Midweek Review

Playing politics with national security

Published

5 years ago

2020/09/30

By Shamindra Ferdinando

Security of a country did not depend on its Defence Secretary. There were various structures and it was a matter of collective action, one-time Defence Secretary, Austin Fernando, told the Presidential Commission of Inquiry (P CoI) on Saturday (26).

The P CoI, appointed by former President Maithripala Sirisena, is inquiring into the Easter Sunday attacks. Sirisena named the Commission several weeks before the end of his five-year term.

Fernando further said: “It is not mandatory for the Defence Secretary to have an intimate knowledge of the role played by the Ministry. If that is the case, a fisherman should be the Secretary to the Ministry of Fisheries, and the Secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture should be a farmer.”

Let me examine Austin Fernando’s statement, taking into consideration the direct talks between President Ranasinghe Premadasa and the LTTE, during the period 1989-1990 (the late General D.S. Attygalle served as the Defence Secretary from 15.08.1983 to 16.02.1990), outbreak of Eelam War II (General S.C Ranatunga served as the Secretary Defence from 16.02.1990 to 01.05.1993) and the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) with the LTTE entered into by Premier Ranil Wickremesinghe (Austin Fernando functioned as the Secretary Defence from 21.12.2001 to 03.11.2003).

Hemasiri Fernando, who served as Secretary Defence in the run-up to the April 21, 2019, Easter Sunday attacks, is under investigation for criminal negligence. In all four above-mentioned instances, the government apparatus collectively failed, though the circumstances were different.

The only difference is in the case of the disastrous 2002 CFA. The then President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga cannot be faulted as Premier Ranil Wickremesinghe blindly signed the catastrophic Oslo-drafted 2002 peace initiative, keeping even his cabinet in the dark.

Austin Fernando is absolutely right. Security of a country does not depend on its Defence Secretary. In fact, a single person cannot guarantee national security, regardless of political clout he or she wielded. However, one person can cause irreparable damage, through irrational and unilateral actions/decisions, as in the case of the CFA. The appointment of retired military officers certainly cannot guarantee national security. The late Gen. Attygalle and Gen. Ranatunga facilitated President Premadasa’s ill-fated strategies that weakened the military. Taking Fernando’s assertion into consideration, it would be pertinent to examine how President Premadasa (1989-1990), Premier Wickremesinghe (2002-2003) and President Sirisena and Premier Wickremesinghe (2015-2019) jeopardized the national security. Those who served under them, too, equally contributed to the rapid deterioration of security by simply giving into political dictates, thereby providing tacit support to despicable political agendas.

Sri Lanka paid a huge price for political and military miscalculations. The political environment, created by Sirisena-Wickremesinghe, cannot be scrutinized without taking into consideration previous situations. In the absence of detailed study, the public tend to consider the Easter Sunday security failure as an isolated case. But, the extraordinary Easter Sunday terror project, perhaps, is part of an insidious political strategy to keep Sri Lanka in perpetual anarchy. Those who had perpetrated nearly simultaneous suicide attacks, in three administrative districts, certainly deliberated the political environment before going ahead with the operation. Who exploited the National Thowheed Jamaat (NTJ) to deliver such a devastating message? Did NTJ succumb to external elements? When did India actually infiltrate the NTJ and what is the status of the Indian intelligence gathering operation in Sri Lanka? Why didn’t Indian intelligence share information on NTJ (Zahran Hashim’s gang) much earlier? And, most importantly, why were both Sinhala and Tamil communities targeted?

Defence Chiefs play ball with Ranasinghe Premadasa

Having secured the presidency, in January 1989, President Premadasa sought an agreement with the JVP. The UNP leader also made an attempt to reach a consensus with Tamil groups, including the LTTE. The President succeeded in reaching an understanding with all armed Tamil groups, except the LTTE. The presence of one-time militant Douglas Devananda, leader of the EPDP (Eelam People’s Democratic Party), in President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s cabinet of ministers, is evidence of Premadasa’s successful political strategy. In addition to the EPDP, Premadasa brought the EPRLF (Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front), TELO (Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization) and PLOTE (People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam) into the political mainstream. However, Premadasa’s bid to reach an understanding with the LTTE ended disastrously, in the second week of June 1990.

At the time, Premadasa initiated direct negotiations with the LTTE, the late Gen. Attygalle had been the Secretary, Ministry of Defence while Lt. Gen. Hamilton Wanasinghe served as the Commander of the Army (16.09.1988- 15.11.91). Did the President consult the Defence Secretary and the Commander of the Army before initiating negotiations with the JVP and the LTTE? Did they approve of releasing from custody of over thousands of JVP suspects in early 1989? Their release resulted in an immediate stepping up of violence though the police, the military and the government-sponsored civilian death squads crushed the JVP, by the end of 1989.

