Features

The JVP’s Military Battle for Power

Published

5 years ago

2021/04/6

Sahan Weerasooriya

THE APRIL 1971 REVOLT – II

By Jayantha Somasundaram

The JVP evolved in the late 1960s under Rohana Wijeweera as a radical rural youth group. It believed that a socialist change in Sri Lanka could only be effected through a sudden armed insurrection launched simultaneously across the country. Recruits to the JVP underwent a series of political classes as well as military training, while the organisation clandestinely armed itself. The United Front Government responded in March 1971 with a State of Emergency, the arrest of JVP cadre and the deploying of the Army to the provinces.

In March 1971 events rapidly escalated. The JVP believed that the government was planning to use the Army to launch an all out offensive against them. And on 2nd April nine JVP leaders, six members of the Political Bureau and three District Secretaries, met at the Vidyodaya Sangaramaya at a meeting presided over by S.V.A Piyatilake. They took the decision to launch their attack at 2330 hours on 5th April. “The decision taken was to attack on a specific date at a specific time. This decision is completely in line with the evidence that the Fifth Class of the JVP…advocated that in the circumstances of our country, the best method would be to launch simultaneous attacks everywhere,” concluded the Judgement of the Criminal Justice Commission Inquiry No 1 1976.

The date of attack was relayed by pre-arranged code in the contents of a paid radio obituary notice by an unsuspecting state-owned Ceylon Broadcasting Corporation. The JVP cadres at Wellawaya however misinterpreted the instruction and launched their attack on the Wellawaya Police Station 24 hours earlier on the night of 4th April.

The initial targets were rural police stations both in order to further arm themselves and because the JVP viewed the police as the only representative of the state in the countryside. Moreover, they believed that the police and the armed forces were low on ammunition and they discounted the government’s ability to counter attack once the JVP had gained control of the countryside. Besides, the attacks on remote police stations across much of the country’s rural south, a large group also travelled north in order to rescue Wijeweera who was held in Jaffna.

Attacking with home-made weapons in groups of 25 to 30 in order to seize better arms from the police stations, the JVP believed that controlling these rural police stations would provide them with areas of military and political control, thereby denying the government access to such areas which would provide secure rear-bases for subsequent attacks by the JVP on towns and cities. Ten out of the island’s 22 Administrative Districts were battlegrounds. “Ninety two Police Stations had been attacked, damaging fifty and causing around fifty to be abandoned,” wrote Major General Anton Muttukumaru in The Military History of Ceylon.

Piyatilake was responsible for operations in Colombo. He detailed Raja Nimal an Advanced Level student to storm the Rosmead Place residence of Prime Minister Sirima Bandaranaike on the night of the 5th along with 50 student cadre, to capture the Prime Minister and transport her to a place where she would be held. However the expected vehicle and Piyatilake failed to arrive at the prearranged rendezvous in Borella and the attack did not materialise. Meanwhile unaware of the impending danger, the Prime Minister’s security advisers prevailed upon her to move to her official residence at Temple Trees, where she would be more secure.

Elsewhere in the Colombo District a major attack occurred at Hanwella, where the A4 High Level and Low Level Roads converge. Early on the morning of the 6th about 100 JVP combatants using hand bombs, Molotov Cocktails and firearms attacked the Police Station compelling its personnel to abandon their positions and flee into the surrounding jungle. The JVP captured the station’s armoury of weapons, hoisted a red flag and froze transport into Colombo. They held the town until armed police from Homagama supported by troops from Panagoda overpowered them.

The Battle for Kegalle

Athula Nimalasiri Jayasinghe, known within the Movement as Loku Athula, was in charge of the Kegalle and Kurunegala Districts. Once the decision to attack was made he moved into the area on the 3rd, meeting Area Leaders at Weliveriya and coordinating operations with detachments in Veyangoda and Mirigama. About 600 JVP combatants were deployed across the Kegalle District concentrated at Warakapola and Rambukkana.

Under Patrick Fernando, the Pindeniya detachment attacked both the local Police Station and the Bogala Graphite Mines, capturing a lorry load of explosives from the mines. On the 8th the Warakapola Police Station was successfully attacked, its weapons including two sub machine guns seized and the building set ablaze. In addition, Police Stations at Bulathkohupitiya, Aranayaka, Mawanella, Rambukkana and Dedigama were also attacked and the station at Aranayake burned down. Only Kegalle Police Station and the area surrounding it remained under Government control.

