Features
Province unsuitable as a unit of governance
by Neville Ladduwahetty
The government is reportedly planning to hold the provincial council elections while an expert committee is actively engaged in the making of a new constitution. Holding elections before the drafting of a constitution imposes a constraint on the expert committee since it cannot afford to drift too far from existing arrangements if it is not to incur the ire of the elected members following an election. This means that the expert committee cannot take into account the prevailing antipathy towards Provincial Councils (PCs), for whatever reason, and propose a fresh approach to devolution
This would be the unfortunate outcome if elections to PCs are held prior to the promulgation of a new constitution. If elections are held after a new Constitution is in place, it will give the expert committee an opportunity to propose a fresh approach after taking into account the lessons of historical experiences Sri Lanka has had to endure. Therefore, the plea to the government is to give the country the opportunity to evolve a system of government that serves them best, free of constraints.
LESSONS OF HISTORY
Having gained control of the whole of the island following the Kandyan Convention in 1815, the British attempted to administer the island as a single unit under a Governor. It did not take long for the British to realize that consolidation of power through an effective administration required the island to be sub-divided into smaller units as recommended by the Colebrooke-Cameron Reforms of 1833. The process of sub-division that started out with five (5) Provinces ended up with nine (9) provinces in 1889. Throughout this process of sub-division each province was further divided into districts and even smaller units in order to better administer the province. Thus by 1889 the nine provinces ended up being divided into the 25 districts.
With the introduction of the 13th Amendment to the Constitution in 1987, which created Provincial Councils, the lessons of history were ignored. Although the lesson of history was that smaller units are more effective as an administrative tool, the reversal to the larger unit of the province ignored the colonial guidelines of administration. The plea to the framers of the New Constitution is that these lessons of history are not ignored. What history has demonstrated clearly is that the province as a unit is ineffective as a unit of governance.
Although the administration of the island was based on the provinces under an all-powerful Government Agent for each province from 1833, his powers underwent significant derogation with the introduction of the Donoughmore Commission recommendations of 1931. Affirming this trend, the citation presented below states: “The status of the GA after the Donoughmore recommendations could be portrayed through the following note. ‘The division of government’s activities into ten ministries with a minister in charge of each activity, in place of general surveillance by the colonial secretary reduced enormously the power and responsibilities of the GA and led to the appointment of the departmental organizations responsible to the minister to manage many of the executives formerly entrusted to GA’. Thus the power and status of the GA, who was once an unquestioned authority in the district, underwent gradual erosion with the acquisition of his powers and authority of local administration by the departmental field agencies (Leitan p.41) Local administration for instance, under which Sanitary Boards and Village Committees were formerly supervised by the Kachchery organizations was now under the Department of Local Government. Education, Agriculture, Health and Public Works that were the subjects under the purview of the GA were the responsibilities of relevant departments under the executive committee system. (Ranasinghe R.A.W, “Role of Government Agent in Local Administration in Sri Lanka, International Journal of Education and Research, Vol. 2 No.2 February 2014).
Commenting on the process of division and sub-division during the colonial period where the powers of the provincial Government Agent become increasingly marginalized, Dr. Peiris in a characteristically scholarly article states: “Intra-provincial administrative adjustments were made at various times bringing the total number of Districts in the country from nineteen in 1889 to twenty-five at present. Government Agents of the provinces, holding executive power over their areas of authority, coordinated a range of government activities in their respective provinces. It is important to note, however, that in certain components of governance, while the related regional demarcations did not always coincide with provincial and district boundaries, the Government Agent had either only marginal involvement or no authority at all. This was particularly evident in fields such as the administration of justice, maintenance of law and order, and the provision of services in education and health care, in which there is large-scale daily interaction between the government and the people. (Dr. G.H. Peiris, Province-based Devolution in Sri Lanka: a Critique, December 17, 2020).
As Chairman of the Executive Committee responsible for Local Government it was Hon. S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike in 1940 who advocated the district as the most suitable unit from a Local Government perspective. His recommendation to the State Council was: “though the word ‘provincial’ is used here, I would point out that this body would be restricted to a revenue district, not necessarily to a province as we have it now, but to a revenue district. The Galle District, the Matara District, the Nuwara Eliya District and so on…” (Hansard {State Council}, 10 July 1940, pp. 1362-1371).