Having captured JVP leader, Rohana Wijeweera, at Ulapane, in the second week of Nov. 1989, he was brought to Colombo, interrogated and executed. Premadasa knew what befell Wijeweera, who led two insurrections, in 1971 and 1987-89.

However, Premadasa’s apparent unilateral decisions, in respect of the LTTE, caused immense harm. Believing in the possibility of successful conclusion of negotiations with the LTTE, Premadasa, hastily announced the hotly disputed decision to request New Delhi to terminate its military mission in the North-East Sri Lanka. Did Premadasa genuinely consult the Defence Secretary, Commander of the Army or at least his Prime Minister, the late D.B. Wijetunga, before demanding the pull-out of the Indian Peace Keeping Force? Premadasa, obviously didn’t believe in consultations. In his capacity as the leader of the UNP and the President, Premadasa largely believed in unilateral decisions. The catastrophic handling of direct negotiations with the LTTE paved the way for terrorists to launch devastating attacks on the Army after obtaining from the then naïve government military supplies, money, as well as building materials. Clearly, the Secretary Defence and the Commander of the Army played ball with Premadasa. In fact, all cooperated with Premadasa. Officials bent backwards to appease the all-powerful President. The then Election Commissioner, the late Chandrananda de Silva, overnight recognized the PFLT (People’s Front of Liberation Tigers) as a registered political party. The writer was among several local and foreign journalists, invited by the late LTTE theoretician Anton Balasingham, to the Colombo Hilton where he made the announcement. Chain-smoking British passport holder Balasingham declared proudly that their emblem would be a Tiger in a red flag of rectangular shape. Premadasa, or late Chandrananda de Silva, had no qualms in the PFLT receiving political recognition in spite of it being armed. The LTTE received political recognition a couple of months before Velupillai Prabhakaran resumed Eelam War II.

Prez playing with fire

Did Premadasa consult the Defence Secretary and Commander of the Army before lifting restrictions imposed on the Northern Province, abandoned Point Pedro and Valvettiturai army detachments, pardoned convicted Maradana bomber Manouri Daniels, along with over a dozen other LTTE cadres, held under the PTA (Prevention of Terrorism Act), and provided weapons and funds to the LTTE. Premadasa did what he wanted to do. The UNP leader was not bothered about security implications. Obviously, his security chiefs remained mum. President felt confident in his political strategy. He was so confident, he ordered law enforcement personnel to surrender after the LTTE surrounded police stations in the East. Premadasa’s decision resulted in the deaths of over 400 officers and men. Did the President consult Gen. Attygalle’s successor Gen. Cyril Ranatunga and the Commander of the Army before the government reached an agreement with the LTTE?

The Army in the East averted a calamity by refusing to surrender, in spite of the senior leadership directing them to do so. General Gerry H. de Silva, who served as the Commander of the Army (1994-1996) in his memoirs titled ‘A most noble profession’ commented on Premadasa’s strategy/the government’s failure to recognize the threat posed by the LTTE. First published in 2011, two years after the successful conclusion of the war against the LTTE, De Silva acknowledged: “We failed to see through the emerging trends and LTTE machinations. Despite constant threats and humiliation meted out to security forces and the police by the militants, the politico-military hierarchy preferred to put up with the ignominy in order not to ‘rock the boat.’

The LTTE capitalized on the situation. A rejuvenated LTTE ‘called the shots,’ and quickly moved into a position of strength, politically and militarily. They were riding the crest of a wave and must have felt that the time was opportune to achieve their goal of Eelam.”

The Gemunu Watch officer is the only Commander of the Army to author a book on his career.

