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Midweek Review

Playing politics with national security

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By Shamindra Ferdinando

Security of a country did not depend on its Defence Secretary. There were various structures and it was a matter of collective action, one-time Defence Secretary, Austin Fernando, told the Presidential Commission of Inquiry (P CoI) on Saturday (26).

The P CoI, appointed by former President Maithripala Sirisena, is inquiring into the Easter Sunday attacks. Sirisena named the Commission several weeks before the end of his five-year term.

Fernando further said: “It is not mandatory for the Defence Secretary to have an intimate knowledge of the role played by the Ministry. If that is the case, a fisherman should be the Secretary to the Ministry of Fisheries, and the Secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture should be a farmer.”

Let me examine Austin Fernando’s statement, taking into consideration the direct talks between President Ranasinghe Premadasa and the LTTE, during the period 1989-1990 (the late General D.S. Attygalle served as the Defence Secretary from 15.08.1983 to 16.02.1990), outbreak of Eelam War II (General S.C Ranatunga served as the Secretary Defence from 16.02.1990 to 01.05.1993) and the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) with the LTTE entered into by Premier Ranil Wickremesinghe (Austin Fernando functioned as the Secretary Defence from 21.12.2001 to 03.11.2003).

Hemasiri Fernando, who served as Secretary Defence in the run-up to the April 21, 2019, Easter Sunday attacks, is under investigation for criminal negligence. In all four above-mentioned instances, the government apparatus collectively failed, though the circumstances were different.

The only difference is in the case of the disastrous 2002 CFA. The then President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga cannot be faulted as Premier Ranil Wickremesinghe blindly signed the catastrophic Oslo-drafted 2002 peace initiative, keeping even his cabinet in the dark.

Austin Fernando is absolutely right. Security of a country does not depend on its Defence Secretary. In fact, a single person cannot guarantee national security, regardless of political clout he or she wielded. However, one person can cause irreparable damage, through irrational and unilateral actions/decisions, as in the case of the CFA. The appointment of retired military officers certainly cannot guarantee national security. The late Gen. Attygalle and Gen. Ranatunga facilitated President Premadasa’s ill-fated strategies that weakened the military. Taking Fernando’s assertion into consideration, it would be pertinent to examine how President Premadasa (1989-1990), Premier Wickremesinghe (2002-2003) and President Sirisena and Premier Wickremesinghe (2015-2019) jeopardized the national security. Those who served under them, too, equally contributed to the rapid deterioration of security by simply giving into political dictates, thereby providing tacit support to despicable political agendas.

Sri Lanka paid a huge price for political and military miscalculations. The political environment, created by Sirisena-Wickremesinghe, cannot be scrutinized without taking into consideration previous situations. In the absence of detailed study, the public tend to consider the Easter Sunday security failure as an isolated case. But, the extraordinary Easter Sunday terror project, perhaps, is part of an insidious political strategy to keep Sri Lanka in perpetual anarchy. Those who had perpetrated nearly simultaneous suicide attacks, in three administrative districts, certainly deliberated the political environment before going ahead with the operation. Who exploited the National Thowheed Jamaat (NTJ) to deliver such a devastating message? Did NTJ succumb to external elements? When did India actually infiltrate the NTJ and what is the status of the Indian intelligence gathering operation in Sri Lanka? Why didn’t Indian intelligence share information on NTJ (Zahran Hashim’s gang) much earlier? And, most importantly, why were both Sinhala and Tamil communities targeted?

 

Defence Chiefs play ball with Ranasinghe Premadasa

Having secured the presidency, in January 1989, President Premadasa sought an agreement with the JVP. The UNP leader also made an attempt to reach a consensus with Tamil groups, including the LTTE. The President succeeded in reaching an understanding with all armed Tamil groups, except the LTTE. The presence of one-time militant Douglas Devananda, leader of the EPDP (Eelam People’s Democratic Party), in President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s cabinet of ministers, is evidence of Premadasa’s successful political strategy. In addition to the EPDP, Premadasa brought the EPRLF (Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front), TELO (Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization) and PLOTE (People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam) into the political mainstream. However, Premadasa’s bid to reach an understanding with the LTTE ended disastrously, in the second week of June 1990.

At the time, Premadasa initiated direct negotiations with the LTTE, the late Gen. Attygalle had been the Secretary, Ministry of Defence while Lt. Gen. Hamilton Wanasinghe served as the Commander of the Army (16.09.1988- 15.11.91). Did the President consult the Defence Secretary and the Commander of the Army before initiating negotiations with the JVP and the LTTE? Did they approve of releasing from custody of over thousands of JVP suspects in early 1989? Their release resulted in an immediate stepping up of violence though the police, the military and the government-sponsored civilian death squads crushed the JVP, by the end of 1989.

Having captured JVP leader, Rohana Wijeweera, at Ulapane, in the second week of Nov. 1989, he was brought to Colombo, interrogated and executed. Premadasa knew what befell Wijeweera, who led two insurrections, in 1971 and 1987-89.

However, Premadasa’s apparent unilateral decisions, in respect of the LTTE, caused immense harm. Believing in the possibility of successful conclusion of negotiations with the LTTE, Premadasa, hastily announced the hotly disputed decision to request New Delhi to terminate its military mission in the North-East Sri Lanka. Did Premadasa genuinely consult the Defence Secretary, Commander of the Army or at least his Prime Minister, the late D.B. Wijetunga, before demanding the pull-out of the Indian Peace Keeping Force? Premadasa, obviously didn’t believe in consultations. In his capacity as the leader of the UNP and the President, Premadasa largely believed in unilateral decisions. The catastrophic handling of direct negotiations with the LTTE paved the way for terrorists to launch devastating attacks on the Army after obtaining from the then naïve government military supplies, money, as well as building materials. Clearly, the Secretary Defence and the Commander of the Army played ball with Premadasa. In fact, all cooperated with Premadasa. Officials bent backwards to appease the all-powerful President. The then Election Commissioner, the late Chandrananda de Silva, overnight recognized the PFLT (People’s Front of Liberation Tigers) as a registered political party. The writer was among several local and foreign journalists, invited by the late LTTE theoretician Anton Balasingham, to the Colombo Hilton where he made the announcement. Chain-smoking British passport holder Balasingham declared proudly that their emblem would be a Tiger in a red flag of rectangular shape. Premadasa, or late Chandrananda de Silva, had no qualms in the PFLT receiving political recognition in spite of it being armed. The LTTE received political recognition a couple of months before Velupillai Prabhakaran resumed Eelam War II.

