Features

The JVP’s Military Battle for Power

Published

4 years ago

2021/04/6

Sahan Weerasooriya

THE APRIL 1971 REVOLT – II

By Jayantha Somasundaram

The JVP evolved in the late 1960s under Rohana Wijeweera as a radical rural youth group. It believed that a socialist change in Sri Lanka could only be effected through a sudden armed insurrection launched simultaneously across the country. Recruits to the JVP underwent a series of political classes as well as military training, while the organisation clandestinely armed itself. The United Front Government responded in March 1971 with a State of Emergency, the arrest of JVP cadre and the deploying of the Army to the provinces.

In March 1971 events rapidly escalated. The JVP believed that the government was planning to use the Army to launch an all out offensive against them. And on 2nd April nine JVP leaders, six members of the Political Bureau and three District Secretaries, met at the Vidyodaya Sangaramaya at a meeting presided over by S.V.A Piyatilake. They took the decision to launch their attack at 2330 hours on 5th April. “The decision taken was to attack on a specific date at a specific time. This decision is completely in line with the evidence that the Fifth Class of the JVP…advocated that in the circumstances of our country, the best method would be to launch simultaneous attacks everywhere,” concluded the Judgement of the Criminal Justice Commission Inquiry No 1 1976.

The date of attack was relayed by pre-arranged code in the contents of a paid radio obituary notice by an unsuspecting state-owned Ceylon Broadcasting Corporation. The JVP cadres at Wellawaya however misinterpreted the instruction and launched their attack on the Wellawaya Police Station 24 hours earlier on the night of 4th April.

The initial targets were rural police stations both in order to further arm themselves and because the JVP viewed the police as the only representative of the state in the countryside. Moreover, they believed that the police and the armed forces were low on ammunition and they discounted the government’s ability to counter attack once the JVP had gained control of the countryside. Besides, the attacks on remote police stations across much of the country’s rural south, a large group also travelled north in order to rescue Wijeweera who was held in Jaffna.

Attacking with home-made weapons in groups of 25 to 30 in order to seize better arms from the police stations, the JVP believed that controlling these rural police stations would provide them with areas of military and political control, thereby denying the government access to such areas which would provide secure rear-bases for subsequent attacks by the JVP on towns and cities. Ten out of the island’s 22 Administrative Districts were battlegrounds. “Ninety two Police Stations had been attacked, damaging fifty and causing around fifty to be abandoned,” wrote Major General Anton Muttukumaru in The Military History of Ceylon.

Piyatilake was responsible for operations in Colombo. He detailed Raja Nimal an Advanced Level student to storm the Rosmead Place residence of Prime Minister Sirima Bandaranaike on the night of the 5th along with 50 student cadre, to capture the Prime Minister and transport her to a place where she would be held. However the expected vehicle and Piyatilake failed to arrive at the prearranged rendezvous in Borella and the attack did not materialise. Meanwhile unaware of the impending danger, the Prime Minister’s security advisers prevailed upon her to move to her official residence at Temple Trees, where she would be more secure.

Elsewhere in the Colombo District a major attack occurred at Hanwella, where the A4 High Level and Low Level Roads converge. Early on the morning of the 6th about 100 JVP combatants using hand bombs, Molotov Cocktails and firearms attacked the Police Station compelling its personnel to abandon their positions and flee into the surrounding jungle. The JVP captured the station’s armoury of weapons, hoisted a red flag and froze transport into Colombo. They held the town until armed police from Homagama supported by troops from Panagoda overpowered them.

The Battle for Kegalle

Athula Nimalasiri Jayasinghe, known within the Movement as Loku Athula, was in charge of the Kegalle and Kurunegala Districts. Once the decision to attack was made he moved into the area on the 3rd, meeting Area Leaders at Weliveriya and coordinating operations with detachments in Veyangoda and Mirigama. About 600 JVP combatants were deployed across the Kegalle District concentrated at Warakapola and Rambukkana.

Under Patrick Fernando, the Pindeniya detachment attacked both the local Police Station and the Bogala Graphite Mines, capturing a lorry load of explosives from the mines. On the 8th the Warakapola Police Station was successfully attacked, its weapons including two sub machine guns seized and the building set ablaze. In addition, Police Stations at Bulathkohupitiya, Aranayaka, Mawanella, Rambukkana and Dedigama were also attacked and the station at Aranayake burned down. Only Kegalle Police Station and the area surrounding it remained under Government control.

The Army could only access the interior regions of the District on the 10th and initially had to focus on removing road blocks and repairing culverts and bridges to gain mobility. When they penetrated the countryside they were frequently ambushed as in Aranayake and both sides sustained casualties. In The JVP 1969-1989 Justice A.C. Alles concludes that “the insurgents had met with considerable success in the Kegalle District.”

