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Left, Right … or Forward?

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The Post-Neoliberal Crisis

The recent historical record of the political centre-right is not particularly impressive. To define the centre-right in this contemporary period, it may be distinguished from the traditional conservatism of D. S. Senanayake, whose philosophy more closely resembled Stanley Baldwin’s “One Nation” conservatism than the neoliberal turn of his successors.

The United National Party (UNP) was conceived as a liberal-conservative party. Senanayake and his contemporaries articulated a moderate, pragmatic brand of conservatism distinct from today’s mainstream centre-right. Liberal conservatism emphasised the state’s role as an instrument of nation-building while respecting and sustaining cultural traditions and social norms. Intellectually, it drew on Edmund Burke, Alexis de Tocqueville, and the classical economic foundations of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and John Stuart Mill, figures who tempered markets with moral order, gradual reform, and social stability.

A section of the Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB), now Sri Lanka’s main Liberal party, seems inclined towards a renewal or regeneration of the ‘right-wing’ or ‘centre-right’ of our politics; a “unite the right” movement from within. There is also a broader, external elite-liberal project to launch a joint-venture between the SJB and the UNP aiming for a more cosmopolitan and “business-friendly” party.

This is not an outlandish strategy, to frame the SJB as a centre-right antidote to the lacklustre performance of the National People’s Power (NPP) “left-progressive” government. Liberal parties like the SJB typically contain multiple factions: traditionalists, progressives, pro-business lobbies, unions, and activists; all contesting to define an ideological centre from which a politics of some value might emanate.

What began in 1977 as a bold experiment of liberalisation, gradually evolved into a system of privilege and exemptions. Instead of fostering competitive industrialisation, successive governments entrenched versions of a “license raj”, with multi-decade, unconditional protections for industries, generous tax holidays sometimes spanning 30 years, with no overarching strategy. The result was not dynamic market competition but elite rent capture, a pattern that work by Tisdell (2000) and Gunatilleke (2012) have described as forms of rentier capitalism, where economic policy served the interests of a small group rather than broader development.

This article seeks to argue that a realignment to the right or left will neither clarify the SJB’s ideology nor inspire its base and attract new supporters. Instead, Sri Lanka requires a party and an opposition of Progressive Centrism, a middle path that rejects both neoliberal retrenchment and populist overreach, without becoming a Clintonian/ Blairite ‘third way’ compromise.

 A Hegemonic Discourse

The global centre-right has long since shifted decisively away from Senanayake’s style of liberal conservatism and toward Ranil Wickremesinghe’s neoliberalism. Stanley Baldwin was British Prime Minister three times during the interwar period, pursuing policies to install or expand unemployment insurance schemes, pensions, housing, and even maternal health services. Under D.S. Senanayake, the newly independent Ceylon carried forward many features of the colonial-era social contract, institutionalising agrarian reforms by broadening land access, expanding the rice subsidy guarantee and investing in public goods.

By contrast, the UNP’s centre-right evolution was formalised in the 1990s by its joining the International Democratic Union, becoming an ideological partner of Thatcherism and Reaganomics, reflecting the broader global political takeover of the centre-right by the forces of neoliberalism.

For a sober, structural definition and analysis of this concept, take David Harvey’s ‘A Brief History of Neoliberalism’ (2005): “Neoliberalism is … a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterised by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade… The role of the state is to create and preserve the institutional framework appropriate to such practices…It must … set up those… legal structures and functions required to secure private property rights and to guarantee, by force if need be, the proper functioning of markets”.

 Harvey is precise in his definition of the role of the State; limited to the generating and preserving of institutions that safeguard the market and further, goes on to state that where markets don’t yet exist, such as in land, water, health, education, the State may create them. Once created, these markets must not be interfered with because governments cannot possibly hope to “out-perform market signals”.

 Susan George’s 1999 speech titled ‘A Short History of Neoliberalism’ (delivered at the ‘Conference on Economic Sovereignty in a Globalising World’ in Bangkok) describes the movement as an ideological project disguised as technical economics, designed to expand the power of markets and corporations while shrinking the State’s role in welfare and redistribution.

Sri Lanka rightly opted for liberalisation in 1977 to spur industrial growth and exports, yet the benefits were unevenly distributed, inequality increased and social protections lagged. Several studies confirm that while liberalisation spurred growth, it failed to deliver inclusive outcomes, especially in poorer and rural areas. For instance, S. Perera et al analyse trade liberalisation’s effects on welfare in South Asia, with specific reference to Sri Lanka, and find that gains largely bypassed rural and estate-sector households, reinforcing income disparities.