 

Prez playing with fire

Did Premadasa consult the Defence Secretary and Commander of the Army before lifting restrictions imposed on the Northern Province, abandoned Point Pedro and Valvettiturai army detachments, pardoned convicted Maradana bomber Manouri Daniels, along with over a dozen other LTTE cadres, held under the PTA (Prevention of Terrorism Act), and provided weapons and funds to the LTTE. Premadasa did what he wanted to do. The UNP leader was not bothered about security implications. Obviously, his security chiefs remained mum. President felt confident in his political strategy. He was so confident, he ordered law enforcement personnel to surrender after the LTTE surrounded police stations in the East. Premadasa’s decision resulted in the deaths of over 400 officers and men. Did the President consult Gen. Attygalle’s successor Gen. Cyril Ranatunga and the Commander of the Army before the government reached an agreement with the LTTE?

The Army in the East averted a calamity by refusing to surrender, in spite of the senior leadership directing them to do so. General Gerry H. de Silva, who served as the Commander of the Army (1994-1996) in his memoirs titled ‘A most noble profession’ commented on Premadasa’s strategy/the government’s failure to recognize the threat posed by the LTTE. First published in 2011, two years after the successful conclusion of the war against the LTTE, De Silva acknowledged: “We failed to see through the emerging trends and LTTE machinations. Despite constant threats and humiliation meted out to security forces and the police by the militants, the politico-military hierarchy preferred to put up with the ignominy in order not to ‘rock the boat.’

The LTTE capitalized on the situation. A rejuvenated LTTE ‘called the shots,’ and quickly moved into a position of strength, politically and militarily. They were riding the crest of a wave and must have felt that the time was opportune to achieve their goal of Eelam.”

 

The Gemunu Watch officer is the only Commander of the Army to author a book on his career.

Within a week after the resumption of hostilities, in the second week of June 1990, the ill-prepared Army lost the Overland Main Supply Route (MSR) to the Jaffna peninsula. Premadasa’s ‘honeymoon’ with Prabhakaran lasted 14 months. The Tiger Supremo resumed the war, at lightning speed, just two months after India terminated its military mission here. Sri Lanka was left high and dry after the series of follies by Premadasa, at peace making, and the military couldn’t regain the MSR, till January 2009. Premadasa’s Generals turned a blind eye to what was happening on the ground. When fighting erupted, the Army had just one battalion, plus troops in the Jaffna peninsula. In spite of continuing to build up, the top brass ignored the growing threat until it was too late. So, the mere appointing of a retired General as Secretary Defence cannot guarantee rationale thinking. Premadasa’s strategy was nothing but a massive and unprecedented collective failure that almost resulted in capitulation of the Northern forces. Premadasa turned a Nelsonian eye to the LTTE evicting the entire Muslim population from the Northern Province, in Oct 1990. At the behest of Premadasa, the then Army Commander facilitated coordinated LTTE attacks on rival Tamil groups. The LTTE massacred hundreds of people. The response of Premadasa and his chief negotiator, the late A.C.S. Hameed, to the LTTE threat, caused quite an embarrassment to the government, undermined the State and, basically, allowed the LTTE to transform itself to a conventional fighting force. The then Higher Education Minister Hameed never realized ground realities.

Retired General de Silva’s assessment can be applied to all Presidents. except war-winning Mahinda Rajapaksa, who had faith in his younger brother Gotabaya’s capacity to coordinate the war effort against the LTTE.

Generals Attygalle and Ranatunga certainly owed an explanation as regards their failure to prevent the catastrophe in the North. Obviously, no one dared to challenge Premadasa’s dangerous strategies. Having served as the Commander of the Army, for a decade, and Defence Secretary, General Attygalle received appointment as Sri Lanka’s High Commissioner in London where he facilitated Kittu’s (Sathasivam Krishnakumar) arrival there. On the orders of Premadasa, the SLAF brought Kittu to Colombo where the British High Commission made arrangements to send the former LTTE Jaffna Commander to receive treatment for his amputated leg. The Generals had no say and Premadasa had his way.

Can you imagine a government facilitating a terrorist’s travel to London where he took over the LTTE’s International Secretariat responsible for running a massive extortion racket? The funds ultimately ended up with arms suppliers who provided the LTTE a range of weapons, T 56 assault rifles to shoulder fired missiles. General Ranatunga, too, received appointment as Sri Lanka’s High Commissioner in Canberra and then London. Presidential nominees to top diplomatic posts always received parliamentary approval.

 

Security fiasco in 2002

Not having learnt from Premadasa’s stupidities, Ranil Wickremesinghe too plunged headlong into a similar folly with Austin Fernando et al in tow.

