“Former Chief of Staff of the Sri Lanka Navy and Vice Chancellor of Sir John Kotalawella Defence University.”

Undersea fiber optic cables constitute the backbone of global digital connectivity, carrying over 95% of international data traffic. The increasing geopolitical tensions involving Iran, Israel, and the United States elevate the risk of deliberate or collateral damage to submarine cable systems, particularly in the Persian Gulf, a critical global digital chokepoint. This article examines the strategic consequences of undersea cable sabotage in this region and its cascading effects across the Indian Ocean, with a focused analysis on Sri Lanka’s vulnerabilities and opportunities. It further argues that prolonged disruption could incentivize technologically advanced states and corporations to accelerate satellite-based global internet architectures, potentially reshaping control over global connectivity. The article concludes that Sri Lanka must urgently operationalize the National Submarine Cable Safety and Resilience Framework (NSCPRF) to safeguard national security while positioning itself within this evolving technological and geopolitical landscape.

Beneath the world’s oceans lies a largely invisible but indispensable network of submarine communication cables that form the backbone of the contemporary global order. These cables silently facilitate financial transactions, sustain military command and control, and power the digital economies that define modern life. Yet, in an era of intensifying geopolitical rivalry, this critical infrastructure has emerged as a strategic vulnerability and a prime target for hybrid warfare.

Current tensions among Iran, Israel, and the United States have introduced a new dimension of conflict: seabed contestation. The Persian Gulf, already a focal point for global energy security, has now become equally pivotal for digital connectivity. Any disruption to its dense network of submarine cables would not merely affect regional actors; the consequences would ripple across the global system, threatening financial stability, communications, and strategic operations worldwide. This evolving vulnerability underscores the urgent need to understand, protect, and adapt to the emerging risks facing undersea infrastructure in geopolitically sensitive regions.

Strategic importance of Persian Gulf cable network

The Persian Gulf serves as a critical digital chokepoint in global connectivity, functioning for data flows much like the Strait of Hormuz does for energy transport. A dense aggregation of undersea fiber optic cables traverses this narrow maritime corridor, linking Europe, the Middle East, and South and East Asia. The strategic centrality of the region arises not only from its role in facilitating global commerce and communications but also from its function as a redundancy hub for intercontinental digital traffic.

Several factors exacerbate the vulnerability of this network. First, the geographic concentration of cable routes in a limited corridor creates systemic risk: damage to even a few cables could severely disrupt connectivity. Second, the relatively shallow waters of the Gulf render cables physically accessible to divers, remotely operated underwater vehicles, and maritime operations that may inadvertently or deliberately cause damage. Third, the proximity of these routes to active conflict zones, territorial disputes, and naval operations further elevates the risk of intentional or collateral disruption.

A significant interruption in the Persian Gulf cable network would have far-reaching consequences, potentially impairing intercontinental data flows, destabilizing financial markets, degrading strategic communications, and undermining both commercial and military operations worldwide. This underscores the Persian Gulf’s dual role as a linchpin of global connectivity and a high-value target within contemporary hybrid warfare and geopolitical contestation.

Undersea cable sabotage as hybrid warfare

Undersea cables, due to their strategic importance and relative physical exposure, constitute high-value targets within contemporary hybrid warfare scenarios. Both state and non-state actors may seek to exploit these vulnerabilities through methods that are difficult to attribute, enabling deniable or covert operations while inflicting disproportionate disruption.

Potential attack vectors encompass a range of capabilities. Physical interference may be conducted by divers, unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), or remotely operated submersibles, allowing direct manipulation or damage to cable infrastructure. Covert disruption may also occur through maritime activities, such as the unintentional or deliberate anchoring of commercial vessels, trawlers, or offshore operations in cable corridors. In parallel, cyberattacks targeting cable landing stations, associated terrestrial networks, or associated operational technology systems could degrade functionality without physical intervention.

