Opinion
Protection of the state from terrorism act:a critique of the current proposal
I. Background to the Government Proposal
The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, No. 48 of 1979, (PTA), has been vigorously assailed for 45 years as the anchor of a legislative regime which is destructive of basic political and civil rights. It has gained ignominy as an instrument for denial of justice in diverse contexts and also placed in jeopardy, internationally, the prestige of our country as a vibrant democracy. There have been legislative interventions from time to time by Act No. 10 of 1982 and Act No. 22 of 1988.
By 2022, it was clear that the momentum of reform had to be accelerated. As Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, on 22 March 2022, I introduced in Parliament, and secured the passage of, a series of amendments to the PTA. This was in the form of Act No. 12 of 2022. These amendments had as their principal objective, shortening the maximum period of permissible detention without trial, enhancing judicial oversight of detention, access to legal representation and communication, expediting of trials, liberalizing the law relating to bail, and invocation of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in fundamental rights applications.
I made it clear in Parliament that this was only a preliminary step confined to the introduction of urgent amendments to address immediate concerns. The ultimate aim, I informed Parliament, was not ad-hoc modification of the existing law, but the enactment of all-encompassing, fresh legislation. Towards this end, a comprehensive review was underway with participation by the Ministries of Defence, Justice, and Foreign Affairs, and the Attorney General’s Department.
At the 50th session of the Human Rights Council on 13 June 2022, as Foreign Minister of Sri Lanka, I gave a firm assurance in Geneva that, pending this overhaul of the applicable legislation, there would be a de facto moratorium on use of the PTA. Although the Inspector General of Police had issued instructions accordingly at the time, unfortunately, after successive changes of government, this undertaking was not adhered to.
Three attempts have been made by different governments to enact complete legislation on terrorism. These were the Counter-Terrorism Act gazetted in September 2018, and two versions of an Anti-Terrorism Act in March and September 2023. On account of strong public resistance, none of these found their way into the statute book.
The current draft, Protection of the State from Terrorism Act, (PSTA), which has been in the making for almost a year, was published in December 2025. Notwithstanding the high level of expectation which it had generated, regrettably, the draft Bill fails, in fundamental respects, to advance the law towards justice and freedom.
II. Issues of Definition and Scope
One of the main weaknesses of the draft legislation is that it is entirely unsuccessful in addressing the pivotal issue of the legitimate boundaries of an extraordinary system of criminal liability which displaces seminal rights inherent in the Rule of Law. In all democratic cultures, it is recognized that imperatives of security in extreme circumstances call for measures incompatible with guarantees of freedom upheld by the regular law. The lines of demarcation, however, are of overriding importance. From this standpoint, the proposed legislation is a singular disappointment.
Structurally, in its very foundation, it contravenes criteria imposed by international human rights law. This is starkly evident in the approach of the draft Bill to definition of the mental ingredient in terrorism-related offences, one of the critical factors in containing liability within appropriate limits.
International law requires, in this context, a hybrid mental requirement consisting of a dual-layered intention to cause death, serious bodily harm, or taking of hostages but necessarily combined with the calculated intention of bringing about a reign of terror and intimidating the public. Both elements are compulsory requisites of liability for a terrorism-related offence. This fundamental postulate is breached by the proposed legislation which adopts the approach of requiring direct intention or knowledge in respect of the first element [section 3(1)], but regards the second as an oblique inference from a “consequence” such as the death of a person, hurt or hostage taking [section 3(2)]. Dramatic lowering of the threshold of responsibility by this mode of definition strikes at the root of the value system entrenched in international law.
The draft legislation creates no fewer than 13 categories of acts carrying the taint of terrorism. The compelling objection to this extensive catalogue is that it blurs the distinction between ordinary criminal acts and the stringently limited category of acts involving terrorism. The first, and indispensable, requirement of legislation in the latter field is that of clear and unambiguous definition with no scope for elasticity of interpretation. By vivid contrast, the draft law contains a multitude of offences which find their proper place in the Penal Code and other regular legislation, but are by no means necessarily susceptible to the label of terrorism. Egregious examples are serious damage to any place of public use or any public property; the offence of robbery, extortion, or theft; and serious obstruction or damage to, or interference with, any electronic, automated, or computerized system [section 3(2)].
The inclusion of these offences in a counter-terrorism law, given the empirical experience of the past, is no less than an invitation to abuse of the system for collateral purposes, with the distinct prospect of danger to cherished democratic freedoms in such vital areas as communication and assembly. This is especially so, because the types of intention envisaged subsume so vague a purpose as “compelling the government of Sri Lanka or any other government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act” [section 3(1) (c)]. The peril is obvious to entirely legitimate forms of protest and agitation. It must be remembered that the penalty applicable is rigorous imprisonment extending up to 20 years and a fine not exceeding 20 million rupees [section 4(b)].
This clearly threatening feature is aggravated by other characteristics of the draft Bill. Several are worthy of note.
