Global Strategic Transformations

Since the 16th century, global power has largely been concentrated in the West, driven by European colonial expansion, industrialisation, and later, US dominance. However, in the 21st century, this balance is gradually, yet profoundly, shifting. This global power shift is evident in four key trends that have shaped the post-Cold War era: the relative decline of the United States, a renewed Cold War-style rivalry between China and the US, Asia’s resurgence, and the US policy shift—its pivot to Asia and the Indo-Pacific. Sri Lanka’s foreign policy must navigate these structural shifts, which carry significant implications for economic partnerships, security alliances, and geopolitical positioning.

Relative Decline of the United States

The relative economic and political decline of the United States, in the new millennium, marked a pivotal turning point in global power dynamics. The US leadership interpreted the end of the Cold War as an ideological victory for liberal democracy. The Cold War did not end through a violent military confrontation, but rather as a result of the voluntary dissolution of the Soviet Union. In the immediate aftermath, the United States emerged as the world’s sole superpower, the undisputed leader of the global order. However, over time, the US began to face mounting challenges from both internal and external factors. The 2008 financial crisis, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, the protracted wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and increasing domestic political polarization all contributed to a decline in US global influence.

The decline of US power, as a global leader, is not sudden. As early as 1973, President Richard Nixon acknowledged that the post-war era in international relations had ended. He observed that the United States had shifted from a nuclear monopoly in the mid-1940s to nuclear superiority in the 1950s and, by the 1960s, to rough strategic parity with the Soviet Union. The Nixon-Kissinger leadership predicted that more complex multi-polar power relations were emerging, replacing the simple bi-polar alignments that characterised the post-World War II era. He also noted that the changing mood of the American people signalled the end of the postwar international order. At the beginning of the Cold War, the US public strongly supported a global leadership role. However, Nixon observed that “after almost three decades, our enthusiasm was waning and the results of our generosity were being questioned. Our policies need change, not only to match new realities in the world but also to meet a new mood in America” (Nixon, Shaping a Durable Peace, 1973: 3). Nixon’s observations on the shifting US global role became particularly relevant in the post-Cold War era, three decades later. The rise of nationalist and inward-looking policies, epitomised by President Donald Trump’s ‘Make America Great Again’ démarche, reflected a renewed skepticism toward US global commitments. His policies, along with his return to the political stage, underscored the tensions between America’s global leadership roles and growing concerns about its relative US economic and political decline.

The transformation of US policy in the Indian Ocean reflects the relative decline of American hegemony in the region. While the US initially relied on military dominance—anchored by Diego Garcia as a critical logistics hub—shifts in global power dynamics have forced a strategic recalibration. The growing influence of China, the rise of regional naval powers, like India, and increasing challenges to unilateral US military presence, have made it difficult to sustain the same level of dominance. As a result, US policy has evolved from a posture of overwhelming military superiority to a more nuanced, cooperative, and regionally integrated approach, signalling a shift in its ability to unilaterally dictate security dynamics in the Indian Ocean. The Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm (1991) successfully expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait but entangled the US in prolonged Middle Eastern conflicts. Similarly, Operation Enduring Freedom (2001) swiftly removed the Taliban from power in Kabul, yet the economic and human costs of maintaining a long-term presence in Afghanistan underscored the limitations of US military interventions in the post-Cold War historical context.

China’s Rise and Evolving

‘New Cold War’

China has taken on an increasingly proactive role in global diplomacy and economics, solidifying its position as a 21st-century superpower. This growing leadership is evident in major initiatives, like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), both of which expand China’s influence on the world stage. The Economist noted that “China’s decision to fund a new multilateral bank rather than give more to existing ones reflects its exasperation with the glacial pace of global economic governance reform” (The Economist, 11 November 2014). Thus far, China’s ascent to global superpower status has been largely peaceful.

