Midweek Review
Playing politics with national security
By Shamindra Ferdinando
Security of a country did not depend on its Defence Secretary. There were various structures and it was a matter of collective action, one-time Defence Secretary, Austin Fernando, told the Presidential Commission of Inquiry (P CoI) on Saturday (26).
The P CoI, appointed by former President Maithripala Sirisena, is inquiring into the Easter Sunday attacks. Sirisena named the Commission several weeks before the end of his five-year term.
Fernando further said: “It is not mandatory for the Defence Secretary to have an intimate knowledge of the role played by the Ministry. If that is the case, a fisherman should be the Secretary to the Ministry of Fisheries, and the Secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture should be a farmer.”
Let me examine Austin Fernando’s statement, taking into consideration the direct talks between President Ranasinghe Premadasa and the LTTE, during the period 1989-1990 (the late General D.S. Attygalle served as the Defence Secretary from 15.08.1983 to 16.02.1990), outbreak of Eelam War II (General S.C Ranatunga served as the Secretary Defence from 16.02.1990 to 01.05.1993) and the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) with the LTTE entered into by Premier Ranil Wickremesinghe (Austin Fernando functioned as the Secretary Defence from 21.12.2001 to 03.11.2003).
Hemasiri Fernando, who served as Secretary Defence in the run-up to the April 21, 2019, Easter Sunday attacks, is under investigation for criminal negligence. In all four above-mentioned instances, the government apparatus collectively failed, though the circumstances were different.
The only difference is in the case of the disastrous 2002 CFA. The then President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga cannot be faulted as Premier Ranil Wickremesinghe blindly signed the catastrophic Oslo-drafted 2002 peace initiative, keeping even his cabinet in the dark.
Austin Fernando is absolutely right. Security of a country does not depend on its Defence Secretary. In fact, a single person cannot guarantee national security, regardless of political clout he or she wielded. However, one person can cause irreparable damage, through irrational and unilateral actions/decisions, as in the case of the CFA. The appointment of retired military officers certainly cannot guarantee national security. The late Gen. Attygalle and Gen. Ranatunga facilitated President Premadasa’s ill-fated strategies that weakened the military. Taking Fernando’s assertion into consideration, it would be pertinent to examine how President Premadasa (1989-1990), Premier Wickremesinghe (2002-2003) and President Sirisena and Premier Wickremesinghe (2015-2019) jeopardized the national security. Those who served under them, too, equally contributed to the rapid deterioration of security by simply giving into political dictates, thereby providing tacit support to despicable political agendas.
Sri Lanka paid a huge price for political and military miscalculations. The political environment, created by Sirisena-Wickremesinghe, cannot be scrutinized without taking into consideration previous situations. In the absence of detailed study, the public tend to consider the Easter Sunday security failure as an isolated case. But, the extraordinary Easter Sunday terror project, perhaps, is part of an insidious political strategy to keep Sri Lanka in perpetual anarchy. Those who had perpetrated nearly simultaneous suicide attacks, in three administrative districts, certainly deliberated the political environment before going ahead with the operation. Who exploited the National Thowheed Jamaat (NTJ) to deliver such a devastating message? Did NTJ succumb to external elements? When did India actually infiltrate the NTJ and what is the status of the Indian intelligence gathering operation in Sri Lanka? Why didn’t Indian intelligence share information on NTJ (Zahran Hashim’s gang) much earlier? And, most importantly, why were both Sinhala and Tamil communities targeted?
Defence Chiefs play ball with Ranasinghe Premadasa
Having secured the presidency, in January 1989, President Premadasa sought an agreement with the JVP. The UNP leader also made an attempt to reach a consensus with Tamil groups, including the LTTE. The President succeeded in reaching an understanding with all armed Tamil groups, except the LTTE. The presence of one-time militant Douglas Devananda, leader of the EPDP (Eelam People’s Democratic Party), in President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s cabinet of ministers, is evidence of Premadasa’s successful political strategy. In addition to the EPDP, Premadasa brought the EPRLF (Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front), TELO (Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization) and PLOTE (People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam) into the political mainstream. However, Premadasa’s bid to reach an understanding with the LTTE ended disastrously, in the second week of June 1990.
At the time, Premadasa initiated direct negotiations with the LTTE, the late Gen. Attygalle had been the Secretary, Ministry of Defence while Lt. Gen. Hamilton Wanasinghe served as the Commander of the Army (16.09.1988- 15.11.91). Did the President consult the Defence Secretary and the Commander of the Army before initiating negotiations with the JVP and the LTTE? Did they approve of releasing from custody of over thousands of JVP suspects in early 1989? Their release resulted in an immediate stepping up of violence though the police, the military and the government-sponsored civilian death squads crushed the JVP, by the end of 1989.
Having captured JVP leader, Rohana Wijeweera, at Ulapane, in the second week of Nov. 1989, he was brought to Colombo, interrogated and executed. Premadasa knew what befell Wijeweera, who led two insurrections, in 1971 and 1987-89.
