Connect with us

Features

Raising of the Kotmale dam – misconceptions and facts

Published

on

By Asoka Herath

BSc (Geology Hons); MSc (Engineering Geology), CEng.

Over the past few months, there has been considerable interests among not only geoscientists and engineers but also ordinary people in the potential risks faced by two of the major hydropower projects constructed in the central highlands, namely the Victoria and Kotmale projects. These projects have come into the limelight owing to some minor seismic tremors felt in the Victoria area, together with the recent announcement of the intention to raise the Kotmale dam. Alarm bells are ringing that seismic activity may jeopardize the integrity of the Victoria dam and the raising of Kotmale may result in dam failure. Should these dams fail, they will be the biggest manmade disasters our country has ever faced. This risk has prompted suggestions from the people higher up that we should seek advice from foreign experts.

Various opinions from the leading geoscientists of the country, regarding the causes and effects of this unusual activity were aired through the media recently. Some have attributed the seismic tremors to limestone quarrying in the Victoria reservoir area, some as the result of neo-tectonic movements of the central highlands, yet some others said they are reservoir-induced earthquakes. Those who are interested in the fundamentals of such activity may find the presentation in this link useful (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7huzvuU9TEI).

The intention of this article is to provide an insight into the geotechnical issues that influence the Kotmale Project, the risks, and to address some misconceptions people may have regarding the project. I take the liberty of writing on these issues as a person who has an in-depth knowledge of the Project by working from the site investigation phase through to construction completion, the later years as the Senior Engineering Geologist, leading the project geoscientist team.

 

The Project

Kotmale was meant to be the main upstream storage reservoir under the Mahaweli development scheme launched in the 1960s. It will regulate the Mahaweli waters, while providing a substantial energy component. The capacity of the reservoir will be more than doubled by the proposed raising of the dam, approximately by 30 m. The project was inaugurated in 1979 and funded by Sweden. Sir William Halcrow and Partners of UK (Halcrow) with Central Engineering Consultancy Bureau of Sri Lanka (CECB) was the design engineer and Skanska of Sweden was the contractor.

 

Geology of the Project Area

To understand the project risks, it is essential to understand the geology and structure of the project area. The area is underlain by Pre-Cambrian age metamorphic rocks comprising predominantly of two rock types, charnokite (gneiss) and crystalline limestone (dolomite or marble) with minor quartzites. The limestone is sandwiched between layers of charnokite gneiss.

The rock units are folded into a gentle anticlinorium (an arch like structure-convex shape) which has a slight plunge downstream. The axis of the anticline trends northwest and falls on the right abutment in the dam area. As such the dam foundation rocks have a slight inclination (15°-25°) downstream and into the abutments.

Charnokite is a very strong resistant rock, which does not breakdown easily while limestone deteriorates and erodes more easily. The initial site investigation drilling in the Kotmale valley found limestone thickness varied from 20 m to 130 m within the project area.

The limestone consists mainly of calcium carbonate (CaCO3) and partly magnesian carbonate (MgCO3). Carbonates dissolves in acidic water (acid rain) and forms solution cavities. These cavities have the potential to create leaks from the reservoirs.

 

Formation of the Kotmale Valley

The Kotmale valley is an amphitheatre-like valley reshaped by the erosional activity of the Kotmale Oya for millennia. It is approximately 5 km wide at the widest point, is surrounded by high rock cliffs up to 300 m high on both flanks, which converge at the Kadadora village; the site of the dam construction. The valley forming process was a combination of differential weathering and erosion of the underlying limestone unit, resulting in the collapse of overlying more resistant rock units. The basal slopes of the cliffs consist of accumulated debris of rocks and soil derived from the cliffs (termed as scree or talus). Historically these talus slopes were in perpetual slow motion (creep) towards the river. They were subjected to numerous landslides, typically during or after heavy rain events. Generally, the Kotmale valley was infamous for landslide activity.

