Midweek Review

Politics of Public Security

Published

5 years ago

2020/12/9

By Shamindra Ferdinando

A smiling Public Security Minister, Sarath Weerasekera, MP, (Colombo District), last Thursday (Dec 3), said he was happy to have his school cadet platoon Sergeant Sarath Fonseka, in Parliament as an ordinary MP. The Former Navy Chief of Staff said so in response to Samagi Jana Balavegaya (SJB) lawmaker Fonseka’s reference to Weerasekera being a Corporal in the Ananda College cadet platoon, at the time he served as the Sergeant.

Recently, Viyathmaga member Weerasekera received appointment as the Public Security Minister (formerly Law and Order Minister). Following the parliamentary election in August, Weerasekera received appointment as the State Minister of Provincial Councils and Local Government. Many an eyebrow was raised when one of the strongest critics of the Provincial Council system was named the Minister in charge. Weerasekera gave up the Provincial Council and Local Government Ministry to accept the far more influential Public Security portfolio.

War-winning Army Chief Field Marshal Fonseka and Rear Admiral Weerasekera also exchanged words over the latter’s son, ASP Sachitra Weerasekera, in uniform, saluting the father and then embracing him.

The exchange between Fonseka and Weerasekera highlighted continuing tensions among some sections of the retired top brass, divided on political lines. Both entered Parliament at the 2010 April parliamentary election, the first since the successful conclusion of the war against the LTTE.

Lawmaker Fonseka reiterated accusations directed at Minister Weerasekera in parliament on Monday (7) in the latter’s absence. Weerasekera told the writer that there was absolutely no basis for Fonseka’s assertions and the claim that he received the post of DG, Civil Defence Force with the then Army Commander’s intervention.

Fonseka contested under the Democratic National Alliance (DNA) symbol, having lost badly to Mahinda Rajapaksa, at the 2010 January presidential election, whereas Weerasekera entered Parliament from the Digamadulla district. At the time, the UNP-led political alliance consisting of the TNA, the JVP and the SLMC fielded Fonseka as the common candidate although the Sinha Regiment veteran hadn’t even been registered as a voter anywhere in Sri Lanka at the time.

Along with Fonseka, the JVP-led DNA won seven seats, including two National List slots at the 2010 general election. The DNA group comprised Fonseka (now with Sajith Premadasa’s SJB), Arjuna Ranatunga (still in beleaguered UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe’s camp), Tiran Alles (National List member of the SLPP) and four JVPers. (Today the JVP group consists of three lawmakers – a 50 per cent drop from the previous 2015-2019 Parliament).

Political maneuvering deprived Fonseka of his seat in early Oct 2010. Jayantha Ketagoda, who replaced Fonseka in Parliament, finally ended up in the SLPP National List last August. Politics here is certainly a game of opportunity lacking in any principles.

At the August 2015 general election, Fonseka contested on the Democratic Party ticket. Fonseka led the party, while Ketagoda functioned as his deputy. The DP failed to secure a single seat. In the following year, thanks to UNP leader Wickremesinghe, Fonseka was accommodated on the UNP National List, in the wake of M.K.D.S. Gunawardena’s sudden death.

Before discussing the circumstances leading to the creation of the Public Security Ministry, and elevation of Weerasekera to cabinet rank, it would be pertinent to mention how the naval veteran created history by being the only lawmaker to vote against the 19th Amendment to the Constitution, enacted by yahapalana strategists in early 2015. Weerasekera, in spite of being repeatedly urged to vote for the much-touted piece of legislation, voted against it, whereas almost the entire UPFA grouping, including the Joint Opposition, backed the 19th Amendment.

Weerasekera received public admiration for always taking a tough stand against terrorism, regardless of consequences. Weerasekera risked his naval career during President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga’s tenure. Weerasekera earned the wrath of the government for resisting LTTE strategies. The then Maj. Gen. Fonseka, too, strongly opposed the LTTE strategy, though the government relentlessly pushed the military to give in. The nation should be eternally grateful to Fonseka for his unwavering stance, in his capacity as Security Forces Commander, Jaffna, to dismantle High Security Zones, in the peninsula. The TNA hated Fonseka so much so that the grouping demanded Fonseka’s removal from the vital Jaffna command, during the 2002-2003 period. Ironically, the TNA and Fonseka, in his capacity as the UNP- backed presidential candidate, reached a marriage of convenience just to oust Rajapaksas in 2010. Again proving that politics is nothing but a game for opportunists in this country, whatever the long term consequences could be.

The unholy alliance that failed to win the 2010 presidential election, succeeded five years later when Maithripala Sirisena defeated Mahinda Rajapaksa, who sought a third presidential term at the expense of political stability. The same alliance, sans the JVP, failed at the 2019 presidential election, to pave the way for wholly new political groups, the SLPP and the SJB to emerge as the main parties. The UNP and the SLFP are irrelevant in today’s context.

Having each served the armed forces, for well over three decades, Fonseka and Weerasekera, now represent the main Opposition (SJB with 54 seats) and the government (145 seats), respectively.

Weerasekera faces a daunting task

There is no point in denying politicization of the police. Successive governments brazenly exploited and abused police, while in return some in the police made hay by often milking the underworld and also getting promotions and perks. The previous yahapalana administration ruined the law enforcement apparatus to such an extent that the police, in spite of having specific foreign intelligence, as regards impending National Thowheed Jamaat (NTJ) strike, allowed the operation to go ahead. At that time of Sri Lanka’s worst security failure, a retired DIG functioned as the Chief of National Intelligence (CNI), a post previously held by veteran intelligence leaders like, then Maj. Gen. Kapila Hendawitharana, one-time head of the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI).

