Features
Presidential and parliamentary elections in 2010
My role in drumming up aid and investment flows following war victory
Up to now MR’s tenure had marked a commendable level of economic growth. Most countries that come out of long wars enter a period of growth since outlays on the military can be curtailed and capital and manpower can be invested in development projects. Lending agencies and investors too are more inclined to cooperate with a government that had restored peace to the land. Accordingly several highway projects, work on ports and airports, transport and power were undertaken adding to a rapid growth of GDP. At his stage there was little interference in decision making by kinsmen and political favourites which became the bane of MR’s second term leading finally to his defeat in 2015.
While my formal appointment was as the Minister of Public Administration and Home Affairs, PB Jayasundera and Lalith Weeratunga suggested to MR that my services as an interlocutor with international agencies had become necessary. Accordingly I was appointed the Deputy Minister of Finance in addition to the portfolio of Public Administration. MR summoned me to Kandy where he was holding a political meeting and administered the oath of office as his deputy. He then dispatched me the following day to Washington to act on his behalf at IMF meetings.
As de facto Minister of International Monetary Cooperation, I worked with the Secretary to the Treasury PB Jayasundera and Governer of the Central Bank Ajit Nivard Cabraal in interacting with the IMF, the World Bank and the ADB. At the same time I joined MR’s delegations on his official trips abroad which were basically attempts to draw much needed funding into the country. Among all these attempts the most important was our request to the IMF for a standby arrangement to the tune of US dollars 2.6 billion.
This called for very close interaction with the staffers of the IMF going all the way up to the Director General who at that time was Dominique Strauss Kahn, one-time Minister of Finance of France and a towering personality with strong progressive views. Unfortunately he later got embroiled in a sex scandal and had to retire. We were lucky to have a DG who could stand up to the US which still was hung up with our ethnic war issues. However I must say that the US Treasury officials we negotiated with were professionals who reported favourably about our case.
Indeed our economy was not as problematic as that of several other developing countries that they examined. In my regular visits to the US Treasury in Washington I was received with much goodwill. Even Mrs. Yellen, the powerful Treasury Secretary, was always available to meet with us and warn us about the emerging problems with interest rates. I was even given entry to their Treasury printing division where dollars are printed and packaged every day. A quaint custom there is that all Treasury employees are paid every month with newly printed dollar notes.
Why was an IMF programme so important to us at this juncture? In the first place the terms and conditions attached to repayment of the loan were concessionary. It also was a signal to the financial community that our economy was under surveillance in terms of the charter of the IMF and that investments could be made with confidence. It was also a signal to the private financial sector that it could confidently lend to us under the umbrella of the IMF.
The approval of an IMF loan which is given in tranches takes time unless political considerations, particularly of the US, leads to quick decision making. The specialist group appointed by the IMF as the study team preparing a presentation to the Board made several visits to Sri Lanka and had an office in the Central Bank. The Governor and I interacted closely with them and the IMF representative in Colombo. The first of these representatives was Anup Singh who was a great friend of mine. He later went on to head an important division of the IMF. Subsequent appointees also worked with us in a positive way and the Ministry of Finance and the IMF had excellent relations at the staff level.
The best depiction of that collaboration was the approval of the USD 2.6 billion stand by arrangement and the disbursements which began immediately. Nivard Cabraal and I had several discussions in Washington to facilitate this decision particularly with Dr. Kato the Japanese head of the Asia division. We also had the strong support of Kalpana Kochar, the head of the South Asia division. The IMF deal coming soon after ending the northern war constituted a strong signal from the global community that we were back in their good books. When I informed MR of the IMF decision he was delighted. He added however that he knew it would turn out that way all along. I was flabbergasted when he told me that he had a “mole” who was a minor employee in Strauss Kahn’s cabinet who was from “down south” in Sri Lanka. She had kept him informed of the progress of our application.
Presidential election 2010
The presidential election was due to be held in late 2011. However on November 23, 2009 MR announced that the election will be held on January 26, 2010. He decided to go to the polls before the expiry of his full term to capitalize on his popularity. At the same time he did not want to give his opponent time to find his feet in the new political environment.
