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Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy amid Geopolitical Transformations:

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Mahinda

1990-2024 – Part VI

(Continued from 11 April, 2025)

Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy after the War

The domestic political context of Sri Lankan foreign policy underwent a significant shift following the end of the war in 2009. The Mahinda Rajapaksa regime that steered the war to a victorious end fanned war triumphalism in the country and used it craftily for regime stability. In contrast, a deeply melancholic atmosphere of frustration, helplessness, and defeat permeated the North. In response to the new challenges stemming from the way the war ended, Sri Lanka’s foreign policy was forced to redefine its priorities. The Sinhala nationalist clientele of the regime gave currency to anti-western rhetoric in the country in response to these challenges.

Since the end of the war, Sri Lanka’s strategic position has evolved significantly. One of the key foreign policy challenges that emerged in the wake of the conclusion of war was how to address the growing international criticism over alleged violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) during the final stages of the conflict, which gained traction in global diplomatic forums. Western powers, particularly the United States, Canada, Britain, and the European Union, pressured Sri Lanka to investigate alleged war crimes committed by both parties during the final phase of war. This led to a noticeable deterioration in Sri Lanka’s relations with these countries. How to respond to the US-backed resolutions at the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) regarding alleged IHL violations, and also to potential future resolutions against Sri Lanka at the UN Security Council, became the central concern of Sri Lanka’s post-war foreign policy. Driven by this obsession, Sri Lanka is increasingly aligning itself with powers that can provide protection against such actions and shield itself from diplomatic and economic pressures from the West.

In President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s vision of economic development, known as the ‘Five Hubs’ concept, the Indian Ocean played a central role. Each of the five hubs—Maritime, Aviation, Commercial, Energy, and Knowledge—had a direct foreign policy dimension. However, there was no concrete plan or program of action to materialize these policy goals. Instead, Sri Lanka’s foreign policy under Rajapaksa in the post-war period was largely preoccupied with residual issues stemming from the end of the war.

In the immediate post-war period, international pressure on Sri Lanka centered on three key issues: investigating the events of the war’s final stages amid widespread allegations of war crimes by both sides; ensuring transitional justice by identifying those responsible for violations of international humanitarian law and civilian deaths; and determining the whereabouts of missing persons, many of whom were believed to have perished in the conflict.

The international community, particularly India, urged the Sri Lankan government to implement a viable political reconstruction programme for war-affected communities in the North and East, ensuring their integration into regional and central decision-making. This call emphasiz\sed the effective devolution of power under the 13th Amendment

International stakeholders expressed their willingness to support economic rebuilding in the North and East. They emphasised the urgent need for a coordinated economic recovery programme and advocated for a comprehensive reconstruction plan to restore critical services. Additionally, they stressed the importance of community involvement, ensuring that those most affected by the conflict actively participated in shaping and implementing the recovery efforts.

The issue of transitional justice and accountability emerged soon after UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon visited the country at the invitation of President Mahinda Rajapaksa on May 23, 2009, five days after the Sri Lankan government officially declared the war over. In the joint statement issued following the visit Sri Lanka reiterated its strong commitment to promoting and protecting human rights in accordance with international standards and emphasised the importance of an accountability process to address violations of international humanitarian and human rights law. The Secretary-General expressed hope that the Sri Lankan government would take measures to address these grievances.

After Ban Ki-moon’s visit, international pressure mounted for the establishment of a transitional justice mechanism. The Sinhala nationalist clientele of the government was of the view that Sri Lanka is a sovereign and independent country and no one has a right to interfere in its domestic affairs of the country.  Initially, the UNHRC was tolerant toward Sri Lanka and willing to allow time and space for the country to develop its own mechanism to address transitional justice issues. This is evident in the resolution adopted at the eleventh Special Session of the UN Human Rights Council on May 27, 2009 (A/HRC/S11/L.1/Rev), which commended the Sri Lankan government’s efforts to address the urgent needs of internally displaced persons and welcomed its continued commitment to promoting and protecting human rights (Amal Jayawardane, 2025, p. 144).  In response to the growing international concerns over the issue of accountability and transitional justice, President Mahinda Rajapaksa appointed the Commission of Inquiry on Lessons Learned and Reconciliation, as a domestic initiative, on May 15th, 2010.