However, Premadasa’s apparent unilateral decisions, in respect of the LTTE, caused immense harm. Believing in the possibility of successful conclusion of negotiations with the LTTE, Premadasa, hastily announced the hotly disputed decision to request New Delhi to terminate its military mission in the North-East Sri Lanka. Did Premadasa genuinely consult the Defence Secretary, Commander of the Army or at least his Prime Minister, the late D.B. Wijetunga, before demanding the pull-out of the Indian Peace Keeping Force? Premadasa, obviously didn’t believe in consultations. In his capacity as the leader of the UNP and the President, Premadasa largely believed in unilateral decisions. The catastrophic handling of direct negotiations with the LTTE paved the way for terrorists to launch devastating attacks on the Army after obtaining from the then naïve government military supplies, money, as well as building materials. Clearly, the Secretary Defence and the Commander of the Army played ball with Premadasa. In fact, all cooperated with Premadasa. Officials bent backwards to appease the all-powerful President. The then Election Commissioner, the late Chandrananda de Silva, overnight recognized the PFLT (People’s Front of Liberation Tigers) as a registered political party. The writer was among several local and foreign journalists, invited by the late LTTE theoretician Anton Balasingham, to the Colombo Hilton where he made the announcement. Chain-smoking British passport holder Balasingham declared proudly that their emblem would be a Tiger in a red flag of rectangular shape. Premadasa, or late Chandrananda de Silva, had no qualms in the PFLT receiving political recognition in spite of it being armed. The LTTE received political recognition a couple of months before Velupillai Prabhakaran resumed Eelam War II.
Prez playing with fire
Did Premadasa consult the Defence Secretary and Commander of the Army before lifting restrictions imposed on the Northern Province, abandoned Point Pedro and Valvettiturai army detachments, pardoned convicted Maradana bomber Manouri Daniels, along with over a dozen other LTTE cadres, held under the PTA (Prevention of Terrorism Act), and provided weapons and funds to the LTTE. Premadasa did what he wanted to do. The UNP leader was not bothered about security implications. Obviously, his security chiefs remained mum. President felt confident in his political strategy. He was so confident, he ordered law enforcement personnel to surrender after the LTTE surrounded police stations in the East. Premadasa’s decision resulted in the deaths of over 400 officers and men. Did the President consult Gen. Attygalle’s successor Gen. Cyril Ranatunga and the Commander of the Army before the government reached an agreement with the LTTE?
The Army in the East averted a calamity by refusing to surrender, in spite of the senior leadership directing them to do so. General Gerry H. de Silva, who served as the Commander of the Army (1994-1996) in his memoirs titled ‘A most noble profession’ commented on Premadasa’s strategy/the government’s failure to recognize the threat posed by the LTTE. First published in 2011, two years after the successful conclusion of the war against the LTTE, De Silva acknowledged: “We failed to see through the emerging trends and LTTE machinations. Despite constant threats and humiliation meted out to security forces and the police by the militants, the politico-military hierarchy preferred to put up with the ignominy in order not to ‘rock the boat.’
The LTTE capitalized on the situation. A rejuvenated LTTE ‘called the shots,’ and quickly moved into a position of strength, politically and militarily. They were riding the crest of a wave and must have felt that the time was opportune to achieve their goal of Eelam.”
The Gemunu Watch officer is the only Commander of the Army to author a book on his career.
Within a week after the resumption of hostilities, in the second week of June 1990, the ill-prepared Army lost the Overland Main Supply Route (MSR) to the Jaffna peninsula. Premadasa’s ‘honeymoon’ with Prabhakaran lasted 14 months. The Tiger Supremo resumed the war, at lightning speed, just two months after India terminated its military mission here. Sri Lanka was left high and dry after the series of follies by Premadasa, at peace making, and the military couldn’t regain the MSR, till January 2009. Premadasa’s Generals turned a blind eye to what was happening on the ground. When fighting erupted, the Army had just one battalion, plus troops in the Jaffna peninsula. In spite of continuing to build up, the top brass ignored the growing threat until it was too late. So, the mere appointing of a retired General as Secretary Defence cannot guarantee rationale thinking. Premadasa’s strategy was nothing but a massive and unprecedented collective failure that almost resulted in capitulation of the Northern forces. Premadasa turned a Nelsonian eye to the LTTE evicting the entire Muslim population from the Northern Province, in Oct 1990. At the behest of Premadasa, the then Army Commander facilitated coordinated LTTE attacks on rival Tamil groups. The LTTE massacred hundreds of people. The response of Premadasa and his chief negotiator, the late A.C.S. Hameed, to the LTTE threat, caused quite an embarrassment to the government, undermined the State and, basically, allowed the LTTE to transform itself to a conventional fighting force. The then Higher Education Minister Hameed never realized ground realities.
Retired General de Silva’s assessment can be applied to all Presidents. except war-winning Mahinda Rajapaksa, who had faith in his younger brother Gotabaya’s capacity to coordinate the war effort against the LTTE.
Generals Attygalle and Ranatunga certainly owed an explanation as regards their failure to prevent the catastrophe in the North. Obviously, no one dared to challenge Premadasa’s dangerous strategies. Having served as the Commander of the Army, for a decade, and Defence Secretary, General Attygalle received appointment as Sri Lanka’s High Commissioner in London where he facilitated Kittu’s (Sathasivam Krishnakumar) arrival there. On the orders of Premadasa, the SLAF brought Kittu to Colombo where the British High Commission made arrangements to send the former LTTE Jaffna Commander to receive treatment for his amputated leg. The Generals had no say and Premadasa had his way.