China’s influence is evident in its extensive investments in port infrastructure, maritime trade routes, and strategic partnerships under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The United States sees this growing presence as a direct challenge to its global dominance, particularly as China deepens its economic entrenchment and modernises its military. US officials worry that dual-use facilities, an expanding naval footprint, and greater regional influence could undermine power projection, disrupt open sea lanes, and weaken allied security. In response, the US has intensified alliances, expanded security cooperation, and bolstered its military presence to counteract what it perceives as an erosion of its global primacy. As a result, the intensifying rivalry between China and the United States appears to be shaping the global strategic landscape in the 21st century.

The current Sino-US rivalry differs from the US-Soviet Cold War in several key aspects. Unlike the Soviet Union, which primarily contested US dominance in military and strategic spheres, China’s challenge to US hegemony is largely economic. This competition intensified during the Trump administration, particularly through the US-China trade war. Given the deep interdependence of global economic activities, US tariffs on Chinese goods have had repercussions for both countries, affecting Americans as much as Chinese producers and consumers.

Indian Ocean small states, such as Sri Lanka, do not necessarily perceive Chinese economic initiatives through a power-political lens. Instead, they assess these initiatives based on their own economic interests and the benefits they offer. Consequently, the US strategy used to counter the Soviet threat during the Cold War is unlikely to be effective in addressing the current challenge posed by China.

China’s progress in the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) adds another dimension to US-China rivalry in trade and technology, digital geopolitics. In 2015, China initiated its ‘Made in China 2025’ plan, aimed at advancing high-tech manufacturing capabilities.The worldwide challenge of the dominance of US IT giants, including Google, Facebook, Amazon, and Microsoft by Chinese IT giants, such as Alibaba, Baidu, and Tencent of came forefront in digital geopolitics. The competition to develop 5G infrastructures, viewed by both powers as pivotal for enabling the next generation of digital application, has added a new dimension to their rivalry.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is another critical frontier in UU-China competition. In March 2016, Google advanced machine-learning technology by integrating algorithms and reinforcement learning to process big data and enhance predictive capabilities. A year later, in July 2017, President Xi Jinping unveiled China’s ‘New Generation AI Development Plan,’ aiming to position China as the global leader in AI by 2030. The plan underscores the strategic advantage of exclusive technological control, allowing a nation to establish dominance before rivals can catch up (Pecotic, 2019). As Sri Lanka embarks on acquiring Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI), it must navigate the intensifying digital geopolitical rivalry among global tech giants. Countries like Sri Lanka, which have only recently begun acquiring Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI), must navigate carefully in the face of digital geopolitical rivalry among global powers such as China, India, and the United States.

Resurgence of Asia and the Asian Century

Another crucial development that signifies the global shift of power is the resurgence of Asia, driven by the strategic rise of China and India, along with the sustained economic growth of other key Asian economies, often referred to as the ‘Asian Tigers.’ This transformation has led to the widespread characterisation of the 21st century as the ‘Asian Century.’ The region’s rapid economic expansion, technological advancements, and growing geopolitical influence have reshaped global power dynamics, positioning Asia at the heart of international affairs. In 2019, the World Economic Forum declared, “We’ve entered the Asian Century, and there is no turning back” (World Economic Forum, 2019). This assertion reflects Asia’s role as the primary driver of global economic growth, trade, and innovation. With China and India leading the way, alongside the economic resilience of nations like Japan, South Korea, and the ASEAN bloc, Asia is not merely rising—it is redefining the global order.

In the Asian Century, the Indian Ocean has emerged as a pivotal geopolitical arena where the global balance of power is increasingly contested and reshaped. As major economic and military powers vie for influence in this strategically vital region, Sri Lanka’s geostrategic significance has grown exponentially. Positioned at the crossroads of key maritime trade routes connecting East and West, Sri Lanka occupies a central role in global politics, attracting the attention of global and regional powers alike.

