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Sri Lanka’s development dilemmas

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by Uditha Devapriya

On May 18, the grace period for a USD 78 million coupon payment expired in Sri Lanka. For the first time in its post-independence history, the island nation defaulted on its foreign debt. The Governor of the Central Bank, Dr Nandalal Weerasinghe, then announced that it would take six months for it to start repaying its creditors. An agreement with the IMF is in the pipeline now, but such an agreement will take another month or two.From a global perspective, of course, there is nothing unique about Sri Lanka’s crisis. For the country’s 22 million plus population, however, its scale has been unprecedented. While horror stories of Sri Lanka turning into another Lebanon or Zimbabwe have been recycled relentlessly in the press, since 2020, in recent months such comparisons have been made more frequently. Inflation, which began peaking last year, hit 30 percent in April and 40 percent in May. While nowhere near Lebanon or Zimbabwe, estimates by certain observers and analysts put Sri Lanka at the top of global inflation indices.All this has given rise to certain perceptions about the country’s problems. Western and Indian media, in particular, ascribe the crisis to the convulsions of domestic politics. Very few commentators have noted that these problems have been decades in the making, that the government’s ineptitude is more a symptom than a cause, and that external factors have had a say in such issues. The President’s bungling has contributed to these problems, to be sure, but that only shows how complex they are in the first place.

Neoliberal prescriptions

Just how complex, though? To answer that, it is necessary to address the structural causes that neoliberal economists and commentators note as having led to the crisis. These groups underline four factors: the government’s indulgence of unorthodox economic theories, its drive towards organic agriculture, its refusal to go to the IMF, and its insistence on diverting foreign reserves to defending the currency and repaying bondholders.It must be noted that all these problems are linked to the structural weaknesses of the economy. While there is a consensus on those weaknesses, though, economists and political analysts are divided over what, or who, is to blame for them.

Sri Lanka’s economy has been paraded, even by some radical commentators, as “export-dependent.” Yet it has been running trade deficits for the last 50 years. Its exports include primary commodities like tea, textiles, and tourism. It also earns remittances from migrant workers, many of whom effectively subsidise West Asian economies.These sectors took a hit from the COVID-19 pandemic. While tourism was on its way up in February, most arrivals were from countries like Russia and Ukraine. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine thus, effectively, dealt a blow to hopes of a long-term revival.

Neoliberal economists, especially those linked to Colombo’s well-funded and well-oiled think-tanks, attribute the country’s problems to excessive money printing and government spending. They see the country’s public sector as bloated, politicised.To an extent, the latter view is correct. Sri Lanka’s bureaucracy has long been a preferred destination for unemployed graduates and the politically connected. While Gotabaya Rajapaksa came to power implying he would end such a culture, he reversed course two years later and hired 65,000 graduates to the state sector. Ironically enough, it is their peers who are occupying the frontlines of anti-government protests today.

The heterodox view: Industrialisation and local production

Heterodox economists see things differently. According to them, Sri Lanka’s problems have had to do with its failure to industrialise and shift to manufacture.One of Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s first decisions, after coming to power in 2019, was to appoint Dr W. D. Lakshman, a proponent of industrialisation, as the Governor of the Central Bank. Economic analyst Shiran Illanperuma describes Dr Lakshman’s appointment as having been “poorly received by comprador capitalists and economists.” Lakshman earned the wrath of this crowd heavily after he began enacting policies aimed, ostensibly, at stimulating growth, including a series of tax cuts which have now been reversed.

Another of the country’s biggest advocates of industrialisation is Dr Howard Nicholas. A Senior Lecturer in Economics at the International Institute of Social Studies at the Erasmus University of Rotterdam, the Netherlands, Dr Nicholas helped set up the Institute of Policy Studies (IPS), a think-tank that advocated industrialisation, in the late 1980s.In its first few years, the IPS promoted alternative development strategies. Its advocacy of these strategies was received positively by then president, Ranasinghe Premadasa; based on its recommendations, he spearheaded an ambitious Garment Factory Programme which provided jobs to the rural sector while stimulating growth. This was around the same time Vietnam embarked on export-led industrialisation via its apparel sector.