Can you imagine a government facilitating a terrorist’s travel to London where he took over the LTTE’s International Secretariat responsible for running a massive extortion racket? The funds ultimately ended up with arms suppliers who provided the LTTE a range of weapons, T 56 assault rifles to shoulder fired missiles. General Ranatunga, too, received appointment as Sri Lanka’s High Commissioner in Canberra and then London. Presidential nominees to top diplomatic posts always received parliamentary approval.
Security fiasco in 2002
Not having learnt from Premadasa’s stupidities, Ranil Wickremesinghe too plunged headlong into a similar folly with Austin Fernando et al in tow.
Ranil Wickremesinghe picked experienced administrative service officer Austin Fernando as Secretary Defence within days after winning the Dec 2001 parliamentary election. Wickremesinghe also brought in one-time Attorney General Tilak Marapana on the National List as the Secretary to the Ministry of Defence. Wickremesinghe adopted a simple strategy. The UNP leader advocated a policy of appeasement, thereby jeopardizing the entire security apparatus. The LTTE brazenly exploited the situation to its advantage. Prabhakaran stepped up training, recruitment of fresh cadres, as well as forcible conscription of children. The government did nothing. The LTTE intensified protests opposite security forces bases, restricted/interfered with police and military movements whereas the government repeatedly reiterated its commitment to the Oslo-led peace process like a mantra. Wickremesinghe dismissed intelligence assessment as regards the rapid LTTE built up. Wickremesinghe told a hastily arranged Temple Trees meeting, attended by senior officers responsible for intelligence services et al their assessment of the LTTE training 6,000 cadres at the onset of the CFA was wrong. The Premier contradicted his own intelligence apparatus on the basis of what the Indians told him. The then Defence Advisor Senior DIG Merril Gunaratne, who had been among those invited by the Premier, had the strength to stand by his report, based on information/analysis provided by all services. Obviously, Wickremesinghe hadn’t been in a mood to listen to anyone who questioned Prabhakaran’s motives though the continuing LTTE build up was evident.
Wickremesinghe followed his policy of appeasement. In his capacity as Secretary Defence Austin Fernando had no option but to go along with the Premier who authorized the finalization of CFA without proper consultations with the military top brass or the intelligence services.
The then Defence Secretary also provided some hilarious side shows like carrying a basket of fruits to a terrorist receiving treatment at a Colombo hospital.
Fernando himself claimed at the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) in August 2010 that he hadn’t been involved in the process leading to the finalization of the document. However, top SCOPP (Secretariat for Coordinating Peace Process) Dr. John Gooneratne subsequently revealed before the LLRC how Norway rejected four proposals made by Sri Lanka. Had those proposals been accommodated in the CFA perhaps Eelam War IV could have been avoided, Gooneratne told the late C.R. de Silva’s Commission. The writer covered the entire LLRC proceedings. Gooneratne revealed the hitherto unknown proposals namely (a) CFA to pave the way for a negotiated settlement (b) prohibition of smuggling of arms, ammunition and equipment (c) freedom of movement for other political parties in areas under the LTTE control and finally (d) halt to forcible recruitment. Sri Lanka never received the backing of Peace Co-Chairs, the US, Norway, EU and Japan to get those just proposals included in the CFA.
The UNP never revealed rejection of its proposals until Gooneratne took advantage of the LLRC to set the record straight. Austin Fernando and SCOPP Chief Bernard Goonetilleke, who appeared before the LLRC could have revealed the truth. The UNP remained mum. Throughout the CFA period, Premier Wickremesinghe tried to suppress information that may have caused embarrassment to his government, the Norwegians and the LTTE. Obviously there hadn’t been any proper consultations among members of the cabinet, parliamentary group or the military top brass regarding the Oslo-led process.
Austin Fernando cannot absolve himself of the responsibility for the UNP government’s actions during the CFA. The person who served as Secretary Defence cannot claim lack of knowledge of a particular situation. The same applies to the Defence Minister. During Marapana’s tenure as the Defence Minister Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI)-run operation was exposed to the whole world with media scenes. In spite of strong protests by the Army, the UNP went ahead with its political project. The exposure of the operation led to the deaths of several operatives. The LTTE also hunted police officers engaged in anti-terrorist operations. When Defence Advisor Merril Gunaratne blamed the LTTE for the killing of Inspector Thabrew at the Dehiwela police station, Premier Wickremesinghe himself questioned the veteran law enforcement officer’s assessment.
The UNP allowed the LTTE to bring in undeclared cargo via the Bandaranaike International Airport (BIA). LTTE delegations returning from negotiations with Wickremesinghe’s delegations from various foreign venues and others brought large packages. The foolish government provided air transport. The LTTE brazenly used the opportunity to its advantage. The CFA provided the organization required protection. The LTTE exploited the Oslo arranged CFA, the same way it used direct talks with Premadasa to achieve its targets. High profile assassination of TULF leader Appapillai Amirthalingham is a case in point. Prabhakaran moved a hit team in an SLAF chopper that brought LTTE delegates from the Vanni to Colombo in 1989.