Thus, the lesson of history confirms the unsuitability of the province by itself as a unit of administration /governance. It is the sub-division of the province to districts that made administration effective during the colonial period. Furthermore, even though the population in the island in 1889 was only three million (Dr. G.H. Peiris), if the colonial powers deemed it appropriate to structure the island into nine provinces and twenty-five districts for reasons of administration, what kind of logic would justify reverting back to the larger unit of the province when the population is more than nearly six times what it was in 1889?
The reason for the reversal to the province was definitely NOT motivated by governance. The motivation for the reversal was clearly political. It was triggered by the need to find a solution to the Tamil national question based on claims of a traditional homeland involving the Northern and Eastern Provinces following the riots of 1983 and the intervention of India under the guise of the Indo-Lanka Accord. The history lesson that had come from colonial times to recognize the district and sub-divisions of the district, was ignored. What was introduced instead, was the province as the unit of governance in 1987, under the 13th Amendment. It is therefore understandable why the reversal to a province is as unworkable today as had been recognized by the colonial rulers.
LEARNING from HISTORY
No amount of additional powers and resources would make the provincial council system work, because the intention of the arrangement was for all power to be retained by the provincial councils. Such a centralized top down approach is inherently unworkable; a lesson the colonial administrators had eventually learnt. The only way to make it work was to devolve powers from the province to districts and to sub-divisions of districts such as pradeshiya sabhas and other local government units. This would derogate the powers currently exercised by the Chief Minister and the provincial council. Consequently, it would not be any different to the erosion of the powers of colonial Government Agents (GA) until the Donoughmore Commission recommendations were implemented and districts and its sub-units directly handled peripheral issues, thereby underscoring the irrelevance of the GA. Therefore, there is little or no prospect of PCs elected under current provisions devolving powers to districts and local governments within the province. Consequently, the current ineffective arrangements under the 13th Amendment would continue unless transformed rationally.
Although the province lost its relevance from an administration perspective, the British continued to identify the territory of the island in terms of provinces and districts. Even independent Ceylon and the Republic of Sri Lanka continued to identify the territory in terms of provinces and districts. However, it was only Article 5 of the 1978 Constitution that identified the territory of the Republic in terms of the district.
Notwithstanding the identification of the territory of the Republic of Sri Lanka in terms of the district, the reference to province resurfaced following the Vaddukoddai Resolution of 1976 that called for a separate state involving the Northern and Eastern Provinces. With this and the three-decade long armed conflict to create a separate state, the province has once more assumed importance to the point of not only becoming a threat to the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka, but also bequeathed an administrative nightmare that needs to be addressed without any further delay.
That nightmare is that every province in Sri Lanka functions under two parallel systems. One system administers functions relating to line ministries of the central government and a second system administers functions relating to the powers devolved to the provinces under the 13th Amendment. Reverting back to the decentralized system that existed prior to devolution is not a satisfactory arrangement either, because of the remoteness of the center from the priorities of the periphery. Devolving power to the provinces is akin to a centralized arrangement because it is as remote from the periphery. The problem with the current arrangement is not so much due to the two parallel systems, but primarily due to the choice of the unit to which power is devolved. Therefore, accepting that two parallel systems need to function concurrently because of its
in-built merit that power needs to be shared, one way to mitigate its negative aspects is to devolve appropriate power to districts and the local government entities in keeping with the concept of subsidiarity, instead of the provinces as exists today.
POSSIBLE OPTIONS
The choice for the Government is either to live with the current ineffective arrangement as per the 13th Amendment despite the denial of human rights of the overwhelming majority for improved governance, or actively promote a change to current arrangements notwithstanding a possible backlash from those who benefit from current arrangements.
One way to mitigate a possible backlash would be to absorb all the elected members in each PC into a District- based Council and divide the powers currently devolved under the 13th Amendment excluding powers relating to Law and Order, Land and Land Settlement and any others based on the concept of subsidiarity between such District-based Councils and the Local Governments. Such an arrangement would empower the districts with powers it did not have and enhance the powers currently assigned to Local Governments. In addition, it would give many more members currently elected to PCs an opportunity to directly engage in District-level activities than they are today.
