Midweek Review

The day Mangala issued a warning to P’karan

Published

5 years ago

2021/09/1

Sahan Weerasooriya

Mangala Samaraweera left an unforgettable mark in politics

By Shamindra Ferdinando

The late Minister Mangala Samaraweera, on Sept. 8, 2006, warned the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) of dire consequences,unless the group returned to the negotiating table. The LTTE quit the negotiating table, in April 2003, during Ranil Wickremesinghe’s tenure as the Premier. The warning was issued in his capacity as the Foreign Minister, at a meeting with the Colombo-based diplomatic community.

Reiterating the then President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s readiness to consider proposals for a comprehensive and verifiable cession of hostilities, Samaraweera warned the LTTE that military aggression, on their part, would entail, what he called, military costs to them.

The Minister said so when he addressed a section of the diplomatic community in the wake of the successful Army assault on the LTTE first-line of defence across the Kilali-Muhamalai frontline a few days before the military recaptured Sampur in the East on August 4 (Forces seize Tigers’ Jaffna frontline with strapline …any military aggression on their part would entail military costs to them-Foreign Minister, The Island, Sept 11, 2006)

Matara district lawmaker, Mangala Pinsiri Samaraweera, who first entered parliament at the 1989 general election, received the vital foreign affairs portfolio in the wake of the then Premier Mahinda Rajapaksa’s triumph at the 2005 presidential election.

Samaraweera, 65, succumbed to Covid-19, at Lanka Hospital, last week.

Rajapaksa won narrowly against UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe, who lost by fewer than 200,000 votes. The polls boycott ordered by the LTTE caused Wickremesinghe’s defeat; he lost the Northern Province Tamil vote, which is traditionally cast in favour of the UNP. Interestingly, the announcement of the undemocratic act of telling the Tamil people not to vote was done by the Tamil National Alliance.

Following the presidential election, the LTTE resumed its offensive action in the Jaffna peninsula, in the first week of Dec. 2005. The LTTE launched a spate of claymore mine attacks in the North in spite of the Oslo-arranged Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) still in place with Peace Co-Chairs, namely the US, Japan, EU and Norway, engaged in the process, in a supervisory role. It looked as if the self-appointed co-chairs were there more to wink at the LTTE as it staged hundreds of CFA violations.

Following the failed attempt to assassinate the then Army Chief Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka, in late April 2006, Mavil-aru battle, in June-July 2006, the LTTE launched large scale offensives, in both the northern and eastern theatres, simultaneously, in the second week of August 2006. The LTTE made some rapid territorial gains, though the armed forces gradually stabilised the situation, on both fronts. Having survived a suicide attack, in late April 2006, and flown to Singapore, where he received specialised treatment, Fonseka was obviously back, wanting to atone for what the LTTE did to him. Back at his heavily fortified headquarters in Colombo where he vowed to finish off the LTTE once and for all.

The LTTE strategy suffered another serious setback when then Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa, too, survived an LTTE suicide attack in the first week of Dec 2006.

Foreign Minister Samaraweera issued the warning to the LTTE, ahead of the LTTE assassination attempt on Gotabaya Rajapaksa. Samaraweera received his first ministerial portfolio in 1994, thanks to President Kumaratunga, who accommodated him in her Cabinet as Posts and Telecommunications Minister. Kumaratunga also rewarded Samaraweera with Urban Development, Construction and Public Utilities.

A cocky LTTE leadership felt confident that its formations could overwhelm the Army in the Jaffna peninsula, having disrupted the Trincomalee- Kankesanthurai Main Supply Route (MSR). Their plans eventually went awry. However, at the time Samaraweera issued the warning, in early Sept 2006, the LTTE was in a commanding position, with the West openly and repeatedly singing hosannas on its behalf claiming that the security forces were incapable of defeating it. A section of the diplomatic community, as well as various experts, believed the LTTE had the wherewithal to bring offensive actions, in the northern theatre, to a successful conclusion. But, by May 2009, just two years and 10 months after the LTTE resumed hostilities, its fighting cadre was left annihilated.

Mangala receives Foreign portfolio

President Rajapaksa rewarded Samaraweera with the Foreign Affairs portfolio, though the latter hadn’t been his first choice. Rajapaksa-Samaraweera duo emerged as a team during the second JVP-inspired insurgency (1987-1990) when they functioned as key spokespersons for the Mothers’ Front. The group represented the interests of those who had been at the receiving end of the military campaign, backed by UNP death squads. The late Anura Bandaranaike, too, expected the President to reappoint him as the Foreign Minister after his failure to secure the premiership with the JVP’s backing. Bandaranaike was sworn in as the Foreign Minister immediately after the assassination of Lakshman Kadirgamar on the night of August 12, 2005, at his private Bullers Lane residence.

It would be pertinent to mention that the JVP contested the 2004 parliamentary election on the UPFA ticket, following the short-lived so-called parivasa administration.

The JVP achieved the unthinkable by securing 39 seats, including three National List slots. In the immediate aftermath of the 2004 polls victory, the JVP, in a letter dated April 5, 2004, addressed to the then President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, demanded that Lakshman Kadirgamar be made the Premier.

JVP General Secretary Tilvin Silva emphasised that their second choice was Anura Bandaranaike and the third Maithripala Sirisena, the then General Secretary of the SLFP.

However, Maithripala Sirisena strongly advised Kumaratunga against the move, widely believed to have had the backing of staunch Kumaratunga loyalist Samaraweera. Son of the late Minister Mahanama Samaraweera and Khema Samaraweera, outspoken Mangala, a fashion designer by profession, was known for his controversial statements. Samaraweera daringly backed LGBT rights when such things were never even openly discussed here and was at the forefront of such campaigns.

