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Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy amid Geopolitical Transformations:

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Mahinda

1990-2024 – Part VI

(Continued from 11 April, 2025)

Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy after the War

The domestic political context of Sri Lankan foreign policy underwent a significant shift following the end of the war in 2009. The Mahinda Rajapaksa regime that steered the war to a victorious end fanned war triumphalism in the country and used it craftily for regime stability. In contrast, a deeply melancholic atmosphere of frustration, helplessness, and defeat permeated the North. In response to the new challenges stemming from the way the war ended, Sri Lanka’s foreign policy was forced to redefine its priorities. The Sinhala nationalist clientele of the regime gave currency to anti-western rhetoric in the country in response to these challenges.

Since the end of the war, Sri Lanka’s strategic position has evolved significantly. One of the key foreign policy challenges that emerged in the wake of the conclusion of war was how to address the growing international criticism over alleged violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) during the final stages of the conflict, which gained traction in global diplomatic forums. Western powers, particularly the United States, Canada, Britain, and the European Union, pressured Sri Lanka to investigate alleged war crimes committed by both parties during the final phase of war. This led to a noticeable deterioration in Sri Lanka’s relations with these countries. How to respond to the US-backed resolutions at the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) regarding alleged IHL violations, and also to potential future resolutions against Sri Lanka at the UN Security Council, became the central concern of Sri Lanka’s post-war foreign policy. Driven by this obsession, Sri Lanka is increasingly aligning itself with powers that can provide protection against such actions and shield itself from diplomatic and economic pressures from the West.

In President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s vision of economic development, known as the ‘Five Hubs’ concept, the Indian Ocean played a central role. Each of the five hubs—Maritime, Aviation, Commercial, Energy, and Knowledge—had a direct foreign policy dimension. However, there was no concrete plan or program of action to materialize these policy goals. Instead, Sri Lanka’s foreign policy under Rajapaksa in the post-war period was largely preoccupied with residual issues stemming from the end of the war.

In the immediate post-war period, international pressure on Sri Lanka centered on three key issues: investigating the events of the war’s final stages amid widespread allegations of war crimes by both sides; ensuring transitional justice by identifying those responsible for violations of international humanitarian law and civilian deaths; and determining the whereabouts of missing persons, many of whom were believed to have perished in the conflict.

The international community, particularly India, urged the Sri Lankan government to implement a viable political reconstruction programme for war-affected communities in the North and East, ensuring their integration into regional and central decision-making. This call emphasiz\sed the effective devolution of power under the 13th Amendment

International stakeholders expressed their willingness to support economic rebuilding in the North and East. They emphasised the urgent need for a coordinated economic recovery programme and advocated for a comprehensive reconstruction plan to restore critical services. Additionally, they stressed the importance of community involvement, ensuring that those most affected by the conflict actively participated in shaping and implementing the recovery efforts.

The issue of transitional justice and accountability emerged soon after UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon visited the country at the invitation of President Mahinda Rajapaksa on May 23, 2009, five days after the Sri Lankan government officially declared the war over. In the joint statement issued following the visit Sri Lanka reiterated its strong commitment to promoting and protecting human rights in accordance with international standards and emphasised the importance of an accountability process to address violations of international humanitarian and human rights law. The Secretary-General expressed hope that the Sri Lankan government would take measures to address these grievances.

After Ban Ki-moon’s visit, international pressure mounted for the establishment of a transitional justice mechanism. The Sinhala nationalist clientele of the government was of the view that Sri Lanka is a sovereign and independent country and no one has a right to interfere in its domestic affairs of the country.  Initially, the UNHRC was tolerant toward Sri Lanka and willing to allow time and space for the country to develop its own mechanism to address transitional justice issues. This is evident in the resolution adopted at the eleventh Special Session of the UN Human Rights Council on May 27, 2009 (A/HRC/S11/L.1/Rev), which commended the Sri Lankan government’s efforts to address the urgent needs of internally displaced persons and welcomed its continued commitment to promoting and protecting human rights (Amal Jayawardane, 2025, p. 144).  In response to the growing international concerns over the issue of accountability and transitional justice, President Mahinda Rajapaksa appointed the Commission of Inquiry on Lessons Learned and Reconciliation, as a domestic initiative, on May 15th, 2010.