The Army could only access the interior regions of the District on the 10th and initially had to focus on removing road blocks and repairing culverts and bridges to gain mobility. When they penetrated the countryside they were frequently ambushed as in Aranayake and both sides sustained casualties. In The JVP 1969-1989 Justice A.C. Alles concludes that “the insurgents had met with considerable success in the Kegalle District.”

On the 12th at Utuwankande the Army was ambushed by the JVP using rifles and submachine guns. But the battle was turning in favour of the Army which brought to bear superior arms to put pressure on the rebels and gradually reopen the abandoned police stations in the district.

Finally on the 29th led by Loku Athula the JVP forces began their withdrawal from the District, from Balapattawa via Alawwa and then north. As they retreated in the direction of the Wilpattu Park they came under attack from the Army and from the air by Air Force helicopters. The Army finally ambushed them near Galgamuwa, killing some and capturing Loku Athula on 7th June.

The experience of the Kegalle District was replicated by the JVP in the Galle, Matara and Hambantota Districts. With the exception of Dickwella all Police Stations in the Matara District were abandoned. While in the Ambalangoda Police Area all stations, Elpitiya, Uragaha, Pitigala and Meetiyagoda fell to the JVP.

Widespread JVP attacks were also launched across the North Central Province where only the Anuradhapura Police Station was spared. As in the Kegalle District the outlying stations had to be abandoned and personnel withdrawn to Anuradhapura. However the Kekirawa Station, though attacked several times, held out. The Army was only able to move into the outlying areas of the Anuradhapura District on the 30th. Further north the Vavuniya Police Station in the Northern Province was also attacked. Less intense activity was reported in the Kandy, Badulla and Moneragala Districts.

N.Sanmugathasan in A Marxist Looks at the History of Ceylon remarked that “The rank and file (of the JVP) seems to have been honestly revolutionary, with a sense of dedication that must be admired, and a willingness to sacrifice their lives – unheard of before in Ceylon.” The first Ceylonese Army Commander General Muttukumaru wrote “Their (JVP) courage was also evident in the display of their military skills which enabled them to control many regions in the country and give battle to the armed forces in fierce guerrilla fighting.”

The military background

In November 1947 on the eve of independence, Ceylon signed a Defence Agreement with the United Kingdom. The military’s threat perception was determined by “the Government’s concern, (which) was invasion by India. The military’s focus was to have a defence force capable of meeting any external threat until assistance arrived from Britain.” In the words of Air Vice-Marshal P.H. ‘Paddy’ Mendis, who was Air Force Commander in 1971, the objective that determined the capabilities of the armed forces therefore was to “hold up an invading force of the enemy until assistance arrived from a bigger country with which we have an alliance.” (Brian Blodgett in Sri Lanka’s Military: The Search for a Mission 1949-2004)

The only military threat perceived was external; there was no anticipation of an internal military threat. Furthermore, in the wake of the 1962 abortive coup against the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) Government, and the alleged 1966 coup against the United National Party Government, both parties that had been in power were wary of the Army which in 1970 had an authorised strength of 329 officers and 6,291 other ranks, and an annual budget of Rs 52 million (US$10mn), just 1.2% of total government expenditure.

Despite these inherent structural limitations, the Government and the Army responded swiftly, appointing regional Co-ordinating Officers in the worst affected districts. They were Colonels E.T. de Z. Abeysekera in Anuradhapura, S. D. Ratwatte in Badulla, Douglas Ramanayake in Galle and Derek Nugawella in Hambantota, Lieutenant Colonels R.R Rodrigo in Jaffna, Cyril Ranatunga in Kegalle, D.J.de S Wickremasinghe in Matara, Tissa Weeratunga in Moneragala and Dennis Hapugalle in Vavuniya.

The Ceylon Volunteer Force was immediately mobilised, and the first military casualty was Staff Sergeant Jothipala of the 2nd Volunteer Battalion, Sinha Regiment [2(V)SR], who was killed at Thulhiriya in the Kurunegala District on the first day of the insurrection. While Sandhurst-trained Major Noel Weerakoon of the 4th Regiment, Ceylon Artillery was the first officer to be killed whilst leading an ammunition convoy from Vavuniya to the besieged town of Anuradhapura; he was wounded when his convoy was ambushed and later succumbed to his injuries.

The battle rages

In 1971 the Royal Ceylon Air Force (RCyAF) consisted of three squadrons: No. 1 Flying Training Squadron with nine Chipmunk trainers based at China Bay, No. 2 Transport Sq. equipped with five Doves, 4 Herons and three Pioneer fixed wing aircraft and four helicopters and No. 3 Reconnaissance Sq. with Cessna aircraft. In the 1960s Britain had gifted five Hunting Jet Provost T51s jet trainers which had gone out of service by 1971.