To the dismay of the Sri Lankan government, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointed a three-member Panel of Experts on June 23, 2010. The panel, chaired by MarzukiDarusman and consisting of YasminSooka and Steven Rattner, was tasked with advising the Secretary-General on issues of accountability regarding alleged violations of international human rights and humanitarian law during the final stages of the Sri Lankan civil war. The Sri Lankan government strongly rejected this move, calling it both unnecessary and unwarranted.

Initially, the LLRC seemed like a hasty response to Western pressures and received a lukewarm reception. However, the LLRC took its mandate seriously and presented its final report on November 15, 2011. The report offered significant observations and recommendations concerning the origins of the conflict, restitution, and other efforts toward national reconciliation. It emphasized that “the root cause of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka lies in the failure of successive governments to address the genuine grievances of the Tamil people” and stressed that “a political solution is imperative to address the causes of the conflict” (The LLRC Report, 2021).

Regarding the issue of accountability, the LLRC noted that “eyewitness accounts and other available materials indicate that significant civilian casualties occurred during the final phase of the conflict.” It recommended that “action be taken to investigate the specific instances mentioned in the observation. If investigations reveal any offenses, appropriate legal action should be taken to prosecute or punish those responsible.”

In March 2012, the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) adopted Resolution A/HRC/19/L.20, titled Promoting Reconciliation and Accountability in Sri Lanka, urging the Sri Lankan government to adopt the LLRC’s constructive recommendations and take “all necessary additional steps to fulfill its legal obligations.” However, dismissive stance of the Sri Lankan government toward international IR bodies was clearly illustrated by the manner in which UN Human Rights Commissioner Navi Pillay’ visit to Sri Lanka in August 2013 was handled.  Later that year, during its 22nd session, the UNHRC adopted another resolution calling on the Office of the High Commissioner to enhance its monitoring and reporting on Sri Lanka’s human rights situation, as well as the progress on reconciliation and accountability. This resolution required the Office to provide an oral update at the Council’s 48th session, a written update at its 49th session, and a comprehensive report at its 51st session, including further options for advancing accountability.

In response to growing international pressure, the Sri Lankan government appointed the Maxwell Paranagama Commission (Presidential Commission to Investigate Complaints of Missing Persons – PCICMP) in August 2013. The commission was tasked with investigating the disappearances of civilians in northern and eastern Sri Lanka between 1983 and 2009. However, the establishment of both the Paranagama and Udulagama commissions did little to quell international concerns. The failure of the Mahinda Rajapaksa government to address the issue of accountability became apparent in the March 2014 UNHRC resolution, which called on the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to investigate the allegations in order to prevent impunity and ensure accountability.

India appeared less focused on advocating for transitional justice and accountability in international forums and, instead, prioritized the political empowerment of minorities, particularly in the North and East of Sri Lanka. Alongside this, India emphasized efforts toward economic reconstruction and national reconciliation, aiming to foster stability and long-term peace.

Full implementation of the 13th Amendment became an international concern in the post-war context. In the last stage of the war, the Sri Lankan government has repeatedly assured the international community that “Sri Lanka will take measures for the effective implementation of the 13th Amendment to the Constitution” (Human Rights Council, 2008).  Sri Lanka continued to assure the international community of its intention to offer a devolution package built on the 13th amendment to the constitution after 2009. India raised this issue in several bi-lateral diplomatic encounters. Most important is assurances given to India in this regard by Sri Lanka.

While the post-war Mahinda Rajapaksa regime faced tensions with Western powers and India, it leaned toward China, reshaping Sri Lanka’s geostrategic position in the early post-war years. Sri Lanka has maintained cordial relations with China since the early 1950s while balancing its ties with other major powers, namely India and the United States. However, after 2009, its foreign policy took a different turn, leaning more toward China at the expense of the traditional balance it had carefully maintained. This shift has had significant implications, particularly in the context of evolving regional and global geopolitical dynamics.