On the 12th at Utuwankande the Army was ambushed by the JVP using rifles and submachine guns. But the battle was turning in favour of the Army which brought to bear superior arms to put pressure on the rebels and gradually reopen the abandoned police stations in the district.

Finally on the 29th led by Loku Athula the JVP forces began their withdrawal from the District, from Balapattawa via Alawwa and then north. As they retreated in the direction of the Wilpattu Park they came under attack from the Army and from the air by Air Force helicopters. The Army finally ambushed them near Galgamuwa, killing some and capturing Loku Athula on 7th June.

The experience of the Kegalle District was replicated by the JVP in the Galle, Matara and Hambantota Districts. With the exception of Dickwella all Police Stations in the Matara District were abandoned. While in the Ambalangoda Police Area all stations, Elpitiya, Uragaha, Pitigala and Meetiyagoda fell to the JVP.

Widespread JVP attacks were also launched across the North Central Province where only the Anuradhapura Police Station was spared. As in the Kegalle District the outlying stations had to be abandoned and personnel withdrawn to Anuradhapura. However the Kekirawa Station, though attacked several times, held out. The Army was only able to move into the outlying areas of the Anuradhapura District on the 30th. Further north the Vavuniya Police Station in the Northern Province was also attacked. Less intense activity was reported in the Kandy, Badulla and Moneragala Districts.

N.Sanmugathasan in A Marxist Looks at the History of Ceylon remarked that “The rank and file (of the JVP) seems to have been honestly revolutionary, with a sense of dedication that must be admired, and a willingness to sacrifice their lives – unheard of before in Ceylon.” The first Ceylonese Army Commander General Muttukumaru wrote “Their (JVP) courage was also evident in the display of their military skills which enabled them to control many regions in the country and give battle to the armed forces in fierce guerrilla fighting.”

The military background

In November 1947 on the eve of independence, Ceylon signed a Defence Agreement with the United Kingdom. The military’s threat perception was determined by “the Government’s concern, (which) was invasion by India. The military’s focus was to have a defence force capable of meeting any external threat until assistance arrived from Britain.” In the words of Air Vice-Marshal P.H. ‘Paddy’ Mendis, who was Air Force Commander in 1971, the objective that determined the capabilities of the armed forces therefore was to “hold up an invading force of the enemy until assistance arrived from a bigger country with which we have an alliance.” (Brian Blodgett in Sri Lanka’s Military: The Search for a Mission 1949-2004)

The only military threat perceived was external; there was no anticipation of an internal military threat. Furthermore, in the wake of the 1962 abortive coup against the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) Government, and the alleged 1966 coup against the United National Party Government, both parties that had been in power were wary of the Army which in 1970 had an authorised strength of 329 officers and 6,291 other ranks, and an annual budget of Rs 52 million (US$10mn), just 1.2% of total government expenditure.

Despite these inherent structural limitations, the Government and the Army responded swiftly, appointing regional Co-ordinating Officers in the worst affected districts. They were Colonels E.T. de Z. Abeysekera in Anuradhapura, S. D. Ratwatte in Badulla, Douglas Ramanayake in Galle and Derek Nugawella in Hambantota, Lieutenant Colonels R.R Rodrigo in Jaffna, Cyril Ranatunga in Kegalle, D.J.de S Wickremasinghe in Matara, Tissa Weeratunga in Moneragala and Dennis Hapugalle in Vavuniya.

The Ceylon Volunteer Force was immediately mobilised, and the first military casualty was Staff Sergeant Jothipala of the 2nd Volunteer Battalion, Sinha Regiment [2(V)SR], who was killed at Thulhiriya in the Kurunegala District on the first day of the insurrection. While Sandhurst-trained Major Noel Weerakoon of the 4th Regiment, Ceylon Artillery was the first officer to be killed whilst leading an ammunition convoy from Vavuniya to the besieged town of Anuradhapura; he was wounded when his convoy was ambushed and later succumbed to his injuries.

The battle rages

In 1971 the Royal Ceylon Air Force (RCyAF) consisted of three squadrons: No. 1 Flying Training Squadron with nine Chipmunk trainers based at China Bay, No. 2 Transport Sq. equipped with five Doves, 4 Herons and three Pioneer fixed wing aircraft and four helicopters and No. 3 Reconnaissance Sq. with Cessna aircraft. In the 1960s Britain had gifted five Hunting Jet Provost T51s jet trainers which had gone out of service by 1971.