Dunham & Kelegama (1995) argue that it was only under President Ranasinghe Premadasa (1989–1993) that liberalisation was fully realised through a “second wave.” This period is praised for its dual approach: combining export-oriented liberalisation with targeted subsidies, welfare expansion, and poverty alleviation. Premadasa’s policies, described by Amaratunga (1999) as a “middle path,” represented a pragmatic model of balancing market reforms with social protections to stabilise growth and broaden its reach.

 Progressive Centrism

Much of Sri Lanka’s economic structural issues such as low tax to GDP, external debt for consumption, a significant ISB Portfolio, a deindustrialising external sector, decades of low investments in health and education, poor quality public services; all reflect outcomes of neoliberalism in other countries.

The SJB’s 2024 manifesto, the Blueprint, explicitly sought to frame a social market economy: capitalism with a human face, growth with equity. It was part of the SJBs evolution and point of departure, from the neoliberalism of the UNP; a more moderate political positioning. The Blueprint emphasised global production value chains (GVCs), FDI in high-technology manufacturing, and intellectual, physical and soft infrastructure for long-term competitiveness.

Progressive centrism will go further, insisting on coupling market dynamism with welfare systems designed for churn, not dependency; recipients must exit as new ones enter, ensuring turnover. Rather than retreating into austerity and orthodoxy, the SJB should support or sponsor legislation that reforms social assistance programs: cash-transfers, subsidies, and training, but with time-bound, hybrid welfare systems that build skills and compulsory savings, creating pathways out of dependency.

This is not utopian: large countries with complex societies, like Brazil and Mexico, have pioneered such models. Brazil’s Bolsa Família, a conditional cash transfer tied to school attendance, vaccinations, training, and micro-credit, lifted over 20 million people out of poverty. But Sri Lankan policymakers need not look as far as South America because the 1989 Janasaviya programme was one of the region’s first hybrid welfare schemes, linking transfers to savings and income-generation.

Launched by President Ranasinghe Premadasa, the Janasaviya programme (1989–1995) emerged as an ambitious poverty alleviation scheme that combined consumption support with a compulsory savings transfer to finance small-scale income-generating projects. Janasaviya was similar in spirit to today’s “graduation” models that link cash assistance to skills, training, and asset-building. High administrative costs led to Janasaviya’s replacement by Samurdhi in 1995, an entirely consumption-oriented transfer program that persists to this day under a different name, Aswesuma, with no graduation-linked policies.

A 2013 nationwide analysis published in The Lancet found that Brazil’s Bolsa Família conditional cash transfer (CCT) reduced child mortality from malnutrition, evidence that cash plus health/education conditionalities translate into real survival gains. Lancet Public Health (2025) estimates the programme prevented 713,000 deaths and 8.2 million hospitalisations between 2004-2019.

In Mexico, the PROGRESA/Oportunidades CCT raised preventive health visits and schooling in rigorously evaluated pilots that later informed national rollout. In Indonesia, evidence shows that Program Keluarga Harapan (PKH), a 2007 national CCT program, sustained gains in incentivised health and education behaviours even six years after launch.

These are not isolated cases, successful experiences are documented around the world from the Philippines to Ethiopia, but policy design matters, not just the quantum of investment.

 Sri Lanka exhibits the worst of all worlds, grossly under-funded, poorly-targeted transfer programs with rudimentary design. Progressive Centrism treats such public policy as instruments to deliver focused solutions instead of ideological radio transmissions. It represents a middle-path treatment of ideology, philosophy and thus public policy rather than a compromise between two sides of the spectrum.

 The Economic Middle-Path

Sri Lanka’s universities face well-documented challenges: oversubscription in arts and social sciences, limited STEM output (World Bank 2020), chronic underfunding, as well as entrenched issues like ragging and harassment. Quite apart from cultural and structural issues, Sri Lanka also exhibits a uniquely active, politically organised student population, with mobilisation capabilities at scale and official integration with established political parties.

This extreme politicisation of student unions is presented as a major obstacle to national progress, take two common issues: (1) The resistance to private higher-education institutions, and (2) The demand and pressure for state employment, post-graduation. Should we dispel these complaints as part of Sri Lanka’s so-called entitlement culture, or should we first try to understand the arguments?