Beginning at 0900 hours on 5th April the Jet Provost, which were in storage at China Bay, began operating out of this airbase. Armed with Browning machine guns and rockets, they carried out air to ground attacks using 60 lb rockets. The three Bell 206A Jet Ranger helicopters protected by Bren Guns airlifted 36,500 lb of ammunition during April to critical police stations. In addition the Doves carried out supply missions and during the course of April, 900 soldiers and 100,000 lb of equipment were transported by the RCyAF.

The JVP seized parts of the Colombo-Kandy A1 Trunk Route at Warakapola and Kegalle, cutting off the main artery between Colombo and the tea growing highlands. In response the Jet Provost had to mount aerial attacks on the key bridge at Alawwa which led to the downing of a Jet Provost and the death of her pilot.

If not for the premature attack in Wellawaya which resulted in the Police and Military around the country being placed on high alert “the situation would have been very grave for not only would several Police Stations have been captured, but the JVP would have been able to arm itself with modern weapons,” wrote Justice Alles.

Desperate for arms and ammunition in the first days of the rebellion, the Government aware that a Chinese cargo vessel bound for Tanzania with an arms shipment was currently in Colombo Harbour, unsuccessfully appealed to both Beijing and Dar-es-Salaam to make these arms available to Sri Lanka.

International support

As rural police stations fell, the government abandoned others, regrouping its limited forces and anxious to protect the towns and cities. This tactic paid off. The JVP only had equipment captured from police stations. They did not go on to overrun military camps nor capture their more sophisticated weapons. While the JVP did control parts of Kegalle, Elpitiya, Deniyaya and Kataragama uncontested, the Army replenished its meagre stocks of weapons.

Wijeweera had focussed solely on a single decisive blow against the Government. There was no provision to conduct even a short term guerrilla operation, or an attempt to lead a peasant uprising. And during the first 72 hours his strategy appeared to be working. What dramatically altered the balance of forces against the JVP was the immediate and sustained influx of military equipment that flowed in from overseas to enable the armed forces to turn the tide in their favour.

Within four days of the JVP attack, Air Ceylon’s Trident took off from Singapore carrying a consignment of small arms provided by Britain from its base there. The following day the UK agreed to supply six Bell-47G Jet Ranger helicopters armed with 7.62mm machine guns. On 12th April on board a US Air Force Lockheed C-141 Starlifter, Washington shipped out critical spare parts for the RCyAF helicopters which were flying twelve hour days. And at Colombo’s request New Delhi on the 14th sent six Indian Air Force Aérospatiale SA 315B Lama utility helicopters with crews to Katunayake Air Force Base, along with troops to guard them as well as arms, ammunition and grenades. They would remain in-country for three months.

On the 17th Air Ceylon flew in nine tons of military equipment which the Soviet Union made available from supplies in Cairo. While on the 22nd a Soviet Air Force Antonov AN-22 transporter arrived with two Kamov Ka-26 rescue helicopters and five Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-15 jet fighters and one MiG-17 high-subsonic fighter. The Soviet aircraft were accompanied by 200 trainers and ground crew.

China, Australia, Pakistan and Yugoslavia would also send arms and equipment. Colombo’s Non Aligned foreign policy which enabled it to source and receive military weapons and equipment from countries across the globe had succeeded. However the disparate array of equipment would pose a logistics dilemma for the military.

The sudden influx of arms and ammunition rapidly altered the balance of power against the JVP. For example the Army took Yugoslav artillery into Kegalle to flush out the rebels. And around 16,500 JVP members were captured, arrested or surrendered. The remaining combatants withdrew into jungle sanctuaries in the Kegalle, Elpitiya, Deniyaya and Kataragama areas.

Meanwhile there were reports that the JVP were endeavouring to bring weapons in by sea. But the Royal Ceylon Navy’s frigate and Thorneycroft boats could not secure the island’s territory nor prevent supplies reaching the rebels. This compelled Colombo to rely on the Indian Navy which sent three of its Hunt-class escort destroyers, INS Ganga, INS Gomathi and INS Godawari to patrol Ceylon’s maritime perimeter. In Sri Lanka Navy: Enhanced Role and New Challenges Professor Gamini Keerawella and Lieutenant Commander S. Hemachandre explain that “Sri Lanka’s dependency on the Indian Navy during the Insurgency to patrol its sea frontier in order to prevent arms supply to the Insurgents, was total.”