Beginning at 0900 hours on 5th April the Jet Provost, which were in storage at China Bay, began operating out of this airbase. Armed with Browning machine guns and rockets, they carried out air to ground attacks using 60 lb rockets. The three Bell 206A Jet Ranger helicopters protected by Bren Guns airlifted 36,500 lb of ammunition during April to critical police stations. In addition the Doves carried out supply missions and during the course of April, 900 soldiers and 100,000 lb of equipment were transported by the RCyAF.

The JVP seized parts of the Colombo-Kandy A1 Trunk Route at Warakapola and Kegalle, cutting off the main artery between Colombo and the tea growing highlands. In response the Jet Provost had to mount aerial attacks on the key bridge at Alawwa which led to the downing of a Jet Provost and the death of her pilot.

If not for the premature attack in Wellawaya which resulted in the Police and Military around the country being placed on high alert “the situation would have been very grave for not only would several Police Stations have been captured, but the JVP would have been able to arm itself with modern weapons,” wrote Justice Alles.

Desperate for arms and ammunition in the first days of the rebellion, the Government aware that a Chinese cargo vessel bound for Tanzania with an arms shipment was currently in Colombo Harbour, unsuccessfully appealed to both Beijing and Dar-es-Salaam to make these arms available to Sri Lanka.

International support

As rural police stations fell, the government abandoned others, regrouping its limited forces and anxious to protect the towns and cities. This tactic paid off. The JVP only had equipment captured from police stations. They did not go on to overrun military camps nor capture their more sophisticated weapons. While the JVP did control parts of Kegalle, Elpitiya, Deniyaya and Kataragama uncontested, the Army replenished its meagre stocks of weapons.

Wijeweera had focussed solely on a single decisive blow against the Government. There was no provision to conduct even a short term guerrilla operation, or an attempt to lead a peasant uprising. And during the first 72 hours his strategy appeared to be working. What dramatically altered the balance of forces against the JVP was the immediate and sustained influx of military equipment that flowed in from overseas to enable the armed forces to turn the tide in their favour.

Within four days of the JVP attack, Air Ceylon’s Trident took off from Singapore carrying a consignment of small arms provided by Britain from its base there. The following day the UK agreed to supply six Bell-47G Jet Ranger helicopters armed with 7.62mm machine guns. On 12th April on board a US Air Force Lockheed C-141 Starlifter, Washington shipped out critical spare parts for the RCyAF helicopters which were flying twelve hour days. And at Colombo’s request New Delhi on the 14th sent six Indian Air Force Aérospatiale SA 315B Lama utility helicopters with crews to Katunayake Air Force Base, along with troops to guard them as well as arms, ammunition and grenades. They would remain in-country for three months.

On the 17th Air Ceylon flew in nine tons of military equipment which the Soviet Union made available from supplies in Cairo. While on the 22nd a Soviet Air Force Antonov AN-22 transporter arrived with two Kamov Ka-26 rescue helicopters and five Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-15 jet fighters and one MiG-17 high-subsonic fighter. The Soviet aircraft were accompanied by 200 trainers and ground crew.

China, Australia, Pakistan and Yugoslavia would also send arms and equipment. Colombo’s Non Aligned foreign policy which enabled it to source and receive military weapons and equipment from countries across the globe had succeeded. However the disparate array of equipment would pose a logistics dilemma for the military.

The sudden influx of arms and ammunition rapidly altered the balance of power against the JVP. For example the Army took Yugoslav artillery into Kegalle to flush out the rebels. And around 16,500 JVP members were captured, arrested or surrendered. The remaining combatants withdrew into jungle sanctuaries in the Kegalle, Elpitiya, Deniyaya and Kataragama areas.

Meanwhile there were reports that the JVP were endeavouring to bring weapons in by sea. But the Royal Ceylon Navy’s frigate and Thorneycroft boats could not secure the island’s territory nor prevent supplies reaching the rebels. This compelled Colombo to rely on the Indian Navy which sent three of its Hunt-class escort destroyers, INS Ganga, INS Gomathi and INS Godawari to patrol Ceylon’s maritime perimeter. In Sri Lanka Navy: Enhanced Role and New Challenges Professor Gamini Keerawella and Lieutenant Commander S. Hemachandre explain that “Sri Lanka’s dependency on the Indian Navy during the Insurgency to patrol its sea frontier in order to prevent arms supply to the Insurgents, was total.”

At Anuradhapura the JVP had established a base camp as well as six sub camps in the surrounding jungle where weapons, explosives and food had been stored. JVP operations in the Rajangana and Tambuttegama areas were controlled from this base camp. A platoon of 1CLI armed with 82mm mortars was sent to Anuradhapura in May and participated in Operation Otthappuwa, under 1CLI 2iC Major Jayawardena to take control of this area. By the end of May the insurrection was completely crushed.