Both political and military leaderships should accept responsibilities for lapses. During Austin Fernando’s tenure as the Defence Secretary, the military was ordered to stop issuing situation reports, suspended ‘Wanni Sevaya’ (special radio that catered to the military and the police), subjected military reports to civilian approval and basically succumbed to LTTE tactics. While closing down ‘Wanni Sevaya’, the government permitted the LTTE to import state-of-the-art radio equipment to upgrade its own propaganda and communication facilities.
If not for the then President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga’s intervention in late 2003, the UNP could have allowed the LTTE build up to continue until it was too late to take counter action. The UNP permitted the deterioration of the situation to such an extent, the LTTE by early 2003 felt confident enough to brazenly quit the negotiating table. The LTTE quit talks in late April 2003 to set the stage for an all-out war. By late 2005, the LTTE was confident it could overwhelm the Army in a large-scale conventional confrontation. The assassination of much-loved Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar, in early August 2005, indicated their readiness to take on the government. Had the LTTE succeeded in assassinating Army Chief Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka and Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa, in late April and early Oct, 2006, the LTTE, perhaps could have achieved Eelam. There cannot be any dispute as regards the role played by the Army Commander and the Defence Secretary to bring the war to a successful conclusion. There had never been previous attempts on the lives of the Army Commander and Secretary Defence. The LTTE knew the government strategy could be aborted by assassinating the two most important men. Their failure brought the war to an end three years later with the LTTE militarily annihilated. If the LTTE succeeded, Sri Lanka’s unitary status could have been jeopardized by now. The Sirisena-Wickremesinghe coalition proved the danger in pulling in different directions, lack of vision and strategy as well as pursuing of political agendas inimical Sri Lanka State.
Midweek Review
Daya Pathirana killing and transformation of the JVP
JVP leader Somawansa Amarasinghe, who returned to Sri Lanka in late Nov, 2001, ending a 12-year self-imposed exile in Europe, declared that India helped him flee certain death as the government crushed his party’s second insurrection against the state in the ’80s, using even death squads. Amarasinghe, sole surviving member of the original politburo of the JVP, profusely thanked India and former Prime Minister V.P. Singh for helping him survive the crackdown. Neither the JVP nor India never explained the circumstances New Delhi facilitated Amarasinghe’s escape, particularly against the backdrop of the JVP’s frenzied anti-India campaign. The JVP has claimed to have killed Indian soldiers in the East during the 1987-1989 period. Addressing his first public meeting at Kalutara, a day after his arrival, Amarasinghe showed signs that the party had shed its anti-India policy of yesteryears. The JVPer paid tribute to the people of India, PM Singh and Indian officials who helped him escape.
By Shamindra Ferdinando
Forty years after the killing of Daya Pathirana, the third head of the Independent Student Union (ISU) by the Socialist Students’ Union (SSU), affiliated with the JVP, one-time Divaina journalist Dharman Wickremaretne has dealt with the ISU’s connections with some Tamil terrorist groups. The LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) hadn’t been among them, according to Wickremaretne’s Daya Pathirana Ghathanaye Nodutu Peththa (The Unseen Side of Daya Pathirana Killing), the fifth of a series of books that discussed the two abortive insurgencies launched by the JVP in 1971 and the early ’80s.
Pathirana was killed on 15 December, 1986. His body was found at Hirana, Panadura. Pathirana’s associate, Punchiralalage Somasiri, also of the ISU, who had been abducted, along with Pathirana, was brutally attacked but, almost by a miracle, survived to tell the tale. Daya Pathirana was the second person killed after the formation of the Deshapremi Janatha Vyaparaya (DJV), the macabre wing of the JVP, in early March 1986. The DJV’s first head had been JVP politburo member Saman Piyasiri Fernando.
Its first victim was H. Jayawickrema, Principal of Middeniya Gonahena Vidyalaya, killed on 05 December, 1986. The JVP found fault with him for suspending several students for putting up JVP posters.
Wickremaretne, who had been relentlessly searching for information, regarding the violent student movements for two decades, was lucky to receive obviously unconditional support of those who were involved with the SSU and ISU as well as other outfits. Somasiri was among them.
Deepthi Lamaheva had been ISU’s first leader. Warnakulasooriya succeeded Lamahewa and was replaced by Pathirana. After Pathirana’s killing K.L. Dharmasiri took over. Interestingly, the author justified Daya Pathirana’s killing on the basis that those who believed in violence died by it.
Wickremaretne’s latest book, the fifth of the series on the JVP, discussed hitherto largely untouched subject – the links between undergraduates in the South and northern terrorists, even before the July 1983 violence in the wake of the LTTE killing 12 soldiers, and an officer, while on a routine patrol at Thinnavely, Jaffna.
The LTTE emerged as the main terrorist group, after the Jaffna killings, while other groups plotted to cause mayhem. The emergence of the LTTE compelled the then JRJ government to transfer all available police and military resources to the North, due to the constant attacks that gradually weakened government authority there. In Colombo, ISU and Tamil groups, including the PLOTE (People’s Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) enhanced cooperation. Wickremaretne shed light on a disturbing ISU-PLOTE connection that hadn’t ever been examined or discussed or received sufficient public attention.
