Connect with us

Politics

In defence of the JVP

Published

on

by Uditha Devapriya

One of the most fascinating things about politics is how a common enemy unites groups that otherwise hold diametrically opposed views. I am not suggesting that the JVP is such an enemy, nor am I implying that their dislike of it has united the SJB and the SLPP. But reading between the tweets, Facebook posts, and even political commentaries, I can only conclude that the resurgence of the JVP has generated a mutual aversion to its policies, personalities, and aspirations. This is intriguing, but by no means is it inexplicable.

While both sides consider the JVP as sectarian, this aversion materialises in different forms and takes on a different character: thus whereas the SJB accuses it of acting as a third-party spoiler against the Opposition, the SLPP accuses it of challenging its policies.

What are we to make of such perceptions? Insofar as the JVP’s attempts to deconstruct the government’s policies are concerned, the SLPP is correct in viewing the party as a challenge. That does not justify the mud supporters of the regime sling at Anura Kumara Dissanayake, but it does provide a rationale, however slight, for such mudslinging.

It’s a different story with the SJB and, to a much lesser extent, the UNP. The gist of their argument, as far as I can make it out, is that the JVP can’t make it on its own at an election. Since this debars it from contending alone, accordingly, it should join a coalition led by the mainstream Opposition. If it does not choose that line, it will split the anti-government vote and enable the SLPP to win again. Thus, the more it dabbles with the idea of going solo, the more counterproductive its campaigns will be for the Opposition.

While this line of reasoning has always surfaced vis-à-vis the JVP whenever a government becomes unpopular, in recent weeks it has unleashed a horde of negative comments against the party. No doubt its resurgence online has contributed to such critiques.

Reading between these comments, one wonders whether SJB supporters are worried about the JVP: one such supporter went as far as to warn that if the latter becomes more sectarian than it is, “there will be a boycott.” The government, of course, faces no such problem: its promoters do not have to contend with the JVP for votes from its traditional bases, though one wonders whether the Rajapaksas will have to fight for support from those fronts in the long term, given their alienation from the SLFP’s peasant and working class roots.

To be fair by the SJB, the argument that the JVP can spoil prospects for a united resistance against the government is partly true. The SJB’s predecessor, the UNP, benefitted not a little from the JVP’s campaign against Sirima Bandaranaike in 1988. This is certainly not to deny the popularity that Ranasinghe Premadasa enjoyed in the run-up to the elections that year. But if the JVP’s tactic of smearing the Opposition is anything to go by, these campaigns have ended up benefiting the status quo more than the resistance.

By no means was this the exception in 1988. Writing to The Island on Christmas Day that year, the columnist Kautilya argued that the benefactor of JVP-instigated violence “was the narrowly winning victor.” I confess this simplifies what was a rather complex situation, since there were, as one analyst contended in Economic and Political Weekly, “reasons to believe that local-level SLFP sympathisers sometimes joined the JVP.” But the underlying conclusion there can’t be denied: the JVP’s violence ultimately tilted the scales against the SLFP, just as the JVP’s rhetoric bolstered the UNP’s prospects a decade earlier.

The situation under yahapalanaya was different. There the JVP had been recognised as part of the official Opposition: its leader happened to be the Chief Opposition Whip. Deprived of any proper standing in parliament, the Mahinda Rajapaksa led Joint Opposition found itself unable to cut ice there; it had to find its base outside the legislature. That paid dividends in 2019 when the slogan of the hour became Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s claim of being a maverick and a newcomer: a claim the JVP could not make.

Krishantha Cooray is only half-correct in his assertion that the UNP’s mistake was “to allow the so-called ‘joint opposition’ to dominate the public discourse on policy matters” – half- correct, because it conveniently lays aside the UNP’s complicity in the Bond Scam and other unpopular measures, a complicity that the present head of the SJB never shared – but he is right in the sense that in ejecting the Joint Opposition and allowing it to gain steam outside, the UNP enabled it to ride over the official Opposition, the TNA.