Student activists correctly note that as the state under-invests in the public system, more private institutions are licensed, many unaffordable to low and middle-income families.

An OECD study from 2017 shows that families often take on debt or liquidate assets to afford tuition; an Indian study (Tilak 2020) suggests that expansions of private systems of education without simultaneous expansion of public sector capacity, inevitably leads to inequality and discrimination of access.

Research suggests that demand for public-sector jobs is partly driven by weak labor markets as much as skills-mismatches, which is certainly a major factor. When private sector jobs are scarce or low-paying, or do not provide pensions and job security, public employment becomes the safe and rational choice.

An IMF Report from 2014 notes this dynamic in developing countries; demand for public-sector jobs signal weak or under-developed private sector labor absorption.

A progressive centrist approach would recognize the validity of these grievances while charting reforms and policies: state-backed, contributory pension schemes to make private employment more attractive, or targeted social infrastructure, such as the state-funded childcare proposal modelled by Verité Research (2021), to ease labor force participation.

India’s 2004 National Pension System (NPS) offers a useful contrast. The NPS is a portable, state-backed defined-contribution scheme open to both public and private sector workers, and even the self-employed. It provides flexibility in investment choices and crucially converts part of the savings into annuities at retirement, ensuring lifelong income security.

Sri Lanka’s Employees’ Provident Fund (EPF) and Employees’ Trust Fund (ETF), while portable across jobs in the formal sector, are limited to lump-sum withdrawals at retirement, with little flexibility, no annuity guarantee, and restricted coverage and excludes most of the informal workforce.

Ideological Caricatures 

Industrial Policy and Export Promotion have succeeded spectacularly in many economies but as policy-making tools, they require radical departures from an orthodoxy that is uncomfortable with the State picking “winners and losers”. This is a fallacy because most often, successful industrial policies are implemented in a context of strong market signals.

In the 1970s, South Korean conglomerates like Samsung and Hyundai identified semiconductors as vital to their survival and global competitiveness. Lacking the scale and technology to enter the industry alone, they worked with the government to secure targeted subsidies, tax breaks, development finance, and R&D support. By the 1990s, South Korea had become a global leader in DRAM chips, with Samsung and SK Hynix now dominating the semiconductor supply chain.

Such industrial policy, often dismissed as “statist” or “interventionist,” was in fact central to the growth trajectories of Germany, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Vietnam, and China. These ideas have been around since Friedrich List and Alexander Hamilton, who argued that markets and states must work together to nurture strategic domesticated industries.

 The welfare state, likewise miscast as leftist, was forged in the post-WWII consensus when liberals and conservatives alike recognised redistribution as essential for stability and civic trust. From John Stuart Mill’s support for inheritance taxes to Friedrich Hayek’s acceptance of limited welfare. Today even the IMF and World Bank stress social safety nets (SSNs) and cash transfers, as foundations for sustainable growth; even the IMF has evolved, so should Sri Lanka’s policymakers.

By Kusum Wijetilleke ✍️



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Opinion

IMF’s failure to tackle corruption in Sri Lanka

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Anti-corruption and governance reforms are central pillars of Sri Lanka’s $2.9 billion bailout agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This was the first time in Asia that an IMF programme was explicitly linked to a comprehensive anti-corruption diagnostic and specific legislative measures.

At the press conference announcing the deal, Senior Mission Chief Peter Breuer said that the IMF had emphasised that anti-corruption and governance reforms are central pillars of the programme. He added that the IMF would subject Sri Lanka to a comprehensive governance diagnostic exercise, making it the first Asian economy to undergo such an exercise, which will assess corruption and governance vulnerabilities in Sri Lanka and provide prioritised and sequenced recommendations. “Sri Lanka will be the first country in Asia to undergo a governance diagnostic exercise by the IMF. We look forward to further engagement and collaboration with stakeholders and civil society organisations on this critical reform area,” the IMF official said.