Within a week after the resumption of hostilities, in the second week of June 1990, the ill-prepared Army lost the Overland Main Supply Route (MSR) to the Jaffna peninsula. Premadasa’s ‘honeymoon’ with Prabhakaran lasted 14 months. The Tiger Supremo resumed the war, at lightning speed, just two months after India terminated its military mission here. Sri Lanka was left high and dry after the series of follies by Premadasa, at peace making, and the military couldn’t regain the MSR, till January 2009. Premadasa’s Generals turned a blind eye to what was happening on the ground. When fighting erupted, the Army had just one battalion, plus troops in the Jaffna peninsula. In spite of continuing to build up, the top brass ignored the growing threat until it was too late. So, the mere appointing of a retired General as Secretary Defence cannot guarantee rationale thinking. Premadasa’s strategy was nothing but a massive and unprecedented collective failure that almost resulted in capitulation of the Northern forces. Premadasa turned a Nelsonian eye to the LTTE evicting the entire Muslim population from the Northern Province, in Oct 1990. At the behest of Premadasa, the then Army Commander facilitated coordinated LTTE attacks on rival Tamil groups. The LTTE massacred hundreds of people. The response of Premadasa and his chief negotiator, the late A.C.S. Hameed, to the LTTE threat, caused quite an embarrassment to the government, undermined the State and, basically, allowed the LTTE to transform itself to a conventional fighting force. The then Higher Education Minister Hameed never realized ground realities.

Retired General de Silva’s assessment can be applied to all Presidents. except war-winning Mahinda Rajapaksa, who had faith in his younger brother Gotabaya’s capacity to coordinate the war effort against the LTTE.

Generals Attygalle and Ranatunga certainly owed an explanation as regards their failure to prevent the catastrophe in the North. Obviously, no one dared to challenge Premadasa’s dangerous strategies. Having served as the Commander of the Army, for a decade, and Defence Secretary, General Attygalle received appointment as Sri Lanka’s High Commissioner in London where he facilitated Kittu’s (Sathasivam Krishnakumar) arrival there. On the orders of Premadasa, the SLAF brought Kittu to Colombo where the British High Commission made arrangements to send the former LTTE Jaffna Commander to receive treatment for his amputated leg. The Generals had no say and Premadasa had his way.

Can you imagine a government facilitating a terrorist’s travel to London where he took over the LTTE’s International Secretariat responsible for running a massive extortion racket? The funds ultimately ended up with arms suppliers who provided the LTTE a range of weapons, T 56 assault rifles to shoulder fired missiles. General Ranatunga, too, received appointment as Sri Lanka’s High Commissioner in Canberra and then London. Presidential nominees to top diplomatic posts always received parliamentary approval.

Security fiasco in 2002

Not having learnt from Premadasa’s stupidities, Ranil Wickremesinghe too plunged headlong into a similar folly with Austin Fernando et al in tow.

Ranil Wickremesinghe picked experienced administrative service officer Austin Fernando as Secretary Defence within days after winning the Dec 2001 parliamentary election. Wickremesinghe also brought in one-time Attorney General Tilak Marapana on the National List as the Secretary to the Ministry of Defence. Wickremesinghe adopted a simple strategy. The UNP leader advocated a policy of appeasement, thereby jeopardizing the entire security apparatus. The LTTE brazenly exploited the situation to its advantage. Prabhakaran stepped up training, recruitment of fresh cadres, as well as forcible conscription of children. The government did nothing. The LTTE intensified protests opposite security forces bases, restricted/interfered with police and military movements whereas the government repeatedly reiterated its commitment to the Oslo-led peace process like a mantra. Wickremesinghe dismissed intelligence assessment as regards the rapid LTTE built up. Wickremesinghe told a hastily arranged Temple Trees meeting, attended by senior officers responsible for intelligence services et al their assessment of the LTTE training 6,000 cadres at the onset of the CFA was wrong. The Premier contradicted his own intelligence apparatus on the basis of what the Indians told him. The then Defence Advisor Senior DIG Merril Gunaratne, who had been among those invited by the Premier, had the strength to stand by his report, based on information/analysis provided by all services. Obviously, Wickremesinghe hadn’t been in a mood to listen to anyone who questioned Prabhakaran’s motives though the continuing LTTE build up was evident.

Wickremesinghe followed his policy of appeasement. In his capacity as Secretary Defence Austin Fernando had no option but to go along with the Premier who authorized the finalization of CFA without proper consultations with the military top brass or the intelligence services.

The then Defence Secretary also provided some hilarious side shows like carrying a basket of fruits to a terrorist receiving treatment at a Colombo hospital.

Fernando himself claimed at the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) in August 2010 that he hadn’t been involved in the process leading to the finalization of the document. However, top SCOPP (Secretariat for Coordinating Peace Process) Dr. John Gooneratne subsequently revealed before the LLRC how Norway rejected four proposals made by Sri Lanka. Had those proposals been accommodated in the CFA perhaps Eelam War IV could have been avoided, Gooneratne told the late C.R. de Silva’s Commission. The writer covered the entire LLRC proceedings. Gooneratne revealed the hitherto unknown proposals namely (a) CFA to pave the way for a negotiated settlement (b) prohibition of smuggling of arms, ammunition and equipment (c) freedom of movement for other political parties in areas under the LTTE control and finally (d) halt to forcible recruitment. Sri Lanka never received the backing of Peace Co-Chairs, the US, Norway, EU and Japan to get those just proposals included in the CFA.