If the JVP strategy succeeded, Mahinda Rajapaksa would have been deprived of the premiership in 2004 and the opportunity to contest the presidential poll in the following year. President Kumaratunga quite wrongly asserted that she could continue till 2006 as the presidential poll scheduled for 2000 under her watch was held in 1999. However, the Supreme Court torpedoed her move. With the collapse of Kumaratunga’s strategy, Samaraweera backed Rajapaksa’s candidature due to failure on her part to secure the backing of party seniors. Samaraweera played a significant role in the overall presidential polls campaign, though both Kumaratunga and Anura Bandaranaike skipped the campaign and more or less worked against Mahinda Rajapaksa, covertly.

Samaraweera had been among several SLFP seniors invited by President Rajapaksa on the evening of Nov 19, 2005 to inform them of the allocation of Cabinet portfolios. The late Jeyaraj Fernandopulle, Maithripala Sirisena, Nimal Siripala de Silva, Mangala Samaraweera, Rohitha Bogollagama, Basil Rajapaksa (not a member of Parliament at the time) and Lalith Weeratunga had been present. Dullas Alahapperuma, too, had been present, though he didn’t sit at that meeting.

“President Rajapaksa didn’t consult anyone as regards allocation of portfolios. He simply informed those who were seated around an oval shaped table what they were going to get. UNPer Rohitha Bogollagama, who switched his allegiance to the SLFP during Kumaratunga’s tenure was offered the Foreign Affairs portfolio. Bogollagama, who held the Foreign Investment portfolio at that time, inquired whether he could retain the same in addition to the foreign affairs. However, the allocation of portfolios quite clearly irritated some party seniors. Shortly, thereafter, only Rohitha Bogollagama sat with President Rajapaksa for dinner whereas others left,” a source familiar with the Temple Trees discussion told the writer.

“Subsequently, the Rajapaksas reached a consensus with Samaraweera by offering him the Foreign portfolio, originally offered to Bogollagama, who accepted the reality.

Some believed Samaraweera expected the premiership and was quite disappointed when he was told he couldn’t retain the Urban Development portfolio. Samaraweera couldn’t maintain peace with the Rajapaksas and was unceremoniously stripped of the Foreign portfolio, in January 2007, in the wake of him pursuing an agenda opposed to that of the then Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa.

President brought in Bogollagama as the Foreign Minister. One-time UNPer handled the Ministry during the most challenging period with the West exerting tremendous pressure to undermine the war effort.

Ousted from SLFP, Mangala joins UNP

In spite of losing the foreign portfolio, Samaraweera antagonised the Rajapaksas by pursuing an agenda which the latter considered was severely inimical to the overall war effort. President Rajapaksa also felt that Samaraweera’s strategy undermined the ruling party, particular at a time the military was engaged in a desperate battle with the LTTE. Finally, President Rajapaksa sacked Samaraweera, along with Anura Bandaranaike and Sripathy Sooriyaarachchi, in the second week of Feb 2007.

However, within days after declaring war on the Rajapaksas, Bandaranaike backtracked and quietly reached an agreement with the ruling clan. President removed the trio after they skipped the vote on the state of emergency. Bandaranaike re-joined what he called ‘Carnival of Clowns’ much to the dismay of Samaraweera, who didn’t receive the support pledged by his colleagues.

A dejected Samaraweera formed the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (Mahajana) Wing. Samaraweera couldn’t secure the much expected backing required to sustain his campaign and finally disbanded his unregistered party, in August 2010, to accept the UNP membership. However, by then Samaraweewa had re-entered Parliament, from the Matara district, on the UNP ticket. Samaraweera had no option but to accept Ranil Wickremesinghe’s leadership and worked diligently for the UNP’s victory, five years later.

Samaraweera played quite a significant role as an Opposition UNP member (2010-2015) and member of the yahapalana administration (2015-2019) before he switched his allegiance to Samagi Jana Balavegaya (SJB) leader Sajith Premadasa.

However, Samaraweera deserted Premadasa in next to no time ahead of the last parliamentary election in August 2020. In an obvious bid meant to undermine the SJB, Samaraweera declared he wouldn’t be in the fray though he handed over nominations as the leader of the Matara District SJB.

Role in 2010 prez poll

In his capacity as the Foreign Minister, Samaraweera clashed with Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s strategy. One of the major issues of disagreement between the two was Samaraweera’s push for the re-opening of the Kandy-Jaffna road, at Muhamalai, to pave the way for the resumption of overland traffic to and from the Jaffna peninsula. Gotabaya Rajapaksa dismissed the suggestion. Rajapaksa asserted that Muhamalai wouldn’t be re-opened through negotiations with the LTTE. Instead, the re-opening would be done by clearing the LTTE fortifications across the Kilali-Muhamalai-Nagarkovil line.

The then Defence Secretary Rajapaksa told the writer of his decision not to re-open the Muhamalai entry/exit point in agreement with the LTTE, under no circumstances. They also disagreed on the deployment of SLAF choppers to move LTTE leaders around (this was done in terms of the Oslo understanding) and the handling of international NGOs. The Foreign Ministry asserted the military would antagonise Western powers whereas the Defence Secretary emphasised that nothing could be allowed to undermine the war effort.

As promised, the government re-opened the Kandy-Jaffna A9 road, only after the eradication of the LTTE in 2009.

Having ridiculed Fonseka as a person not even capable of commanding the Salvation Army, Samaraweera had no qualms in accepting the challenging task of being the Opposition candidate’s campaign strategist. In fact, Samaraweera, on behalf of Fonseka, assured the US of his good intentions. One such meeting took place on January 6, 2010, a few days before the then US Ambassador in Colombo, Patricia Butenis, in a leaked diplomatic memo, named the Rajapaksa brothers, Mahinda, Gotabaya and Basil and Sarath Fonseka, as war criminals. The massive defeat suffered by Fonseka, at the January 2010 presidential election, revealed serious shortcomings in the overall strategy. The Fonseka campaign suffered due to foolish attempts to placate the Tamil electorate by blaming the Army for battlefield executions during the last phase of the Vanni east offensive. Samaraweera played a significant role in forming the US backed alliance which included the Tamil National Alliance, onetime cat’s paw of Velupillai Prabhakaran. Samaraweera also facilitated the JVP’s participation in the high profile project, spearheaded by the UNP.