 

History of Kotmale Project investigations

The location of the dam site had been selected for the seemingly favourable topography formed by the converging valley flanks. One of the first jobs assigned to me when I joined the CECB in 1978 as a young engineering geologist, was to map four exploratory tunnels driven into the abutments of the proposed dam and report the rock conditions. Our evaluation indicated the left abutment had very poor rock conditions not suitable for a dam foundation.

In 1979, to evaluate the landslide risk to the project, Halcrow carried out a landslide survey of the project area. This survey was done due to the frequent landslide activity in the Kothmale area, and its similarities to the Vajont Dam disaster that occurred in Italy in 1963, which wiped out several downstream towns resulting about 2500 deaths.

This study identified the left abutment as a settled block (subsided en mass); limestone solution the likely cause. It strongly recommended to move the damsite downstream and monitor the impressive cliffs on the left flank of the valley for potential movements.

 

Evaluation by a panel of experts

As these findings were major issues impacting the viability of the Project, the Mahaweli Authority of Sri Lanka as the owner of the project, in early 1980 engaged a panel of foreign experts who were the leaders in the fields of rock and soil mechanics, to evaluate the potential issues and provide recommendations. This panel endorsed the relocation of the damsite.

Subsequently, the dam axis was moved approximately 200 m downstream from the original location.

 

Nature and distribution of the limestone

At the new location, the limestone was at a much greater depth below the dam foundation compared to the original site as shown in Figure 1. Even so, solution cavities were observed in the contact zone and within the limestone itself identified by drilling and close circuit television (CCTV) inspections carried out in the drillholes. Our best estimate indicated small cavities, however a drillhole represents only a small area, therefore the existence of larger cavities could not be ruled out.

 

Leakage through cavernous limestone is widespread from the reservoirs built in our hill country. The Samanalawewa Project is the best example where significant leakage had been occurring through a cavernous limestone under the right abutment since the impoundment, which could not be sealed.

 

Continuity of the Kotmale limestone

Investigations were carried out to establish the continuity of the Kotmale limestone to downstream areas in view of potential leakage which were inconclusive. The recent geological map for the Kandy-Nuwara-Eliya districts (GSMB), I am convinced that the Kotmale limestone continues to Gampola-Atabage Valley and further to the Victoria Reservoir as a major rock unit. The limestone quarrying in the Victoria Reservoir area occurs in the same unit, which caused the recent furore about seismic events allegedly caused by blasting. Whilst I do not believe there is (or will be) significant leakage from Kotmale Reservoir, future raising of the dam may enhance leakage if it exists which needs evaluation.

 

Water tightness of the dam foundation

To eliminate the risk of water leakage through the limestone under the dam foundation, it was extensively grouted from a grouting gallery constructed below the dam level (see Figure 1). Generally, the grout intakes were low. Nevertheless, few holes required significant amounts of grout before they could be sealed. Subsequent water pressure testing indicated the limestone unit was properly sealed and the foundation was watertight.

 

Monitoring of the cliffs and other landslides

During the initial impoundment, the cliffs were inspected by walkover surveys and by periodic monitoring with geodetic surveying. Movements of any significance, precursor of an impending major failure were not recorded during the early years after construction.

 

Reservoir Induced Seismicity (RIS)

One important consideration in the construction of large reservoirs is the potential for reservoir induced seismicity (RIS). RIS is the incidence of earthquakes triggered due to the impoundment of water behind a dam. A simplistic explanation is that reservoirs trigger earth tremors due to the load of water which could activate otherwise dormant faults, the energy released causing earth tremors.

Halcrow decided to investigate the risk of movement of some major structures present in the Kotmale reservoir area upon impoundment, which could potentially induce seismic events. Consequently, a micro-seismic monitoring network (MSMN) consisting of four monitoring stations was established around Kotmale project in 1981. The monitoring program was managed by the CECB and continued until the early 90s.