(To be continued)

by Gamini Keerawella



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Opinion

Growth at 4.2%: The real test facing Sri Lanka’s economy

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by Prof Ranjith Bandara,
PhD (Qld)
Emeritus Professor of Economics, University of Colombo

The Department of Census and Statistics (CS Department) reports that Sri Lanka’s real GDP grew by 4.2 per cent in the second quarter of 2026, compared with 5.1 per cent in the first quarter. Although the economy continued to grow, the reported rate was lower in the second quarter. The figures have prompted differing views about what this means for the country’s economic and political future.
In this article, I share my views on the Department’s figures and the comments they have prompted. I consider whether slower economic growth can lead to an economic crisis or political instability. Drawing on Sri Lanka’s latest economic indicators and examples from other countries, I examine how economic difficulties can affect public confidence and, in turn, political stability.
Economic analyst Dhananath Fernando has warned that political leaders may seek to consolidate control over the judiciary, state institutions and other centres of political power. But if they fail to ensure economic growth and improve people’s lives, they may eventually lose power. This is an important warning. Yet the relationship between economic growth, people’s wellbeing and political power is not automatic. These factors influence one another in complex ways.

What the growth figures tell us

According to the CS Department, Sri Lanka’s real GDP grew by 4.2 per cent in the second quarter of 2026 compared with the same period in 2025. In the first quarter, growth was 5.1 per cent compared with the same quarter a year earlier. The reported rate was therefore 0.9 percentage points lower in the second quarter. This indicates that the pace of year-on-year growth eased and deserves attention. It does not mean that the economy contracted or is collapsing. Since both figures compare a quarter with the same quarter of the previous year, they cannot, on their own, show whether the economy shrank from one quarter to the next.

The IMF’s forecast also needs to be considered. In May 2026, the IMF said Sri Lanka’s economy had grown by 5 per cent in 2025 and projected growth of 3 per cent for 2026. It identified higher oil prices, conflict in the Middle East and lower tourism receipts as risks to growth and the country’s external finances. The IMF also projected public debt at about 100.1 per cent of GDP in 2026.
The IMF’s 3 per cent figure and the Department’s 4.2 per cent figure measure different things. The IMF figure is a forecast for the whole of 2026; the Department’s figure measures the change in economic output in the second quarter compared with the same quarter a year earlier. The IMF forecast was also issued before the second-quarter results were published. The two figures should not be treated as directly comparable, or as if one disproves the other. Read together, however, they point to a central challenge: keeping growth on track while protecting the economy from external shocks.

Growth also varied across sectors. In the second quarter, industrial activity expanded by 7.3 per cent, while services grew by 2.7 per cent. Agricultural activity, by contrast, contracted by 2.3 per cent. Growth in construction and mining supported industry, while information technology, financial services and telecommunications contributed to growth in services. However, the Department reported slower growth in some services, including tourism-related activities, than in the same period a year earlier.

The decline in agriculture deserves particular attention. According to the Department’s figures, value added in rice cultivation fell by 15.1 per cent, while freshwater fishing and aquaculture fell by 61 per cent. Agriculture’s importance cannot be judged only by its share of GDP. A decline in agricultural activity can affect food supplies, farmers’ incomes, rural employment, food prices and the need for imports. It is therefore more than a figure in the national accounts: it can affect rural household incomes and the cost of food for consumers.

The key question is not only whether GDP is growing. We must also ask whether that growth creates secure, good-quality jobs; raises household incomes after allowing for price increases; and gives small businesses the confidence to invest and expand. If the cost of living remains high, or if the gains from growth reach only a small part of society, people may not feel the improvement shown in the official figures. Public confidence depends not only on the growth rate, but also on whether people experience the benefits of growth in their daily lives.

Lessons from other countries

Sri Lanka’s 2022 crisis is the clearest example of how severe economic hardship can affect political stability. It was not simply a period of slower growth. Foreign exchange shortages, the suspension of debt payments, shortages of fuel and other essential goods, and rising living costs reinforced one another. The World Bank reported that jobs were lost, while food insecurity and poverty increased during the crisis. Shortages and the hardships of daily life contributed to mass protests, and the President resigned. The crisis showed how economic distress can shake political power. But it was a far deeper breakdown than a modest decline in the growth rate: the country faced a debt crisis and a collapse in its ability to pay for imports.