Having defeated Ranil Wickremesinghe, by 180,000 votes, at the 2005 presidential election, the President secured a second term by polling over 1.8mn more votes than the war- winning Army Commander. Obviously, Samaraweera’s strategy didn’t work, though many, including some sections of the diplomatic community, strongly believed the former Foreign Minister could turn tables on Mahinda Rajapaksa. At the end, the UNP-led camp made a ridiculous bid to blame the humiliating defeat Fonseka suffered on what bankrupt JVP called a computer jilmaart (fraud)

Mangala as yahapalana FM

Samaraweera who enjoyed excellent relations with the JVP at politically crucial periods, played strategic roles in both the SLFP and UNP-led camps. At the 2005 presidential poll, Samaraweera threw his weight behind Mahinda Rajapaksa and five years later the electorate saw him spearheading Fonseka’s presidential campaign. Samaraweera proved again in politics there were no permanent friends or enemies.

Perhaps, one of Samaraweera’s major successes was his ability to secure the support of the powerful Tamil Diaspora. Samaraweera was quite satisfied with the way he handled the Diaspora in the run-up to the 2015 presidential election. The writer, who accompanied the government delegation to London, led by President Sirisena, had an opportunity to discuss the matter with the then Foreign Minister Samaraweera during the visit a couple of months after the presidential election.

Samaraweera facilitated the TNA’s backing for Sirisena that made his triumph over Mahinda Rajapaksa a reality.

The writer sought GTF’s spokesperson Suren Surendiran’s comment on Samaraweera’s demise Surendiran said that his first ever interaction with the late lawmaker had been in 2007 in his personal capacity. However, as the GTF spokesperson, Surendiran had interacted with Samaraweera, in 2011, and again when he visited the UK, in 2012, over dinner at his place with fellow colleagues of GTF. Surendiran said: “In September 2013 we formally met along with other politicians and civil society activists from Sri Lanka, and overseas, in Singapore. We, as GTF, have met him several times in the UK, Germany, Washington, Switzerland, Australia and Singapore.”

Responding to another query, Surendiran said that Samaraweera had been instrumental in arranging the GTF’s first meeting with the then President Maithripala Sirisena, in 2015, in London. Yes, I met you (the writer) downstairs after that meeting). “Mangala was not just a fellow Sri Lankan and politician, he was a great friend. Mangala spoke to several of us from GTF, from various countries, at a virtual meeting, on 17 July 2021. My last personal interaction was on 06 August, 2021, via texts. Under normal circumstances he would have wished me on my birthday but that wasn’t to be as he was moved to ICU a couple of days before.”

Unlike many of his colleagues in the government and the Opposition, Samaraweera never hesitated to take a public stand on the post-war national reconciliation process. Samaraweera openly contradicted President Sirisena’s frequent claims that he hadn’t been aware of the finalisation of the Geneva Resolution on Oct 1, 2015.

Responding to the strong criticism of his role in the Geneva process, Samaraweera included the following section in a bigger statement he issued during the yahapalana administration: The final text of the resolution was largely negotiated over the phone, with the President and I at the same hotel in New York, and the Prime Minister in Colombo, accompanied by the Secretary to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at the time, and the Ambassador of the US and High Commissioner of the UK. Once consensus was reached , the Secretary to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at the time, who was in Colombo, had coordinated with Sri Lanka’s Permanent Representative to the UN in Geneva and conveyed the decision of the Government of Sri Lanka to the Human Rights Council.”

What Samaraweera didn’t say was that Sri Lanka’s Permanent Representative to the UN in Geneva, Ravinatha Aryasinghe, had rejected the draft just over a week before, during informal discussion with the Sri Lanka Core Group, headed by the US. Whatever the likes of Samaraweera said the UNP earned the wrath of the people for what was called Geneva betrayal. The treachery in Geneva proved to be as bad as the Treasury bond scams, in Feb 2015 and March 2016, leading to the humiliating defeat at the Feb 2018 Local Government polls. Although President Sirisena switched portfolios, held by Samaraweera and Finance Minister Ravi Karunanayake, in May 2017 in consultation with UNP leader Wickremesinghe, the rot continued unabated. The Wickremesinghe-Samaraweera led strategy that pushed the country towards the US-led Quad alliance with Sri Lanka entering into a Comprehensive Partnership with Japan in the first week of Oct 2015, in addition to talks on SOFA (Status of Forces Agreement) and MCC (Millennium Challenge Corporation) agreements also with the US against the backdrop of President Sirisena entering into ACSA (Access and Cross Servicing Agreement) didn’t help the then government at all.

Finally, Samaraweera abandoned the UNP and joined the newly formed SJB soon after the 2019 presidential poll only to quit the parliamentary election at the eleventh hour. Following the SLPP’s sweeping victory at the general election, Samaraweera launched a political campaign with the involvement of some civil society activists. His office, situated at T.B. Jayah Mawatha a little distance away from SLFP main office, was called ‘Freedom Hub’, where he addressed his last media briefing on July 25.

Samaraweera warned the current leadership of the dire financial crisis experienced by the country not only due to the raging Covid-19 epidemic but waste, corruption, irregularities and negligence as well. At the time Samaraweera served as the Finance Minister (May 2017 to Nov 2019) the government revenue surpassed Rs 1,900 bn. The shortsighted policy of the SLPP that did away with a range of taxes and duties, immediately after the presidential election resulted in the loss of over Rs 500 bn in government revenue, which too contributed to the current messy financial situation. Perhaps one of Samaraweera’s major achievements was the transformation of the telecommunications sector though he too couldn’t absolve himself of being part of an utterly corrupt and ruinous political party system.