For instance, under the current PC system, on an average, only the Chief Minister and four others form the Board of Ministers in each of the nine provinces. This means a total of forty-five are actively engaged in all the nine provinces with the majority of the Council members not having an opportunity to play a meaningful role. Consequently, the arrangement is undemocratic since the majority of elected members do not have the opportunity to contribute their views and express their concerns. If as proposed herein, a five-member Board of Minister is created in each district a total of one hundred and twenty-five Councilors in the twenty-five districts would be in a position to engage themselves meaningfully. According to a website as of 2017 there were 455 PC members. Accommodating all of them in the 25 districts would mean each district-based council would have an average of 18 to 19 members. On the other hand, if the district-based council is made up of a minimum of 2 from each of the nearly 260 Pradheshiya Sabahs (not including the 14MCs and 37UCs) the number in the 25 district council would be 520 i.e. more than from all the PCs. Therefore, whether the district council is formed from members of PCs or from members of local governments, the numbers involved would be similar. The only difference being the cost of conducting an election to elect the district-based council. Therefore, regardless of how the district based council is elected, it is imperative that if Sri Lanka is to prosper it has to transfer powers currently devolved to the provinces to district-based councils and local government entities.
CONCLUSION
The Province as a territorial unit is of relevance to the Tamil political leadership, while it is of no relevance to the overwhelming majority of citizens. To the Tamil leadership the province provides them the opportunity to merge the Northern and Eastern Provinces and carve out a single political unit on grounds of a dubious Tamil homeland claim despite the absence of any physical vestige of such a claim. To the average citizen the province with all power vested in it, is an impediment to improved governance that affects his/her well-being. Furthermore, the province is an ever present and a constant threat to Sri Lanka’s territorial integrity and national security as demonstrated by a three-decade long armed conflict followed by continuing threats by the Tamil leadership to go it alone.
Although colonial administrators started out to govern the island by creating five provinces in 1833 under Colebrooke-Cameron Reforms, they soon realized that effective administration was not possible without creating more provinces along with districts within each province. This process continued until 1889, when the territory of colonial Ceylon was divided into nine provinces and twenty-five districts. However, with the introduction of Donoughmore Commission reforms the relevance of the Government Agent of the province and the province as an administrative tool gradually faded and the smaller unit of the district became the more effective territorial unit for effective governance. This trend is quoted in the references cited above. The district as the unit of administration was also recognized by the State Council for purposes of Local Government even prior to independence in 1940.
These lessons of history were ignored when power was devolved to provinces under the 13th Amendment to the Constitution in 1987. The true intent for resurrecting the province with political power was clearly political because it provided for the Northern and Eastern provinces to be merged into a single territorial unit to be governed by a single PC. For this to happen the province has to survive and its survival depends on how it delivers on governance. The fact that the province has failed as a viable devolved unit means that the province has lost its purpose and therefore the justification to exist.
If Sri Lanka is to prosper it is imperative that the province as a territorial and political entity is abolished for three vital reasons.
One – That powers devolved to the provinces under the 13th Amendments excluding Law and Order, Land and Land Settlement and any others based on the concept of subsidiarity, should be divided between the districts and related local governments with a view to facilitating greater economic development and for reasons of fostering enhanced democratic governance.
Two – That the province represents a clear and constant danger to Sri Lanka’s territorial integrity because its size tempts separatist aspirations.
Three – That because the province was created in order to meet political exigencies and not for reasons of good governance, the time and opportunity have come to abandon serving parochial political imaginings of a few and create a system that focuses on human development for the benefit of all citizens.
The local government elections, long delayed and much anticipated, are shaping up to be a landmark political event. These elections were originally due in 2023, but were postponed by the previous government of President Ranil Wickremesinghe. The government of the day even defied a Supreme Court ruling mandating that elections be held without delay. They may have feared a defeat would erode that government’s already weak legitimacy, with the president having assumed office through a parliamentary vote rather than a direct electoral mandate following the mass protests that forced the previous president and his government to resign. The outcome of the local government elections that are taking place at present will be especially important to the NPP government as it is being accused by its critics of non-delivery of election promises.