Argentina’s crisis in 2001 offers another example. As the country’s financial and debt problems worsened, public protests grew. The President resigned, the government defaulted on its debt, and the exchange-rate system was abandoned. Argentina’s experience shows how an economic crisis can become a crisis of public confidence when people’s incomes, savings and jobs are all under pressure.
Greece offers a different lesson. A prolonged recession, high unemployment and painful economic adjustment weakened public support for established political parties, while new political forces gained ground. This shows that the way people experience economic policies—and whether they believe the costs are being shared fairly—can shape their political response. Difficult reforms may be necessary, but carrying them out without public trust and support for those most affected can deepen political instability.

Zimbabwe, however, shows that economic decline does not always remove a government from power. The country experienced prolonged periods of high inflation, currency instability and falling production. Yet restrictions on opposition activity and the concentration of state power helped the ruling party remain in office. Economic failure can increase the risk that a government will lose power, but it does not guarantee that outcome. Electoral rules, independent institutions, media freedom, the strength of the opposition and people’s ability to organise also matter.

Debt, growth and public confidence

Slower growth can increase debt risks, but debt sustainability depends on more than the growth rate. Interest costs, government revenue, the budget balance, the maturity of debt, and whether it is owed locally or abroad all matter. The IMF’s 2026 estimate puts public debt at about 100.1 per cent of GDP. Reducing that burden will require growth, stronger public revenue and careful spending to work together.

Sri Lanka therefore needs more than a higher growth rate. It needs a stronger economic base that can sustain growth over time. This means expanding exports and competitive production, creating a stable environment for private investment, improving agricultural productivity, providing young people with good jobs, and protecting those most affected by economic reforms. If growth is not broad enough to benefit many people, it may appear in the statistics without restoring public confidence.
The claim that political leaders will inevitably lose power if the economy fails to grow should be treated as a serious warning, not an unbreakable rule. Long periods of economic weakness can increase public dissatisfaction, strengthen political opposition and raise the risk of a crisis of government. Whether this leads to a change in power also depends on the country’s political and institutional conditions.

In the end, leaders must answer a simple question: do people feel the recovery in their incomes, jobs and daily lives, or do they see it only in the statistics? If the answer is no, it will become harder for any government to retain public confidence—and harder to remain in power.

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Monument to H.C.P. Bell and Bell Party: Unsung Labour Force of Early Archaeological Surveys – II

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Bronze Figurines Discovered at Siva Devale, Polonnaruwa (C.H.P. Bell. 1907)

by Lokubanda Tillakaratne

Nature of Bell Party work

Villagers and the headmen mostly provided information about these potential digging sites. Since the start of the archaeological projects, the Bell Party was probably the first to see our ancient monuments there, by the mileposts of history, frozen before disappearing, holding their last breath beneath the earth, for reasons known and unknown.

Sinhala Bell Party members often passed up digging out a Buddha statue for superstitious reasons and fear of yakkas believed to haunt (guard?) Buddhist ruins, statues, and ancient artifacts. But Bell found Tamil workers showed no such traits.

Often, a village muladeni, usually the arachchirala, joined a traveling Bell Party and came to the vadiya to help with excavations. Once, Korala of Kahatagasdigiliya came to the Bell’s vadiya at Konwewa to help. Muladeniya usually provided accouterments and food for the Bell Party at excavation sites within his weikkiya, jurisdiction.

Although they were no Archaeologists, Bell’s guidance led the Party men to push forward with sheer determination to rebuild and restore these ancient structures on stone stylobates, piece by piece, connecting them to the present.

Bell wrote that the Party’s work involved exploring “backwoods in the wildest and most inaccessible nooks and corners of Ceylon.” After thinning trees and brush, and general weeding and digging, they looked for evidence of statues, sculptured stone pillars, engravings, relief carvings, and inscriptions on rocks covering areas as big as Melville’s whale, paintings, ceramic material, coins, gems, seals, jewels, arms, tools, ornaments, lamps, and any item of antiquarian interest. The Party also helped Bell with archaeological conservation and epigraphical work.