At Anuradhapura the JVP had established a base camp as well as six sub camps in the surrounding jungle where weapons, explosives and food had been stored. JVP operations in the Rajangana and Tambuttegama areas were controlled from this base camp. A platoon of 1CLI armed with 82mm mortars was sent to Anuradhapura in May and participated in Operation Otthappuwa, under 1CLI 2iC Major Jayawardena to take control of this area. By the end of May the insurrection was completely crushed.

Some counter insurgency operations however continued into the following year. A-Company 1CLI established a forward base in Horowapatana as late as November 1972 from where they carried out combing out operations until April 1973 while 1CLI’s D-Company closed its Kegalle operations only in December 1974.

Outcomes

The international media reported that summary executions had taken place. Writing from Colombo in the Nouvel Observateur on 23rd May, Rene Dumont said “from the Victoria Bridge on 13th April I saw corpses floating down the (Kelani) River which flows through the north of the capital watched by hundreds of motionless people. The Police who had killed them let them float downstream to terrorise the population.” The New York Times in its 15th April edition said that “many were found to have been shot in the back.”

Lieutenant Colonel Cyril Ranatunga commanding troops in Kegalle was emphatic. “We have learned too many lessons from Vietnam and Malaysia. We must destroy them completely.” While another officer was quoted alongside him in the International Herald Tribune of 20th April as saying “Once we are convinced prisoners are insurgents we take them to a cemetery and dispose of them.” And the Washington Post on 9th May quoted a major who said that “we have never had the opportunity to fight a real war in this country. All these years we have been firing at dummies, now we are being put to use.”

One of these public executions became a celebrated case, the brutal murder of Premawathi Manamperi of Kataragama. She had been crowned festival queen at the previous year’s Sinhala New Year celebration. Two soldiers, Lieutenant Wijeysooria and Sergeant Ratnayaka would be convicted, but both claimed their orders were: “Take no prisoners; bump them off, liquidate them.” (Jayasumana Obeysekara Revolutionary Movements in Ceylon in Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia edited by Kathleen Gough and Hari P. Sharma)

Janice Jiggins notes in Caste and Family in the Politics of the Sinhalese 1947-1976 that “Many in the armed services took the view that the fighting was an expression of anti-Govigama resentment and in certain areas went into low caste villages and arrested all the youth, regardless of participation.”

In the aftermath of the insurgency the armed forces expanded. The Air Force which had 1,400 personnel in 1971 grew to 3,100 by 1976. New units were raised: a Special Police Reserve Force, a Volunteer RCyAF and a new Field Security Detachment targeting subversion. The latter was placed under Lieutenant Colonel Anurudha Ratwatte 2(V) SR, the Security Liaison Officer to the Prime Minister. While a new Volunteer Army unit the National Service Regiment, targeting recruits over 35 years provided according to Fred Halliday “a damning sign that the whole of the country’s youth was in opposition to (the Government).”

The JVP uprising broke the back of the left parties which were trapped politically by the insurrection which they could only denounce at the cost of their long term influence. The SLFP too was isolated from its electorate due to the harsh measures adopted; curfew, censorship, trial without jury, postponement of elections, suspension of habeas corpus and other civil rights. Their Government suffered a devastating defeat at the next elections in 1977.

The uprising questioned the efficacy of a parliamentary system that could not accommodate a generation of educated youth, nor keep politicians aware of their needs and strengths. The decades-old mass national parties seemed to have no place for them. And the JVP charge that the leaders in parliament were of a different class and therefore they themselves of a different sub culture, seemed valid.

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Features

Indian Ocean Security: Strategies for Sri Lanka

Published

19 hours ago

2026/02/20

Thilina Walpola

During a recent panel discussion titled “Security Environment in the Indo-Pacific and Sri Lankan Diplomacy”, organised by the Embassy of Japan in collaboration with Dr. George I. H. Cooke, Senior Lecturer and initiator of the Awarelogue Initiative, the keynote address was delivered by Prof Ken Jimbo of Kelo University, Japan (Ceylon Today, February 15, 2026).

The report on the above states: “Prof. Jimbo discussed the evolving role of the Indo-Pacific and the emergence of its latest strategic outlook among shifting dynamics. He highlighted how changing geopolitical realities are reshaping the region’s security architecture and influencing diplomatic priorities”.

