Midweek Review
Sirisena, SLFP enmeshed in Easter Sunday fallout
The Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) is desperate to reach a consensus with political parties in the Opposition. But the Opposition is very much reluctant to do so due to the SLFP leader Maithripala Sirisena’s fickle past and now again under intense fire over the 2019 Easter Sunday attack. Field Marshal Sarath Fonseka, no stranger to controversy, especially to his advantage, having served Sirisena’s cabinet during the Yahapalana administration, called the former President the mastermind of the Easter carnage. The SJB Chairman, who is now at loggerheads with the party, declared in Parliament that there were two masterminds. One was Gotabaya Rajapaksa and the other Maithripala Sirisena. Jathika Jana Balawegaya leader Anura Kumara Dissanayake flayed Sirisena for being so petty-minded that he sabotaged the National Security Council over his personal dispute with the then Premier Wickremesinghe.
By Shamindra Ferdinando
Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) Chairman Maithripala Sirisena, MP, recently accused ousted General Secretary of the party, parliamentarian Dayasiri Jayasekera, unceremoniously kicked out by him, of seeking to contest the next presidential election. The former President (2015-2019) claimed that the Kurunegala District lawmaker pursued political ambitions at his expense, regardless of the consequences. Therefore, as the Chairman of the Party he had no option but to thwart the conspiracy hatched by a group of conspirators.
The accusation was made during a live interview on Salakuna, anchored by Chamuditha Samarawickrema, who served the then President Sirisena as his Media Director. At one point, visibly upset Sirisena accused Samarawickrema of being part of the growing conspiracy to ruin his political career.
During the no holds barred interview, the Hiru panel relentlessly pressed the former President over his failure to prevent the 2019 Easter Sunday attacks, the simmering turmoil in the SLFP, with the focus on his battle with Jayasekera, and future plans. Jayasekera has been removed from the position of General Secretary and his party membership suspended at the same time.
Sirisena strongly defended repeated accusations that he caused the ruination of the SLFP from the commanding position of 144 MPs in 2010 to just one elected on the SLFP ticket at the last general election in August 2020, whereas the remaining 13, including himself, entered parliament on the SLPP ticket.
Sirisena attributed that victory to Sri Lanka’s triumph over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in May 2009. The UPFA recorded a significant increase of 39 seats since the 2004 general election. The UNP-led UNF secured 60 seats, a decline of 22. The Tamil National Alliance (TNA) obtained 14 seats, down from the 22 they won in 2004, and Sarath Fonseka-led DNA, contesting for the first time, won seven seats.
Responding to the Samarawickrema-led Hiru panel, Sirisena repeated a range of allegations against war-winning Army Commander Sarath Fonseka who was also accused of conspiring against the SLFP leader. Sirisena repeated accusations against Fonseka in Parliament recently that during the Army Chief’s much publicized visits to Kilinochchi during the war, the Sinha Regiment officer hid in a concrete bunker.
Perhaps the most astonishing declaration the embattled President made during that interview was his readiness to reach a consensus with UNP leader and incumbent President Ranil Wickremesinghe. Sirisena indicated he was ready to cooperate with anyone as political parties sought alliances. Let me stop the comment on ‘Salakuna’ interview and examine the challenges Sirisena faced as he struggled to navigate choppy waters.
The ex-President exploded when Samarawickrema accused him of lying regarding his visit to Singapore in April 2019. The ex-presidential aide played a voice recording of Sirisena claiming that he was on holiday in Singapore soon after he told the interviewers of visiting Mount Elizabeth Hospital for a medical check-up. Saramawickrema pointed out that the bills were paid by the President’s Fund belonging to the people.
The reality is that the SLFP has been reduced to just one MP Angajan Ramanathan elected from the Jaffna district and may find it extremely difficult to finalize an agreement in time for the presidential election. Sirisena realizes the pathetic state his party is in as the seniors are keen to face the future under Wickremesinghe’s leadership. The growing criticism of Sirisena’s conduct in the run-up to the Easter Sunday carnage, and after, has caused irreparable damage to Sirisena. The bottom line is Sirisena is a liability. The SLFP cannot under any circumstances expect to reach an electoral alliance with any political party represented in Parliament as long as Sirisena remained the leader. That is the undeniable truth. Unfortunately, Sirisena seems to be in a dream world of his own incapable of comprehending the political environment or the utterly desperate situation he is in.
Kilinochchi concrete bunker
Did the Army Chief visit Kilinochchi often during the war? In spite of being a member of the Cabinet and Acting Minister of Defence on a number of occasions during the war, Sirisena seems to be clueless regarding even the basics in military strategy or what really happened. Kilinochchi, which served as the outward LTTE headquarters, where foreign and local visitors were entertained, was not liberated till January 2009. In fact, the then Lt. Gen. Fonseka hadn’t visited Kilinochchi until the Army brought the LTTE bastion under its control. He no doubt personally directed frontline operations from Colombo often bypassing many top officers in the command structure. He even had the habit of giving orders directly to small brigade-type operations led by lieutenant colonels using CDMA phones as he knew Tigers were monitoring all their radio communications. In one instance we can recall that when we reached the base camp of one such unit advancing north of Vavuniya, parallel to A-9 highway one evening, Fonseka came on line while we were meeting the lieutenant colonel leading that push and immediately attention was drawn to field maps on the improvised table there and the Army Commander without wasting any formalities started asking why they had not completed a certain task assigned to them that day, the poor Lt. Col. literally stammering said they had run into a minefield and immediately Fonseka shouted back and pointed out that there is a nearby trail used by lumber thieves and for them to advance along that to bypass the minefield. And that is how Fonseka, who knew the northern terrain like the back of his hand, won the war that many experts said was unwinnable by our security forces.