The two main contenders were incumbent President Mahinda Rajapaksa and his former Army Commander Sarath Fonseka. Fonseka who believed that he had been willfully sidelined by the Rajapaksas accepted the offer of the Opposition parties to be their “common candidate”. He resigned from his post of CDS and entered the fray under the “swan” symbol which then received the endorsement of the UNP, JVP and the minority parties. It is significant that even the Tamil parties preferred him to MR.
It was a bitterly fought election though MR had the benefit of incumbency, heavy financing and a reputation as a leader who had ended the fratricidal war. Both parties undertook a publicity contest which was unique in our electoral history. MR and his party had the advantage of emerging victorious in a local council election which was held soon after the war was won. This gave him the confidence that the party machinery was well oiled. He was contesting an election in which he was the firm favourite notwithstanding the fact that SF was the best possible choice for the Opposition under the prevailing circumstances.
Election campaign
This election campaign saw the most vicious contest between two antagonists who had been close to each other earlier. Both had a sense of betrayal by the other after collaborating to achieve a victory over the LTTE which many had thought impossible. Mahinda had tried to woo SF but when he failed he unleashed a “no holds barred” attack on his former commander. Even at the start of the campaign an attempt was made to deny SF a large building in the heart of Colombo for his headquarters. A relative of SF’s wife who had a hotel and a conference hall came to his rescue. The benefactor was earmarked for retribution by the Rajapaksa juggernaut which was being managed by MRs children who were now overseeing the fathers election campaign.
I was invited to be present when several advertising companies were asked to make a pitch for the well funded effort of the MR camp. Decisions taken by family members could not be challenged even though Namal tried his best to balance the discussion and prevent the professional advertising personnel from walking out. SFs campaign was underpinned by the UNP but half way through they lost the initiative because it appeared that their leader Ranil was afraid of promoting a new leader who would take the limelight away from him. Minority parties and the JVP on the other hand worked hard for SF and carried the brunt of the campaign. But they were no match for the well oiled political machine of the Rajapaksas who were riding a wave of popularity after winning the Northern war.
The animus that prevailed in this campaign was best seen in the manner of the physical violence unleashed on SF and his top staff after the results were announced. They had taken refuge in a hotel after the announcement of the results to avoid revenge attacks. It did not succeed. An army officer who had a personal grudge against SF was detailed to harass his former chief in a shameful manner. The UNP did not fight back and it was left to Hakeem the Muslim Congress leader, to protest this behaviour which was unprecedented in our political history.
This was clearly not MRs initiative since he had always taken the ups and downs of politics in his stride. But this episode created such a bad impression that Maithripala Sirisena who contested MR in the next Presidential election said publicly that he was afraid that if he lost the election he would have been six feet under. He was in hiding in Kurunegala when the election result in which he was declared the winner was announced. SF was charged in court soon after and sentenced to hard labour. This was the first time that a political rival of national stature had been subjected to such a savage act of revenge.
The result
The final result was a comfortable victory for MR though his challenger had performed better than anticipated by many observers. The final turnout was of 10,495,451 voters or 74.5 percent of the 14,088,500 registered voters. This was a high percentage testifying to the keen interest that was evoked by this Presidential election which was first held after the Northern victory. The result was as follows;
Mahinda Rajapaksa [SLFP] 6,015,934 [57.88 percent] Sarath Fonseka [NDF] 4,173,185 [40.15 percent]
MR had cleared the 50 percent barrier very comfortably unlike in 2005 when he barely managed to avoid a second count. What was seen very clearly from the results was that MR had swept the polls in all the districts save in the Northern and Eastern provinces which went solidly to SF The only exception was the district of Nuwara Eliya which though in the Central Province has a multi-ethnic composition. It is also to be noted that SF fared well in Colombo and other urbanized areas which were won with a comparatively smaller majority by MR.