(i) Ancillary offences are framed in such broad terms as to inject a deterrent effect in respect of exercise of individual and group rights enshrined by the Constitution. Section 8(1), according to its marginal note, purports to deal with acts “associated with terrorism”, a vague and catch-all phrase. The text of this provision imposes liability on a person who is “concerned in” the commission of a terrorist offence. “Encouragement of Terrorism”, the title of section 9, is manifestly overbroad. Its ambit, encompassing all forms of “indirect encouragement”, would sweep within its purview, for instance, a large swath of the activity associated with the Aragalaya in 2022, which brought about a change of government.
There is unmistakable exposure for all forms of social activism. Section 10, entitled “Dissemination of Terrorist Publications”, goes so far as to bring within the net of liability for terrorism any person who “provides a service to others that enables them to obtain, read, listen to, or look at a terrorist publication or to acquire it”. The whole range of mainstream and social media is indisputably in jeopardy.
(ii) There are other obnoxious aspects, as well. The draft law makes generous use of the idea of “recklessness”, as in the context of publication of statements and uttering of words (section 9), and in the dissemination of publications (section 10). This is a state of mind alternative to intention; but the concept of “recklessness” is operative within very narrow confines in criminal jurisprudence. This is yet another lever for expansion of liability beyond the class of terrorist offences, properly so designated.
(iii) A feature of the proposed law, open to even more cogent objection, is the extension of this draconian form of liability, carrying condign punishment, to mere omissions. This is the effect of section 15, which makes failure to provide information a terrorist offence. The trend in the modern criminal law is markedly hostile to widening the boundaries of liability to situations in which the accused has only refrained from commission of an act. One of my own mentors, Professor Glanville Williams of Cambridge University, described by Professor Sir Rupert Cross, at the time Vinerian Professor in the University of Oxford, as the greatest criminal lawyer in the United Kingdom since Sir Fitzjames Stephen, has consistently opposed, in principle, the attribution of criminal liability, let alone liability for terrorist offences, to mere omissions. In conjunction with all the other instruments embedded in the draft, this expedient places in the hands of a politically motivated Executive a ready means for indiscriminate application of terrorist sanctions, to the detriment of enjoyment of rights taken for granted in a democratic society.
(iv) Section 3(4), which purports to confer a measure of protection on such activity as protests, advocacy of dissent, or engagement in strikes, by a provision that such activity, by itself, is not to be regarded as a sufficient basis for inference of terrorist intent, has an illusory character. While engendering a sense of comfort, its applicability is negated by parallel provisions which enable imposition of liability, for example, on the ground of alleged intent to bring compulsive pressure to bear on the State [section 3(1)(c)]. Uncertainty created by the conflict between these provisions places at unacceptable risk the ethos of democratic safeguards.
III. Overreach of the Executive Arm for Arrest and Detention
Broadening of categories of terrorist offences beyond legitimate limits presages an imminent danger. This takes the form of authority conferred on the Executive, represented by such officials as the armed forces, the police, and coast guard personnel, to resort to action which erodes the rudiments of liability. The wider the ambit of terrorist offences, the ampler is the power available to these officials to invade the substance of freedom by action to enter the homes of citizens, interrogate persons, seize documents, carry out stop and search operations on public highways, and engage in other forms of harassment. The current draft has no hesitation in conferring these powers in the fullest measure.
(i) Detention Orders
This is one of the features of the PTA of 1979, which attracted trenchant criticism for more than four decades. In terms of section 9(1) of that Act, the Minister of Defence was invested with power to issue detention orders for a maximum period of three months in the first instance, capable of extension for periods not exceeding three months at a time, subject to an aggregate period of detention not exceeding 18 months. Significantly, corresponding provision is contained in the current draft which empowers the Secretary to the Ministry of Defence to issue detention orders [section 29(2)] at the behest of the Inspector General of Police or a Deputy Inspector General of Police authorized by the IGP [section 29(1)].
The only difference is with regard to the period of detention. According to the new draft, the detention order cannot be extended for a period in excess of two months at a time, and the aggregate period is a maximum of one year. Subject to this marginal variation, the perils of the instrument of a detention order continue, unabated.
What is especially disquieting are the grounds specified in the draft for issuance of a detention order. There are four grounds spelt out. Among these is “to facilitate the conduct of the investigation in respect of the suspect” [section 3(a)]. This is wide enough to permit the most flagrant abuse. A provision, so flexibly phrased, allows detention without judicial review. Due process, required by the regular criminal justice system, is supplanted by a regime antithetical at its core to the fundamentals of the Rule of Law.
Our country has had a distressing record of torture and extrajudicial executions in custodial settings. The recurring feature is that these atrocities have typically taken place in non-judicial custody. In the face of this reality and in cynical disregard of sustained protests against this obvious avenue of abuse, the present draft complacently leaves wide open this convenient window. This is done by section 30(1) which accords official sanction to “approved places of detention”. The accumulated harrowing experience of the past has totally escaped attention.
Despite largely cosmetic concessions, the victims of detention orders within the framework of the proposed legislation, no less than under previous statutory regimes, remain substantially at the mercy of the Executive.