But the tragedy is that Field Marshal Fonseka has forgotten how that dream victory was made possible by the tremendous unstinted backing he had received from the then political and security forces leaderships. Earlier capable Generals like Denzil Kobbekaduwa, Wijaya Wimalaratne et al were handicapped by being sabotaged from within or having eccentric political leaderships at the apex, especially with the likes of Presidents Ranasinghe Premadasa and Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, while the former was overly punctual, the latter basically had no sense of time.
A retired Special Forces officer holding middle-level rank confirmed that the Army Chief flew to Kilinochchi on the morning of April 16, 2009, along with President Mahinda Rajapaksa and Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa. Kilinochchi was brought under military control in the first week of January 2009. The Army Chief visited Vanni east again only after the successful conclusion of the war on May 19, 2009. Therefore, there couldn’t be any basis for Sirisena’s claim that the Army Chief sought to build his image by flying into Vanni often as that was simply not possible with a formidable enemy like the LTTE dominating Wanni, except for periodic strikes by the Army’s deep penetration units that eliminated some key Tiger leaders. After the Army Chief’s visit to Kilinochchi on April 16, 2009, the LTTE lasted less than five weeks.
The war-winning President Mahinda Rajapaksa declared in Parliament on May 19, 2009, “When I won the Presidential Election in 2005 there were LTTE police stations in the North and East. There were Tiger courts. What was missing was only a Tiger parliament. Today we have finished all that forever.”
Sirisena should be especially ashamed that he didn’t at least bother to verify such serious accusations before going public.
The SLFP cannot further delay making a proper assessment of the impact of Sirisena’s culpability as well as negligence on his part pertaining to the Easter Sunday carnage. Sirisena, in addition to being the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Defence Minister, held the Public Security portfolio at the time the National Thowheed Jamaat (NTJ) mounted a spate of suicide attacks.
In spite of repeated requests by the coalition partner UNP, Sirisena declined to swear in their nominee though he accepted Ranil Wickremesinghe as the Premier following the Supreme Court declaration of December 13, 2018. Sirisena hasn’t been able to explain his actions though he is bombarded with questions.
Political uncertainty caused by the Sirisena-Rajapaksa alliance, too, may have influenced the NTJ strategy. The Supreme Court ruled that Sirisena’s decision to dissolve Parliament 20 months before the end of its term was unconstitutional. A full seven-judge bench unanimously declared that the President couldn’t dissolve Parliament until it completed a four-and-a-half-year term.
Sirisena’s actions should be examined taking into consideration three major developments in 2015. (1) The President being compelled to accept Singaporean Arjuna Mahendran as Governor of the Central Bank (2) Dissolution of Parliament in late June 2015 to prevent the Committee on Public Enterprises (COPE) from tabling special report on the first Treasury bond scam perpetrated in late February 2015, no sooner the Yahapalana government assumed office and (3) Sirisena, in his capacity as the Chairman of the SLFP delivered a knockout blow to his own party by declaring that Mahinda Rajapaksa wouldn’t be appointed Prime Minister even if the UPFA won the election.
The last above declaration by Sisisena was meant to dishearten Mahinda supporters. The President obviously wanted to ensure the victory of those who fielded him as the common candidate at the 2015 presidential election. The coalition consisted of the UNP, TNA, JVP, SLMC and other smaller minority parties, all backed by an influential section of the civil society, well-funded by the West. Sirisena’s move restricted the UPFA total to 95 seats, including 12 National List slots whereas the UNP secured 106 seats. The UNP group included 13 National List seats. Sirisena allies TNA won 16 seats, JVP 06, EPDP 01 and SLMC 01. Today both the UNP and SLFP have been reduced to just one MP.
A debilitating setback
There is consensus among the Opposition that the SLFP cannot be part of a coalition against the backdrop of the Supreme Court ordering Sirisena to pay a sum of Rs 100 mn as compensation to the Easter Sunday victims. The apex court in a judgment delivered on January 12, 2023 ordered Sirisena, four officials and the State to pay compensation amounting to Rs. 311 million rupees.
That unprecedented move compelled the Opposition (SLPP rebels, including those in the Uththara Lanka Sabhagaya) to ask Sirisena to take the SLFP out of a coalition formed in January this year to contest indefinitely the postponed Local Government polls.
Sirisena is on record as having said that rebel SLPP lawmakers, Prof. G. L. Peiris and Dullas Alahapperuma visited him at his official residence in the wake of the Supreme Court ruling and requested him to quit the ‘Helicopter’ alliance. They wouldn’t have done so without consulting other constituents.
The ground reality is that the Opposition now found it difficult to accommodate the SLFP in a coalition at any level. The party lacked the strength to go it alone for obvious reasons. The continuing dispute between Sirisena and Jayasekera should be examined against the backdrop of Ports, Shipping and Aviation Minister Nimal Siripala de Silva’s success at the High Court of Civil Appeal.
The SLFPer thwarted bids made by Sirisena and Jayasekera, in their capacities as the Chairman and General Secretary of the SLFP, respectively, to prevent him from functioning as Senior Vice President of the party. Silva and the majority of those who had been elected to Parliament on the SLPP ticket, have pledged their allegiance to President Wickremesinghe. In fact, with the removal of Jayasekera, Sirisena appeared to have deprived himself of an apparatus capable of even basic organizational work.
The Presidential Commission of Inquiry (PCoI) into the Easter Sunday carnage, in its final report, made a damning recommendation pertaining to Sirisena. For some strange reason, Sirisena continued to downplay the severity of the PCoI recommendation. Declaring that Sirisena failed in his duties and responsibilities and his failure went beyond mere civil negligence, the PCoI advised the Attorney General to consider instituting criminal proceedings under any suitable provision in the Penal Code. (Final report, Vol 01, p 265).