According to Dr Nicholas, Sri Lanka’s prospects were bright in the 1990s. It even had the potential to surpass Vietnam. Yet with the assassination of Premadasa and the election in 1994 of a regime that modelled itself on Clintonian Third Way Centrist lines, industrialisation was abandoned in favour of outright privatisation and deregulation.The new strategy filled the government coffers – for a while. But with the escalation of the civil war and, paradoxically, the elevation of the country to middle-income status in the 2000s, Sri Lanka found it hard to access traditional aid programmes. It was at that juncture that it started moving into international bond markets.

While Western media and think-tanks propagate Chinese debt trap narratives, it has been Sri Lanka’s reliance on bond markets, which constitute a greater proportion of its external debt than does China, that finally brought its economy to its knees.To be sure, over the years several groups have highlighted these concerns. Yet, they differ as to the strategies and tactics needed to chart a way out of the crisis.

Neoliberal commentators argue that the private sector should take the lead. But Sri Lanka’s private sector is dominated by rentiers. Moreover, the country’s exports are limited to commodities and tourism, along with sectors such as IT. These themselves are dependent heavily on imported raw materials and intermediate capital goods.According to Harvard University’s Atlas of Economic Complexity, Sri Lanka’s largest exports are in “moderate and low complexity products”, like textiles. This contrasts with Vietnam, where textiles are more highly complex. Sri Lanka is also seeing “a static pattern of export growth.” In other words, while in 1990 it could boast of much potential in garments, by the early 2000s the sector’s prospects had considerably reduced.

To resolve the economic crisis, heterodox economists and analysts thus contend that the government must oversee a radical, socialist strategy, centring on import-substitution and local production: a dreary, dismal prospect for Colombo’s neoliberal coterie.

Leaderless protests and lack of alternatives

Sadly, the protests themselves seem little concerned by these imperatives. As has been pointed out by Rathindra Kuruwita in The Diplomat, they remain leaderless and rudderless. This has exposed them considerably to the risk of manipulation.Thus, while the protesters have called for Rajapaksa’s resignation and coupled it with demands for the resignation of all parliamentarians, they have also claimed that the latter demand, which delegitimises the country’s legislature and empowers the Executive, was incorporated into the protests by government supporters. Moreover, many of them fault the government for not going to the IMF earlier, failing to realise that the IMF’s track record in the Global South, during the COVID-19 pandemic, has been questionable.

More seriously, none of the protesters seem aware of what led to the crisis in the first place. To quote Dr Asoka Bandarage of the California Institute of Integral Studies, they “have not been able to put forward an alternative leadership or a viable road map for the future” and seem “unaware of the global dynamics” of the crisis.

Gotagogama, the site of the protests at Galle Face Green, has played host to several radical activists and artists, many of them linked to Marxist, anarchist, and other anti-government parties and alliances. Yet even these groups have failed to call attention to the wider issues. Those that have, like workers’ collectives and leftist commentators, have been marginalised by neoliberal discourses and populist demands for resignations.

The failures of governance and the road ahead

On the other hand, unfortunate as it has been for advocates of alternative development, the government has failed to appreciate the importance of their recommendations. A combination of corruption, ineptitude, and an eagerness to capitulate has thus put alternative development, and industrialisation, on the backburner.Milco is a case in point. Sri Lanka’s state-owned milk manufacturer, Milco recorded profits after a while last year. Yet a year or so after this milestone in the island’s public sector, the government replaced its chairman rather inexplicably. Such actions, multiplied many times over, have only distanced capable individuals from the State.

At one level, all this fits in with South Asia’s legacy of dynastic politics. From India to Bangladesh, the subcontinent is hardly a stranger to family rule. The Rajapaksas are no exception there: despite the recent spurt in anti-government protests, members of the family continue to hold important positions in the country.However, at another level, the Rajapaksa family has gone well beyond the regional model. As the country’s leading political analyst Dr Dayan Jayatilleka has observed, “this is not the Asian phenomenon of familial succession in politics, which is serial and sequential. The contemporary Sri Lankan phenomenon and process is both sequential and simultaneous, vertical and horizontal.” In other words, while family rule in the rest of Asia has served to sustain the political system, in Sri Lanka it has led to its very dismantlement. This includes the Rajapaksas’ deployment of the military, and allegations of militarisation in the north and east of the country: regions which bore the brunt of a 30-year civil war.