Published data (Fernando & Kulasinghe 1985) show that the maximum event recorded at Kotmale during the first two and half years of monitoring, was an event of 2.25 magnitude (Richter Scale), located far away from the project area. The monitoring led to the conclusion that the potential for RIS at Kotmale was extremely low or non-existent. However, in view of the recent seismic events recorded around Victoria, it will be prudent to revisit the monitoring records from the Kotmale network, presumably archived by the CECB.

 

Potential risks from future raising

The Kotmale project infrastructure, were designed and constructed for future raising. Theraised dam simply achieves the original vision of the project, as the main upstream storage reservoir and increases power output.

 

In my opinion the geotechnical risks arising from the raising of the Kotmale dam are as follows:

= The raised water level in the reservoir will fully inundate the scree slopes and reach the base of the left bank cliffs with potential to create major landslides. Cliff monitoring should be re-established using modern methods such as satellite based synthetic aperture radar interferometry (inSAR).

= There is potential for leakage through the limestone with raised water levels. All evidence suggests the limestone under the dam was properly sealed. Leakage from the reservoir flanks cannot be prevented, which is not a fatal flaw to the project. Requirement for abutment sealing should be revisited.

= It will be useful to re-establish the monitoring program of stream gauging in the Gampola-Atabage valley to investigate if any leakage will occur from Kotmale to Atabage valley. This should be initiated before the dam raising.

= All evidence points to reservoir induced seismicity is a non-issue for Kotmale Project.

 

Finally, I strongly advocate the raising of the dam for the following reasons:

 

= The original project infrastructure was developed with the intention of future raising.

= There are potential risks but not fatal flaws to the viability of the Project. These risks can be mitigated.

= People were evacuated from their ancestral lands going under the reservoir and if the project is not completed as originally intended, then this relocation of people was without merit and a grave injustice to them.

= The country unnecessarily lost approximately 30 MW of power for more than 35 years.

 

The potential risks with the raising of the Kotmale dam discussed here need to be evaluated, and if the need arise, they should be mitigated and managed using local expertise. In my opinion, what Sri Lanka lacks is good project managers vital in successful implementation of projects of such enormous national importance. In hindsight, the Kotmale reservoir should have been built to the full capacity at the first instance.

 

(The author currently works as a Principal Geotechnical Engineer with AMC Consultants Pty Ltd, Perth, Australia, and can be contacted at hma1904@gmail.com).



Features

Who Owns the Clock? The Quiet Politics of Time in Sri Lanka

Published

on

(This is the 100th column of the Out of the Box series, which began on 6 September, 2023, at the invitation of this newspaper – Ed.)

A new year is an appropriate moment to pause, not for celebration, but to interrogate what our politics, policies, and public institutions have chosen to remember, forget, and repeat. We celebrate the dawn of another brand-new year. But whose calendar defines this moment?

We hang calendars on our walls and carry them in our phones, trusting them to keep our lives in order, meetings, exams, weddings, tax deadlines, pilgrimages. Yet calendars are anything but neutral. They are among humanity’s oldest instruments of power: tools that turn celestial rhythms into social rules and convert culture into governance. In Sri Lanka, where multiple traditions of time coexist, the calendar is not just a convenience, it is a contested terrain of identity, authority, and fairness.

Time is never just time

Every calendar expresses a political philosophy. Solar systems prioritise agricultural predictability and administrative stability; lunar systems preserve religious ritual even when seasons drift; lunisolar systems stitch both together, with intercalary months added to keep festivals in season while respecting the moon’s phases. Ancient India and China perfected this balancing act, proving that precision and meaning can coexist. Sri Lanka’s own rhythms, Vesak and Poson, Avurudu in April, Ramadan, Deepavali, sit inside this wider tradition.

What looks “technical” is actually social. A calendar decides when courts sit, when budgets reset, when harvests are planned, when children sit exams, when debts are due, and when communities celebrate. It says who gets to define “normal time,” and whose rhythms must adapt.