Sirisena’s efforts to consolidate his position in the party with an eye on the next presidential election appeared to have collapsed due to the Easter Sunday fallout. Minister de Silva challenged in court the legality of constitutional amendments pertaining to the party. In his capacity as the Chairman, Sirisena sought the power to reconstitute the party Central Committee by nominating 35 members of his choice, increase the number of Vice Presidents to 14 and Senior Vice Presidents to seven. Sirisena also sought unilateral authority to remove any office bearer.
Sirisena appeared to have blundered by calling for UN intervention/assistance in the wake of Channel 4’s wild claims that the Easter Sunday carnage was facilitated by State Intelligence Service (SIS) and the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) helped SLPP candidate Gotabaya Rajapaksa to win last presidential poll conducted in November 2019. As that accusation had been made even before the presidential election, Sirisena owed the public an explanation why his party contested on the SLPP ticket at the subsequent general election held in August 2020. Sirisena appeared to have tied himself in knots with his illogical greedy strategy.
The former President lacked both time and space to address issues at hand, the latest being the accusations pertaining to the General Secretary of the party trying to oust him. Sirisena has refused to disclose the names of those involved in the alleged bid to oust him. Perhaps, Sirisena has quite conveniently forgotten how he betrayed Mahinda Rajapaksa in late 2014 just a couple of weeks before the presidential poll and morning after enjoying a sumptuous string hopper dinner with the Rajapaksas at Temple Trees.
Difficult road ahead
Sirisena needs to take stock of things. This should be done without further delay as pressure builds-up on his party to address issues arising out of the Easter Sunday carnage. The former President must realize that the party will continue to suffer as long as he remains as its leader. Wickremesinghe under any circumstances wouldn’t accept the SLFP as long as Sirisena served as its Chairman though the PCoI also strongly criticized Wickremesinghe’s own response to growing Islamic extremism here.
The PCoI observed that Wickremesinghe’s approach towards Islamic extremism was one of the primary reasons for the failure on the part of the government to neutralize the threat. Wickremesinghe’s approach facilitated the build-up of Islamic extremism and caused the Easter Sunday carnage (Final report, Vol 01, p 276-277). However, the PCoI refrained from making any specific recommendation in respect of Wickremesinghe. The Catholic Church has publicly questioned the failure on the part of the PCoI in this regard.
Of the politicians investigated by the PCoI and whose names transpired in the Easter Sunday coverage, Sirisena seems to be the only one really affected. Had Field Marshal Sarath Fonseka or a UNP member served as the Law and Order Minister at the time of the Easter Sunday attacks, Sirisena could have exploited the situation. The civil society grouping that backed Sirisena’s candidature at the 2015 presidential backed Fonseka as the Law and Order Minister. Before Sirisena brought that portfolio under himself, Tilak Marapana, PC (not in active politics now), Sagala Ratnayake (Security Advisor to the incumbent President) and Ranjith Maddumabandara (General Secretary of the Samagi Jana Balawegaya) served as the Law and Order Minister.
Sirisena cannot absolve himself of the responsibility for political instability caused by the constitutional
coup that may have influenced the NTJ. The live interview with Samarawickrema has further weakened Sirisena’s position. The former President struggled to convince the interviewer that both the Presidential Security Division (PSD) and the Prime Ministerial Security Division (PMSD) hadn’t been aware of the warning given by the Indian intelligence service on April 04, 2019. But many others, like present Tourism Minister Harin Fernando, had been aware of the threat through other channels. In fact his late father had told him not to attend church on that fateful Sunday because of the pending threat. It being such an important date in the Christian calendar even many of those aware of the threat would have ignored the warning as a mere crying wolf.
The shocking revelation how SLFPer and ex-UPPA MP Shantha Bandara, in his capacity as an aide to the then President Sirisena, extended support to those who managed a factory where the suicide jackets were alleged to have been produced, further tarnished the SLFP’s image. Bandara is among the 13 SLFPers elected on the SLPP ticket in the current Parliament. Interestingly, Sirisena accommodated Bandara on the UPFA National List after M.L.A.M. Hisbullah resigned in the first week of January 2019 to receive appointment as Governor of the Eastern Province. This appointment was made just four months before the Easter Sunday blasts. Hisbullah was among those politicians who appeared before the PCoI after having been examined by the Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC) on the Easter Sunday carnage. The PCoI, having asserted that Hisbullah facilitated the spread of ‘extremism within Kattankudy’ has now got back the massive building complex in the East meant to house a private Shariah University that had been built with no expenses spared, thanks to secret lavish funding from Arab donors!
Recently, the Wickremesinghe-Rajapaksa government handed back the Batticaloa University that had been brought under the military after the Easter Sunday killings to Hisbullah despite the skullduggery involved from the word go. Perhaps a separate article based on proceedings of PSC and PCoI relating to the private Batticaloa University may help those really interested in the issues at hand to understand how politics transcends ‘everything.’
Midweek Review
Gotabaya’s escape from Aragalaya mob in RTI spotlight
The Court of Appeal declared on 09 March, 2026: “On the facts currently before us, the application of the exemption contained in Section 5 (1) (b) (i) of the Act is unsustainable. There is a little logical connection between the requested statistics in this information request (that do not pertain to the personal details of individuals) and national security. We see that asserting that national security is at peril, is not a “blanket or unreviewable justification” for withholding information. It should be noted that any restriction must be strictly necessary, proportionate, and supported by a “demonstrable risk of serious harm to the State.” In the case in hand, the Petitioner failed to establish a clear nexus between the disclosure of naval voyage expenditures and any genuine prejudice to national security under Section 5(1)(a) of the Right to Information Act. In the absence of specific evidence, the reliance on security is characterised as a “generalised assertion or mere assertion” cannot be a panacea, we hold it is insufficient to meet the statutory threshold.”