Some counter insurgency operations however continued into the following year. A-Company 1CLI established a forward base in Horowapatana as late as November 1972 from where they carried out combing out operations until April 1973 while 1CLI’s D-Company closed its Kegalle operations only in December 1974.

Outcomes

The international media reported that summary executions had taken place. Writing from Colombo in the Nouvel Observateur on 23rd May, Rene Dumont said “from the Victoria Bridge on 13th April I saw corpses floating down the (Kelani) River which flows through the north of the capital watched by hundreds of motionless people. The Police who had killed them let them float downstream to terrorise the population.” The New York Times in its 15th April edition said that “many were found to have been shot in the back.”

Lieutenant Colonel Cyril Ranatunga commanding troops in Kegalle was emphatic. “We have learned too many lessons from Vietnam and Malaysia. We must destroy them completely.” While another officer was quoted alongside him in the International Herald Tribune of 20th April as saying “Once we are convinced prisoners are insurgents we take them to a cemetery and dispose of them.” And the Washington Post on 9th May quoted a major who said that “we have never had the opportunity to fight a real war in this country. All these years we have been firing at dummies, now we are being put to use.”

One of these public executions became a celebrated case, the brutal murder of Premawathi Manamperi of Kataragama. She had been crowned festival queen at the previous year’s Sinhala New Year celebration. Two soldiers, Lieutenant Wijeysooria and Sergeant Ratnayaka would be convicted, but both claimed their orders were: “Take no prisoners; bump them off, liquidate them.” (Jayasumana Obeysekara Revolutionary Movements in Ceylon in Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia edited by Kathleen Gough and Hari P. Sharma)

Janice Jiggins notes in Caste and Family in the Politics of the Sinhalese 1947-1976 that “Many in the armed services took the view that the fighting was an expression of anti-Govigama resentment and in certain areas went into low caste villages and arrested all the youth, regardless of participation.”

In the aftermath of the insurgency the armed forces expanded. The Air Force which had 1,400 personnel in 1971 grew to 3,100 by 1976. New units were raised: a Special Police Reserve Force, a Volunteer RCyAF and a new Field Security Detachment targeting subversion. The latter was placed under Lieutenant Colonel Anurudha Ratwatte 2(V) SR, the Security Liaison Officer to the Prime Minister. While a new Volunteer Army unit the National Service Regiment, targeting recruits over 35 years provided according to Fred Halliday “a damning sign that the whole of the country’s youth was in opposition to (the Government).”

The JVP uprising broke the back of the left parties which were trapped politically by the insurrection which they could only denounce at the cost of their long term influence. The SLFP too was isolated from its electorate due to the harsh measures adopted; curfew, censorship, trial without jury, postponement of elections, suspension of habeas corpus and other civil rights. Their Government suffered a devastating defeat at the next elections in 1977.

The uprising questioned the efficacy of a parliamentary system that could not accommodate a generation of educated youth, nor keep politicians aware of their needs and strengths. The decades-old mass national parties seemed to have no place for them. And the JVP charge that the leaders in parliament were of a different class and therefore they themselves of a different sub culture, seemed valid.

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Features

Tariffs as business deals?

Published

12 hours ago

2025/04/23

Sahan Weerasooriya

From White House to Wall Street:

I am going to examine the financial market repercussions of President Donald Trump’s 2025 tariff policies, focusing on equities, bonds, derivatives, and interest rates. It explores how asymmetric information and alleged insider trading influenced market dynamics, highlighting the challenges posed to market integrity and investor confidence.

In 2025, President Donald Trump’s administration implemented a series of tariffs targeting major trading partners, including China, Canada, and Mexico. These policies aimed to protect domestic industries but resulted in significant volatility across global financial markets. The sudden shifts in trade policy introduced uncertainty, affecting various asset classes and raising concerns about the exploitation of insider information.

In response to escalating market turmoil and international pressure, President Trump announced a 90-day deferral on certain tariffs, via social media on April 9, 2025. However, the announcement’s ambiguity led to continued market instability.

Pre-Tariff Market Conditions

(February 2025)

In February 2025, US financial markets were experiencing relative stability. The S&P 500 was trading near record highs, buoyed by strong corporate earnings and positive economic indicators. Interest rates remained steady, with the 10-year Treasury yield hovering around 3.9%, reflecting moderate inflation expectations and a balanced economic outlook. The CBOE Volatility Index (VIX), a measure of market volatility, was subdued, indicating investor confidence.

