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Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy amid Geopolitical Transformations:

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Mahinda

1990-2024 – Part VI

(Continued from 11 April, 2025)

Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy after the War

The domestic political context of Sri Lankan foreign policy underwent a significant shift following the end of the war in 2009. The Mahinda Rajapaksa regime that steered the war to a victorious end fanned war triumphalism in the country and used it craftily for regime stability. In contrast, a deeply melancholic atmosphere of frustration, helplessness, and defeat permeated the North. In response to the new challenges stemming from the way the war ended, Sri Lanka’s foreign policy was forced to redefine its priorities. The Sinhala nationalist clientele of the regime gave currency to anti-western rhetoric in the country in response to these challenges.

Since the end of the war, Sri Lanka’s strategic position has evolved significantly. One of the key foreign policy challenges that emerged in the wake of the conclusion of war was how to address the growing international criticism over alleged violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) during the final stages of the conflict, which gained traction in global diplomatic forums. Western powers, particularly the United States, Canada, Britain, and the European Union, pressured Sri Lanka to investigate alleged war crimes committed by both parties during the final phase of war. This led to a noticeable deterioration in Sri Lanka’s relations with these countries. How to respond to the US-backed resolutions at the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) regarding alleged IHL violations, and also to potential future resolutions against Sri Lanka at the UN Security Council, became the central concern of Sri Lanka’s post-war foreign policy. Driven by this obsession, Sri Lanka is increasingly aligning itself with powers that can provide protection against such actions and shield itself from diplomatic and economic pressures from the West.

In President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s vision of economic development, known as the ‘Five Hubs’ concept, the Indian Ocean played a central role. Each of the five hubs—Maritime, Aviation, Commercial, Energy, and Knowledge—had a direct foreign policy dimension. However, there was no concrete plan or program of action to materialize these policy goals. Instead, Sri Lanka’s foreign policy under Rajapaksa in the post-war period was largely preoccupied with residual issues stemming from the end of the war.

In the immediate post-war period, international pressure on Sri Lanka centered on three key issues: investigating the events of the war’s final stages amid widespread allegations of war crimes by both sides; ensuring transitional justice by identifying those responsible for violations of international humanitarian law and civilian deaths; and determining the whereabouts of missing persons, many of whom were believed to have perished in the conflict.

The international community, particularly India, urged the Sri Lankan government to implement a viable political reconstruction programme for war-affected communities in the North and East, ensuring their integration into regional and central decision-making. This call emphasiz\sed the effective devolution of power under the 13th Amendment

International stakeholders expressed their willingness to support economic rebuilding in the North and East. They emphasised the urgent need for a coordinated economic recovery programme and advocated for a comprehensive reconstruction plan to restore critical services. Additionally, they stressed the importance of community involvement, ensuring that those most affected by the conflict actively participated in shaping and implementing the recovery efforts.

The issue of transitional justice and accountability emerged soon after UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon visited the country at the invitation of President Mahinda Rajapaksa on May 23, 2009, five days after the Sri Lankan government officially declared the war over. In the joint statement issued following the visit Sri Lanka reiterated its strong commitment to promoting and protecting human rights in accordance with international standards and emphasised the importance of an accountability process to address violations of international humanitarian and human rights law. The Secretary-General expressed hope that the Sri Lankan government would take measures to address these grievances.

After Ban Ki-moon’s visit, international pressure mounted for the establishment of a transitional justice mechanism. The Sinhala nationalist clientele of the government was of the view that Sri Lanka is a sovereign and independent country and no one has a right to interfere in its domestic affairs of the country.  Initially, the UNHRC was tolerant toward Sri Lanka and willing to allow time and space for the country to develop its own mechanism to address transitional justice issues. This is evident in the resolution adopted at the eleventh Special Session of the UN Human Rights Council on May 27, 2009 (A/HRC/S11/L.1/Rev), which commended the Sri Lankan government’s efforts to address the urgent needs of internally displaced persons and welcomed its continued commitment to promoting and protecting human rights (Amal Jayawardane, 2025, p. 144).  In response to the growing international concerns over the issue of accountability and transitional justice, President Mahinda Rajapaksa appointed the Commission of Inquiry on Lessons Learned and Reconciliation, as a domestic initiative, on May 15th, 2010.