Examples cited are failure to bring opposition leaders accused of large scale corruption and impunity to book, failure to bring a halt to corruption in government departments where corruption is known to be deep rooted, failure to find the culprits behind the Easter bombing and failure to repeal draconian laws such as the Prevention of Terrorism Act. In the former war zones of the north and east, there is also a feeling that the government is dragging its feet on resolving the problem of missing persons, those imprisoned without trial for long periods and return of land taken over by the military. But more recently, a new issue has entered the scene, with the government stating that a total of nearly 6000 acres of land in the northern province will be declared as state land if no claims regarding private ownership are received within three months.
The declaration on land to be taken over in three months is seen as an unsympathetic action by the government with an unrealistic time frame when the land in question has been held for over 30 years under military occupation and to which people had no access. Further the unclaimed land to be designated as “state land” raises questions about the motive of the circular. It has undermined the government’s election campaign in the North and East. High-level visits by the President, Prime Minister, and cabinet ministers to these regions during a local government campaign were unprecedented. This outreach has signalled both political intent and strategic calculation as a win here would confirm the government’s cross-ethnic appeal by offering a credible vision of inclusive development and reconciliation. It also aims to show the international community that Sri Lanka’s unity is not merely imposed from above but affirmed democratically from below.
Economic Incentives
In the North and East, the government faces resistance from Tamil nationalist parties. Many of these parties have taken a hardline position, urging voters not to support the ruling coalition under any circumstances. In some cases, they have gone so far as to encourage tactical voting for rival Tamil parties to block any ruling party gains. These parties argue that the government has failed to deliver on key issues, such as justice for missing persons, return of military-occupied land, release of long-term Tamil prisoners, and protection against Buddhist encroachment on historically Tamil and Muslim lands. They make the point that, while economic development is important, it cannot substitute for genuine political autonomy and self-determination. The failure of the government to resolve a land issue in the north, where a Buddhist temple has been put up on private land has been highlighted as reflecting the government’s deference to majority ethnic sentiment.
The problem for the Tamil political parties is that these same parties are themselves fractured, divided by personal rivalries and an inability to form a united front. They continue to base their appeal on Tamil nationalism, without offering concrete proposals for governance or development. This lack of unity and positive agenda may open the door for the ruling party to present itself as a credible alternative, particularly to younger and economically disenfranchised voters. Generational shifts are also at play. A younger electorate, less interested in the narratives of the past, may be more open to evaluating candidates based on performance, transparency, and opportunity—criteria that favour the ruling party’s approach. Its mayoral candidate for Jaffna is a highly regarded and young university academic with a planning background who has presented a five year plan for the development of Jaffna.
There is also a pragmatic calculation that voters may make, that electing ruling party candidates to local councils could result in greater access to state funds and faster infrastructure development. President Dissanayake has already stated that government support for local bodies will depend on their transparency and efficiency, an implicit suggestion that opposition-led councils may face greater scrutiny and funding delays. The president’s remarks that the government will find it more difficult to pass funds to local government authorities that are under opposition control has been heavily criticized by opposition parties as an unfair election ploy. But it would also cause voters to think twice before voting for the opposition.
Broader Vision
The government’s Marxist-oriented political ideology would tend to see reconciliation in terms of structural equity and economic justice. It will also not be focused on ethno-religious identity which is to be seen in its advocacy for a unified state where all citizens are treated equally. If the government wins in the North and East, it will strengthen its case that its approach to reconciliation grounded in equity rather than ethnicity has received a democratic endorsement. But this will not negate the need to address issues like land restitution and transitional justice issues of dealing with the past violations of human rights and truth-seeking, accountability, and reparations in regard to them. A victory would allow the government to act with greater confidence on these fronts, including possibly holding the long-postponed provincial council elections.