Sri Lanka’s enhanced strategic relevance presents both opportunities and challenges. On the one hand, it allows the country to leverage its geographic advantage for economic development, foreign investment, and diplomatic engagement. On the other hand, it requires careful navigation of complex geopolitical dynamics to maintain strategic autonomy while balancing the competing interests of global powers. In this evolving landscape, Sri Lanka’s foreign policy choices will be instrumental in shaping not only its national trajectory but also broader regional stability in the Indian Ocean.

Pivot to Asia and Indo-Pacific Concept

The emergence of the Indo-Pacific strategic concept reflects the shifting global balance of power towards the Indian Ocean. In response to Asia’s rise, the US recalibrated its approach through the ‘Pivot to Asia’ and ‘Strategic Rebalancing’ under the Obama Administration. While Obama championed the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) as a signature initiative, the Trump administration abandoned it in favour of the ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) strategy. The Indo-Pacific Strategy Report of the US Department of Defence (2019) asserts: “The United States is a Pacific nation. Our ties to the Indo-Pacific are forged by history, and our future is inextricably linked… The past, present, and future of the United States are interwoven with the Indo-Pacific.” To align with this policy slant, the US Pacific Command (PACOM) renamed itself as the US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) in May 2018.

In addition to the United States, India, Australia, and Japan are in the forefront in promoting the concept of Indo-Pacific. Since 2010, Indian political leaders and the strategic community have actively promoted the Indo-Pacific framework. It reinforces the strategic rationale behind India’s Look East, Act East policy and expands its maneuverability beyond the Indian Ocean, aligning with its aspirations as an emerging global power. Under the Indo-Pacific strategic framework, US-India defence relations have reached a new stage, with the INDUS-X, launched on June 20, 2023, to bring together US and Indian stakeholders, including research and academic institutions, industry leaders, startups, and investors, to accelerate and scale up commercial technologies with military applications.

Southeast Asia emerges as the centre of the strategic theatre in the Indo-Pacific strategic construct, while South Asia appears to be positioned further west. At first glance, this shift may suggest a reduced strategic focus on other small states in South Asia like Sri Lanka. In fact, the connectivity of the Pacific and Indian Oceans reinforces the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean, too. Rather than being sidelined, small South Asian states are positioned to benefit from the economic dynamism of Southeast and East Asia through the Indo-Pacific framework.

Sri Lanka remains strategically relevant despite a growing regional focus on Southeast Asia. Its central location ensures continued engagement from major regional and global powers. Sri Lanka’s engagement in Indo-Pacific security discourse, economic frameworks, and infrastructure initiatives will shape its ability to benefit from regional growth while balancing competing strategic interests. Strengthening regional connectivity, trade partnerships, and infrastructure development could unlock new economic opportunities. However, success will depend on Sri Lanka’s ability to navigate regional power dynamics while maintaining strategic autonomy. This highlights the critical role of foreign policy in securing the country’s interests. (To be continued)

by Gamini Keerawella

A new Era of Dance in Sri Lanka

Kapila Palihawadana, an internationally renowned dancer and choreographer staged his new dance production, Riddhi-Ma, on 28 March 2025 at the Elphinstone theatre, which was filled with Sri Lankan theatregoers, foreign diplomats and students of dance. Kapila appeared on stage with his charismatic persona signifying the performance to be unravelled on stage. I was anxiously waiting to see nATANDA dancers. He briefly introduced the narrative and the thematic background to the production to be witnessed. According to him, Kapila has been inspired by the Sri Lankan southern traditional dance (Low Country) and the mythologies related to Riddhi Yâgaya (Riddi Ritual) and the black magic to produce a ‘contemporary ballet’.

Riddhi Yâgaya also known as Rata Yakuma is one of the elaborative exorcism rituals performed in the southern dance tradition in Sri Lanka. It is particularly performed in Matara and Bentara areas where this ritual is performed in order to curb the barrenness and the expectation of fertility for young women (Fargnoli & Seneviratne 2021). Kapila’s contemporary ballet production had intermingled both character, Riddi Bisaw (Princes Riddhi) and the story of Kalu Kumaraya (Black Prince), who possesses young women and caught in the evil gaze (yaksa disti) while cursing upon them to be ill (De Munck, 1990).