To the dismay of the Sri Lankan government, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointed a three-member Panel of Experts on June 23, 2010. The panel, chaired by MarzukiDarusman and consisting of YasminSooka and Steven Rattner, was tasked with advising the Secretary-General on issues of accountability regarding alleged violations of international human rights and humanitarian law during the final stages of the Sri Lankan civil war. The Sri Lankan government strongly rejected this move, calling it both unnecessary and unwarranted.

Initially, the LLRC seemed like a hasty response to Western pressures and received a lukewarm reception. However, the LLRC took its mandate seriously and presented its final report on November 15, 2011. The report offered significant observations and recommendations concerning the origins of the conflict, restitution, and other efforts toward national reconciliation. It emphasized that “the root cause of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka lies in the failure of successive governments to address the genuine grievances of the Tamil people” and stressed that “a political solution is imperative to address the causes of the conflict” (The LLRC Report, 2021).

Regarding the issue of accountability, the LLRC noted that “eyewitness accounts and other available materials indicate that significant civilian casualties occurred during the final phase of the conflict.” It recommended that “action be taken to investigate the specific instances mentioned in the observation. If investigations reveal any offenses, appropriate legal action should be taken to prosecute or punish those responsible.”

In March 2012, the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) adopted Resolution A/HRC/19/L.20, titled Promoting Reconciliation and Accountability in Sri Lanka, urging the Sri Lankan government to adopt the LLRC’s constructive recommendations and take “all necessary additional steps to fulfill its legal obligations.” However, dismissive stance of the Sri Lankan government toward international IR bodies was clearly illustrated by the manner in which UN Human Rights Commissioner Navi Pillay’ visit to Sri Lanka in August 2013 was handled.  Later that year, during its 22nd session, the UNHRC adopted another resolution calling on the Office of the High Commissioner to enhance its monitoring and reporting on Sri Lanka’s human rights situation, as well as the progress on reconciliation and accountability. This resolution required the Office to provide an oral update at the Council’s 48th session, a written update at its 49th session, and a comprehensive report at its 51st session, including further options for advancing accountability.

In response to growing international pressure, the Sri Lankan government appointed the Maxwell Paranagama Commission (Presidential Commission to Investigate Complaints of Missing Persons – PCICMP) in August 2013. The commission was tasked with investigating the disappearances of civilians in northern and eastern Sri Lanka between 1983 and 2009. However, the establishment of both the Paranagama and Udulagama commissions did little to quell international concerns. The failure of the Mahinda Rajapaksa government to address the issue of accountability became apparent in the March 2014 UNHRC resolution, which called on the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to investigate the allegations in order to prevent impunity and ensure accountability.

India appeared less focused on advocating for transitional justice and accountability in international forums and, instead, prioritized the political empowerment of minorities, particularly in the North and East of Sri Lanka. Alongside this, India emphasized efforts toward economic reconstruction and national reconciliation, aiming to foster stability and long-term peace.

Full implementation of the 13th Amendment became an international concern in the post-war context. In the last stage of the war, the Sri Lankan government has repeatedly assured the international community that “Sri Lanka will take measures for the effective implementation of the 13th Amendment to the Constitution” (Human Rights Council, 2008).  Sri Lanka continued to assure the international community of its intention to offer a devolution package built on the 13th amendment to the constitution after 2009. India raised this issue in several bi-lateral diplomatic encounters. Most important is assurances given to India in this regard by Sri Lanka.

While the post-war Mahinda Rajapaksa regime faced tensions with Western powers and India, it leaned toward China, reshaping Sri Lanka’s geostrategic position in the early post-war years. Sri Lanka has maintained cordial relations with China since the early 1950s while balancing its ties with other major powers, namely India and the United States. However, after 2009, its foreign policy took a different turn, leaning more toward China at the expense of the traditional balance it had carefully maintained. This shift has had significant implications, particularly in the context of evolving regional and global geopolitical dynamics.

(To be continued)

by Gamini Keerawella



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Opinion

Dengue: Who will guard the state?

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I am writing to draw public attention to a serious  health hazard regarding a property located at elvitigala mawatha, belonging to the national housing development authority (NHDA)

As seen in the attached photographs, the site is filled with waste that traps water and provides shelter for mosquitoes. Despite repeated complaints, no action has been taken to clean the premises.