Parliamentary election 2010
MR has always been unafraid of elections. This time around he was keen to go to the Parliamentary polls early as he was sure of a resounding victory. I had earlier decided that I would not contest because I would be reaching the age of 71 at the time of election and 76 by the close of that Parliament. Another important consideration was that my nephew Dilum was the SLFP organizer for Senkadagala and would contest that seat at the forthcoming election. It would be unwise and unseemly for two Amunugamas to contest from the same party in the same district.
I had planned to retire and campaign for Dilum who would have a longer tenure. If by my entering the fray Dilum was left out it would be a pity in terms of the long time plans of the party and of my nephew. I had therefore informed MR that had no intention of contesting the elections of 2010. MR had however told my friend Nimal Siripala de Silva that he would like to have me as a nominated MP. This was mainly because three of his closest advisors – PB Jayasundera, Lalith Weeratunga and especially Sunimal Fernando – had prevailed upon him to allocate the post of Minister of Education in his forthcoming Cabinet to me. They had a blueprint for educational reform and wanted me to steer it in the coming years. Such was the understanding when one evening I received a telephone call from MR asking me to come immediately to Temple Trees. I went there to find him in earnest conversation with DM Jayaratne and Anuruddha Ratwatte. All three asked me to change my mind and lead the SLFP team in the forthcoming election.
MR said that earlier he had agreed to Jayaratne’s request to contest the election as the district leader of the SLFP. But he had later backed out of this arrangement as his children had pleaded with him not to enter the fray. He had said that his daughter had fallen at his feet and prayed that he should withdraw. MR had then consulted Anuruddha who also had declined saying that his son Lohan wished to contest in his stead. I replied that I too had a similar problem since my nephew Dilum was contesting the Senkadagala seat.
However they all unanimously said that this problem could be overlooked in view of the fact that the Mahanayakas had specifically requested that I should be made the Kandy leader. They all piously assured the President that they would canvass for me and said that I should not let down the party at this juncture. MR added that the Rajapaksas – Chamal and Namal – were contesting from Hambantota district and that too was an uncle-nephew combination. So I agreed to this request from the three senior most members of the party and went back home to plan an election campaign which I had not envisaged even a day before. I had to rewind my electoral machine and plan a campaign in which my main concern was to ensure that Dilum will not be left behind in the rat race.
Notwithstanding MRs assurances it was not easy for two members from the same family to win an election in which the party could win only seven or eight seats from the district. This was especially so because the minorities tend to vote with the UNP in Kandy. Only a few families could boast of having their members elected simultaneously to Parliament. To the best of my knowledge only TB Ilangaratne and his wife Tamara were elected together in Kandy district [in 1970] In 1977 they were both defeated.
Furthermore Kandy had a reputation for rejecting its leaders who had a national profile. Thus George E de Silva A. Ratnayake, Illangaratne and Kobbekaduwa had tasted defeat at varying times. Both Anuruddha and Jayaratne had opted out when their progeny – Lohan and Anuradha insisted on contesting the 2010 election. In Ratnapura district when Pavithra Wanniarachchi and her father contested the latter fared badly in the polls and could not enter Parliament. I was aware of the risk that I was taking especially when I found that both seniors who were keen to have me contest suddenly turned lukewarm as they were eyeing a seat as nominated MPs.
My victory and entry Into the cabinet would reduce their chances. In fact after my victory to which Anuruddha contributed little, he was dropped by MR from the national list which in effect meant the end of his political career. Jayaratne was nominated instead and he held cabinet office till he fell badly ill and was incapacitated.
The contest in Kandy
It was a difficult contest because one candidate who had not done well in earlier elections played the caste card in a disgraceful manner. He also used goon squads to intimidate voters, particularly the large number of estate workers who would usually have voted as dictated by their party – the CWC. Mano Ganesan – MP from Colombo, who attempted to establish a base of voters among the Tamil community, was not allowed to campaign in this electorate due to thuggery and he had to get back to his Colombo constituency. Violence was directed also at other candidates who however had enough to do in other electorates and tended to avoid their tormentor. But his violent behaviour reached its peak on election day when goons invaded the booths that did not favour him and began stuffing ballot boxes. Since he had ensured that subservient police officers were attached to his electorate they looked on while the mayhem continued.
