Opinion
Protection of the state from terrorism act:a critique of the current proposal
I. Background to the Government Proposal
The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, No. 48 of 1979, (PTA), has been vigorously assailed for 45 years as the anchor of a legislative regime which is destructive of basic political and civil rights. It has gained ignominy as an instrument for denial of justice in diverse contexts and also placed in jeopardy, internationally, the prestige of our country as a vibrant democracy. There have been legislative interventions from time to time by Act No. 10 of 1982 and Act No. 22 of 1988.
By 2022, it was clear that the momentum of reform had to be accelerated. As Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, on 22 March 2022, I introduced in Parliament, and secured the passage of, a series of amendments to the PTA. This was in the form of Act No. 12 of 2022. These amendments had as their principal objective, shortening the maximum period of permissible detention without trial, enhancing judicial oversight of detention, access to legal representation and communication, expediting of trials, liberalizing the law relating to bail, and invocation of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in fundamental rights applications.
I made it clear in Parliament that this was only a preliminary step confined to the introduction of urgent amendments to address immediate concerns. The ultimate aim, I informed Parliament, was not ad-hoc modification of the existing law, but the enactment of all-encompassing, fresh legislation. Towards this end, a comprehensive review was underway with participation by the Ministries of Defence, Justice, and Foreign Affairs, and the Attorney General’s Department.
At the 50th session of the Human Rights Council on 13 June 2022, as Foreign Minister of Sri Lanka, I gave a firm assurance in Geneva that, pending this overhaul of the applicable legislation, there would be a de facto moratorium on use of the PTA. Although the Inspector General of Police had issued instructions accordingly at the time, unfortunately, after successive changes of government, this undertaking was not adhered to.
Three attempts have been made by different governments to enact complete legislation on terrorism. These were the Counter-Terrorism Act gazetted in September 2018, and two versions of an Anti-Terrorism Act in March and September 2023. On account of strong public resistance, none of these found their way into the statute book.
The current draft, Protection of the State from Terrorism Act, (PSTA), which has been in the making for almost a year, was published in December 2025. Notwithstanding the high level of expectation which it had generated, regrettably, the draft Bill fails, in fundamental respects, to advance the law towards justice and freedom.
II. Issues of Definition and Scope
One of the main weaknesses of the draft legislation is that it is entirely unsuccessful in addressing the pivotal issue of the legitimate boundaries of an extraordinary system of criminal liability which displaces seminal rights inherent in the Rule of Law. In all democratic cultures, it is recognized that imperatives of security in extreme circumstances call for measures incompatible with guarantees of freedom upheld by the regular law. The lines of demarcation, however, are of overriding importance. From this standpoint, the proposed legislation is a singular disappointment.
Structurally, in its very foundation, it contravenes criteria imposed by international human rights law. This is starkly evident in the approach of the draft Bill to definition of the mental ingredient in terrorism-related offences, one of the critical factors in containing liability within appropriate limits.
International law requires, in this context, a hybrid mental requirement consisting of a dual-layered intention to cause death, serious bodily harm, or taking of hostages but necessarily combined with the calculated intention of bringing about a reign of terror and intimidating the public. Both elements are compulsory requisites of liability for a terrorism-related offence. This fundamental postulate is breached by the proposed legislation which adopts the approach of requiring direct intention or knowledge in respect of the first element [section 3(1)], but regards the second as an oblique inference from a “consequence” such as the death of a person, hurt or hostage taking [section 3(2)]. Dramatic lowering of the threshold of responsibility by this mode of definition strikes at the root of the value system entrenched in international law.
The draft legislation creates no fewer than 13 categories of acts carrying the taint of terrorism. The compelling objection to this extensive catalogue is that it blurs the distinction between ordinary criminal acts and the stringently limited category of acts involving terrorism. The first, and indispensable, requirement of legislation in the latter field is that of clear and unambiguous definition with no scope for elasticity of interpretation. By vivid contrast, the draft law contains a multitude of offences which find their proper place in the Penal Code and other regular legislation, but are by no means necessarily susceptible to the label of terrorism. Egregious examples are serious damage to any place of public use or any public property; the offence of robbery, extortion, or theft; and serious obstruction or damage to, or interference with, any electronic, automated, or computerized system [section 3(2)].
The inclusion of these offences in a counter-terrorism law, given the empirical experience of the past, is no less than an invitation to abuse of the system for collateral purposes, with the distinct prospect of danger to cherished democratic freedoms in such vital areas as communication and assembly. This is especially so, because the types of intention envisaged subsume so vague a purpose as “compelling the government of Sri Lanka or any other government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act” [section 3(1) (c)]. The peril is obvious to entirely legitimate forms of protest and agitation. It must be remembered that the penalty applicable is rigorous imprisonment extending up to 20 years and a fine not exceeding 20 million rupees [section 4(b)].
This clearly threatening feature is aggravated by other characteristics of the draft Bill. Several are worthy of note.