The colonial clock still ticks

Like many postcolonial societies, Sri Lanka inherited the Gregorian calendar as the default language of administration. January 1 is our “New Year” for financial statements, annual reports, contracts, fiscal plans, school terms, and parliamentary sittings, an imported date shaped by European liturgical cycles and temperate seasons rather than our monsoons or zodiac transitions. The lived heartbeat of the island, however, is Avurudu: tied to the sun’s movement into Mesha Rāshi, agricultural renewal, and shared rituals of restraint and generosity. The result is a quiet tension: the calendar of governance versus the calendar of lived culture.

This is not mere inconvenience; it is a subtle form of epistemic dominance. The administrative clock frames Gregorian time as “real,” while Sinhala, Tamil, and Islamic calendars are relegated to “cultural” exceptions. That framing shapes everything, from office leave norms to the pace at which development programmes expect communities to “comply”.

When calendars enforce authority

History reminds us that calendar reforms are rarely innocent. Julius Caesar’s reshaping of Rome’s calendar consolidated imperial power. Pope Gregory XIII’s reform aligned Christian ritual with solar accuracy while entrenching ecclesiastical authority. When Britain finally adopted the Gregorian system in 1752, the change erased 11 days and was imposed across its empire; colonial assemblies had little or no say. In that moment, time itself became a technology for governing distant subjects.

Sri Lanka knows this logic. The administrative layers built under colonial rule taught us to treat Gregorian dates as “official” and indigenous rhythms as “traditional.” Our contemporary fiscal deadlines, debt restructurings, even election cycles, now march to that imported drumbeat, often without asking how this timing sits with the island’s ecological and cultural cycles.

Development, deadlines and temporal violence

Modern governance is obsessed with deadlines: quarters, annual budgets, five-year plans, review missions. The assumption is that time is linear, uniform, and compressible. But a farmer in Anuradhapura and a rideshare driver in Colombo do not live in the same temporal reality. Monsoons, harvests, pilgrimage seasons, fasting cycles, school term transitions, these shape when people can comply with policy, pay taxes, attend trainings, or repay loans. When programmes ignore these rhythms, failure is framed as “noncompliance,” when in fact the calendar itself has misread society. This mismatch is a form of temporal violence: harm produced not by bad intentions, but by insensitive timing.

Consider microcredit repayment windows that peak during lean agricultural months, or school examinations scheduled without regard to Avurudu obligations. Disaster relief often runs on the donor’s quarterly clock rather than the community’s recovery pace. In each case, governance time disciplines lived time, and the least powerful bend the most.

Religious time vs administrative time

Sri Lanka’s plural religious landscape intensifies the calendar question. Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, and Christianity relate to time differently: lunar cycles, solar markers, sacred anniversaries. The state acknowledges these mainly as public holidays, rather than integrating their deeper temporal logic into planning. Vesak is a day off, not a rhythm of reflection and restraint; Ramadan is accommodated as schedule disruption, not as a month that reorganises energy, sleep, and work patterns; Avurudu is celebrated culturally but remains administratively marginal. The hidden assumption is that “real work” happens on the Gregorian clock; culture is decorative. That assumption deserves challenge.

The wisdom in complexity

Precolonial South and East Asian calendars were not confused compromises. They were sophisticated integrations of astronomy, agriculture, and ritual life, adding intercalary months precisely to keep festivals aligned with the seasons, and using lunar mansions (nakshatra) to mark auspicious thresholds. This plural logic admits that societies live on multiple cycles at once. Administrative convenience won with the Gregorian system, but at a cost: months that no longer relate to the moon (even though “month” comes from “moon”), and a yearstart with no intrinsic astronomical significance for our context.