Weerasekera will have to grapple with an extremely dicey situation with two key units – the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and the Police Narcotic Bureau (PNB) under investigation over serious offenses. In both cases, police headquarters had no option but to hastily remove the DIGs, as well as Directors in charge of the CID and the PNB, pending investigations. Police headquarters is yet to reveal its findings. The PNB is under investigation for dealing in heroin, whereas the CID is under fire for releasing Riyaj Bathiudeen, SJB lawmaker Rishad Bathiudeen’s brother under mysterious circumstances after having been taken into custody under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA).

Previous CID head Shani Abeysekera is now in remand for framing a DIG. He has many other cases in the pipeline against him like fixing cases involving other victims, some of which are on tape him discussing them with actor turned politician Ranjan Ramanayake.

In both the PNB and Riyaj cases, no less a person than intrepid Attorney General Dappula de Livera, PC intervened. The AG demanded special investigation into the CID’s handling of Riyaj Bathiudeen’s case. The President’s Counsel certainly didn’t mince his words when he questioned the deliberate failure on the part of the police to conduct the inquiry and the deliberate denial of the required expertise to bring it to a successful conclusion.

The AG rapped the police in two other cases, namely the Negombo Prison officer’s misconduct and the inordinate delay in the Brandix investigation. In the wake of the Negombo Prison officer’s case, involving the disgraced superintendent of prison Anuruddha Sampayo, the AG called a media briefing, the first time by any AG in over 100 years to take a public stand. On behalf of the AG, Deputy Solicitor General Dileepa Peiris went to the extent of suggesting the deployment of the military to execute arrest warrants if the police found the task too difficult. In the high profile Brandix case, the AG directed an investigation into what his Coordinating Officer State Counsel Nishara Jayaratne called negligence on the part of Brandix, and government officials, in the deadly coronavirus second eruption.

Restoring confidence in law enforcement will certainly be a tough task for the new Minister. The public expected the new administration to take remedial measures. However, the damaging of a section of King Bhuvanekabahu II’s royal pavilion, while demolishing an appendage constructed in more recent times in Kurunegala, in July, on the orders of Kurunegala Mayor Thushara Sanjeewa, bulldozing of a section of the Anavilundawa Ramsar wetland, for shrimp farming, by former Arachchikattuwa Pradeshiya Sabha Chairman Jagath Samantha, brother of State Minister Sanath Nishantha, in September, caused quite a shock.

In the wake of the recent acquittal of former Presidential Secretary Lalith Weeratunga, and the then Director General of the Telecommunication Regulatory Commission Anusha Palpita by the Court of Appeal, in the high profile sil redi case, the focus is now on the police and the Office of the AG. Perhaps there should be a judicial review of the whole process, as successive governments and Oppositions, and vice versa, repeatedly accuse each other of politicizing the judiciary and the police. The nine-member Committee, headed by Romesh de Silva, PC, tasked with formulating a new Constitution, should explore ways and means of having an independent review mechanism.

The Public Security Ministry will have to be mindful of the overall developments, including political environment. Many an eyebrow was raised when Sivenesathurai Chandrakanthan aka Pilleyan, formerly a member of the LTTE fighting cadre, now a lawmaker, who had been arrested in Oct 2015 over his alleged involvement in the assassination of TNA MP Joseph Pararajasingham, in Batticaloa, 10 years before was granted bail after being in remand for about five years over a confession that is not admissible in a court. Chandrakanthan backed the SLPP presidential candidate, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, at the 2019 presidential election. Chandrakanthan also voted for the 20th Amendment to the Constitution. If those who had ordered Chandrakanthan arrested for political reasons, they owed an explanation.

The yahapalana Prime Minister appointed one-time Attorney General Tilak Marapana, PC, as the Law and Order Minister, in Sept 2015. Marapana was accommodated on the UNP National List. The CID arrested Chandrakanthan during Marapana’s short stint as the Law and Order Minister. Marapana resigned in the second week of Nov 2015 over the Avant Garde controversy as he did not see eye to eye with the yahapalana government on that issue like then Minister Wijeyadasa Rajapakse. His resignation paved the way for another Wickremesinghe favourite, Sagala Ratnayake, to assume the Law and Order portfolio. Ratnayake resigned close on the heels of the debilitating setback suffered by the UNP at the Feb 2018 Local Government polls.

Western backed civil society wanted Fonseka

A section of the UNP, as well as the powerful civil society grouping, faulted the Law and Order and Justice Minister Dr. Wijeyadasa Rajapakse, PC for the defeat. They alleged the UNP-led government experienced such a devastating defeat due to their failure to bring high profile cases against the Rajapaksa administration to a successful conclusion. Those who largely found fault with Sagala Ratnayake and Wijeyadasa Rajapakse demanded the appointment of Sarath Fonseka as the Law and Order Minister. President Sirisena, at the UNP’s behest, in mid-August 2017, replaced Wijeyadasa Rajapakse with Thalatha Atukorale. However, President Sirisena flatly refused to accommodate Fonseka as Law and Order Minister. The President’s stand was anyone but Fonseka, who had been harsh on the SLFP leader on many occasions.

The civil society, too, pushed President Sirisena hard to accommodate Fonseka. In the wake of the humiliating defeat suffered by the party, civil society leaders felt the yahapalana arrangement could collapse unless they made a special effort.

Close on the heels of the Feb 10, 2018 defeat, civil society representatives sought assurance from both President Sirisena and Premier Wickremesinghe that they wouldn’t quit the yahapalana alliance over debilitating polls setback. In a bid to pressure the SLFP and UNP leaders, co-conveners of Purawesi Balaya, Gamini Viyangoda, K.W. Janaranjana and Saman Ratnapriya briefed the media as regards their efforts at a hastily arranged media conference at the Centre for Society and Religion (CSR), Maradana on Feb 13, 2018. They acknowledged the possibility of an unceremonious end to the yahapalana arrangement, unless the simmering dispute between the two leaders could be settled. The delegation that made representations to the President and the Premier on Feb 12, 2010, consisted of Ven. Dambara Amila, ‘Annidda’ editor K.W. Janaranjana, Gamini Viyangoda and Saman Ratnapriya. Purawesi Balaya attributed the polls defeat primarily to the yahapalana leaders’ failure to introduce a new Constitution and their failure to punish those responsible for killings and corruption. The writer covered the Purawesi Balaya briefing (Last ditch attempt to prevent collapse of govt – The Island, Feb 14, 2020).