Kapila weaves a tapestry of ritual dance elements with the ballet movements to create visually stunning images on stage. Over one and a half hours of duration, Kapila’s dancers mesmerized the audience through their virtuosic bodily competencies in Western ballet, Sri Lankan dance, especially the symbolic elements of low country dance and the spontaneity of movements. It is human bodily virtuosity and the rhythmic structures, which galvanised our senses throughout the performance. From very low phases of bodily movements to high speed acceleration, Kapila managed to visualise the human body as an elevated sublimity.

Contemporary Ballet

Figure 2 – (L) Umesha Kapilarathna performs en pointe, and (R) Narmada Nekethani performs with Jeewaka Randeepa, Riddhi-Ma, at Elphinstone Theatre, Maradana, 28th March 2025. Source:
Malshan Witharana

The dance production Riddhi-Ma was choreographed in several segments accompanied by a flow of various music arrangements and sound elements within which the dance narrative was laid through. In other words, Kapila as a choreographer, overcomes the modernist deadlock in his contemporary dance work that the majority of Sri Lankan dance choreographers have very often succumbed to. These images of bodies of female dancers commensurate the narrative of women’s fate and her vulnerability in being possessed by the Black Demon and how she overcomes and emancipates from the oppression. In this sense, Kapila’s dancers have showcased their ability to use the bodies not much as an object which is trained to perform a particular tradition but to present bodily fluidity which can be transformed into any form. Kapila’s performers possess formlessness, fluid fragility through which they break and overcome their bodily regimentations.

It was such a highly sophisticated ‘contemporary ballet’ performed at a Sri Lankan theatre with utmost rigour and precision. Bodies of all male and female dancers were highly trained and refined through classical ballet and contemporary dance. In addition, they demonstrated their abilities in performing other forms of dance. Their bodies were trained to achieve skilful execution of complex ballet movements, especially key elements of traditional ballet namely, improvisation, partnering, interpretation and off-balance and the local dance repertoires. Yet, these key ballet elements are not necessarily a part of contemporary ballet training (Marttinen, 2016). However, it is important for the dance students to learn these key elements of traditional ballet and use them in the contemporary dance settings. In this sense, Kapila’s dancers have achieved such vigour and somatic precision through assiduous practice of the body to create the magic on stage.

Pas de deux

Among others, a particular dance sequence attracted my attention the most. In the traditional ballet lexicon, it is a ‘pas de deux’ which is performed by the ‘same race male and female dancers,’ which can be called ‘a duet’. As Lutts argues, ‘Many contemporary choreographers are challenging social structures and norms within ballet by messing with the structure of the pas de deux (Lutts, 2019). Pas de Deux is a dance typically done by male and female dancers. In this case, Kapila has selected a male and a female dancer whose gender hierarchies appeared to be diminished through the choreographic work. In the traditional pas de deux, the male appears as the backdrop of the female dancer or the main anchorage of the female body, where the female body is presented with the support of the male body. Kapila has consciously been able to change this hierarchical division between the traditional ballet and the contemporary dance by presenting the female dominance in the act of dance.

The sequence was choreographed around a powerful depiction of the possession of the Gara Yakâ over a young woman, whose vulnerability and the powerful resurrection from the possession was performed by two young dancers. The female dancer, a ballerina, was in a leotard and a tight while wearing a pair of pointe shoes (toe shoes). Pointe shoes help the dancers to swirl on one spot (fouettés), on the pointed toes of one leg, which is the indication of the ballet dancer’s ability to perform en pointe (The Kennedy Centre 2020).