Ranil Wickremesinghe picked experienced administrative service officer Austin Fernando as Secretary Defence within days after winning the Dec 2001 parliamentary election. Wickremesinghe also brought in one-time Attorney General Tilak Marapana on the National List as the Secretary to the Ministry of Defence. Wickremesinghe adopted a simple strategy. The UNP leader advocated a policy of appeasement, thereby jeopardizing the entire security apparatus. The LTTE brazenly exploited the situation to its advantage. Prabhakaran stepped up training, recruitment of fresh cadres, as well as forcible conscription of children. The government did nothing. The LTTE intensified protests opposite security forces bases, restricted/interfered with police and military movements whereas the government repeatedly reiterated its commitment to the Oslo-led peace process like a mantra. Wickremesinghe dismissed intelligence assessment as regards the rapid LTTE built up. Wickremesinghe told a hastily arranged Temple Trees meeting, attended by senior officers responsible for intelligence services et al their assessment of the LTTE training 6,000 cadres at the onset of the CFA was wrong. The Premier contradicted his own intelligence apparatus on the basis of what the Indians told him. The then Defence Advisor Senior DIG Merril Gunaratne, who had been among those invited by the Premier, had the strength to stand by his report, based on information/analysis provided by all services. Obviously, Wickremesinghe hadn’t been in a mood to listen to anyone who questioned Prabhakaran’s motives though the continuing LTTE build up was evident.

Wickremesinghe followed his policy of appeasement. In his capacity as Secretary Defence Austin Fernando had no option but to go along with the Premier who authorized the finalization of CFA without proper consultations with the military top brass or the intelligence services.

The then Defence Secretary also provided some hilarious side shows like carrying a basket of fruits to a terrorist receiving treatment at a Colombo hospital.

Fernando himself claimed at the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) in August 2010 that he hadn’t been involved in the process leading to the finalization of the document. However, top SCOPP (Secretariat for Coordinating Peace Process) Dr. John Gooneratne subsequently revealed before the LLRC how Norway rejected four proposals made by Sri Lanka. Had those proposals been accommodated in the CFA perhaps Eelam War IV could have been avoided, Gooneratne told the late C.R. de Silva’s Commission. The writer covered the entire LLRC proceedings. Gooneratne revealed the hitherto unknown proposals namely (a) CFA to pave the way for a negotiated settlement (b) prohibition of smuggling of arms, ammunition and equipment (c) freedom of movement for other political parties in areas under the LTTE control and finally (d) halt to forcible recruitment. Sri Lanka never received the backing of Peace Co-Chairs, the US, Norway, EU and Japan to get those just proposals included in the CFA.

The UNP never revealed rejection of its proposals until Gooneratne took advantage of the LLRC to set the record straight. Austin Fernando and SCOPP Chief Bernard Goonetilleke, who appeared before the LLRC could have revealed the truth. The UNP remained mum. Throughout the CFA period, Premier Wickremesinghe tried to suppress information that may have caused embarrassment to his government, the Norwegians and the LTTE. Obviously there hadn’t been any proper consultations among members of the cabinet, parliamentary group or the military top brass regarding the Oslo-led process.

Austin Fernando cannot absolve himself of the responsibility for the UNP government’s actions during the CFA. The person who served as Secretary Defence cannot claim lack of knowledge of a particular situation. The same applies to the Defence Minister. During Marapana’s tenure as the Defence Minister Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI)-run operation was exposed to the whole world with media scenes. In spite of strong protests by the Army, the UNP went ahead with its political project. The exposure of the operation led to the deaths of several operatives. The LTTE also hunted police officers engaged in anti-terrorist operations. When Defence Advisor Merril Gunaratne blamed the LTTE for the killing of Inspector Thabrew at the Dehiwela police station, Premier Wickremesinghe himself questioned the veteran law enforcement officer’s assessment.

The UNP allowed the LTTE to bring in undeclared cargo via the Bandaranaike International Airport (BIA). LTTE delegations returning from negotiations with Wickremesinghe’s delegations from various foreign venues and others brought large packages. The foolish government provided air transport. The LTTE brazenly used the opportunity to its advantage. The CFA provided the organization required protection. The LTTE exploited the Oslo arranged CFA, the same way it used direct talks with Premadasa to achieve its targets. High profile assassination of TULF leader Appapillai Amirthalingham is a case in point. Prabhakaran moved a hit team in an SLAF chopper that brought LTTE delegates from the Vanni to Colombo in 1989.

Both political and military leaderships should accept responsibilities for lapses. During Austin Fernando’s tenure as the Defence Secretary, the military was ordered to stop issuing situation reports, suspended ‘Wanni Sevaya’ (special radio that catered to the military and the police), subjected military reports to civilian approval and basically succumbed to LTTE tactics. While closing down ‘Wanni Sevaya’, the government permitted the LTTE to import state-of-the-art radio equipment to upgrade its own propaganda and communication facilities.

If not for the then President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga’s intervention in late 2003, the UNP could have allowed the LTTE build up to continue until it was too late to take counter action. The UNP permitted the deterioration of the situation to such an extent, the LTTE by early 2003 felt confident enough to brazenly quit the negotiating table. The LTTE quit talks in late April 2003 to set the stage for an all-out war. By late 2005, the LTTE was confident it could overwhelm the Army in a large-scale conventional confrontation. The assassination of much-loved Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar, in early August 2005, indicated their readiness to take on the government. Had the LTTE succeeded in assassinating Army Chief Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka and Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa, in late April and early Oct, 2006, the LTTE, perhaps could have achieved Eelam. There cannot be any dispute as regards the role played by the Army Commander and the Defence Secretary to bring the war to a successful conclusion. There had never been previous attempts on the lives of the Army Commander and Secretary Defence. The LTTE knew the government strategy could be aborted by assassinating the two most important men. Their failure brought the war to an end three years later with the LTTE militarily annihilated. If the LTTE succeeded, Sri Lanka’s unitary status could have been jeopardized by now. The Sirisena-Wickremesinghe coalition proved the danger in pulling in different directions, lack of vision and strategy as well as pursuing of political agendas inimical Sri Lanka State.



Midweek Review

Govt. failure to fill top two courts’ vacancies leaves Judiciary in a conundrum

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Supreme Court of Sri Lanka

The ruling NPP is in a deepening dilemma over a hotly disputed move to extend the retirement age of superior courts judges. The party is also under heavy fire for delaying fresh appointments to the superior courts consisting of the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court. 