(i) Ancillary offences are framed in such broad terms as to inject a deterrent effect in respect of exercise of individual and group rights enshrined by the Constitution. Section 8(1), according to its marginal note, purports to deal with acts “associated with terrorism”, a vague and catch-all phrase. The text of this provision imposes liability on a person who is “concerned in” the commission of a terrorist offence. “Encouragement of Terrorism”, the title of section 9, is manifestly overbroad. Its ambit, encompassing all forms of “indirect encouragement”, would sweep within its purview, for instance, a large swath of the activity associated with the Aragalaya in 2022, which brought about a change of government.
There is unmistakable exposure for all forms of social activism. Section 10, entitled “Dissemination of Terrorist Publications”, goes so far as to bring within the net of liability for terrorism any person who “provides a service to others that enables them to obtain, read, listen to, or look at a terrorist publication or to acquire it”. The whole range of mainstream and social media is indisputably in jeopardy.
(ii) There are other obnoxious aspects, as well. The draft law makes generous use of the idea of “recklessness”, as in the context of publication of statements and uttering of words (section 9), and in the dissemination of publications (section 10). This is a state of mind alternative to intention; but the concept of “recklessness” is operative within very narrow confines in criminal jurisprudence. This is yet another lever for expansion of liability beyond the class of terrorist offences, properly so designated.
(iii) A feature of the proposed law, open to even more cogent objection, is the extension of this draconian form of liability, carrying condign punishment, to mere omissions. This is the effect of section 15, which makes failure to provide information a terrorist offence. The trend in the modern criminal law is markedly hostile to widening the boundaries of liability to situations in which the accused has only refrained from commission of an act. One of my own mentors, Professor Glanville Williams of Cambridge University, described by Professor Sir Rupert Cross, at the time Vinerian Professor in the University of Oxford, as the greatest criminal lawyer in the United Kingdom since Sir Fitzjames Stephen, has consistently opposed, in principle, the attribution of criminal liability, let alone liability for terrorist offences, to mere omissions. In conjunction with all the other instruments embedded in the draft, this expedient places in the hands of a politically motivated Executive a ready means for indiscriminate application of terrorist sanctions, to the detriment of enjoyment of rights taken for granted in a democratic society.
(iv) Section 3(4), which purports to confer a measure of protection on such activity as protests, advocacy of dissent, or engagement in strikes, by a provision that such activity, by itself, is not to be regarded as a sufficient basis for inference of terrorist intent, has an illusory character. While engendering a sense of comfort, its applicability is negated by parallel provisions which enable imposition of liability, for example, on the ground of alleged intent to bring compulsive pressure to bear on the State [section 3(1)(c)]. Uncertainty created by the conflict between these provisions places at unacceptable risk the ethos of democratic safeguards.
III. Overreach of the Executive Arm for Arrest and Detention
Broadening of categories of terrorist offences beyond legitimate limits presages an imminent danger. This takes the form of authority conferred on the Executive, represented by such officials as the armed forces, the police, and coast guard personnel, to resort to action which erodes the rudiments of liability. The wider the ambit of terrorist offences, the ampler is the power available to these officials to invade the substance of freedom by action to enter the homes of citizens, interrogate persons, seize documents, carry out stop and search operations on public highways, and engage in other forms of harassment. The current draft has no hesitation in conferring these powers in the fullest measure.
(i) Detention Orders
This is one of the features of the PTA of 1979, which attracted trenchant criticism for more than four decades. In terms of section 9(1) of that Act, the Minister of Defence was invested with power to issue detention orders for a maximum period of three months in the first instance, capable of extension for periods not exceeding three months at a time, subject to an aggregate period of detention not exceeding 18 months. Significantly, corresponding provision is contained in the current draft which empowers the Secretary to the Ministry of Defence to issue detention orders [section 29(2)] at the behest of the Inspector General of Police or a Deputy Inspector General of Police authorized by the IGP [section 29(1)].
The only difference is with regard to the period of detention. According to the new draft, the detention order cannot be extended for a period in excess of two months at a time, and the aggregate period is a maximum of one year. Subject to this marginal variation, the perils of the instrument of a detention order continue, unabated.
What is especially disquieting are the grounds specified in the draft for issuance of a detention order. There are four grounds spelt out. Among these is “to facilitate the conduct of the investigation in respect of the suspect” [section 3(a)]. This is wide enough to permit the most flagrant abuse. A provision, so flexibly phrased, allows detention without judicial review. Due process, required by the regular criminal justice system, is supplanted by a regime antithetical at its core to the fundamentals of the Rule of Law.
Our country has had a distressing record of torture and extrajudicial executions in custodial settings. The recurring feature is that these atrocities have typically taken place in non-judicial custody. In the face of this reality and in cynical disregard of sustained protests against this obvious avenue of abuse, the present draft complacently leaves wide open this convenient window. This is done by section 30(1) which accords official sanction to “approved places of detention”. The accumulated harrowing experience of the past has totally escaped attention.
Despite largely cosmetic concessions, the victims of detention orders within the framework of the proposed legislation, no less than under previous statutory regimes, remain substantially at the mercy of the Executive.
The exhortation in section 36 that “Every investigation shall be completed without unnecessary delay” amounts to no more than a pious aspiration, in the absence of a mandatory maximum period stipulated for investigations. Moreover, even when the investigation, potentially open-ended, has been completed and a report submitted to the Magistrate, the Magistrate’s power to discharge the suspect is rigidly curtailed. This is because a judicial order for discharge is possible in terms of section 36(3) only when an allegation against the suspect is not disclosed on the face of the report. There is telling irony in this situation.