Seeing a buried Buddha statue, restoring it to its former luster, and probably hearing its hummingbird heartbeat must have been like seeing the Buddha alive. How satisfying for the Party to see remnants of stone pillars they raised back to life as grand temples, in a lovely and telling shape?

But when sarong- and amuda-clad men dug up a serene Buddha statue or an ornamental moonstone, sandakadapahana, with relief figures of animals parading from horizon to horizon, Disney illustrators or Old Masters at the Louvre would have envied the chance to see such superb artistry.

The bulk of the work was done while Bell and other contractors stood around and directed. During rainy days, soggy earth made the Bell Party’s work difficult. They dug ditches to drain water from the swampy site and reach the submerged ruins. At Sigiriya, when they restored the pond, they first used a yotta, a long scoop hung on a crossbar, to remove water.

Drowned in a furry forest, unfrequented and alone, often weeks away from the civilisation, Bell, his assistants, and the Bell Party enjoyed untainted freedom. Bell once chimed to a friend about his independence. He wrote, “After all it is good to be Head Man, even in Hell!”

In a letter Bell wrote to the Colonial Secretary in the annexure to the Third Progress Report in 1890, he stressed the Bell Party’s struggles to excavate Buddhist Railings near Abhayagiriya. To begin excavations, the Party had to remove about 50 large weera trees, which took 10 days. The excavation then reached 10 ft wide and 3-4 ft deep to expose the base and recover scattered railing plinths, posts, and coping.

Raising the 7 ft. tall, sedentary Buddha statue at Pankuliya required 50 Bell Party members and 6 Europeans in 1892. Another Buddha statue, which Bell described as having “soft expression, symmetry and repose of the body,” … and “finest brought to light” at Toluwila between Anuradhapura Railway Station and the Nuwara Wewa bund, was 7.6 ft tall and 7 ft across, weighing like a large CAT excavator at a construction site.

Bell Party did all the lifting of this statue using wood beams the size of street lamp-posts and deer-skin ropes, waramadhu, and pulleys. It now adorns the entrance to the Colombo Museum. We must thank the Bell Party for this stunning representation of Sri Lankan history, literally at the doorstep of its repository.

When Bell had to read an inscription on a rock face 20ft above ground, the Party members climbed up the rock and built a hanging platform. One writer saw them crawling like cats on a sloping rock. At Ritigala, the Bell Party managed to get a rope across a deep crevice between two rocks for Bell to cross the chasm.

Some statues escaped Bell’s eye. I know one instance when villagers and the area arachchirala did not notify the authorities about archaeological items in their neighborhood. An example is the little-known 4 ft tall seated Buddha at Rame (රරාමේ) near Kahapathwilagama, my father’s village, described in Echoes of the Millstone (Lokubanda Tillakaratne, 2013). After a villager leading a herd of buffaloes stumbled upon it, the elders decided to keep it a secret for fear that Bell Mahattaya would take it as a museum piece. Meanwhile Toluwila villagers lost their Buddha statue which connected them to their long and proud history.

Travelling

Watada Ge, Polonnaruwa (1907) before restoration (H.C.P. Bell)

The mode of transport of the Bell Party was unlike that of some storied migrants who crossed the North American continent in covered wagons in the 19th century. In their treks through scrub and thorn jungle, the Party had no street signs to follow. Mostly, the sun, moon, stars, and large and aging trees that witnessed the ruins in their better days fueled the men with a collective instinct to keep moving. While walking through the trackless forest, they often got lost. Then a Party member climbed a tree to retrace their route. Some days they walked 20 miles to reach a site.

Bell Party walked while Bell Mahattaya usually rode on a horse or a bullock cart on hastily cleared paths just enough for the yoke to proceed. When convenient, bullock carts owned by the Archaeological Department or loaned by a arachchirala transported supplies and equipment on these trips. On some days, an advance party of men carried supplies ahead on pack animals, while others followed a day later. Usually, a muladeni in the area was always there to help with logistics.