Nevertheless, despite all this, it goes without saying that what protesters consider as the government’s failures have been symptoms, rather than causes, of the structural faults underpinning the economy. The government must share the blame for this: in particular, its tendency to surround itself with yes-men and henchmen.Yet beyond this narrative, there is a far more compelling problem: a failure to resolve pressing issues like the island’s dependence on imports and sovereign debt. That in itself is linked to the sprawling global debt crisis, which has extended to other countries. While not all protesters are oblivious to these priorities, many of them are yet to address them fully. So long as debates over the crisis remain dominated by narratives of corruption and political personalities, such problems will go unnoticed and unresolved.

(The writer is an international relations analyst, researcher, and columnist based in Sri Lanka who can be reached at udakdev1@gmail.com. A shorter version of this article appeared in Global South Development Magazine.)



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Opinion

Sri Lanka, the Stars,and statesmen

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JRJ with President Ronald Reagan at the White House

When President J. R. Jayewardene stood at the White House in 1981 at the invitation of U.S. President Ronald Reagan, he did more than conduct diplomacy; he reminded his audience that Sri Lanka’s engagement with the wider world stretches back nearly two thousand years. In his remarks, Jayewardene referred to ancient explorers and scholars who had written about the island, noting that figures such as Pliny the Elder had already described Sri Lanka, then known as Taprobane, in the first century AD.

Pliny the Elder (c. AD 23–79), writing his Naturalis Historia around AD 77, drew on accounts from Indo-Roman trade during the reign of Emperor Claudius (AD 41–54) and recorded observations about Sri Lanka’s stars, shadows, and natural wealth, making his work one of the earliest Roman sources to place the island clearly within the tropical world. About a century later, Claudius Ptolemy (c. AD 100–170), working in Alexandria, transformed such descriptive knowledge into mathematical geography in his Geographia (c. AD 150), assigning latitudes and longitudes to Taprobane and firmly embedding Sri Lanka within a global coordinate system, even if his estimates exaggerated the island’s size.

These early timelines matter because they show continuity rather than coincidence: Sri Lanka was already known to the classical world when much of Europe remained unmapped. The data preserved by Pliny and systematised by Ptolemy did not fade with the Roman Empire; from the seventh century onward, Arab and Persian geographers, who knew the island as Serendib, refined these earlier measurements using stellar altitudes and navigational instruments such as the astrolabe, passing this accumulated knowledge to later European explorers. By the time the Portuguese reached Sri Lanka in the early sixteenth century, they sailed not into ignorance but into a space long defined by ancient texts, stars, winds, and inherited coordinates.

 Jayewardene, widely regarded as a walking library, understood this intellectual inheritance instinctively; his reading spanned Sri Lankan chronicles, British constitutional history, and American political traditions, allowing him to speak of his country not as a small postcolonial state but as a civilisation long present in global history. The contrast with the present is difficult to ignore. In an era when leadership is often reduced to sound bites, the absence of such historically grounded voices is keenly felt. Jayewardene’s 1981 remarks stand as a reminder that knowledge of history, especially deep, comparative history, is not an academic indulgence but a source of authority, confidence, and national dignity on the world stage.  Ultimately, the absence of such leaders today underscores the importance of teaching our youth history deeply and critically, for without historical understanding, both leadership and citizenship are reduced to the present moment alone.

Anura Samantilleke

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General Educational Reforms: To what purpose? A statement by state university teachers

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"With the NPP government in charge of educational reforms, we had expectations of a stronger democratic process underpinning the reforms to education, and attention to issues that have been neglected in previous reform efforts."

One of the major initiatives of the NPP government is reforming the country’s education system. Immediately after coming to power, the government started the process of bringing about “transformational” changes to general education. The budgetary allocation to education has been increased to 2% of GDP (from 1.8% in 2023). Although this increase is not sufficient, the government has pledged to build infrastructure, recruit more teachers, increase facilities at schools and identified education reforms as an urgent need. These are all welcome moves. However, it is with deep concern that we express our views on the general education reforms that are currently underway.