A section of the Opposition wants Speaker Dr. Jagath Wickremaratne to take up the inordinate delay in filling vacancies in the superior courts. The Bar Association of Sri Lanka, Colombo High Court lawyers, Lawyers Collective, as well as the Commonwealth Lawyers’ Union have criticised the government’s move.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) leader Rauff Hakeem, MP, recently expressed concern over the alleged way Balachandran Prabhakaran, 12-year-old son of LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran was killed, in cold blood, on 19 May, 2009.

A section of the Tamil media highlighted Kandy District lawmaker Hakeem’s comments regarding the alleged way Balachandran, the youngest of the three children of Tiger Supremo, met his end. Prabhakaran himself was also killed on the same day.

What prompted MP Hakeem to raise a contentious but now largely forgotten issue! Both the Sinhala and English print and electronic media failed to report the SLMC leader’s comments. Some questioned the purpose in lawmaker Hakeem raising Balachandran’s death. Some even suggested a Tamil Diaspora hand in Hakeem’s unexpected interest in Balachandran’s death.

The Island obtained the video, released by the Parliament, of the SLMC leader’s 10-minute speech, delivered on 10 June. Reference to Balachandran’s killing had been made towards the tail end of his fiery speech that primarily dealt with President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s continuing failure to fill existing vacancies in the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court.

The deliberate and utterly contemptible holding up of judicial promotions, for whatever reasons, cannot be discussed without examining a disputed bid to introduce an amendment to the Constitution to increase the retirement age of the Judges of the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court.

President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, the leader of two registered political parties, namely the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and the National People’s Power (NPP), seems to be on a collision course with the Opposition. With a commanding 159 MPs in Parliament, meaning a 2/3 majority, Dissanayake can easily introduce the required amendment, regardless of protests. But, the electorate won’t like that dictatorial attitude. Those who exercised their franchise for Dissanayake and the NPP at the September 2024 and November 2024 national polls, respectively, wouldn’t expect them to adopt, what can be safely described as, a dogmatic approach.

Attorney-at-law and one-time Justice Minister Rauff Hakeem castigated the President and the ruling party, ahead of the joint Opposition action, to pressure the President to fill the vacancies. Their appeal to Speaker Dr. Jagath Wickremaratne in this regard can be also interpreted as a collective opposition to the proposed amendment to increase the retirement age of judges.

The SLMC group in Parliament consists of five MPs. Of them, three had been elected under the SLMC symbol (two elected and one on the National List) and two through the Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB), one of them on the latter’s National List.

Lawmaker Hakeem, who had served the Parliament for over 30 years, at the onset of his speech, questioned the sudden decision to bring in regulation to compel exporters to convert their export proceeds into USD. The SLMCer declared that such panic action was taken by the government in view of the rapid deterioration of the Rupee against the USD.

Commenting on the extension of the Emergency continuously, MP Hakeem alleged that it was done for the NPP’s own parochial purposes and the Opposition expected the government to discontinue the practice.

Then he dealt with the alleged move to extend the retirement age of top judges. Referring to Chief Government Whip Dr. Nalinda Jayatissa’s shameless declaration that the issue hadn’t been even discussed among the government. The ex-justice Minister, however, disputed Jayatissa’s claim made at the post-Cabinet media briefing, while highlighting the statements issued by the Bar Association, Colombo High Court Lawyers’ Association. In addition, the Lawyers’ Collective and the Commonwealth Lawyers’ Association strongly opposed the alleged move. In spite of the Cabinet spokesman’s denial, Justice Minister and Attorney-at-Law Harshana Nanayakkara, in his comments on the issue, indicated that the matter was under discussion. In fact, Nanayakkara mentioned a comparatively higher retirement age of top judges in other countries to support the NPP’s controversial and unnecessary move.

Obviously, the NPP is not talking in one voice.

Rauff takes a strong stand

Emphasising that he addressed the issue at hand as a member of the BASL, Hakeem pointed out that there were four vacancies, each in the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, for the past six months. The SLMC leader said: “The President has failed in his constitutional duty to nominate judges for promotion. From the High Court to the Court of Appeal and from the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court. By denying the rights of the judges, undue pressure is being brought on them. What will happen? This very President, when he was in the Opposition, when the previous Presidents failed to gazette the names decided on by the Constitutional Council, he made a big protest. Several times he spoke about this very vociferously in the House. But, since becoming the President, he has not nominated any names. Very clearly, the 21 Amendment provision was made to prevent Presidents from delaying the decisions taken by the Constitutional Council. He is doing the reverse by not nominating anyone to the top two courts. This is much worse. As a consequence, even our fundamental rights are impacted. Because we as litigants or lawyers or public, our right for the expeditious disposal of cases is being impacted by the delay in appointing judges to the Superior Courts.

Moreover, you are frustrating the judges who served years in the judiciary. What happens to the minor judiciary and others? There are heavy concerns among the judiciary about extending the retirement age. That’ll block their path. That’ll deprive many suitably qualified individuals the right to get onto the bench or the superior bench. High court judges will now await their chances of being promoted. Undue pressure will be brought upon them.”

Hakeem alleged that the Constitution was being deliberately violated by the President. Having directed serious allegations at the President, Hakeem emphasised the responsibility on the part of the Speaker to take up this matter with the President on their behalf. Hakeem questioned as to why the President unduly delayed the promotions. The President’s deliberate failure has caused unnecessary frustration among the judicial ranks in the country and deprived those who served the judiciary of their due rights.”

Hakeem explained how even senior officers of the Attorney General’s Department had been affected by the President’s inaction. Those officials have been deprived of the opportunity to move onto one of the superior courts, Hakeem alleged, accusing the President of, what he called, deliberate inaction and a constitutional violation.

Then Hakeem made a very serious allegation. The ex-Justice Minister alleged that the NPP was delaying the process until a favoured person is eligible to get onto the bench, “You are picking and choosing people by that thereby undermining the judiciary.”