The Party carried tools, camping equipment like tarpaulin, cameras, pickaxes, mamoties, cooking supplies and utensils, and drinking water. In some instances, they were lucky to get water from a Pin-thaliya, a roadside pot of drinking water on a waist-high pedestal conveniently set up by villagers for travellers. These drinking pots also appeared on major roadways, reflecting the caring and sharing character of Sri Lankan people. In Remembered Yesterdays (1927), Maha Mudaliyar Solomon Dias Bandaranayake writes about the Pin-thaliya he set up on Kandy Road in front of his Horagolla residence in 1887 to commemorate the Queen Victoria Jubilee celebrations.

On long treks, when night fell, Bell slept on his tarpaulin shed, a gaman vadiya, erected by the Party on site or at a nearby village. Others in the Party just slept under the stars watching celestial streaming shows – shooting stars spilling out into the night sky. Often the dreary cry of Ula Lena, the mysterious nocturnal animal believed to be a lizard or a bird, woke them up sweating. There were times when Bell slept on an altar slab unearthed during the day.

Mosquitoes and other night critters serenaded the tired group. Walking through the rank forest involved encounters with caterpillars and other poison-skinned creatures swinging from silvery strands. One or two party members stood guard against quadruped thieves – bears, boars, and porcupines who would follow the smell of dry food men carried from a mile away. When they had to cross a swollen creek, they often felled a tree across the water to pass through. Finally, emerging from the dense woods, they reached an open villu, where a deafening hush stretched across its entire span. With a drying slough, which probably was an ancient river bed in the middle of the villu, it mimicked a half-ripen papaya half.

For comparison, let me describe how His Excellency the Governor Henry Ward went on circuits. In 1856, a little over three decades before the creation of the Bell Party, he took an extensive circuit covering nearly every big town from Polonnaruwa to Jaffna. His party consisted of 120 coolies, five elephants, 13 horses, and five tents. He stopped at Mihintale to telegraph Colombo to get his watch recalibrated.

Decades later, Bell out in Komarkiwala, in a large swath of uninhabited forest between Kahatagasdigiliya and Huruluwewa, had no such convenience keeping his chronograph in shape. He probably used his own sundial – his midday shadow – to adjust his watch as most did at the time.

Bell Party, accompanying their boss without the luxury of the governor, carried basic accouterments enough for weeks in the jungle to conduct excavations. It was quite a sight – Bell on a horse leading the Party along a tank bund overgrown with brush or crossing its bed as it too seemed to have been emaciated years ago.

A native leader led the way in the forest. The sight of bare-bodied men walking in a line through close-set jungle or along a footpath as shadows moved between dimmed forest patches on either side is easier to imagine than describe. Often they used buffalo tracks, or pushed forward in trackless wilderness, hanging twigs as markers to guide them back. They waded across swollen creeks and rivulets to these sites, passing areas of forest separating villages by leagues. These men are used to such walks. They have seen it all while on honey-collecting excursions in their spare time in miles of forest.

Writing in the The Island newspaper in 1987, A.T.G.A. Wickramasuriya revealed the hardship his father, P. Don Ambrose, based in Anuradhapura, endured in the early decades of the 20th century carrying the salaries of the Bell Party workers in Polonnaruwa, 100 km southeast. With a trunk full of money, Ambrose takes the morning train from Anuradhapura and transfers to the Kandy-Matale train at Polgahawela. From Matale he rode a Trincomalee-bound horse-drawn Mail Coach to Habarana. It is already midnight. From there, he hops on a bullock cart and arrives at Polonnaruwa at dawn, covering a cool 306 km, 24 hours after he started.

Sights and Scenes

Bell camped out in a village (Bethia N, and Heather M Bell)

In every outing, the eyes of the Bell Party feasted on sights others see only decades later or never. They were the first to feel the touch of heavenly ladies marooned on a cave wall in Sigiriya, the most dangerous and demanding site the Bell Party worked. In contrast to this perilous adventure, Bell once wrote how Kaludiya Pokuna, a large black-water pool by the Mihintale hill, came into view before their eyes taking up a “delightful glen, as it suddenly bursts on the charmed gaze, entrancing in its quiet picturesqueness. A perfect sanctuary could not be found anywhere throughout the length and breadth of Ceylon. … Fringed by umbrageous trees, which dip their boughs in its placid depths, as hills offered inviting shade.” Bell then tweaked the 13th-century Indo-Persian poet Amir Kushrau: “Oh! If there be an Elysium on earth, it is this, it is this.”