The UNP never revealed rejection of its proposals until Gooneratne took advantage of the LLRC to set the record straight. Austin Fernando and SCOPP Chief Bernard Goonetilleke, who appeared before the LLRC could have revealed the truth. The UNP remained mum. Throughout the CFA period, Premier Wickremesinghe tried to suppress information that may have caused embarrassment to his government, the Norwegians and the LTTE. Obviously there hadn’t been any proper consultations among members of the cabinet, parliamentary group or the military top brass regarding the Oslo-led process.

Austin Fernando cannot absolve himself of the responsibility for the UNP government’s actions during the CFA. The person who served as Secretary Defence cannot claim lack of knowledge of a particular situation. The same applies to the Defence Minister. During Marapana’s tenure as the Defence Minister Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI)-run operation was exposed to the whole world with media scenes. In spite of strong protests by the Army, the UNP went ahead with its political project. The exposure of the operation led to the deaths of several operatives. The LTTE also hunted police officers engaged in anti-terrorist operations. When Defence Advisor Merril Gunaratne blamed the LTTE for the killing of Inspector Thabrew at the Dehiwela police station, Premier Wickremesinghe himself questioned the veteran law enforcement officer’s assessment.

The UNP allowed the LTTE to bring in undeclared cargo via the Bandaranaike International Airport (BIA). LTTE delegations returning from negotiations with Wickremesinghe’s delegations from various foreign venues and others brought large packages. The foolish government provided air transport. The LTTE brazenly used the opportunity to its advantage. The CFA provided the organization required protection. The LTTE exploited the Oslo arranged CFA, the same way it used direct talks with Premadasa to achieve its targets. High profile assassination of TULF leader Appapillai Amirthalingham is a case in point. Prabhakaran moved a hit team in an SLAF chopper that brought LTTE delegates from the Vanni to Colombo in 1989.

Both political and military leaderships should accept responsibilities for lapses. During Austin Fernando’s tenure as the Defence Secretary, the military was ordered to stop issuing situation reports, suspended ‘Wanni Sevaya’ (special radio that catered to the military and the police), subjected military reports to civilian approval and basically succumbed to LTTE tactics. While closing down ‘Wanni Sevaya’, the government permitted the LTTE to import state-of-the-art radio equipment to upgrade its own propaganda and communication facilities.

If not for the then President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga’s intervention in late 2003, the UNP could have allowed the LTTE build up to continue until it was too late to take counter action. The UNP permitted the deterioration of the situation to such an extent, the LTTE by early 2003 felt confident enough to brazenly quit the negotiating table. The LTTE quit talks in late April 2003 to set the stage for an all-out war. By late 2005, the LTTE was confident it could overwhelm the Army in a large-scale conventional confrontation. The assassination of much-loved Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar, in early August 2005, indicated their readiness to take on the government. Had the LTTE succeeded in assassinating Army Chief Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka and Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa, in late April and early Oct, 2006, the LTTE, perhaps could have achieved Eelam. There cannot be any dispute as regards the role played by the Army Commander and the Defence Secretary to bring the war to a successful conclusion. There had never been previous attempts on the lives of the Army Commander and Secretary Defence. The LTTE knew the government strategy could be aborted by assassinating the two most important men. Their failure brought the war to an end three years later with the LTTE militarily annihilated. If the LTTE succeeded, Sri Lanka’s unitary status could have been jeopardized by now. The Sirisena-Wickremesinghe coalition proved the danger in pulling in different directions, lack of vision and strategy as well as pursuing of political agendas inimical Sri Lanka State.

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Midweek Review

Year ends with the NPP govt. on the back foot

Published

17 hours ago

2025/12/24

Sahan Weerasooriya

President Dissanayake addresses Parliament as PM Dr. Harini Amarasuriya looks on. Dissanayake is the leader of both the JVP and NPP

The failure on the part of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP)-led National People’s Power (NPP) government to fulfil a plethora of promises given in the run up to the last presidential election, in September, 2024, and a series of incidents, including cases of corruption, and embarrassing failure to act on a specific weather alert, ahead of Cyclone Ditwah, had undermined the administration beyond measure.