The exhortation in section 36 that “Every investigation shall be completed without unnecessary delay” amounts to no more than a pious aspiration, in the absence of a mandatory maximum period stipulated for investigations. Moreover, even when the investigation, potentially open-ended, has been completed and a report submitted to the Magistrate, the Magistrate’s power to discharge the suspect is rigidly curtailed. This is because a judicial order for discharge is possible in terms of section 36(3) only when an allegation against the suspect is not disclosed on the face of the report. There is telling irony in this situation.
The loophole is one through which the Executive is able to drive a coach and six with the greatest ease. Practical experience demonstrates conclusively that, in situations indicative of the most grotesque abuse in the past, the courts were confronted not with the total absence of an allegation, but rather with a clumsy, trumped-up allegation defying credibility. In this, the typical case, the proposed legislation chooses to leave the Magistrate with no jurisdiction to grant urgently needed relief.
The most hazardous provision of all is one which enables a suspect, already in judicial custody, to be transferred to police custody in pursuance of a detention order issued by the Defence Secretary. It is this power, fraught with dire consequences, that the new draft, in section 39(1), seeks to confer. This power can be invoked on the disingenuous pretext that the suspect, prior to being arrested, had committed an offence of which the officer in charge of the relevant police station was unaware. While the desirable direction of movement is obviously from police to judicial custody, movement in the opposite direction is the strange result of this provision. Although interposition of a High Court Judge’s authority is envisaged, the exigencies of a security situation, urged with emphasis by the Executive, may well be difficult to resist in practice.
IV. Other Oppressive Interventions
(a) Restriction Orders
It is quite remarkable that other instruments of oppression which have attracted strenuous condemnation during the entire operation of the PTA, continue substantially intact.
Restriction orders offer an illustrative example. Any police officer of the rank of Deputy Inspector General of Police or above is given authority to make application to a Magistrate’s Court for a restriction order (section 64). The only contrast with the PTA is that, in terms of that regime, the Minister was empowered to make the order directly. In subsequent attempts at reform, this was clearly acknowledged as unacceptable, and in the amending legislation proposed but not enacted in September 2023, the initiative was that of the President and it was the High Court that had jurisdiction to issue the order.In comparison with this, the current proposal is regressive, in that the application is to be made by a police officer, (clearly at the behest of the Executive), and jurisdiction to issue the order is vested in a lower court.
In yet another respect, the present proposal is less satisfactory than the innovation proposed in 2023, in that desirable safeguards embedded in the latter, such as that the order sought should be “necessary” or “proportionate” [section 80(4)], are omitted from the present proposal. In this sense, the current draft is not merely stagnant but regressive, by abjuring salutary approaches to reform.
Restriction orders, without doubt, infringe basic rights corrosively. Their awesome scope contravenes core rights as to communication, association, employment, and travel [section 64(3)]. These erosions remain untouched as to intensity and range, except in respect of duration.While the PTA provided that a restriction order was to be in force for a period not exceeding 3 months, subject to further extensions of 3 months at a time, the maximum aggregate of such extensions being 18 months, the sole concession made by the present proposal is that the validity of a restriction order is limited to 1 month, and the aggregate period cannot exceed 6 months [section 64(9)].
(b) Proscription Orders
In this regard as well, the present proposal takes a step in the wrong direction. Proscription orders are a means by which the President exercises overarching power, simply by notification in the Gazette, to declare organizations illegal, with the consequence of preventing recruitment, meetings, and other activities, transactions in bank accounts, lobbying and canvassing, and publication of material (section 63). The period of application of a proscription order has an arbitrary and capricious quality: it is entirely at the discretion of the President and remains valid until rescinded [section 63(6)].
It is especially noteworthy that the legislative regime at present in force, the PTA, contains no provision whatever for the issuance of proscription orders. This purpose could be accomplished only by having recourse to regulations made under section 27(1) of the Act. Incorporation of this power in the substance of the principal Act itself was proposed in the draft legislation of 2023, which could not be enacted because of vehement resistance. The current proposal, curiously enough, sanctifies as part of the substantive Act, a dangerously fraught procedure which can, as of now, be resorted to only through subordinate legislation. The present draft, then, operates as a travesty rather than a palliative by pushing the law backwards. This hardly amounts to delivery on a promise that underpinned the year-long process which culminated in publication of the current proposal.
(c) Declarations Designating Prohibited Places
The bizarre reality, here again, is that the present proposal, far from expunging excrescences from the current law, actually adds further objectionable provisions which do not exist in the body of terrorist legislation today.
The much-maligned PTA does not include a provision empowering the Executive to declare places as “prohibited places”. This had to be done, if at all, under the aegis of legislation dealing with entirely different subject matter, for example, section 2 of the Official Secrets Act, No. 32 of 1955. Contrary to the professed objective, the new proposal, for the first time, introduces into terrorist legislation the conferment of power on the Defence Secretary to designate “prohibited places”.
The consequences are far-reaching, indeed: entry into a designated place, the taking of photographs and video recordings, and the making of drawings or sketches are all criminalized by the infliction of imprisonment for up to 3 years or a fine not exceeding 3 million rupees [section 66(8)]. This has a particularly chilling effect on journalists and media personnel; and it is the bequest of legislation professedly aspiring to enhance the contours of freedom.