“He also addressed Sri Lanka’s position within this evolving framework, emphasising that non-alignment today does not mean isolation, but rather, diversified engagement. Such an approach, he noted, requires the careful and strategic management of dependencies to preserve national autonomy while maintaining strategic international partnerships” (Ibid).

Despite the fact that Non-Alignment and Neutrality, which incidentally is Sri Lanka’s current Foreign Policy, are often used interchangeably, both do not mean isolation. Instead, as the report states, it means multi-engagement. Therefore, as Prof. Jimbo states, it is imperative that Sri Lanka manages its relationships strategically if it is to retain its strategic autonomy and preserve its security. In this regard the Policy of Neutrality offers Rule Based obligations for Sri Lanka to observe, and protection from the Community of Nations to respect the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka, unlike Non-Alignment. The Policy of Neutrality served Sri Lanka well, when it declared to stay Neutral on the recent security breakdown between India and Pakistan.

Also participating in the panel discussion was Prof. Terney Pradeep Kumara – Director General of Coast Conservation and Coastal Resources Management, Ministry of Environment and Professor of Oceanography in the University of Ruhuna.

He stated: “In Sri Lanka’s case before speaking of superpower dynamics in the Indo-Pacific, the country must first establish its own identity within the Indian Ocean region given its strategically significant location”.

“He underlined the importance of developing the ‘Sea of Lanka concept’ which extends from the country’s coastline to its 200nauticalmile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Without firmly establishing this concept, it would be difficult to meaningfully engage with the broader Indian Ocean region”.

“He further stated that the Indian Ocean should be regarded as a zone of peace. From a defence perspective, Sri Lanka must remain neutral. However, from a scientific and resource perspective, the country must remain active given its location and the resources available in its maritime domain” (Ibid).

Perhaps influenced by his academic background, he goes on to state:” In that context Sri Lanka can work with countries in the Indian Ocean region and globally, including India, China, Australia and South Africa. The country must remain open to such cooperation” (Ibid).

Such a recommendation reflects a poor assessment of reality relating to current major power rivalry. This rivalry was addressed by me in an article titled “US – CHINA Rivalry: Maintaining Sri Lanka’s autonomy” ( 12.19. 2025) which stated: “However, there is a strong possibility for the US–China Rivalry to manifest itself engulfing India as well regarding resources in Sri Lanka’s Exclusive Economic Zone. While China has already made attempts to conduct research activities in and around Sri Lanka, objections raised by India have caused Sri Lanka to adopt measures to curtail Chinese activities presumably for the present. The report that the US and India are interested in conducting hydrographic surveys is bound to revive Chinese interests. In the light of such developments it is best that Sri Lanka conveys well in advance that its Policy of Neutrality requires Sri Lanka to prevent Exploration or Exploitation within its Exclusive Economic Zone under the principle of the Inviolability of territory by any country” ( https://island.lk/us- china-rivalry-maintaining-sri-lankas-autonomy/). Unless such measures are adopted, Sri Lanka’s Exclusive Economic Zone would end up becoming the theater for major power rivalry, with negative consequences outweighing possible economic gains.

The most startling feature in the recommendation is the exclusion of the USA from the list of countries with which to cooperate, notwithstanding the Independence Day message by the US Secretary of State which stated: “… our countries have developed a strong and mutually beneficial partnership built on the cornerstone of our people-to-people ties and shared democratic values. In the year ahead, we look forward to increasing trade and investment between our countries and strengthening our security cooperation to advance stability and prosperity throughout the Indo-Pacific region (NEWS, U.S. & Sri Lanka)

Such exclusions would inevitably result in the US imposing drastic tariffs to cripple Sri Lanka’s economy. Furthermore, the inclusion of India and China in the list of countries with whom Sri Lanka is to cooperate, ignores the objections raised by India about the presence of Chinese research vessels in Sri Lankan waters to the point that Sri Lanka was compelled to impose a moratorium on all such vessels.

CONCLUSION

During a panel discussion titled “Security Environment in the Indo-Pacific and Sri Lankan Diplomacy” supported by the Embassy of Japan, Prof. Ken Jimbo of Keio University, Japan emphasized that “… non-alignment today does not mean isolation”. Such an approach, he noted, requires the careful and strategic management of dependencies to preserve national autonomy while maintaining strategic international partnerships”. Perhaps Prof. Jimbo was not aware or made aware that Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy is Neutral; a fact declared by successive Governments since 2019 and practiced by the current Government in the position taken in respect of the recent hostilities between India and Pakistan.