Historical precedent underscores the plausibility of such scenarios. The 2008 Mediterranean submarine cable disruption, which caused widespread interruptions in internet connectivity across multiple regions, illustrates how failures, whether accidental or malicious can propagate globally. In the context of conflict involving high-stakes geopolitical actors, deliberate and coordinated sabotage could amplify these impacts, triggering cascading disruptions across financial systems, communications, and critical infrastructure worldwide.

Global consequences and systemic risks

A major disruption to undersea cable systems in the Persian Gulf would have far-reaching and cascading effects across the global digital and economic landscape. Financial systems, including banking networks, trading platforms, and digital payment infrastructures, could experience severe instability, potentially halting international transactions and market operations. Digital services reliant on continuous connectivity, such as cloud computing, data centers, and online platforms would face operational collapse, disrupting both commercial and governmental functions worldwide.

From a security perspective, military command, control, and communication systems could be degraded, compromising operational readiness and the ability to coordinate defense and strategic responses. Logistical networks, encompassing aviation, maritime shipping, and port operations, would similarly be affected, creating delays in supply chains and critical goods transportation.

The sudden rerouting of data traffic through alternative pathways, notably via the Indian Ocean region, would place immense strain on those networks, exacerbating congestion and increasing vulnerability to further disruption. In this context, Persian Gulf cable vulnerabilities are not merely regional concerns; they represent systemic risks capable of destabilizing global connectivity, commerce, and security simultaneously.

Spillover into the Indian Ocean region

The Indian Ocean functions as a strategically significant secondary corridor for global data traffic, linking the Persian Gulf, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Africa. In the event of disruptions to submarine cables in the Persian Gulf, whether due to conflict, sabotage, or hybrid warfare traffic would inevitably be rerouted through Indian Ocean pathways, placing unprecedented strain on existing networks. This redirection could result in severe bandwidth congestion, degradation of service quality, and delays in critical communications for both commercial and military operations.

The increased reliance on the Indian Ocean network would also elevate the region’s vulnerability to further attacks, whether deliberate or opportunistic, as adversaries may seek to exploit the bottlenecked infrastructure. Moreover, the operational scope of any regional conflict could expand, effectively extending the theatre of digital contestation to the Indian Ocean and affecting the maritime security environment of surrounding nations.

Consequently, the Indian Ocean is not merely a passive conduit for rerouted data; it could emerge as an active domain of strategic competition, where control over undersea infrastructure and the ability to defend it becomes a critical determinant of regional and global digital resilience.

Sri Lanka’s strategic position and vulnerability

Situated at a pivotal maritime and digital crossroads in the Indian Ocean, Sri Lanka occupies a uniquely strategic position within global communication networks. The island serves as a critical node for multiple undersea fiber optic cable systems, including the SEA-ME-WE 3, 4, and 5 series, the Bay of Bengal Gateway (BBG), FALCON, as well as Chinese-led systems such as the Asia-Pacific Cable Network (APCN) and China-Asia-Pacific Network (CAPN). These networks not only connect Europe, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East, but also provide essential redundancy for global data traffic, rendering Sri Lanka an indispensable conduit for intercontinental digital flows.

Vulnerabilities

Sri Lanka’s strategic location, while advantageous, also exposes it to significant vulnerabilities. In the event of disruptions elsewhere in the network, traffic is often rerouted through the island, increasing the operational load on existing infrastructure and heightening the risk of congestion. Moreover, the island’s position as a critical redundancy node renders it a potential target for deliberate attacks or sabotage in scenarios of geopolitical tension. Currently, the absence of a fully operational legal and regulatory framework for submarine cable protection exacerbates these risks, leaving strategic infrastructure exposed. Limitations in seabed surveillance and rapid response capability further constrain the country’s ability to detect, deter, and mitigate threats effectively.

National implications

Disruptions to Sri Lanka’s undersea cable network could have profound national consequences. Financial and commercial systems reliant on uninterrupted digital connectivity would face operational instability, with potential cascading effects on banking, trading, and online services. Port operations and maritime logistics, which increasingly depend on real-time communication and data flows, would also be adversely affected, impacting the island’s role as a regional transshipment hub. From a national security perspective, interruptions could compromise command, control, and communication systems essential for defense and maritime governance. Finally, economic repercussions would extend to the digital and technology sectors, threatening both foreign investment and domestic industry reliant on high-speed connectivity.