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Midweek Review

2019 Easter Sunday carnage in retrospect

Published

1 week ago

2026/04/8

Sahan Weerasooriya

November 21, 2019: President Gotabaya Rajapaksa meets Archbishop of Colombo, His Eminence Malcolm Cardinal Ranjith at the Bishop House where he requested the Church to nominate a representative for the Presidential Commission of Inquiry (PCoI) probing the Easter Sunday carnage.

Coordinated suicide attacks targeted three churches—St. Anthony’s in Colombo, St. Sebastian’s at Katuwapitiya and Zion Church in Batticaloa—along with popular tourist hotels Shangri-La, Kingsbury, and Cinnamon Grand. No less a person than His Eminence Archbishop of Colombo Rt. Rev. Malcolm Cardinal Ranjith is on record as having said that the carnage could have been averted if the Yahapalana government shared the available Indian intelligence warning with him. Yahapalana Minister Harin Fernando publicly admitted that his family was aware of the impending attack and the warning issued to senior police officers in charge of VVIP/VIP security is evidence that all those who represented Parliament at the time knew of the mass murder plot. Against the backdrop of Indian intelligence warning and our collective failure to act on it, it would be pertinent to ask the Indians whether they knew the Easter Sunday operation was to facilitate Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s victory at the 2019 presidential poll. Perhaps, a key to the Easter Sunday conspiracy is enigma Sara Jasmin (Tamil girl from Batticaloa converted to Islam) whose husband Atchchi Muhammadu Hasthun carried out the attack on St. Sebastian’s Church, Katuwapitiya

By Shamindra Ferdinando

Pivithuru Hela Urumaya (PHU) leader Udaya Gammanpila’s Pasku Praharaye Mahamolakaru Soya Yema (Searching for the mastermind behind the Easter Sunday attacks) inquired into the 2019 April 21 Easter Sunday carnage. The former Minister and Attorney-at-Law quite confidently argued that the mastermind of the only major post-war attack was Zahran Hashim, one of the two suicide bombers who targeted Shangri-la, Colombo.

Gammanpila launched his painstaking work recently at the Sambuddhathva Jayanthi Mandiraya at Thummulla, with the participation of former Presidents Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who had been accused of being the beneficiary of the Easter Sunday carnage at the November 2019 presidential election, and Maithripala Sirisena faulted by the Presidential Commission of Inquiry (PCoI) that probed the heinous crime. Rajapaksa and Sirisena sat next to each other, in the first row, and were among those who received copies of the controversial book.

PCoI, appointed by Sirisena in September, 2019, in the run-up to the presidential election, in its report submitted to President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, in February, 2020, declared that Sirisena’s failure as the President to act on ‘actionable intelligence’ exceeded mere civil negligence. Having declared criminal liability on the part of Sirisena, the PCoI recommended that the Attorney General consider criminal proceedings against former President Sirisena under any suitable provision in the Penal Code.

PCoI’s Chairman Supreme Court Judge Janak de Silva handed over the final report to President Rajapaksa on February 1, 2021 at the Presidential Secretariat. Gotabaya Rajapaksa received the first and second interim reports on 20 December and on 2 March, 2020, respectively.

The Commission consists of the following commissioners: Justice Janak De Silva (Judge of the Supreme Court and Chairman of the Commission), Justice Nissanka Bandula Karunarathna (Judge of the Court of Appeal), Justice Nihal Sunil Rajapakse (Retired Judge of the Court of Appeal), Bandula Kumara Atapattu (Retired Judge of the High Court) and Ms W.M.M.R. Adikari (Retired Ministry Secretary).

H.M.P. Buwaneka Herath functioned as the Secretary to the PCoI.

It would be pertinent to mention that the Archbishop of Colombo Malcolm Cardinal Ranjith, declined an opportunity offered by President Rajapaksa to nominate a person for the PCoI. The Church leader asserted such a move would be misconstrued by various interested parties. Both the former President and Archbishop of Colombo confirmed that development soon after the presidential election.

Having declared its faith in the PCoI and received assurance of the new government’s intention to implement its recommendations, the Church was taken aback when the government announced the appointment of a six-member committee, chaired by Minister Chamal Rajapaksa, to examine the PCoI and recommend how to proceed. That Committee included Ministers Johnston Fernando, Udaya Gammanpila, Ramesh Pathirana, Prasanna Ranatunga and Rohitha Abeygunawardena.

The Church cannot deny that their position in respect of the Yahapalana government’s pathetic failure to thwart the Easter Sunday carnage greatly influenced the electorate, and the SLPP presidential candidate Gotabaya Rajapaksa directly benefited. Alleging that the Archbishop of Colombo played politics with the Easter Sunday carnage, SJB parliamentarian Harin Fernando, in June 2020, didn’t mince his words when he accused the Church of influencing a decisive 5% of voters to back Gotabaya Rajapaksa. At the time that accusation was made about nine months before the PCoI handed over its report, President Rajapaksa and the Archbishop of Colombo enjoyed a close relationship.

The Church raised the failure on the part of the government to implement the PCoI’s recommendations six months after President Rajapaksa received the final report.

The National Catholic Committee for Justice to Eastern Sunday Attack Victims, in a lengthy letter dated 12 July 2021, demanded the government deal with the following persons for their failure to thwart the attacks. The Committee warned that unless the President addressed their concerns alternative measures would be taken. The government ignored the warning. Instead, the SLPP adopted delaying tactics much to their disappointment and the irate Church finally declared unconditional support for the US-India backed regime change project.