Ditwah dealt a knockout blow to the arrogant and cocky NPP. If the ruling party consented to the Opposition proposal for a Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC) to probe the events leading to the November 27 cyclone, the disclosure would be catastrophic, even for the all-powerful Executive President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, as responsible government bodies, like the Disaster Management Centre that horribly failed in its duty, and the Met Department that alerted about the developing storm, but the government did not heed its timely warnings, directly come under his purview.

The NPP is on the back foot and struggling to cope up with the rapidly developing situation. In spite of having both executive presidency and an overwhelming 2/3 majority in Parliament, the government seems to be weak and in total disarray.

The regular appearance of President Dissanayake in Parliament, who usually respond deftly to criticism, thereby defending his parliamentary group, obviously failed to make an impression. Overall, the top NPP leadership appeared to have caused irreparable damage to the NPP and taken the shine out of two glorious electoral victories at the last presidential and parliamentary polls held in September and November 2024 respectively.

The NPP has deteriorated, both in and out of Parliament. The performance of the 159-member NPP parliamentary group, led by Prime Minister Dr. Harini Amarasuriya, doesn’t reflect the actual situation on the ground or the developing political environment.

Having repeatedly boasted of its commitment to bring about good governance and accountability, the current dispensation proved in style that it is definitely not different from the previous lots or even worse. (The recent arrest of a policeman who claimed of being assaulted by a gang, led by an NPP MP, emphasised that so-called system change is nothing but a farce) In the run-up to the November, 2024, parliamentary polls, President Dissanayake, who is the leader of both the JVP and NPP, declared that the House should be filled with only NPPers as other political parties were corrupt. Dissanayake cited the Parliament defeating the no-confidence motions filed against Ravi Karunanayake (2016/over Treasury Bond scams) and Keheliya Rambukwella (2023/against health sector corruption) to promote his argument. However, recently the ongoing controversy over patient deaths, allegedly blamed on the administration of Ondansetron injections, exposed the government.

Mounting concerns over drug safety and regulatory oversight triggered strong calls from medical professionals, and trade unions, for the resignation of senior officials at the National Medicines Regulatory Authority (NMRA) and the State Pharmaceutical Corporation (SPC).

Medical and civil rights groups declared that the incident exposed deep systemic failures in Sri Lanka’s drug regulatory framework, with critics warning that the collapse of quality assurance mechanisms is placing patients’ lives at grave risk.

The Medical and Civil Rights Professional Association of Doctors (MCRPA), and allied trade unions, accused health authorities of gross negligence and demanded the immediate resignation of senior NMRA and SPC officials.

MCRPA President Dr. Chamal Sanjeewa is on record as having said that the Health Ministry, NMRA and SPC had collectively failed to ensure patient safety, citing, what he described as, a failed drug regulatory system.

The controversy has taken an unexpected turn with some alleging that the NPP government, on behalf of Sri Lanka and India, in April this year, entered into an agreement whereby the former agreed to lower quality/standards of medicine imports.

Trouble begins with Ranwala’s resignation

The NPP suffered a humiliating setback when its National List MP Asoka Ranwala had to resign from the post of Speaker on 13 December, 2024, following intense controversy over his educational qualification. The petroleum sector trade union leader served as the Speaker for a period of three weeks and his resignation shook the party. Ranwala, first time entrant to Parliament was one of the 18 NPP National List appointees out of a total of 29. The Parliament consists of 196 elected and 29 appointed members. Since the introduction of the National List, in 1989, there had never been an occasion where one party secured 18 slots.

The JVP/NPP made an initial bid to defend Ranwala but quickly gave it up and got him to resign amidst media furor. Ranwala dominated the social media as political rivals exploited the controversy over his claimed doctorate from the Waseda University of Japan, which he has failed to prove to this day. But, the JVP/NPP had to suffer a second time as a result of Ranwala’s antics when he caused injuries to three persons, including a child, on 11 December, in the Sapugaskanda police area.

The NPP made a pathetic, UNP and SLFP style effort to save the parliamentarian by blaming the Sapugaskanda police for not promptly subjecting him for a drunk driving test. The declaration made by the Government Analyst Department that the parliamentarian hadn’t been drunk at the time of the accident, several days after the accident, does not make any difference. Having experienced the wrongdoing of successive previous governments, the public, regardless of what various interested parties propagated on social media, realise that the government is making a disgraceful bid to cover-up.

No less a person than President Dissanayake is on record as having said that their members do not consume liquor. Let us wait for the outcome of the internal investigation into the lapses on the part of the Sapugaskanda police with regard to the accident that happened near Denimulla Junction, in Sapugaskanda.

