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How the plot would unfold

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1962 coup – Part IV

A group of senior Police and Military officers attempted to overthrow the Sirimavo Bandaranaike Government. They were driven by three critical events in the years leading up to January 1962. The coup participants belonged to the Westernised urban middle class who were alarmed at the undermining of the secular plural state and government.

Continued from yesterday

By Jayantha Somasundaram

The coup d’état would commence at midnight Saturday, 27 January, 1962. Lieutenant Colonel Noel Mathysz, Commanding Officer, Ceylon Electrical and Mechanical Engineers would take the Central Telegraph Office, Major Weerasena Rajapakse, Ceylon Armoured Corps would send four armoured vehicles to guard the Governor-General’s residence, Queen’s House, and another four to the Kirillapone Bridge to secure a key access point into Colombo. Captain J.A.R. Felix would guard Lake House.

The Prime Minister was scheduled to return to Colombo on the 27 after a visit to Kataragama. At Hunugama on the A2 Road, Superintendent of Police, Southern Province (East), David Thambyah would intercept her and place her under arrest.

While the Coup plot included officers and former officers from the Police, the Army and the Navy, the heads of these services were not participants. The sympathies of the Army Commander Major General Winston Wijeyakoon had been unclear to the conspirators prior to the Coup. It is claimed that he had been sounded out obliquely about moving against the government, but the Coup plotters felt that he was too cautious and would “act against the regime only when the situation deteriorated to the point of anarchy.”

The Inspector General of Police Walter Abeykoon was a Civil Servant from outside the Police Force. Moreover, specifically appointed by S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, he was considered an SLFP loyalist. The acting Captain of the Royal Ceylon Navy Commodore Rajanathan Kadirgamar was seen as a supporter of Sirimavo Bandaranaike. So, on the night of the Coup, Kadirgamar was shadowed by the conspirators in order to be aware of his movements and location. The Royal Ceylon Air Force was commanded by a Royal Air Force-seconded officer, Air Commodore J.L. Barker, who was presumed to be indifferent to domestic political issues.

Mastermind

The Coup participants identified different leaders as the prime movers. According to Royce de Mel, Derek de Saram was the person who masterminded it. While according to Douglas Liyanage “everyone knew that the brains behind the Coup was Sidney de Zoysa, although F.C. De Saram took personal responsibility,” once they were apprehended.

Former President J.R. Jayewardene claimed that in April 1966 at Kandawala (Kotalawala’s then residence and the current Military Academy) former Prime Minister Sir John Kotelawala informed him that both former Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake and he “had been involved in the planning of the Coup.” According to Jayawardene the Coup leaders had discussed the plot with Kotelawala who had advised them to get the support of Dudley Senanayake and Sir Oliver Goonetilleke. Both Sir John and Dudley had participated in a meeting at Borella to finalise the Coup, followed by a further meeting at Kandawala on the 26, with Dudley presiding. While a few weeks before his death in 1988 Douglas Liyanage “confirmed that Senanayake, Kotalawala and Goonetilleke had been in the know of it” (K. M. de Silva and Howard Wriggins in J. R. Jayewardene of Sri Lanka Vol II ).

In 1958 during the anti-Tamil riots, Prime Minister Bandaranaike had been unwilling to act firmly against the rioters and as a consequence the violence had spread. This compelled the Governor-General to declare a State of Emergency, deploy the armed forces and take command of security operations. The Coup was premised on a similar situation, that mindful of the severity of the political crisis, the Governor-General would agree to take political control once the Bandaranaike Government had been overthrown.

Take Post order

The first step in the execution of the Coup would be taken by CC ‘Jungle’ Dissanayake who in his capacity as DIG Range I which covered the city of Colombo would issue a Take Post order to officers in his range at 2200 hours Saturday. He had instructed all the Coup participants to be in uniform.

In response the first operation would be carried out by ASP Traffic Bede Johnpillai who would get the Police to secure within half an hour all entry points into Colombo. Police patrol cars would then go around Colombo announcing the imposition of a curfew which would commence at midnight. They would be backed by troops from the 2nd Volunteer Ceylon Signal Corps equipped with radio transmitters enabling the Coup Commanders to monitor events across the city.

Soldiers would now take up positions across the city, seizing and securing key points and armoured vehicles would be deployed at strategic entry points. Because of the highly unstable labour and political situation which had been deteriorating over the past months, and because the military had been inducted into many facets of normal civilian life, from unloading cargo at the Colombo Port to imprisoning Tamil parliamentarians at military bases, a heightened presence of troops and their performing what normally were non-military duties were expected neither to attract attention nor be construed as abnormal or cause for alarm.