Identified unfairly with the UNP, the JVP did much to pinpoint and publicise the flaws of the regime. Sunil Handunetti’s chairmanship of COPE enabled the Bond Scam to come out into the public; while certain MPs, many of them later migrating to the SJB, attempted clumsily to insert several footnotes in the COPE Report, Handunetti stuck to his guns and released the report as it stood. The JVP lambasted the UNP’s policies as much as the Joint Opposition did, standing with students protesting against SAITM and with unions protesting against the Port City deal. Yet these moments belonged to the Rajapaksas; despite its laudable critiques of the UNP, the JVP thus had to give way to a more nationalist-populist front.

Neither supporters of this government nor advocates of yahapalanism will admit the role played by the JVP in tarnishing the yahapalana regime’s prospects. That says as much about the popularity of the Rajapaksas as it does about the myopia of those who think that regime was the best we got, and argue as much in column after column. In both instances, the JVP remains forgotten, marginalised, and criminally underappreciated.

My point here is that if the ability to mobilise vast swathes of the population against the government is the litmus test of any opposition party, the JVP has failed to match its policy rhetoric with election results. Since 2005, it has registered an almost terminal decline at the polls, hardly commensurate with the popularity it enjoys among the youth.

The view that an “honest” opposition does not need to win elections – a view supporters of the JVP subscribe to – does not bode well for a party identifying itself with a disenchanted electorate. In politics, numbers matter. Without numbers, any attempt at acting “holier than thou” – a tactic the JVP resorts to so frequently it has become a trademark today – not only fails to generate votes, but also denies counterparts elsewhere crucial support. Perhaps it is this high-strung idealism, bordering on arrogance, that alienates SJB activists. Unfortunately for the JVP, it has not tried to extricate itself from such perceptions, as Anura Dissanayake’s outburst at Sajith Premadasa over the latter’s call for snap elections shows.

Having said that, the assumption that the JVP’s rhetoric impairs the SJB’s prospects as the country’s main Opposition is flawed and, to me, smacks of partisanship. It is no small irony that political activists trying their best to bring down the government can, in the same vein, denigrate the decisions and stances of a party that, for all the disenchantment the people had with this regime in the wake of the first wave last year, received only three percent of the vote at the general election. To denigrate such a party even subtly indicates, in the first instance, a fear of that party – hardly becoming of an Opposition attempting to pose as an alternative to the regime – and, in the second, a confidence in the main Opposition’s ability to unify disgruntled sections of the population against this regime.

To consider the SJB as somehow being more unified than the JVP is of course to overlook the reality. The SJB is presently suffering from a twin paradox: between its modest size and the scale of the divisions raging in it on the one hand, and between its break from the UNP and its response to the UNP’s return to parliament on the other.

The height of its confused relations with the UNP surfaced the other day, on Twitter, when certain SJB MPs alleged, then quickly withdrew the allegation, that UNP officials connived to delay investigations by the previous regime into the Lasantha Wickrematunge murder. Such confusions to me reflect a deeper problem: the SJB is yet to evolve an identity that can help it stand out and apart. Indeed, while publicly rejecting its UNP heritage, not a few of its MPs tout policies no different to the neoliberal prescriptions of the mother party.

That this remains the case despite Sajith Premadasa’s attempts to reach out to social groups alienated by the policies of the previous regime, despite a shift among some SJB MPs from adherence to orthodox theory to calls for populist measures, and despite a debate that has sprung up over economic policy within SJB circles (a debate in which Dayan Jayatilleka and Kusum Wijetilleke, among others, have made commendable interventions), should inform us that while there are many terms one can use to describe the SJB, “unified” is not among them.

The end-result has been dismally clear: people no longer distinguish between the old party and the new; nor, indeed, between the government and the opposition.

It is this, primarily, that has bolstered support for the JVP. While I remain sceptical over whether its resurgence can translate into actual votes, it is clear that disenchantment with the government’s policies has made a third option – which is what the JVP has historically been – preferable to a mainstream Opposition. Instead from attacking the JVP’s insularity, hence, SJB activists should find out why anger against the regime has turned its critics, not to a mainstream party as is typically the case, but to a party whose identity remains to the left and decidedly to the left of mainstream Opposition MPs.

There are many valid critiques that can be made about the JVP. I have made them, in this column and elsewhere, again and again. But to bemoan its decision to play the game alone, without finding out why the SJB has been unable to summon as much firepower, even after all these months, is to me unfair, unjust, and counterproductive. The way out for the SJB lies neither in demeaning the JVP nor in returning to the UNP, but rather in charting an ideology that squares with the interests of the country and the aspirations of its people.