In sum, Sri Lanka’s unique position at the intersection of major global and regional undersea cable systems provides both strategic leverage and significant exposure. Recognizing and addressing these vulnerabilities through a comprehensive protection and resilience framework is essential for national security, economic stability, and regional digital leadership.

Indian Ocean nexus: From seabed vulnerability to space-based control

A disruption originating in the Persian Gulf would cascade into the Indian Ocean, where dense maritime activity and limited surveillance heighten systemic risk. Reduced communication integrity and gaps in maritime awareness could mask further interference with submarine cables, compounding the crisis. Also, the Fragmented jurisdiction under frameworks such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and limitations in real-time monitoring create exploitable gaps.

Yet disruption also creates opportunity. Technologically advanced nations and corporations, already deploying Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite constellations, could rapidly step in as alternative providers of global connectivity. Systems led by SpaceX, Amazon, and OneWeb are capable of scaling quickly to offset cable outages, while China’s state-backed China Satellite Network Group (Guowang) and commercial initiatives such as Qianfan further reinforce this emerging space-based connectivity architecture. In such a context, the large-scale deployment of thousands of miniature satellites dedicated to global data connectivity by technologically advanced nations cannot be ruled out, further accelerating the shift toward space-based communication dominance.

Emerging risk: Space-based connectivity and strategic monopoly

A prolonged or large-scale disruption of undersea cable systems could catalyze a structural shift in global connectivity architecture. High-technology corporations and advanced states may exploit such a crisis to accelerate the deployment of satellite constellations, effectively bypassing vulnerable seabed infrastructure.

Sustained or large-scale disruption of undersea cable systems possesses the capacity to trigger a profound structural transformation in the global connectivity landscape. In such a scenario, technologically advanced states and private enterprises could exploit the crisis to accelerate the deployment of satellite constellations, effectively bypassing the vulnerabilities inherent in submarine cable infrastructure. This transition would fundamentally reshape the architecture of global communications, enabling rapid network deployment that surpasses the timelines required to repair damaged cables. It also carries the potential to centralize control over global connectivity within a narrow set of actors, undermining national data sovereignty and altering the distribution of geopolitical influence by establishing dominance over space-based communication systems. In effect, disruption at sea may act as a catalyst, accelerating a strategic shift from seabed-based to orbital-based control of global information flows, concentrating technological, informational, and strategic power in the hands of a limited cohort of state and corporate actors, and redefining the very nature of global digital governance.

Case for national submarine cable safety and resilience framework

Sri Lanka’s proposed National Submarine Cable Safety and Resilience Framework (NSCPRF) constitutes a proactive and strategically essential response to the evolving spectrum of threats to critical undersea communication infrastructure. Recognizing the vulnerabilities posed by both accidental and deliberate disruptions, the framework has been developed with technical guidance from the International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC) and operational support from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Importantly, it aligns with international obligations, including UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/73/124, thereby situating Sri Lanka’s initiative within the broader framework of global maritime security norms.

The NSCPRF is designed around four core objectives: first, to formally recognize submarine cables as Critical National Infrastructure, thereby elevating their status within national security and policy frameworks; second, to establish dedicated Cable Protection Zones within Sri Lanka’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) to prevent inadvertent damage and deliberate interference; third, to integrate naval, coastguard, and civilian agencies into coordinated protection, monitoring, and enforcement efforts, ensuring a unified operational response; and fourth, to develop rapid repair and contingency mechanisms capable of restoring connectivity promptly in the event of disruption. Collectively, these measures aim to safeguard Sri Lanka’s strategic digital infrastructure, mitigate the risks associated with global cable vulnerabilities, and strengthen the country’s resilience in an increasingly contested maritime and technological domain.