The stunning imagery was created throughout this sequence by the female and the male dancers intertwining their flexible bodies upon each other, throwing their bodies vertically and horizontally while maintaining balance and imbalance together. The ballerina’s right leg is bent and her toes are directed towards the floor while performing the en pointe with her ankle. Throughout the sequence she holds the Gara Yakâ mask while performing with the partner.

The male dancer behind the ballerina maintains a posture while depicting low country hand gestures combining and blurring the boundaries between Sri Lankan dance and the Western ballet (see figure 3). In this sequence, the male dancer maintains the balance of the body while lifting the female dancer’s body in the air signifying some classical elements of ballet.

Haptic sense

Figure 3: Narmada Nekathani performs with the Gara Yaka mask while indicating her right leg as en pointe. Male dancer, Jeewaka Randeepa’s hand gestures signify the low country pose. Riddhi-Ma, Dance Theatre at Elphinstone Theatre, 28th March 2025. Source: Malshan Witharana.

One significant element of this contemporary ballet production is the costume design. The selection of colour palette, containing black, red and while combining with other corresponding colours and also the costumes which break the traditional rules and norms are compelling. I have discussed in a recent publication how clothes connect with the performer’s body and operate as an embodied haptic perception to connect with the spectators (Liyanage, 2025). In this production, the costumes operate in two different ways: First it signifies sculpted bodies creating an embodied, empathic experience.

Secondly, designs of costumes work as a mode of three dimensional haptic sense. Kapila gives his dancers fully covered clothing, while they generate classical ballet and Sinhalese ritual dance movements. The covered bodies create another dimension to clothing over bodies. In doing so, Kapila attempts to create sculpted bodies on stage by blurring the boundaries of gender oriented clothing and its usage in Sri Lankan dance.

Sri Lankan female body on stage, particularly in dance has been presented as an object of male desire. I have elsewhere cited that the lâsya or the feminine gestures of the dance repertoire has been the marker of the quality of dance against the tândava tradition (Liyanage, 2025). The theatregoers visit the theatre to appreciate the lâsya bodies of female dancers and if the dancer meets this threshold, then she becomes the versatile dancer. Kandyan dancers such as Vajira and Chithrasena’s dance works are explored and analysed with this lâsya and tândava criteria. Vajira for instance becomes the icon of the lâsya in the Kandyan tradition. It is not my intention here to further discuss the discourse of lâsya and tândava here.

But Kapila’s contemporary ballet overcomes this duality of male-female aesthetic categorization of lâsya and tândava which has been a historical categorization of dance bodies in Sri Lanka (Sanjeewa 2021).

Figure 4: Riddhi-Ma’s costumes creates sculpted bodies combining the performer and the audience through empathic projection. Dancers, Sithija Sithimina and Senuri Nimsara appear in Riddhi-Ma, at Elphinstone Theatre, 28th March 2025, Source, Malshan Witharana.

Conclusion

Dance imagination in the Sri Lankan creative industry exploits the female body as an object. The colonial mind set of the dance body as a histrionic, gendered, exotic and aesthetic object is still embedded in the majority of dance productions produced in the current cultural industry. Moreover, dance is still understood as a ‘language’ similar to music where the narratives are shared in symbolic movements. Yet, Kapila has shown us that dance exists beyond language or lingual structures where it creates humans to experience alternative existence and expression. In this sense, dance is intrinsically a mode of ‘being’, a kinaesthetic connection where its phenomenality operates beyond the rationality of our daily life.

At this juncture, Kapila and his dance ensemble have marked a significant milestone by eradicating the archetypical and stereotypes in Sri Lankan dance. Kapila’s intervention with Riddi Ma is way ahead of our contemporary reality of Sri Lankan dance which will undoubtedly lead to a new era of dance theatre in Sri Lanka.

References

De Munck, V. C. (1990). Choosing metaphor. A case study of Sri Lankan exorcism. Anthropos, 317-328. Fargnoli, A., & Seneviratne, D. (2021). Exploring Rata Yakuma: Weaving dance/movement therapy and a

Sri Lankan healing ritual. Creative Arts in Education and Therapy (CAET), 230-244.