Purawesi Balaya

called a second media briefing on the same matter, on Feb 15, 2020, at the same venue, to demand an immediate solution to the failure on the government’s part to investigate killings and corruption. Amila thera demanded the immediate appointment of Fonseka as the Law and Order Minister. Flanked by Executive Director of the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) Dr. Pakiasothy Saravanamuttu, Nimalka Fernando, Chameera Perera and Saman Ratnapriya, the yahapalana proponent urged the government to allow the police, under Fonseka, to operate outside what he called democratic norms. Ven. Amila demanded that the police operate beyond normal laws of the land. The openly hardcore right wing monk emphasized that the FCID (Financial Crimes Investigation Division), the CID and other law enforcement arms be placed under Fonseka and the military put on alert. Purawesi Balaya wanted Fonseka given six months to execute the operation. Reiterating their role in Sirisena winning the presidency, the grouping insisted that the yahapalana leaders couldn’t, under any circumstances, abandon the agreed agenda (Prez, PM urged to appoint SF Law & Order Minister – The Island, February 16, 2020).

Rear Admiral Weerasekera wouldn’t have envisaged him receiving the Public Security portfolio as he threw his weight behind the high profile Viyathmaga campaign meant to promote wartime Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa as the SLPP candidate. It would be pertinent to mention that at the time the Viyathmaga campaign got underway, the breakaway UPFA faction hadn’t registered a political outfit of its own.

Sand mining Mafia challenges police

Restoring public confidence in the police would be a herculean task. The police would have to seriously think beyond neutralizing the underworld. Bringing the underworld to its knees is certainly a necessity that needs urgent action. The powerful sand mining Mafia recently killed a 32-year-old policeman, attached to the Bingiriya police station. Although the police quickly arrested the 27-year-old driver of the tipper truck, that ran over the policeman, who signaled him to stop, police headquarters should ensure a proper investigation. Police spokesman Attorney-At-Law DIG Ajith Rohana is on record as having said that the police were deployed to thwart illegal mining at Deduru Oya, on a specific Supreme Court directive. Minister Weerasekera should, without further delay, examine the deteriorating ground situation. High profile case involving former Director of CID SSP Shani Abeysekera, now in remand, custody, fugitive Inspector Nishantha Silva, securing political asylum, in Switzerland, and the arrest of an officer over accusations that he helped the wife of Easter Sunday bomber Hasthun, underscored the need for special attention.

Minister Johnston Fernando, last Saturday (Dec 5) questioned the UNP/SJB, in Parliament over the late Makandure Madush fleeing the country, several years ago. Fernando, onetime UNP heavyweight, who switched his allegiance at the onset of Mahinda Rajapaksa’s first presidential term, alleged a former UNP minister brought the notorious underworld leader on the Southern highway to the Bandaranaike International Airport. Fernando should have named the former minister.

EPDP leader Douglas Devananda recently made a shocking claim in Parliament. One-time militant Devananda, who himself received weapons training, in India, alleged, in Parliament, that a lawmaker, from the Jaffna peninsula, currently serving Parliament, was involved in the abduction and killing of SSP Charles Wijewardena, in Jaffna, during the Ceasefire Agreement. The mainstream media, as well as the social media, conveniently refrained from providing sufficient coverage to the incident. A couple of weeks later, Devananda received appointment as the Prime Minister’s representative in the five-member Parliamentary Council, the successor to the former so called independent Constitutional Council, which in practice proved to be far from independent of the previous government. Minister Devananda’s statement hadn’t received the attention it deserved.

Wijewardena was kidnapped and killed in Jaffna, while he was travelling to Inuvil to investigate a shooting incident on August 4, 2005. The killing took place at Mallakam. Parliament also accommodated LTTE’s Eastern Commander, Karuna Amman, under whose command terrorists butchered over 400 unarmed surrendered policemen at the onset of the Eelam War II, in June 1990. Karuna served two terms as a lawmaker during Mahinda Rajapaksa’s tenure as the President. Karuna’s one-time junior associate LTTE cadre Pilleyan is now a Member of Parliament, whereas Karuna bid to enter Parliament, from Digamadulla, at the last general election, failed.

The JVP responsible for hundreds of deaths, if not thousands, too, is represented in Parliament – since 1994. The TNA that recognized the LTTE, in late 2001, as the sole representatives of the Tamil people, and then served them until the very end, is also represented in Parliament. The TNA includes three former terrorist groups, the TELO, PLOTE and EPRLF.

Sri Lanka’s politics is certainly an ‘explosive mix.’ Having failed to secure the presidency, Field Marshal Fonseka serves as a lawmaker. The war-winning Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa is the seventh executive President. Retired Rear Admiral Weerasekera is the Public Security Minister, whereas the LTTE and other Tamil groups, as well as the JVP, responsible for two bloody insurrections, are part of the system.

How Sajith Premadasa promoted Fonseka as his future Defence Minister, during the failed 2019 presidential campaign, and lawmaker and retired Supreme Court Justice C.W. Wigneswaran, exploiting the LTTE cause, as well as Gajendrakumar Ponnambalam’s fiery speeches in Parliament, are grim reminders the country is yet to achieve stability ten years after the war. Public Security Minister Weerasekera’s recent warning in Parliament that Tamil political parties promoted terrorism underscores the need to address security issue, regardless of political consequences.