MP Hakeem also dealt with the vexed issue of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) that had been opposed by many political parties, civil society as well as organisations such as Amnesty International. The Sttorney-at-Law took up the issue in the wake of the controversial arrest of Maj. Gen. (retd.) Suresh Sallay, Director of the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI/2012-2016) and Director, State Intelligence Service/2019-2024) in terms of the PTA.

MP Hakeem chided the NPP for proposing to bring in a new anti-terrorism law, under a different title, to replace the existing PTA. Declaring that the new Act would be definitely far worse than the current law, the lawyer faulted the police and the Attorney General’s Department for abusing the PTA. The former Minister said so while alleging the continuous deterioration of the standards of the police and the Attorney General’s department, due to their dependence on the draconian PTA.

Killing of Balachandran

Referring to Tamil media reports regarding the new UK Channel 4 video that dealt with the killing of Prabhakaran’s 12-year-old son, lawmaker Hakeem discussed how the military dealt with the families of the LTTE leader and that of the JVP leader Rohana Wijeweera, killed on the night of 13 November, 1989.

Pointing out that Wijeweera who had been apprehended, along with his family, by the military, was killed, Hakeem stressed that the family members weren’t harmed. They lived under the protection of successive governments but in Prabhakaran’s case the situation was entirely differently.

Hakeem scorned the JVP/NPP government for conveniently forgetting its leaders, though an annual ceremony was held in Colombo in memory of those who perished during the insurgency. Hakeem said that even the daughter of Zahran Hashim, who led the 2019 Easter Sunday attacks, was spared. But, if Prabharatan’s daughter, Duwaraka, had been killed, as alleged, that should be investigated, Hakeem said. Hakeem ended his speech addressing the Parliament in Tamil.

Prabhakaran’s wife Mathivathani, too, had been killed during the final phase of the ground offensive. Prabhakaran’s eldest son, Charles Anthony, was killed in the Karayamullavaikkal area of the Mullaitivu district, the day before Prabhakaran, wife Mathivathani, daughter Duwaraka and younger son Balachandran were killed.

Acknowledging the SLMC leader’s right to rake up the controversy over the alleged manner the deaths of the LTTE leader and his family, while in government custody, took place. It would be pertinent to mention that Hakeem, in his capacity as the Justice Minister, from November, 2010, to December, 2014, could have pushed the Mahinda Rajapaksa government to inquire into the incident.

In fact, the writer once sought a meeting with the then Minister Hakeem to discuss accountability issues and the failure on the part of the government to address them. Although the Minister gave a patience hearing and acknowledged the urgent need to take remedial measures, the war-winning Rajapaksa government, instead of taking tangible measures, played politics. By late 2014, the SLMC switched its allegiance to the UNP-led coalition, formed with the US blessings to back the candidature of another political turncoat, Maithripala Sirisena, at the 2015 presidential election.

Hakeem received the Urban Development, Water Supply and Drainage portfolio in the succeeding Yahapalana government. The Tamil National Alliance (TNA), that had been an integral part of that alliance, served the Yahapalana interests well, though it refrained from accepting any Cabinet portfolio. The JVP, too, refrained from joining the Cabinet but their role in the Yahapalana operation is in the public domain.

The Yahapalana government betrayed the armed forces at the Geneva-based United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), in October, 2015, but the extent of their treachery was highlighted two years later when that administration unceremoniously dismissed Lord Naseby’s revelations pertaining to the final phase of the war.

What made the SLMC leader Hakeem to compare three incidents – the killing of Wijeweera, and government protection for his family, in November, 1989; killing of Prabhakaran and his family on the banks of the Nanthikadal lagoon, in May, 2009; and the rescue of Zahran Hashim’s daughter, following the Sainthamaruthu blasts in April, 2019. Whatever the SLMC leader’s motive in highlighting the LTTE’s case now, the need for collective response on the part of the Parliament to address the concerns of the loved ones of those who engaged in terrorism cannot be overemphasised.

The circumstances of Prabhakaran, his wife and their daughter and youngest son remained mired in controversy. Like over 11,000 LTTE cadres, both men and women, including suicide cadres who surrendered to the advancing troops on multiple fronts, Prabhakaran and his family could have given themselves up to the Army on the Vanni front. They ignored that opportunity believing in a US operation to evacuate them.

Critically important combined stand

As mentioned by the SLMC leader during his 10 June speech in Parliament, a group of Opposition MPs handed over a letter expressing their concerns over the inordinate delay in filling the vacancies in the superior courts. Pointing out that the President, in his capacity as the Chairman of the Constitutional Council, had failed to fill those vacancies, the Opposition MPs stressed the responsibility on the part of the President to act in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. They also reminded the Speaker that it would be his responsibility to protect the independence of the judiciary, which is an important part of the sovereignty of the people.

Kandy District MP Anuradha Jayaratne, represented the new Democratic Front (NDF) in the SJB-led effort, while NDF MP Ravi Karunanayake, too, joined, though he is in logger heads with the UNP over taking the National List slot won by the NDF at the last parliamentary election. Former President and UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe threw his weight behind the NDF, at the November, 2024, General Electio, but could not achieve the anticipated results. The NDF managed to secure just five seats, two of them National List slots.

All Ceylon Tamil Congress leader Gajendrakumar Ponnambalam, representing the Jaffna electoral district, signed the petition, along with the Sarvajana Balaya leader Dilith Jayaweera. Unfortunately, the SLPP hadn’t been part of that grouping. Responding to The Island queries, SLPP sources assured that though they didn’t sign the petition handed over to Speaker Wickremaratne, they wholeheartedly supported the initiative.

Whatever efforts by political parties/governments in power to interfere with the judiciary should be opposed at every level. The Rajapaksas went to the extent of impeaching Chief Justice Dr. Shirani Bandaranayake and removing her under the most despicable circumstances. Belligerent Rajapaksas reacted, as expected, following the Supreme Court rulings, including one against the then SLFP/UPFA strongman Basil Rajapaksa.