Impact on Financial Markets

Equities and Traditional Investment Strategies

The announcement of tariffs led to a sharp decline in US stock markets. Major indices, such as the Dow Jones Industrial Average and the Nasdaq Composite, experienced significant losses, with the Nasdaq entering bear market territory after a 5.82% drop. The traditional 60/40 investment strategy, allocating 60% to equities and 40% to bonds, proved ineffective during this period, as both asset classes suffered losses due to rising bond yields and falling stock prices (Figure 1).

Market Indices (S&P 500, Nasdaq, Dow Jones): Major crashes occurred on April 3–4, 2025, following the tariff imposition. Slight recovery or stabilisation followed Trump’s deferral tweet on April 9, but markets dipped sharply again on April 10 (Table 1).

Market Reaction to Tariff Imposition

(April 2–5, 2025)

* April 3, 2025: The S&P 500 plummeted by 4.88%, the Nasdaq Composite fell by 5.97%, and the Dow Jones Industrial Average declined by 3.98%. The Russell 2000 entered bear market territory, dropping over 20% from its recent peak.

* April 4, 2025: Markets continued their downward trajectory. The S&P 500 fell an additional 5.97%, the Nasdaq Composite decreased by 5.82%, and the Dow Jones Industrial Average dropped by 5.50%.

* April 5, 2025: The newly imposed tariffs officially took effect, further exacerbating market volatility and investor uncertainty.

* Over this period, US stock markets lost approximately $6.6 trillion in value, marking the largest two-day loss in history.

Market Response to Tariff Deferral

(April 9–11, 2025)

* April 10, 2025: Despite the deferral, the S&P 500 declined by approximately 15%, and long-term Treasury bonds faced significant selling pressure. The US dollar weakened, and gold prices surged as investors sought safe-haven assets.

* April 11, 2025: Consumer sentiment plummeted, with the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index dropping to 50.8, the second-lowest level since records began in 1952. This decline reflected widespread economic pessimism amid the ongoing trade tensions.

Bond Market and Interest Rates

The bond market reacted to the tariffs with increased yields, reflecting investor concerns about inflation and economic growth. The US 10-year Treasury yield rose to 4.358%, indicating expectations of higher interest rates. This rise in yields contributed to the decline in bond prices, further challenging traditional investment strategies.

10-Year Treasury Yield: Climbed steadily from 3.9% to 4.358% (April 2–21), suggesting increased inflation expectations and risk premium. The bond market experienced significant fluctuations during this period. Therefore, investors demanded higher returns for perceived increased risk. This rise in yields indicated expectations of higher inflation and potential economic slowdown due to the tariffs. (Table 2).

Derivatives and Market Volatility

The derivatives market, including options and futures, experienced heightened volatility in response to tariff announcements. The CBOE Volatility Index (VIX), often referred to as “Wall Street’s fear index,” spiked to its highest level since 2020, closing at 45.31 points. This surge in volatility presented both risks and opportunities for investors, particularly those with access to timely information.

VIX Volatility Index: Rose from 19 on April 2 to a peak of 45.31 on April 4, indicating extreme market fear. The VIX spiked to 45.31, its highest level since 2020, indicating heightened market anxiety (Table 3).

Asymmetric Information and Insider Trading Allegations

Allegations of insider trading emerged during the tariff saga, highlighting concerns about asymmetric information. Congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene faced scrutiny for stock transactions made shortly before tariff announcements, including purchases in companies like Amazon and Tesla, and the sale of Treasury bills. While Greene denied insider knowledge, the timing of these trades raised questions about the potential exploitation of non-public information (The Times, 2025).

Additionally, unusual trading patterns in S&P 500 futures preceding major policy shifts suggested possible insider activity. Although direct evidence linking these trades to White House insiders remains inconclusive, the patterns underscore the challenges in detecting and preventing insider trading in policy-driven markets (Los Angeles Times, 2025).

Tariff Decisions as Business Deals

While tariffs are typically seen as instruments of trade policy aimed at protecting domestic industries or rebalancing trade deficits, the Trump administration’s 2025 tariff imposition and abrupt deferral appear less rooted in strategic policy and more akin to short-term market manipulations. These decisions unfolded not through institutional processes or legislative debates, but rather through presidential tweets and sudden reversals, strongly suggesting a deal-making mindset characteristic of business negotiations rather than public governance.

The Role of Asymmetric Information and Market Elites

Insider trading is traditionally associated with illegal access to non-public corporate information. However, in this case, asymmetric political information—known only to a select few close to power—may have created an opportunity to profit.

Market actors with proximity to decision-makers, or even sophisticated algorithms tied to social media monitoring, could have anticipated the tariff deferral.

