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How the plot would unfold

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1962 coup – Part IV

A group of senior Police and Military officers attempted to overthrow the Sirimavo Bandaranaike Government. They were driven by three critical events in the years leading up to January 1962. The coup participants belonged to the Westernised urban middle class who were alarmed at the undermining of the secular plural state and government.

Continued from yesterday

By Jayantha Somasundaram

The coup d’état would commence at midnight Saturday, 27 January, 1962. Lieutenant Colonel Noel Mathysz, Commanding Officer, Ceylon Electrical and Mechanical Engineers would take the Central Telegraph Office, Major Weerasena Rajapakse, Ceylon Armoured Corps would send four armoured vehicles to guard the Governor-General’s residence, Queen’s House, and another four to the Kirillapone Bridge to secure a key access point into Colombo. Captain J.A.R. Felix would guard Lake House.

The Prime Minister was scheduled to return to Colombo on the 27 after a visit to Kataragama. At Hunugama on the A2 Road, Superintendent of Police, Southern Province (East), David Thambyah would intercept her and place her under arrest.

While the Coup plot included officers and former officers from the Police, the Army and the Navy, the heads of these services were not participants. The sympathies of the Army Commander Major General Winston Wijeyakoon had been unclear to the conspirators prior to the Coup. It is claimed that he had been sounded out obliquely about moving against the government, but the Coup plotters felt that he was too cautious and would “act against the regime only when the situation deteriorated to the point of anarchy.”

The Inspector General of Police Walter Abeykoon was a Civil Servant from outside the Police Force. Moreover, specifically appointed by S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, he was considered an SLFP loyalist. The acting Captain of the Royal Ceylon Navy Commodore Rajanathan Kadirgamar was seen as a supporter of Sirimavo Bandaranaike. So, on the night of the Coup, Kadirgamar was shadowed by the conspirators in order to be aware of his movements and location. The Royal Ceylon Air Force was commanded by a Royal Air Force-seconded officer, Air Commodore J.L. Barker, who was presumed to be indifferent to domestic political issues.

Mastermind

The Coup participants identified different leaders as the prime movers. According to Royce de Mel, Derek de Saram was the person who masterminded it. While according to Douglas Liyanage “everyone knew that the brains behind the Coup was Sidney de Zoysa, although F.C. De Saram took personal responsibility,” once they were apprehended.

Former President J.R. Jayewardene claimed that in April 1966 at Kandawala (Kotalawala’s then residence and the current Military Academy) former Prime Minister Sir John Kotelawala informed him that both former Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake and he “had been involved in the planning of the Coup.” According to Jayawardene the Coup leaders had discussed the plot with Kotelawala who had advised them to get the support of Dudley Senanayake and Sir Oliver Goonetilleke. Both Sir John and Dudley had participated in a meeting at Borella to finalise the Coup, followed by a further meeting at Kandawala on the 26, with Dudley presiding. While a few weeks before his death in 1988 Douglas Liyanage “confirmed that Senanayake, Kotalawala and Goonetilleke had been in the know of it” (K. M. de Silva and Howard Wriggins in J. R. Jayewardene of Sri Lanka Vol II ).

In 1958 during the anti-Tamil riots, Prime Minister Bandaranaike had been unwilling to act firmly against the rioters and as a consequence the violence had spread. This compelled the Governor-General to declare a State of Emergency, deploy the armed forces and take command of security operations. The Coup was premised on a similar situation, that mindful of the severity of the political crisis, the Governor-General would agree to take political control once the Bandaranaike Government had been overthrown.

Take Post order

The first step in the execution of the Coup would be taken by CC ‘Jungle’ Dissanayake who in his capacity as DIG Range I which covered the city of Colombo would issue a Take Post order to officers in his range at 2200 hours Saturday. He had instructed all the Coup participants to be in uniform.

In response the first operation would be carried out by ASP Traffic Bede Johnpillai who would get the Police to secure within half an hour all entry points into Colombo. Police patrol cars would then go around Colombo announcing the imposition of a curfew which would commence at midnight. They would be backed by troops from the 2nd Volunteer Ceylon Signal Corps equipped with radio transmitters enabling the Coup Commanders to monitor events across the city.