Strategic recommendations

To enhance national resilience and strengthen Sri Lanka’s strategic positioning in the emerging landscape of maritime and digital security, a multi-dimensional approach is required. First and foremost, the NSCPRF should be enacted without delay, providing a formal legal and operational framework that recognizes submarine cables as critical national infrastructure and establishes robust protection protocols.

Second, Sri Lanka must significantly strengthen its Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) capabilities, with a particular emphasis on seabed surveillance and real-time monitoring of undersea cable routes. This would enable early detection of potential threats, ranging from accidental damage to deliberate sabotage, and allow for timely, coordinated responses.

Third, the development of specialized naval and coastguard capabilities dedicated to submarine cable protection is essential. These forces should be trained and equipped for rapid interdiction, repair support, and enforcement operations within Sri Lanka’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), ensuring both deterrence and resilience against emerging threats.

Fourth, infrastructure redundancy should be promoted through diversification of cable routes and integration with alternative regional networks. Redundant pathways would reduce the operational and economic impact of localized disruptions, ensuring continuity of digital communications under a variety of contingency scenarios.

Fifth, Sri Lanka should actively engage in international partnerships to facilitate coordinated protection, information sharing, and joint response mechanisms. Collaboration with regional actors, international organizations, and private cable operators would enhance collective security and resilience across the Indian Ocean Region.

Finally, as the risk of space-based connectivity monopolization grows, Sri Lanka should assess the integration of satellite systems as a complementary component of national digital infrastructure. This approach would safeguard against technological dependency on a limited number of external actors, while maintaining national control over critical communications.

Taken together, these recommendations provide a comprehensive roadmap for safeguarding Sri Lanka’s undersea cable infrastructure, reinforcing national security, and positioning the country as a regional leader in maritime and digital resilience.

Securing seabed, safeguarding the skies

Undersea cables are no longer merely commercial infrastructure; they are strategic assets at the heart of global stability. In a conflict involving Iran, Israel, and the United States, disruption in the Persian Gulf could trigger a global digital crisis, with cascading effects across the Indian Ocean.

Simultaneously, such a disruption could open the door for technologically advanced actors to redefine global connectivity through satellite constellations, potentially establishing monopolistic control over digital networks.

The crisis envisioned in “When the Seabed Goes Dark” is not hypothetical, but it is structurally plausible. The convergence of dense cable networks, geopolitical rivalry, and weak maritime governance creates conditions where disruption is not only possible, but strategically attractive. What follows may be even more consequential: a shift in global connectivity from the ocean floor to orbital space where control is narrower, faster, and potentially monopolistic.

For nations like Sri Lanka and the broader Indian Ocean region, the challenge is clear: secure seabed infrastructure while preparing for the strategic realities of space-based connectivity.

For the broader Indo-Pacific region, the challenge is clear: to secure the seas without surrendering the skies. By operationalizing the NSCPRF and adopting a forward-looking posture, Sri Lanka can transform vulnerability into leadership in the emerging domain of integrated maritime and digital security.

In the future battle-space, dominance will depend not only on control of the seas , but on control of the data pathways beneath them and the satellites above them.

This article and its conceptual framework are based on the research and analysis of Rear Admiral JJ Ranasinghe (Retd), who holds a master’s degree in Maritime Policy from the University of Wollongong, reflecting his strategic insights into undersea cable vulnerabilities, Indo-Pacific maritime security, and emerging space-based connectivity risks.

by Rear Admiral Jagath Ranasinghe Retd)
VSV, USP, psc, MSc (DS) Mgt, MMaritimePol (Aus),
PG Dip in CPS, DIP in CR, FNI(Lond), Former Govt Fellow GCSP,

Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter prohibits member states from using threats or force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. Violating international law, the United States and Israel attacked Iran on February 28, 2026. The ostensible reason for this unprovoked aggression was to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon.