Liyanage, S. 2025. “Arts and Culture in the Post-War Sri Lanka: Body as Protest in Post-Political Aragalaya (Porattam).” In Reflections on the Continuing Crises of Post-War Sri Lanka, edited by Gamini Keerawella and Amal Jayawardane, 245–78. Colombo: Institute for International Studies (IIS) Sri Lanka.

Lutts, A. (2019). Storytelling in Contemporary Ballet.

Samarasinghe, S. G. (1977). A Methodology for the Collection of the Sinhala Ritual. Asian Folklore Studies, 105-130.

Sanjeewa, W. (2021). Historical Perspective of Gender Typed Participation in the Performing Arts in Sri Lanka During the Pre-Colonial, The Colonial Era, and the Post-Colonial Eras. International Journal of Social Science And Human Research, 4(5), 989-997.

The Kennedy Centre. 2020. “Pointe Shoes Dancing on the Tips of the Toes.” Kennedy-Center.org. 2020 https://www.kennedy-center.org/education/resources-for-educators/classroom-resources/media- and-interactives/media/dance/pointe-shoes/..

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank Himansi Dehigama for proofreading this article.

About the author:

Saumya Liyanage (PhD) is a film and theatre actor and professor in drama and theatre, currently working at the Department of Theatre Ballet and Modern Dance, Faculty of Dance and Drama, University of the Visual and Performing Arts (UVPA), Colombo. He is the former Dean of the Faculty of Graduate Studies and is currently holding the director position of the Social Reconciliation Centre, UVPA Colombo.

Chinese Naval Entry and End of Post-War Unipolarity

The ascendancy of China as an emerging superpower is one of the most striking shifts in the global distribution of economic and political power in the 21st century. With its strategic rise, China has assumed a more proactive diplomatic and economic role in the Indian Ocean, signalling its emergence as a global superpower. This new leadership role is exemplified by initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The Economist noted that “China’s decision to fund a new multilateral bank rather than give more to existing ones reflects its exasperation with the glacial pace of global economic governance reform” (The Economist, 11 November 2014). Thus far, China’s ascent to global superpower status has been largely peaceful.

In 2025, in terms of Navy fleet strength, China became the world’s largest Navy, with a fleet of 754 ships, thanks to its ambitious naval modernisation programme. In May 2024, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) further strengthened its capabilities by commissioning the Fujian, its latest aircraft carrier. Equipped with an advanced electromagnetic catapult system, the Fujian can launch larger and heavier aircraft, marking a significant upgrade over its predecessors.

Driven by export-led growth, China sought to reinvest its trade surplus, redefining the Indian Ocean region not just as a market but as a key hub for infrastructure investment. Notably, over 80 percent of China’s oil imports from the Persian Gulf transit to the Straits of Malacca before reaching its industrial centres. These factors underscore the Indian Ocean’s critical role in China’s economic and naval strategic trajectories.

China’s port construction projects along the Indian Ocean littoral, often associated with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), exemplify its deepening geopolitical and economic engagement in the region. These initiatives encompass multipurpose berth development, deep-sea port construction, and supporting infrastructure projects aimed at enhancing maritime connectivity and trade. Key projects include the development of Gwadar Port in Pakistan, a strategic asset for China’s access to the Arabian Sea; Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka, which became a focal point of debt diplomacy concerns; the Payra deep-sea port in Bangladesh; as well as port and road infrastructure development in Myanmar’s Yunnan and Kyaukphyu regions and Cambodia’s Koh Kong.