Not only the agents of other candidates but also the public servants who manned the booths complained to me as the district party leader about such unlawful behaviour. I therefore contacted the Elections Commissioner Dissanayake and requested him to annul the result in the booths where the Returning Officers had indicated that there was foul play. Dissanayake immediately held an inquiry and withheld the results of about twelve booths in that electorate which had been tampered with. This decision sent shock waves in the country.
MR was furious with this errant candidate as he had taken the shine off a splendid victory that he and his party had achieved. The Elections Commissioner had fixed a new date for a poll in those contested voting centres and we had to get back to electioneering. This cancellation of a poll was unprecedented and drew national attention to the misdemeanours of that candidate who had up to then got away with his violent tactics. Several editorials and cartoons appeared in the press which severely embarrassed the party.
After I informed MR and Gotabaya of this situation they authorized the army to set up a camp in the heart of the town to ensure a peacefull poll. I was allocated a squad of armed soldiers as there was a threat to my life. I took up residence in an estate bungalow belonging to my friend Irvin Weerakkody and directed operations from there. A large number of people who had been intimidated by this candidate came to me, some in the secrecy of the night, to pledge support. I was particularly touched when “Tambi” Thondaman telephoned me to say that MR had spoken to him and that he was instructing his local organization to back me in the forthcoming poll.
All this was helpful for me to gather a sufficient number of votes from the Nawalapitiya electorate which ensured that both Dilum and I would enter Parliament. Special mention must be made of my supporters from Galagedera, Kandy and Senkadagala who came to Nawalpitiya by bus, car, motor cycle and train to go house to house canvassing and thwart the efforts of the local candidate to keep us out of the winners list. He was crestfallen and later apologized to me in Parliament in the presence of several party leaders. Needless to say MR was not pleased at these developments which detracted from his outstanding Parliamentary victory.
(The Sarath Amunugama autobiography is available at the Vijitha Yapa Bookshop)
(Excerpted from volume 3 of the Sarath Amunugama autobiography)
Features
The Digital Underground
Illegal Foreign Exchange, Undiyal, Hawala and Money Laundering, A Four-Part Investigative Series
Forex Platforms, Cryptocurrency, AI and the New Financial Battlefield
THE INVISIBLE FINANCIAL EMPIRE – PART III
The Boyfriend Who Was Never Real
Priya, a 34-year-old professional in Colombo, met “David” on LinkedIn. He claimed to work in fintech in Singapore. For six weeks they exchanged messages daily, about work, about life, about a recent trip he had taken to the Maldives. Eventually, the conversation turned, gently and naturally, to money.
“I’ve been trading on this platform, let me show you,” he said, sharing a screenshot of a sleek trading dashboard showing consistent, impressive returns.
Priya invested a small amount first, $500. Within days, her dashboard showed it had grown to $650. She withdrew $100 successfully, just to test it. It worked. Encouraged, she invested more. Then more. Over two months, she transferred a total of $42,000 into the platform.
When she tried to withdraw her full balance, the platform demanded a “regulatory release fee” of $8,000 before funds could be unlocked. She paid it. Then another fee appeared. Then the platform stopped responding altogether. “David” vanished. The trading dashboard, the customer support chat, the entire brokerage, all of it had never been real.
This is what investigators now call “pig butchering”, and, in 2026, the most disturbing development is not the scam itself, which has existed for years, but what now powers it: artificial intelligence has industrialised the entire operation.
From Manual Fraud to Machine-Generated Deception
For most of the past decade, romance-and-investment scams, like the one that targeted Priya, required enormous manual labour. Scam operations, many of them staffed by trafficked workers held against their will in compounds across Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos, needed real humans to build relationships with victims over weeks, manage fake trading platforms, and respond convincingly to questions.