An extract from the Technical Assistance Report on Governance Diagnostic Assessment, Sri Lanka  (September 30, 2023) is as follows; “The report highlights immediate and short-term measures to address key corruption issues, as well as structural reforms that require more time and resources but are essential to strengthen governance and initiate lasting change. The recommendations are designed as a coherent approach to improving governance through a focus on: clarity of authority and responsibility for core functions; financial and operational independence of essential accountability and law enforcement institutions; transparency in government practices and performance, especially relating to the planning, spending, and accounting for the use of public funds and assets; inclusive, accessible, and rule-based means to enforce private agreements and challenge official behaviour; and efficient mechanisms for making information public and holding organisations and individuals to account for their performance and behaviour”.

Further, the agreement required Sri Lanka to implement several specific, actionable measures to curb corruption vulnerabilities:

New Anti-Corruption Legislation: The government passed the landmark Anti-Corruption Act in 2023, which expanded the powers of the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC), required electoral candidates and officials to declare their assets, and introduced protections for whistleblowers.

Fiscal and Procurement Reforms: The IMF programme included commitments to improve public financial management, increase tax transparency, and advance public procurement laws to eliminate political interference and cronyism in government contracts.

The IMF Executive Board is supposed to continuously track these anti-corruption and governance benchmarks during its periodic programme reviews to ensure compliance. The IMF officials’ last visit to Sri Lanka was from March 26th to April 9th when they reviewed the progress of the programme, decided that it was going well and approved the release of the final tranche. Their statement did not carry any reference to the activities of the government regarding control of corruption.

The Letter of Intent submitted by the government at the conclusion of the review becomes relevant under these circumstances. It was officially released on May 29, 2026. One of the critical undertakings by the government, according to the Letter of Intent, relates to cost-recovery pricing, the government has reaffirmed its commitment to maintaining cost-recovery pricing for fuel and electricity.

Going by available communications, apparently the IMF has not inquired into what caused the increase of cost of production of electricity. Cost of electricity production has gone up due to increased use of diesel, as low quality coal is not producing the required amounts. The coal that has been recently imported has been found to be of low quality and the government has said the losses due to this misadventure will not be shifted to the people. The irregularities in the coal procurement process that has happened recently is no secret, the Auditor General’s report has pointed out the flaws in the said procedure. Ironically, the IMF programme highlights the need to have fool proof procurement and tender procedures, and emphasises “holding organisations and individuals to account for their performance and behaviour” as the above quoted Technical Assistance Report mentions, yet it is silent on this matter showing its lack of responsibility. And it wants cost-recovery pricing for electricity! This may be taken as proof that the IMF is not very much concerned about the plight of the poor.

Further, these policies and recommendations of the IMF may substantiate the accusations made by left oriented organisations that the IMF insists on austerity measures, often at the expense of welfare expenditure, in order to serve neoliberalism. The clauses on corruption control in its agreement with the government appear to be mere lip service and window dressing. If no follow-up action is taken on these requirements, such clauses have no meaning and serve no useful purpose. If it is a responsible organisation, the IMF should have called for an impartial inquiry into the coal procurement procedure, for it is mandated to ensure transparency and integrity in these procedures. Moreover, if it is concerned about the welfare of the public it should not have asked for cost-recovery pricing of electricity when the reason for the increased cost could be corruption. Instead of going into the matter of corruption the IMF asks the government to recover the losses from the people. Cannot it think of a fairer means of recovering these losses instead of burdening the already impoverished people?

Thus, the question arises whether the IMF is a tool of imperialism. Many critics, particularly in the Global South, argue that the IMF functions as an instrument of financial imperialism or neo-colonialism. Structural Adjustment Programmes of the IMF ties its emergency loans to strict conditions like austerity, privatisation, and deregulation. Critics argue these demands dismantle local welfare systems, strip developing nations of their sovereignty, and open their markets to exploitation by multinational corporations. Further, the wealthy nations, particularly the United States and European powers, hold the majority of voting shares and effectively control the institution, dictating economic policy to weaker states. Critics claim that IMF-mandated currency devaluations artificially lower the cost of raw materials and natural resources in developing countries, benefiting wealthy creditor nations which amount to resource extraction.

Another matter of concern is that the interest rate for IMF loans to Sri Lanka, contrary to common belief that it is concessionary, is 5% which is pretty high and may be unbearable to a poor country like Sri Lanka. The country was in a woeful state in 2022 and was forced to declare bankruptcy, and seek IMF assistance. If we seriously examine the cause of this economic disaster, we will see that it was due to the economic policies the country had been following since independence. We import more than we export and take loans to meet the shortfall. This practice has gone on and on and is continued at present. No government, including the present one, despite its left leaning claims, had attempted to correct this colossal mistake. Our debt burden is frightening, less said about it the better.