Towards temporal pluralism

The solution is not to abandon the Gregorian calendar. Global coordination, trade, aviation, science, requires shared reference points. But ‘shared’ does not mean uncritical. Sri Lanka can lead by modelling temporal pluralism: a policy posture that recognises different ways of organising time as legitimate, and integrates them thoughtfully into governance.

Why timing is justice

In an age of economic adjustment and climate volatility, time becomes a question of justice: Whose rhythms does the state respect? Whose deadlines dominate? Whose festivals shape planning, and whose are treated as interruptions? The more governance assumes a single, imported tempo, the wider the gap between the citizens and the state. Conversely, when policy listens to local calendars, legitimacy grows, as does efficacy. People comply more when the schedule makes sense in their lives.

Reclaiming time without romanticism

This is not nostalgia. It is a pragmatic recognition that societies live on multiple cycles: ecological, economic, ritual, familial. Good policy stitches these cycles into a workable fabric. Poor policy flattens them into a grid and then blames citizens for falling through the squares.

Sri Lanka’s temporal landscape, Avurudu’s thresholds, lunar fasts, monsoon pulses, exam seasons, budget cycles, is rich, not chaotic. The task before us is translation: making administrative time converse respectfully with cultural time. We don’t need to slow down; we need to sync differently.

The last word

When British subjects woke to find 11 days erased in 1752, they learned that time could be rearranged by distant power. Our lesson, centuries later, is the opposite: time can be rearranged by near power, by a state that chooses to listen.

Calendars shape memory, expectation, discipline, and hope. If Sri Lanka can reimagine the governance of time, without abandoning global coordination, we might recover something profound: a calendar that measures not just hours but meaning. That would be a reform worthy of our island’s wisdom.

(The writer, a senior Chartered Accountant and professional banker, is Professor at SLIIT, Malabe. The views and opinions expressed in this article are personal.)

Continue Reading

Features

Medicinal drugs for Sri Lanka:The science of safety beyond rhetoric

Published

on

The recent wave of pharmaceutical tragedies in Sri Lanka, as well as some others that have occurred regularly in the past, has exposed a terrifying reality: our medicine cabinets have become a frontline of risk and potential danger. In recent months, the silent sanctuary of Sri Lanka’s healthcare system has been shattered by a series of tragic, preventable deaths. The common denominator in these tragedies has been a failure in the most basic promise of medicine: that it will heal, not harm. This issue is entirely contrary to the immortal writings of the Father of Medicine, Hippocrates of the island of Kos, who wrote, “Primum non nocere,” which translates classically from Latin as “First do no harm.” The question of the safety of medicinal drugs is, at present, a real dilemma for those of us who, by virtue of our vocation, need to use them to help our patients.

For a nation that imports the vast majority of its medicinal drugs, largely from regional hubs like India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, the promise of healing is only as strong as the laboratory that verifies these very same medicinal drugs. To prevent further problems, and even loss of lives, we must demand a world-class laboratory infrastructure that operates on science, not just sentiment. We desperately need a total overhaul of our pharmaceutical quality assurance architecture.

The detailed anatomy of a national drug testing facility is not merely a government office. It is a high-precision fortress. To meet international standards like ISO/IEC 17025 and World Health Organisation (WHO) Good Practices for Pharmaceutical Quality Control Laboratories, such a high-quality laboratory must be zoned into specialised units, each designed to catch a different type of failure.

*  The Physicochemical Unit: This is where the chemical identity of a drug is confirmed. Using High-Performance Liquid Chromatography (HPLC) and Gas Chromatography-Mass Spectrometry (GC-MS), scientists determine if a “500mg” tablet actually contains 500mg of the active ingredient or if it is filled with useless chalk.

*  The Microbiology Suite: This is the most critical area for preventing “injection deaths.” It requires an ISO Class 5 Cleanroom: sterile environments where air is filtered to remove every microscopic particle. Here, technicians perform Sterility Testing to ensure no bacteria or fungi are present in medicines that have to be injected.