V. Deprivation of Liberty by Insidious Pressure
One of the few positive elements of the new proposal is the deletion of provisions in the PTA dealing with the admissibility of confessions made to a police officer above the rank of an Assistant Superintendent [section 16(1) of the PTA]. Unfortunately, however, this benefit is largely detracted from by other provisions which constitute an onslaught on values intrinsic to the Rule of Law. Pre-eminent among these is the presumption of innocence and the postulate precluding denial of freedom except in full compliance with due process, both substantively and procedurally.
These sacrosanct values receive short shrift in the proposed law, which gives the Attorney-General overwhelming coercive powers in respect of deferment of criminal proceedings on the basis of an iniquitous quid pro quo. The Attorney-General is invested with authority to defer the institution of criminal proceedings for as long a period as 20 years on the footing of a “prior consensual agreement” between the Attorney-General and the suspect, subject to sanction by the High Court [section 56(1)].
It is entirely unrealistic to impute to this “agreement” any element of spontaneity or independent volition. The suspect finds himself under virtually irresistible pressure to acquiesce in any condition proposed, in order to obtain release from the stress and turmoil of a criminal trial potentially entailing the gravest penalties. The situation becomes wholly untenable when the condition takes the form of submission to “a specified programme of rehabilitation”. This is a euphemism for de facto incarceration under thinly-veiled duress without the interposition of a fair trial before a court of law.
VI. Conclusion
Far from making any contribution of value to restoration of balance between security and freedom, the proposed draft has the effect of reversing some of the recent gains of law reform in this field without offering anything significant by way of redeeming features. This is a statutory misadventure which can reflect no credit on the laws of our country.
By Professor G. L. Peiris ✍️
D. Phil. (Oxford), Ph. D. (Sri Lanka);
Former Minister of Justice, Constitutional Affairs and National Integration;
Quondam Visiting Fellow of the Universities of Oxford, Cambridge and London;
Former Vice-Chancellor and Emeritus Professor of Law of the University of Colombo.
Opinion
Fifty years after Soweto uprising
On 16 June 1976 began the revolt of school students in Johannesburg’s black underserved settlement complex, which kick-started the process of dismantling Apartheid.
Long before the formal advent of apartheid in 1948, South Africa functioned as a colonial extraction machine in which indigenous Africans were systematically subordinated to serve imperial economic interests. British and Afrikaner elites together built a political economy centred on mining, settler agriculture, and control of strategic sea routes around the Cape, dispossessing Africans of land and pushing them into cheap labour roles. The apartheid system installed by the National Party after 1948 did not create racial domination from nothing; it rationalised and intensified an existing colonial order into a more tightly codified regime of segregation, labour control, and political exclusion.
Education, Bantustans,
and Soweto as a system
The Afrikaner minority acted within this framework, as a settler elite securing both its own material interests and the wider stability of Western capital in southern Africa, especially for mining conglomerates extracting gold and other minerals. Apartheid laws on residence, movement, and employment guaranteed a dependable, rightless African workforce while insulating white society politically and spatially from the Black majority.
This structure of domination included education as a core instrument. The 1953 Bantu Education Act created a separate, inferior schooling system for Black South Africans, explicitly geared to produce a subservient labour force rather than citizens able to compete with whites in skilled or professional roles. Curriculum, funding, and language policy all reinforced the message that Africans had no legitimate claim to equal participation in the country’s political or economic life.
Simultaneously, between 1951 and 1970, the apartheid state constructed “Bantustans,” such as Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and Ciskei, designating them as supposed ethnic “homelands” for different African groups. By removing Africans from the national political community and assigning them to Bantustans, the regime tried to strip them of South African citizenship and rebrand them as “foreign” labour migrants inside what was still their own country.
Soweto (South Western Townships), purpose-built on the outskirts of Johannesburg, the urban counterpart to this system, functioned as a segregated dormitory zone to house Black labourers. They serviced, but had no permanent geographic, economic, or political rights in the white city. The Bantustans and Soweto formed two halves of the same apparatus: the former as reservoirs and political dumping grounds, the latter as tightly controlled labour depots feeding South Africa’s industrial and mining core. By 1976, this system had matured, with Bantustans entrenched, and Soweto grew into a massive, overcrowded township with acute housing shortages, poor services, and deep political resentment.
The Afrikaans decree and the spark in Soweto
Against this background, the decision to impose Afrikaans as a medium of instruction appeared as a provocation rather than a mere educational reform. In the mid1970s, the Apartheid government moved to require that key subjects, such as mathematics and social sciences, be taught in Black secondary schools in Afrikaans, while others would be in English. Black South Africans perceived Afrikaans as the language of the oppressor, associated with the police, the army, and the bureaucracy of apartheid, whereas they linked English to broader opportunities and international solidarity.
The policy hit Soweto’s schools amid rising enrolment, Black Consciousness ideas spreading among youth, and high levels of frustration over overcrowding, unemployment, pass laws, and Bantustan citizenship. Student organisations such as the South African Students’ Movement and local committees in Soweto mobilised against the Afrikaans decree, framing it as an attempt to deepen mental and material subjugation by forcing children to learn through a language many neither liked nor mastered, further sabotaging their prospects in an already unequal system.