By Shamindra Ferdinando
The deployment of SLNS Gajabahu (P 626), an Advanced Offshore Patrol Vessel (AOPV), on the afternoon of 09 July, 2022, to move the then President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, being pursued by a violent aragalaya mob, to safety, from Colombo to Trincomalee, is in the news again.
The issue at hand is how much the deployment of the vessel cost the taxpayer. In response to the Right to Information (RTI) query, the Navy has declined to reveal the cost of the AOPV deployment, or those who were given safe passage to Trincomalee, on the basis of national security.
SLNS Gajabahu, formerly USCGC Sherman (WHEC-720), a United States Coast Guard Hamilton-class high endurance cutter, was transferred to the Sri Lanka Navy on 27 August, 2018, at Honolulu. The vessel was recommissioned 06 June, 2019, as SLNS Gajabahu (P626) during Maithripala Sirisena’s tenure as the President. (Last week, US Special Envoy for South and Central Asia, Sergio Gor, who was here to deliver a message to President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, in the company of Navy Chief of Staff Rear Admiral Damian Fernando, visited SLNS Gajabahu, at the Colombo port.)
What would have happened if the then Navy Chief, Vice Admiral Nishantha Ulugetenne (15 July, 2020, to 18 December, 2022) failed to swiftly respond to the threat on the President? Those who spearheaded the violent campaign may not have expected the President to flee Janadhipathi Mandiraya, as protestors breached its main gates, or believed the Navy would intervene amidst total collapse of the ‘ground defences.’ Ulugetenne accompanied the President to Trincomalee. Among the group were the then Brigadiers Mahinda Ranasinghe and Madura Wickramaratne (incumbent Commanding Officer of the Commando Regiment) as well as the President’s doctor.
The circumstances leading to the President and First Lady Ayoma Rajapaksa boarding SLNS Gajabahu should be examined taking into consideration (1) the killing of SLPP lawmaker Amarakeerthi Atukorale and his police bodyguard Jayantha Gunawardena by an Aragalaya mob, at Nittambuwa, on the afternoon of 09 May, 2022 (2) the Army, deployed to protect Janadhipathi Mandiraya, quite rightly refrained from firing at the violent mob (3) efforts made by the top Aragalaya leadership to compel the then Premier Ranil Wickremesinghe to quit. Subsequently, it emerged that pressure was brought on the President to remove Wickremesinghe to pave the way for Speaker Mahinda Yapa Abeywardena to become the President and lastly (4) arrest of Kegalle SSP K.B. Keerthirathna and three police constables over the killing of a protester at Rambukkana on 19 April, 2022. The police alleged that they opened fire to prevent a violent mob from setting a petrol bowser, barricaded across the railway line there, ablaze.
Now, swift action taken by the Navy, under extraordinary circumstances to prevent possible threat on the lives of the President and the First Lady, had been challenged. The writer felt the need to examine the evacuation of the President against the backdrop of an attempt to compare it with President Wickremesinghe’s visit to the University of Wolverhampton in September, 2023, to attend the awarding of an honorary professorship to his wife Prof. Maithri Wickremesinghe.
The 09 July intervention made by the Navy cannot be, in any way, compared with the public funds spent on any other President. It would be pertinent to mention that the President, fleeing Janadhipathi Mandiraya, and the withdrawal of the armed forces deployed there, happened almost simultaneously. Once a collective decision was made to vacate Janadhipathi Mandiraya, they didn’t have any other option than rushing to the Colombo harbor where SLNS Gajabahu was anchored.
Overall defences in and around Janadhipathi Mandiraya crumbled as crowds surged in the absence of an effective strategy to thwart them. As we recall the law enforcers (both military and police) simply did nothing to halt the advance of the mob right into Janadhipathi Mandiraya, as people, like the then US Ambassador Julie Chung, openly prevailed on the hapless administration not to act against, what she repeatedly termed, ‘peaceful protesters’, even after they, in a pre-planned operation, meticulously burnt down more than hundred properties of government politicos and loyalists, across the country, on 9/10 May, 2022. So they were, on the whole, the proverbial wolves in sheep’s clothing working with the Western regime change project here as was previously done in places like Libya and Iraq and more recently in neighbouring countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal to install pliant governments.
After the 9/10 incidents, President Rajapaksa replaced the Commander of the Army, General Shavendra Silva, with Lt. Gen. Vikum Liyanage.
RTI query
M. R. Ali of Kalmuinai, in terms of Section 34 of the Right to Information Act No. 12 of 2016 (read with Article 138), has sought information, in September 2022, regarding the deployment of SLNS Gajabahu. The Navy rejected the request in November 2022, citing Section 5(1)(b)(i) of the RTI Act, which relates to information that could harm national security or defence. Obviously, the release of information, sought by that particular RTI, couldn’t undermine national security. No one can find fault with Ali’s decision to appeal to the RTI Commission against the position taken up by the Navy.
Following hearings in 2023, the Commission issued a split decision on 29 August, 2023. The RTI Commission upheld the Navy’s refusal to disclose items 1 through 5 and item 8, but directed the Navy to release the information for items 6 and 7, specifically, the cost of the travel and who paid for it.
However, the Navy has moved the Court of Appeal against the RTI directive to release the cost of the travel and who paid for it. Having examined the case in its entirety, the Court of Appeal held that the Navy, being the Public Authority responsible for the deployment of the vessel, had failed to prove how they could receive protection under 5(1)(b)(i) of the Right to Information Act. The Court of Appeal affirmed the order dated 29/08/2023 of the Right to Information Commission. The Court dismissed the appeal without costs. The bench consisted of R. Gurusinghe J and Dr. Sumudu Premachandra J.