JVP/NPP bigwigs obviously hadn’t learnt from the Weligama W 15 hotel attack in December, 2023, that ruined President Ranil Wickremeinghe’s administration. That incident exposed the direct nexus between the government and the police in carrying out Mafia-style operations. Although the two incidents cannot be compared as the circumstances differ, there is a similarity. Initially, police headquarters represented the interests of the wrongdoers, while President Wickremesinghe bent over backwards to retain the man who dispatched the CCD (Colombo Crime Division) team to Weligama, as the IGP. The UNP leader went to the extent of speaking to Chief Justice Jayantha Jayasuriya, PC, and Speaker Mahinda Yapa Abeywardena to push his agenda. There is no dispute the then Public Security Minister Tiran Alles wanted Deshabandu Tennakoon as IGP, regardless of a spate of accusations against him, in addition to him being faulted by the Supreme Court in a high-profile fundamental rights application.

The JVP/NPP must have realised that though the Opposition remained disorganised and ineffective, thanks to the media, particularly social media, a case of transgression, if not addressed swiftly and properly, can develop into a crisis. Action taken by the government to protect Ranwala is a case in point. Government leaders must have heaved a sigh of relief as Ranwala is no longer the Speaker when he drove a jeep recklessly and collided with a motorcycle and a car.

Major cases, key developments

Instead of addressing public concerns, the government sought to suppress the truth by manipulating and exploiting developments

* The release of 323 containers from the Colombo Port, in January 2025, is a case in point. The issue at hand is whether the powers that be took advantage of the port congestion to clear ‘red-flagged’ containers.

Although the Customs repeatedly declared that they did nothing wrong and such releases were resorted even during Ranil Wickremesinghe’s presidency (July 2022 to September 2024), the public won’t buy that. Container issue remains a mystery. That controversy eroded public confidence in the NPP that vowed 100 percent transparency in all its dealings. But the way the current dispensation handled the Port congestion proved that transparency must be the last thing in the minds of the JVPers/NPPers holding office.

* The JVP/NPP’s much touted all-out anti-corruption stand suffered a debilitating blow over their failure to finalise the appointment of a new Auditor General. In spite of the Opposition, the civil society, and the media, vigorously taking up this issue, the government continued to hold up the appointment by irresponsibly pushing for an appointment acceptable to President Dissanayake. The JVP/NPP is certainly pursuing a strategy contrary to what it preached while in the Opposition and found fault with successive governments for trying to manipulate the AG. It would be pertinent to mention that President Dissanayake should accept the responsibility for the inordinate delay in proposing a suitable person to that position. The government failed to get the approval of the Constitutional Council more than once to install a favourite of theirs in it, thanks to the forthright position taken by its civil society representatives.

The government should be ashamed of its disgraceful effort to bring the Office of the Auditor General under its thumb:

* The JVP/NPP government’s hotly disputed decision to procure 1,775 brand-new double cab pickup trucks, at a staggering cost exceeding Rs. 12,500 mn, under controversial circumstances, exposed the duplicity of that party that painted all other political parties black. Would the government rethink the double cab deal, especially in the wake of economic ruination caused by Cyclone Ditwah? The top leadership seems to be determined to proceed with their original plans, regardless of immeasurable losses caused by Cyclone Ditwah. Post-cyclone efforts still remain at a nascent stage with the government putting on a brave face. The top leadership has turned a blind eye to the overwhelming challenge in getting the country back on track especially against the backdrop of its agreement with the IMF.

Post-Cyclone Ditwah recovery process is going to be slow and extremely painful. Unfortunately, both the government and the Opposition are hell-bent on exploiting the miserable conditions experienced by its hapless victims. The government is yet to acknowledge that it could have faced the crisis much better if it acted on the warning issued by Met Department Chief Athula Karunanayake on 12 November, two weeks before the cyclone struck.

Foreign policy dilemma

Sri Lanka moved further closer to India and the US this year as President Dissanayake entered into several new agreements with them. In spite of criticism, seven Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs), including one on defence, remains confidential. What are they hiding?

Within weeks after signing of the seven MoUs, India bought the controlling interests in the Colombo Dockyard Limited for USD 52 mn.

Although some Opposition members, representing the SJB, raised the issue, their leader Sajith Premadasa, during a subsequent visit to New Delhi, indicated he wouldn’t, under any circumstances, raise such a contentious issue.

Premadasa went a step further. The SJB leader assured his unwavering commitment to the full implementation of the 13th Amendment to the Constitution that was forced on Sri Lanka during President JRJ’s administration, under the highly questionable Indo-Lanka Accord of July, 1987, after the infamous parippu drop by Indian military aircraft over Jaffna, their version of the old gunboat diplomacy practiced by the West.