Billionaire investors and influencers like Elon Musk, who maintain both financial influence and political access, are often speculated to benefit from such opaque decision-making environments. The quick reversal of tariffs led to a surge in tech stocks, many of which form the core holdings of large institutional investors, hedge funds, and elite entrepreneurs.

For example: The Nasdaq rebounded by 1.5% following the deferral tweet. Options trading volumes spiked on tech-heavy indices, indicating pre-positioning by well-informed actors. Reports from Bloomberg and Reuters noted unusual activity in Tesla call options shortly before the deferral (Reuters, 2025; Bloomberg Markets, 2025).

A Business Deal Mindset

Trump’s own language underscores the deal-making philosophy. The President tweeted that the tariffs were a “strong hand in negotiations” and “paused for talks with China”, using terms more common in corporate boardrooms than diplomatic channels. This rhetoric, combined with the lack of institutional transparency, raises serious concerns about the manipulation of public policy for private gains.

In this light, the administration’s behaviour is not reflective of classical economic policy objectives like comparative advantage or strategic protectionism. Instead, it aligns with the wealth-maximising tactics of a private enterprise, where the aim is to control narrative, timing, and volatility to benefit select stakeholders.

Conclusions

More critically, the Trump tariff saga of 2025 blurs the lines between public policy and private profit. The opacity, erratic timing, and informal communication channels—particularly via presidential tweets—suggest that these were less about coherent trade strategies and more akin to orchestrated business maneuvers. The reactive movements of major indices, coupled with unusual options trading patterns and speculative capital flows, indicate that market elites likely capitalised on volatility, benefiting from privileged access or predictive positioning based on asymmetric information.

This raises serious concerns about market integrity and the ethical boundaries between governance and profiteering. When financial markets are left vulnerable to abrupt and opaque political actions, especially ones lacking institutional oversight, the door opens to manipulation, insider trading, and erosion of public trust.

In sum, the 2025 Trump tariff episode serves as a cautionary tale—one that highlights the dangers of politicising economic policy, the vulnerabilities of global markets to personalised decision-making, and the importance of upholding the foundational principles of fairness, transparency, and accountability in modern financial systems.

(The writer, a senior Chartered Accountant and professional banker, is Professor at SLIIT University, Malabe. He is also the author of the “Doing Social Research and Publishing Results”, a Springer publication (Singapore), and “Samaja Gaveshakaya (in Sinhala). The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the institution he works for. He can be contacted at saliya.a@slit.lk and www.researcher.com)

Features

The sea-change after Modi’s visit

Published

12 hours ago

2025/04/23

Sahan Weerasooriya

The cosy relationship between President Anura Kumara Dissanayake and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is causing concerns, perhaps, for good reasons. The inheritor of the leadership of the party, the JVP, which launched the first insurgency in the modern history of Sri Lanka, way back in 1971 citing ‘Indian expansionism’ as one of the reasons, seems to have undergone a miraculous transformation; it is now cosying up to India. The process started well before the last presidential election, with the astute Indian intelligence sensing which way political winds were blowing in Sri Lanka; AKD was invited as an honoured guest to India, though he did not hold any important position in Sri Lanka. This, no doubt, increased his chances of victory but the bigger beneficiary was India as during that trip AKD showed that he was prepared to reverse the attitude of the JVP towards India. The camaraderie between AKD and Modi has increased, culminating in the latter’s Sri Lanka visit, which Indian media have hailed as a foreign policy success.

Some political commentators have expressed concern that Sri Lanka is heading towards being the 29th state of India. Those in government may attempt to dispel this as a baseless fear but, unfortunately, they fail to realise that it is the very actions of their president that has given rise to such concerns, the way Indo-Lanka Defence MoU/agreement was signed during the recent visit of the Prime Minister Modi. One may wonder why there are no protests but there is a very reasonable explanation for this; those who mounted repeated protests against closer ties with India, from as far back as 1971, are now in government and seem to have metamorphosed to be the most pro-Indian!

During the recent ‘flying’ state-visit of the Indian PM Modi, a large number of MOUs have been signed, including the one on defence corporation, the contents of which are unknown, apparently even to the members of the Cabinet! How come this happens with a government that came to power on the promise of eradicating corruption, establishing transparency, and system change? Neville Ladduwahetty, in an excellent analysis, points out that this agreement would result in Sri Lanka becoming, at least, a vassal state of India (Sri Lanka-India MoUs and their implications, The Island 18 April).