*  The Instrumentation Wing: Modern testing requires Atomic Absorption Spectrometers to detect heavy metal contaminants (like lead or arsenic) and Stability Chambers to see how drugs react to Sri Lanka’s high humidity.

*  The injectable drug contamination is a serious challenge. The most recent fatalities in our hospitals were linked to Intravenous (IV) preparations. When a drug is injected directly into the bloodstream, there is no margin for error. A proper national laboratory must conduct two non-negotiable tests:

*  Bacterial Endotoxin Testing (BET): Even if a drug is “sterile” (all bacteria are dead), the dead bacteria leave behind toxic cell wall products called endotoxins. If injected, these residual compounds cause “Pyrogenic Reactions” with violent fevers, organ failure, and death. A functional lab must use the Limulus Amoebocyte Lysate (LAL) test to detect these toxins at the parts-per-billion level.

*  Particulate Matter Analysis: Using laser obscuration, labs must verify that no microscopic shards of glass or plastic are floating in the vials. These can cause fatal blood clots or embolisms in the lungs.

It is absolutely vital to assess whether the medicine is available in the preparation in the prescribed amounts and whether it is active and is likely to work. This is Bioavailability. Sri Lanka’s heavy reliance on “generic” imports raises a critical question: Is the cheaper version from abroad as effective as the original, more expensive branded formulation? This is determined by Bioavailability (BA) and Bioequivalence (BE) studies.

A drug might have the right chemical formula, but if it does not dissolve properly in the stomach or reach the blood at the right speed, it is therapeutically useless. Bioavailability measures the rate and extent to which the active ingredient is absorbed into the bloodstream. If a cheaper generic drug is not “bioequivalent” to the original brand-named version, the patient is essentially taking a useless placebo. For patients with heart disease or epilepsy, even a 10% difference in bioavailability can lead to treatment failure. A proper national system must include a facility to conduct these studies, ensuring that every generic drug imported is a true “therapeutic equivalent” to the brand-named original.

As far as testing goes, the current testing philosophy is best described as Reactive, rather than Proactive. The current Sri Lankan system is “reactive”: we test a drug only after a patient has already suffered. This is a proven recipe for disaster. To protect the public, we must shift to a Proactive Surveillance Model of testing ALL drugs at many stages of their dispensing.

*  Pre-Marketing Approval: No drug should reach a hospital shelf without “Batch Release” testing. Currently, we often accept the manufacturer’s own certificate of analysis, which is essentially like allowing students to grade their own examination answers.

*  Random Post-Marketing Surveillance (PMS): Regulatory inspectors must have the power to walk into any rural pharmacy or state hospital, pick a box of medicine at random, and send it to the lab. This could even catch “substandard” drugs that may have degraded during shipping or storage in our tropical heat. PMS is the Final Safety Net. Even the best laboratories cannot catch every defect. Post-Marketing Surveillance is the ongoing monitoring of a drug’s safety after it has been released to the public. It clearly is the Gold Standard.

*  Pharmacovigilance: A robust digital system where every “Adverse Drug Reaction” (ADR) is logged in a national database.

*  Signal Detection: An example of this is if three hospitals in different provinces report a slight rash from the same batch of an antibiotic, the system should automatically “flag” that batch for immediate recall before a more severe, unfortunate event takes place.

*  Testing for Contaminants: Beyond the active ingredients, we must test for excipient purity. In some global cases, cheaper “glycerin” used in syrups was contaminated with diethylene glycol, a deadly poison. A modern lab must have the technology to screen for these hidden killers.

When one considers the Human Element, Competence and Integrity, the very best equipment in the world is useless without the human capital to run it. A national lab would need the following:

*  Highly Trained Pharmacologists and Microbiologists and all grades of staff who are compensated well enough to be immune to the “lobbying” of powerful external agencies.

*  Digital Transparency: A database accessible to the public, where any citizen can enter a batch number from their medicine box and see the lab results.