But nothing matches an incident the Bell Party saw at Sigiriya in 1906, involving the Governor – the king’s representative and his Royal entourage. While the Governor and the Royal Duchess, sister-in-law of His Majesty, climbed down to the base of the Sigiriya rock ahead of others, the Bell Party was still on the top working on the ruins. Suddenly, the Governor’s daughter and the Bell Party workers saw over the precipice a bald man chasing and beating the princess with his hat. They were confused and alarmed.

Only later would they learn that the Governor was trying to protect the princess from an angry swarm of giant bees (bambaru) that descended and circled over her head. Probably, the workers at Sigiriya did a bad job of sedating the beehive with vedi dodan – a ball of leaves with various aromatic characteristics set on fire to burn slowly, generating smoke to sedate the bees.

A Monument for the Bell Party

A short essay like this does not do justice to memorialize the workers of the Bell Party. Far out where evidence of ancient settlements and structures existed, the work of this Party is a fond memory. In my village, it is not just a sobriquet, probably public knowledge of a valued tradition conferred from kings’ times.

Their story did not cross the pen of history and literary apostles in 19th- and 20th-century Sri Lanka because the Bell Party consisted of a bunch of coolies from distant villages. But they were the luckiest to find and raise the ancient monuments Sri Lankan kings fought wars to build and protect. Sadly, there isn’t even a lifeless fresco or a sign depicting their work beside the granite paneling near an ancient temple they reconstructed. The peaceful Toluwila Buddha sits at a museum entrance in Colombo over a hundred kilometers away from home, waiting to hear the names of the men and women of the Bell Party who helped it back to sit in its meditative state.

Although the collective pulsation of these men and women as they raised stone pillars and serene sages has become a welcoming breeze in the old city of Anuradhapura, kings standing arrayed in coronation ornaments, granite paneling reconnecting royal guard houses, and inscriptions on stone surfaces whispering elegancies of our past all thank the Bell Party for making all that a reality.

They worked with mechanics that would raise eyebrows among the Romans. Even with his passion, curiosity, and persistence, Bell would not have completed half of his pioneering work without Bell Party help.

We hardly find kings etching their names on these ancient structures they supervised building. In those days, they must have thought, rightly so, that it was a weird practice to engrave on a structure the name of the king, who I bet never got down to a mud pit to make a single brick. That’s probably why we don’t see King Kasyapa’s name anywhere near Sigiriya today.

The Bell Party stood by this ancient practice and did not scratch something as small as an initial on a brick they placed in mortar to reify an ancient wall. Until the Bell Party came around, history looked on as these great works fell into decay and those who built them remained nameless.

And yet.

The times have changed. The faddish trend now is to etch the names of the prominent few on a stone slab by a people- funded structure, rather than the actual workers who mixed concrete and set stones in place. Let it be known that none of this prominent few dropped something as a fistful of sand into the cement bucket to build it or offered a can of cold soda to a worker whenever they happened to pass by the site.

Therefore, to celebrate the group of exceptional Nuwarakalaviya villagers in the Bell Party, known on record as coolies, earth men, earth party, basket men, and warriors, and their headman, the incomparable H.C.P. Bell himself, I now request that the Archaeological Commissioner erect a 2 ft x 2 ft monument with appropriate wording celebrating their gracious contribution. It is the right thing to do, and not a bridge too far to cross.

Walk of Fame of Archaeological Survey

I cannot think of a better spot for this monument to go up than on what I call Sri Lanka’s Walk of Fame of Archaeological Survey – the cobblestone path connecting the Sri Maha Bodhi and the Ruwanweli Seya in the old city of Anuradhapura. Then present and future generations will know that a spirited group of labourers called the Bell Party worked to bring back the brilliance of our lost past. (Concluded).