The loophole is one through which the Executive is able to drive a coach and six with the greatest ease. Practical experience demonstrates conclusively that, in situations indicative of the most grotesque abuse in the past, the courts were confronted not with the total absence of an allegation, but rather with a clumsy, trumped-up allegation defying credibility. In this, the typical case, the proposed legislation chooses to leave the Magistrate with no jurisdiction to grant urgently needed relief.
The most hazardous provision of all is one which enables a suspect, already in judicial custody, to be transferred to police custody in pursuance of a detention order issued by the Defence Secretary. It is this power, fraught with dire consequences, that the new draft, in section 39(1), seeks to confer. This power can be invoked on the disingenuous pretext that the suspect, prior to being arrested, had committed an offence of which the officer in charge of the relevant police station was unaware. While the desirable direction of movement is obviously from police to judicial custody, movement in the opposite direction is the strange result of this provision. Although interposition of a High Court Judge’s authority is envisaged, the exigencies of a security situation, urged with emphasis by the Executive, may well be difficult to resist in practice.
IV. Other Oppressive Interventions
(a) Restriction Orders
It is quite remarkable that other instruments of oppression which have attracted strenuous condemnation during the entire operation of the PTA, continue substantially intact.
Restriction orders offer an illustrative example. Any police officer of the rank of Deputy Inspector General of Police or above is given authority to make application to a Magistrate’s Court for a restriction order (section 64). The only contrast with the PTA is that, in terms of that regime, the Minister was empowered to make the order directly. In subsequent attempts at reform, this was clearly acknowledged as unacceptable, and in the amending legislation proposed but not enacted in September 2023, the initiative was that of the President and it was the High Court that had jurisdiction to issue the order.In comparison with this, the current proposal is regressive, in that the application is to be made by a police officer, (clearly at the behest of the Executive), and jurisdiction to issue the order is vested in a lower court.
In yet another respect, the present proposal is less satisfactory than the innovation proposed in 2023, in that desirable safeguards embedded in the latter, such as that the order sought should be “necessary” or “proportionate” [section 80(4)], are omitted from the present proposal. In this sense, the current draft is not merely stagnant but regressive, by abjuring salutary approaches to reform.
Restriction orders, without doubt, infringe basic rights corrosively. Their awesome scope contravenes core rights as to communication, association, employment, and travel [section 64(3)]. These erosions remain untouched as to intensity and range, except in respect of duration.While the PTA provided that a restriction order was to be in force for a period not exceeding 3 months, subject to further extensions of 3 months at a time, the maximum aggregate of such extensions being 18 months, the sole concession made by the present proposal is that the validity of a restriction order is limited to 1 month, and the aggregate period cannot exceed 6 months [section 64(9)].
(b) Proscription Orders
In this regard as well, the present proposal takes a step in the wrong direction. Proscription orders are a means by which the President exercises overarching power, simply by notification in the Gazette, to declare organizations illegal, with the consequence of preventing recruitment, meetings, and other activities, transactions in bank accounts, lobbying and canvassing, and publication of material (section 63). The period of application of a proscription order has an arbitrary and capricious quality: it is entirely at the discretion of the President and remains valid until rescinded [section 63(6)].
It is especially noteworthy that the legislative regime at present in force, the PTA, contains no provision whatever for the issuance of proscription orders. This purpose could be accomplished only by having recourse to regulations made under section 27(1) of the Act. Incorporation of this power in the substance of the principal Act itself was proposed in the draft legislation of 2023, which could not be enacted because of vehement resistance. The current proposal, curiously enough, sanctifies as part of the substantive Act, a dangerously fraught procedure which can, as of now, be resorted to only through subordinate legislation. The present draft, then, operates as a travesty rather than a palliative by pushing the law backwards. This hardly amounts to delivery on a promise that underpinned the year-long process which culminated in publication of the current proposal.
(c) Declarations Designating Prohibited Places
The bizarre reality, here again, is that the present proposal, far from expunging excrescences from the current law, actually adds further objectionable provisions which do not exist in the body of terrorist legislation today.
The much-maligned PTA does not include a provision empowering the Executive to declare places as “prohibited places”. This had to be done, if at all, under the aegis of legislation dealing with entirely different subject matter, for example, section 2 of the Official Secrets Act, No. 32 of 1955. Contrary to the professed objective, the new proposal, for the first time, introduces into terrorist legislation the conferment of power on the Defence Secretary to designate “prohibited places”.
The consequences are far-reaching, indeed: entry into a designated place, the taking of photographs and video recordings, and the making of drawings or sketches are all criminalized by the infliction of imprisonment for up to 3 years or a fine not exceeding 3 million rupees [section 66(8)]. This has a particularly chilling effect on journalists and media personnel; and it is the bequest of legislation professedly aspiring to enhance the contours of freedom.