Sirisena and others

On the basis of the 19th Chapter, titled ‘Accountability’ of the final report, the Committee drew President Rajapaksa’s attention to the following persons as listed by the PCoI: (1) President Maithripala Sirisena (2) PM Ranil Wickremesinghe (3) Defence Secretary Hemasiri Fernando (4) Chief of National Intelligence Sisira Mendis (5) Director State Intelligence Service Nilantha Jayawardena.

The 20th Chapter, titled ‘Failures on the part of law enforcement authorities’ in the Final report (First Volume), identified the following culprits ,namely IGP Pujith Jayasundera, SDIG Nandana Munasinghe (WP), Deshabandu Tennakoon (DIG, Colombo, North), SP Sanjeewa Bandara (Colombo North), SSP Chandana Atukorale, B.E.I. Prasanna (SP, Director, Western province, Intelligence), ASP Sisira Kumara, Chief Inspector R.M. Sarath Kumarasinghe (Acting OIC, Fort), Chief Inspector Sagara Wilegoda Liyanage (OIC, Fort)., Chaminda Nawaratne (OIC, Katana), State Counsel Malik Azeez and Deputy Solicitor General Azad Navaavi.

The PCoI named former Minister and leader of All Ceylon Makkal Congress Rishad Bathiudeen, his brother Riyaj, Dr Muhamad Zulyan Muhamad Zafras and Ahamad Lukman Thalib as persons who facilitated the Easter Sunday conspiracy, while former Minister M.L.A.M. Hisbullah was faulted for spreading extremism in Kattankudy.

Major General (retd) Suresh Sallay, who is now in remand custody, under the CID, for a period of 90 days, in terms of the prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) ,was not among those named by the PCoI. Sallay, who served as the head of the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI/from 2012 to 2016) was taken into custody on 25 February and named as the third suspect in the high profile investigation. (Interested parties propagated that Sallay was apprehended on the basis of UK’s Channel 4 claim that the officer got in touch with would-be Easter Sunday bombers, including Zahran Hashim, with the help of Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan, alias Pilleyan. However, Pilleyan who had been arrested in early April 2025 under PTA was recently remanded by the Mount Lavinia Magistrate’s Court, pending the Attorney General’s recommendations in connection with investigations into the disappearance of a Vice Chancellor in the Eastern Province in 2006. There was absolutely no reference to the Easter Sunday case)

The Church also emphasised the need to investigate the then Attorney General Dappula de Livera’s declaration of a ‘grand conspiracy’ behind the Easter Sunday carnage. The Church sought answers from President Rajapaksa as to the nature of the grand conspiracy claimed by the then AG on the eve of his retirement.

Sallay was taken into custody six years after the PCoI handed over its recommendations to President Rajapaksa and the appointment of a six-member parliamentary committee that examined the recommendations. The author of Pasku Praharaye Mahamolakaru Soya Yema, Gammanpila, the only lawyer in the six-member PCoI, should be able to reveal the circumstances that committee came into being.

Against the backdrop of the PCoI making specific recommendations in respect of the disgraced politicians, civilian officials and law enforcement authorities over accountability and security failures, the SLPP owed an explanation regarding the appointment of a six-member committee of SLPPers. Actually, the SLPP owed an explanation to Sallay whose arrest under the PTA eight years after Easter Sunday carnage has to be discussed taking into consideration the failure to implement the recommendations.

Let me briefly mention PCoI’s recommendations pertaining to two senior police officers. PCoI recommended that the AG consider criminal proceedings against SDIG Nandana Munasinghe under any suitable provision in the Penal Code or Section 82 of the Police Ordinance (Final report, Vol 1, page 312). The PCoI recommended a disciplinary inquiry in respect of DIG Deshabandu Tennakoon. The SLPP simply sat on the PCoI recommendations.

Following the overthrow of President Rajapaksa by a well-organised Aragalaya mob in July 2022, the SLPP and President Ranil Wickremesinghe paved the way for Deshabandu Tennakoon to become the Acting IGP in November 2023. Wickremesinghe went out of his way to secure the Constitutional Council’s approval to confirm the controversial police officer Tennakoon’s status as the IGP.

Some have misconstrued the Supreme Court ruling, given in January 2023, as action taken by the State against those named in the PCoI report. It was not the case. The SC bench, comprising seven judges, ordered Sirisena to pay Rs 100 mn into a compensation fund in response to 12 fundamental rights cases filed by families of the Easter Sunday victims, Catholic clergy and the Bar Association of Sri Lanka. The SC also ordered ex-IGP Pujith Jayasundara and former SIS head Nilantha Jayawardene to pay Rs. 75m rupees each, former Defence Secretary Hemasiri Fernando Rs. 50 million and former CNI Sisira Mendis Rs. 10 million from their personal money. All of them have been named in the PCoI report. As previously mentioned, Maj. Gen. Sallay, who headed the SIS at the time of the SC ruling that created the largest ever single compensation fund, was not among those faulted by the sitting and former justices.

Initial assertion

The Archbishop of Colombo, in mid-May 2019, declared the Easter Sunday carnage was caused by local youth at the behest of a foreign group. The leader of the Catholic Church said so in response to a query raised by the writer regarding a controversial statement made by TNA MP M. A. Sumanthiran. The Archbishop was joined by Most Ven Ittapane Dhammalankara Nayaka Thera of Kotte Sri Kalyani Samagri Dharma Maha Sangha Sabha of Siyam Maha Nikaya. They responded to media queries at the Bishop’s House, Borella.

The Archbishop contradicted Sumanthiran’s claim that the failure on the part of successive governments to address the grievances of minorities over the past several decades led to the 2019 Easter Sunday massacre.

Sumanthiran made the unsubstantiated claim at an event organised to celebrate the first anniversary of the Sinhala political weekly ‘Annidda,’ edited by Attorney-at-Law K.W. Janaranjana at the BMICH.