This is extremely concerning given the current dengue situation. As of July 18, the National Dengue Control Unit reported over 73,500 dengue cases and 50 deaths nationwide this year, with Colombo being one of the worst affected districts. Residents, including children and the elderly living nearby, are now at direct risk.

PHIs have previously noted that legal action against government premises for dengue breeding is often blocked. If this continues, we are essentially allowing a government property to endanger public health.

I therefore urge the Colombo Municipal Council, the Ministry of Health, and the National Dengue Operations Centre to intervene immediately, clean this property, and hold the authorities concerned accountable before it leads to more dengue cases in our community.

Concerned Citizen

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Opinion

Lucille Amarasuriya

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Lucille Amarasuriya

(Written by the late Lakshmi Nimalasuriya in July 1986 and published to mark Lucille’s 40th death anniversary)

She was a special friend. We first met when she was president and I was honorary secretary of a voluntary organization. We worked together in great harmony. She was a person of outstanding merit and enmeshed in dreams and goals which she pursued with unflagging zeal.

Her wealth and position made no impact of exclusiveness, nor the advantages she had as a politician’s wife make her dominating.

She was intelligent, receptive and warm hearted and an indispensable member of the All-Ceylon Buddhist Women’s Association and the All-Ceylon Buddhist Congress. She had the ability to respond to any situation and act with confidence – the criterion of leadership.

She was invited to serve on national councils sponsored by the government and was successful in redistributing the allocation of grants which had continued to be unequal and favoured. She was an active member of the Inner Wheel Club adept at fund-raising and was in great demand. She worked long hours in preparation and enlisted all she knew to make the Flag Days successful. She wooed the wives of diplomats for charity performances and the press for publicity. By her tireless efforts she enriched the ever-depleting coffers of these voluntary organizations.

The spiritual growth of young people was a subject close to her heart. She initiated the Youth Forum of the ACBC. She was indeed a happy mother at the time of her death as all her children had grown up to become good citizens.

She was a gifted and versatile person who could sing, write, draw, paint, design, sew and make lovely handicrafts with effortless ease. So, be it an important occasion like her children’s weddings, or mundane functions, fetes, annual general meetings, or at a simple pinkama in the temple or nunnery, or on a sacred day, her lovely creations which she spent hours in making in silent enjoyment would add that splash of gaiety and festivity which delighted us. She told me she learnt this love of decoration from her father who was an eminent Buddhist worker. Underlying all her work was her dedication to the Buddha Sasana.

The death of her teenage daughter early in life, and the death of her husband, who pre-deceased her by a few years, left her inconsolable and she with great difficulty reconciled herself to their loss.

She relives again in memory – Here she comes, a winsome smile on her lovely face, of graceful stature, her wavy hair drawn back, her favourite throatlet around her neck; with friendly charm, her hand out-stretched to help and bound to a generous heart, so she rightly claimed her name of endearment – she was to all Lucilla akka, sister Lucille.

May she soon attain her goal – the end of suffering – Nibbana.

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Opinion

Ukraine’s power struggle spills on to the streets

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Zelensky

A leadership crisis that exposes the strategic fault lines of Ukraine’s war effort—and the competing imperatives of domestic command, Western pressure, and battlefield reality.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s abrupt dismissal of Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov and his broader cabinet reshuffle have exposed a deep fracture within Ukraine’s wartime power structure. This extends far beyond personalities and into the strategic orientation of the state itself. What is unfolding is not merely a bureaucratic dispute but a crisis of command in a country prosecuting a high intensity, NATO-supported war against Russia.

On 16 July, protests broke out in Kyiv demanding the removal of Commander in Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi and the reinstatement of Fedorov. Smaller demonstrations occurred in Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Lutsk, Dnipro, and other cities. These protests, which have continued for a week, signal a rupture within the prowar bloc that has sustained the Zelensky administration since 2022.

Antiwar sentiment did not drive the demonstrations, in which the “usual suspects” of US-backed “Colour Revolutions” took part. In this case, veterans, territorial defence networks, and upper middleclass “civil society” actors, who remain committed to the war’s continuation. Their demand for Fedorov’s reinstatement reflects a belief that Zelensky has lost operational coherence and strategic clarity. Placards bearing Fedorov’s name were, in effect, endorsements of escalating long range warfare against Russia, despite the catastrophic human toll already borne by both sides.