That labour-intensive model has now been substantially automated. According to financial-crime researchers tracking this shift through 2026, threat actors are standing up entire AI-generated “brokerage” experiences end-to-end, complete with KYC onboarding, branded customer-service chat, animated portfolio dashboards, and falsified live market data feeds, and operating them at industrial scale against multiple victims simultaneously. Generative-AI relationship managers now front the WhatsApp and Telegram conversations that once required real human scammers. AI-cloned regulator letters are generated on demand to justify the fake “release fees” that drain victims a final time before the platform disappears.
What has changed is not the deception itself, it is the production economics. The cost of running a credible synthetic brokerage against one additional victim has collapsed, meaning a single criminal network can now run hundreds of “Davids” simultaneously, each one indistinguishable from a genuine fintech professional until it is too late. (Figure 01)

Sri Lanka: From Victim Pool to Operating Base
Sri Lanka’s relationship to this global scam economy has shifted in an alarming direction over the past two years. The country is no longer only a source of victims, it has become an operating base for the criminal networks themselves.
In April, 2026, Sri Lankan police raided a five-star hotel property, in Ambakandavila, and arrested 150 individuals, including 133 Chinese nationals, 13 Vietnamese nationals, and one Malaysian national, allegedly running a cyber fraud centre with links to international criminal syndicates, based in Myanmar and Cambodia. Investigators say the operation followed a now-familiar regional pattern: recruiters advertise “online marketing” or “data entry” jobs on social media to lure foreign workers to Sri Lanka, confiscate their passports on arrival, and force them to operate scam campaigns under threat.
The Central Bank of Sri Lanka has formally flagged pig-butchering scams as a “developing threat,” warning that foreign scam networks are increasingly targeting overseas nationals through scam farms operating from Sri Lankan soil. A 2026 United Nations report estimated that at least 300,000 people have been trafficked into scam centres across Southeast Asia.
This is not an abstract international problem. It is unfolding in hotels and rented properties across the country, exploiting the same infrastructure, high-speed internet, affordable accommodation, accessible tourist visas, that Sri Lanka has built to attract legitimate digital businesses and tourists.
Where the Money Actually Goes: The Stablecoin Pipeline
Behind every successful pig-butchering scam sits a laundering pipeline that has been transformed almost as dramatically as the scams themselves, and the transformation has a single dominant feature: stablecoins.
According to the Financial Action Task Force’s March 2026, report, drawing on analysis from blockchain intelligence firms Chainalysis and TRM Labs, stablecoins accounted for 84% of the USD 154 billion in illicit virtual asset transaction volume recorded in 2025, the highest share ever observed, and a dramatic jump from just 15% only a few years earlier. TRM Labs separately found that illicit entities received USD 141 billion in stablecoins, in 2025 alone, the highest level observed in five years. (See Table 01)

The scale of state-level abuse is striking. A Russian sanctions-evasion network built around the ruble-pegged stablecoin A7A5 processed more than USD 72 billion in total volume in 2025.
Fighting Fire with Fire: AI on the Defensive Side
The same artificial intelligence reshaping financial crime is also, out of necessity, reshaping the defence against it. Legacy anti-money laundering systems, built on static, rule-based thresholds, have proven badly outmatched by AI-generated fraud operating at machine speed. Research cited by compliance technology analysts suggests that between 90% and 95% of alerts generated by legacy AML systems are false positives, consuming enormous investigator time while genuinely suspicious activity slips through.
This is not a frictionless transition. AI models are notoriously difficult to explain to regulators and examiners in the way traditional rule-based systems are. The practical compromise emerging across the industry is a hybrid model: AI handles the initial scoring and prioritisation of risk, while documented rule-based logic still governs the final decision that must be defensible to a regulator.
The Regulatory Response: Catching Up to the Digital Frontier
Regulators worldwide have begun moving to close the most dangerous gaps exposed by this digital transformation of financial crime. (See Table 02)

What Comes Next
We have now traced this investigation from the centuries-old mechanics of Hawala and Undiyal, through the three-stage architecture that turns criminal proceeds into apparently legitimate wealth, to the AI-generated frontier of digital financial crime reshaping all of it at machine speed.