As the government is facing international pressure especially from India but also from the Western countries to hold the long postponed provincial council elections, a government victory at the local government elections may speed up the provincial council elections. The provincial councils were once seen as the pathway to greater autonomy; their restoration could help assuage Tamil concerns, especially if paired with initiating a broader dialogue on power-sharing mechanisms that do not rely solely on the 13th Amendment framework. The government will wish to capitalize on the winning momentum of the present. Past governments have either lacked the will, the legitimacy, or the coordination across government tiers to push through meaningful change.
Obtaining the good will of the international community, especially those countries with which Sri Lanka does a lot of economic trade and obtains aid, India and the EU being prominent amongst these, could make holding the provincial council elections without further delay a political imperative. If the government is successful at those elections as well, it will have control of all three tiers of government which would give it an unprecedented opportunity to use its 2/3 majority in parliament to change the laws and constitution to remake the country and deliver the system change that the people elected it to bring about. A strong performance will reaffirm the government’s mandate and enable it to move from promises to results, which it will need to do soon as mandates need to be worked at to be long lasting.
by Jehan Perera
The fall of Saigon (now Ho Chi Minh City – HCM) on 30 April 1975 marked the end of Vietnam’s decades-long struggle for liberation—first against French colonialism, then U.S. imperialism. Ho Chi Minh’s Viet Minh, formed in 1941, fought Japanese occupiers and later defeated France at Dien Bien Phu (1954). The Geneva Accords temporarily split Vietnam, with U.S.-backed South Vietnam blocking reunification elections and reigniting conflict.
The National Liberation Front (NLF) led resistance in the South, using guerrilla tactics and civilian support to counter superior U.S. firepower. North Vietnam sustained the fight via the Ho Chi Minh Trail, despite heavy U.S. bombing. The costly 1968 Tet Offensive exposed U.S. vulnerabilities and shifted public opinion.
Of even more import, the Vietnam meat-grinder drained the U.S. military machine of weapons, ammunition and morale. By 1973, relentless resistance forced U.S. withdrawal. In March 1975, the Vietnamese People’s Army started operations in support of the NLF. The U.S.-backed forces collapsed, and by 30 April the Vietnamese forces forced their way into Saigon.
At 11 am, Soviet-made T-54 tank no. 843 of company commander Bui Quang Than rammed into a gatepost of the presidential palace (now Reunification Palace). The company political commissar, Vu Dang Toan, following close behind in his Chinese-made T-59 tank, no. 390, crashed through the gate and up to the palace. It seems fitting that the tanks which made this historic entry came from Vietnam’s principal backers.
Bui Quang Than bounded from his tank and raced onto the palace rooftop to hoist the NLF flag. Meanwhile, Vu Dang Toan escorted the last president of the U.S.-backed regime, Duong Van Minh, to a radio station to announce the surrender of his forces. This surrender meant the liberation not only of Saigon but also of the entire South, the reunification of the country, and a triumph of perseverance—a united, independent nation free from foreign domination after a 10,000-day war.
Celebrations
On 30 April 2025, Vietnam celebrated the 50th anniversary of the Liberation of the South and National Reunification. HCM sprouted hundreds of thousands of national flags and red hammer-and-sickle banners, complemented by hoardings embellished with reminders of the occasion – most of them featuring tank 590 crashing the gate.
Thousands of people camped on the streets from the morning of 29 April, hoping to secure good spots to watch the parade. Enthusiasm, especially of young people, expressed itself by the wide use of national flag t-shirts, ao dais (traditional long shirts over trousers), conical hats, and facial stickers. This passion may reflect increasing prosperity in this once impoverished land.
The end of the war found Vietnam one of the poorest countries in the world, with a low per capita income and widespread poverty. Its economy struggled due to a combination of factors, including wartime devastation, a lack of foreign investment and heavy reliance on subsistence agriculture, particularly rice farming, which limited its potential for growth. Western sanctions meant Vietnam relied heavily on the Soviet Union and its socialist allies for foreign trade and assistance.
The Vietnamese government launched Five-Year Plans in agriculture and industry to recover from the war and build a socialist nation. While encouraging family and collective economies, it restrained the capitalist economy. Despite these efforts, the economy remained underdeveloped, dominated by small-scale production, low labour productivity, and a lack of modern technology. Inflexible central planning, inept bureaucratic processes and corruption within the system led to inefficiencies, chronic shortages of goods, and limited economic growth. As a result, Vietnam’s economy faced stagnation and severe hyperinflation.