The obvious solution to this problem would have been to achieve self-sufficiency in our essential needs, like food, and reduce reliance on imports. Most of our needs in food and other essentials could be locally produced. The IMF may not recommend such a course of action. It would want us to remain a poor country, struggling in the vicious cycle of import-export-debt quagmire.

by N. A. de S. Amaratunga

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When the decisive vote changes hands: Sri Lanka’s next electoral shift may already be underway

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In the summer of 1789, as the French Revolution gathered momentum, delegates of the National Assembly assembled in Versailles to debate the future of France. The seating arrangement inside the chamber was not planned to shape political vocabulary for centuries to come. Yet it did. Those who favoured sweeping political change, greater equality, and the dismantling of inherited privilege gravitated to the left side of the hall. Those who defended the monarchy, established institutions, and traditional social hierarchies took their seats on the right. What began as a matter of convenience soon became a political metaphor. More than two centuries later, we still speak of the “left” and the “right” to describe competing visions of society.

Since then, the terms have evolved and acquired different meanings across countries and historical periods. Yet, the broad distinction remains remarkably durable. Ideologies associated with the left generally place greater emphasis on social, political, and economic equality, often advocating a more active role for the state in addressing disparities and expanding collective welfare. Ideologies associated with the right tend to place greater value on tradition, market mechanisms, authority, and various forms of social hierarchy, arguing that stability and prosperity emerge from preserving established institutions and incentives. Most political movements, of course, occupy positions somewhere between these poles, combining elements of both traditions in different proportions.

Few elections have altered the course of Sri Lankan politics as dramatically as the general election of 1977. Sweeping to power with an unprecedented five-sixths majority in Parliament, the United National Party ushered in a new political and economic era under the leadership of J. R. Jayewardene. He would later become the country’s first Executive President under a constitutional framework that vested extensive powers in the office. The changes that followed reflected a decisive move towards market-oriented reforms and a political outlook that leaned more to the right than anything Sri Lanka had previously experienced.

Yet even a political machine as formidable as the UNP’s could not hold power indefinitely. After nearly seventeen years of dominance, its grip on the electorate weakened. In 1994, the pendulum swung once again, bringing Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga. The victory was widely interpreted as a return to a more socially conscious and centre-left political vision.

What followed was not merely a change of government but the emergence of a recurring pattern in Sri Lankan political landscape. Since 1994, governments of varying compositions and personalities have risen to power with crucial support from parties and constituencies positioned on the left of the political spectrum. Whether through formal coalitions, strategic alliances, or ideological influence, the left has often provided the decisive electoral weight needed to secure victory. In many cases, without that support, the arithmetic of power would have looked very different.

Yet it is equally important to recognise what Sri Lanka has not become. Despite the enduring influence of left-wing thought, the country has never embraced an uncompromising far-left political project. Instead, successive governments have largely occupied a centre-left space, balancing market economics with welfare commitments, nationalism with social reform, and political pragmatism with egalitarian aspirations. The result has been a political landscape where power changes hands, parties rise and fall, and personalities dominate headlines, but the centre of gravity remains remarkably leftist. Sri Lanka’s electorate has repeatedly rewarded those who speak the language of social justice, even while stopping short of endorsing political extremes.

One possible explanation for this enduring centre-left tendency lies not in political parties themselves, but in the cultural formation of the electorate. For much of the period between the 1960s and the liberalisation of the economy in 1977–78, Russian literature occupied a prominent place in Sri Lanka’s reading culture. Affordable translations of the works of writers such as Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Gorky, Chekhov and Pushkin circulated widely among students, teachers and ordinary readers. Alongside their literary value, these works exposed generations of Sri Lankans to questions of social justice, class inequality, collective responsibility and the moral obligations of society toward the vulnerable.

By the early 1990s, the generation that had grown up reading this literature had come of age politically. As they entered the electorate in larger numbers, they helped shape the contours of public opinion. Their voting preferences did not necessarily favour revolutionary socialism or radical left-wing politics. Rather, they appeared to support governments that combined commitments to welfare, social protection and egalitarian ideals with the practical realities of governing a developing nation. In this sense, the centre-left orientation that has characterised much of Sri Lanka’s political landscape since 1994 may owe as much to the country’s literary and intellectual culture as to the strategies of political parties themselves.