The United States is the first and only country to have used nuclear weapons in war, against Japan in August 1945. Some officials in Israel have threatened to use a “doomsday weapon” against Gaza. On March 14, David Sacks, billionaire venture capitalist and AI and crypto czar in the Trump administration, warned that Israel may resort to nuclear weapons as its war with Iran spirals out of control and the country faces “destruction.”

Although for decades Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, opposed nuclear weapons on religious grounds, in the face of current existential threats it is likely that Iran will pursue their development. On March 22, the head of the WHO warned of possible nuclear risks after nuclear facilities in both Iran and Israel were attacked. Indeed, will the current war in the Middle East continue for months or years, or end sooner with the possible use of a nuclear weapon by Israel or the United States?

Widening Destruction

Apart from the threat of nuclear conflagration—and what many analysts consider an impending ground invasion by American troops—extensive attacks using bombs, missiles, and drones are continuing apace, causing massive loss of life and destruction of resources and infrastructure. US–Israel airstrikes have killed Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and top Iranian officials. Countless civilians have died, including some 150 girls in a primary school in Minab, in what UNESCO has called a “grave violation of humanitarian law.” Moreover, the targeting of desalination plants by both sides could severely disrupt water supplies across desert regions.

Iran’s retaliatory attacks on United States military bases in Persian Gulf countries have disrupted global air travel. Even more significantly, Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz—the critical maritime energy chokepoint through which 20% of global oil and liquefied natural gas pass daily—has blocked the flow of energy supplies and goods, posing a severe threat to the fossil fuel–driven global economy. A global economic crisis is emerging, with soaring oil prices, power shortages, inflation, loss of livelihoods, and deep uncertainty over food security and survival.

The inconsistent application of international law, along with structural limitations of the United Nations, erodes trust in global governance and the moral authority of Western powers and multilateral institutions. Resolution 2817 (2026), adopted by the UN Security Council on March 12, condemns Iran’s “egregious attacks” against its neighbours without any condemnation of US–Israeli actions—an imbalance that underscores this concern.

The current crisis is exposing fault lines in the neo-colonial political, economic, and moral order that has been in place since the Second World War. Iran’s defiance poses a significant challenge to longstanding patterns of intervention and regime-change agendas pursued by the United States and its allies in the Global South. The difficulty the United States faces in rallying NATO and other allies also reflects a notable geopolitical shift. Meanwhile, the expansion of yuan-based oil trade and alternative financial settlement mechanisms is weakening the petrodollar system and dollar dominance. Opposition within the United States—including from segments of conservatives and Republicans—signals growing skepticism about the ideological and moral basis of a US war against Iran seemingly driven by Israel.

A New World Order?

The unipolar world dominated by the United States—rooted in inequality, coercion, and militarism—is destabilising, fragmenting, and generating widespread chaos and suffering. Challenges to this order, including from Iran, point toward a fragmented multipolar world in which multiple actors possess agency and leverage.

The BRICS bloc—Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, along with Iran, the UAE, and other members—represents efforts to create alternative economic and financial systems, including development banks and reserve currencies that challenge Western financial dominance.

However, is BRICS leading the world toward a much-needed order, based on equity, partnership, and peace? The behaviour of BRICS countries during the current crisis does not indicate strong collective leadership or commitment to such principles. Instead, many appear to be leveraging the situation for national advantage, particularly regarding access to energy supplies.

A clear example of this opportunism is India, the current head of the BRICS bloc. Historically a leader of non-alignment and a supporter of the Palestinian cause, India now presents itself as a neutral party upholding international law and state sovereignty. However, it co-sponsored and supported UN Security Council Resolution 2817 (2026), which condemns only Iran.

India is also part of the USA–Israel–India–UAE strategic nexus involving defence cooperation, technology sharing, and counterterrorism. Additionally, it participates in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) with the United States, Japan, and Australia, aimed at countering China’s growing influence. In effect, despite its leadership role in BRICS, India is closely aligned with the United States, raising questions about its ability to offer independent leadership in shaping a new world order.