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Midweek Review

Dr. Jaishankar drags H’tota port to reverberating IRIS Dena affair

Published

6 days ago

2026/03/11

Sahan Weerasooriya

Sri Lanka reached an agreement with China to build the Hambantota port after India declined the then President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s request to take charge of the high profile project. The Indian decision may have been influenced by the war raging in the northern region at that time.

Indian Foreign Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar recognised Hambantota harbour as a Chinese military facility that underlined intimidating foreign military presence in the Indian Ocean. Jaishankar was responding to queries regarding India’s widely mentioned status as the region’s net security provider against the backdrop of a US submarine blowing up an Iranian frigate IRIS Dena, off Galle, within Sri Lanka’s Exclusive Economic Zone.

This happened at the Raisina Dialogue 2026 (March 5 to 7) in New Delhi. Raisina Dialogue was launched in 2016, three years after Narendra Modi became the Prime Minister.

The query obviously rattled the Indian Foreign Minister. Urging the moderator, Ms. Pakli Sharma Ipadhyay, to understand, what he called, the reality of the Indian Ocean, Dr. Jaishankar pointed out the joint US-British presence at Diego Garcia over the past five decades. Then he referred to the Chinese presence at Djibouti in East Africa, the first overseas Chinese military base, established in 2017, and Chinese takeover of Hambantota port, also during the same time. China secured the strategically located port on a 99-year lease for USD 1.2 bn, under controversial circumstances. China succeeded in spite of Indian efforts to halt Chinese projects here, including Colombo port city.

The submarine involved is widely believed to be Virginia-class USS Minnesota. The crew, included three Australian Navy personnel, according to international news agencies. However, others named the US Navy fast-attack submarine, involved in the incident, as USS Charlotte.

Diego Garcia is responsible for military operations in the Middle East, Africa and the Indo-Pacific. Dr. Jaishankar didn’t acknowledge that India, a key US ally and member of the Quad alliance, operated P8A maritime patrol and reconnaissance flights out of Diego Garcia last October. The US-India-Israel relationship is growing along with the US-Sri Lanka partnership.

The Indian Foreign Minister emphasised the deployment of the US Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, one of the countries that had been attacked by Iran, following the US-Israeli assassination of Iranian Supreme Leader, and key government functionaries, in a massive surprise attack, aiming at a regime change there. The Indian Minister briefly explained how they and Sri Lanka addressed the threat on three Indian navy vessels following the unprovoked US-Israeli attacks on Iran. Whatever the excuses, the undeniable truth is, as Sharma pointed out, that the US attack on the Iranian frigate took place in India’s backyard.

Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Vijitha Herath who faced Sharma before Dr. Jaishankar, struggled to explain the country’s position. Dr. Jaishankar made the audience laugh at Minister Herath’s expense who repeatedly said that Sri Lanka would deal with the situation in terms of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and international laws. Herath should have pointed out that Hambantota was not a military base and couldn’t be compared, under any circumstances, with the Chinese base in Djibouti.

Typical of the arrogant Western power dynamics, the US never cared for international laws and President Donald Trump quite clearly stated their position.

Israel is on record as having declared that the decision to launch attacks on Iran had been made months ago. Therefore, the sinking of the fully domestically built vessel that was launched in 2021 should be examined in the context of overall US-Israeli strategy meant to break the back of the incumbent Islamic revolutionary government and replace it with a pro-Western regime there as had been the case after the toppling of the democratically elected government there, led by Prime Minister Mossadegh, in August, 1953.

US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth declared that IRIS Dena “thought it was safe in international waters’ but died a quiet death.” A US submarine torpedoed the vessel on the morning of March 4, off Galle, within Sri Lanka’s exclusive economic zone and that decision must have been made before the IRIS Dena joined International Fleet Review (IFR) and Exercise Milan 2026, at Visakhapatnam, from February 15 to 25.

The sinking of the Iranian vessel, a Moudge –class frigate attached to Iran’s southern fleet deployed in the Gulf of Oman and Strait of Hormuz, had been calculated to cause mayhem in the Indian Ocean. Obviously, and pathetically, Iran failed to comprehend the US-Israeli mindset after having already been fooled with devastating attacks, jointly launched by Washington and Tel Aviv against the country’s nuclear research facilities, while holding talks with it on the issue last June. Had they comprehended the situation they probably would have pulled out of the IFR and Milan 2026. Perhaps, Iran was lulled into a false sense of security because they felt the US wouldn’t hit ships invited by India. The US Navy did not participate though the US Air Force did.

The US action dramatically boosted Raisina Dialogue 2026, but at India’s expense. Prime Minister Modi’s two-day visit to Tel Aviv, just before the US-Israel launched the war to effect a regime change in Teheran, made the situation far worse. BJP seems to have decided on whose side India is on. But, the US action has, invariably, humiliated India. That cannot be denied. The Indian Navy posted a cheery message on X on February 17, the day before President Droupadi Murmu presided over IFR off the Visakhapatnam coast. “Welcome!” the Indian Navy wrote, greeting the Iranian warship IRIS Dena as it steamed into the port of Visakhapatnam to join an international naval gathering. Photographs showed Iranian sailors and a grey frigate gliding into the Indian harbour on a clear day. The hashtags spoke of “Bridges of Friendship” and “United Through Oceans.”

US alert

Dr. Jaishankar

Altogether, three Iranian vessels participated in IFR. In addition to the ill-fated IRIS Dena, the second frigate IRIS Lavan and auxiliary ships IRIS Bushehr comprised the group. Dr. Jaishankar disclosed at the Raisina Dialogue 2026 that Iran requested India to allow IRIS Lavan to enter Indian waters. India accommodated the vessel at Cochin Port (Kochi Port) on the Arabian Sea in Kerala.