V. Deprivation of Liberty by Insidious Pressure
One of the few positive elements of the new proposal is the deletion of provisions in the PTA dealing with the admissibility of confessions made to a police officer above the rank of an Assistant Superintendent [section 16(1) of the PTA]. Unfortunately, however, this benefit is largely detracted from by other provisions which constitute an onslaught on values intrinsic to the Rule of Law. Pre-eminent among these is the presumption of innocence and the postulate precluding denial of freedom except in full compliance with due process, both substantively and procedurally.
These sacrosanct values receive short shrift in the proposed law, which gives the Attorney-General overwhelming coercive powers in respect of deferment of criminal proceedings on the basis of an iniquitous quid pro quo. The Attorney-General is invested with authority to defer the institution of criminal proceedings for as long a period as 20 years on the footing of a “prior consensual agreement” between the Attorney-General and the suspect, subject to sanction by the High Court [section 56(1)].
It is entirely unrealistic to impute to this “agreement” any element of spontaneity or independent volition. The suspect finds himself under virtually irresistible pressure to acquiesce in any condition proposed, in order to obtain release from the stress and turmoil of a criminal trial potentially entailing the gravest penalties. The situation becomes wholly untenable when the condition takes the form of submission to “a specified programme of rehabilitation”. This is a euphemism for de facto incarceration under thinly-veiled duress without the interposition of a fair trial before a court of law.
VI. Conclusion
Far from making any contribution of value to restoration of balance between security and freedom, the proposed draft has the effect of reversing some of the recent gains of law reform in this field without offering anything significant by way of redeeming features. This is a statutory misadventure which can reflect no credit on the laws of our country.
By Professor G. L. Peiris ✍️
D. Phil. (Oxford), Ph. D. (Sri Lanka);
Former Minister of Justice, Constitutional Affairs and National Integration;
Quondam Visiting Fellow of the Universities of Oxford, Cambridge and London;
Former Vice-Chancellor and Emeritus Professor of Law of the University of Colombo.
By Chula Goonasekera,
on behalf of the LEADS Forum
Based on discussions with Ajith Wijemanna, Director General of the Department of Meteorology, and Kithsiri Abayasinghe, former Director of the Department of Meteorology
Sri Lanka may be facing another major natural challenge. Unlike many disasters, however, the warning signs are already visible, giving the country an opportunity to prepare before the situation becomes critical.
A recent discussion with two of Sri Lanka’s most experienced meteorologists highlighted concerns about the developing El Niño phenomenon and its potential consequences for the country. While no scientist can predict with certainty exactly how El Niño will evolve, current indications suggest the possibility of above-normal rainfall later this year, followed by reduced rainfall and potentially severe drought conditions in early 2027.
This is a warning Sri Lanka cannot afford to ignore.
Most Sri Lankans still remember the devastation caused by the Indian Ocean tsunami in December 2004. El Niño is fundamentally different. It does not arrive as a single catastrophic event. Instead, its effects can develop over many months, potentially bringing drought, water shortages, crop failures, extreme heat, wildfires, flooding and food insecurity.
The critical difference is that, unlike a tsunami, El Niño gives us time to prepare.
Sri Lanka therefore has a choice: act on the warnings now or pay a far greater price later.
We Must Not Wait for Disaster
The 2004 tsunami exposed Sri Lanka’s vulnerability to large-scale disasters and demonstrated the immense human and economic costs of inadequate preparedness.
El Niño cannot be prevented. However, many of its potentially damaging consequences can be reduced through early planning, effective coordination, public awareness and practical risk-reduction measures.
The purpose of this article is not to predict exactly what will happen. Rather, it is to ask a more important question:
Are we prepared for what could happen?
Depending on the intensity and evolution of El Niño, Sri Lanka could face:
· severe drought and prolonged dry spells;
· water shortages affecting households, agriculture and industry;
· reduced agricultural production and increased food insecurity;
· increased risks of forest and grassland fires;
· heatwaves and heat-related illness; and
· localised flooding caused by unusually heavy rainfall.
One threat deserves particular attention: wildfires.
During prolonged dry periods, fires can spread rapidly through forests and grasslands, destroying ecosystems, wildlife habitats, agricultural land, livelihoods and critical infrastructure, while placing enormous pressure on emergency services.
The lesson is straightforward: understanding potential worst-case scenarios before they occur greatly improves our ability to prevent them from becoming national catastrophes.
A Crucial Role for Disaster Management
We understand that Sri Lanka’s Disaster Management Centre (DMC) is already engaged in preparing the country for the potential impacts of a stronger El Niño event. Its focus must remain on helping communities prepare before emergencies arise, while ensuring that essential services continue to function during periods of crisis.
Disaster response and recovery come at a high cost to the public through government expenditure and taxpayer-funded resources. Investing in preparedness is therefore not only a humanitarian responsibility but also a sound economic strategy—particularly at a time when Sri Lanka continues to face considerable fiscal constraints and limited capacity to absorb another major shock.
The principle is clear:
Prevention is invariably less costly than recovery.
Every rupee invested in preparedness today can help prevent far greater social and economic losses tomorrow.
Listen to the Scientists
The public should pay close attention to forecasts and guidance issued by the Department of Meteorology.