The government’s approach to education reform has been hasty and lacking in transparency and public consultation. Announcements regarding the reforms planned for January 2026 were made in July 2025. In August, 2025, a set of slides was circulated, initially through unofficial sources. It was only in November 2025, just three months ahead of implementation, that an official policy document, Transforming General Education in Sri Lanka 2025, was released. The Ministry of Education held a series of meetings about the reforms. However, by this time the modules had already been written, published, and teacher training commenced.

The new general education policy shows a discrepancy between its conceptual approach and content. The objectives of the curriculum reforms include: to promote “critical thinking”, “multiple intelligences”, “a deeper understanding of the social and political value of the humanities and social sciences” and embed the “values of equity, inclusivity and social justice” (p. 9). Yet, the new curriculum places minimal emphasis on social sciences and humanities, and leaves little time for critical thinking or for molding social justice-oriented citizens. Subjects such as environment, history and civics, are left out at the primary level, while at the junior secondary level, civics and history are allocated only 10 and 20 hours per term. The increase in the number of “essential subjects” to 15 restricts the hours available for fundamentals like mathematics and language; only 30 hours are allocated to mathematics and the mother tongue, per term, at junior secondary level. Learning the second national language and about our conflict-ridden history are still not priorities despite the government’s pledge to address ethnic cohesion. The time allocation for Entrepreneurship and Financial Literacy, now an essential subject, is on par with the second national language, geography and civics. At the senior secondary level (O/L), social sciences and humanities are only electives. If the government is committed to the objectives that it has laid out, there should be a serious re-think of what subjects will be taught at each grade, the time allocated to each, their progress across different levels, and their weight in the overall curriculum.

A positive aspect of the reforms is the importance given to vocational training. A curriculum that recognises differences in students, whether in terms of their interest in subject matter, styles of learning, or their respective needs, and caters to those diverse needs, would make education more pluralistic and therefore democratic. However, there must be some caution placed on how difference is treated, and this should not be reflected in vocational training alone, but in all aspects of the curriculum. For instance, will the history curriculum account for different narratives of history, including the recent history of Sri Lanka and the histories of minorities and marginalised communities? Will the family structures depicted in textbooks go beyond conventional conceptions of the nuclear family? Addressing these areas too would allow students to feel more represented in curricula and enable them to move through their years of schooling in ways that are unconstrained by stereotypes and unjust barriers.

The textbooks for the Grade 6 modules on the National Institute of Education (NIE) website appear to have not gone through rigorous review. They contain rampant typographical errors and include (some undeclared) AI-generated content, including images that seem distant from the student experience. Some textbooks contain incorrect or misleading information. The Global Studies textbook associates specific facial features, hair colour, and skin colour, with particular countries and regions, and refers to Indigenous peoples in offensive terms long rejected by these communities (e.g. “Pygmies”, “Eskimos”). Nigerians are portrayed as poor/agricultural and with no electricity. The Entrepreneurship and Financial Literacy textbook introduces students to “world famous entrepreneurs”, mostly men, and equates success with business acumen. Such content contradicts the policy’s stated commitment to “values of equity, inclusivity and social justice” (p. 9). Is this the kind of content we want in our textbooks?

The “career interest test” proposed at the end of Grade 9 is deeply troubling. It is inappropriate to direct children to choose their career paths at the age of fourteen, when the vocational pathways, beyond secondary education, remain underdeveloped. Students should be provided adequate time to explore what interests them before they are asked to make educational choices that have a bearing on career paths, especially when we consider the highly stratified nature of occupations in Sri Lanka. Furthermore, the curriculum must counter the stereotyping of jobs and vocations to ensure that students from certain backgrounds are not intentionally placed in paths of study simply because of what their parents’ vocations or economic conditions are; they must also not be constrained by gendered understandings of career pathways.

The modules encourage digital literacy and exposure to new communication technologies. On the surface, this initiative seems progressive and timely. However, there are multiple aspects such as access, quality of content and age-appropriateness that need consideration before uncritical acceptance of digitality. Not all teachers will know how to use communication technologies ethically and responsibly. Given that many schools lack even basic infrastructure, the digital divide will be stark. There is the question of how to provide digital devices to all students, which will surely fall on the shoulders of parents. These problems will widen the gap in access to digital literacy, as well as education, between well-resourced and other schools.