To the dismay of the Sri Lankan government, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointed a three-member Panel of Experts on June 23, 2010. The panel, chaired by MarzukiDarusman and consisting of YasminSooka and Steven Rattner, was tasked with advising the Secretary-General on issues of accountability regarding alleged violations of international human rights and humanitarian law during the final stages of the Sri Lankan civil war. The Sri Lankan government strongly rejected this move, calling it both unnecessary and unwarranted.

Initially, the LLRC seemed like a hasty response to Western pressures and received a lukewarm reception. However, the LLRC took its mandate seriously and presented its final report on November 15, 2011. The report offered significant observations and recommendations concerning the origins of the conflict, restitution, and other efforts toward national reconciliation. It emphasized that “the root cause of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka lies in the failure of successive governments to address the genuine grievances of the Tamil people” and stressed that “a political solution is imperative to address the causes of the conflict” (The LLRC Report, 2021).

Regarding the issue of accountability, the LLRC noted that “eyewitness accounts and other available materials indicate that significant civilian casualties occurred during the final phase of the conflict.” It recommended that “action be taken to investigate the specific instances mentioned in the observation. If investigations reveal any offenses, appropriate legal action should be taken to prosecute or punish those responsible.”

In March 2012, the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) adopted Resolution A/HRC/19/L.20, titled Promoting Reconciliation and Accountability in Sri Lanka, urging the Sri Lankan government to adopt the LLRC’s constructive recommendations and take “all necessary additional steps to fulfill its legal obligations.” However, dismissive stance of the Sri Lankan government toward international IR bodies was clearly illustrated by the manner in which UN Human Rights Commissioner Navi Pillay’ visit to Sri Lanka in August 2013 was handled.  Later that year, during its 22nd session, the UNHRC adopted another resolution calling on the Office of the High Commissioner to enhance its monitoring and reporting on Sri Lanka’s human rights situation, as well as the progress on reconciliation and accountability. This resolution required the Office to provide an oral update at the Council’s 48th session, a written update at its 49th session, and a comprehensive report at its 51st session, including further options for advancing accountability.

In response to growing international pressure, the Sri Lankan government appointed the Maxwell Paranagama Commission (Presidential Commission to Investigate Complaints of Missing Persons – PCICMP) in August 2013. The commission was tasked with investigating the disappearances of civilians in northern and eastern Sri Lanka between 1983 and 2009. However, the establishment of both the Paranagama and Udulagama commissions did little to quell international concerns. The failure of the Mahinda Rajapaksa government to address the issue of accountability became apparent in the March 2014 UNHRC resolution, which called on the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to investigate the allegations in order to prevent impunity and ensure accountability.

India appeared less focused on advocating for transitional justice and accountability in international forums and, instead, prioritized the political empowerment of minorities, particularly in the North and East of Sri Lanka. Alongside this, India emphasized efforts toward economic reconstruction and national reconciliation, aiming to foster stability and long-term peace.

Full implementation of the 13th Amendment became an international concern in the post-war context. In the last stage of the war, the Sri Lankan government has repeatedly assured the international community that “Sri Lanka will take measures for the effective implementation of the 13th Amendment to the Constitution” (Human Rights Council, 2008).  Sri Lanka continued to assure the international community of its intention to offer a devolution package built on the 13th amendment to the constitution after 2009. India raised this issue in several bi-lateral diplomatic encounters. Most important is assurances given to India in this regard by Sri Lanka.

While the post-war Mahinda Rajapaksa regime faced tensions with Western powers and India, it leaned toward China, reshaping Sri Lanka’s geostrategic position in the early post-war years. Sri Lanka has maintained cordial relations with China since the early 1950s while balancing its ties with other major powers, namely India and the United States. However, after 2009, its foreign policy took a different turn, leaning more toward China at the expense of the traditional balance it had carefully maintained. This shift has had significant implications, particularly in the context of evolving regional and global geopolitical dynamics.

(To be continued)

by Gamini Keerawella



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Opinion

Tribute to a distinguished BOI leader

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Mr. Tuli Cooray, former Deputy Director General of the Board of Investment of Sri Lanka (BOI) and former Secretary General of the Joint Apparel Association Forum (JAAF), passed away three months ago, leaving a distinguished legacy of public service and dedication to national economic development.

An alumnus of the University of Colombo, Mr. Cooray graduated with a Special Degree in Economics. He began his career as a Planning Officer at the Ministry of Plan Implementation and later served as an Assistant Director in the Ministry of Finance (Planning Division).