Although both Non-Alignment and Neutrality are often mistakenly used interchangeably, they both do NOT mean isolation. The difference is that Non-Alignment is NOT a Policy but only a Strategy, similar to Balancing, adopted by decolonized countries in the context of a by-polar world, while Neutrality is an Internationally recognised Rule Based Policy, with obligations to be observed by Neutral States and by the Community of Nations. However, Neutrality in today’s context of geopolitical rivalries resulting from the fluidity of changing dynamics offers greater protection in respect of security because it is Rule Based and strengthened by “the UN adoption of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of peace”, with the freedom to exercise its autonomy and engage with States in pursuit of its National Interests.

Apart from the positive comments “that the Indian Ocean should be regarded as a Zone of Peace” and that “from a defence perspective, Sri Lanka must remain neutral”, the second panelist, Professor of Oceanography at the University of Ruhuna, Terney Pradeep Kumara, also advocated that “from a Scientific and resource perspective (in the Exclusive Economic Zone) the country must remain active, given its location and the resources available in its maritime domain”. He went further and identified that Sri Lanka can work with countries such as India, China, Australia and South Africa.

For Sri Lanka to work together with India and China who already are geopolitical rivals made evident by the fact that India has already objected to the presence of China in the “Sea of Lanka”, questions the practicality of the suggestion. Furthermore, the fact that Prof. Kumara has excluded the US, notwithstanding the US Secretary of State’s expectations cited above, reflects unawareness of the geopolitical landscape in which the US, India and China are all actively known to search for minerals. In such a context, Sri Lanka should accept its limitations in respect of its lack of Diplomatic sophistication to “work with” such superpower rivals who are known to adopt unprecedented measures such as tariffs, if Sri Lanka is to avoid the fate of Milos during the Peloponnesian Wars.

Under the circumstances, it is in Sri Lanka’s best interest to lay aside its economic gains for security, and live by its proclaimed principles and policies of Neutrality and the concept of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace by not permitting its EEC to be Explored and/or Exploited by anyone in its “maritime domain”. Since Sri Lanka is already blessed with minerals on land that is awaiting exploitation, participating in the extraction of minerals at the expense of security is not only imprudent but also an environmental contribution given the fact that the Sea and its resources is the Planet’s Last Frontier.

by Neville Ladduwahetty

Features

Protecting the ocean before it’s too late: What Sri Lankans think about deep seabed mining

Published

19 hours ago

2026/02/20

Thilina Walpola

Far beneath the waters surrounding Sri Lanka lies a largely unseen frontier, a deep seabed that may contain cobalt, nickel and rare earth elements essential to modern technologies, from smartphones to electric vehicles. Around the world, governments and corporations are accelerating efforts to tap these minerals, presenting deep-sea mining as the next chapter of the global “blue economy.”

For an island nation whose ocean territory far exceeds its landmass, the question is no longer abstract. Sri Lanka has already demonstrated its commitment to ocean governance by ratifying the United Nations High Seas Treaty (BBNJ Agreement) in September 2025, becoming one of the early countries to help trigger its entry into force. The treaty strengthens biodiversity conservation beyond national jurisdiction and promotes fair access to marine genetic resources.

Yet as interest grows in seabed minerals, a critical debate is emerging: Can Sri Lanka pursue deep-sea mining ambitions without compromising marine ecosystems, fisheries and long-term sustainability?

Speaking to The Island, Prof. Lahiru Udayanga, Dr. Menuka Udugama and Ms. Nethini Ganepola of the Department of Agribusiness Management, Faculty of Agriculture & Plantation Management, together with Sudarsha De Silva, Co-founder of EarthLanka Youth Network and Sri Lanka Hub Leader for the Sustainable Ocean Alliance, shared findings from their newly published research examining how Sri Lankans perceive deep-sea mineral extraction.

The study, published in the journal Sustainability and presented at the International Symposium on Disaster Resilience and Sustainable Development in Thailand, offers rare empirical insight into public attitudes toward deep-sea mining in Sri Lanka.

Limited Public Inclusion

“Our study shows that public inclusion in decision-making around deep-sea mining remains quite limited,” Ms. Nethini Ganepola told The Island. “Nearly three-quarters of respondents said the issue is rarely covered in the media or discussed in public forums. Many feel that decisions about marine resources are made mainly at higher political or institutional levels without adequate consultation.”

The nationwide survey, conducted across ten districts, used structured questionnaires combined with a Discrete Choice Experiment — a method widely applied in environmental economics to measure how people value trade-offs between development and conservation.