The ruling UPFA directed a series of unsubstantiated allegations against her, including financial impropriety and interfering in legal cases. SJB MP Dayasiri Jayasekera recently made reference to the impeachment of Dr. Bandaranayake when he censured the NPP move to extend the retirement age of judges of the superior courts. MP Jayasekera questioned whether the NPP wanted to retain Chief Justice Preethi Padman Surasena beyond the stipulated retirement age.

Although there had been a spate of interventions, the 2013 impeachment of CJ 43 was undoubtedly the worst case ever and the appointment of former Attorney General Mohan Peiris as her successor made matters worse.

The UPFA hit back hard at Dr. Bandaranayake following unprecedented controversy over The Town and Country Planning (Amendment) Bill and Divi Neguma, gazetted in 2011 and 2012, respectively. The UPFA abandoned the first Bill and then amended the second to avoid a referendum and the required 2/3 approval. By then, the cocky UPFA had decided to impeach Dr. Bandaranayake who stood up to outright political intimidation.

Ranil Wickremesinghe, during his tenure as the President (July, 2022, to September, 2024) reacted angrily to the Supreme Court ruling that he, in his capacity as the Finance Minister and the Election Commission, violated voters’ rights by arbitrarily delaying the Local Government polls in 2023. Wickremesinghe had been also angered by his failure to secure Supreme Court endorsement for his bid to appoint Dehabandu Tennakoon as the IGP in the run-up to the 2024 Presidential Election.

There had been so many other instances when the political party/coalition, in power, felt that the judiciary undermined its agenda. There cannot be better examples of the daunting challenge faced by the UPFA due to the Supreme Court stand during Dr. Bandaranayake’s tenure as the Chief Justice.

But post-Aragalaya period, no one expected President Dissanayake to pursue an agenda that compelled the BASL to issue hard hitting statements. Since May Day 2026, there had been two such statements from the BASL that should have triggered alarm bells. The NPP is obviously on the wrong path, believing that it can proceed with a 2/3 super majority unhindered in Parliament.

The first BASL statement dealt with President Dissanayake’s controversial May Day prediction of a court ruling in a high profile case. The second one responded to a move to extend superior court judges’ retirement age.

The government should rethink its strategy. With the national economy experiencing severe difficulties and the government under pressure to abolish fuel and electricity subsidies at the behest of the IMF, the NPP should concentrate on saving the economy instead of creating fresh issues that it cannot just brush aside just because of its steamroller majority in Parliament.

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Midweek Review

The Legacy Lost

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Gladdening was the sight at morn,

For the folk of the invisible village,

Of mirthful children trekking to school,

And refuge did they take in the thought,

That at least their young would be spared,

The crushing ordeals of tenant farming,

Since they would come by some erudition,

But our elders are now up against the truth,

That all is not well at the humble school,

Since even the morsel of education,

Painstakingly dished out there,

Comes with scary price tags attached;

Making dropping out the best thing to do.

 

By Lynn Ockersz

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Midweek Review

July 09: An inexcusable overall security failure and exceptional contingency plan

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A massive throng of people inside the President's House after mobs forced Gotabaya Rajapaksa to flee on 09 July, 2022

Ulugetenne

The Sri Lanka Navy, on 04 June, commissioned SLNS Samudravijaya, formerly United States Coast Guard Cutter Decisive. It is the fourth mothballed US Coast Guard cutter transferred to the SLN through the US Excess Defence Articles Programme. President Anura Kumara Dissanayake attended the ceremony at the Colombo Port. The US Embassy in Colombo, in a statement issued on the same day, quoted Defence Attaché Lieutenant Colonel Matthew House as having said: “Few partners have demonstrated the commitment to maintaining and operating these vessels as successfully as the Sri Lanka Navy. The outstanding condition and operational performance of SLNS Samudura, SLNS Gajabahu, and SLNS Vijayabahu are a testament to the professionalism and technical expertise of Sri Lankan sailors. Their stewardship of these vessels helped build the confidence that made this fourth transfer possible.” The first of the four vessels SLNS Samudura was commissioned on 19 February, 2005, during Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga’s tenure as the President. Milinda Moragoda, Economic Reforms and Science and Technology Minister of the previous UNP-led UNF government, played a significant role in acquiring that vessel. SLNS Samudura boosted SLN and participated in numerous operations, including the high profile hunt for LTTE floating warehouses, during the Eelam War IV. But, the US refrained from transferring any more big ships during the war though on the then Navy Commander Vice Admiral Wsantha Karannagoda’s request to provide intelligence and Washington obliging, made the successful hunt for LTTE floating arsenals in the last stages of the war possible. The transfer of the second vessel took place 19 years after the end of the war. Ex USCG Sherman was commissioned 06 June, 2019, as SLNS Gajabahu (P626). The third vessel was transferred to the Sri Lanka Navy on October 26, 2021, as the country was heading towards an unprecedented economic crisis. That vessel was commissioned as SLNS Vijayabahu at the Colombo Port with the participation of President Ranil Wickramasinghe and US Ambassador to Sri Lanka Julie Chung on November 20, 2022. Ironically SLNS Gajabahu, one of the ex-US vessels prominently figured in the contingency plan to save President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, but whose downfall was engineered by the US.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

The moment President Gotabaya Rajapaksa decided to take up residence at the President’s House (Janadhipathi Mandiraya), Fort, in the first week of April, 2022, the Navy had no option but to prepare a thorough contingency plan, in case the regime change project posed a realistic threat to the life of the President.

The President, in consultation with senior military officers, made his move within 48 hours after violence erupted outside his private residence at Pangiriwatte, Mirihana, on the night of 31 March, 2022. That decision seemed realistic and sensible at that time.

But, in the wake of the disastrous overall armed forces response to the coordinated violence unleashed by the regime change project on 09 May, 2022, in the aftermath of the Temple Trees ordered attack on Galle Face protesters, the top brass must have recognised the urgent need for total overhauling of security strategy. But, unfortunately, that hadn’t been the case. With violent crowds overwhelming the armed forces, deployed to block them, rapidly approaching the President’s House, those who had been at the makeshift Operations Room there were stunned.