Soldiers would now take up positions across the city, seizing and securing key points and armoured vehicles would be deployed at strategic entry points. Because of the highly unstable labour and political situation which had been deteriorating over the past months, and because the military had been inducted into many facets of normal civilian life, from unloading cargo at the Colombo Port to imprisoning Tamil parliamentarians at military bases, a heightened presence of troops and their performing what normally were non-military duties were expected neither to attract attention nor be construed as abnormal or cause for alarm.

Before any of these plans would be implemented though, a premature arrest had been made. At about 10:00 pm that night SP (Southern Province) Elster Perera with a team from the Galle Police arrested the LSSP MP for Baddegama, Neal de Alwis, Felix Dias’ uncle by marriage.

Meanwhile, unknown to the other conspirators, SP Colombo Stanley Senanayake had got in touch with his father-in-law Patrick de S Kularatne MP. Kularatne met the IGP Walter Abeykoon at the Orient Club on Saturday evening and notified him of the plot; he also informed Felix Dias.

Thwarting the Coup

Felix Dias promptly initiated counter measures to thwart the Coup. He briefed the Prime Minister, who for reasons unconnected with the Coup had cancelled her Kataragama trip. Positioning himself at Temple Trees he summoned the IGP who thereupon sent the following radio message to Police Stations, island-wide:

“To All OICC Divisions and Districts: From the IGP: Please don’t carry out whatever instructions of a special nature that you have received from your DIG. Be in readiness to carry out orders only from the IGP.”

This was followed by Colonel Sepala Attygalle, commander 1st Reconnaissance Regiment, Ceylon Armoured Corps instructing Major Weerasena Rajapakse to send armoured vehicles to guard Temple Trees. And at 1.30 am on 28 morning 300 troops supported by Bren gun carriers surrounded Jungle Dissanayake’s Longden Place residence and took him into custody.

Operation Holdfast had been

checkmated.

Thirty suspects were arrested of whom 24 defendants were tried before Chief Justice M.C. Sansoni, Justice H.N.G Fernando and Justice L.B. de Silva who tried the case without jury. They did so under The Criminal Law (Special Provisions) Act, No. 1 of 1962 which was passed by Parliament after the plot was uncovered. Thirteen were regular or volunteer Army officers, six were gazetted police officers. Other officers who were suspect were sent on compulsory leave or forced to resign.

The Trial-at-Bar found 11 suspects guilty of waging war against the Queen and sentenced each of them to 10 years in prison and the confiscation of all property. On appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council they were released on a point of law. The Privy Council’s verdict of 5 December, 1965 stated that “The Ceylon Government has no powers to pass the new law styled The Criminal Law (Special Provisions) Act No. 1 of 1962, which is ultra-vires, bad in law and had denied a fair trial.”

(Concluded)



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Opinion

War with Iran and unravelling of the global order – II

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A US airstrike on Iran

Broader Strategic Consequences

One of the most significant strategic consequences of the war is the accelerated erosion of U.S. political and moral hegemony. This is not a sudden phenomenon precipitated solely by the present conflict; rather, the war has served to illuminate an already evolving global reality—that the era of uncontested U.S. dominance is in decline. The resurgence of Donald Trump and the reassertion of his “America First” doctrine reflect deep-seated domestic economic and political challenges within the United States. These internal pressures have, in turn, shaped a more unilateral and inward-looking foreign policy posture, further constraining Washington’s capacity to exercise global leadership.

Moreover, the conduct of the war has significantly undermined the political and moral authority of the United States. Perceived violations of international humanitarian law, coupled with the selective application of international norms, have weakened the credibility of U.S. advocacy for a “rules-based international order.” Such inconsistencies have reinforced perceptions of double standards, particularly among states in the Global South. Skepticism toward Western normative leadership is expected to deepen, contributing to the gradual fragmentation of the international system. In this broader context, the ongoing crisis can be seen as symptomatic of a more fundamental transformation: the progressive waning of a global order historically anchored in U.S. hegemony and the emergence of a more contested and pluralistic international landscape.

The regional implications of the crisis are likely to be profound, particularly given the centrality of the Persian Gulf to the global political economy. As a critical hub of energy production and maritime trade, instability in this region carries systemic consequences that extend far beyond its immediate geography. Whatever may be the outcome, whether through the decisive weakening of Iran or the inability of external powers to dismantle its leadership and strategic capabilities, the post-conflict regional order will differ markedly from its pre-war configuration. In this evolving context, traditional power hierarchies, alliance structures, and deterrence dynamics are likely to undergo significant recalibration.