At the same time, it is important to recognise that long-range forecasting is inherently complex. Climate systems involve countless interacting variables, many of which cannot be measured or predicted with complete accuracy months in advance.
When a forecast subsequently changes, this should not automatically be regarded as a failure of science. Forecasting is, by its nature, an assessment of probabilities and risks based on the best available evidence at a particular point in time.
The appropriate response is not to dismiss forecasts because they contain uncertainty, but to use them as tools for informed preparation.
What Should the Government Do?
The Government and relevant public institutions should urgently review Sri Lanka’s preparedness for drought, flooding, wildfires and extreme heat.
Key priorities should include:
· strengthening climate monitoring and early-warning systems;
· improving weather forecasting and public communication;
· developing comprehensive drought, flood and wildfire preparedness plans;
· enhancing reservoir, catchment and water-resource management;
· maintaining drainage infrastructure to reduce urban flooding;
· strengthening wildfire prevention, detection and response capabilities;
· investing in climate-resilient infrastructure; and
· establishing clear lines of responsibility and coordination among government agencies.
Coordination is particularly important. During a national emergency, citizens should never be left wondering which institution is responsible for taking action.
Water Security Must Be a National Priority
If prolonged dry conditions materialise, water security could become one of Sri Lanka’s most pressing challenges.
The country should strengthen groundwater protection, support the rehabilitation and maintenance of wells, and implement long-term water-security strategies in drought-prone regions. Such measures are important not only for human communities but also for agriculture, livestock and the natural ecosystems that sustain the country’s biodiversity.
Reservoirs and catchments must be managed carefully, while water conservation should be actively promoted among households, businesses, industries and farmers.
The key question is simple:
How much water will Sri Lanka require if the dry season lasts significantly longer than expected?
That question is far easier to answer before reservoirs begin to run dry.
Protecting Agriculture and Food Security
Agriculture remains highly vulnerable to drought and irregular rainfall. Significant disruption could result in rising food prices, reduced farm incomes and increased pressure on vulnerable households.
Sri Lanka should accelerate the adoption of drought-resistant crops, climate-smart farming techniques and efficient irrigation systems, including drip irrigation. Measures should also be taken to secure water and feed supplies for livestock, maintain strategic food reserves and strengthen weather-based advisory services for farmers.
Food security must be regarded not merely as an agricultural concern but as a matter of national resilience.
Preparing for Wildfires
Prolonged dry conditions can significantly increase wildfire risks. Sri Lanka must strengthen its capacity to prevent, detect and respond to fires before they escalate.
An effective strategy should rest on four pillars:
Prevention. Preparedness. Early detection. Rapid response.
Seasonal climate forecasts should be used to identify periods of heightened risk. Vegetation dryness, weather conditions and fire-prone regions should be monitored systematically, with modern technologies used wherever feasible.
Firebreaks should be established and maintained around vulnerable communities, forests and critical infrastructure. Dry vegetation and other combustible materials should be appropriately managed. Where environmentally and scientifically justified, carefully regulated controlled burning could also form part of an integrated fire-management strategy.
Human activity is responsible for many wildfires. During high-risk periods, open burning should therefore be restricted and unsafe land-clearing practices rigorously controlled. Public education campaigns should reinforce these measures.
Firefighting resources should be pre-positioned in high-risk areas before peak fire seasons begin. Adequate equipment and water supplies should be secured, and coordination strengthened among local authorities, fire services, forestry officials, disaster-management agencies and, where necessary, the armed forces.
Where practical and affordable, aerial firefighting capabilities should also be considered.
The guiding principle is straightforward:
Fight fires when they are small, rather than after they become uncontrollable.
Protecting Sri Lanka’s Natural Ecosystems
Healthy ecosystems are among the country’s most effective natural defences against climate stress.
Sri Lanka should protect wetlands and other water-retaining ecosystems, conserve forests, prevent unnecessary land clearing and fragmentation, and safeguard wildlife habitats from fire and degradation.
Forest conservation is not simply an environmental issue. It is central to water security, food security, biodiversity protection, public health and long-term national resilience.
Citizens Also Have a Responsibility
Preparedness cannot be the responsibility of government alone.
During dry periods, households should conserve water and avoid unnecessary waste. Communities should ensure that wells are cleaned, maintained and restored where necessary, particularly if prolonged disruptions to piped water supplies occur.
During periods of extreme heat, people should remain hydrated, avoid unnecessary outdoor activity and follow public health advice.
Families should maintain basic emergency plans and supplies. Communities in fire-prone areas should know evacuation routes and designated safe assembly points. Citizens should also avoid activities that could inadvertently start fires and remain alert to official warnings.
Particular attention should be given to vulnerable groups, including older people, people with disabilities and those with limited mobility. Communities should also be prepared for the health effects of wildfire smoke and deteriorating air quality.
From Response to Preparedness
Sri Lanka’s greatest challenge is not responding when disaster strikes. It is ensuring that natural hazards do not develop into national catastrophes.
This requires a fundamental shift from a culture of reaction to a culture of preparedness.
Government agencies, scientists, farmers, businesses, schools, community organisations and individual citizens all have important roles to play. A coordinated approach combining climate forecasting, land management, public education, community preparedness, early-warning systems and rapid emergency response can significantly reduce the risks posed by El Niño and other climate-related threats.