Ganepola noted that awareness of seabed mining remains low. However, once respondents were informed about potential impacts — including habitat destruction, sediment plumes, declining fish stocks and biodiversity loss — concern rose sharply.

“This suggests the problem is not a lack of public interest,” she told The Island. “It is a lack of accessible information and meaningful opportunities for participation.”

Ecology Before Extraction

Dr. Menuka Udugama said the research was inspired by Sri Lanka’s growing attention to seabed resources within the wider blue economy discourse — and by concern that extraction could carry long-lasting ecological and livelihood risks if safeguards are weak.

“Deep-sea mining is often presented as an economic opportunity because of global demand for critical minerals,” Dr. Udugama told The Island. “But scientific evidence on cumulative impacts and ecosystem recovery remains limited, especially for deep habitats that regenerate very slowly. For an island nation, this uncertainty matters.”

She stressed that marine ecosystems underpin fisheries, tourism and coastal well-being, meaning decisions taken about the seabed can have far-reaching consequences beyond the mining site itself.

Prof. Lahiru Udayanga echoed this concern.

“People tended to view deep-sea mining primarily through an environmental-risk lens rather than as a neutral industrial activity,” Prof. Udayanga told The Island. “Biodiversity loss was the most frequently identified concern, followed by physical damage to the seabed and long-term resource depletion.”

About two-thirds of respondents identified biodiversity loss as their greatest fear — a striking finding for an issue that many had only recently learned about.

A Measurable Value for Conservation

Perhaps the most significant finding was the public’s willingness to pay for protection.

“On average, households indicated a willingness to pay around LKR 3,532 per year to protect seabed ecosystems,” Prof. Udayanga told The Island. “From an economic perspective, that represents the social value people attach to marine conservation.”

The study’s advanced statistical analysis — using Conditional Logit and Random Parameter Logit models — confirmed strong and consistent support for policy options that reduce mineral extraction, limit environmental damage and strengthen monitoring and regulation.

The research also revealed demographic variations. Younger and more educated respondents expressed stronger pro-conservation preferences, while higher-income households were willing to contribute more financially.

At the same time, many respondents expressed concern that government agencies and the media have not done enough to raise awareness or enforce safeguards — indicating a trust gap that policymakers must address.

“Regulations and monitoring systems require social acceptance to be workable over time,” Dr. Udugama told The Island. “Understanding public perception strengthens accountability and clarifies the conditions under which deep-sea mining proposals would be evaluated.”

Youth and Community Engagement

Ganepola emphasised that engagement must begin with transparency and early consultation.

“Decisions about deep-sea mining should not remain limited to technical experts,” she told The Island. “Coastal communities — especially fishers — must be consulted from the beginning, as they are directly affected. Youth engagement is equally important because young people will inherit the long-term consequences of today’s decisions.”

She called for stronger media communication, public hearings, stakeholder workshops and greater integration of marine conservation into school and university curricula.

“Inclusive and transparent engagement will build trust and reduce conflict,” she said.

A Regional Milestone

Sudarsha De Silva described the study as a milestone for Sri Lanka and the wider Asian region.

“When you consider research publications on this topic in Asia, they are extremely limited,” De Silva told The Island. “This is one of the first comprehensive studies in Sri Lanka examining public perception of deep-sea mining. Organizations like the Sustainable Ocean Alliance stepping forward to collaborate with Sri Lankan academics is a great achievement.”

He also acknowledged the contribution of youth research assistants from EarthLanka — Malsha Keshani, Fathima Shamla and Sachini Wijebandara — for their support in executing the study.

A Defining Choice

As Sri Lanka charts its blue economy future, the message from citizens appears unmistakable.

Development is not rejected. But it must not come at the cost of irreversible ecological damage.

The ocean’s true wealth, respondents suggest, lies not merely in minerals beneath the seabed, but in the living systems above it — systems that sustain fisheries, tourism and coastal communities.

For policymakers weighing the promise of mineral wealth against ecological risk, the findings shared with The Island offer a clear signal: sustainable governance and biodiversity protection align more closely with public expectations than unchecked extraction.

In the end, protecting the ocean may prove to be not only an environmental responsibility — but the most prudent long-term investment Sri Lanka can make.

By Ifham Nizam

Features

How Black Civil Rights leaders strengthen democracy in the US

Published

2 days ago

2026/02/19

Sahan Weerasooriya

Jesse Jackson / Barack Obama

On being elected US President in 2008, Barack Obama famously stated: ‘Change has come to America’. Considering the questions continuing to grow out of the status of minority rights in particular in the US, this declaration by the former US President could come to be seen as somewhat premature by some. However, there could be no doubt that the election of Barack Obama to the US presidency proved that democracy in the US is to a considerable degree inclusive and accommodating.