A key lesson underscored by the war is the deep interconnectivity of the contemporary global economic order. In an era of highly integrated production networks and supply chains, disruptions in a single strategic node can generate cascading effects across the global system. As such, regional conflicts increasingly assume global significance. The structural realities of globalisation make it difficult to contain economic and strategic shocks within regional boundaries, as impacts rapidly transmit through trade, energy, and financial networks. In this context, peace and stability are no longer purely regional concerns but global public goods, essential to the functioning and resilience of the international system

The conflict highlights the emergence of a new paradigm of warfare shaped by the integration of artificial intelligence, cyber capabilities, and unmanned systems. The extensive use of unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs)—a trend previously demonstrated in the Russia–Ukraine War—has been further validated in this theatre. However, unlike the Ukraine conflict, where Western powers have provided sustained military, technological, and financial backing, the present confrontation reflects a more direct asymmetry between a dominant global hegemon and a Global South state. Iran’s deployment of drone swarms and AI-enabled targeting systems illustrates that key elements of Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) warfare are no longer confined to technologically advanced Western states. These capabilities are increasingly accessible to Global South actors, lowering barriers to entry and significantly enhancing their capacity to wage effective asymmetric warfare. In this evolving context, technological diffusion is reshaping the strategic landscape, challenging traditional military hierarchies and altering the balance between conventional superiority and innovative, cost-effective combat strategies.

The war further exposed and deepened the weakening of global governance institutions, particularly the United Nations. Many of these institutions were established in 1945, reflecting the balance of power and geopolitical realities of the immediate post-Second World War era. However, the profound transformations in the international system since then have rendered aspects of this institutional architecture increasingly outdated and less effective.

The war has underscored the urgent need for comprehensive international governance reforms to ensure that international institutions remain credible, representative, and capable of addressing contemporary security challenges. The perceived ineffectiveness of UN human rights mechanisms in responding to violations of international humanitarian law—particularly in contexts such as the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and more recently in Iran—has amplified calls for institutional renewal or the development of alternative frameworks for maintaining international peace and security. Moreover, the selective enforcement of international law and the persistent paralysis in conflict resolution mechanisms risk accelerating the fragmentation of global norms. If sustained, this trajectory would signal not merely the weakening but the possible demise of the so-called liberal international order, accelerating the erosion of both the legitimacy and the effective authority of existing multilateral institutions, and deepening the crisis of global governance.

Historically, major wars have often served as harbingers of new eras in international politics, marking painful yet decisive transitions from one order to another. Periods of systemic decline are typically accompanied by instability, uncertainty, and profound disruption; yet, it is through such crises that the contours of an emerging order begin to take shape. The present conflict appears to reflect such a moment of transition, where the strains within the existing global system are becoming increasingly visible.

Notably, key European powers are exhibiting a gradual shift away from exclusive reliance on the U.S. security umbrella, seeking instead a more autonomous and assertive role in global affairs. At the same time, the war is likely to create strategic space for China to expand its influence. As the United States becomes more deeply entangled militarily and politically, China may consolidate its position as a stabilising economic actor and an alternative strategic partner. This could be reflected in intensified energy diplomacy, expanded infrastructure investments, and a more proactive role in regional conflict management, advancing Beijing’s long-term objective of reshaping global governance structures.

However, this transition does not imply a simple replacement of Pax Americana with Pax Sinica. Rather, the emerging global order is likely to be more diffuse, pluralistic, and multilateral in character. In this sense, the ongoing transformation aligns with broader narratives of an “Asian Century,” in which power is redistributed across multiple centers rather than concentrated in a single hegemon. The war, therefore, may ultimately be understood not merely as a geopolitical crisis, but as a defining inflection point in the reconfiguration of the global order.

Conclusion: A New Era on the Horizon

History shows that major wars often signal the birth of new eras—painful, disruptive, yet transformative. The present conflict is no exception. It has exposed the vulnerabilities of the existing world order, challenged U.S. dominance, and revealed the limits of established global governance.