While these projects were promoted as avenues for economic growth and regional connectivity, they also triggered geopolitical tensions and domestic opposition in several host countries. Concerns over excessive debt burdens, lack of transparency, and potential dual-use (civilian and military) implications of port facilities led to scrutiny from both local and external stakeholders, including India and Western powers. As a result, some projects faced significant pushback, delays, and, in certain cases, suspension or cancellation. This opposition underscores the complex interplay between economic cooperation, strategic interests, and sovereignty concerns in China’s Indian Ocean engagements.

China’s expanding economic, diplomatic, and naval footprint in the Indian Ocean has fundamentally altered the region’s strategic landscape, signalling the end of early post-Cold War unipolarity. Through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) initiatives, China has entrenched itself economically, financing. Diplomatically, Beijing has deepened its engagement with littoral states through bilateral agreements, security partnerships, and regional forums, challenging traditional Western and Indian influence.

China’s expanding naval deployments in the Indian Ocean, including its military base in Djibouti, and growing security cooperation with regional states, mark the end of unchallenged US dominance in the region. The Indian Ocean is now a contested space, where China’s presence compels strategic recalibrations by India, the United States, and other regional actors. The evolving security landscape in the Indian Ocean—marked by intensifying competition, shifting alliances, and the rise of a multipolar order—has significant implications for Sri Lanka’s geopolitical future.

India views China’s growing economic, political, and strategic presence in the Indian Ocean region as a key strategic challenge. In response, India has pursued a range of strategic, political, and economic measures to counterbalance Chinese influence, particularly in countries like Sri Lanka through infrastructure investment, defense partnerships, and diplomatic engagements.

Other Extra-Regional powers

Japan and Australia have emerged as significant players in the post-Cold War strategic landscape of the Indian Ocean. During the early phases of the Cold War, Australia played a crucial role in Western ‘Collective Security Alliances’ (ANZUS and (SEATO). However, its direct engagement in Indian Ocean security remained limited, primarily supporting the British Royal Navy under Commonwealth obligations. Japan, meanwhile, refrained from deploying naval forces in the region after World War II, adhering to its pacifist constitution and post-war security policies. In recent decades, shifting strategic conditions have prompted both Japan and Australia to reassess their roles in the Indian Ocean, leading to greater defence cooperation and a more proactive regional presence.

In the post-Cold War era, Australia has progressively expanded its naval engagements in the Indian Ocean, driven by concerns over maritime security, protection of trade routes, and China’s growing influence. Through initiatives, such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and deeper defence partnerships with India and the United States, Australia has bolstered its strategic presence in the Indian Ocean region.

Recalibration of Japan’s approach

Japan, too, has recalibrated its approach to Indian Ocean security in response to geopolitical shifts. Recognising the Indian Ocean’s critical importance for its energy security and trade, Japan has strengthened its naval presence through port visits, joint exercises, and maritime security cooperation. The Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force (JMSDF) has taken on a more active role in anti-piracy operations, freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS), and strategic partnerships with Indian Ocean littoral states. This shift aligns with Japan’s broader strategy of contributing to regional stability while balancing its constitutional constraints on military force projection.

Japan’s proactive role in the Indian Ocean region is evident in its diplomatic and defence engagements. In January 2019, Japan sent its Foreign Minister, Taro Kono, and Chief of Staff, Joint Staff, Katsutoshi Kawano, to the Raisina Dialogue, a high-profile geopolitical conference in India. Japan’s National Security Strategy, released in December 2022, identifies China’s growing assertiveness as its greatest strategic challenge and underscores the need to deepen bilateral ties and multilateral defence cooperation in the Indian Ocean. It also emphasises the importance of securing stable access to sea-lanes, through which more than 80 percent of Japan’s oil imports pass. In recent years, Japan has expanded its port investment portfolio across the Indian Ocean, with major projects in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. In 2021, Japan participated for the first time in CARAT-Sri Lanka (Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training), a bilateral naval exercise. Japan’s Maritime Self-Defence Force returned for the exercise in January 2023, held at Trincomalee Port and Mullikulam Base.