Before any of these plans would be implemented though, a premature arrest had been made. At about 10:00 pm that night SP (Southern Province) Elster Perera with a team from the Galle Police arrested the LSSP MP for Baddegama, Neal de Alwis, Felix Dias’ uncle by marriage.

Meanwhile, unknown to the other conspirators, SP Colombo Stanley Senanayake had got in touch with his father-in-law Patrick de S Kularatne MP. Kularatne met the IGP Walter Abeykoon at the Orient Club on Saturday evening and notified him of the plot; he also informed Felix Dias.

Thwarting the Coup

Felix Dias promptly initiated counter measures to thwart the Coup. He briefed the Prime Minister, who for reasons unconnected with the Coup had cancelled her Kataragama trip. Positioning himself at Temple Trees he summoned the IGP who thereupon sent the following radio message to Police Stations, island-wide:

“To All OICC Divisions and Districts: From the IGP: Please don’t carry out whatever instructions of a special nature that you have received from your DIG. Be in readiness to carry out orders only from the IGP.”

This was followed by Colonel Sepala Attygalle, commander 1st Reconnaissance Regiment, Ceylon Armoured Corps instructing Major Weerasena Rajapakse to send armoured vehicles to guard Temple Trees. And at 1.30 am on 28 morning 300 troops supported by Bren gun carriers surrounded Jungle Dissanayake’s Longden Place residence and took him into custody.

Operation Holdfast had been

checkmated.

Thirty suspects were arrested of whom 24 defendants were tried before Chief Justice M.C. Sansoni, Justice H.N.G Fernando and Justice L.B. de Silva who tried the case without jury. They did so under The Criminal Law (Special Provisions) Act, No. 1 of 1962 which was passed by Parliament after the plot was uncovered. Thirteen were regular or volunteer Army officers, six were gazetted police officers. Other officers who were suspect were sent on compulsory leave or forced to resign.

The Trial-at-Bar found 11 suspects guilty of waging war against the Queen and sentenced each of them to 10 years in prison and the confiscation of all property. On appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council they were released on a point of law. The Privy Council’s verdict of 5 December, 1965 stated that “The Ceylon Government has no powers to pass the new law styled The Criminal Law (Special Provisions) Act No. 1 of 1962, which is ultra-vires, bad in law and had denied a fair trial.”

(Concluded)



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Opinion

Funding of higher education in Sri Lanka

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(A response to Prof. Shamala Kumar’s article, “Public funding of higher education: Seeking private funds to fill the gap?” in The Island of 10 June 2025)

*  Acknowledging the Funding Crisis and Equity Gap

Prof. Kumar rightly draws attention to the precipitous decline in state funding for higher education in Sri Lanka from 4.25% of GDP in the 1960s to a mere 1.5% in 2022, and the consequential disparities in revenue-raising capacities, with the University of Colombo generating approximately 20% of its budget independently, while regional universities such as the University of Jaffna and Wayamba University operate with less than 2% (Kumar, 2025). This fiscal contraction worsens structural inequities and hampers the mission of regional institutions. Ashraf et al. (2012) state that the system resource approach to organisational effectiveness highlights that an institution’s ability to secure and use resources is crucial for its success. Without strategic investment and resource redistribution, less-resourced universities will continue to lag behind, perpetuating systemic inequities.

However, in this context, it is important to recognise that looking for alternative revenue sources, like increasing the number of foreign students and forming public-private partnerships, is not just a concession to the market; it is a strategic necessity.

These methods can help universities diversify their funding sources, improve their resilience, and lessen their dependence on decreasing public funds. Also, attracting international students and private investment can provide essential resources for infrastructure, faculty development, and research, which supports the broader mission of higher education (British Council, 2024).

Institutional Constraints Over Full Marketisation: The Imperative of Governance Reform

The expectation that public universities transition to full self-funding is neither feasible nor equitable in the absence of substantive governance reforms. Sri Lankan universities remain entangled in rigid administrative frameworks, including protracted approvals for signing MOUs with foreign universities, foreign-funded research and Treasury-mandated procurement protocols, which severely restrict strategic autonomy (Kumar, 2025). The process approach to organisational effectiveness highlights the need for efficient internal operations, trust, and communication as key factors for institutional success (Ashraf et al., 2012). Too much bureaucracy weakens these elements, limiting innovation and responsiveness.