At the time US torpedoed IRIS Dena, within Sri Lanka’s EEZ, IRIS Lavan was at Cochin port. Sri Lanka’s territorial waters extend 12 nautical miles (approximately 22 km) from the country’s coastline. The US hit the vessel 19 nautical miles off southern coastline.

Sri Lanka, too, participated in IFR and Milan 2026. SLN Sagara (formerly Varaha), a Vikram-class offshore patrol vessel of the Indian Coast Guard and SLN Nandimithra, A Fast Missile Vessel, acquired from Israel, participated and returned to Colombo on February 27, the day before IRIS Lavan sought protection in Indian waters.

Although many believed that Sri Lanka responded to the attack on IRIS Dena, following a distressed call from that ship, the truth is it was the Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) that alerted the Maritime Rescue Coordination centre (MRCC) after blowing it up with a single torpedo. The SLN’s Southern Command dispatched three Fast Attack Craft (FACs) while a tug from Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA) joined later.

The INDOPACOM, while denying the Iranian claim that IRIS Dena had been unarmed at the time of the attack, emphasised: “US forces planned for and Sri Lanka provided life-saving support to survivors in accordance with the Law of Armed Conflict.” In the post shared on X (formerly Twitter) the US has, in no uncertain terms, said that they planned for the rescuing of survivors and the action was carried out by the Sri Lanka Navy.

IRIS Lavan and IRIS Bushehr are most likely to be held in Cochin and in Trincomalee ports, respectively, for some time with the crews accommodated on land. With the US-Israel combine vowing to go the whole hog there is no likelihood of either India or Sri Lanka allowing the ships to leave.

Much to the embarrassment of the Modi administration, former Indian Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal has said that IRIS Dena would not have been targeted if Iran was not invited to take part in IFR and Milan naval exercise.

“We were the hosts. As per protocol for this exercise, ships cannot carry any ammunition. It was defenseless. The Iranian naval personnel had paraded before our president,” he said in a post on X.

Sibal argued that the attack was premeditated, pointing out that the US Navy had been invited to the exercise but withdrew at the last minute, “presumably with this operation in mind.”

Sibal added that the US ignored India’s sensitivities, as the Iranian ship was present in the waters due to India’s invitation.

He stressed that India was neither politically nor militarily responsible for the US attack, but carried a moral and humanitarian responsibility.

“A word of condolence by the Indian Navy (after political clearance) at the loss of lives of those who were our invitees and saluted our president would be in order,” Sibal said.

Iran and even India appeared to have ignored the significance of USN pullout from IFR and Milan exercise at the eleventh hour. India and Sri Lanka caught up in US-Israeli strategy are facing embarrassing questions from the political opposition. Both Congress and Samagi Jana Balwegaya (SJB), as well as Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP), exploited the situation to undermine respective governments over an unexpected situation created by the US. Both India and Sri Lanka ended up playing an unprecedented role in the post-Milan 2026 developments that may have a lasting impact on their relations with Iran.

The regional power India and Sri Lanka also conveniently failed to condemn the February 28 assassination of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, while that country was holding talks with the US, with Oman serving as the mediator.

Condemning the unilateral attack on Iran, as well as the retaliatory strikes by Iran, Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha and Congress leader Rahul Gandhi on Tuesday (March 3, 2026) questioned India’s silence on the Middle East developments.

In a post on social media platform X, Gandhi said Prime Minister Narendra Modi must speak up. “Does he support the assassination of a Head of State as a way to define the world order? Silence now diminishes India’s standing in the world,” he said.

Under heavy Opposition fire, India condoled the Iranian leader’s assassination on March 5, almost a week after the killing. Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri met the Iran Ambassador in Delhi and signed the condolence book, though much belatedly.

SL-US relations

The Opposition questioned the NPP government’s handling of the IRIS Dena affair. They quite conveniently forgot that any other government wouldn’t have been able to do anything differently than bow to the will of the US. Under President Trump, Washington has been behaving recklessly, even towards its longtime friends, demanding that Canada become its 51st state and that Denmark handover Greenland pronto.

SJB and Opposition leader Sajith Premadasa cut a sorry figure demanding in Parliament whether Sri Lanka had the capacity to detect submarines or other underwater systems. Sri Lanka should be happy that the Southern Command could swiftly deploy three FACs and call in SLPA tug, thereby saving the lives of 32 Iranians and recovering 84 bodies of their unfortunate colleagues. Therefore, of the 180-member crew of IRIS Dena, 116 had been accounted for. The number of personnel categorised as missing but presumably dead is 64.

There is no doubt that Sri Lanka couldn’t have intervened if not for the US signal to go ahead with the humanitarian operation to pick up survivors. India, too, must have informed the US about the Iranian request for IRIS Lavan to re-enter Indian waters. Sri Lanka, too, couldn’t have brought the Iranian auxiliary vessel without US consent. President Trump is not interested in diplomatic niceties and the way he had dealt with European countries repeatedly proved his reckless approach. The irrefutable truth is that the US could have torpedoed the entire Iranian group even if they were in Sri Lankan or Indian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) that extends to 200 nautical miles from its coastline.

In spite of constantly repeating Sri Lanka’s neutrality, successive governments succumbed to US pressure. In March 2007, Mahinda Rajapaksa’s government entered into Acquisition and Cross- Servicing Agreement (ACSA) with the US, a high profile bilateral legal mechanism to ensure uninterrupted support/supplies. The Rajapaksas went ahead with ACSA, in spite of strong opposition from some of its partners. In fact, they did not even bother to ask or take up the issue at Cabinet level before the then Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa, a US citizen at the time, and US Ambassador here Robert O. Blake signed it. Close on the heels of the ACSA signing, the US provided specific intelligence that allowed the Sri Lanka Navy to hunt down four floating LTTE arsenals. Whatever critics say, that US intervention ensured the total disruption of the LTTE supply line and the collapse of their conventional fighting capacity by March 2009. The US favourably responded to the then Vice Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda’s request for help and the passing of intelligence was not in any way in line with ACSA.