In our concluding instalment, Part IV: “Sri Lanka at the Crossroads: Economic Consequences, Organised Crime and the Road Ahead”, we bring this series home. We examine precisely what all of this costs Sri Lanka in hard economic terms: lost remittances, exchange rate pressure, tax revenue forgone, and the 2026 FATF evaluation that will determine whether the country’s institutions can demonstrate, with evidence rather than legislation alone, that they are equal to this challenge. We close with a practical policy roadmap.
(The writer, a senior Chartered Accountant and professional banker, is Professor at SLIIT, Malabe.
Views expressed in this article are personal.)
Features
‘There are no private universities in Sri Lanka’ – some considerations for higher education reform
Academics involved in education policy like to say that there is no such thing as a private university in Sri Lanka. The only ‘universities’ in the country are state universities; anything else offering degrees is a private higher education institution (HEI). This position is technically accurate. Yet, in the discourse and imagination of the public, private universities are very real – people teach in them, students register in them, families pay fees, and such degree holders enter job markets in Sri Lanka and outside.
For decades, activists concerned for public higher education have ignored or resisted looking at private HEIs, as if such scrutiny would taint them. Others have worked in both types of institutions, carrying practices from each to the other. The apex body governing state universities, the UGC, has, meanwhile, ignored the concept of conflict of interest and appointed individuals in private higher education in committees and leadership positions. It is unsurprising then that some of the ideologies informing private higher education appear in reform agendas in the state sector.
This is a good time then to consider the varying types of private HEIs around us, and to take a look at some of the issues within them in the hope that higher education reform agendas will include private, as well as state higher education.
What is a ‘private university’?
First, some clarifications. In the public imaginary, a ‘private university’ is typically an institution that provides a foreign or local degree for which the student makes a payment. But this broad classification encompasses a host of diverse institutions and types of degrees which I detail below.
The Non-State Higher Education Division (NSHE) of the Ministry of Education has recognised 295 degrees by 32 institutions. Most of these are private companies and include a handful of established, well-known private HEIs that are ‘university like’. The degrees are local degrees conferred by the institutions accredited by the NSHE Division. While private HEIs conferring local degrees must be accredited by the NSHE Division, there appears to be no legal consequence for not doing so. In addition, there are several permutations of the private degree that miss the net of this Division and the Standing Committee on Accreditation and Quality Assurance (SCAQA) that assists this Division.
For one, degrees conferred by foreign universities offered, via these same private HEIs, are not vetted by the NSHE Division. Secondly, there is a growing plethora of private HEIs which have either no physical presence locally or only a dubious presence. The University Grants Commission has notified the public, through their website, that foreign universities listed in the Commonwealth Universities Yearbook and the World Higher Education Database are recognised, but refrained from giving any other details – which degrees? Offered by what modes? These details are not known. Some of the foreign universities in the lists may be legitimate entities in their own land but the degrees conferred locally, in their name, may not adhere to curriculum or teaching specifications of the NSHE Division or the UGC.
Another troubling phenomenon is the ‘top up degree’, which appears to work on the same principle as that of a pre-paid mobile connection: if I have a Diploma or an HND of a sort, I am eligible to complete a course of study which provides me with a degree, usually from a foreign university. The idea that someone who does not initially qualify for a degree programme should be able to work their way towards one is a progressive notion. This is the concept that open and distance learning (ODL) was based on initially, but which is now sadly exploited. ODL models are expected to provide opportunity for learning for those who may be excluded from traditional learning institutions. In Sri Lanka, however, we have seen ODL become a marketplace offering easy to obtain, for-fee qualifications by institutions with little commitment to superior teaching and learning.
Finally, a perusal of the many types of private HEIs and their varied degrees bring to mind another question – how should the private degrees, provided by state institutions (that are not educational institutions), be regulated? Who should do so?
All of these create a host of problems for the public – for hopeful students and parents and trusting employers. For the higher education sector, recruitment of academic staff, too, has become difficult due to this plethora of ambiguous higher education qualifications, as I discussed in a previous Kuppi article (‘Recruiting academics to state universities’).