There hadn’t been a similar case previously. The Navy, for some strange reason, failed to highlight that the failure on their part to act swiftly and decisively during the 09 July, 2022, violence that directly threatened the lives of the President and the First Lady, thwarted a possible catastrophic situation.
The action taken by the Navy should be discussed, taking into consideration the failure on the part of the Army and Police to save the lives of MP Atukorale and his police bodyguard. No less a person than retired Rear Admiral and former Public Security Minister Sarath Weerasekera alleged, both in and outside Parliament, that the Army failed to respond, though troops were present in Nittambuwa at the time of the incident. Had the Navy hesitated to evacuate the President and the First Lady the country may have ended up with another case similar to that of lawmaker Atukorale’s killing.
The Gampaha High Court, on 11 February, 2026, sentenced 12 persons to death for the killing of Atukorale and his security officer Gunawardena.
Let me stress that the costs of presidential travel have been released in terms of the RTI Act. The deployment of SLNS Gajabahu, at that time, has to be examined, taking into account the eruption of Aragalaya outside President Rajapaksa’s private residence at Pangiriwatte, Mirihana, on the night of 31 March, 2022, evacuation of the resigned Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa from Temple Trees, after protesters breached the main gate on 10 May, 2010, and the JVP/JBB-led attempt to storm Parliament on 13 July, 2022. Mahinda Rajapaksa and wife Shiranthi took refuge at the Trincomalee Navy base, chosen by Gotabaya Rajapaksa as sanctuary a few months later.
US Ambassador Julie Chung tweeted that Washington condemned “the violence against peaceful protestors” and called on the Sri Lankan “government to conduct a full investigation, including the arrest and prosecution of anyone who incited violence.”
The US fully backed the violent protest campaign while the direct involvement of India in the regime change project later transpired. As far as the writer is aware, this particular request is the only RTI query pertaining to Aragalaya. Evacuation of Mahinda Rajapaksa took place in the wake of a foolish decision taken at Temple Trees to unleash violence on Galle Face protesters, who were also besieging Temple Trees.
Defence Secretary retired General Kamal Gunaratne told a hastily arranged media conference that the former Prime Minister was at the Naval Dockyard in Trincomalee. The media quoted him as having said: “He will be there for a few more days. We will provide him with whatever security he needs and for as long as he wants.” Mahinda Rajapaksa remained in Trincomalee for over a week before attending Parliament.
Navy’s dilemma

Gotabaya
At the time information was sought under the RTI Act, Ulugetenne served as the Commander of the Navy. Vice Admiral Priyantha Perera succeeded Ulugetenne on 18 December, 2022. Following VA Perera’s retirement on 31 December, 2024, President Anura Kumara Dissanayake brought in the incumbent Kanchana Banagoda, as the 26th Commander of the Navy.
On the basis of the RTI query that dealt with the deployment of SLNS Gajabahu to evacuate President Gotabaya Rajapaksa and First Lady Ayoma, one can seek information regarding the expenditure incurred by Air Force in flying Mahinda Rajapaksa and his wife from Colombo to Trincomalee and back, as well, as Gotabaya Rajapaksa, his wife and two bodyguards leaving the country on Air Force AN 32 on 13 July, 2022. On the following day, they flew to Singapore on a Saudi flight.
Ali, in his representations, stressed that his objective hadn’t been to determine the legality of the Navy’s actions but to exercise his right as a citizen and taxpayer to oversee public spending. He questioned the failure on the part of the Navy to explain as to how revelation of specific information would “directly and reasonably” harm national security. In spite of the RTI Commission directive, the Navy refrained from answering two specific questions as mentioned by justice Dr. Sumudu Premachandra. Question number (6) How much money did the Sri Lanka Navy spent for the travel of former President Gotabhaya Rajapaksha in this ship? And (Question 7) Who paid this money? When did they pay?
Both the RTI Commission and Court of Appeal quite rightly rejected the Navy’s position that the revelation of cost of the deployment of vessels poses a significant threat to national security. That claim was based on the assertion that such financial data could allow third parties to calculate sensitive operational details, such as a ship’s speed, fuel consumption, and operational range. The Navy claimed that the disclosure of sensitive information could reveal supply dependencies, logistics constraints, and fueling locations, making the vessels vulnerable to sabotage or economic warfare.
The Navy sought protection of RTI Act’s section 5(1)(b)(i). Following is the relevant section: “(b) disclosure of such information– (i) would undermine the defence of the State or its territorial integrity or national security;”
The Navy appears to be in a bind over the RTI move for obvious reasons. With the ultimate beneficiary of Aragalaya at the helm, the Navy would find it extremely difficult to explain the circumstances SLNS Gajabahu was deployed against the backdrop of direct threat on the lives of the then incumbent President and the First Lady. The truth is desperate action taken by the Navy saved the life of the President and his wife. That is the undeniable truth. But, the current political environment may not be conducive to say so. What a pathetic situation in which the powers that be lacked the courage to lucidly explain a particular situation. As stressed in the Supreme Court judgment of November 2023, the Rajapaksa brothers – including two ex-Presidents – were guilty of triggering the country’s worst financial crisis by mishandling the economy.
In a majority verdict on petitions filed by academics and civil rights activists, a five-judge bench ruled that the respondents, who all later resigned or were sacked, had violated public trust. The regime change project took advantage of the attack ordered by Temple Trees on 09 May, 2009, on Galle Face protesters, to unleash pre-planned violence on ruling party politicians and loyalists.