On 16 June 1976, an estimated 10,000–20,000 students, many in school uniform, marched peacefully through Soweto to protest against the Afrikaans policy and to present their demands to authorities. The police confronted them, firing tear gas, and then using live ammunition on unarmed children, killing several. A photograph of the dying body 13-year-old Hector Pieterson travelled around the world and came to symbolise the brutality of apartheid.
The shooting of schoolchildren transformed what began as a focused protest on language into a broad uprising against apartheid itself. In Soweto, anger at the killings spilled into widespread unrest: clashes with police, the burning of government buildings and administration offices, seen as symbols of state control, and running street battles that lasted for days.
The state responded with escalating force, deploying heavily armed police and later military units, making mass arrests, and using banning and detention without trial in an attempt to crush the uprising. But rather than restoring the preexisting “calm,” repression helped spread the revolt. Protests, school boycotts, solidarity actions and general strikes erupted in other townships and cities across South Africa, including areas around Pretoria, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, and parts of the Eastern Cape. This wave of unrest left hundreds killed (estimates place the death toll at more than 500) and thousands injured or detained, exposing the depth of youth anger and the fragility of everyday order in Black urban South Africa.
From Sharpeville to Soweto
The 1960 Sharpeville massacre marked an earlier turning point: the killing of protesters against “pass laws” led to the banning of the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), the launch of underground armed struggle, and a decade of intense repression that enforced a harsh surface calm inside South Africa. However, at that time fewer independent African states existed nearby to provide safe haven, and internal organisations had less experience and fewer networks to sustain long-term clandestine activity.
Soweto 1976 occurred in a regional and international environment very different from that of Sharpeville. By the mid1970s, most African states north of South Africa gained formal independence, and the liberation struggles in Mozambique and Angola had succeeded in 1975, creating new frontline states sympathetic to antiapartheid movements. The South African military’s intervention in Angola in 1975–76, alongside Western-backed forces, underscored the apartheid regime’s determination to shape regional outcomes and, at the same time, highlighted its vulnerability to guerrilla and conventional resistance supported from neighbouring territories.
By 1976 the antiapartheid movement, both inside and outside the country, had matured. The Soviet Union and its allies (notably East Germany and Cuba) provided much-needed material help. Cities such as Lusaka and Dar es Salaam had established exile infrastructure; Mozambique and Angola had liberation governments; and South Africa contained expanded networks of student, religious, and community organisations. Soweto thus occurred at a moment when the system’s underlying tensions, generated by decades of dispossession, Bantustan policy, and labour exploitation, had grown cumulatively.
Within South Africa itself, the 1970s saw a resurgence of labour militancy (such as the Durban strikes of 1973), the growth of Black Consciousness, and a new generation of students and young workers with a shared experience of inferior schooling, Bantustan citizenship, and township life. In this environment, state violence in Soweto was not interpreted as an isolated atrocity but as confirmation that peaceful protest inside the existing constitutional framework had reached its limits.
Umkhonto we Sizwe
Before 1976, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the armed wing of the ANC, operated mainly from exile, with a relatively small number of highly selected recruits engaged in sabotage and limited guerrilla operations, particularly after heavy repression in the 1960s. Estimates suggest that by the mid1960s only a few hundred recruits had managed to cross borders to join MK. The Soweto uprising changed this dramatically.
In the months and years after 16 June, thousands of politicised students and young people left South Africa, often via Botswana, Swaziland, Mozambique, and other neighbouring states, driven by grief, anger, and a desire to “strike back” at the regime. Many of these exiles joined MK camps and political schools run by the ANC and allied movements, with some studies estimating roughly 3,000 new recruits in the two years immediately following the uprising and more than 11,000 between 1976 and the unbanning of the ANC in 1990. This “1976 generation” carried with it the ideological imprint of Black Consciousness and the lived memory of township confrontation, helping transform MK from a small sabotage organisation into a larger force preparing for protracted guerrilla warfare and closer integration with internal township structures.
The mass youth rebellion and subsequent exodus to join MK represented a shift from incremental, “quantitative” changes in struggle capacity to a “qualitative” change in the nature and scale of resistance.
Shattering apartheid’s “stability” and the role of capital
The Soweto uprising shattered the illusion that apartheid could secure stable, lowcost resource extraction indefinitely. After 1976, South Africa experienced recurrent waves of township unrest, the growth of powerful trade unions, and a more sustained internal challenge that made large parts of the country intermittently “ungovernable” by the mid1980s. Repression remained intense, but each new cycle of violence tended to produce more recruits, deepen international isolation, and raise the political and economic costs of maintaining the system.
Internationally, the images of children shot in Soweto energised sanctions and divestment campaigns, while regionally the growing strength of liberation movements limited Pretoria’s freedom of action. Over time, powerful segments of domestic and international capital began to view apartheid not as a guarantor of order, but as a generator of risk and instability that threatened long-term profitability and access to markets and finance. In the 1980s, figures connected to major firms such as Anglo American and Consolidated Gold Fields played key roles in initiating quiet contacts between representatives of the apartheid state and the ANC in exile, including secret meetings facilitated by Michael Young of Consolidated Gold Fields in England.