As a group, BRICS does not fundamentally challenge corporate hegemony, the concentration of wealth among a global elite, or entrenched technological and military dominance. While it rejects aspects of Western geopolitical hierarchy, it largely upholds neoliberal economic principles: competition, free trade, privatisation, open markets, export-led growth, globalisation, and rapid technological expansion.

The current Middle East crisis underscores the need to question the assumption that globalisation, market expansion, and technological growth are the foundations of human well-being. The oil and food crises, declining remittances from Asian workers in the Middle East, and reduced tourism due to disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz and regional airspace all highlight the fragility of global interdependence.

These conditions call for consideration of alternative frameworks—bioregionalism, import substitution, local control of resources, food and energy self-sufficiency, and renewable energy—in place of dependence on imported fossil fuels and global supply chains.

Both the Western economic model and its BRICS variant continue to prioritise techno-capitalist expansion and militarism, despite overwhelming evidence linking these systems to environmental destruction and social inequality. While it is difficult for individual countries to challenge this dominant model, history offers lessons in collective resistance.

Collective Resistance

One of the earliest examples of nationalist economic resistance in the post-World War II period was the nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the creation of the National Iranian Oil Company in 1951 under Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh. He was overthrown on August 19, 1953, in a coup orchestrated by the US CIA and British intelligence (MI6), and Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was installed to protect Western oil interests.

A milestone for decolonisation occurred in Egypt in 1956, when President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal Company. Despite military intervention by Israel, the United Kingdom, and France, Nasser retained control, emerging as a symbol of Arab and Third World nationalism.

Following political independence, many former colonies sought to avoid entanglement in the Cold War through the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), officially founded in Belgrade in 1961. Leaders including Josip Broz Tito, Jawaharlal Nehru, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Kwame Nkrumah, Sukarno, and Sirimavo Bandaranaike promoted autonomous development paths aligned with national priorities and cultural traditions.

However, maintaining economic sovereignty proved far more difficult. Patrice Lumumba, the first democratically elected Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, was assassinated in 1961 with the involvement of US and Belgian interests after attempting to assert control over national resources. Kwame Nkrumah was similarly overthrown in a US-backed coup in 1966.

In Tanzania, Julius Nyerere’s Ujamaa (“African socialism”) sought to build community-based development and food security, but faced both internal challenges and external opposition, ultimately limiting its success and discouraging similar efforts elsewhere.

UN declarations from the 1970s reflect Global South resistance to the Bretton Woods system. Notably, the 1974 Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (Resolution 3201) called for equitable cooperation between developed and developing countries based on dignity and sovereign equality.

Today, these declarations are more relevant than ever, as Iran and other Global South nations confront overlapping crises of economic instability, neocolonial pressures, and intensifying geopolitical rivalry. Courtesy: Inter Press Service

by Dr. Asoka Bandarage

The long standing foreign policy of Sri Lanka was Non-Alignment. However, in the context of emerging geopolitical rivalries, there was a need to question the adequacy of Non-Alignment as a policy to meet developing challenges. Neutrality as being a more effective Policy was first presented in an article titled “Independence: its meaning and a direction for the future” (The Island, February 14, 2019). The switch over from Non-Alignment to Neutrality was first adopted by former President Gotabaya Rajapaksa and followed through by successive Governments. However, it was the current Government that did not miss an opportunity to announce that its Foreign Policy was Neutral.

The policy of Neutrality has served the interests of Sri Lanka by the principled stand taken in respect of the requests made by two belligerents associated with the Middle East War. The justification for the position adopted was conveyed by President Anura Kumara Dissanayake to Parliament that Iran had made a formal request on February 26 for three Iranian naval ships to visit Sri Lanka, and on the same evening, the United States also requested permission for two war planes to land at Mattala International Airport. Both requests were denied on grounds of maintaining “our policy of neutrality”.