If not for the courageous decision taken by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, in spite of his private residence, at Kollupitiya, being set ablaze by protesters on the night of 09 July, 2022, to order the military to thwart the JVP/JJB march on Parliament, two days later, and evict protesters from Galle Face soon after Parliament elected him the President on 20 July, 2022, saved the country from anarchy. Although Wickremesinghe, without restraints, encouraged Aragalaya, he quickly became the bulwark against the anti-State project that threatened to overwhelm the political party system.
Obviously, during Wickremesinghe’s tenure as the President, the SLPP, that accommodated the UNP leader as the Head of State, appeared to have turned a blind eye to the RTI query. Had the SLPP done so, it could have captured public attention, thereby making an attempt to influence all involved. In fact, the case never received media attention until journalist and Attorney-at-Law Nayana Tharanga Gamage, in his regular online programme, dealt with the issues at hand.
Before leaving Janadhipathi Mandiraya, the President has warned the military top brass, and the IGP, to prevent the destruction of the historic building. However, no sooner, the President left, the military top brass vacated the building leaving protesters an easy opportunity to take control. They held Janadhipathi Mandiraya until Gotabaya Rajapaksa resigned on 14 July 2022 to pave the way for Ranil Wickremesinghe to become the President.
It would be pertinent to mention that President Gotabaya Rajapaksa only moved into the Presidential Palace (Janadhipathi Mandiraya) after massive protest outside his Pangiriwatte private residence on 31 March, 2022, underscored his vulnerability for an attack.
Midweek Review
Village tank cascades, great river quartet and Cyclone Ditwah
This past November and December Ditwah showed us how dark, eerie and haunting catastrophes cyclones can be. Past generations have suffered as shown in 1911, the Canberra Times reporting the great flood of Ceylon on December 30 of that year. It killed 200 people and left over 300,000 homeless. Half century later, on December 25, 1957, a nameless cyclone brought severe rain to the North Central Province (NCP), and the Nachchaduwa reservoir breached, unloading its full power of volume into Malwatu Oya, a mid-level river flowing through the city of Anuradhapura, nearly washing away its colonial-era bridge near the Lion Tower. A cyclone paid a visit to the Eastern Coast of Sri Lanka on November 17-23, 1978.
Half a century later, Ditwah came with swagger.
Quartet of Rivers
Cyclone Ditwah unleashed disaster and tragedy, terrorising every breath of hundreds of thousands of people. These cyclones come spaced by a generation or two. How the Great River Quartet of Mahaweli, Kelani, Kalu, and Walawe, and their attendant mid-level streams, behaved before Ditwah masks the reality that they are not the loving and smiling beauties poets claim them to be. During the Ditwah visit, our river Quartet showed its true colours in plain sight when wave after wave of chocolate rage pushed uprooted forests creasing islands of floating debris and crashed onto bridges, shattering their potency into pieces. These rivers are nothing more than a bunch of evil reincarnations cloaked in ruinous intentions.
The River Quartet and its mates woke up to the first thunder of Ditwah. They carried away villages, people, property, herds of cattle, and wild elephants to the depths of the Indian Ocean. While we continue to dig out the dead buried in muddy mountainsides, dislodged from their moorings during this flood of biblical proportions, how our rivers, streams, and, particularly, the village tanks handled the pressure on their own will be the core of many future discussions.
The destruction and tragedy caused by this water hurt all of us in many ways. But we all wish they were only a fleeting dream. Sadly, though, the real-life sight of the pulverised railway bridge at Peradeniya is not a dream. This section of the rail line was stripped of its modesty and laid bare. It hung in the air, literally, like strands of an abandoned spider’s web on a wet Kandyan morning. It was a reminder to us that running water is a masked devil and should not be considered inviting. It can unleash the misery with a chilling ending no one wants to experience in a lifetime.
Tank Cascade Systems (TCS)
Although the Ditwah cyclone covered Sri Lanka from top to bottom with equal fury, the mountainous areas and floodplains of our River Quartet surrendered soon. However, the village tanks in the Dry Zone – Northern, North Central, Northeast, and Eastern provinces – weathered that onslaught, sustaining only manageable damage. They collectively mitigated the damage caused by over 200 mm of rain that fell across the catchment areas they represented. Thus, the tank, the precious possession of the village, deserves to be titled as a real beauty.
Let me introduce the village tanks systems our engineering ancestors built with sophistication and ingenuity, a force like Ditwah hardly made a dent in groups of these tanks called Tank Cascade Systems (TDS). Many of the village tanks in the Dry Zone, covering 60% of Sri Lanka’s land area, stand in groups of TDS, separated as individual bodies of water but sharing water from one or more dedicated ephemeral streams. R.W. Ievers, the Government agent for North Central Province in the 1890s, noted that these tanks were the result of “one thousand years of experiment and experience,” and “ancient tank builders took advantage of the flat and undulating topography of the NCP to make chains of tanks in the valleys.” Colonial Irrigation Engineers of the early 20th century also recognised this uniqueness. Still, they could not connect the dots to provide a comprehensive definition for this major appurtenance of the village.
Although these tanks appear to be segregated ecosystems, a closer look at the peneplain topographic map of Sri Lanka shows that each stream feeding them ultimately flows into a larger reservoir or river, jointly or independently influencing the mechanics of regional water use and debouching patterns. This character is the spirit of the dictum of King Parakramabahu centuries earlier: “let not a single drop of water go to waste into the sea without being used by people.” Villagers knew that each tank in their meso-catchment area was related to other tanks on the stream it was in ensuring maximised use of water.