The Archbishop alleged that a foreign group used misguided loyal youth to mount the Easter Sunday attacks (‘Cardinal rejects TNA’s interpretation’, with strap line ‘foreign group used misguided local youth’, The Island, May 15, 2019 edition).

Interested parties interpreted the Easter Sunday carnage in line with their thinking. The writer was present at a special media briefing called by President Sirisena on 30 April, 2019 at the President’s House where the then Northern Province Governor Dr. Suren Raghavan called for direct talks with those responsible for the Easter Sunday massacre. One-time Director of the President’s Media Division (PMD) Dr. Raghavan emphasised that direct dialogue was necessary in the absence of an acceptable mechanism to deal with such a situation. Don’t forget Sisisena had no qualms in leaving the country a few days before the attacks and was away in Singapore when extremists struck. Sirisena arrived in Singapore from India.

The NP Governor made the declaration though none of the journalists present sought his views on the post-Easter Sunday developments.

During that briefing, in response to another query raised by the writer, Army Commander Lt. Gen. Mahesh Senanayake disclosed that the CNI refrained from sharing intelligence alerts received by the CNI with the DMI. Brigadier Chula Kodituwakku, who served as Director, DMI, had been present at Sirisena’s briefing and was the first to brief the media with regard to the extremist build-up leading to the Easter Sunday attacks.

The collapse of the Yahapalana arrangement caused a security nightmare. Frequent feuds between Yahapalana partners, the UNP and the SLFP, facilitated the extremists’ project. The top UNP leadership feared to step in, even after Justice Minister Dr. Wijeyadasa Rajapaksha issued a warning in Parliament, in late 2016, regarding extremist activities and some Muslim families securing refuge in countries dominated by ISIS. Instead of taking tangible measures to address the growing threat, a section of the UNP parliamentary group pounced on the Minister.

The UNP felt that police/military action against extremists may undermine their voter base. The UNP remained passive even after extremists made an abortive bid to kill Thasleem, Coordinating Secretary to Minister Kabir Hashim, on 8 March 2019. Thasleem earned the wrath of the extremists as he accompanied the CID team that raided the extremists’ facility at Wanathawilluwa. The 16 January 2019 raid indicated the deadly intentions of the extremists but PM Wickremesinghe was unmoved, while President Sirisena appeared clueless as to what was going on.

Let me reproduce the PCoI assessment of PM Wickremesinghe in the run-up to the Easter Sunday massacre. “Upon consideration of evidence, it is the view of the PCoI that the lax approach of Mr. Wickremesinghe towards Islamic extremists as the Prime Minister was one of the primary reasons for the failure on the part of the then government to take proactive steps towards tackling growing extremism. This facilitated the build-up of Islam extremists to the point of the Easter Sunday attack.” (Final report, Vol 1, pages 276 and 277).

The National Catholic Committee for Justice to Easter Sunday Attack Victims, in its letter dated 12 July, 2021, addressed to President Rajapaksa, questioned the failure on the part of the PCoI to make any specific recommendations as regards Wickremesinghe. Accusing Wickremesinghe of a serious act of irresponsibility and neglect of duty, the Church emphasised that there should have been further investigations regarding the UNP leader’s conduct.

SLPP’s shocking failure

The SLPP never made a serious bid to examine all available information as part of an overall effort to counter accusations. If widely propagated lie that the Easter Sunday massacre had been engineered by Sallay to help Gotabaya Rajapaksa win the 2019 presidential poll is accepted, then not only Sirisena and Wickremesinghe but all law enforcement officers and others mentioned in the PCoI must have contributed to that despicable strategy. It would be interesting to see how the conspirators convinced a group of Muslims to sacrifice their lives to help Sinhala Buddhist hardliner Gotabaya Rajapaksa to become the President.

Amidst claims, counter claims and unsubstantiated propaganda all forgotten that a senior member of the JVP/NPP government, in February 2021, when he was in the Opposition directly claimed Indian involvement. The accusation seems unfair as all know that India alerted Sri Lanka on 4 April , 2019, regarding the conspiracy. However, Asanga Abeygoonasekera, in his latest work ‘Winds of Change’ questioned the conduct of the top Indian defence delegation that was in Colombo exactly two weeks before the Easter Sunday carnage. Abeygoonasekera, who had been a member of the Sri Lanka delegation, expressed suspicions over the visiting delegation’s failure to make reference to the warning given on 4 April 2019 regarding the plot.

The SLPP never had or developed a strategy to counter stepped up attacks. The party was overwhelmed by a spate of accusations meant to undermine them, both in and outside Parliament. The JVP/NPP, in spite of accommodating Mohamed Yusuf Ibrahim, father of two Easter Sunday suicide bombers Ilham Ahmed Ibrahim (Shangila-la) and Imsath Ahmed Ibrahim (Cinnamon Grand), in its 2015 National List was never really targeted by the SLPP. The SLPP never effectively raised the possibility of the wealthy spice trader funding the JVP to receive a National List slot.

The Catholic Church, too, was strangely silent on this particular issue. The issue is whether Mohamed Yusuf Ibrahim had been aware of the conspiracy that involved his sons. Another fact that cannot be ignored is Attorney-at-Law Hejaaz Hizbullah who had been arrested in April 2020 in connection with the Easter Sunday carnage but granted bail in February 2022 had been the Ibrahim family lawyer.

Hejaaz Hizbullah’s arrest received international attention and various interested parties raised the issue.

The father of the two brothers, who detonated suicide bombs, was granted bail in May 2022.

Eric Solheim, who had been involved in the Norwegian-led disastrous peace process here, commented on the Easter Sunday attacks. In spite of the international media naming the suicide bombers responsible for the worst such atrocity Solheim tweeted: “When we watch the horrific pictures from Sri Lanka, it is important to remember that Muslims and Christians are small minorities. Muslims historically were moderate and peaceful. They have been victims of violence in Sri Lanka, not orchestrating it.”