Some issues in private HEIs – a bellwether for change in state universities
In this second part of this article, I will discuss some aspects of work in private HEIs – albeit the more established institutions – given that such issues may appear in reform agendas in future.
Across state universities, all permanent staff of a specific category are paid according to the same criteria. The picture is not so clear when it comes to private HEIs since they are different entities legally, typically companies. Private HEIs have salary scales and financial incentives that are different to each other. The more established private HEIs reportedly have attractive renumeration packages, possibly a reason for academics of state universities migrating eagerly to such institutions during sabbatical years and on retirement. This may not of course be the case with other less established, or improperly registered HEIs of which we know little. Academic staff of these more accepted private HEIs seem to value the high financial remuneration they receive (in comparison to state universities) as something that makes their work rewarding.
Attractive remuneration is important to sustain the good life and is at times seen as the institution’s way of encouraging good work. Yet, this has implications for the future of the institution: to continue to deliver on promised financial packages, institutions must continue to have large profit margins. One strategy has been to enroll multiple cohorts of students per year, even up to three or four intakes per year. This can result in exploitative work conditions, since staff must cater to all these cohorts in that same year. If there is inadequate staff, employees are further burdened. On the other hand, if there is a sudden drop in enrolments (degrees can go out of fashion) unexpected layoffs occur. Similar to other sectors that employ short-term contract staff – including state universities – in private HEIs, too, individual teachers, who are on short term contracts that need regular renewal, can feel pressured to work under difficult or exploitative conditions.
At the same time, even in the more established private HEIs, work norms differ from those of state universities in that they include promotional work that keeps the institution’s name in the eye of the public. The Marketing (or similarly named) unit comes up in conversations as one of the most important departments. It appears to weigh in on decision-making related to the number of staff, the amount of re-sits per exams, and other pedagogically important matters. This is a worrying example of how financial rationales interfere with pedagogically or academically sound processes, resulting in problematic results in the classroom. On the plus side, junior colleagues, who had experience in both state and private HEIs, also felt that they faced less harassment in private HEIs – primarily due to the private HEIs ability to take swift action in reported cases of harassment. This is a real indictment on state institutions and their reluctance to address chronic issues of harassment in our universities.
Yet, while we hear much about problems in state universities, we hardly hear of problems that staff in private HEIs face. One rationale for a lack of public expressions by staff is that expressions of discontent might lead to trouble given the importance of reputation for private HEIs. The worry about reputational damage is a growing concern in state universities, too, as evidenced by social media policies and internal conversations on reputational damage, consequent to negative publicity. Institutional worries of reputational damage are harmful in the long run since these impact not only freedom of expression by student and staff, but also research that is possible in and about the education sector.
Some thoughts at the end…
A close look at the private higher education sector is important given its strong presence in the country. Impending reform needs to regulate this diverse array of higher education offerings in the private sector, as well as the state institutions that offer privately-funded options of higher education (a topic for a separate Kuppi on its own). It is time we carefully considered how to build a whole system of higher education out of this broken mess.
Kaushalya Perera is a senior lecturer at the University of Colombo.
Kuppi is a politics and pedagogy happening on the margins of the lecture hall that parodies, subverts, and simultaneously reaffirms social hierarchies.
Features
Ready for solo spotlight
Singer Nish Peiris is set to take the next big step in her music journey.
The talented vocalist, who has been seen and heard in the scene here for a short while, and was also featured with the now-defunct band, Inner Vision, has announced that she will be fully committing to her solo career, after completing her degree this year.
“I’m finishing my degree this year, and after that I’ll be fully committing to my solo music career,” Nish told The Island.
“I’ve already got a few tours lined up for next year, so I’m really excited for what’s ahead.”
Fans, no doubt, will remember Nish for her smooth voice and stage presence, and the good news is that she is now ready to chart her own path and bring new music to audiences at home and abroad.
With tours already planned for 2027, the year 2026 promises to be an exciting year for the young artiste as she steps into the spotlight on her own.
We wish Nish every success in this new chapter!
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