The writer can be reached at udakdev1@gmail.com



Continue Reading
Click to comment

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Politics

President’s Dinner for his Old Comrades

Published

on

The President and Commander in Chief HE Gotabaya Rajapakse invited 186 of his old military comrades and their ladies for dinner at President’s House on Dec. 22, 2021. For a media that lives on gossip, this was manna.

A Sunday paper (not the Island) on 26 Dec reported the invitees numbered 1,050.The figure was specific. Many readers were, as expected, duped to believe it. Added on was that ‘drinks’ too were served as though that was news. No detailed description of the menu was given as has happened before for reasons that will be a revelation. Was it to show profligacy which was news? The Sunday Island of Dec. 2, 2021 had a news item by Dayan Jayatilleka that went one better. He increased the figure to a smarter 1,090. Those made a lie look like the truth. It was meant to be so. No questions were asked as to sources.

The Dec. 26 Sunday paper also had a dig at the organizers. Apparently a few had turned down the invitation. That was curious as the invitations were sent only to those who confirmed verbal enquiries as to their attendance. It may have been that after accepting the invitation a few old sweats, officers and gentlemen it is said they had been, were churlish enough to avoid attendance at the C in C’s dinner. Were they the same fellows, who being absent from the scene, did the counting of heads too?

Jayatilleka went further. He thought there was something odd if not sinister in the exercise. He believed 1,090 ‘senior military men, serving and retired’ attended. He asked readers not to continue reading if they did not believe that the invitations had been sent with some ulterior motive. The suggestion was that the dinner was not a ‘sociable, benign gesture of a year-end party’. It obviously worried him that good and normal men in SL would have thought differently and questioned the assumption.

To begin with his facts were absolutely cock eyed. The cooked figures he had been served (1,090) by someone who was possibly not at the dinner, clearly supported his fertile imagination. He probably thought a mere 186 officers at dinner would not be enough to invent a rollicking fairy tale.

The only serving officers present were the tri services commanders. With their spouses a round figure of 400 invitees could have been closer to the truth. All the others were veterans aged 70 years and above, some disabled. A few were 90 years old and were in wheel chairs.

Now what did Jayatilleka a former minister in the EPRLF that was a IPKF stooge that made a Unilateral Declaration of Independence in the late1990s, think the doddering old and but still bold 186 could have been up to? It certainly helped to propel his latest onslaughts on the fanciful ‘militarization’ of the nation. Was it also to mark up points with the West, just in case?

So how did the ‘gala’ dinner go? First of all male guests in smart casual (tie), and their ladies in sarees, arrived well in time as is the norm among servicemen. They were given antigen tests by a team of medics before gathering in the manicured garden where the military bands played some lively music.

Old comrades reminisced with their friends, many after decades and two years of Covid. Everyone was refreshingly relaxed. Many recalled long forgotten incidents, hilarious mishaps mostly, and extraordinary characters they served with. Many heroes were present but stories of daring and battle were not recounted here. The missing was not forgotten.

As at any military social function, not a word of politics was heard. No one pulled rank. When the C in C came and graciously mixed with his guests, all older than him, no one in the best of service traditions and etiquette forgot who he, the C in C, was. He knew and called all of them by their first names. He seemed as happy as his guests were, to meet simply as old comrades, exchange greetings and enjoy themselves. There were no speeches.

A splendid buffet dinner followed.

Here was the first old soldier who had become the elected President and C in C of SL. He was now among old friends. They all thanked and wished him and his lady the very best in the challenging year to come.

People who will never know what military comradeship is should not waste their time trying to question the motives of a C in C in inviting his old comrades to dinner. It was the first ever in SL history. There was nothing ‘gala’ either, as anyone who was inveigled by his ‘informant’ may have believed. Such people should try not to judge others by their standards, be mean and gullible and should not to circulate worn out tales or have recurring nightmares about ‘militarization’.

Old soldiers never die; they only fade away, even from the President’s House. God only knows what happens to mercenaries and tale carriers.