That agreement covered the 2007 to 2017 period. The Yahapalana government extended it. Yahapalana partners, the SLFP and UNP, never formally discussed the decision to extend the agreement though President Maithripala Sirisena made a desperate attempt to distance himself from ACSA.

It would be pertinent to mention that the US had been pushing for ACSA during Rail Wickremesinghe’s tenure as the Premier, in the 2001-2003 period. But, he lacked the strength to finalise that agreement due to strong opposition from the then Opposition. During the time the Yahapalana government extended ACSA, the US also wanted the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) signed. SOFA, unlike ACSA, is a legally binding agreement that dealt with the deployment of US forces here. However, SOFA did not materialise but the possibility of the superpower taking it up cannot be ruled out.

Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who won the 2019 presidential election, earned the wrath of the US for declining to finalise MCC (Millennium Challenge Corporation) Compact on the basis of Prof. Gunaruwan Committee report that warned that the agreement contained provisions detrimental to national security, sovereignty, and the legal system. In the run up to the presidential election, UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe declared that he would enter into the agreement in case Sajith Premadasa won the contest.

Post-Aragalaya setup

Since the last presidential election held in September 2024, Admiral Steve Koehler, a four-star US Navy Admiral and Commander of the US Pacific Fleet visited Colombo twice in early October 2024 and February this year. Koehler’s visits marked the highest-level U.S. military engagement with Sri Lanka since 2021.

Between Koehler’s visits, the United States and Sri Lanka signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) formalising the defence partnership between the Montana National Guard, the US Coast Guard District 13, and the Sri Lanka Armed Forces under the Department of War’s State Partnership Programme (SPP). The JVP-led NPP government seems sure of its policy as it delayed taking a decision on one-year moratorium on all foreign research vessels entering Sri Lankan waters though it was designed to block Chinese vessels. The government is yet to announce its decision though the ban lapsed on December 31, 2024.

The then President Ranil Wickremesinghe was compelled to announce the ban due to intense US-Indian pressure.

The incumbent dispensation’s relationship with US and India should be examined against allegations that they facilitated ‘Aragalaya’ that forced President Gotabaya Rajapaksa out of office. The Trump administration underscored the importance of its relationship with Sri Lanka by handing over ex-US Coast Guard Cutter ‘Decisive ‘to the Sri Lanka Navy. The vessel, commanded by Captain Gayan Wickramasooriya, left Baltimore US Coast Guard Yard East Wall Jetty on February 23 and is expected to reach Trincomalee in the second week of May.

Last year Sri Lanka signed seven MoUs, including one on defence and then sold controlling shares of the Colombo Dockyard Limited (CDL) to a company affiliated to the Defence Ministry as New Delhi tightened its grip.

Sri Lanka-US relations seemed on track and the IRIS Dena incident is unlikely to distract the two countries. The US continues to take extraordinary measures to facilitate war on Iran. In a bid to overcome the Iranian blockade on crude carriers the US temporarily eased sanctions to allow India to buy Russian oil.

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent declared a 30-day waiver was a “deliberate short-term measure” to allow oil to keep flowing in the global market. The US sanctioned Russian oil following Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, forcing buyers to seek alternatives.

The US doesn’t care about the Ukraine government that must be really upset about the unexpected development. India was forced to halt buying Russian oil and now finds itself in a position to turn towards Russia again. But that would be definitely at the expense of Iran facing unprecedented military onslaught.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

Midweek Review

A Living Legend of the Peradeniya Tradition:

Published

6 days ago

2026/03/11

Sahan Weerasooriya

Prof. H. L. Seneviratne

A Tribute to Professor H. L. Seneviratne – Part I

My earliest memories of the eminent anthropologist, Professor H. L. Seneviratne date back to my childhood, when I first encountered his name through the vivid accounts of campus life shared by my late brother, Sugathapala de Silva, then a lecturer in the Department of Sinhala at the University of Peradeniya. By the time I became a first-year sociology student in 1968/69, I had the privilege of being taught by the Professor, whose guidance truly paved the way for my own progression in sociology and anthropology. Even then, it was clear that he was a towering presence—not just as an academician, but as a central figure in the lively cultural and literary renaissance that defined that era of the university’s intellectual history.

H.L. Seneviratne stood alongside a galaxy of intellectuals who shaped and developed the literary consciousness of the Peradeniya University. His professorial research made regular appearances in journals such as Sanskriti and Mimamsa, published Sinhala and English articles, and served as channels for the dissemination of the literary consciousness of Peradeniya to the population at large. These texts were living texts of a dynamic intellectual ferment where the synthesis of classical aesthetic sensibilities with current critical intellectual thought in contemporary Sri Lanka was under way.

The concept of a ‘Peradeniya tradition or culture’, a term which would later become legendary in Sri Lankan literary and intellectual circles, was already being formed at this time. Peradeniya culture came to represent a distinctive synthesis: cosmopolitanism entwined with well-rooted local customs, aesthetic innovation based on classical Sinhala styles, and critical interaction with modernity. Among its pre-eminent practitioners were intellectual giants such as Ediriweera Sarachchandra, Gunadasa Amarasekara, and Siri Gunasinghe. These figures and H.L. Seneviratne himself, were central to the shaping of a space of cultural and literary critique that ranged from newspapers to book-length works, public speeches to theatrical performance.