These mounting challenges prompted the Communist Party of Vietnam to introduce Đổi Mới (Renovation) reforms in 1986. These aimed to transition from a centrally planned economy to a “socialist-oriented market economy” to address inefficiencies and stimulate growth, encouraging private ownership, economic deregulation, and foreign investment.
Transformation
Đổi Mới marked a historic turning point, unleashing rapid growth in agricultural output, industrial expansion, and foreign direct investment. Early reforms shifted agriculture from collective to household-based production, encouraged private enterprise, and attracted foreign investment. In the 2000s, Vietnam became a top exporter of textiles, electronics, and rice, shifting towards high-tech manufacturing (inviting Samsung and Intel factories). By the 2020s, it emerged as a global manufacturing hub, the future focus including the digital economy, green energy, and artificial intelligence.
In less than four decades, Vietnam transformed from a poor, agrarian nation into one of Asia’s fastest-growing economies, though structural reforms are still needed for sustainable development. Growth has remained steady, at 5-8% per year.
Vietnam’s reforms lifted millions out of poverty, created a dynamic export-driven economy, and improved education, healthcare, and infrastructure. This has manifested itself in reducing extreme poverty from 70% to 1%, increasing literacy to 96%, life expectancy from 63 to 74 years, and rural electrification from less than 50% to 99.9%. Industrialisation drove urbanisation, which doubled from 20% in 1986 to 40% now.
This change displayed itself during the celebrations in HCM, amid skyscrapers, highways and the underground metro system. Everybody dressed well, and smartphones could be seen everywhere – penetration has reached three-fourths of the population. Thousands turned out on motorbikes and scooters (including indigenous electric scooters) – two-wheeler ownership is over 70%, the highest rate per capita in ASEAN. Traffic jams of mostly new cars emphasised the growth of the middle class.
At the same time, street food vendors and makeshift pavement bistro owners joined sellers of patriotic hats, flags and other paraphernalia to make a killing from the revellers. This reflects the continuance of the informal sector– currently representing 30% of the economy.
The Vietnamese government channelled tax income from booming sectors into underdeveloped regions, investing in rural infrastructure and social welfare to balance growth and mitigate urban-rural inequality during rapid economic expansion. Nevertheless, this economic transformation came with unequal benefits, exacerbating income inequality and persistent gender gaps in wages and opportunities. Sustaining growth requires tackling corruption, upgrading workforce skills, and balancing development with inequality.
NLF flag
Tank 390 courtesy Bao Hai Duong
The parade itself, meticulously carried out (having been rehearsed over three days), featured cultural pageants and military displays and drew admiration. Of special note, the inclusion of foreign military contingents from China, Laos, and Cambodia for the first time signalled greater regional solidarity, acknowledging their historical support while maintaining a balanced foreign policy approach.
Veteran, war-era foreign journalists noted another interesting fact: the re-emergence of the NLF flag. Comprising red and blue stripes with a central red star, this flag had never been prominent at the ten-year anniversary celebrations. The journalists questioned its sudden reappearance. It may be to give strength to the idea of the victory being one of the South itself, part of a drive to increase unity between North and South.
Before reunification in 1975, North and South Vietnam embodied starkly contrasting economic and social models. The North operated under a centrally planned socialist system, with collectivised farms and state-run industries. It emphasised egalitarianism, mass education, and universal healthcare while actively preserving traditional Vietnamese culture. The South, by contrast, maintained a market-oriented economy heavily reliant on agricultural exports (rice and rubber) and foreign aid. A wealthy elite dominated politics and commerce, while Western—particularly American—cultural influence grew pervasive during the war years.
Following reunification under the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (1976), the government moved swiftly to integrate the two regions. In 1978, it introduced a unified national currency (the đồng, VND), merging the North’s and South’s financial systems into a single, state-controlled framework. The unification of monetary policy symbolised the broader ideological project: to erase colonial and capitalist legacies.