Soweto 1976 can be seen as a structural break: it undermined the regime’s internal legitimacy, produced a new generation of militant activists, and accelerated the militarisation and politicisation of townships. Crucially, it set in motion feedback loops, through repression, resistance, international pressure, and capital’s recalculations, that made the eventual negotiated end of apartheid less a question of “if” than of “when.”
Vinod Moonesinghe, formerly chair of the Ceylon German Technical Training Institute and of the National Institute for Language Education and Training, serves as a Convenor of the Asia Progress Forum.
by Vinod Moonesinghe
Opinion
Palm leaf manuscripts of Sri Lanka – Part V
Medical prescriptions were written on palm leaf manuscripts. Bhesajja Manjusa (Casket of Medicine) is the oldest medical manuscript written in Sri Lanka. There is a Sinhala translation of the Pali original in the Colombo Museum library. The manuscript of Bhesajja Manjusa held in Ayurveda Research Institute, Maharagama was included in the UNESCO Memory of the World national register in 2016.
The Bhesajja manuscripts can be found in Dalada Maligawa Patirippuwa library, Galvene purana vihara Angoda, Mettaramaya in Bambalapitiya, Colombo Valukaramaya at Pamburana, Matara and Kosgodella Raja Maha Vihara.
Sirancee Gunawardana says she has seen a medical manuscript belonging to Sirimavo Bandaranaike, handed down from her grandfather, a medical practitioner. It had prescriptions using herbs, roots, barks of trees and indigenous seeds, for ailments ranging from stomach trouble, pediatric, pregnancy, fever, headaches, cholera, smallpox, chicken pox, eye, cancer and snake bite. It was written in 1850. There are 39 other such manuscripts in the collection.
Palm leaf manuscripts mention immersion therapy and acupuncture. Sirancee has paid special attention to acupuncture. Sirancee found a very old manuscript on acupuncture in the Institute of Ayurveda, Rajagiriya. It is very well illustrated. Pelmadulla Raja Maha Vihara has a 12th century manuscript giving acupuncture points for humans, also for cock, horse, buffalo. The full manuscript is reproduced in her book. She has also included in full another acupuncture manuscript by Sadiris Perera.
Manuscripts that give remedies for snake bites were known as Sarpa Veda oth. Colombo Museum Library has one where the prescriptions are given in verse. Sirancee owned a ‘very interesting’ ola on herbal treatment of cobra and other snake bites.
The Sinhala state had its own healing system in the Udarata before the British took over the kingdom. Western medicine soon displaced the Vederala (local doctor) but some parts of the native system survived up to the middle of the 20 century.
The Report of the 1950 Commission on the Ancient system of Sinhalese Medicine (SP 17 of 1950) stated that Sihala “vedakam” was a distinct medical system with its own drugs, diagnostic methods and treatments. It was particularly effective for snake bite, fractures, rabies and cancerous tumors, said the Report.’ The Sinhala “vedakam” or “Desiya chikithsa” physicians saw themselves as a distinct group, belonging to ‘veda parampara’ through the possession of secret family recipes, the report said. A national health system cannot operate on secret prescriptions. This secrecy would have been a later aberration.
Sinhala vedakam prescriptions would have been recorded on palm leaf. The National Library of Sri Lanka has publicized the fact that it has manuscripts on Sinhala Vedakam. Hugh Neville collection has a Sinhala pharmacopeia, written in the 19th century. Pelmadulla Purana Viharaya had an ola dealing with surgical specialties, written in Sinhala, copied in 1862.
There are many palm leaf manuscripts written in Sinhala containing herbal prescriptions that have originated in Sri Lanka, said Sirancee. Firstly, there is the collection of prescriptions which the vederala carries with him for immediate use. It is a collection compiled by him or his ancestors and is known as ‘beheth vattoru potha.’ This potha contained prescriptions for emetics, purgatives, medicine for diarrhea, piles, worm treatment and blood ailments.
There is a ‘beheth vattoru pota’ in the Kosgoda vihara library. There are about 103 beheth vattoru poth in the TPP Goonetilleke collection. Historical Manuscripts Commission was shown a Udarata beheth potha, one manuscript held in a curated collection, contained the prescriptions of a physician named Hatara Korale Huhgampola Ruppege Dara Mudalihami (sic).
Elephants played a major role in the Sinhala state. There are many palm leaf manuscripts on how to manage elephants and treat their illnesses. The manuscript titled ‘Hasti Yoga Silpa’ , seen by Sirancee is in verse and has charms for protection of elephants. Harakola Sri Anandarama Viharaya in Gampola had two manuscripts on elephants, one manuscript was an Ali veda pota , the other was on elephant charms and sensitive spots.
Palm leaf manuscripts provide scattered information on music, song and dance. Alutnuwara Raja Maha Vihara had a manuscript with music notations. Sirancee Gunawardana in her book ‘Palm leaf manuscripts of Sri Lanka’ said she has not seen anything else like it and published a photograph of the manuscript in her book. Historical manuscripts Commission found a manuscript which had a stanza in very rare meter in a chant for Kataragama Deviyo.