Some of the excuses being doled out are nothing short of hilarious. When questions were raised in parliament about the contents of these MOUs and pacts, the response from a government spokesman was that if anyone is interested, they can obtain details by making a request under the Rights to Information act! Isn’t this the actions of a government which has lost all semblance of transparency in such a short period of time? An even more important question is whether India is exploiting the lack of experience of the politicians in power to its advantage.

One may wonder whether it was a coincidence that this extremely important and closely guarded defence pact was signed on 5 April, 54 years to the very day the JVP launched its first insurrection in Sri Lanka with the rallying-cry, “Motherland or death”! Considering the sinister ways of India’s operations, at times, it is more likely to be a deliberate and subtle reminder to the NPP/JVP government than a coincidence. What an irony it was for the Sri Lankan President, the heir to the JVP throne, to award the highest honour possible to the Prime Minister of India, a country they detested so much! After his very successful trip, PM Modi flew by helicopter, no doubt, gazing at the remnants of the Ram Sethu bridge, probably dreaming of rebuilding it to connect the 29th state to the mainland!

It is high time the government reassured the public by informing at least the context of the defence pact signed, even if details are withheld for security reasons. If it is not done the credibility of the government would be further eroded. It has already lost its credibility on the promise of honesty and integrity. The former speaker, who had to give up the third highest ranking position in the country as he had misplaced the certificates of his doctorate from a private university in Japan, promised to produce the certificates to clear his name. Enough time has passed for him to get even duplicates but despite the obvious dishonesty, unashamedly, he remains an MP! Is this the cleansing of Diyawannawa they promised?

What is happening regarding the Easter terrorist attack is raising concerns too, as it is being reinvestigated to find a mastermind under the supervision of two retired police officers, who were rewarded with top posts for openly supporting the NPP, despite being found fault for neglect of duty by a committee of Inquiry tasked to investigate the failures leading to that attack. Even if they were wrongly implicated by that committee, they should not be a party to any relevant investigation till their names were cleared. The government has demonstrated the lack of good governance by allowing these two officers to be involved in the investigation and the two officers have demonstrated their total lack of integrity by not removing themselves voluntarily. The current investigation reminds one of the Sinhala saying Horage ammagen pena ahanawa wagei (seek help from a female clairvoyant to catch a thief who happens to be her own son.)

This search for a mastermind, which started with the pronouncements of a previous Attorney-General who has refused, so far, to substantiate his claims took a new turn with the notorious Channel 4 programme based on the testimony of an asylum seeker who has produced fraudulent documents. President Sirisena, long after he left the presidency, claimed to know the mastermind! Anyone with an interest in facts ought to watch the excellent “Hyde Park” interview on Ada Derana with Professor Rohan Gunaratna, an internationally acclaimed authority on counterterrorism. He has interviewed key personnel in ISIS and has studied 337 intelligence reports, both local and international including those from FBI, Scotland Yard, Interpol etc. He is of the strong opinion that it was an attack masterminded by ISIS and there is no basis, whatsoever, to consider it to be politically motivated. However, he did not address the issue of whether a foreign nation was masterminded for other reasons.

Attributing a political motivation may suit the government as it has a vested interest. It should not be forgotten that the father of two of the bombers, one of them the leader, was a prominent financial backer of the JVP whose name was on its national list.

The other theory advanced by some is that India’s RAW may be behind the attack, the reasons given being that RAW gave exactingly detailed intelligence regarding the attacks and that the attack on Taj Samudra was aborted, at the last moment, due to a mysterious telephone call the bomber received.

Adding fuel to the fire of speculation is the latest action of AKD. His much-promised exposure of the mastermind on 21 April turned out to be a pus wedilla! The country waited eagerly, but all he did was to hand over the Presidential Inquiry report to the CID, contrary to the recommendation of the commission that it be handed over to the Attorney General for action!

Hasn’t there been a sea-change after PM Modi’s visit?

By Dr Upul Wijayawardhana

Features

RuGoesWild: Taking science into the wild — and into the hearts of Sri Lankans

Published

1 day ago

2025/04/22

Sahan Weerasooriya

Visiting Komodo

At a time when misinformation spreads so easily—especially online—there’s a need for scientists to step in and bring accurate, evidence-based knowledge to the public. This is exactly what Dr. Ruchira Somaweera is doing with RuGoesWild, a YouTube channel that brings the world of field biology to Sri Lankan audiences in Sinhala.

“One of my biggest motivations is to inspire the next generation,” says Dr. Somaweera. “I want young Sri Lankans to not only appreciate the amazing biodiversity we have here, but also to learn about how species are studied, protected, and understood in other parts of the world. By showing what’s happening elsewhere—from research in remote caves to marine conservation projects—I hope to broaden horizons and spark curiosity.”