Dinner guest

Continue Reading

Politics

DE-CODING THE AKD-JVP-NPP RELATIONSHIP

Published

on

DR. DAYAN JAYATILLEKA

The JVP-NPP is prominent in the struggle against the presidential system–while permitting speculation that Anura Kumara Dissanayake will be the presidential candidate—and in the vanguard in the struggle against corruption.

Whether it realizes it or not, it is being hypocritical—not because of that duality–and so too are those who support them on those grounds.

The reason is simple and self-evident. Whether one is against the presidential system as such, or whether one is against the 20th amendment while being for the Presidential system, the reason is the same: the critique of over-centralization. To spell it out, the objection is too much power and too many functions in the hands of a single person and the remedy is seen as the separation of powers, which makes for check and balances.

In its practice, the JVP-NPP runs completely against that principle.

The next ‘signature issue’ is corruption. There too, the principle is the same: if one person holds more than one post and there is a possible conflict of interest, that is the potential source of corruption. Here too, the crux of the matter is that one person should not head several institutional or organization spaces. Interlocking directorates are the conduit of corruption. I am not accusing the JVP-NPP of corruption, but of violating the principle of safeguards or guardrails against overlapping and over-concentration.

The NPP was not founded by non-party activists or those of many political parties. Still less was it formed by academics. It was founded by Anura Kumara Dissanayake in 2015.

The NPP is not led by a non-party personality. It is led by Anura Kumara Dissanayake who founded it.

Anura Kumara Dissanayake is the leader of the JVP. He was the leader of the JVP when he established the NPP, and remains the leader of the JVP.

It is reasonable to assume that as the JVP’s leader, rather than merely a JVP member or second-level leader, Mr. Dissanayake would have founded the NPP as part of the JVP’s strategic vision.

Insofar as the NPP is the creation of the JVP’s leader, the NPP is the child of the JVP.

Latin American Left

The JVP has almost always had phases in which it had personalities and mass organization to which it gave a long leash. Indika Gunawardena and Sunila Abeysekara are two examples but not the only ones. Perhaps a more important one is HN Fernando the politically highly literate leader of the Ceylon Teachers Union which he had built up into a 30,000 strong organization. All of them were purged from the party when views that dissented from the changing party line, were voiced. (HN Fernando, who was Wijeweera’s brother-in-law was physically assaulted).

These seem to me the earlier prototypes of what is now manifested as the NPP. The NPP seems to me to be a new model of the same old template: a front organization of fellow-travelers.

If the NPP were to be an autonomous civic or mass organization or more ambitiously the formation which should be recognized as a contender to lead the country, the Latin American Left provides the architecture.

Uruguay’s Tupamaros and its Communist Party founded the Frente Amplio, the Broad Front, which lasted from the early 1970s through the decades of military dictatorship, to this day. The first leader of the Frente Amplio who remained so for many years, was General Liber Seregni, not the MLN-Tupamaro leader Raul Sendic nor the Uruguayan CP’s leader Rodney Arismendi.

In El Salvador, the revolutionary vanguard unified as the FMLN, with its politico-diplomatic partner being the Frente Democratico Revolutionario, the FDR. None of the FMLN’s leaders headed the FDR.

That is the model by which the autonomy of the civic front is ensured. In the case of the NPP, it is headed, not even by a JVP personality like Nalinda Jayatissa or Bimal Ratnayake, still less a respected progressive activist, intellectual or cultural-artistic figure but precisely by the top leader of the JVP.

As a disciplined leader who is committed to the strategy and decisions of the JVP, there is hardly a structural possibility of genuine autonomy for and on the part of the NPP.

Political Culture: Falsification & Opacity

A great many of us watched as Anura Kumara Dissanayake repeatedly emphasized on national TV that Kumara Gunaratnam was never a member of the JVP. Quiet apart from the insult to the memory of Ranjithan Gunaratnam, a real hero and martyr of the JVP leadership, it was a plain lie because it was widely known that Kumara Gunaratnam played the major role in rebuilding the JVP clandestinely after the repression was over.

The post 1994 JVP was built upon the foundation laid by Kumara Gunaratnam whom Anura Kumara Dissanayake told the nation was never a member of the party.