Yet there is an apparent paradox at the heart of this story. While successive governments often drew legitimacy from centre-left political ideals, their economic policies frequently moved in a different direction. Confronted by fiscal constraints, global economic pressures and shifting geopolitical realities, they operated within an international economic order largely shaped by market-oriented principles. Institutions such as the International Monetary Fund exerted considerable influence over economic policymaking, encouraging reforms associated more closely with liberalisation, fiscal discipline and market efficiency than with traditional left-wing economics.

It was thus a balancing act that defined Sri Lankan governance for decades after 1994: governments elected on promises of social justice and collective welfare, yet compelled to pursue economic strategies shaped by the imperatives of a global market economy. Politically, the country remained centre-left. Economically, it often travelled along a more market-oriented path.

Sri Lanka may have settled its political direction for the next few years, but the next truly decisive moment may arrive closer to 2030. By then, the composition of the electorate will have changed once again. A growing share of voters will belong to Generation Z and Generation Alpha, generations whose intellectual and cultural worlds differ markedly from those that came before them.

If the electorate that emerged in the 1990s was shaped, in part, by the values encountered in Russian literature and a reading culture that emphasised questions of social responsibility, collective welfare and inequality, the generations now entering political maturity have been formed by a different landscape altogether. Their influences are increasingly digital, global and instantaneous, are shaped more by algorithms and by social media feeds, content creators and transnational cultural currents. Many have grown up in a world where entrepreneurship, individual success, innovation and market-driven solutions occupy a far more visible place in public discourse.

This generational shift is unfolding alongside broader transformations in global politics. Across much of the world, including major powers such as the United Kingdom and the United States, contemporary political movements that emphasise markets, national interests, economic competitiveness, and stronger state authority have gained momentum. Whether these trends will find a lasting echo in Sri Lanka remains a question that deserves careful attention, not merely as an electoral matter, but as one intertwined with some of the defining challenges of our time.

Today, concerns of national sovereignty, security, strategic influence and even soft power are increasingly mediated through economic strength and market performance. Nations are judged not only by their political ideals but also by their ability to compete, innovate and secure their place within an interconnected global economy. Sri Lanka, still navigating the aftermath of economic crisis and charting its future development path, finds itself at the centre of these debates.

Against this backdrop, if the decisive vote is gradually passing from a generation shaped by the books that once filled the nation’s shelves to one shaped by the screens that now fill its hands, the question therefore does not simply become who will win the next election. It is whether the intellectual and cultural influences that shaped Sri Lanka’s centre-left political consensus can retain their hold on a new electorate formed by different experiences, different technologies, and different aspirations.

If every era is ultimately defined by the stories it tells itself, what story is the next generation of Sri Lankan voters already beginning to write? Will it move the centre of gravity towards a more market-oriented, centre-right vision? The answer may well determine not only the outcome of future elections, but the ideological direction of Sri Lanka itself.

By Viran Maddumage PhD (Reading), Macquarie University,
and Sanduni Rathnayake, AAL

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For attention of Education Minister

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Reimagining Sri Lanka’s Old Boys’ Unions into Lifelong Alumni Ecosystems A National Call for Ethical Citizenship, Educational Transformation and Social Renewal

For more than a century, Sri Lanka’s schools and colleges have produced generations of citizens who contributed immensely to the nation’s administration, education, medicine, engineering, law, agriculture, business, military service, arts, and leadership. Alongside these institutions emerged Old Boys’ Unions and alumni associations that represented far more than ceremonial organisations. They symbolised loyalty, institutional pride, brotherhood, continuity, and shared values that transcended generations. In many ways, these alumni associations became the emotional and moral extension of school life itself.

However, Sri Lanka now stands at a crossroads. While annual dinners, jubilees, and big matches continue to preserve nostalgia and tradition, many alumni organisations are increasingly struggling to remain relevant to younger generations. The modern world has changed rapidly, yet many alumni systems have remained largely unchanged. Today’s youth face digital disruption, migration pressures, economic uncertainty, social fragmentation, mental stress, and intense competition. As a result, younger alumni increasingly seek practical value from institutional networks through mentorship, career guidance, entrepreneurship support, emotional wellbeing systems, digital networking, and lifelong learning opportunities. Unfortunately, many traditional alumni associations continue functioning mainly as event-driven organisations rather than dynamic ecosystems capable of supporting individuals throughout life.