In hindsight, the President’s decision to remain at the President’s House, regardless of the near failure on the part of the armed forces to repulse the raid on Temple Trees, on 09 May, seemed unwise. The rescue operation could have gone wrong and the war-winning President Mahinda Rajapaksa could have ended up in the hands of an angry mob.

Perhaps, the conspirators envisaged the President’s move, from Pangiriwatte to the President’s House, situated walking distance away from the Galle Face protest site, where they could draw additional strength.

The failure on the part of the government to take tangible measures, in the wake of the President’s House becoming the sole target on that fateful day, is a contentious issue that needs to be properly investigated. Don’t forget that the court case filed over the 09 May attacks on the residences and properties belonging to SLPP politicians, and some supporters ,was later withdrawn. The Wickremesinghe-Rajapaksa government never investigated the 09 May incidents.

Exactly two months after the mobs almost succeeded in breaking through defences at Temple Trees, on the night of 09 May/10, where Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa was residing, they mounted the assault on the President’s House.

In the wake of the 09 May mayhem, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa named Lt. Gen. Vikum Liyanage as the Commander of the Army. He succeeded General Shavendra Silva who served as the CDS but was out of the country when all-out mayhem was unleashed by the Aragalaya mobs on 09 July, 2022, to oust the sitting government.

In spite of a direct and growing threat to the President’s House, on 09 July, 2022, the President felt confident in meeting the challenge. The President issued a directive to the Secretary, Ministry of Defence, General (retd.) Kamal Gunaratne, to shift the Operations Room from the Defence Force Headquarters, at Akuregoda, to the President’s House. Having shifted the Operations Room on 08 July, 2022, to the President’s House, as directed by the President, the top brass prepared to face the challenge.

Maj. General K.B. Egodawela, who served as an Additional Secretary (Administration) to the President, from the day the President moved to the President’s House, till he vacated on 09 July, 2022, in his memoirs ‘Aragalaya: Adarayen Prachandathwayata’ (From Love to Violence) revealed that though the top brass opposed the shifting of the Operations Room they carried out the directive. While the President felt that the top brass could collectively work at the President’s House to bring the situation under control, Gen Gunaratne proposed that the President should move to Akuregoda Defence Forces Headquarters, according to Egodawela. In fact, Gunaratne, who had been with Gotabaya Rajapaksa from the very beginning of the sinister campaign, strongly opposed the President’s decision to remain there.

Obviously, the President’s House pathetically failed to ascertain the scale of the protest and the rapidity with which protesters overwhelmed troops deployed outside the President’s House stunned the top brass. Had they swiftly reached consensus on Gen. Gunaratne’s suggestion, perhaps the 09 July regime change operation could have been thwarted. The armed forces could have resorted to tougher measures to prevent a march on Akuregoda Defence Forces Headquarters had the President agreed to move there.

Within two hours after the protest, targeting the President’s House began, video footage provided by drones indicated that troops couldn’t hold the rampaging mobs any longer. According to Egodawela, the top brass had been prepared to remove the President, even without his consent, by landing a helicopter in the Colombo harbor or by ship. Finally, they resorted to the second option. As the President and First Lady Ayoma got into a vehicle and took the rear exit into the adjoining former Navy Headquarters, mobs entered the President’s House. Another vehicle carrying several other persons followed.

The then Navy Commander Vice Admiral Nishantha Ulugetenne who had been with the President at the President’s House got into the vehicle carrying the President. Had they stayed at the President’s House for 10 more minutes, the consequences could have been devastating. https://island.lk/gotabayas-escape-from-aragalaya-mob-in-rti-spotlight/

Egodawela, who had been with the President from the very beginning of the presidential term, alleged that the raiders planned to kill the President and several others and display their bodies. The author quoted an unidentified intelligence officer as having told him that the raiders wanted to display the bodies the way LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran’s body was shown.

Perhaps shifting the Operations Room from Akuregoda Defence Force Headquarters to the President’s House had been a risky move that, in a way, facilitated the regime change operation. The rationale in bringing those who had been tasked with countering the impending threat to one place (President’s House) to be with the target (Gotabaya Rajapaksa) seems unbelievably a dicey move. The President had been influenced by what he described as inordinate and unforgivable delay on the part of the Akuregoda Operations Room to carry out timely evacuation of Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa on the night of 09 May from Temple Trees. Most probably, the President wanted to oversee the 09 July counter operation personally. But, in hindsight, the decision to shift the Operations Room from Akuregoda to the President’s House obviously hadn’t been a clever move.

SLN preparations

When mobs threatened to overwhelm the President’s security at Pangiriwattta, on 31 March, additional police and STF contingents were brought in. They were followed by the Navy and Air Force. The Army arrived at the scene, subsequently.

As pointed out by the President himself, the situation at Temple Trees, on 09 May, had been far worse and the combined police and armed forces response revealed that they hadn’t taken precautionary/counter measures, even after the Pangiriwatta fiasco.

At the time of the incidents, the overall Temple Trees security deployment included about 60 elite Special Boat Squadron (SBS) personnel deployed within the premises and were supplemented by seven SLN platoons. The Army also moved in to strengthen Temple Trees defences but the mobs pressed on till troops fired blank ammunition.

The top brass, directing counter measures from Akuregoda Defence Force Headquarters, had to act swiftly and decisively to evacuate those at the Temple Trees or face the consequences. As there hadn’t been any other alternative place of living proposed, Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa, wife Shiranthi and their eldest son Namal were escorted to nearby former Air Force Headquarters and from there flown to the Trincomalee Navy base. VA Ulugetenne, over the phone, issued instructions to the relevant officer in Trincomalee to make arrangements as two helicopters carrying the group took off from the helipad on the top of the former Air Force Headquarters. The helicopters departed around 04 in the morning.