Both India and the US consolidated their position here further in the post-Aragalaya period. Those who felt that the JVP would be in a collision course with them must have been quite surprised by the turn of events and the way post-Aragalaya Sri Lanka leaned towards the US-India combine with not a hum from our carboard revolutionaries now installed in power. They certainly know which side of the bread is buttered. Sri Lanka’s economic deterioration, and the 2023 agreement with the IMF, had tied up the country with the US-led bloc.

In spite of India still procuring large quantities of Russian crude oil and its refusal to condemn Russia over the conflict in Ukraine, New Delhi has obviously reached consensus with the US on a long-term partnership to meet the formidable Chinese challenge. Both countries feel each other’s support is incalculably vital and indispensable.

Sri Lanka, India, and Japan, in May 2019, signed a Memorandum of Cooperation (MoC) to jointly develop the East Container Terminal (ECT) at the Colombo Port. That was during the tail end of the Yahapalana administration. The Gotabaya Rajapaksa administration wanted to take that project forward. But trade unions, spearheaded by the JVP/NPP combine, thwarted a tripartite agreement on the basis that they opposed privatisation of the Colombo Port at any level.

But, the Colombo West International Terminal (CWIT) project, that was launched in November, 2022, during Ranil Wickremesinghe’s presidency, became fully operational in April this year. The JVP revolutionary tiger has completely changed its stripes regarding foreign investments and privatisation. If the JVP remained committed to its previous strategies, India taking over CDL or CWIT would have been unrealistic.

The failure on the part of the government to reveal its stand on visits by foreign research vessels to ports here underscored the intensity of US and Indian pressure. Hope our readers remember how US and India compelled the then President Wickremesinghe to announce a one-year moratorium on such visits. In line with that decision Sri Lanka declared research vessels wouldn’t be allowed here during 2024. The NPP that succeeded Wickremesinghe’s administration in September, 2024, is yet to take a decision on foreign research vessels. What a pity?

The NPP ends the year on the back foot, struggling to cope up with daunting challenges, both domestic and external. The recent revelation of direct Indian intervention in the 2022 regime change project here along with the US underscored the gravity of the situation and developing challenges. Post-cyclone period will facilitate further Indian and US interventions for obvious reasons.

****

Perhaps one of the most debated events in 2025 was the opening of ‘City of Dreams Sri Lanka’ that included, what the investors called, a world-class casino. In spite of mega Bollywood star Shah Rukh Khan’s unexpected decision to pull out of the grand opening on 02 August, the investors went ahead with the restricted event. The Chief Guest was President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, who is also the Finance Minister, in addition to being the Defence Minister. Among the other notable invitees were Dissanayake’s predecessor Ranil Wickremesinghe, whose administration gave critical support to the high-profile project, worth over USD 1.2 bn. John Keells Holdings PLC (JKH) and Melco Resorts & Entertainment (Melco) invested in the project that also consist of the luxurious Nüwa hotel and a premium shopping mall. Who would have thought President Dissanayake’s participation, even remotely, possible, against the backdrop of his strong past public opposition to gambling of any kind?

Don’t forget ‘City of Dreams’ received a license to operate for a period of 20 years. Definitely an unprecedented situation. Although that license had been issued by the Wickremesinghe administration, the NPP, or any other political party represented in Parliament, didn’t speak publicly about that matter. Interesting, isn’t it, coming from people, still referred by influential sections of the Western media, as avowed Marxists?

By Shamindra Ferdinando

Midweek Review

The Aesthetics and the Visual Politics of an Artisanal Community

Published

17 hours ago

2025/12/24

Sahan Weerasooriya

Through the Eyes of the Patua:

Organised by the Colombo Institute for Human Sciences in collaboration with Millennium Art Contemporary, an interesting and unique exhibition got underway in the latter’s gallery in Millennium City, Oruwala on 21 December 2025. The exhibition is titled, ‘Through the Eyes of the Patua: Ramayana Paintings of an Artisanal Community’ and was organized in parallel with the conference that was held on 20 December 2025 under the theme, ‘Move Your Shadow: Rediscovering Ravana, Forms of Resistance and Alternative Universes in the Tellings of the Ramayana.’ The scrolls on display at the gallery are part of the over 100 scrolls in the collection of Colombo Institute’s ‘Roma Chatterji Patua Scroll Collection.’ Prof Chatterji, who taught Sociology at University of Delhi and at present teaches at Shiv Nadar University donated the scrolls to the Colombo Institute in 2024.