In fact, EROS (Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students), too, had been involved with the ISU. According to the author, the ISU had its first meeting on 10 April, 1980. In the following year, ISU established contact with the EPRLF (Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front). The involvement of ISU with the PLOTE and Wickremaretne revealed how the SSU probed that link and went to the extent of secretly interrogating ISU members in a bid to ascertain the details of that connection. ISU activist Pradeep Udayakumara Thenuwara had been forcibly taken to Sri Jayewardenepura University where he was subjected to strenuous interrogation by SSU in a bid to identify those who were involved in a high profile PLOTE operation.
The author ascertained that the SSU suspected Pathirana’s direct involvement in the PLOTE attack on the Nikaweratiya Police Station, and the Nikaweratiya branch of the People’s Bank, on April 26, 1985. The SSU believed that out of a 16-member gang that carried out the twin attacks, two were ISU members, namely Pathirana, and another identified as Thalathu Oya Seneviratne, aka Captain Senevi.
The SSU received information regarding ISU’s direct involvement in the Nikaweratiya attacks from hardcore PLOTE cadre Nagalingam Manikkadasan, whose mother was a Sinhalese and closely related to JVP’s Upatissa Gamanayake. The LTTE killed Manikkadasan in a bomb attack on a PLOTE office, in Vavuniya, in September, 1999. The writer met Manikkadasan, at Bambapalitiya, in 1997, in the company of Dharmalingham Siddharthan. The PLOTE had been involved in operations in support of President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga’s administration.
It was President Premadasa who first paved the way for Tamil groups to enter the political mainstream. In spite of some of his own advisors expressing concern over Premadasa’s handling of negotiations with the LTTE, he ordered the then Elections Commissioner Chandrananda de Silva to grant political recognition to the LTTE. The LTTE’s political wing PFLT (People’s Front of Liberation Tigers) received recognition in early December, 1989, seven months before Eelam War II erupted.
Transformation of ISU
The author discussed the formation of the ISU, its key members, links with Tamil groups, and the murderous role in the overall counter insurgency campaign during JRJ and Ranasinghe Premadasa presidencies. Some of those who had been involved with the ISU may have ended up with various other groups, even civil society groups. Somasiri, who was abducted along with Pathirana at Thunmulla and attacked with the same specialised knife, but survived, is such a person.
Somasiri contested the 06 May Local Government elections, on the Jana Aragala Sandhanaya ticket. Jana Aragala Sandhanaya is a front organisation of the Frontline Socialist Party/ Peratugaami pakshaya, a breakaway faction of the JVP that also played a critical role in the violent protest campaign Aragalaya against President Gotabaya Rajapaksa. That break-up happened in April 2012, The wartime Defence Secretary, who secured the presidency at the 2019 presidential election, with 6.9 mn votes, was forced to give up office, in July 2022, and flee the country.
Somasiri and Jana Aragala Sandhanaya were unsuccessful; the group contested 154 Local Government bodies and only managed to secure only 16 seats whereas the ruling party JVP comfortably won the vast majority of Municipal Councils, Urban Councils and Pradeshiya Sabhas.
Let us get back to the period of terror when the ISU was an integral part of the UNP’s bloody response to the JVP challenge. The signing of the Indo-Lanka accord, in late July 1987, resulted in the intensification of violence by both parties. Wickremaretne disclosed secret talks between ISU leader K.L. Dharmasiri and the then Senior SSP (Colombo South) Abdul Cader Abdul Gafoor to plan a major operation to apprehend undergraduates likely to lead protests against the Indo-Lanka accord. Among those arrested were Gevindu Cumaratunga and Anupa Pasqual. Cumaratunga, in his capacity as the leader of civil society group Yuthukama, that contributed to the campaign against Yahapalanaya, was accommodated on the SLPP National List (2020 to 2024) whereas Pasqual, also of Yuthukama, entered Parliament on the SLPP ticket, having contested Kalutara. Pasqual switched his allegiance to Ranil Wickremesinghe after Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s ouster in July 2022.
SSU/JVP killed K.L. Dharmasiri on 19 August, 1989, in Colomba Kochchikade just a few months before the Army apprehended and killed JVP leader Rohana Wijeweera. Towards the end of the counter insurgency campaign, a section of the ISU was integrated with the military (National Guard). The UNP government had no qualms in granting them a monthly payment.
Referring to torture chambers operated at the Law Faculty of the Colombo University and Yataro operations centre, Havelock Town, author Wickremaretne underscored the direct involvement of the ISU in running them.
Maj. Tuan Nizam Muthaliff, who had been in charge of the Yataro ‘facility,’ located near State Defence Minister Ranjan Wijeratne’s residence, is widely believed to have shot Wijeweera in November, 1989. Muthaliff earned the wrath of the LTTE for his ‘work’ and was shot dead on May 3, 2005, at Polhengoda junction, Narahenpita. At the time of Muthaliff’s assassination, he served in the Military Intelligence.
Premadasa-SSU/JVP link
Ex-lawmaker and Jathika Chinthanaya Kandayama stalwart Gevindu Cumaratunga, in his brief address to the gathering, at Wickremaretne’s book launch, in Colombo, compared Daya Pathirana’s killing with the recent death of Nandana Gunatilleke, one-time frontline JVPer.