Once a proper system is put in place, we need to assess as to how our facilities measure up against the WHO’s “Model Quality Assurance System.” That will ensure maintenance of internationally recognised standards. The confirmed unfavourable results of any testing procedure, if any, should lead to a very prompt “Blacklist” Initiative, which can be used to legally bar failing manufacturers from future tenders. Such an endeavour would help to keep all drug manufacturers and importers on their toes at all times.

This author believes that this article is based on the premise that the cost of silence by the medical profession would be catastrophic. Quality assurance of medicinal compounds is not an “extra” cost. It is a fundamental right of every Sri Lankan citizen, which is not at all subject to any kind of negotiation. Until our testing facilities match the sophistication of the manufacturers we buy from, we are not just importing medicine; we are importing potential risk.

The promises made by the powers-that-be to “update” the testing laboratories will remain as a rather familiar, unreliable, political theatre until we see a committed budget for mass spectrometry, cleanroom certifications, highly trained and committed staff and a fleet of independent inspectors. Quality control of therapeutic medicines is not a luxury; it is the price to be paid for a portal of entry into a civilised and intensively safe healthcare system. Every time we delay the construction of a comprehensive, proactive testing infrastructure, we are playing a game of Russian Roulette with the lives of our people.

The science is available, and the necessary technology exists. What is missing is the political will to put patient safety as the premier deciding criterion. The time for hollow rhetoric has passed, and the time for a scientifically fortified, transparent, and proactive regulatory mechanism is right now. The good health of all Sri Lankans, as well as even their lives, depend on it.

Dr B. J. C. Perera  

MBBS(Cey), DCH(Cey), DCH(Eng), MD(Paediatrics), MRCP(UK), FRCP(Edin), FRCP(Lond), FRCPCH(UK), FSLCPaed, FCCP, Hony. FRCPCH(UK), Hony. FCGP(SL) 

Specialist Consultant Paediatrician and Honorary Senior Fellow, Postgraduate Institute of Medicine, University of Colombo, Sri Lanka.

Joint Editor, Sri Lanka Journal of Child Health

Section Editor, Ceylon Medical Journal

Continue Reading

Features

Rebuilding Sri Lanka Through Inclusive Governance

Published

on

Management Committee of the 'Rebuilding Sri Lanka' Fund Appointed with Representatives from the Public and Private Sectors - PMD

In the immediate aftermath of Cyclone Ditwah, the government has moved swiftly to establish a Presidential Task Force for Rebuilding Sri Lanka with a core committee to assess requirements, set priorities, allocate resources and raise and disburse funds. Public reaction, however, has focused on the committee’s problematic composition. All eleven committee members are men, and all non-government seats are held by business personalities with no known expertise in complex national development projects, disaster management and addressing the needs of vulnerable populations. They belong to the top echelon of Sri Lanka’s private sector which has been making extraordinary profits. The government has been urged by civil society groups to reconsider the role and purpose of this task force and reconstitute it to be more representative of the country and its multiple  needs.

 The group of high-powered businessmen initially appointed might greatly help mobilise funds from corporates and international donors, but this group may be ill equipped to determine priorities and oversee disbursement and spending. It would be necessary to separate fundraising, fund oversight and spending prioritisation, given the different capabilities and considerations required for each. International experience in post disaster recovery shows that inclusive and representative structures are more likely to produce outcomes that are equitable, efficient and publicly accepted. Civil society, for instance, brings knowledge rooted in communities, experience in working with vulnerable groups and a capacity to question assumptions that may otherwise go unchallenged.

 A positive and important development is that the government has been responsive to these criticisms and has invited at least one civil society representative to join the Rebuilding Sri Lanka committee. This decision deserves to be taken seriously and responded to positively by civil society which needs to call for more representation rather than a single representative.  Such a demand would reflect an understanding that rebuilding after a national disaster cannot be undertaken by the state and the business community alone. The inclusion of civil society will strengthen transparency and public confidence, particularly at a moment when trust in institutions remains fragile. While one appointment does not in itself ensure inclusive governance, it opens the door to a more participatory approach that needs to be expanded and institutionalised.