If this were not so, Barack Obama, an Afro-American politician, would never have been elected President of the US. Obama was exceptionally capable, charismatic and eloquent but these qualities alone could not have paved the way for his victory. On careful reflection it could be said that the solid groundwork laid by indefatigable Black Civil Rights activists in the US of the likes of Martin Luther King (Jnr) and Jesse Jackson, who passed away just recently, went a great distance to enable Obama to come to power and that too for two terms. Obama is on record as owning to the profound influence these Civil Rights leaders had on his career.

The fact is that these Civil Rights activists and Obama himself spoke to the hearts and minds of most Americans and convinced them of the need for democratic inclusion in the US. They, in other words, made a convincing case for Black rights. Above all, their struggles were largely peaceful.

Their reasoning resonated well with the thinking sections of the US who saw them as subscribers to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for instance, which made a lucid case for mankind’s equal dignity. That is, ‘all human beings are equal in dignity.’

It may be recalled that Martin Luther King (Jnr.) famously declared: ‘I have a dream that one day this nation will rise up, live out the true meaning of its creed….We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal.’

Jesse Jackson vied unsuccessfully to be a Democratic Party presidential candidate twice but his energetic campaigns helped to raise public awareness about the injustices and material hardships suffered by the black community in particular. Obama, we now know, worked hard at grass roots level in the run-up to his election. This experience proved invaluable in his efforts to sensitize the public to the harsh realities of the depressed sections of US society.

Cynics are bound to retort on reading the foregoing that all the good work done by the political personalities in question has come to nought in the US; currently administered by Republican hard line President Donald Trump. Needless to say, minority communities are now no longer welcome in the US and migrants are coming to be seen as virtual outcasts who need to be ‘shown the door’ . All this seems to be happening in so short a while since the Democrats were voted out of office at the last presidential election.

However, the last US presidential election was not free of controversy and the lesson is far too easily forgotten that democratic development is a process that needs to be persisted with. In a vital sense it is ‘a journey’ that encounters huge ups and downs. More so why it must be judiciously steered and in the absence of such foresighted managing the democratic process could very well run aground and this misfortune is overtaking the US to a notable extent.

The onus is on the Democratic Party and other sections supportive of democracy to halt the US’ steady slide into authoritarianism and white supremacist rule. They would need to demonstrate the foresight, dexterity and resourcefulness of the Black leaders in focus. In the absence of such dynamic political activism, the steady decline of the US as a major democracy cannot be prevented.

From the foregoing some important foreign policy issues crop-up for the global South in particular. The US’ prowess as the ‘world’s mightiest democracy’ could be called in question at present but none could doubt the flexibility of its governance system. The system’s inclusivity and accommodative nature remains and the possibility could not be ruled out of the system throwing up another leader of the stature of Barack Obama who could to a great extent rally the US public behind him in the direction of democratic development. In the event of the latter happening, the US could come to experience a democratic rejuvenation.

The latter possibilities need to be borne in mind by politicians of the South in particular. The latter have come to inherit a legacy of Non-alignment and this will stand them in good stead; particularly if their countries are bankrupt and helpless, as is Sri Lanka’s lot currently. They cannot afford to take sides rigorously in the foreign relations sphere but Non-alignment should not come to mean for them an unreserved alliance with the major powers of the South, such as China. Nor could they come under the dictates of Russia. For, both these major powers that have been deferentially treated by the South over the decades are essentially authoritarian in nature and a blind tie-up with them would not be in the best interests of the South, going forward.

However, while the South should not ruffle its ties with the big powers of the South it would need to ensure that its ties with the democracies of the West in particular remain intact in a flourishing condition. This is what Non-alignment, correctly understood, advises.

Accordingly, considering the US’ democratic resilience and its intrinsic strengths, the South would do well to be on cordial terms with the US as well. A Black presidency in the US has after all proved that the US is not predestined, so to speak, to be a country for only the jingoistic whites. It could genuinely be an all-inclusive, accommodative democracy and by virtue of these characteristics could be an inspiration for the South.

However, political leaders of the South would need to consider their development options very judiciously. The ‘neo-liberal’ ideology of the West need not necessarily be adopted but central planning and equity could be brought to the forefront of their talks with Western financial institutions. Dexterity in diplomacy would prove vital.