Questioning the suspicious circumstances surrounding Gunatilleke’s demise, Cumaratunga strongly emphasised that assassinations shouldn’t be used as a political tool or a weapon to achieve objectives. The outspoken political activist discussed the Pathirana killing and Gunatilleke’s demise, recalling the false accusations directed at the then UNPer Gamini Lokuge regarding the high profile 1986 hit.
Cumaratunga alleged that the SSU/JVP having killed Daya Pathirana made a despicable bid to pass the blame to others. Turning towards the author, Cumaratunga heaped praise on Wickremaretne for naming the SSU/JVP hit team and for the print media coverage provided to the student movements, particularly those based at the Colombo University.
Cumaratunga didn’t hold back. He tore into SSU/JVP while questioning their current strategies. At one point a section of the audience interrupted Cumaratunga as he made references to JVP-led Jathika Jana Balawegaya (JJB) and JJB strategist Prof. Nirmal Dewasiri, who had been with the SSU during those dark days. Cumaratunga recalled him attending Daya Pathirana’s funeral in Matara though he felt that they could be targeted.
Perhaps the most controversial and contentious issue raised by Cumaratunga was Ranasinghe Premadasa’s alleged links with the SSU/JVP. The ex-lawmaker reminded the SSU/JVP continuing with anti-JRJ campaign even after the UNP named Ranasinghe Premadasa as their candidature for the December 1988 presidential election. His inference was clear. By the time Premadasa secured the presidential nomination he had already reached a consensus with the SSU/JVP as he feared JRJ would double cross him and give the nomination to one of his other favourites, like Gamini Dissanayake or Lalith Athulathmudali.
There had been intense discussions involving various factions, especially among the most powerful SSU cadre that led to putting up posters targeting Premadasa at the Colombo University. Premadasa had expressed surprise at the appearance of such posters amidst his high profile ‘Me Kawuda’ ‘Monawada Karanne’poster campaign. Having questioned the appearance of posters against him at the Colombo University, Premadasa told Parliament he would inquire into such claims and respond. Cumaratunga alleged that night UNP goons entered the Colombo University to clean up the place.
The speaker suggested that the SSU/JVP backed Premadasa’s presidential bid and the UNP leader may have failed to emerge victorious without their support. He seemed quite confident of his assertion. Did the SSU/JVP contribute to Premadasa’s victory at one of the bloodiest post-independence elections in our history.
Cumaratunga didn’t forget to comment on his erstwhile comrade Anupa Pasqual. Alleging that Pasqual betrayed Yuthukama when he switched allegiance to Wickremesinghe, Cumaratunga, however, paid a glowing tribute to him for being a courageous responder, as a student leader.
SSU accepts Eelam
One of the most interesting chapters was the one that dealt with the Viplawadi Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna/Revolutionary Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (RJVP), widely known as the Vikalpa Kandaya/Alternative Group and the ISU mount joint campaigns with Tamil groups. Both University groups received weapons training, courtesy PLOTE and EPRLF, both here, and in India, in the run-up to the so-called Indo-Lanka Peace Accord. In short, they accepted Tamils’ right to self-determination.
The author also claimed that the late Dharmeratnam Sivaram had been in touch with ISU and was directly involved in arranging weapons training for ISU. No less a person than PLOTE Chief Uma Maheswaran had told the author that PLOTE provided weapons training to ISU, free of charge ,and the JVP for a fee. Sivaram, later contributed to several English newspapers, under the pen name Taraki, beginning with The Island. By then, he propagated the LTTE line that the war couldn’t be brought to a successful conclusion through military means. Taraki was abducted near the Bambalapitiya Police Station on the night of 28 April, 2005, and his body was found the following day.
The LTTE conferred the “Maamanithar” title upon the journalist, the highest civilian honour of the movement.
In the run up to the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord, India freely distributed weapons to Tamil terrorist groups here who in turn trained Sinhala youth.
Had it been part of the overall Indian destabilisation project, directed at Sri Lanka? PLOTE and EPRLF couldn’t have arranged weapons training in India as well as terrorist camps here without India’s knowledge. Unfortunately, Sri Lanka never sought to examine the origins of terrorism here and identified those who propagated and promoted separatist ideals.
Exactly a year before Daya Pathirana’s killing, arrangements had been made by ISU to dispatch a 15-member group to India. But, that move had been cancelled after law enforcement authorities apprehended some of those who received weapons training in India earlier. Wickremaretne’s narrative of the students’ movement, with the primary focus of the University of Colombo, is a must read. The author shed light on the despicable Indian destabilisation project that, if succeeded, could have caused and equally destructive war in the South. In a way, Daya Pathirana’s killing preempted possible wider conflict in the South.
Gevindu Cumaratunga, in his thought-provoking speech, commented on Daya Pathirana. At the time Cumaratunga entered Colombo University, he hadn’t been interested at all in politics. But, the way the ISU strongman promoted separatism, influenced Cumaratunga to counter those arguments. The ex-MP recollected how Daya Pathirana, a heavy smoker (almost always with a cigarette in his hand) warned of dire consequences if he persisted with his counter views.