The writer is the author of Pulse of the Jungle (Dayawansa Jayakody, 2000) and Ratashabhawa of Nuwarakalviya, grew up among several Bell Party members in Nuwarakalaviya.

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Opinion

Prof. G. H. Peiris: Eulogy for an intellectual par excellence

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Prof. G. H. Peiris PhD, Emeritus Professor, University of Peradeniya, passed away on the 20th September 2026. His mortal remains were donated to the Anatomy Department, Faculty of Medicine, University of Peradeniya, according to his wishes. He was born on 30th January, 1938, in Junagaha, close to Negombo, and entered the University of Ceylon, at the age of 17 years. After obtaining a first class honours degree in Geography, the first to do so in the history of the University, he joined the staff of the Geography Department, Peradeniya University, and soon proceeded to Cambridge University to read for his doctorate.

Prof. Peiris excelled in academic work in teaching and research while serving the University for 43 long years. His research delved deeply into land reforms, economic and social change, irrigated agriculture, university education and ethnic conflict. He held visiting professorial appointments in Australia, Canada, the United States and Norway, and has undertaken sponsored study tours in the Philippines and the United States. His consultancy assignments include those conducted for the ILO, WHO and UNICEF. He has collaborated with scholars from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Syria, the Netherlands and the United States in major research projects.

Based on his research, he debunked the homeland theory concocted by separatists.

Prof Peiris was appointed to the committee to draft a new constitution by the Gotabaya Rajapaksa government in 2020. He did not agree with the views of several members of the committee on the matter of federalism as a solution to the ethnic conflict. He held that the best solution would be devolution at the district level and consequently he submitted a dissenting report to the final draft constitution. In his extensive academic work and policy stances, such as his thesis Federalism and the ‘Federal Option’ for Sri Lanka, he argued that shifting from a unitary to a federal structure would not resolve ethnic tensions. Instead, he characterised federalism in the Sri Lankan context as an “absurdity,” given the island’s small geographic size.

He firmly contested the concept of a combined Northern and Eastern Province acting as a federal unit. He vocally opposed the “Traditional Tamil Homeland” hypothesis, arguing that merging these provinces, along ethnic lines, created severe risks to the country’s territorial integrity and ethnic harmony. Peiris maintained that supreme political power must be confined to the government.

After retirement, in 2003, Prof. Peiris authored and edited several major books focusing on socio-economic development, land policy, and ethnic conflict and these include; Sri Lanka: Challenges of the New Millennium (2006), Twilight of the Tigers: Peace Efforts and Power Struggles in Sri Lanka (2009), Political Conflict in South Asia (2013), Sri Lanka: Land Policy for Sustainable Development – To Strengthen the Struggle for Survival (2016/2017).

His book, in Sinhala, titled “Ganaduraka Sihivatana” (Memories of an Era of Darkness), a 307-page work, focuses heavily on the political history, ethnic conflicts, and peace efforts involving the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. In it, he draws from his extensive research career to provide a highly detailed critique of the LTTE’s secessionist campaigns, territorial claims, and the broader socio-political ramifications of the conflict in Sri Lanka.

Prof Peiris served as a member of the Council of the University of Peradeniya, from 2014 until he was appointed the Chancellor of the University in 2022, a post he held until 2025, when ill health forced him to step down. In the Council he consistently provided a mature viewpoint on many contentious issues and took up a balanced position that often helped the Council to arrive at an acceptable decision.

Prof. Peiris occupied the exalted seat of Chancellor of the University with much aplomb and dignity. It was so unfortunate that his tenure was cut short due to ill health.

He leaves his loving wife, Yasa, whom he had met in the University, a daughter, Indumathi, who is a Professor in Physiology in the Medical Faculty, Peradeniya, and a son, Manjula, who is a surgeon attached to the Department of Surgery, Faculty of Medicine Peradeniya. It gave him much happiness that his children and their spouses were all members of the academic staff of the University that he loved so much.

May he rest in peace!

Prof. N. A. de S. Amaratunga PhD, DSc, DLitt

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