The political shock waves have reverberated through Ukraine’s Western patrons. The Mayor of Kyiv, Vitaly Klitschko, a major player in the 2014 “Maidan Coup” who is aligned with German strategic interests, condemned the firing publicly as a “big mistake,” while major Western media outlets described the move as “destabilising.” Behind the scenes, officials in Washington and Brussels viewed the sudden change with alarm. Such reactions reveal the degree to which Fedorov had become embedded in Western military technical planning, particularly in the domain of drone warfare, where Ukraine’s operations increasingly intersect with NATO intelligence and logistical support.

This conflict has emerged precisely as Ukraine intensifies drone strikes deep inside Russian territory and escalates operations against Crimea. Fedorov, appointed only six months ago, became the face of this strategy, celebrated by Western media as a “drone warfare mastermind” and criticised domestically for sidelining artillery procurement. His approach aligned closely with NATO’s interest in testing and refining asymmetric strike capabilities against Russia.

Zelensky’s subsequent hints that he may reconsider the decision underscore the precariousness of his position. His authority now rests on a fragile balance between Western expectations, domestic military factions, and a society exhausted by mobilisation. His consultations with both Syrskyi and Fedorov suggest an attempt to reassert control over a command structure that is no longer unified.

Fedorov’s postdismissal revelations sharpen the picture. His claim that Syrskyi and Chief of the General Staff Andrii Hnatov blocked reform initiatives systematically, and that Syrskyi enabled corruption, points to a structural clash between two models of warfare. The Western media has analysed the row as one in which Fedorov represents a Westernaligned, technologydriven paradigm emphasising drones, automation, and longrange strikes. It portrays Syrskyi as embodying an entrenched Sovietera command culture, reliant on artillery, mass mobilisation, and hierarchical control. Zelensky’s decision to side with Syrskyi is presented as a political calculation, preserving the loyalty of the traditional military establishment at the expense of the “reformist” faction.

However, Fedorov’s political alliances complicate this narrative. His cultivation of farright networks, including neo Nazi blogger Serhii Sternenko, reveals the darker undercurrents of Ukraine’s wartime coalition. Sternenko’s role in the 2014 Odessa massacre underscores how extremist actors continue to intersect with state structures, especially in moments of institutional fragmentation.

In actual fact, the power struggle reflects a contradiction between two elite strategies for managing subordination. Ukraine is a subaltern national state embedded in a wider hierarchy of imperialist power. Fedorov is tied to global centi-billionaires and Western technology platforms. His camp can look “more Western” because it is more integrated into transnational circuits of capital and war-tech. The apparent modernity of that model still carries dependency: it improves efficiency while deepening reliance on external monopolies. The war state becomes dependent on foreign-owned infrastructure, satellite systems, software, and elite relationships, which gives external capital leverage over military coordination and political priorities.

Syrskyi, by contrast, is closer to an older form of domestic elite power: the military-bureaucratic order linked to native oligarchic interests, procurement channels, and patronage. This is a more nationally rooted fraction of the bourgeois bloc, but not necessarily a more independent one, because Ukrainian oligarchic power has long been intertwined with Western finance, arms flows, and state restructuring.

The struggle between Syrskyi and Fedorov therefore reflects competing modes of dependency, and (although clearly the Western establishment favours the latter) not a clean split between “national” and “Western” camps. One route passes through transnational tech capital and managerial reform; the other through entrenched oligarchic-military command and domestic networks of influence. The clash is therefore not an isolated dispute but a symptom of an intra-elite struggle over how Ukraine should be governed as a dependent war economy. Neither side points beyond bourgeois rule; they are different management styles of the same subordinated state form.

Taken together, the crisis reflects a deeper geopolitical reality: Ukraine’s war effort is no longer anchored by a unified elite consensus. Instead, it is being pulled apart by competing military doctrines, Western strategic pressures, corruption scandals, and the exhaustion of a society asked to sustain indefinite mobilisation.

Vinod Moonesinghe, formerly chair of the Ceylon German Technical Training Institute and of the National Institute for Language Education and Training, serves as Convenor of the Asia Progress Forum.

By Vinod Moonesinghe ✍️

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