The NIE is responsible for conceptualising, developing, writing and reviewing the general education curriculum. Although the Institution was established for the worthy cause of supporting the country’s general education system, currently the NIE appears to be ill-equipped and under-staffed, and seems to lack the experience and expertise required for writing, developing and reviewing curricula and textbooks. It is clear by now that the NIE’s structure and mandate need to be reviewed and re-invigorated.

In light of these issues, the recent Cabinet decision to postpone implementation of the reforms for Grade 6 to 2027 is welcome. The proposed general education reforms have resulted in a backlash from opposition parties and teachers’ and student unions, much of it, legitimately, focusing on the lack of transparency and consultation in the process and some of it on the quality and substance of the content. Embedded within this pushback are highly problematic gendered and misogynistic attacks on the Minister of Education. However, we understand the problems in the new curriculum as reflecting long standing and systemic issues plaguing the education sector and the state apparatus. They cannot be seen apart from the errors and highly questionable content in the old curriculum, itself a product of years of reduced state funding for education, conditionalities imposed by external funding agencies, and the consequent erosion of state institutions. With the NPP government in charge of educational reforms, we had expectations of a stronger democratic process underpinning the reforms to education, and attention to issues that have been neglected in previous reform efforts.

With these considerations in mind, we, the undersigned, urgently request the Government to consider the following:

*  postpone implementation and holistically review the new curriculum, including at primary level.

*  adopt a consultative process on educational reforms by holding public sittings across the country .

*  review the larger institutional structure of the educational apparatus of the state and bring greater coordination within its constituent parts

*  review the NIE’s mandate and strengthen its capacity to develop curricula, such as through appointexternal scholars an open and transparent process, to advise and review curriculum content and textbooks.

*  consider the new policy and curriculum to be live documents and make space for building consensus in policy formulation and curriculum development to ensure alignment of the curriculum with policy.

*  ensure textbooks (other than in language subjects) appear in draft form in both Sinhala and Tamil at an early stage so that writers and reviewers from all communities can participate in the process of scrutiny and revision from the very beginning.

*  formulate a plan for addressing difficulties in implementation and future development of the sector, such as resource disparities, teacher training needs, and student needs.

A.M. Navaratna Bandara,
formerly, University of Peradeniya

Ahilan Kadirgamar,
University of Jaffna

Ahilan Packiyanathan,
University of Jaffna

Arumugam Saravanabawan,
University of Jaffna

Aruni Samarakoon,
University of Ruhuna

Ayomi Irugalbandara,
The Open University of Sri Lanka.