A few years ago, after Kumara Gunaratnam had been ‘disappeared’ and tortured in 2011, and was released only due to external lobbying and the intervention of Mahinda Rajapaksa, Gotabaya Rajapaksa made a throw-away public remark in response to Anura Kumara’s criticism of him on an entirely different matter, that the crackdown on Gunaratnam and his emerging new outfit (it wasn’t called Peratugamee at the time) was made on an alert from the same quarter that was now criticizing him. There was no answer from AKD.

If anything, a left alternative must occupy the moral high ground, and not only in its own eyes. The historical truth is the only path to the moral high ground.

None of this is meant as an indictment of or attack on Anura Kumara as a person. It speaks to the discourse, the political culture of the JVP and its opacity. The denial of Kumara Gunaratnam, his removal from the annals of the JVP, the sheer falsification of history, tells us what the JVP still is. This travesty is not something that has occurred, would occur or could occur in any other political party in Sri Lanka. The JVP was and is a party which is the most opaque in Sri Lanka.

It is the same Anura Kumara who leads the same JVP who also founded and leads the NPP.

Therefore, any influence that the NPP has on the JVP will be secondary, episodic and tactical, while the JVP’s influence over the NPP will be strategic and structural. The tail won’t be wagging the dog.

Continue Reading

Politics

Foreign exchange, foreign policy, and economic roundtables

Published

on

by Uditha Devapriya

Sri Lanka’s Central Bank will be settling a USD 500 million bond the day after tomorrow. Earlier this month, Ajith Nivard Cabraal tweeted that the Bank had set aside the required amount from its foreign reserves, reiterating the country’s commitment to honouring its debt obligations. Perhaps in response to this development, bondholders appear to have regained confidence about our prospects: latest figures show that bond market prices are converging with face value, though this may well be a temporary gain.

The January 18 settlement is the first of two that will have to be made to our International Sovereign Bond (ISB) holders this year. The second, amounting to USD one billion, is due on July 25. The Central Bank’s strategy is one of doubling down on these debt obligations while renegotiating loans from other governments. This strategy isn’t as muddled up as it is made to be by its critics: unlike governments, ISB holders don’t negotiate, and if they are asked to, it’s usually on the eve of a default or severe economic crisis.

In strategising a way out, then, the Central Bank has identified its priorities: it will pay up on its ISB commitments and devote foreign exchange to little else.

It’s difficult to predict how that will affect our foreign relations in the longer term. The country is presently governed by a party that promised never to sell or lease out its assets. Yet, today, officials are travelling everywhere, negotiating with this government and that, hoping for more lifelines. We have clearly exhausted other options: we can’t raise anything from bond auctions, and we are rejecting the IMF line. Since governments are easier to talk with, we are hence talking with as many of them as possible. It’s doubtful whether this is the only option available, but it’s probably the best shot we can give.

In giving that shot, however, are we exposing ourselves to the pressures of regional and extra-regional power pressures? Consider the countries we have gone to so far: Oman, China, and India. Negotiations with India have been successful, with Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar stating that Delhi is ready to stand with Sri Lanka. Though his government has remained quiet over requests for credit lines, these may well come our way.

On the other hand, Beijing has responded to Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s call to Foreign Minister Wang Yi to restructure its debts, with Cabraal declaring that a new loan is on the blocks. As for Oman, though negotiations have stalled over requests to explore the Mannar Oil Basin in return for interest-free credit, this too is a window that remains open.

These developments are, all things considered, intriguing. In the face of the worst global health crisis in over a century, our foreign policy has taken a massive beating. The fertiliser imbroglio with China and the withdrawal of Chinese projects from the North over alleged Indian pressure, as well as the visit of the Chinese Ambassador to the North, are cases in point here. All these point to an increasingly complicated foreign policy front. The question is, will the country’s foreign exchange problems complicate it even more?

Perhaps more so than the 1970s, when it faced a severe balance of payments crisis, Sri Lanka is gradually giving way to a foreign policy dictated by depleting foreign reserves. The administration’s dismissal of W. D. Lakshman and appointment of Cabraal, in that regard, accompanied a shift of focus, during the fourth quarter of last year, to the country’s foreign exchange situation. This has spilled over to our external relations.