On the subject of drums, Andreas Nell presented the Colombo Museum library with a copy of an ola titled “Bera, davul, tammata adiye upata.” The original is in the British Library. The Tupavamsa manuscript mentions 20 types of drums used in Sri Lanka. The “Isavara nartaya” manuscript in the Colombo Museum, which is in Sinhala, gives 32 tunes for drums written in kavi style.
Regarding dance, Hugh Neville collection has a manuscript titled “nrutya upata“. It has three sections, gitaya, nrutya, and pada and provides 36 different beats for the drum. Alutnuwara Raja Maha Vihara had a manuscript called Pada Natuma.
There were three other manuscripts on movement. Hugh Nevill collection had a 100-year-old manuscript on Sokari nateema. There were many palm leaf manuscripts on leekeli in Colombo Museum library. Historical Manuscripts Commission (1951) had found a manuscript, titled Pandama ganna kavi ,5 verses sung to invoke the blessing of the gods before the dancers approached the road. This would have been for a perahera.
There was some information on the song. Historical Manuscript Commission (1933) found in family collections, lots of panegyric type songs for the Udarata kings. One manuscript had verses sung at the coronation of Kandyan kings. Verses sung at the coronation of king Narendrasinha were recorded in a manuscript titled “Sringara alamkaraya” (1842).
Sri Lanka has a notable “kavi” tradition. There are many kavi manuscripts dating from the 18th and 19th centuries, in palm leaf collections. An interesting feature in these collections are the kavi to be sung at work, including songs to be sung when spinning thread.
Colombo museum library has a manuscript with two sets of “kavi“. Kavi to be sung when weeding paddy fields and “Nelum kavi” to be sung when reaping the harvest. The “Nelum kavi” manuscript was prepared by Tikiri Yadesguru in 1862.
Olas contain kavi for harvesting Kurakkan. Colombo Museum library has a manuscript on growing kurakkan (millet), how to sow the grain, protect it, fence it from wild pigs , how to put up a watch hut, how to harvest the millet and how to cook it.
Hugh Nevill collection has a “kavi” manuscript titled “Peduru Male” This manuscript relates the story of a rush mat weaving competition between a mother-in-law and a daughter in law. They first weave ordinary mats then a strong knotted mat, gold flowered mat, tasseled mat, mat with hare, mat showing a jackal about to eat the hare, then a deer mat, leopard mat, cat, rat, lion and elephant mats. Thereafter, they weave a mat with a buddha’s throne and finally a mat with loha-maha-paya and dagoba design. Sirancee observed that this ballad describes various unusual mat designs and provides information on the art of weaving rush mats.
Historical Manuscripts Commission (1933) found an architectural plan at Lankatilleke vihara, 17th or 18th century. It was the ground plan of a royal palace, a ‘raja maliga salasma’. Design was rectangular, with ornate triangular and circular buildings within the space. The plan gave the Sinhala names for special buildings and the different departments set aside for different services. This was of considerable value since these words are rarely met and indicates the functions of these apartments.
Cook books were found among curated collections. Dalada Maligawa library has a book titled ‘Supa Sastra’ containing recipes and food prepared for the king. Hugh Neville collection has a manuscript in Sinhala which gives rules for selecting a cook, how to arrange the logs in a hearth, how to make a fire and how rice should be cooked. The ola gave instruction on cooking fish, meat, broths, vegetables, sambals, chutneys and spiced curries. The ola had recipes for making milk rice, pickle, jackfruit curry, and oil cakes. There was advice on how to avoid overeating and how to distinguish poisons in food.
Traditional Sinhala society believes in astrology. Horoscopes are cast when a child is born. The chart and interpretation are inscribed on an ola. This was the tradition up to the first half of the 20 century. My horoscope, prepared in the 1940s, is on palm leaf. It is wound round and round and fastened through a slit in the leaf itself. From 1960 onwards, horoscopes were written on paper, but there are persons capable of recording them on palm leaf, if requested, even today.
Traditional Sinhala society also believes in the supernatural. There is a great fear of sorcery in our society. Yantra (talismans) are used in Sri Lanka to counter such sorcery. Yantra are mystic diagrams and geometrical designs, drawn onto strips of palm leaf or engraved onto copper or gold foil which are then rolled up and worn in a little metal case around the neck or upper arm as a protection against harm.
Yantra are meant to be protective charms primarily, but yantra are also used for curative purposes, for soliciting favors, and in rituals of revenge. Yantra were inscribed on palm leaves until recently. They are now etched on thin copper sheets.
Yantra manuscripts are profusely illustrated. They have diagrams and also ritual images drawn on them. Yantra drawings are in secret code. The Hugh Neville collection has a manuscript containing seven yantras which served as guidelines for those creating yantra images. These were kept secret by the practitioners.
LSD Peiris has one of the largest collections of Yantra manuscripts in the country. He has written a book titled ‘Yantra drawings in palm leaf, Sri Lanka.’ He has studied the subject for many years and has some interesting observations.
He says there is intricacy in the art forms way beyond what is needed, while preserving their ritual properties and intended purpose. I found the proportions and the ornamentation around the geometric outlines, the circles, ovals, squares, rectangles, diagonals and arcs very pleasing to the eye, though I could not appreciate their ritual significance.