Buddhima Padmasiri,
The Open University of Sri Lanka

Camena Guneratne,
The Open University of Sri Lanka

Charudaththe B.Illangasinghe,
University of the Visual & Performing Arts

Chulani Kodikara,
formerly, University of Colombo

Chulantha Jayawardena,
University of Moratuwa

Dayani Gunathilaka,
formerly, Uva Wellassa University of Sri Lanka

Dayapala Thiranagama,
formerly, University of Kelaniya

Dhanuka Bandara,
University of Jaffna

Dinali Fernando,
University of Kelaniya

Erandika de Silva,
formerly, University of Jaffna

G.Thirukkumaran,
University of Jaffna

Gameela Samarasinghe,
University of Colombo

Gayathri M. Hewagama,
University of Peradeniya

Geethika Dharmasinghe,
University of Colombo 

F. H. Abdul Rauf,
South Eastern University of Sri Lanka

H. Sriyananda,
Emeritus Professor, The Open University of Sri Lanka

Hasini Lecamwasam,
University of Peradeniya

(Rev.) J.C. Paul Rohan,
University of Jaffna

James Robinson,
University of Jaffna

Kanapathy Gajapathy,
University of Jaffna

Kanishka Werawella,
University of Colombo

Kasun Gajasinghe, formerly,
University of Peradeniya

Kaushalya Herath,
formerly, University of Moratuwa

Kaushalya Perera,
University of Colombo

Kethakie Nagahawatte,
formerly, University of Colombo

Krishan Siriwardhana,
University of Colombo

Krishmi Abesinghe Mallawa Arachchige,
formerly, University of Peradeniya

L. Raguram,
University of Jaffna

Liyanage Amarakeerthi,
University of Peradeniya

Madhara Karunarathne,
University of Peradeniya

Madushani Randeniya,
University of Peradeniya

Mahendran Thiruvarangan,
University of Jaffna

Manikya Kodithuwakku,
The Open University of Sri Lanka

Muttukrishna Sarvananthan,
University of Jaffna

Nadeesh de Silva,
The Open University of Sri Lanka

Nath Gunawardena,
University of Colombo

Nicola Perera,
University of Colombo

Nimal Savitri Kumar,
Emeritus Professor, University of Peradeniya

Nira Wickramasinghe,
formerly, University of Colombo

Nirmal Ranjith Dewasiri,
University of Colombo

P. Iyngaran,
University of Jaffna

Pathujan Srinagaruban,
University of Jaffna

Pavithra Ekanayake,
University of Peradeniya

Piyanjali de Zoysa,
University of Colombo

Prabha Manuratne,
University of Kelaniya

Pradeep Peiris,
University of Colombo

Pradeepa Korale-Gedara,
formerly, University of Peradeniya

Prageeth R. Weerathunga,
Rajarata University of Sri Lanka

Priyantha Fonseka,
University of Peradeniya

Rajendra Surenthirakumaran,
University of Jaffna

Ramesh Ramasamy,
University of Peradeniya

Ramila Usoof,
University of Peradeniya

Ramya Kumar,
University of Jaffna

Rivindu de Zoysa,
University of Colombo

Rukshaan Ibrahim,
formerly, University of Jaffna 

Rumala Morel,
University of Peradeniya

Rupika S. Rajakaruna,
University of Peradeniya

S. Jeevasuthan,
University of Jaffna

S. Rajashanthan,
University of Jaffna 

S. Vijayakumar,
University of Jaffna

Sabreena Niles,
University of Kelaniya

Sanjayan Rajasingham,
University of Jaffna

Sarala Emmanuel,
The Open University of Sri Lanka

Sasinindu Patabendige,
formerly, University of Jaffna

Savitri Goonesekere,
Emeritus Professor, University of Colombo

Selvaraj Vishvika,
University of Peradeniya

Shamala Kumar,
University of Peradeniya

Sivamohan Sumathy,
formerly, University of Peradeniya

Sivagnanam Jeyasankar,
Eastern University Sri Lanka

Sivanandam Sivasegaram,
formerly, University of Peradeniya

Sudesh Mantillake,
University of Peradeniya

Suhanya Aravinthon,
University of Jaffna

Sumedha Madawala,
University of Peradeniya

Tasneem Hamead,
formerly, University of Colombo.

Thamotharampillai Sanathanan,
University of Jaffna

Tharakabhanu de Alwis,
University of Peradeniya 

Tharmarajah Manoranjan,
University of Jaffna 

Thavachchelvi Rasan,

University of Jaffna

Thirunavukkarasu Vigneswaran,
University of Jaffna

Timaandra Wijesuriya,
University of Jaffna

Udari Abeyasinghe,
University of Peradeniya

Unnathi Samaraweera,
University of Colombo

Vasanthi Thevanesam,
Professor Emeritus, University of Peradeniya

Vathilingam Vijayabaskar,
University of Jaffna

Vihanga Perera,
University of Sri Jayewardenepura

Vijaya Kumar,
Emeritus Professor, University of Peradeniya

Viraji Jayaweera,
University of Peradeniya

Yathursha Ulakentheran,
formerly, University of Jaffna.

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Opinion

Science at the heart of democracy: A blueprint for Sri Lanka

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When Vikings arrived in Iceland towards the end of the 8th century, they gathered on a midsummer’s day to hear the laws of the land proclaimed, air grievances, and seek justice. This marked the beginning of the oldest known parliament in the world — the Althing, or Thingvellir — which still operates today.

The word “parliament” later came to describe the after-dinner discussions between monks in their cloisters. Modern parliaments trace their roots to 13th-century England, when King Edward I convened joint meetings of two governing bodies: the Great Council and the Curia Regis, a smaller body of semi-professional advisors.