Unlimited influence

H.L. Seneviratne’s influence was not limited to the printed page, which I discuss in this article. He operated in and responded to the performative, interactive space of drama and music, situating lived artistic practice in his cultural thought. I recall with vividness the late 1950s, a period seared into my memory as one of revelation, when I as a child was fortunate enough to witness one of the first performances of Maname, the trailblazing Sinhala drama that revolutionised Sri Lankan theatre. Drawn from the Nadagam tradition and staged in the open-air theatre in Peradeniya—now known as Sarachchandra Elimahan Ranga Pitaya—or Wala as used by the campus students. Maname was not so much a play as a culturally transformative experience.

H.L. Seneviratne was not just an observer of this change. He joined the orchestra of Maname staged on November 3, 1956, lending his voice and presence to the collective heartbeat of the performance. He even contributed to the musical group by playing the esraj, a quiet but vital addition to the performance’s beauty and richness. Apart from these roles, he played an important part in the activities of Professor Sarathchandra’s Sinhala Drama Society, a talent nursery and centre for collaboration between artists and intellectuals. H.L. Seneviratne was a friend of Arthur Silva, a fellow resident of Arunachalam Hall then, and the President of the Drama Circle. H.L. Seneviratne had the good fortune to play a role, both as a member of the original cast, and an active member of the Drama Circle that prevailed on lecturer E.R. Sarathchandra to produce a play and gave him indispensable organizational support. It was through this society that Sarachchandra attracted some of the actors who brought into being Maname and later Sinhabhahu, plays which have become the cornerstone of Sri Lanka’s theatrical heritage.

The best chronicler of Maname

H.L. Seneviratne is the best chronicler of Maname. (Towards a National Art, From Home and the World, Essays in honour of Sarath Amunugama. Ramanika Unamboowe and Varuni Fernando (eds)). He chronicles the genesis of Ediriweera Sarachchandra’s seminal play Maname, framing it as a pivotal attempt to forge a sophisticated national identity by synthesizing indigenous folk traditions with Eastern theatrical aesthetics. Seneviratne details how Sarachchandra, disillusioned with the ‘artificiality’ of Western-influenced urban theatre and the limitations of both elite satires and rural folk plays, looked toward the Japanese Noh and Kabuki traditions to find a model for a ‘national’ art that could appeal across class divides. The author emphasises that the success of Maname was not merely a solo intellectual feat but a gruelling, collective effort involving a ‘gang of five’ academics and a dedicated cohort of rural, bilingual students from the University of Ceylon at Peradeniya. Through anecdotes regarding the discovery of lead actors like Edmund Wijesinghe and the assembly of a unique orchestra, Seneviratne highlights the logistical struggles—from finding authentic instruments to managing cumbersome stage sets—that ultimately birthed a transformative ‘oriental’ theatre rooted in the nadagama style yet refined for a modern, sophisticated audience.

Born in Sri Lanka in 1934, in a village in Horana, he was educated at the Horana Taxila College following which he was admitted to the Department of Sociology at the University of Peradeniya. H.L. Seneviratne’s academic journey subsequently led him to the University of Rochester for his doctoral studies. But, despite his long tenure in the United States, his research has remained firmly rooted in the soil of his homeland.

His early seminal work, Rituals of the Kandyan State, his PhD thesis turned into a book, offered a groundbreaking analysis of the Temple of the Tooth (Dalada Maligawa). By examining the ceremonies surrounding the sacred relic, H.L. Seneviratne demonstrated how religious performance served as the bedrock of political legitimacy in the Kandyan Kingdom. He argued that these rituals at the time of his fieldwork in the early 1970s were not static relics of the past, but active tools used to construct and maintain the authority of the state, the ideas that would resonate throughout his later career.

The Work of Kings

Perhaps, his most provocative contribution arrived with the publication of The Work of Kings published in 1999. In this sweeping study, H.L. Seneviratne traced the transformation of the Buddhist clergy, or Sangha, from the early 20th-century ‘social service’ monks, who focused on education and community upliftment, to the more politically charged nationalist figures of the modern era. He analysed the shift away from a universalist, humanistic Buddhism toward a more exclusionary identity, sparking intense debate within both academic and religious circles in Sri Lanka.

In The Work of Kings, H.L. Seneviratne has presented a sophisticated critique and argued that in the early 20th century, influenced by figures like Anagarika Dharmapala, there was a brief ‘monastic ideal’ centred on social service and education. This period saw monks acting as catalysts for community development and moral reform embodying a humanistic version of Buddhism that sought to modernize the country while maintaining its spiritual integrity.

However, H.L. Seneviratne contends that this situation was eventually derailed by the rise of post-independence nationalism. He describes a process where the clergy moved away from universalist goals to become the vanguard of a narrow ethno-religious identity. By aligning themselves so closely with the state and partisan politics, H.L. Seneviratne suggests that the Sangha inadvertently traded their moral authority for political influence. This shift, in his view, led to the ‘betrayal’ of the original social service movement, replacing a vision of broad social progress with one centred on political dominance.

The core of his critique lies in the disappearance of what he calls the ‘intellectual monk.’ He laments the decline of the scholarly, reflective tradition in favour of a more populist and often inflammatory rhetoric. By analysing the rhetoric of key monastic figures, H.L. Senevirathne illustrates how the language of Buddhism was repurposed to justify political ends, often at the expense of the pluralistic values that he believes are inherent to the faith’s core teachings.

H.L. Seneviratne’s work remains highly relevant today as it provides a framework for understanding contemporary religious tensions. His analysis serves as a warning about the consequences of merging religious institutional power with state politics. By documenting this historical shift, he challenges modern Sri Lankans—and global observers—to reconsider the role of religious institutions in a secular, democratic state, urging a return to the compassionate and socially inclusive roots of the Buddhist tradition.