To fully realise the benefits of recruiting foreign students and forming public-private partnerships, governance reforms must give universities the power to negotiate, carry out, and manage these initiatives effectively. Without these reforms, even the best strategies might be slowed down by bureaucracy and inefficiency. This would limit their potential impact on institutional growth and equity.

Moreover, governance in higher education is complex. It involves coordination between government agencies, institutional leadership, and internal governance bodies (De Boer et al., 2015). Effective reform must strike a balance between institutional autonomy and transparent accountability mechanisms. Empirical research from Ethiopian public universities indicates that governance principles, including academic freedom, accountability, and transparency, are positively correlated with educational quality (Gebremariam et al., 2020). These findings suggest that enhancing autonomy and leadership capacity is critical to improving institutional performance in Sri Lanka.

Reforming Quality Assurance in Sri Lankan Higher Education: A Unified Total Quality Management Framework for Public and Private Institutions

The prevailing quality assurance (QA) framework in Sri Lanka’s higher education sector, overseen predominantly by the University Grants Commission (UGC), has been critiqued for its compliance-driven, top-down approach. As Prof. Kumar insightfully notes, this system marginalises internal democratic bodies such as Faculty Boards and Senates, reducing QA to bureaucratic box-ticking exercises that stifle institutional creativity and contextual responsiveness. This model fails to foster a culture of continuous improvement and innovation, which is essential for elevating educational quality in a diverse and evolving landscape.

To overcome these limitations, it is necessary to adopt a Total Quality Management (TQM) approach tailored specifically for higher education (Yusuf, 2023). Unlike traditional compliance models, TQM emphasises continuous improvement, stakeholder engagement, and process optimisation. Frameworks like ISO 21001, which has been designed for educational organisations, highlight learner-centered practices, visionary leadership, and social responsibility, aligning quality management with the dynamic needs of institutions and their communities which also incorporates both Total Quality Management (TQM) principles and compliance requirements.

Institutional Autonomy with Collaborative National Oversight

A reimagined QA system would grant universities, both public and private, the autonomy to implement TQM practices suited to their unique contexts. This autonomy fosters a culture of self- reflection and ongoing quality enhancement, empowering institutions to innovate while remaining accountable. Simultaneously, a national apex body would be established to collaboratively develop quality benchmarks with key stakeholders, including faculty, students, employers, and policymakers. This participatory governance model ensures that quality standards are relevant, transparent, and socially accountable, consistent with the strategic constituency model of organisational effectiveness.

To balance autonomy and accountability, a tiered accreditation system is proposed:

Under such a system, institutions that meet or exceed quality benchmarks would enjoy full autonomy to innovate and refine their quality management without excessive external interference whereas institutions that fall short would remain under a compliance-driven regime, receiving targeted support and oversight until they achieve the required standards (Russell Group, 2014). This, while motivating underperforming institutions to elevate their standards, will free high- performing institutions from being bound by the limitations of low-performing institutions in setting quality benchmarks. Therefore, the proposed graded approach would incentivise excellence while safeguarding minimum quality standards, recognising the diversity of institutional missions and capacities across Sri Lanka’s higher education sector.

Ensuring a Level Playing Field: Integrating Private Providers

Market distortions often attributed to private-sector education largely stem from the absence of a unified, developmental QA framework. Incorporating private providers into the same TQM-based QA system as public universities ensures equitable quality assurance across the sector. Private institutions adopting TQM principles would align with ISO 21001 standards, embracing learner- centeredness, ethical conduct, and social responsibility.

As indicated before, a national apex body would oversee this unified QA framework, setting transparent benchmarks and monitoring performance across all institutions. The tiered accreditation system applies equally to private providers, fostering a competitive environment driven by quality and innovation rather than price or minimal compliance. This approach addresses concerns regarding misuse of autonomy in the private sector and guarantees equitable access, academic standards, and ethical fundraising practices.

Empirical Evidence and International Best Practices Empirical studies support the effectiveness of Total Quality Management (TQM) in higher education, particularly in improving institutional processes and stakeholder satisfaction. For instance, Gorontalo State University’s adoption of TQM practices has been linked to notable gains in accreditation, governance, research collaboration, and community outreach (Rahman et al., 2018). Globally, organisations such as the OECD encourage coherent national quality assurance systems, where both public and private institutions are subject to clear, development-oriented standards monitored by appropriate national authorities.

Capacity Building and Facilitative Governance

Effective TQM adoption requires capacity building in leadership, quality culture, and data management. The national apex body’s role should be facilitative, providing guidance, disseminating best practices, and supporting professional development, rather than functioning as a rigid regulator. This enables a sector-wide cultural shift from compliance to continuous improvement.