Costly Exclusions

 Going  down the road of history, the absence of inclusion in government policymaking has cost the country dearly. The exclusion of others, not of one’s own community or political party, started at the very dawn of Independence in 1948. The Father of the Nation, D S Senanayake, led his government to exclude the Malaiyaha Tamil community by depriving them of their citizenship rights. Eight years later, in 1956, the Oxford educated S W R D Bandaranaike effectively excluded the Tamil speaking people from the government by making Sinhala the sole official language. These early decisions normalised exclusion as a tool of governance rather than accommodation and paved the way for seven decades of political conflict and three decades of internal war.

Exclusion has also taken place virulently on a political party basis. Both of Sri Lanka’s post Independence constitutions were decided on by the government alone. The opposition political parties voted against the new constitutions of 1972 and 1977 because they had been excluded from participating in their design. The proposals they had made were not accepted. The basic law of the country was never forged by consensus. This legacy continues to shape adversarial politics and institutional fragility. The exclusion of other communities and political parties from decision making has led to frequent reversals of government policy. Whether in education or economic regulation or foreign policy, what one government has done the successor government has undone.

 Sri Lanka’s poor performance in securing the foreign investment necessary for rapid economic growth can be attributed to this factor in the main. Policy instability is not simply an economic problem but a political one rooted in narrow ownership of power. In 2022, when the people went on to the streets to protest against the government and caused it to fall, they demanded system change in which their primary focus was corruption, which had reached very high levels both literally and figuratively. The focus on corruption, as being done by the government at present, has two beneficial impacts for the government. The first is that it ensures that a minimum of resources will be wasted so that the maximum may be used for the people’s welfare.

Second Benefit

 The second benefit is that by focusing on the crime of corruption, the government can disable many leaders in the opposition. The more opposition leaders who are behind bars on charges of corruption, the less competition the government faces. Yet these gains do not substitute for the deeper requirement of inclusive governance. The present government seems to have identified corruption as the problem it will emphasise. However, reducing or eliminating corruption by itself is not going to lead to rapid economic development. Corruption is not the sole reason for the absence of economic growth. The most important factor in rapid economic growth is to have government policies that are not reversed every time a new government comes to power.

 For Sri Lanka to make the transition to self-sustaining and rapid economic development, it is necessary that the economic policies followed today are not reversed tomorrow. The best way to ensure continuity of policy is to be inclusive in governance. Instead of excluding those in the opposition, the mainstream opposition in particular needs to be included. In terms of system change, the government has scored high with regard to corruption. There is a general feeling that corruption in the country is much reduced compared to the past. However, with regard to inclusion the government needs to demonstrate more commitment. This was evident in the initial choice of cabinet ministers, who were nearly all men from the majority ethnic community. Important committees it formed, including the Presidential Task Force for a Clean Sri Lanka and the Rebuilding Sri Lanka Task Force, also failed at first to reflect the diversity of the country.

 In a multi ethnic and multi religious society like Sri Lanka, inclusivity is not merely symbolic. It is essential for addressing diverse perspectives and fostering mutual understanding. It is important to have members of the Tamil, Muslim and other minority communities, and women who are 52 percent of the population, appointed to important decision making bodies, especially those tasked with national recovery. Without such representation, the risk is that the very communities most affected by the crisis will remain unheard, and old grievances will be reproduced in new forms. The invitation extended to civil society to participate in the Rebuilding Sri Lanka Task Force is an important beginning. Whether it becomes a turning point will depend on whether the government chooses to make inclusion a principle of governance rather than treat it as a show of concession made under pressure.

by Jehan Perera

Continue Reading

Trending