In fact, Gevindu Cumaratunga ensured that the ’80s terror period was appropriately discussed at the book launch. Unfortunately, Wickremaretne’s book didn’t cause the anticipated response, and a dialogue involving various interested parties. It would be pertinent to mention that at the time the SSU/JVP decided to eliminate Daya Pathirana, it automatically received the tacit support of other student factions, affiliated to other political parties, including the UNP.
Soon after Anura Kumara Dissanayake received the leadership of the JVP from Somawansa Amarasinghe, in December 2014, he, in an interview with Saroj Pathirana of BBC Sandeshaya, regretted their actions during the second insurgency. Responding to Pathirana’s query, Dissanayake not only regretted but asked for forgiveness for nearly 6,000 killings perpetrated by the party during that period. Author Wickremaretne cleverly used FSP leader Kumar Gunaratnam’s interview with Upul Shantha Sannasgala, aired on Rupavahini on 21 November, 2019, to remind the reader that he, too, had been with the JVP at the time the decision was taken to eliminate Daya Pathirana. Gunaratnam moved out of the JVP, in April 2012, after years of turmoil. It would be pertinent to mention that Wimal Weerawansa-Nandana Gunatilleke led a group that sided with President Mahinda Rajapaksa during his first term, too, and had been with the party by that time. Although the party split over the years, those who served the interests of the JVP, during the 1980-1990 period, cannot absolve themselves of the violence perpetrated by the party. This should apply to the JVPers now in the Jathika Jana Balawegaya (JJB), a political party formed in July 2019 to create a platform for Dissanayake to contest the 2019 presidential election. Dissanayake secured a distant third place (418,553 votes [3.16%])
However, the JVP terrorism cannot be examined without taking into JRJ’s overall political strategy meant to suppress political opposition. The utterly disgusting strategy led to the rigged December 1982 referendum that gave JRJ the opportunity to postpone the parliamentary elections, scheduled for August 1983. JRJ feared his party would lose the super majority in Parliament, hence the irresponsible violence marred referendum, the only referendum ever held here to put off the election. On 30 July, 1983, JRJ proscribed the JVP, along with the Nawa Sama Samaja Party and the Communist Party, on the false pretext of carrying out attacks on the Tamil community, following the killing of 13 soldiers in Jaffna.
Under Dissanayake’s leadership, the JVP underwent total a overhaul but it was Somawansa Amarasinghe who paved the way. Under Somawansa’s leadership, the party took the most controversial decision to throw its weight behind warwinning Army Chief General (retd) Sarath Fonseka at the 2010 presidential election. That decision, the writer feels, can be compared only with the decision to launch its second terror campaign in response to JRJ’s political strategy. How could we forget Somawansa Amarasinghe joining hands with the UNP and one-time LTTE ally, the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), to field Fonseka? Although they failed in that US-backed vile scheme, in 2010, success was achieved at the 2015 presidential election when Maithripala Sirisena was elected.
Perhaps, the JVP took advantage of the developing situation (post-Indo-Lanka Peace Accord), particularly the induction of the Indian Army here, in July 1987, to intensify their campaign. In the aftermath of that, the JVP attacked the UNP parliamentary group with hand grenades in Parliament. The August 1987 attack killed Matara District MP Keerthi Abeywickrema and staffer Nobert Senadheera while 16 received injuries. Both President JRJ and Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa had been present at the time the two hand grenades were thrown at the group.
Had the JVP plot to assassinate JRJ and Premadasa succeeded in August 1987, what would have happened? Gevindu Cumaratunga, during his speech also raised a very interesting question. The nationalist asked where ISU Daya Pathirana would have been if he survived the murderous JVP.
Midweek Review
Reaping a late harvest Musings of an Old Man
I am an old man, having reached “four score and five” years, to describe my age in archaic terms. From a biological perspective, I have “grown old.” However, I believe that for those with sufficient inner resources, old age provides fertile ground to cultivate a new outlook and reap a late harvest before the sun sets on life.
Negative Characterisation of Old Age
My early medical education and training familiarised me with the concept of biological ageing: that every living organism inevitably undergoes progressive degeneration of its tissues over time. Old age is often associated with disease, disability, cognitive decline, and dependence. There is an inkling of futility, alienation, and despair as one approaches death. Losses accumulate. As Shakespeare wrote in Hamlet, “When sorrows come, they come not single spies, but in battalions.” Doctors may experience difficulty in treating older people and sometimes adopt an attitude of therapeutic nihilism toward a life perceived to be in decline.
Categorical assignment of symptoms is essential in medical practice when arriving at a diagnosis. However, placing an individual into the box of a “geriatric” is another matter, often resulting in unintended age segregation and stigmatisation rather than liberation of the elderly. Such labelling may amount to ageism. It is interesting to note that etymologically, the English word geriatric and the Sanskrit word jara both stem from the Indo-European root geront, meaning old age and decay, leading to death (jara-marana).
Even Sigmund Freud (1875–1961), the doyen of psychoanalysis, who influenced my understanding of personality structure and development during my psychiatric training, focused primarily on early development and youth, giving comparatively little attention to the psychology of old age. He believed that instinctual drives lost their impetus with ageing and famously remarked that “ageing is the castration of youth,” implying infertility not only in the biological sense. It is perhaps not surprising that Freud began his career as a neurologist and studied cerebral palsy.