Globally, leading educational institutions in countries such as Singapore, the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, and India have transformed their alumni organisations into sophisticated lifelong engagement ecosystems. These institutions maintain integrated digital platforms that support graduates from the moment they leave school until retirement and beyond. Their alumni systems provide mentorship, startup incubation, executive education, mental health assistance, professional networking, welfare support, diaspora engagement, retirement communities, and AI-driven alumni management systems. These modern ecosystems have evolved into strategic human capital development platforms that strengthen institutions, economies, and societies.

Sri Lanka possesses one of the strongest school identity cultures in Asia. The emotional attachment Sri Lankans maintain toward their alma mater remains exceptionally powerful even decades after leaving school. This cultural strength presents a historic national opportunity. If properly restructured, professionally governed, digitally transformed, and strategically managed, Sri Lankan alumni associations could become one of the country’s strongest long-term mechanisms for shaping ethical citizenship, reducing corruption, strengthening social cohesion, and nurturing morally grounded future generations.

One of the major weaknesses in modern society is that moral guidance and ethical accountability often decline sharply after formal schooling ends. During school life, students operate within structured environments shaped by discipline, institutional culture, accountability, and values. Yet, once individuals leave school, many gradually disconnect from those value systems and become increasingly exposed to political manipulation, unethical business cultures, social isolation, corruption, and declining civic responsibility. The absence of long-term moral ecosystems contributes significantly to the erosion of social ethics within society.

This is where modern Alumni Ecosystems can play a transformative role. A properly functioning alumni system should not merely preserve memories of the past. It should reinforce ethical citizenship and moral accountability throughout adulthood. Alumni communities can continuously remind individuals where they came from, what values shaped them, and what responsibilities they carry toward society. Such ecosystems can cultivate leadership ethics, civic consciousness, professional integrity, and social responsibility across generations. In this context, alumni associations become not merely educational bodies, but important instruments of national governance and social development.

A well-managed alumni ecosystem can therefore contribute meaningfully toward building a corruption-free society. Ethical peer influence, mentorship from respected senior alumni, intergenerational accountability, and strong institutional identity can discourage unethical behaviour and reinforce integrity in professional and public life. Sri Lanka should envision a future where every student entering adulthood remains connected to a structured lifelong support network. School leavers could receive career guidance and mentorship, entrepreneurs could access ethical business networks and investment opportunities, migrant professionals could reconnect globally through alumni platforms, and retired alumni could continue contributing through mentoring and community service. Elderly alumni could receive welfare support, companionship, and dignity during the later stages of life.

Another important concept is the “1950 Generation Acid Test” for alumni organisations. The true strength of an alumni association should not be measured merely by the number of events conducted or sponsorships obtained. Instead, institutions must ask how many of their oldest surviving alumni — particularly those born around 1950 or earlier — remain actively connected, respected, cared for, and meaningfully engaged by the institution. The demographic profile, wellbeing, engagement, and continued institutional connectivity of the oldest surviving members should be recognized as one of the most important indicators of the true strength, ethical legitimacy, and long-term sustainability of any alumni ecosystem.

Sri Lanka now urgently requires a National Alumni Transformation Framework under the Ministry of Education. Such a framework should modernise alumni constitutions, establish professional alumni offices, digitise databases, introduce transparent governance standards, integrate youth representation, strengthen diaspora engagement, establish welfare and wellness units, and create lifelong mentorship ecosystems. A structured tripartite partnership involving the College Alumni Association, the Principal of the respective college, and the Provincial Education Authorities could become a transformative governance mechanism to ensure continuity, accountability, intergenerational engagement, and value-based citizenship development.

Sri Lanka’s long-term transformation will not be achieved through infrastructure development alone. It will be achieved through people — and people are shaped not only during schooling, but through the lifelong communities they remain connected to afterward. The next decade may therefore determine whether Sri Lanka’s Old Boys’ Unions gradually decline into ceremonial nostalgia-driven organisations or evolve into intelligent, intergenerational Alumni Ecosystems capable of shaping ethical citizenship, corruption-free leadership cultures, and national transformation itself.

by Dammike Kobbekaduwe
FIPM (SL), Member-CIPM (SL), MBA (HRM)Founder Director of the Proprietary Planters Alliance (Pvt) Ltd

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