They had stayed at Trincomalee Navy House for about a week and, as requested by the Navy, paid for their stay because by then Mahinda Rajapaksa had resigned. Perhaps, they could have taken refuge at the Panagoda Army cantonment or at Saliyapura, home to the Gajaba Regiment, but, at the end, sought the protection at the Trincomalee Navy base.

Ironically, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, too, had to take refuge at the Trincomalee Navy base, exactly two months later. Ever since the President moved into the President’s House, Fort, the Navy had been on their toes to meet any eventuality. The daunting task of arranging evacuation by sea fell on the shoulders of VA Ulugetenne, who, meticulously, planned the operation with his staff.

Having informed the President of the contingency plans, VA Ulugetenne stationed two Advanced Offshore Patrol Vessels (AOPVs), namely SLNS Sindurala and SLNS Gajabahu and four Fast Attack Craft (FACs), at the Colombo Port. It would be pertinent to mention that SLNS Sindurala, built at the Goa shipyard, in terms of an agreement signed at the tail end of the Mahinda Rajapaksa government, was adjudged the best vessel in the SLN fleet in 2022.

Additional SBS personnel and snipers, too, had been brought in to Colombo though none of them knew exactly what their task would be. The OPV and FAC crews most probably felt that they were awaiting orders for a major anti-drug operation in the high seas.

As the decision was made to evacuate the President and the First Lady, the Chief alerted the vessels and quickly deployed tugboats to pull SLNS Sindurala and, shortly thereafter, SLNS Gajabahu, formerly of the US Coast Guard, carrying the President and the First Lady. By the time the two AOPVs moved in different directions, on the instructions of VA Ulugetenne, the hand phones of SLNS Gajabahu crew were collected to prevent them from revealing what was happening. Along with the AOPVs, two pairs of FACs had moved out to sea. (https://island.lk/ranil-reveals-bid-to-get-rid-of-him-while-gr-was-fleeing-to-trinco-on-board-slns-gajabahu/)

Nearly 12-hour journey to Trinco

The SLNS Gajabahu, formerly of the US Coast Guard, had a crew consisting of over 100 officers and men. Someone, most probably a port employee, posted a short clip of some unidentified persons taking large travelling bags into the ship but the President, First Lady and VA Ulugetenne going in were never captured on a camera.

As the vessel began its journey towards Trincomalee, it remained approximately 12 nautical miles from land and the President received many calls, some of which weren’t answered. VA Ulugetenne, too, received quite a number of calls. Those familiar with the developments at that time said that some felt that SLNS Gajabahu should move out of Sri Lankan waters. There had been suggestions that the destination should be the Maldives, India or Singapore. Regardless of such suggestions, SLNS Gajabahu proceeded towards Trincomalee where the Navy made necessary arrangements to host them.

Captain Marlon Perera, who still serves the Navy, had been the Commanding Officer of the vessel. Perera now holds the Commodore rank.

During the journey precautions were taken to ensure the safety and security of the President and the First Lady. Although the crew hadn’t been aware that they would be entrusted with such a sensitive task at a time the country was in crossroads against the backdrop of an economic collapse and sovereign default, there were fears of the crew being affected by propaganda in support of regime change operation.

The attempt made by sailor Wijemuni Vijitha Rohana de Silva to cause harm to Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, way back in July, 1987, underscored the necessity to take precautions during the Colombo-Trincomalee journey as the possibility of anti-Gotabaya campaign having an impact on at least some members of the ship crew couldn’t be ruled out.

On July 30, 1987, during a guard of honor in Colombo, the 21-year-old naval rating struck Gandhi on the shoulder and back with the butt of his rifle. Gandhi narrowly avoided the full impact of the blow by evasive ducking.

On the invitation of VA Ulugetenne, Gotabaya Rajapaksa attended all the formalities in respect of a visit undertaken by the President to the Trincomalee Navy base. The President participated in those formalities knowing that he couldn’t attend the commissioning parade that was scheduled to be held on 15 July, 2022. The Navy was not in a position to put off the commissioning parade hence the decision to invite Defence Secretary Gunaratne as the Chief Guest.

Ulugetenne retired from active naval service on 18 December, 2022, following a distinguished career, spanning over 37 years. He received the appointment as the 24th Commander of the Navy in July, 2020, just a couple of months after Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s election as the President.

Wickremesinghe, in his capacity as Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s successor, appointed Ulugetenne as Sri Lanka’s Ambassador to Cuba. The appointment was made in late 2023 and the retired Navy Chief presented his credentials to Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel on 13 February, 2024 (https://island.lk/from-fonseka-convictions-to-arrest-of-ulugetenne/)

However, within weeks after the last presidential election held in late November, 2024, the NPP government recalled over a dozen top envoys appointed by the previous administration. Admiral Ulugetenne was among them. The government deprived a decorated officer, who had served the country for nearly four decades, from completing his term in Havana. Within months after his return, he became the target of a murder investigation.

Then out of the blue the retired Navy Chief became the focus of a murder investigation, that, too, post-war. The Criminal Investigation Department (CID) arrested him on 28 July, 2025, over the disappearance of a person reported in July, 2020.

Kurunegala High Court Judge Tikiri Jayatilleke, on 14 October, 2025, granted him bail. Jayatilleke declared that the CID acted in an illegal manner in respect of the former Navy Commander. His counsel Kalinga Indatissa, PC, alleged in court that his client had been apprehended only on the basis of an ex-LTTE cadre’s allegation in the absence of any evidence

The next hearing is scheduled for 08 July, 2026. Ulugetenne was held at the Kegalle Prison for four days and then transferred to the Dumbara (Pallekale) Prison. Altogether, he was in prison for 80 days, like a common criminal, despite him being a former Navy Commander with an unblemished career record.

Wartime Chief of Naval Intelligence, Rear Admiral (retd) Sarath Mohotti, who had been also arrested in connection with the same investigation, was also granted bail, a few weeks later.

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