Even if severe drought conditions do not materialise, investments in preparedness will strengthen Sri Lanka’s resilience against future disasters. If severe conditions do occur, early preparation could save lives, protect livelihoods, reduce economic losses and prevent a difficult situation from escalating into a national crisis.
Sri Lanka has already learned, at enormous cost, the consequences of being unprepared. We should not wait for another disaster to teach us the same lesson.
The warning signs are present. The scientists are speaking. The risks are increasingly clear.
What remains is the political will and public commitment to act.
Preparation today will always cost less than recovery tomorrow.
After nearly 77 years of wildlife conservation, Sri Lanka must strengthen the institutions, professional leadership and political will needed to safeguard its natural heritage for generations to come.
By Dilum Alagiyawanna
Sri Lanka has a long and proud history of protecting its natural heritage. Generations of wildlife officers, forest officers, scientists, researchers, field staff and conservationists have worked, often under difficult circumstances, to protect our forests, wildlife and ecosystems. Their contribution deserves recognition and respect.
One important milestone in this journey came in October 1949, when the Wildlife department was established as a separate institution, following the Fauna and Flora Protection Ordinance of 1937 and the expansion of the country’s wildlife reserves. The creation of a dedicated department reflected an important recognition of the time: wildlife conservation required specialised institutional attention.
Today, nearly 77 years after its establishment, Sri Lanka has an opportunity not simply to reflect on that institutional journey, but to consider what kind of institutions and leadership we need for the next 75 years.
This is not an argument about the individuals currently holding positions in our conservation institutions. Nor is it intended to question the commitment, professionalism or sacrifices of the many public servants who have served these institutions over the years.
It is a broader institutional question.
What kind of leadership does Sri Lanka need to protect its natural heritage in the 21st century?
The issue is not who occupies a particular position today. It is whether our system of identifying, developing and appointing leaders is designed to meet the conservation challenges of tomorrow
A Changing conservation landscape
When many of our major conservation institutions were established, the principal challenges were relatively straightforward: establish protected areas, prevent poaching, enforce wildlife legislation and protect forests and wildlife from direct exploitation.
Those responsibilities remain fundamental.
But conservation today is considerably more complex.
Habitat fragmentation, expanding infrastructure, human-elephant conflict, climate change, invasive species, pollution, wildlife disease, road mortality, unplanned tourism and competing demands for land and water are placing increasing pressures on ecosystems.
Conservation can no longer be treated as an isolated environmental concern.
A highway can fragment a wildlife habitat. An irrigation project can alter an ecosystem. Poorly planned tourism can degrade a protected landscape. Agricultural expansion can affect wildlife movement. Climate change can alter species distributions, water availability and ecosystem resilience.
Conservation therefore intersects with agriculture, irrigation, energy, transport, tourism, disaster management, climate policy, land-use planning and national economic development.
It has become a multidisciplinary national policy challenge.
Beyond administration: What conservation leadership requires
There is nothing inherently wrong with a career public service.
Sri Lanka needs a professional, impartial and experienced public administration. Administrative knowledge, institutional memory and an understanding of government procedures are indispensable to the functioning of the State.
The question is whether administrative experience and seniority alone should be the principal criteria for leading institutions entrusted with complex living ecosystems and irreplaceable natural capital.
I believe they should not.
Leadership of major natural-resource institutions should combine administrative competence with scientific and technical understanding, field experience, strategic thinking, integrity, sound judgement and a demonstrated commitment to conservation outcomes.
This is not an argument for automatically replacing administrators with scientists. Nor is personal passion for nature, by itself, sufficient.
What Sri Lanka needs is mission-driven professional leadership.
A person leading a conservation institution should understand not only how to administer a government department, but also why that institution exists, what ecological outcomes it is expected to achieve and what may happen if those outcomes are not achieved.
Dr P. E. P. Deraniyagala: A legacy of scientific leadership
Sri Lanka’s own history provides a remarkable example of what can happen when scientific expertise, intellectual curiosity and institutional leadership come together.
Dr P. E. P. Deraniyagala was a zoologist, palaeontologist and naturalist whose contribution to Sri Lanka’s natural heritage extended far beyond the formal responsibilities of a government position.
He was appointed Director of the Colombo Museum in 1939 and, following the reorganisation of the museums, became the first Director of the Department of National Museums, a position he held until his retirement in 1963. His scientific work ranged from Sri Lanka’s living fauna to fossil elephants and other extinct prehistoric mammals.
It lies in what he brought to that position.
He brought scientific curiosity, intellectual independence, research capability and a lifelong commitment to understanding Sri Lanka’s natural heritage.
He did not simply administer an institution concerned with heritage. He contributed to the body of knowledge upon which our understanding of that heritage depended.
That is an important lesson for today.
Our conservation institutions must not merely administer conservation programmes. They must increasingly become knowledge-driven institutions capable of generating, interpreting and applying scientific evidence to management decisions.
From institutional continuity to institutional renewal
After nearly 77 years of experience, the appropriate response is not to criticise or dismantle the institutions that have served the country.