The paintings on display are what might be called narrative scrolls that are often over ten feet long. Each scroll narrates a story, with separate panels pictorially depicting one component of a story. The Patuas or the Chitrakars, as they are also known, are traditionally bards. A bard will sing the story that is depicted by each scroll which is simultaneously unfurled. For Sri Lankan viewers for whom the paintings and their contexts of production and use would be unusual and unfamiliar, the best way to understand them is to consider them as a comic strip. In the case of the ongoing exhibition, since the bards or the live songs are not a part of it, the word and voice elements are missing. However, the curators have endeavoured to address this gap by displaying a series of video presentations of the songs, how they are performed and the history of the Patuas as part of the exhibition itself.

The unfamiliarity of the art on display and their histories, necessitates broader explanation. The Patua hail from Medinipur District of West Bengal in India. Essentially, this community of artisans are traditional painters and singers who compose stories based on sacred texts such as the Ramayana or Mahabharata as well as secular events that can vary from the bombing of the Twin Towers in New York in 2001 to the Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004. Even though painted storytelling is done by a number of traditional artisan groups in India, the Patua is the only community where performers and artists belong to the same group. Hence, Professor Chatterji, in her curatorial note for the exhibition calls them “the original multi-media performers in Bengal.”

‘The story of the Patuas’ also is an account of what happens to such artisanal communities in contemporary times in South Asia more broadly even though this specific story is from India. There was a time before the 21st century when such communities were living and working across a large part of eastern India – each group with a claim to their recognizably unique style of painting. However, at the present time, this community and their vocation is limited to areas such as Medinipur, Birbhum, Purulia in West Bengal and Dumka in Jharkhand.

A pertinent question is how the scroll painters from Medinipur have survived the vagaries of time when others have not. Professor Chatterji provides an important clue when she notes that these painters, “unlike their counterparts elsewhere, are also extremely responsive to political events.” As such, “apart from a rich repertoire of stories based on myth and folklore, including the Ramayana and other epics, they have, over many years, also composed on themes that range from events of local or national significance such as boat accidents and communal violence to global events such as the tsunami and the attack on the World Trade Centre.”

There is another interesting aspect that becomes evident when one looks into the socio-cultural background of this community. As Professor Chatterji writes, “one significant feature that gives a distinct flavour to their stories is the fact that a majority of Chitrakars consider themselves to be Muslims but perform stories based largely on Hindu myths.” In this sense, their story complicates the tension-ridden dichotomies between ethno-cultural and religious groups typical of relations between groups in India as well as more broadly in South Asia, including in Sri Lanka. Prof Chatterji suggests this positionality allows the Patua to have “a truly secular voice so vital in the world that we live in today.”

As a result, she notes, contemporary Patuas “have propagated the message of communal harmony in their compositions in the context of the recent riots in India and the Gulf War. Their commentaries couched in the language of myth are profoundly symbolic and draw on a rich oral tradition of storytelling.” What is even more important is their “engagement with contemporary issues also inflects their aesthetics” because many of these painters also “experiment with novel painterly values inspired by recent interaction with new media such as comic books and with folk art forms from other parts of the country.”

From this varied repertoire of the Patuas’ painterly tradition, this exhibition focusses on scrolls portraying different aspects of the Ramayana. In North Indian and the more dominant renditions of the Ramayana, the focus is on Rama while in many alternate renditions this shifts to Ravana as typified by versions popular among the Sinhalas and Tamils in Sri Lanka as well as in some areas in several Indian states. Compared to this, the Patua renditions in the exhibition mostly illustrate the abduction of Sita with a pronounced focus on Sita and not on Ravana, the conventional antagonist or on Rama, the conventional protagonist. As a result, these two traditional male colossuses are distant. Moreover, with the focus on Sita, these folk renditions also bring to the fore other figures directly associated with her such as her sons Luv and Kush in the act of capturing Rama’s victory horse as well as Lakshmana.

Interestingly, almost as a counter narrative, which also serves as a comparison to these Ramayana scrolls, the exhibition also presents three scrolls known as ‘bin-Laden Patas’ depicting different renditions on the attack on New York’s Twin Towers.

While the painted scrolls in this collection have been exhibited thrice in India, this is the first time they are being exhibited in Sri Lanka, and it is quite likely such paintings from any community beyond Sri Lanka’s shores were not available for viewing in the country before this. Organised with no diplomatic or political affiliation and purely as a Sri Lankan cultural effort with broader South Asian interest, it is definitely worth a visit. The exhibition will run until 10 January 2026.