European powers are beginning to chart a more independent course, reducing reliance on the U.S. security umbrella, while China is poised to expand its influence as an economic stabiliser and strategic partner. Through energy diplomacy, infrastructure investments, and active engagement in regional conflicts, Beijing is quietly shaping the contours of a more multipolar world. Yet this is not the rise of Pax Sinica replacing Pax Americana. The emerging order is likely to be multilateral, fluid, and competitive—a world in which multiple powers, old and new, share the stage. The war, in all its turbulence, may therefore mark the dawn of a genuinely new global era, one where uncertainty coexists with opportunity, and where the next chapter of international politics is being written before our eyes.

by Gamini Keerawella
(First part of this article appeared yesterday (08 April)

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Opinion

University admission crisis: Academics must lead the way

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130,000 students are left out each year—academics hold the key

Each year, Sri Lanka’s G.C.E. Advanced Level examination produces a wave of hope—this year, nearly 175,000 students qualified for university entrance. Yet only 45,000 will be admitted to state universities. That leaves more than 130,000 young people stranded—qualified, ambitious, but excluded. This is not just a statistic; it is a national crisis. And while policymakers debate infrastructure and funding, the country’s academics must step forward as catalysts of change.

Beyond the Numbers: A National Responsibility

Education is the backbone of Sri Lanka’s development. Denying access to tens of thousands of qualified students risks wasting talent, fueling inequality, and undermining national progress. The gap is not simply about seats in lecture halls—it is about the future of a generation. Academics, as custodians of knowledge, cannot remain passive observers. They must reimagine the delivery of higher education to ensure opportunity is not a privilege for the few.

Expanding Pathways, Not Just Campuses

The traditional model of four-year degrees in brick-and-mortar universities cannot absorb the demand. Academics can design short-term diplomas and certificate programmes that provide immediate access to learning. These programmes, focused on employable skills, would allow thousands to continue their education while easing pressure on degree programmes. Equally important is the digital transformation of education. Online and blended learning modules can extend access to rural students, breaking the monopoly of physical campuses. With academic leadership, Sri Lanka can build a reliable system of credit transfers, enabling students to begin their studies at affiliated institutions and later transfer to state universities.

Partnerships That Protect Quality

Private universities and vocational institutes already absorb many students who miss out on state admissions. But concerns about quality and recognition persist. Academics can bridge this divide by providing quality assurance and standardised curricula, supervising joint degree programmes, and expanding the Open University system. These partnerships would ensure that students outside the state system receive affordable, credible, and internationally recognised education.

Research and Advocacy: Shaping Policy

Academics are not only teachers—they are researchers and thought leaders. By conducting labour market studies, they can align higher education expansion with employability. Evidence-based recommendations to the University Grants Commission (UGC) can guide strategic intake increases, regional university expansion, and government investment in digital infrastructure. In this way, academics can ensure reforms are not reactive, but visionary.

Industry Engagement: Learning Beyond the Classroom

Sri Lanka’s universities must become entrepreneurship hubs and innovation labs. Academics can design programmes that connect students directly with industries, offering internship-based learning and applied research opportunities. This approach reduces reliance on classroom capacity while equipping students with practical skills. It also reframes education as a partnership between universities and the economy, rather than a closed system.

Making the Most of What We Have

Even within existing constraints, academics can expand capacity. Training junior lecturers and adjunct faculty, sharing facilities across universities, and building international collaborations for joint programmes and scholarships are practical steps. These measures maximise resources while opening new avenues for students.

A Call to Action

Sri Lanka’s university admission crisis is not just about numbers—it is about fairness, opportunity, and national development. Academics must lead the way in transforming exclusion into empowerment. By expanding pathways, strengthening partnerships, advocating for policy reform, engaging with industry, and optimizing resources, they can ensure that qualified students are not left behind.

“Education for all, not just the fortunate few.”

Dr. Arosh Bandula (Ph.D. Nottingham), Senior Lecturer, Department of Agricultural Economics & Agribusiness, Faculty of Agriculture, University of Ruhuna

by Dr. Arosh Bandula

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Opinion

Post-Easter Sri Lanka: Between memory, narrative, and National security

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As Sri Lanka approaches the seventh commemoration of the Easter Sunday attacks, the national mood is once again marked by grief, reflection, and an enduring sense of incompleteness. Nearly seven years later, the tragedy continues to cast a long shadow not only over the victims and their families, but over the institutions and narratives that have since emerged.

Commemoration, however, must go beyond ritual. It must be anchored in clarity, accountability, and restraint. What is increasingly evident in the post-Easter landscape is not merely a search for truth, but a contest over how that truth is framed, interpreted, and presented to the public.