It is to ask how we can make them stronger, more scientifically capable, technologically advanced and better equipped for the next 75 years.
The challenges of 2026 are vastly different from those of 1949.
Satellite remote sensing, GIS, GPS telemetry, camera trapping, drones, genetic analysis, artificial intelligence and ecological modelling can transform how wildlife and ecosystems are understood and managed.
But technology alone cannot transform conservation.
Institutions need the scientific capacity to interpret information, the field capacity to collect reliable data and, above all, leadership capable of turning evidence into timely decisions.
A capable leader, however, also needs an institution with adequate resources, professional autonomy, scientific capacity and the authority to act. Leadership reform therefore cannot be reduced simply to changing individuals. It must also strengthen the institutional environment in which those individuals operate.
From species management to ecosystem stewardship
Sri Lanka must also move beyond a narrow concept of wildlife management.
An elephant is not simply an animal to be managed when it enters a village.
A leopard is not simply a species to be protected when a conflict occurs.
A forest is not simply a designated area on a map.
Each exists within a larger ecological system.
Effective conservation therefore requires landscape-level thinking: protecting habitats, maintaining ecological connectivity, securing watersheds, managing human activity and ensuring that development decisions properly account for ecological consequences.
Conservation expertise must therefore be incorporated into national development planning before decisions are made, rather than being brought into the process after environmental conflicts have already emerged.
Preventing conservation conflicts before they reach the courts
There is another reality that cannot be ignored.
For decades, conservationists, environmental organisations, researchers, professionals and concerned citizens have repeatedly found themselves having to seek administrative, political and sometimes judicial intervention when environmental concerns have not been adequately resolved through normal institutional processes.
The courts have consequently become an important safeguard for environmental protection.
But this should make us ask a deeper question.
Why should citizens repeatedly have to go to court to protect a forest, wildlife habitat, wetland or other environmentally sensitive area when the State already has institutions, laws, scientists and regulatory mechanisms designed to address these matters?
Judicial intervention is an essential component of a democratic system and an important safeguard for the public interest. But courts should not have to become the primary mechanism through which conservation policy is resolved, case by case.
A judicial determination necessarily operates within the legal and evidentiary framework before the court. It cannot substitute for a scientifically informed conservation policy or a strong institutional mechanism capable of identifying and resolving environmental risks at an early stage.
The objective should therefore be to build institutions strong enough to prevent many of these disputes from reaching the courtroom in the first place.
Conservationists and environmental organisations should ideally be able to engage with government institutions early in the decision-making process, supported by credible scientific evidence and transparent procedures, rather than being forced into the role of permanent opponents of the State.
Leadership that gets decisions right
This is precisely why Sri Lanka needs conservation leadership with the knowledge, independence, judgement and courage to make the right decisions at the right time.
Good conservation leadership is not simply about enforcing the law after a conflict has emerged.
It is about anticipating problems, understanding ecological consequences, identifying risks early and taking scientifically sound decisions before an issue becomes a political, social or legal dispute.
Sometimes the right decision may require saying no.
Sometimes it may require proposing a better alternative.
And sometimes it may require bringing scientists, communities, development agencies and political decision-makers together early enough to find a solution that protects both the public interest and the environment.
This is not about confrontation with governments or development.
It is about preventing unnecessary confrontation by getting the decision right in the first place.
The right leader can prevent a conservation problem from becoming an administrative problem, an administrative problem from becoming a political problem, and a political problem from ultimately becoming a legal dispute.
The best conservation decision is often the one that prevents the conflict from arising in the first place.
Conservation requires political will
Strong professional leadership, however, is not enough.
Conservation also requires political leadership with the vision, commitment and political will to support the right decisions, particularly when they may be difficult or politically inconvenient.
India’s Project Tiger, launched in 1973, provides a compelling example. The Government of India established the programme in response to the serious decline of tiger populations, creating a national conservation initiative that combined scientific management, protected areas and strong political commitment.
Indira Gandhi’s interest in environmental protection and her government’s support helped create the political conditions for major conservation initiatives during that period.
The lesson is not that political leaders should run conservation institutions.
It is the opposite.
Political leadership must create the space, authority and support for professional conservation institutions to do their job properly.
A scientifically sound decision made by a conservation institution can achieve little if political leadership is unwilling to stand behind it. Conversely, political will, working together with scientific and professional leadership, can turn a good conservation idea into a transformative national programme.
Sri Lanka needs both sides of this equation:
professional conservation leadership capable of making the right decisions, and political leadership with the will to support those decisions in the national interest.
The ideal relationship is not political interference in conservation.
It is political commitment to evidence-based conservation.
Natural Heritage Is National Capital
Sri Lanka’s natural resources should also be recognised as national capital.
Forests support water security.
Wetlands provide natural flood protection.
Healthy watersheds support agriculture and hydropower.
Biodiversity supports tourism.
Marine ecosystems support fisheries.
Intact landscapes provide resilience against climate-related disasters.
When these systems are degraded, the country incurs an economic cost.
The question should therefore not simply be:
How much will conservation cost?
It should also be:
How much will it cost Sri Lanka if we fail to conserve its natural capital?