Peiris says the script in which the text is written has ‘the authentic flavor of the Sinhala written script’. He says it is possible to locate fragments of letters from the Sinhala alphabet in the drawings. This can be seen in the fingers, toes and facial features of the figures drawn in the yantra. CONCLUDED.
REFERENCES
1st report of Historical Manuscripts Commission 1933 SP 9 of 1933
3rd report of Historical Manuscripts Commission 1951, SP 19 of 1951.
Report of the Commission on ancient system of Sinhalese medicine SP 17 of 1950
Sirancee Gunawardana Palm leaf manuscripts of Sri Lanka . 1977
L.S.D. Pieris Yantra drawing on palm leaf Sri Lanka 2018
https://www.natlib.lk/NLDSB/unesco-mow/
by KAMALIKA PIERIS
Opinion
Decoding Trump’s 12.5% “Forced Labor Tariff” on Sri Lanka
On June 2, 2026, the U.S. government once again proposed a new tariff on 60 economies, including Sri Lanka, because these countries have failed “to address the importation of goods made with forced labor.” The proposed additional duty on 54 economies is 12.5%. On other six economies, namely Canada, Ecuador, European Union, Indonesia, Mexico and Pakistan, the proposed additional duty is 10%. Surprisingly, Sri Lanka is in the 12.5% group.
This U.S. policy initiative marks a significant paradigm shift in international trade rules, as this is the first time that forced labour has been used as a rationale to trigger blanket retaliatory tariffs by any country. Earlier, “forced labour” was factored into bilateral trade agreements and preferential trade arrangements. For example, the European Union’s GSP labour arrangement, which was introduced in 1999, provided an additional tariff preference to developing countries which had ratified and effectively implemented the key ILO conventions, including two core conventions on forced labour. Interestingly, Sri Lanka was the first developing country to become eligible to receive tariff concessions under this arrangement. In other words, more than twenty years ago, the European Union recognized that Sri Lanka had effectively implemented core ILO conventions on forced labour and provided additional duty concessions.
So then, why did the U.S. suddenly introduce these “forced labor” tariffs?
To understand this, let’s start from that awful day in April 2025… the day President Trump announced with much glee and fanfare his sweeping “reciprocal tariffs” on over 90 countries under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). The additional tariffs imposed ranged from 10% to 50%. Sri Lanka was hit with one of the highest additional tariffs at 44 percent! Mercifully, this was later negotiated down to 20%.
On February 20, 2026, the United States Supreme Court struck down these reciprocal tariffs and ruled that President Trump did not have the authority to impose tariffs under the IEEPA, because under the Article 1 of the U.S. Constitution the power to impose tariffs belongs exclusively to the U.S. Congress.
With that, President Trump’s executive powers on tariffs narrowed down to the Trade Act of 1974 (Trade Act), which grants the President the authority to combat unfair foreign trade practices. Section 122 of the Trade Act authorizes the President to impose temporary import surcharges to address fundamental balance-of-payments problems, up to a maximum of 150 days. Section 301 of the Trade Act authorizes the USTR to investigate and impose sanctions on foreign countries that violate U.S. trade agreements or engage in policies that are “unjustifiable,” “unreasonable,” or “discriminatory” and burden U.S. commerce.
Thus, immediately after the Supreme Court’s decision, on February 24th, President Trump imposed an additional 10% tariff on all imports from all trading partners, under Section 122. However, these tariffs cannot be extended beyond July 24, 2026, without the approval of the U.S. Congress. So, on March 12, 2026, the USTR initiated sixty investigations into the United States’ most important trading partners, from where 99.4 percent of U.S. imports are shipped. “….to determine whether the acts, policies, and practices of various economies related to the failure to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor are actionable under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.“
Sri Lanka’s Failure to Participate in Consultations and Public Hearings
After launching the 301 investigations on March 12th, the USTR requested consultations with the governments of each economy subject to investigation, and the USTR participated in confidential government-to-government consultations with 46 economies. As per available information, Sri Lanka was one of the fourteen countries that did not participate in these consultations. In addition to that, a public comment period was also opened for written submissions by all governments and other stakeholders, and the Section 301 Committee conducted a public hearing on April 28 and 29, 2026, with interested parties. Sri Lanka was once again conspicuously absent from these public hearings. It is difficult to understand why the Embassy of Sri Lanka in Washington, D.C., failed to participate in these consultations and public hearings! Participating in these consultations is an important part of the duties of Washington based diplomats. For example, at the public hearing held on April 29, Pakistan was represented by the ambassador and a leading garment exporter. Diplomats and trade experts from India, Indonesia, Egypt and other countries participated at these hearings. According to available information, by participating in these discussions and by taking appropriate follow-up measures, Pakistan, Ecuador, and Indonesia managed to get into the 10% duty category.
As these consultations are ongoing, one can only hope Sri Lanka will at least participate in the public hearings on July 7 and manage to get the duty reduced. After all, in the fight against forced labour, Sri Lanka has a much better track record than most other countries.
(The writer, a retired public servant, can be reached at senadhiragomi@gmail.com)
by Gomi Senadhira
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