He subsequently joined the Greater Colombo Economic Commission (GCEC), where he rose from Manager to Senior Manager and later Director. During this period, he also served at the Treasury as an Assistant Director. With the transformation of the GCEC into the BOI, he was appointed Executive Director of the Investment Department and later elevated to the position of Deputy Director General.

In recognition of his vast experience and expertise, he was appointed Director General of the Budget Implementation and Policy Coordination Division at the Ministry of Finance and Planning. Following his retirement from government service, he continued to contribute to the national economy through his work with JAAF.

Mr. Cooray was widely respected as a seasoned professional with exceptional expertise in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) and facilitating investor relations. His commitment, leadership, and humane qualities earned him the admiration and affection of colleagues across institutions.

He was also one of the pioneers of the BOI Past Officers’ Association, and his passing is deeply felt by its members. His demise has created a void that is difficult to fill, particularly within the BOI, where his contributions remain invaluable.

Mr. Cooray will be remembered not only for his professional excellence but also for his integrity, humility, and the lasting impact he made on those who had the privilege of working with him.

The BOI Past Officers’ Association

jagathcds@gmail.com

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When elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers

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As a small and open country, Singapore will always be vulnerable to what happens around us. As Lee Kuan Yew used to say: “when elephants fight, the grass suffers, but when elephants make love, the grass also suffers“. Therefore, we must be aware of what is happening around us, and prepare ourselves for changes and surprises.” – Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, during the debate on the President’s Address in Singapore Parliament on 16 May, 2018, commenting on the uncertain external environment during the first Trump Administration.

“When elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers”

is a well-known African proverb commonly used in geopolitics to describe smaller nations caught in the crossfire of conflicts between major powers. At the 1981 Commonwealth conference, when Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere quoted this Swahili proverb, the Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew famously retorted, “When elephants make love, the grass suffers, too”. In other words, not only when big powers (such as the US, Russia, EU, China or India) clash, the surrounding “grass” (smaller nations) get “trampled” or suffer collateral damage but even when big powers collaborate or enter into friendly agreements, small nations can still be disadvantaged through unintended consequences of those deals. Since then, Singaporean leaders have often quoted this proverb to highlight the broader reality for smaller states, during great power rivalry and from their alliances. They did this to underline the need to prepare Singapore for challenges stemming from the uncertain external environment and to maintain high resilience against global crises.

Like Singapore, as a small and open country, Sri Lanka too is always vulnerable to what happens around us. Hence, we must be alert to what is happening around us, and be ready not only to face challenges but to explore opportunities.

When Elephants Fight

To begin with, President Trump’s “Operation Epic Fury”.

Did we prepare adequately for changes and surprises that could arise from the deteriorating situation in the Gulf region? For example, the impact the conflict has on the safety and welfare of Sri Lankans living in West Asia or on our petroleum and LNG imports. The situation in the Gulf remains fluid with potential for further escalation, with the possibility of a long-term conflict.

The region, which is the GCC, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Syria and Azerbaijan (I believe exports to Azerbaijan are through Iran), accounts for slightly over $1 billion of our exports. The region is one of the most important markets for tea (US$546 million out of US$1,408 million in 2024. According to some estimates, this could even be higher). As we export mostly low-grown teas to these countries, the impact of the conflict on low-grown tea producers, who are mainly smallholders, would be extremely strong. Then there are other sectors like fruits and vegetables where the impact would be immediate, unless of course exporters manage to divert these perishable products to other markets. If the conflict continues for a few more weeks or months, managing these challenges will be a difficult task for the nation, not simply for the government. It is also necessary to remember the Russia – Ukraine war, now on to its fifth year, and its impact on Sri Lanka’s economy.

Mother of all bad timing

What is more unfortunate is that the Gulf conflict is occurring on top of an already intensifying global trade war. One observer called it the “mother of all bad timing”. The combination is deadly.

Early last year, when President Trump announced his intention to weaponise tariffs and use them as bargaining tools for his geopolitical goals, most observers anticipated that he would mainly use tariffs to limit imports from the countries with which the United States had large trade deficits: China, Mexico, Vietnam, the European Union, Japan and Canada. The main elephants, who export to the United States. But when reciprocal tariffs were declared on 2nd April, some of the highest reciprocal tariffs were on Saint Pierre and Miquelon (50%), a French territory off Canada with a population of 6000 people, and Lesotho (50%), one of the poorest countries in Southern Africa. Sri Lanka was hit with a 44% reciprocal tariff. In dollar terms, Sri Lanka’s goods trade deficit with the United States was very small (US$ 2.9 billion in 2025) when compared to those of China (US$ 295 billion in 2024) or Vietnam (US$ 123 billion in 2024).