Japan’s strategic interests in the Indian Ocean have been most evident in its involvement in port infrastructure development projects. Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Myanmar are key countries where early Chinese-led port construction faced setbacks. Unlike India, which carries historical and political complexities in its relations with these countries, Japan is better positioned to compete with China. In December 2021, a Japanese company established a ship repair and rebuilding facility in Trincomalee, complementing the already well-established Tokyo Cement factory. When the Sri Lanka Ports Authority announced plans in mid-2022 to develop Trincomalee as an industrial port—inviting expressions of interest from investors to utilise port facilities and up to 2,400 hectares of surrounding land—Trincomalee regained strategic attention.

The Colombo Dockyard, in collaboration with Japan’s Onomichi Dockyard, has established a rapid response afloat service in Trincomalee, marking a significant development in Japan’s engagement with Sri Lanka’s maritime infrastructure. This initiative aligns with Japan’s broader strategic interests in the Bay of Bengal, a region of critical economic and security importance. A key Japanese concern appears to be limiting China’s ability to establish a permanent presence in Trincomalee. This initiative underscores the broader strategic competition in the Indian Ocean. Trincomalee, with its deep-water harbour, has long been regarded as a critical maritime asset. Japan’s involvement reflects its efforts to deepen economic and strategic engagement with Sri Lanka amid growing regional competition. The challenge before Sri Lanka is how to navigate this strategic contest while maximising its national interests.

Other Regional Powers

In analyzing the evolving naval security architecture of the post-Cold War Indian Ocean, particular attention should be given to the naval developments of regional powers such as Pakistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia. In 2012, Pakistan established the Naval Strategic Force Command (NSFC) to strengthen Pakistan’s policy of Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD). The creation of the NSFC suggests a shift toward sea-based deterrence, complementing Pakistan’s broader military strategy. In December 2012, Pakistan conducted a series of cruise missile tests from naval platforms in the Arabian Sea. Given India’s expanding maritime capabilities, which Pakistan views as a significant threat, the Pakistan Navy may consider deploying tactical nuclear weapons on surface ships as part of its evolving deterrence strategy. Sri Lanka’s foreign policy cannot overlook this development.

Indonesia also emerged as a significant player in the evolving naval security landscape of the Indian Ocean. In 2010, it launched a military modernisation programme aimed at achieving a ‘Minimum Essential Force’ (MEF) by 2024. As part of this initiative, Indonesia sought to build a modern Navy with 247 surface vessels and 12 submarines. One of the primary challenges faced by the Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL) is piracy. To enhance maritime security, Indonesia and Singapore signed the SURPIC Cooperation Arrangement in Bantam in May 2005, enabling real-time sea surveillance in the Singapore Strait for more effective naval patrols. In 2017, Indonesia introduced the Indonesian Ocean Policy (IOP) and subsequently incorporated blue economy strategies into its national development agenda, reinforcing its maritime vision. According to projections from the Global Firepower Index, published in 2025, the Indonesian Navy is ranked fourth in global ranking and second in Asia in terms of Navy fleet strength (Global Firepower, 2025).

In October 2012, the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) announced plans to build a second Scorpène simulator training facility at its base in Kota Kinabalu, in addition to submarine base in Sepanggar, Sabah, constructed in 2002. To enhance its naval capabilities, the RMN planned to procure 18 Littoral Mission Ships (LMS) for maritime surveillance and six Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) between 2019 and 2023. Malaysia and China finalised their first major defence deal during Prime Minister Najib Razak’s visit to Beijing in November 2016. During this visit, Malaysia’s Defence Ministry signed a contract to procure LMS from China, as reported by The Guardian. Despite this agreement, Malaysia continues to maintain amicable relations with both China and India, as does Indonesia.

The increasing presence of major naval powers, the rise of regional stakeholders, and the growing significance of trade routes and maritime security have transformed the Indian Ocean into a central pivot of both regional and global politics, with Sri Lanka positioned at its heart. (To be Continued)

by Gamini Keerawella