That ill-conceived tweet exposed the mindset of a man who unashamedly pursued a despicable agenda that threatened the country’s unitary status with the connivance of the UNP. Had they succeeded, the LTTE would have emerged as the dominant political-military power in the Northern and Eastern Provinces and a direct threat to the rest of the country.

Midweek Review

War with Iran and unravelling of the global order – I

Published

1 week ago

2026/04/8

Sahan Weerasooriya

At present, the world stands in the midst of a transitional and turbulent phase, characterised by heightened uncertainty and systemic flux, reflecting an ongoing transformation of the modern global order. The existing global order, rooted in the US hegemony, shows unmistakable signs of decay, while a new and uncertain global system struggles to be born. In such moments of profound transformation, as Antonio Gramsci observed, morbid symptoms proliferate across the body politic. From a geopolitical perspective, the intensifying coordinated aggression of the United States and Israel against Iran is not merely a regional crisis, but an acceleration of a deeper structural transformation in the international order. In this context, the conduct of Donald Trump appears less as an aberration and more as a morbid symptom of a declining US-led global order. As Amitav Acharya argues in The Once and Future World Order (2025), the emerging global order may well move beyond Western dominance. However, the pathway to that future is proving anything but orderly, shaped instead by disruption, unilateralism, and the unsettling symptoms of a system in transition.

Origins of the Conflict

To begin with, the origins and objectives of the parties to the present armed confrontation require unpacking. In a sense, the current Persian Gulf crisis reflects a convergence of long-standing geopolitical rivalries and evolving security dynamics in the Middle East. The roots of tension between the West and the Middle East can be traced back to earlier historical encounters, from the Persian Wars of classical antiquity to the Crusades of the medieval period. A new phase in the region’s political trajectory commenced in 1948 with the establishment of Israel—widely perceived as a Western enclave within the Arab world—and the concurrent displacement of approximately 700,000 Palestinians from their homeland. Since then, Israel has steadily consolidated and expanded its territory, a process that has remained a persistent source of regional instability. The Iranian Revolution introduced a further layer of complexity, fundamentally reshaping regional alignments and ideological contestations. In recent years, tensions between Israel and the United States on one side and Iran on the other have steadily intensified. The current phase of the conflict, however, was directly triggered by coordinated U.S.–Israeli airstrikes on both civilian and military targets on 28 February 2026, which, as noted in a 2 April 2026 statement by 100 international law experts from leading U.S. universities, constituted a clear violation of the UN Charter and International Humanitarian Law (IHL).

Objectives and Strategic Aims

Israel’s strategic objective appears to be directed toward the systematic and total destruction of Iran’s military, nuclear, and economic capabilities, driven by the perception that Iran remains the principal obstacle to its security and its pursuit of regional primacy. Israel was aware that Iran did not possess a nuclear weapon at the time; however, its nuclear programme remained a subject of international contention, with competing assessments regarding its ultimate intent and potential for weaponisation.

The United States, for its part, appears to be pursuing more targeted political and strategic objectives, including eventual transformation of Iran’s current political regime. Washington has long regarded the Iranian leadership as fundamentally antagonistic to U.S. interests in the Middle East. In this context, the United States may seek to enhance its strategic leverage over Iran, including in relation to its substantial oil and gas resources, a point underscored in recent statements by Donald Trump. It must be noted, however, successive U.S. administrations since 1979 have avoided direct large-scale military confrontation with Iran, preferring instead a combination of sanctions, diplomatic pressure, and indirect military engagement.

The positions of other Arab states in the Persian Gulf are shaped by a combination of security calculations, sectarian considerations, and broader geopolitical alignments. While several Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members, notably Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, have expressed tacit support for measures that counter Iranian regional influence, their involvement remains calibrated to avoid direct military confrontation. Their position is informed by the belief that Iran provides backing to militant non-state actors, including Hezbollahs in the West Bank and the Houthis in Southern Yemen, which they view as destabilising forces in the region. These states are balancing competing priorities: the desire to curb Iran’s power projection, maintain strong security and economic ties with the United States, and preserve domestic stability. At the same time, countries such as Oman and Qatar have adopted more neutral or mediating stances, emphasizing diplomatic engagement and conflict de-escalation.

Militarily, Iran is not positioned to match the combined military capabilities of U.S.–Israeli forces. Nevertheless, it retains significant asymmetric leverage, particularly through its capacity to influence global energy flows. Control over critical maritime chokepoints, most notably the Strait of Hormuz, provides Tehran with a potent strategic instrument to disrupt global oil supply. Iranian leadership appears to view this leverage as a key pressure point, designed to compel global economic actors to push Washington and Tel Aviv toward a cessation of hostilities and a negotiated settlement. In this context, attacks on oil and gas infrastructure, shipping routes, and supply lines constitute central components of Iran’s survival strategy. As long as the conflict persists and energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz remain disrupted, the resulting instability is likely to generate severe repercussions across the global economy, increasing pressure on the United States to halt military operations against Iran.

Now entering its fifth week, the conflict continues to flare intensely, characterised by sustained and intensive aerial operations. Joint U.S.–Israeli strikes have reportedly destroyed substantial elements of Iran’s air and naval capabilities, as well as critical military and economic infrastructure. Nevertheless, Iran has retained the capacity to conduct guided missile strikes within Israel and against selected U.S. economic, diplomatic, and military assets across the Middle East, including reported long-range attacks on the U.S. facility at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, approximately 4,000 kilometers from Iranian territory. Initial U.S. and Israeli strategic calculations—anticipating that a decisive initial strike and the targeted killing of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei would precipitate regime collapse and popular uprising—have not materialized. On the contrary, the destruction of civilian facilities has strengthened anti-American sentiment and reinforced domestic support for the Iranian leadership. While Iran faced initial setbacks on the battlefield, it has achieved notable success in the international media front, effectively shaping global perceptions and advancing its propaganda objectives. By the fifth week, Tehran’s asymmetric strategy has yielded tangible results, including the downing of two U.S. military aircraft, F15E Strike Eagle fighter jet and A10 Thunderbolt II (“Warthog”) ground-attack aircraft , signaling the resilience and operational efficacy of Iran’s military power.