In recent times, public discourse has been shaped by book launches, panel discussions, and media interventions that claim to offer new insights into the attacks. While such contributions are not inherently problematic, the manner in which certain narratives are advanced raises legitimate concerns. The selective disclosure of information particularly when it touches on intelligence operations demands careful scrutiny.

Sri Lanka’s legal and institutional framework is clear on the sensitivity of such matters. The Official Secrets Act (No. 32 of 1955) places strict obligations on the handling of information related to national security. Similarly, the Police Ordinance and internal administrative regulations governing intelligence units emphasize confidentiality, chain of command, and the responsible use of information. These are not mere formalities; they exist to safeguard both operational integrity and national interest.

When individual particularly those with prior access to intelligence structures enter the public domain with claims that are not subject to verification, it raises critical questions. Are these disclosures contributing to justice and accountability, or are they inadvertently compromising institutional credibility and future operational capacity?

The challenge lies in distinguishing between constructive transparency and selective exposure.

The Presidential Commission of Inquiry into the Easter Sunday Attacks provided one of the most comprehensive official examinations of the attacks. Its findings highlighted a complex web of failures: lapses in intelligence sharing, breakdowns in inter-agency coordination, and serious deficiencies in political oversight. Importantly, it underscored that the attacks were not the result of a single point of failure, but a systemic collapse across multiple levels of governance.

Yet, despite the existence of such detailed institutional findings, public discourse often gravitates toward simplified narratives. There is a tendency to identify singular “masterminds” or to attribute responsibility in ways that align with prevailing political or ideological positions. While such narratives may be compelling, they risk obscuring the deeper structural issues that enabled the attacks to occur.

Equally significant is the broader socio-political context in which these narratives are unfolding. Sri Lanka today remains a society marked by fragile intercommunal relations. The aftermath of the Easter attacks saw heightened suspicion, polarisation, and, in some instances, collective blame directed at entire communities. Although there have been efforts toward reconciliation, these fault lines have not entirely disappeared.

In this environment, the language and tone of public discourse carry immense weight. The framing of terrorism whether as a localized phenomenon or as part of a broader ideological construct must be handled with precision and responsibility. Overgeneralization or the uncritical use of labels can have far-reaching consequences, including the marginalization of communities and the erosion of social cohesion.

At the same time, it is essential to acknowledge that the global discourse on terrorism is itself contested. Competing narratives, geopolitical interests, and selective historiography often shape how events are interpreted. For Sri Lanka, the challenge is to avoid becoming a passive recipient of external frameworks that may not fully reflect its own realities.

A professional and unbiased approach requires a commitment to evidence-based analysis. This includes:

· Engaging with primary sources, including official reports and judicial findings
·

· Cross-referencing claims with verifiable data
·

· Recognizing the limits of publicly available information, particularly in intelligence matters

It also requires intellectual discipline the willingness to question assumptions, to resist convenient conclusions, and to remain open to complexity.

The role of former officials and subject-matter experts in this discourse is particularly important. Their experience can provide valuable insights, but it also carries a responsibility. Public interventions must be guided by professional ethics, respect for institutional boundaries, and an awareness of the potential impact on national security.

There is a fine balance to be maintained. On one hand, democratic societies require transparency and accountability. On the other, the premature or uncontextualized release of sensitive information can undermine the very systems that are meant to protect the public.

As Sri Lanka reflects on the events of April 2019, it must resist the temptation to reduce a national tragedy into competing narratives or political instruments. The pursuit of truth must be methodical, inclusive, and grounded in law.

Easter is not only a moment of remembrance. It is a test of institutional maturity and societal resilience.

The real question is not whether new narratives will emerge they inevitably will. The question is whether Sri Lanka has the capacity to engage with them critically, responsibly, and in a manner that strengthens, rather than weakens, the foundations of its national security and social harmony.

In the end, justice is not served by noise or conjecture. It is served by patience, rigor, and an unwavering commitment to truth.

Mahil Dole is a former senior law enforcement officer and national security analyst, with over four decades of experience in policing and intelligence, including serving as Head of Counter-Intelligence at the State Intelligence Service of Sri Lanka and a graduate of the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawai, USA.

by Mahil Dole
Former Senior Law Enforcement Officer National Security Analyst; Former Head of Counter-Intelligence, State Intelligence Service)

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