This is why conservation expertise must be integrated into national development decision-making from the beginning.
Choosing the leaders for tomorrow
Sri Lanka does not lack people with knowledge, experience and commitment.
Our universities, research institutions, wildlife and forest services, professional organisations and civil society contain scientists, researchers, field practitioners and conservationists with considerable expertise.
What is needed is a system that allows this expertise to contribute more effectively to institutional leadership.
Future appointments to senior positions in natural-resource institutions should therefore consider more than administrative seniority.
They should consider:
Scientific and technical competence
Conservation and field experience
Strategic leadership
Institutional management capability
Integrity and independence
Understanding of communities and stakeholders
A demonstrated record of achieving meaningful outcomes
Such a system would not weaken the public service.
It would strengthen it by bringing administrative excellence and conservation excellence together.
The Wildlife Department is a useful lens through which to examine this broader question, but the issue extends far beyond wildlife. It concerns every institution entrusted with Sri Lanka’s forests, biodiversity, wetlands, coastal ecosystems, marine resources and other forms of natural capital.
What should Sri Lanka’s conservation institutions look like for the next 75 years?
Sri Lanka should be proud of the conservation institutions it has built since the middle of the last century.
But institutional pride should never become institutional complacency.
The establishment of the Wildlife Department in 1949 was itself an example of institutional adaptation. The country recognised that wildlife conservation had become sufficiently important and specialised to require a dedicated institution.
The same principle applies today.
The conservation challenges of 2026 are vastly different from those of 1949.
The answer is not to abandon what was built.
It is to evolve it.
We need conservation institutions that are stronger, more scientific, more innovative and better equipped to influence national development decisions.
We need leadership selection systems that recognise conservation as a specialised professional responsibility.
We need a public service in which administrative excellence is complemented by scientific expertise, field experience and a genuine commitment to conservation outcomes.
And we need political leadership with the vision and will to recognise that protecting natural capital is not an obstacle to national development, but an essential condition for sustainable national prosperity.
This is not about replacing individuals.
It is about building a better system for the future.
It is not about weakening existing institutions.
It is about strengthening them for the challenges ahead.
And it is not about choosing between development and conservation.
It is about ensuring that development does not destroy the natural capital upon which Sri Lanka’s long-term prosperity depends.
After nearly 77 years of dedicated wildlife conservation, perhaps this is the right moment to ask a fundamental question:
What should Sri Lanka’s conservation institutions look like for the next 75 years?
The answer should not reject the past.
It should be an ambitious evolution of it.
Because when the next generation looks back at our time, they will not judge us simply by how well we administered the institutions we inherited.
They will judge us by what forests remained standing, what species survived, what ecosystems remained intact, and whether we had the wisdom and courage to pass on Sri Lanka’s extraordinary natural heritage in better condition than we received it.
Author: Dilum Alagiyawanna is a telecommunications engineer turned environmental and wildlife conservationist, citizen scientist and wildlife documentary filmmaker. His work bridges science, public policy and sustainable development, with particular emphasis on the long-term conservation of Sri Lanka’s elephants and other threatened species.
On Monday 27 December 2021, according to a Flight Safety Foundation narrative, “Cessna 172L 4R-GAF (ex 4R-HDC) of Sakurai Aviation crash landed in a paddy field in Paththayam Watta, Kimbulapitiya, Negombo in the Gampaha district close to Bandaranaike International Airport (VCBI) after the aircraft suffered an engine RPM fluctuation and subsequent engine failure. Three of the four occupants were injured. The charter flight was on its way to Koggala Airport (VCCK) from Sigiriya Airport (VCCS) when the problems started to occur. It had initially taken off from Ratmalana Airport (VCCC) and was supposed to land there after departing Koggala Airport (VCCK). The flight was going to make an emergency landing at Bandaranaike International Airport (VCBI) but while the aircraft was descending the pilot in command informed the controller that he had no control over the engine power. During the final approach to runway 22 the pilot in command then declared a “MAYDAY” call and the aircraft crash landed soon after.”
The touchdown itself at the paddy field was safe but due to a concrete road, which was not visible from to air at low level and running across the field, the nose wheel hit it and broke off creating the destruction and injury.
With the economic recovery, the present government has started reconstructing the highways and expressways that were suspended in the recent past. In countries like the United States of America (USA) there are straight stretches of expressways and highways, at regular intervals, where light to medium size aircraft could safely land in an emergency unlike the accident described above. Not only that, that particular stretch of road is maintained by the local Regulating Authority like the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the case of the USA.
A Safe Landing on an Expressway in India.
The Sri Lanka National Aviation Policy of 2017 also recommends that there should be helipads at regular intervals along the expressways/ highways to facilitate medical evacuation in case of motor accidents. It should be noted that the Minister in Charge of Aviation and Highways is one and the same
Will the Government spare a thought for safer multimodal transport especially when there is a push to make Domestic Aviation available for tourism? Or will it be just another pipe dream?
Capt. G A Fernando
Former member of the Accident Investigation Team, Civil Aviation Authority, Sri Lanka.(CAASL)
Immediate past President of Aircraft Owners and Operators Association, Sri Lanka. (AOAOA)
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