The British Parliament, often called the “Mother of Parliaments,” consists of the Sovereign, the House of Lords, and the House of Commons. Historically, such law-making institutions are designed to hear diverse views and facilitate informed debate. Access to up-to-date scientific and academic knowledge plays a crucial role in shaping these debates — enabling the UK to remain a world-leading economy with proactive decision-making.

Being an island nation influenced by British democratic traditions, Sri Lanka could also draw inspiration from such processes to remain agile in a fast-changing world.

From Medieval Advice to Modern Science in Governments

Providing advice — especially scientific advice — to lawmakers has evolved dramatically since the 13th century.

In 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic, then the UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson often appeared alongside the Government Chief Scientific Advisor and the Government Chief Medical Advoser. Professor Jonathan Van-Tam, Deputy Chief Medical Officer at the time, became widely known for explaining complex public health messages using relatable football metaphors.

The Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) guided the government on pandemic preparedness, supplying expert knowledge for critical decisions. Today, the UK Government Office for Science hosts Chief Scientific Advisers in each government department, typically senior academics from research-intensive universities appointed for three to five years.

Scrutiny and Evidence in Policymaking

The Parliament is the ultimate law-making body in the UK, holding the government accountable through debates and select committee inquiries. These committees — composed of MPs outside government and led by senior members — scrutinise policy decisions and monitor their implementation.

Support structures such as the Parliamentary Office for Science and Technology (POST) conduct ongoing research on topics of policy interest, identified through “horizon scanning” involving both internal and external experts. The Knowledge Exchange Unit maintains links with academic institutions, ensuring access to the latest evidence.

However, policy-making often happens under tight deadlines, reacting to both domestic and global developments. This demands quick access to authoritative expertise and knowledge — a need not always easy to meet.

Thematic Research Leads: A New Approach

To address this, the UK has introduced Thematic Research Leads (TRLs) — mid-career researchers embedded in Parliament three days a week while retaining their academic posts. TRLs act as impartial subject experts, bringing networks of research connections to parliamentary teams.

Their work includes organising expert briefings, running training sessions, hosting roundtables, and even simulating policy scenarios.

During my tenure as TRL for AI and Digital Technologies, I have supported this process in multiple ways.

* Supported multiple select committees by scoping inquiries, preparing briefing notes, and identifying expert witnesses.

* Delivered technical presentations — for example, explaining how social media algorithms operate, drawing directly from academic literature and open-source code.

* Collaborated with other TRLs, such as in crime and justice, to train parliamentary staff on AI’s role in surveillance and criminal justice.

Such efforts deepen Parliament’s technical understanding, enabling more informed, future-ready policy scrutiny.

Lessons for Sri Lanka: Integrating Science into Policymaking Infrastructure

There are few ways in which I believe Sri Lanka can utilise scientific and expert knowledge within the democratic processes.

1. Embed experts in Parliament

– Appoint Chief Scientific Advisors or Thematic Research Leads to bring impartial, up-to-date expertise directly into legislative debates.

2. Scan for niche opportunities

– Proactively identify sectors where Sri Lanka has unique strengths (e.g., agriculture, nanotechnology, AI) and link them to emerging global markets.

3. Build a “College of Experts”

– Create a formal network connecting the Sri Lankan scientific diaspora with local specialists to advise policymakers.

4. Strengthen research–policy links

– Develop units like the UK’s Parliamentary Office for Science and Technology to supply evidence-based briefings and horizon scanning. Then seek to collaborate with similar institutions around the world such as the POST.

5. Upskill policymakers

– Provide MPs and officials with targeted technical training so they can scrutinise policies with confidence and depth.

6. Move from reactive to proactive

– Use foresight tools and expert panels to anticipate global changes rather than only responding to crises.

In a world where artificial intelligence, bioengineering, and climate threats move faster than traditional politics, the ability to turn cutting-edge research into timely policy will decide which countries lead — and which fall behind.

Professor Varuna De Silva is the Chair of AI and Digital Technologies at Loughborough University, UK. He currently serves as the Thematic Research Lead to the UK Parliament, in the area of AI and Digital. He is a graduate of the University of Moratuwa, Sri Lanka, and received his Ph.D. from the University of Surrey in the UK in 2011.

by Professor Varuna De Silva

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