Within the broader context of Sri Lankan anthropology, H.L. Seneviratne is frequently grouped with other towering figures of his generation, most notably Stanley Jeyaraja Tambiah and Gananath Obeyesekere. Together, this remarkable cohort revolutionized the study of Sri Lanka by applying structural and psychological analyses to religious and ethnic identity. While Tambiah famously interrogated the betrayal of non-violent Buddhist principles in the face of political violence, H.L. Seneviratne’s work is often seen as the essential sociological counterpart, providing the detailed historical and institutional narrative of how the monastic order itself was reshaped by these very forces.

Reation to Seneviratne’s critque

The reaction to H.L. Seneviratne’s critique has been as multifaceted as the work itself. In academic circles, particularly those influenced by post-colonial theory, he is celebrated for speaking truth in a public place. Scholars have noted that because he writes as an insider—both a Sinhalese and a Buddhist, that makes them both credible and, to some, highly objectionable. His work has paved the way for a younger generation of Sri Lankan sociologists and anthropologists to move beyond traditional functionalism towards more radical articulations of competing interests and political power.

However, his analysis has also made him a target for nationalist critics. Those aligned with ethno-religious movements often view his deconstruction of the Sangha’s political role as an attack on Sinhalese-Buddhist identity itself. These detractors argue that H.L. Seneviratne’s intellectualist or universalist view of Buddhism fails to account for the necessity of the clergy’s role in protecting the nation against neo colonial and modern pressures. This tension highlights the very descent into ideology that H.L. Seneviratne has spent his career documenting.

H.L. Seneviratne’s legacy is defined by this ongoing dialogue between scholarship and social reality. His transition from the detached scholar seen in his early work on Kandyan rituals to the socially concerned intellectual of The Work of Kings mirrors the very transformation of the Sangha and Buddha Sasana he studied. By refusing to look away from the complexities of the present, he has ensured that his work remains a cornerstone for any serious discussion on the future of religion and governance in Sri Lanka.

Focus on good governance

In his later years, H.L. Seneviratne has pivoted his focus toward the practical application of his theories, specifically examining how the concept of ‘Good Governance’ interacts with traditional religious structures. He argues that for Sri Lanka to achieve true stability, there must be a fundamental reimagining of the Sangha’s role in the public sphere—one that moves away from the ‘work of Kings’ and returns to a more ethical, advisory capacity. This shift in his recent lectures reflects a deep concern about the erosion of democratic institutions and the way religious sentiment can be harnessed to bypass the rule of law.

Building on this, contemporary scholars like Benjamin Schonthal have expanded H.L. Seneviratne’s inquiry into the legal and constitutional dimensions of Buddhism in Sri Lanka. While H.L. Seneviratne provided the anthropological groundwork for how monks gained political power, this newer generation of academics examines how that power has been codified into the very laws of the state. They explore the ‘path dependency’ created by the historical shifts H.L. Seneviratne documented, looking at how the legal privileging of Buddhism creates unique challenges for a pluralistic society.

New Sangha

Furthermore, his influence is visible in the work of local scholars who focus on ‘engaged Buddhism.’ These researchers look back at H.L. Seneviratne’s description of the early 20th-century social service monks as a blueprint for modern reform. By identifying the moment where the clergy’s mission shifted from social welfare to political nationalism, these scholars use H.L. Seneviratne’s historical milestones to advocate a ‘New Sangha’ that prioritizes reconciliation and inter-ethnic harmony over state-aligned power.

The enduring power of H.L. Seneviratne’s work lies in its refusal to offer easy answers. By mapping the transition within Buddhist practice from ritual to politics, and from social service to nationalism, he has provided an analytical framework in which the nation can see its own transformation. His legacy is not just a collection of books, but a persistent, rigorous habit of questioning that continues to inspire those who seek to understand the delicate balance between faith and the modern state.

H.L. Seneviratne continues to challenge his audience to think beyond the immediate political moment. By documenting the arc of Sri Lankan history from the sacred rituals of the Kandyan kings to the modern halls of parliament, he provides a vital sense of perspective. Whether he is being celebrated by the academic community or critiqued by nationalist voices, his work ensures that the conversation regarding the soul of the nation remains rigorous, historically grounded, and unafraid of its own complexities.

Anthropology and cinema

H.L. Seneviratne identifies the mid-1950s as the critical turning point for this cinematic shift, specifically anchoring the move to 1956 with the release of Lester James Peries’s “Rekava.” This period was a watershed moment in Sri Lankan history, coinciding with a broader nationalist resurgence that sought to reclaim a localized identity from the influence of colonial and foreign powers. H.L. Seneviratne suggests that before this era, the ‘South Indian formula’ dominated the screen, characterized by studio-bound sets, theatrical acting, and musical interludes that felt alien to the island’s actual social fabric. The pioneers of this movement, led by Lester James Peries and later followed by figures like Siri Gunasinghe in the early 1960s, deliberately moved the camera into the open air of the rural village to capture what H.L. Seneviratne describes as the ‘authentic rhythms’ of life. This transition was not merely aesthetic but deeply ideological; it replaced the mythical, exaggerated heroism of commercial cinema with a nuanced exploration of the post-colonial middle class and the crumbling feudal hierarchies. By the 1960s, through landmark works like ‘Gamperaliya,’ these filmmakers were successfully crafting a modern mythology that reflected the internal psychological tensions and the social evolution of a nation navigating its way between traditional Buddhist values and a rapidly modernizing world.

His critique of the relationship between art and the state is particularly evident in his analysis of historical epics, where he has argued that certain cinematic portrayals of ancient kings and battles serve as a form of ‘visual nationalism,’ translating the ideological shifts he documented in The Work of Kings onto the silver screen. By analysing these films, he shows how popular culture can become a powerful tool for constructing a simplified, heroic past that often ignores the multi-ethnic and pluralistic realities of the island’s history.

(To be concluded)

by Professor M. W. Amarasiri de Silva