Unity and solidarity
However, the economic disparities and cultural divides between regions persist, though less pronounced than before. The South, particularly HCM, remains Vietnam’s economic powerhouse, with a stronger private sector and international trade connections. The North, including Hanoi, has a more government-driven economy. Southerners tend to have a more entrepreneurial mindset, while Northerners are often seen as more traditional and rule-bound. Conversely, individuals from the North occupy more key government positions.
Studies suggest that people in the South exhibit lower trust in the government compared to those in the North. HCM tends to have stronger support for Western countries like the United States, while Hanoi has historically maintained closer ties with China. People in HCM tend to use the old “Saigon” city name.
Consequently, the 50th anniversary celebrations saw a focus on reconciliation and unity, reflecting a shift in perspective towards peace and friendship, as well as accompanying patriotism with international solidarity.
The exuberant crowds, modern infrastructure, and thriving consumer economy showcased the transformative impact of Đổi Mới—yet lingering regional disparities, informal labour challenges, and unequal gains remind the nation that sustained progress demands inclusive reforms. The symbolic return of the NLF flag and the emphasis on unity underscored a nuanced reconciliation between North and South, honouring shared struggle while navigating enduring differences.
As Vietnam strides forward as a rising Asian economy, it balances its socialist legacy with global ambition, forging a path where prosperity and patriotism converge. The anniversary was not just a celebration of the past but a reflection on the complexities of Vietnam’s ongoing evolution.
(Vinod Moonesinghe read mechanical engineering at the University of Westminster, and worked in Sri Lanka in the tea machinery and motor spares industries, as well as the railways. He later turned to journalism and writing history. He served as chair of the Board of Governors of the Ceylon German Technical Training Institute. He is a convenor of the Asia Progress Forum, which can be contacted at asiaprogressforum@gmail.com.)
By Vinod Moonesinghe
The Sri Lanka music scene is certainly a happening place for quite a few of our artistes, based abroad, who are regularly seen in action in our part of the world. And they certainly do a great job, keeping local music lovers entertained.
Rohitha and Rohan, the JAYASRI twins, who are based in Vienna, Austria, are in town, doing the needful, and the twosome has turned out to be crowd-pullers.
Says Rohitha: Our season here in Sri Lanka, and summer in the south hemisphere (with JAYASRI) started in October last year, with many shows around the island, and tours to Australia, Japan, Dubai, Doha, the UK, and Canada. We will be staying in the island till end of May and then back to Austria for the summer season in Europe.”
Rohitha mentioned their UK visit as very special.
The JAYASRI twins Rohan and Rohitha
“We were there for the Dayada Charity event, organised by The Sri Lankan Kidney Foundation UK, to help kidney patients in Sri Lanka, along with Yohani, and the band Flashback. It was a ‘sold out’ concert in Leicester.
“When we got back to Sri Lanka, we joined the SL Kidney Foundation to handover the financial and medical help to the Base Hospital Girandurukotte.
“It was, indeed, a great feeling to be a part of this very worthy cause.”
Rohitha and Rohan also did a trip to Canada to join JAYASRI, with the group Marians, for performances in Toronto and Vancouver. Both concerts were ‘sold out’ events.
They were in the Maldives, too, last Saturday (03).
Alpha Blondy:
In action, in
Colombo, on
19th July!
JAYASRI, the full band tour to Lanka, is scheduled to take place later this year, with Rohitha adding “May be ‘Another legendary Rock meets Reggae Concert’….”
The band’s summer schedule also includes dates in Dubai and Europe, in September to Australia and New Zealand, and in October to South Korea and Japan.
Rohitha also enthusiastically referred to reggae legend Alpha Blondy, who is scheduled to perform in Sri Lanka on 19th July at the Air Force grounds in Colombo.
“We opened for this reggae legend at the Austria Reggae Mountain Festival, in Austria. His performance was out of this world and Sri Lankan reggae fans should not miss his show in Colombo.”
Alpha Blondy is among the world’s most popular reggae artistes, with a reggae beat that has a distinctive African cast.
Calling himself an African Rasta, Blondy creates Jah-centred anthems promoting morality, love, peace, and social consciousness.
With a range that moves from sensitivity to rage over injustice, much of Blondy’s music empathises with the impoverished and those on society’s fringe.
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