Though the adverse impact of US additional ad valorem duty has substantially reduced due to the recent US Supreme Court decision on reciprocal tariffs, the turbulence in the US market would continue for the foreseeable future. The United States of America is the largest market for Sri Lanka and accounts for nearly 25% of our exports. Yet, Sri Lanka’s exports to the United States had remained almost stagnant (around the US $ 3 billion range) during the last ten years, due to the dilution of the competitive advantage of some of our main export products in that market. The continued instability in our largest market, where Sri Lanka is not very competitive, doesn’t bode well for Sri Lanka’s economy.

When Elephants Make Love

In rapidly shifting geopolitical environments, countries use proactive anticipatory diplomacy to minimise the adverse implications from possible disruptions and conflicts. Recently concluded Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations between India and the EU (January 2026) and India and the UK (May 2025) are very good examples for such proactive diplomacy. These negotiations were formally launched in June 2007 and were on the back burner for many years. These were expedited as strategic responses to growing U.S. protectionism. Implementation of these agreements would commence during this year.

When negotiations for a free trade agreement between India and the European Union (which included the United Kingdom) were formally launched, anticipating far-reaching consequences of such an agreement on other developing countries, the Commonwealth Secretariat requested the University of Sussex to undertake a study on a possible implication of such an agreement on other low-income developing countries. The authors of that study had considered the impact of an EU–India Free Trade Agreement on the trade of excluded countries and had underlined, “The SAARC countries are, by a long way, the most vulnerable to negative impacts from the FTA. Their exports are more similar to India’s…. Bangladesh is most exposed in the EU market, followed by Pakistan and Sri Lanka.”

So, now these agreements are finalised; what will be the implications of these FTAs between India and the UK and the EU on Sri Lanka? According to available information, the FTA will be a game-changer for the Indian apparel exporters, as it would provide a nearly ten per cent tariff advantage to them. That would level the playing field for India, vis-à-vis their regional competitors. As a result, apparel exports from India to the UK and the EU are projected to increase significantly by 2030. As the sizes of the EU’s and the UK’s apparel markets are not going to expand proportionately, these growths need to come from the market shares of other main exporters like Sri Lanka.

So, “also, when elephants make love, the grass suffers.”

Impact on Sri Lanka

As a small, export dependent country with limited product and market diversification, Sri Lanka will always be vulnerable to what happens in our main markets. Therefore, we must be aware of what is happening in those markets, and prepare ourselves to face the challenges proactively. Today, amid intense geopolitical conflicts, tensions and tariff shifts, countries adopt high agility and strategic planning. If we look at what our neighbours have been doing in London, Brussels and Tokyo, we can learn some lessons on how to navigate through these turbulences.

(The writer is a retired public servant and can be reached at senadhiragomi@gmail.com)

by Gomi Senadhira

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Opinion

QR-based fuel quota

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The introduction of the QR code–based fuel quota system can be seen as a timely and necessary measure, implemented as part of broader austerity efforts to manage limited fuel resources. In the face of ongoing global fuel instability and economic challenges, such a system is aimed at ensuring equitable distribution and preventing excessive consumption. While it is undeniable that this policy may disrupt the daily routines of certain segments of the population, it is important for citizens to recognize the larger national interest at stake and cooperate with these temporary measures until stability returns to the global fuel market.

At the same time, this initiative presents an important opportunity for the Government to address long-standing gaps in regulatory enforcement. In particular, the implementation of the QR code system could have been strategically linked to the issuance of valid revenue licenses for vehicles. Restricting QR code access only to vehicles that are properly registered and have paid their revenue dues would have helped strengthen compliance and improve state revenue collection.

Available data from the relevant authorities indicate that a significant number of vehicles—especially three-wheelers and motorcycles—continue to operate without valid revenue licences. This represents a substantial loss of income to the State and highlights a weakness in enforcement mechanisms. By integrating the fuel quota system with revenue license verification, the government could have effectively encouraged vehicle owners to regularise their documentation while simultaneously improving fiscal discipline.

In summary, while the QR code fuel system is a commendable step toward managing scarce resources, aligning it with existing regulatory requirements would have amplified its benefits. Such an approach would not only support fuel conservation but also enhance government revenue and promote greater accountability among vehicle owners.

Sariputhra
Colombo 05

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