With their embodied wisdom, our ancestors centuries ago configured the placement of individual tanks that shared water from a catchment area. But not until 1985, following a careful autopsy of the pattern of these small tanks in the Dry Zone, Professor Madduma Bandara noticed a distinctive intrinsic relationship within each group of tanks. He called a group of such tanks a Cascade of Tanks. He wrote, “a (tank) cascade is a connected series of tanks organized within a micro-catchment of the Dry Zone landscape, storing, conveying, and utilising water from an ephemeral rivulet.” In short, it is a “series of tanks located in succession one below the other.” Dr. M.U.A. Tennakoon shared the names of the villagers in Nuwarakalaviya used for this configuration of tanks: Ellangawa. On a map, these tanks appear as hanging on a string. Thus, Ellangawa can be a portmanteau, a blend, of these two words.
There are over 475 such cascading tank groups in the Dry Zone. On average, each cascade typically supports four tanks. One cascade, Toruwewa, near Kekirawa, has 12 tanks. According to Professor Madduma Bandara, a cascade of tanks held about 20-30% of the water falling on its catchment area. As I will show later in this essay, the tank cascades behave like buddies in good times and bad times. By undertaking to build a vascular structure to collect, conserve, and share water with communities along the stream path, our ancestors forewarned of the consequences of failing to undertake such micro-projects where they chose to live. The following are a villager’s thoughts on how to retool this concept to mitigate the potential for damage from excess water flow in a larger river system.
To villagers, their tank is royalty. Its water is their lapis lazuli. Therefore, they often embroidered the title of the village with the suffix wewa (tank) or kulam (tank, in Tamil), indicating the close connection between the two. It is the village’s foremost provider and is interdependent. That is why we have the saying, “the village is the tank, and the tank is the village.”
A study in 1954/55 found that there were 16,000 tanks in Sri Lanka, of which over 12,500 were operational. Out-of-commission tanks were those that fell into disuse after the original settlers abandoned them for a host of reasons, such as a breach in the bund, fear of plague or disease, or superstition. Collectively, they supply water to an area larger than the combined area of the fields served by the major irrigation reservoirs in the country at the time.
In some villages, an additional tank called olagama, with its own acreage of fields, receives water from the same stream or from another feeder stream which joins the principal stream above or below the main tank. In the event the main tank is disabled, often the olagama tank can serve as the alternate water source for their fields.
Cultural and Engineering

A graphical representation of the tank cascade system. Image courtesy of IUCN Sri Lanka.
A tank cascade is also an engineering undertaking. But village tank builders were not engineers with gold-trimmed diplomas. They were ordinary folks, endowed with generations of collective wisdom, including titbits on the physics of water, its speed, and its cruelty. Village pioneers responsible for starting the construction of the tank bund, gam bendeema, placed the first lump of earth after marking off home sites, not immediately below the future bund, but slightly towards one end of it, in the area called gammedda, or the elevated area the bund links to, gamgoda.
Engineering of a tank cascade has a cultural underpinning. It is founded on the feeling of solidarity among the villages along an ephemeral stream. In practice, it was a wholesome area with small communities of kin below each tank sorting out their own affairs without much intervention of the ruling class. For example, during heavy rains, each village in the chain communicated with the villages below the volume in its tank and the projected flow of the stream. When the tank reached its capacity and water began to spill over the spillway, the village below must take measures to protect its tank bund. If it breached, villagers up and down the cascade helped each other repair it.
They were aware that an earthen dam was susceptible to failure, so they used their own town-planning ideas. They avoided building residential zones directly under the stream’s path, generally at the midpoint of the dam. Instead, they built their triumvirate of life – tank, field, and dagoba (stupa) – keeping safety and practicality in mind. Dagoba was always on a higher ground, never supported by beams on a stream bank like what Ditwah revealed recently. We now know what happens to dagobas built on sagging beams by deceptively serenading riverbanks when thunder waters and unworldly debris came down hand in hand.
From top to bottom, the Tank Cascade showed the engineering instinct of the builders and accessory parts that helped its smooth functioning. There was the Olagama and Kulu Wewa associated with a system. Tank builders had an idea of the volume of water a given stream would bring in a year. In conjunction with this, the bunds of the Olagama and Kulu Wewa are built small. In contrast, the bunds of the tanks that formed the lower rung of the cascade are relatively larger. The idea behind this was that, in the event of a breach in an upstream tank, the downstream tanks could withstand an unexpected influx of water.
During the Ditwah’s death dance, the Mahaweli River did not have this luxury as it marched downstream from Kotmale dam. There were not enough dams to tame this river, and its beastly nature was allowed to run wild until it was too late for many.
The embodied imprints of experience inherited from their ancestors’ helped villagers design the tank’s physical attributes. In general, a tank supplied by this stream had a dam of a size proportional to the amount of water it could store for the fields. Later, as the village added families and field acreage increased, villagers raised the bund and the spillway to meet increased storage capacity. This simple practice guarded against eventualities like uncontrollable floods between villages. Excess water was allowed to flow through the sluice gate and the spillway, reducing the pressure on the bund. Had we applied this fundamental practice on a proportional scale to a large stream, i.e., oya or river, it would have lessened the destruction during a major rainstorm, ilk of which Ditwah brought.
With my experience living in a village with its tank, part of a TCS of five tanks, I wish large rivers like the Mahaweli had a few small-scale dams or partial diversions mimicking a rudimentary TCS so that the Railway Bridge at Peradeniya could have avoided the wrath of hell and high-water bringing muck and debris along its 46 km descent from Kotmale, where its lone dam is. I am glad I have company here. Professor Madduma Bandara noted 40 years ago, “much water flows through drainage lines due mainly to the absence of a village tank-type storage system.” Mahaweli turned out to be that drainage line this past November, holding hands, sadly, though, jubilantly, with the designs of Ditwah. Recently, former Head of Geo-Engineering at Peradeniya University, Udeni Bandara Amarasinghe, highlighted the importance of building reservoirs on other rivers to control floods like those we experienced recently.