Potential for Growth in Old Age
The model of human development proposed by the psychologist Erik Erikson (1902–1994), which he termed the “eight stages of man,” is far more appealing to me. His theory spans the entire life cycle, with each stage presenting a developmental task involving the negotiation of opposing forces; success or failure influences the trajectory of later life. The task of old age is to reconcile the polarity between “ego integrity” and “ego despair,” determining the emotional life of the elderly.
Ego integrity, according to Erikson, is the sense of self developed through working through the crises (challenges) of earlier stages and accruing psychological assets through lived experience. Ego despair, in contrast, results from the cumulative impact of multiple physical and emotional losses, especially during the final stage of life. A major task of old age is to maintain dignity amidst such emotionally debilitating forces. Negotiating between these polarities offers the potential for continued growth in old age, leading to what might be called a “meaningful finish.”
I do not dispute the concept of biological ageing. However, I do not regard old age as a terminal phase in which growth ceases and one is simply destined to wither and die. Though shadowed by physical frailty, diminishing sensory capacities and an apparent waning of vitality, there persists a proactive human spirit that endures well into late life. There is a need in old age to rekindle that spirit. Ageing itself can provide creative opportunities and avenues for productivity. The aim is to bring life to a meaningful close.
To generate such change despite the obstacles of ageing — disability and stigmatisation — the elderly require a sense of agency, a gleam of hope, and a sustaining aspiration. This may sound illusory; yet if such illusions are benign and life-affirming, why not allow them?
Sharon Kaufman, in her book The Ageless Self: Sources of Meaning in Late Life, argues that “old age” is a social construct resisted by many elders. Rather than identifying with decline, they perceive identity as a lifelong process despite physical and social change. They find meaning in remaining authentically themselves, assimilating and reformulating diverse life experiences through family relationships, professional achievements, and personal values.
Creative Living in Old Age
We can think of many artists, writers, and thinkers who produced their most iconic, mature, or ground-breaking work in later years, demonstrating that creativity can deepen and flourish with age. I do not suggest that we should all aspire to become a Monet, Picasso, or Chomsky. Rather, I use the term “creativity” in a broader sense — to illuminate its relevance to ordinary, everyday living.
Endowed with wisdom accumulated through life’s experiences, the elderly have the opportunity for developmental self-transformation — to connect with new identities, perspectives, and aspirations, and to engage in a continuing quest for purpose and meaning. Such a quest serves an essential function in sustaining mental health and well-being.
Old age offers opportunities for psychological adaptation and renewal. Many elders use the additional time afforded by retirement to broaden their knowledge, pursue new goals, and cultivate creativity — an old age characterised by wholeness, purpose, and coherence that keeps the human spirit alive and growing even as one’s days draw to a close.
Creative living in old age requires remaining physically, cognitively, emotionally, and socially engaged, and experiencing life as meaningful. It is important to sustain an optimistic perception of health, while distancing oneself from excessive preoccupation with pain and trauma. Positive perceptions of oneself and of the future help sustain well-being. Engage in lifelong learning, maintain curiosity, challenge assumptions — for learning itself is a meaning-making process. Nurture meaningful relationships to avoid disengagement, and enter into respectful dialogue, not only with those who agree with you. Cultivate a spiritual orientation and come to terms with mortality.
The developmental task of old age is to continue growing even as one approaches death — to reap a late harvest. As Rabindranath Tagore expressed evocatively in Gitanjali [‘Song Offerings’], which won him the Nobel Prize:: “On the day when death will knock at thy door, what wilt thou offer to him?
Oh, I will set before my guest the full vessel of my life — I will never let him go with empty hands.”
by Dr Siri Galhenage
Psychiatrist (Retired)
[sirigalhenage@gmail.com]
Midweek Review
Left’s Voice of Ethnic Peace
Multi-gifted Prof. Tissa Vitarana in passing,
Leaves a glowing gem of a memory comforting,
Of him putting his best foot forward in public,
Alongside fellow peace-makers in the nineties,
In the name of a just peace in bloodied Sri Lanka,
Caring not for personal gain, barbs or brickbats,
And for such humanity he’ll be remembered….
Verily a standard bearer of value-based politics.
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JVP leader Somawansa Amarasinghe, who returned to Sri Lanka in late Nov, 2001, ending a 12-year self-imposed exile in Europe, declared that India helped him flee certain death as the government crushed his party’s second insurrection against the state in the ’80s, using even death squads. Amarasinghe, sole surviving member of the original politburo of the JVP, profusely thanked India and former Prime Minister V.P. Singh for helping him survive the crackdown. Neither the JVP nor India never explained the circumstances New Delhi facilitated Amarasinghe’s escape, particularly against the backdrop of the JVP’s frenzied anti-India campaign. The JVP has claimed to have killed Indian soldiers in the East during the 1987-1989 period. Addressing his first public meeting at Kalutara, a day after his arrival, Amarasinghe showed signs that the party had shed its anti-India policy of yesteryears. The JVPer paid tribute to the people of India, PM Singh and Indian officials who helped him escape.