Here the Central Bank has had to reckon with a contradiction: between its insistence on not going to the IMF and its assurances about meeting ISB obligations. Though it’s debatable whether the Bank has addressed, let alone resolved, that contradiction, it’s clearly making use of Sri Lanka’s foreign policy to pay bondholders their due.

For their part, economic experts have shifted in their response to what the government is doing. While earlier they warned about impending defaults, now many of them have turned to questioning the current policy of repaying bondholders no matter what.

Nishan de Mel of Verité Research, for instance, points out correctly that defaulting is not the same thing as declaring bankruptcy. Suggesting that the former is preferable, he contends that the government should do what it can to renegotiate its debts. On the other hand, as Dushni Weerakoon of the IPS rightly observes, restructuring debt may be easy for a country with a reputation for defaults, like Ecuador, but it is unviable, lengthy, and costly, at least in the short and medium term, for a country like Sri Lanka.

What of the IMF line? It’s obvious that Sri Lanka can no longer negotiate for more breathing space from the IMF without conditionalities being imposed on it. The only way it can obtain such space, in other words, is by succumbing to those conditionalities.

Now, defenders of the IMF line may argue, justifiably, that there’s no give without take, and that if we go to that body we will have to eat humble pie, gratefully. But the question to ask here is, who are we asking to take on these burdens? Who are we asking to endure more of the same? Have IMF advocates considered these problems?

The IMF is not a charity: it has provided financial assistance to almost 90 countries on condition that fiscal discipline be enforced in the long term. If we go down that road, we will need to give back something, like public sector retrenchment and fuel price formulas. These have generated enough backlashes elsewhere. Are we ready to risk them here?

So long as the government fears an uprising from the people, it will not choose the IMF line. To say this is not to defend the powers that be. They have contributed to the mess we are in. But to admit to that is not to deny that, whatever that mess may be, to opt for structural adjustment, when social pressures are peaking, would be politically inadvisable.

That is why Basil Rajapaksa’s billion rupee economic relief package, tabled earlier this month despite much criticism, is intriguing: among other things, it promises a LKR 5,000 allowance to 1.5 million government workers, pensioners, and disabled soldiers. Its underlying thrust is not less money, but more: not spending cuts, but spending hikes.

The urban and suburban middle-classes have responded to the package with characteristic ambivalence. While demanding for relief from the government, they are also questioning the efficacy of printing money. What they have failed to realise is that that printing money is the only resort the government has to grant the kind of relief being demanded. It’s a classic either/or scenario: you get the relief with printed money, or you don’t.

Though economists don’t spell it out exactly in these terms, they do observe that printing money can only lead to greater inflation, implying that the only alternative is to stop doing so. But what are the socio-political costs of such measures? What are the knock-on effects they will have on economic relief for the masses? To ask these questions is not to split hairs, but to raise valid concerns that have not been addressed by the other side.

That is not to say that the government’s measures have been farsighted. They have not. Though Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) policies, which the regime is advocating, may get us space in the short term, it is not the type of reform we should be enacting in the longer term. The policies we need require radical reform and radical action. However viable it may be, printing money should not be considered a substitute for such reform.

To suggest one option, one of Sri Lanka’s most brilliant economists, Howard Nicholas, has advised that we industrialise, noting that the historical record has been better for countries which opted to do so. The example of Vietnam shows how even a sector like textiles can be used to propel industrialisation. That is an example Sri Lanka under Ranasinghe Premadasa followed, at least according to Dr Nicholas, but it is one we have since abandoned, in favour of orthodox prescriptions of fiscal consolidation and untrammelled privatisation.

Sri Lanka needs to consider these options without caving into stopgap measures and orthodox alternatives. How do we do that? As Dayan Jayatilleka suggested some time ago, we should convene an economic roundtable. Such a roundtable will likely prevent economic discussions from becoming a monopoly of elites, thereby helping the government, and the opposition, to align the interests of the economy with the interests of the masses.

This has been a long time coming. Both the government and the opposition have tended to view economic priorities as distinct from other socio-political concerns. Yet the two remain very much interlinked. In that sense, caving into economic orthodoxy while ignoring social reality would be detrimental to the future of the country and the plight of its people. To this end, we need to think of alternatives, and fast. But have we, and are we?

The writer can be reached at udakdev1@gmail.com

Continue Reading

Trending