makes good reading including the story that he brought back pounds 325 when he returned to Ceylon at the end of five months. His landlady in London, Mrs. Butler, had tried to persuade him to buy her terraced house for pounds 750 and offered to arrange a mortgage. “I didn’t even consider it,” says Fernando. “That apartment was worth four million pounds in 2019.”

What comes out strongest in the book is Merril Fernando’s passion for “pure Ceylon tea” and his determination that this product be offered globally to discerning consumers worldwide. When strong lobbies were hard at work saying that Sri Lanka should be made an International Tea Hub like Dubai and Rotterdam by permitting the import of cheaper teas for blending, packaging and exporting, he battled unrelentingly against a move he considered would be disastrous making many enemies in the process.

Equally strong is the projection of Dilmah as a family business with his two sons figuring in both text and pictures. Merril promoted his tea using his own photo widely and with homely messages to consumers of a product coming from “us to you.” His own avuncular appearance and the excellence of the photography, perhaps an offshoot of Dilhan’s passion for the camera, played a major role in promoting Dilmah, evident in many of the photographs included in the book. Fernando’s faith in God and belief in divine intervention is a continuing thread through the publication.

There is no doubt that Merril Fernando has made a major contribution towards preserving the authenticity of Ceylon tea which had over the long period when it succeeded coffee in this country had built the reputation for unique flavour and quality that made tea drinkers worldwide recognize the product as the best available. His early training exposed him to the harsh realities of international tea export trade and he says he learned many important lessons he would never forget. These helped him to chart his business course over the next few decades. This experience and the absence of severe work pressure gave him time as a trainee in London for reflection, absorbing new impressions, acquiring new tastes and inculcate in him a lifelong passion for travel and new cultural experiences.

Attacks directed at him over the years included accusations that he was getting favours from his former father-in-law, Major Motague Jayawickreme, onetime Minister of Plantation Industries, although his marriage to Devika Jayawickreme had long ended by then. The fact that President J.R. Jayewardene made Jayawickreme dispose a small shareholding in MJF’s listed Ceylon Tea Services Ltd. (the predecessor to Dilmah Ceylon Tea Compny PLC) on a conflict of interest argument is duly recorded in the book. But Fernando makes the telling point that Jayawickreme bought the shares three years before he became minister. He also says he once refused to speak to Jayawickreme for three months when the latter called for a vote on an appointment to the new Tea Centre in New York with Fernando’s the only dissenting vote against the proposal.

The reader must not be misled by what’s written above to think that Merril Fernando has made his autobiography a platform to merely hit out at those who opposed him. On the contrary, he has been lavish in his praise of many including senior bureaucrats and political authorities that include one time Plantation Industries Minister, Dr. Colvin. R. de Silva and his former teacher and later Trade Minister Hugh Fernando. But there is another side to that coin when he discusses estrangements with business partners at AF Jones and later in his own companies.

I have known Merril Fernando for over 50 years and reported on his journey through the tea industry. One anecdote I will relate here is an occasion he took me to his home on Gower Street in Havelock Town for a string hopper dinner. That was the first time I had eaten a seer fish kiri hodda with pol sambol. I was so impressed about the meal that I mentioned it to his neighbour, my friend Mrs. Bertha Samarasinghe, the wife of the then Judge-Advocate of the Navy. A fine cook herself, Bertha responded: “Merril understands fish. I see him buying his fish from vendors at his gate.” This came to mind when I read a reference in the book to the “ever-faithful Alice, the best chef I have ever known apart from my mother.” She probably cooked the meal I enjoyed.

He could have found no better writer than Anura Gunasekera, a retired tea planter who worked for Dilmah for 10 years after he quit planting to collaborate in the writing which took all of three years to finish. With Merril Fernando completing his 92nd birthday days before the book was launched in May, there were constant challenges including covid, MJF’s hospitalization off and on during the writing and many more. But an excellent production of a compelling read has been the result.

The book is priced at Rs. 10,000 with all proceeds of sales going to MJF supported charities. But it looks as though it would have cost more to produce if all costs are factored. However that be, it’s a compelling read on the life of a remarkable man, a self-made billionaire who’s fond of saying that “business is a matter of public service” – his many charities testifying to this. It’s the history of a battle to preserve the integrity of Ceylon Tea which Merril Fernando says ought to be marketed like wine and champagne.

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