The Military Industrial Complexes and ProIsrael Lobby

Why did the United States initiate military action against Iran at this particular juncture? Joe Kent, who resigned in protest over the war, stated that available intelligence did not indicate an imminent Iranian capability to produce a nuclear weapon or pose an immediate threat to the United States. This assessment raises important questions about the stated objective of dismantling Iran’s nuclear programme, suggesting that it may have served to obscure broader strategic and economic considerations underpinning the intervention. To understand the timing and rationale of the U.S. intervention in the Persian Gulf, it is therefore necessary to examine the influence of two powerful domestic pressure groups: the military–industrial complex and the pro-Israel lobby.

The influence of the U.S. military–industrial complex on American foreign policy is most clearly manifested through the institutionalized “revolving door” between defense corporations and senior positions within the U.S. administration. Over the past two decades, key figures such as Lloyd Austin (Secretary of Defence, 2021–2025), a former board member of Raytheon Technologies, Mark Esper (Secretary of Defence 2019–2020), who previously served as a senior executive at the same firm, and Patrick Shanahan (2019) from Boeing exemplify the direct movement of personnel from industry into the highest levels of strategic decision-making. This circulation is complemented by influential policy actors such as Michèle Flournoy (Under Secretary of Defence Under President Obama) and Antony Blinken (Secretary of State 2021 to 2025, Deputy Secretary of State 2015 to 2017), whose engagement with consultancies like WestExec Advisors further blurs the boundary between public policy and private defense interests. This pattern appears to persist under the present Trump administration, where the interplay between defense industry interests and strategic policymaking continues to shape procurement priorities and threat perceptions. Consequently, the military–industrial complex operates not merely as an external pressure group but as an internalized component of the policy process, shaping U.S. foreign policy in ways that align strategic objectives with the structural and commercial interests of the defense sector. Armed conflicts may also generate substantial commercial opportunities, as increased military spending often translates into expanded profits for defense contractors.

The influence of the pro-Israel lobby on U.S. foreign policy is best understood as a dense network of advocacy organisations, donors, policy institutes, and political actors that shape both elite consensus and decision-making within successive administrations. At the center of this network is the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, widely regarded as one of the most effective lobbying organisations in Washington, which works alongside a broader constellation of groups and donors to sustain bipartisan support for Israel. This influence is reinforced through the presence of senior policymakers and advisors with strong ideological or institutional affinities toward Israel, including Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu, whose close political alignment has translated into consistent diplomatic and strategic backing. Policy decisions—ranging from the recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital to continued military assistance—reflect not only geopolitical calculations but also the domestic political salience of pro-Israel advocacy within the United States. Consequently, the pro-Israel lobby operates not merely as an external pressure group but as an embedded force within the policy ecosystem, shaping U.S. foreign policy in ways that sustain a strong and often unconditional commitment to Israeli security and strategic interests. A fuller explanation of U.S. policy toward Iran emerges when the influence of both the military–industrial complex and the pro-Israel lobby is considered together. These two forces, while distinct in composition and motivation, converge in reinforcing a strategic outlook that prioritises the identification of Iran as a central threat and legitimizes the use of coercive military instruments.

Global Economic Fallout

After five weeks of sustained conflict, the trajectory of the war suggests that Iran’s strategy of resilience and asymmetric resistance is yielding tangible effects. While the United States, alongside Israel, has inflicted significant damage on Iran’s economic and military infrastructure, it has not succeeded in eroding Tehran’s capacity—or resolve—to continue the conflict through unconventional means. At the same time, Washington appears to be encountering increasing difficulty in bringing the war to a decisive conclusion, even as signs of strain emerge in its relations with key European allies. Most importantly, the repercussions of the conflict are no longer confined to the battlefield: the unfolding crisis has generated a widening economic shock that is reverberating across global markets and supply chains. It is this broader international economic impact of the war that now warrants closer examination.

The Persian Gulf conflict is rapidly sending shockwaves through the global economy. At the forefront is the energy sector: even partial disruptions to oil and gas exports from the region are driving prices sharply higher, placing severe pressure on energy-importing economies in Europe and Asia and fueling inflation worldwide. Maritime trade is also under strain, as heightened risk prompts longer shipping routes, increased freight rates, and rising war-risk premiums. These disruptions ripple through global supply chains, pushing up the cost of goods far beyond the energy sector.

Insurance costs for shipping and aviation are soaring as large zones are designated high-risk or even excluded from coverage, further elevating transport costs and pricing out smaller operators. Together, these pressures constitute a systemic economic shock: industrial production costs rise, supply chains fragment, and trade volumes contract, stressing manufacturing, logistics, and consumption simultaneously.

The cumulative effect is already slowing global growth. Major economies such as the EU, China, and India face slower expansion, while import-dependent states risk recession. Trade-driven sectors are contracting, reinforcing a scenario of high inflation and stagnating growth. Air travel is also impacted, with restricted airspace, higher fuel prices, and elevated insurance premiums driving up ticket costs and lengthening travel routes. Rising energy prices, logistics bottlenecks, and increased production costs are pushing up food prices and cost-of-living pressures, potentially forcing central banks into tighter monetary policy and slowing growth further.

Finally, global manufacturing—from chemicals and plastics to agriculture—is experiencing ripple effects as supply chain disruptions intensify shortages and price increases. The conflict in the Persian Gulf is thus not only a regional security crisis but also a catalyst for broad, interconnected economic disruptions that are reverberating across markets, trade networks, and everyday life worldwide.

(To be continued)