Unlike many travel and wildlife channels that prioritise entertainment, RuGoesWild focuses on real science. “What sets RuGoesWild apart is its focus on wildlife field research, not tourism or sensationalised adventures,” he explains. “While many travel channels showcase nature in other parts of the world, few dig into the science behind it—and almost none do so in Sinhala. That’s the niche I aim to fill.”

Excerpts of the Interview

Q: Was there a specific moment or discovery in the field that deeply impacted you?

“There have been countless unforgettable moments in my 20-year career—catching my first King cobra, discovering deep-diving sea snakes, and many more,” Dr. Somaweera reflects. “But the most special moment was publishing a scientific paper with my 10-year-old son Rehan, making him one of the youngest authors of an international peer-reviewed paper. We discovered a unique interaction between octopi and some fish called ‘nuclear-forager following’. As both a dad and a scientist, that was an incredibly meaningful achievement.”

Saltwater crocodiles in Sundarbans in Bangladesh, the world’s largest mangrove

Q: Field biology often means long hours in challenging environments. What motivates you to keep going?

“Absolutely—field biology can be physically exhausting, mentally draining, and often dangerous,” he admits. “I’ve spent weeks working in some of the most remote parts of Australia where you can only access through a helicopter, and in the humid jungles of Borneo where insects are insane. But despite all that, what keeps me going is a deep sense of wonder and purpose. Some of the most rewarding moments come when you least expect them—a rare animal sighting, a new behavioural observation, or even just watching the sun rise over a pristine habitat.”

Q: How do you balance scientific rigour with making your work engaging and understandable?

“That balance is something I’m constantly navigating,” he says. “As a scientist, I’m trained to be precise and data-driven. But if we want the public to care about science, we have to make it accessible and relatable. I focus on the ‘why’ and ‘wow’—why something matters, and what makes it fascinating. Whether it’s a snake that glides between trees, a turtle that breathes through its backside, or a sea snake that hunts with a grouper, I try to bring out the quirky, mind-blowing parts that spark curiosity.”

Q: What are the biggest misconceptions about reptiles or field biology in Sri Lanka?

“One of the biggest misconceptions is that most reptiles—especially snakes—are dangerous and aggressive,” Dr. Somaweera explains. “In reality, the vast majority of snakes are non-venomous, and even the venomous ones won’t bite unless they feel threatened. Sadly, fear and myth often lead to unnecessary killing. With RuGoesWild, one of my goals is to change these perceptions—to show that reptiles are not monsters, but marvels of evolution.”

Q: What are the most pressing conservation issues in Sri Lanka today?

“Habitat loss is huge,” he emphasizes. “Natural areas are being cleared for housing, farming, and industry, which displaces wildlife. As people and animals get pushed into the same spaces, clashes happen—especially with elephants and monkeys. Pollution, overfishing, and invasive species also contribute to biodiversity loss.”

Manta Rays

Q: What role do local communities play in conservation, and how can scientists better collaborate with them?

“Local communities are absolutely vital,” he stresses. “They’re often the first to notice changes, and they carry traditional knowledge. Conservation only works when people feel involved and benefit from it. We need to move beyond lectures and surveys to real partnerships—sharing findings, involving locals in fieldwork, and even ensuring conservation makes economic sense to them through things like eco-tourism.”

Q: What’s missing in the way biology is taught in Sri Lanka?

“It’s still very exam-focused,” Dr. Somaweera says. “Students are taught to memorize facts rather than explore how the natural world works. We need to shift to real-world engagement. Imagine a student in Anuradhapura learning about ecosystems by observing a tank or a garden lizard, not just reading a diagram.”

Q: How important is it to communicate science in local languages?

“Hugely important,” he says. “Science in Sri Lanka often happens in English, which leaves many people out. But when I speak in Sinhala—whether in schools, villages, or online—the response is amazing. People connect, ask questions, and share their own observations. That’s why RuGoesWild is in Sinhala—it’s about making science belong to everyone.”

‘Crocodile work’ in northern Australia.

Q: What advice would you give to young Sri Lankans interested in field biology?

“Start now!” he urges. “You don’t need a degree to start observing nature. Volunteer, write, connect with mentors. And once you do pursue science professionally, remember that communication matters—get your work out there, build networks, and stay curious. Passion is what will carry you through the challenges.”

Q: Do you think YouTube and social media can shape public perception—or even influence policy?

“Absolutely,” he says. “These platforms give scientists a direct line to the public. When enough people care—about elephants, snakes, forests—that awareness builds momentum. Policymakers listen when the public demands change. Social media isn’t just outreach—it’s advocacy.”

by Ifham Nizam