Check Dams & Macroscopic Control
Within the TCS, the check dams, Kulu Wewa or Kele Wewa – forest tanks above a working tank held back sediments generated by upstream denudation. They controlled the volume and water entering the main tank. Kulu Wewa provided water for wild animals and checked their tendency to raid crops below the main tank. The difference between Kulu Wewa and Olagama was that, because of its topographical location, Kulu Wewa was occasionally used as a source of water for crops when the main tank below it became inoperable due to a breach or was undergoing repairs or used up its water early.
Based on these definitions, each working tank in the TCS also acted like a check dam for the one below it. Furthermore, if a tank in the cascade ran out of water, other tanks in the cascade stepped in. They linked up with the tanks above through temporary canals made by extending an existing minor canal, wella, or the wagala, excess water pan, of an upstream field.
The tank bund tamed and kept in check the three attributes of a stream – water velocity, volume, and its destructive power. By damming the stream, the villagers broke fueling momentum of it. They rerouted it via the spillway at the end of the bund, a form of recycling. Water from some spillways is diverted along a large niyara-like (field ridge) lesser dam, built along the wanatha (flanks) of the field, until it empties into the atrophied stream below the field.
Simultaneously, by controlling the release of water through two sluice gates on the bund, goda and mada horowwa, and directing it to the two flanks of the field, ihala and pahala wanatha, villagers succeeded in tamping down the pressure on the bund. Water from the neutered stream is thus redirected from all three exit points. It must now continue its journey along the wagala, to which field units (liyadi) also empty their excess water. This water is called wel pahu wathura.
After going through this process, the momentum of the ephemeral stream water is passive by the time it reaches the tanks in the lower parts of the cascade, often a kilometer or two downstream. This way, a line of tanks along the stream’s axis now shares the responsibility of holding back its full potential, limiting its ability to cause damage.
Such a break of momentum was lacking in the Four Great River Quartet and their lesser cousins. For the long-term solution to prevent damage from future cousins of Ditwah, we must consider this ingenious water-control method for rivers on a macroscopical scale.
Reservoirs

1957 and 2025 Cyclones Flood Marks written above window and below on the wall of a house by the banks of the Malwatu Oya in Anuradhapura.
As Ditwah-type floods occurred in 1911, 1957, 1978, and 2025, with a bit of luck, we can expect to have a few more decades of recess to work on cascading edifices along rivers, such as dams or diversions, before the next flood comes with roguish intentions. The Accelerated Mahaweli Diversion Program (AMDP), started in 1978, took 30 years to complete and now has over a dozen reservoirs between Kandy and the Dry Zone coastal belt, holding back its might. These reservoirs held their ground while Ditwah rained hell, so consulting the TCS’s ingenuity, though seems antiquated, is a good investment.
As soon as Cyclone Ditwah began to make noise, word spread that releasing water from a few of them on the Mahaweli and Kelani rivers could have made a difference. The problem with the Kelani River basin in Western Province and the Mahaweli basin in Central Province above Kandy is that, despite their combined population being nine times that of the NCP, they only have six reservoirs. On the contrary, the NCP has twice as much in the lower Mahaweli River basin, built under the AMDP. Furthermore, the NCP also has many ancient reservoirs it inherited from our ancestors. A string (cascade) of large reservoirs or minor dams in the hill country could have helped break the river’s energy which it accumulated along the way. G.T. Dharmasena, an irrigation engineer, had already raised the idea of “reorienting the operational approach of major reservoirs operators under extreme events, where flood control becomes a vital function.”
Unique Epitaphs for the Cyclones
The processes discussed above could have prevented the destruction of the railway track at the Peradeniya bridge, the image of which now stands like a pictorial epitaph to the malicious visit of the Ditwah and a reminder to us, “what if…?” or “what next…?”
As mentioned at the beginning of this essay, when the 1957 Cyclone dropped heavy rain on the NCP, a Railway Department employee at Anuradhapura made an exceptional effort to keep the memory of that saga for posterity with an epitaph still visible 70 years later. This person memorialised his near escape from the Malwatu Oya flood. As the river roared past over the railing of the bridge near the Lion Pillar roundabout, this employee, probably trapped in his two-storied house near the roundabout, day-stamped the visit of the flood with a red line on the wall of his house to mark the height it reached to trap him.
Three meters from the ground, right between two archtop windows facing the road to Sri Maha Bodhi, he wrote, “Flood level” in Sinhala, Tamil, and English. Right below it, at the end of the faded line, he added, “1957-12-25.”
As Cyclone Ditwah came along, the current resident of the house was not going to break this seven-decade-old tradition. After the flood receded this time, this duty-bound resident drew a line in blue ink and wrote at its end, ‘2025-11-28’, his contributing epitaph reminding us of infamous day Ditwah showed her might by driving the river off its banks. (See picture)
He added a coda to his epitaph – the numeral “8” in 28 is written in bold!
Lokubanda Tillakaratne is the author of Rata Sabhawa of Nuwarakalaviya: Judicature in a Princely Province – An Ethnographical and Historical Reading (2023).
by LOKUBANDA
TILLAKARATNE
Midweek Review
Whither Honesty?
In the imperiled IOR’s ‘Isle of Smiles’,
The vital ‘National Honesty Week’,
Has sadly gone unobserved,
In an unsettling sign of our times,
That honesty is no longer the best policy,
For neither smooth-talking rulers,
Taking after posh bourgeois predecessors,
Nor perhaps sections of the harried ruled,
Now sensing tremors of a repeat implosion.
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