WHY NEUTRALITY

Excerpts from the article cited above that recommended Neutrality as the best option for Sri Lanka considering the vulnerability to its security presented by its geographic location in the context of emerging rivalries arising from “Pivot to Asia” are presented below:

“Traditional thinking as to how small States could cope with external pressures are supposed to be: (1) Non-alignment with any of the major centers of power; (2) Alignment with one of the major powers thus making a choice and facing the consequences of which power block prevails; (3) Bandwagoning which involves unequal exchange where the small State makes asymmetric concessions to the dominant power and accepts a subordinate role of a vassal State; (4) Hedging, which attempts to secure economic and security benefits of engagement with each power center: (5) Balancing pressures individually, or by forming alliances with other small States; (6) Neutrality”.

Of the six strategies cited above, the only strategy that permits a sovereign independent nation to charter its own destiny is neutrality, as it is with Switzerland and some Nordic countries. The independence to self-determine the destiny of a nation requires security in respect of Inviolability of Territory, Food Security, Energy Security etc. Of these, the most critical of securities is the Inviolability of Territory. Consequently, Neutrality has more relevance to protect Territorial Security because it is based on International Law, as opposed to Non-Alignment which is based on principles applicable to specific countries that pledged to abide by them

“The sources of the international law of neutrality are customary international law and, for certain questions, international treaties, in particular the Paris Declaration of 1856, the 1907 Hague Convention No. V respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, the 1907 Hague Convention No. XIII concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War, the four 1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I of 1977” (ICRC Publication on Neutrality, 2022).

As part of its Duties a Neutral State “must ensure respect for its neutrality, if necessary, using force to repel any violation of its territory. Violations include failure to respect the prohibitions placed on belligerent parties with regard to certain activities in neutral territory, described above. The fact that a neutral State uses force to repel attempts to violate its neutrality cannot be regarded as a hostile act. If the neutral State defends its neutrality, it must however respect the limits which international law imposes on the use of force. The neutral State must treat the opposing belligerent States impartially. However, impartiality does not mean that a State is bound to treat the belligerents in exactly the same way. It entails a prohibition on discrimination” (Ibid).

“It forbids only differential treatment of the belligerents which in view of the specific problem of armed conflict is not justified. Therefore, a neutral State is not obliged to eliminate differences in commercial relations between itself and each of the parties to the conflict at the time of the outbreak of the armed conflict. It is entitled to continue existing commercial relations. A change in these commercial relationships could, however, constitute taking sides inconsistent with the status of neutrality” (Ibid).

THE POTENTIAL of NEUTRALITY

It is apparent from the foregoing that Neutrality as a Policy is not “Passive” as some misguided claim Neutrality to be. On the other hand, it could be dynamic to the extent a country chooses to be as demonstrated by the actions taken recently to address the challenges presented during the ongoing Middle East War. Furthermore, Neutrality does not prevent Sri Lanka from engaging in Commercial activities with other States to ensuring Food and Energy security.

If such arrangements are undertaken on the basis of unsolicited offers as it was, for instance, with Japan’s Light Rail Project or Sinopec’s 200,000 Barrels a Day Refinery, principles of Neutrality would be violated because it violates the cardinal principle of Neutrality, namely, impartiality. The proposal to set up an Energy Complex in Trincomalee with India and UAE would be no different because it restricts the opportunity to one defined Party, thus defying impartiality. On the other hand, if Sri Lanka defines the scope of the Project and calls for Expressions of Interest and impartially chooses the most favourable with transparency, principles of Neutrality would be intact. More importantly, such conduct would attract the confidence of Investors to engage in ventures impartial in a principled manner. Such an approach would amount to continue the momentum of the professional approach adopted to meet the challenges of the Middle East War.

CONCLUSION

The manner in which Sri Lanka acted, first to deny access to the territory of Sri Lanka followed up by the humanitarian measures adopted to save the survivors of the torpedoed ship, earned honour and respect for the principled approach adopted to protect territorial inviolability based on International provisions of Neutrality.

If Sri Lanka continues with the momentum gained and adopts impartial and principled measures recommended above to develop the country and the wellbeing of its Peoples, based on self-reliance, this Government would be giving Sri Lanka a new direction and a fresh meaning to Neutrality that is not passive but dynamic.

by Neville Ladduwahetty