Beyond Blaming “Neoliberalism”: Emphasising Implementation and Governance Culture

While Prof. Kumar warns that unchecked marketisation can weaken free undergraduate education and increase social inequalities (Kumar, 2025), it is important to understand that how well an organisation performs depends on the design and management of governance and policy, not just on economic ideology (Cameron, 1978; Ashraf et al., 2012).

The focus on internationalisation and industry collaboration should not be dismissed as purely ‘neoliberal.’ Rather, these strategies should be evaluated based on how they can promote the public good. When appropriately regulated, such efforts can enhance graduate employability, foster applied research aligned with national priorities, and enable Sri Lankan universities to participate more actively in global knowledge and technology production (British Council, 2024; Ashraf et al., 2012).

Governance reform must address not only structural autonomy but also the culture of governance. Research in Europe, including the UK, highlights that inclusive and participatory governance cultures, characterised by transparency, engagement, and proactive leadership, are essential for effective institutional management (Bergan and Pinheiro, 2021). These cultural aspects complement formal reforms in promoting institutional agility and innovation. Although operating within a state- controlled system, Tsinghua University has undertaken governance reforms that demonstrate evolving models of internal collaboration among faculty, administrators, and students (Wang and Liu, 2019). This underscores the potential benefits of empowering internal democratic bodies such as Councils, Senates, and Faculty Boards in the Sri Lankan university system.

Governance as a Catalyst for Collaboration, Research Quality, and Innovation

Effective governance frameworks support collaboration across different fields and promote research excellence. These elements are vital for improving the quality of higher education (Lee et al., 2020). Public-private partnerships can create opportunities for joint research, technology sharing, and ecosystems that lead to innovation, benefiting both schools and businesses.

Universities with solid governance systems create environments that encourage academic freedom and independence. This approach promotes innovation and valuable research results. Therefore, reforming governance is crucial not only for fairness and quality control but also for Sri Lanka’s overall research and innovation goals.

A Balanced, Action-Oriented Policy Framework.

Conclusions

Prof. Kumar’s critique of growing inequality due to unchecked market forces is relevant and significant. However, completely rejecting private involvement could result in continued resource shortages and hinder innovation. We need a complex and thoughtful approach. This approach should acknowledge the role of internationalisation and cooperation between public and private sectors. These aspects are vital for building institutional strength, generating knowledge, and supporting national progress. By using established models of organisational effectiveness (Cameron, 1978; Ashraf et al., 2012) and research on governance, this approach should combine governance reform, balanced revenue strategies, fair taxation, and a cohesive framework for quality assurance in development. Transitioning to a TQM-based, unified quality assurance system that encompasses both public and private higher education providers, supported by institutional autonomy and a stakeholder-driven national framework, presents a promising path forward for Sri Lanka. This model aligns with international best practices and addresses the current regime’s limitations by fostering innovation, contextual adaptation, and equitable quality enhancement. Ultimately, it creates a level playing field that elevates quality, equity, and innovation across the entire higher education sector. Only through such thorough reforms can Sri Lanka maintain its commitment to free education, promote innovation, and provide equitable, high-quality higher education for all.

References

*  Ashraf, G., Abd Kadir, S., & others. (2012). A Review on the Models of Organizational Effectiveness: A Look at Cameron’s Model in Higher Education. International Education Studies, 5(2), 80-87.

*  Bergan, S., & Pinheiro, R. (2021). Governance and Institutional Autonomy in Higher Education: The Role of Culture. European Journal of Higher Education, 11(3), 255-270.

*  British Council. (2024). Growth of Sri Lanka’s private higher education sector.

*  Cameron, K. S. (1978). Measuring Organizational Effectiveness in Institutions of Higher Education. Administrative Science Quarterly, 23(4), 604-632.

*  De Boer, H., Enders, J., & Schimank, U. (2015). Higher Education Governance and Institutional Autonomy: A Multi-Level Perspective. Higher Education Policy, 28(3), 293-311.

*  Gebremariam, M., et al. (2020). The Impact of Governance Principles on Quality of Education in Ethiopian Public Universities. Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management, 42(3), 234-250.

*  Kumar, S. (2025). Public funding of higher education: Seeking private funds to fill the gap? The Island, June 10, 2025.

*  Lee, S., et al. (2020). Governance and Research Collaboration in Higher Education. Studies in Higher Education, 45(5), 1021-1037.

*  OECD. (2020). Quality Assurance in Higher Education: Trends and Challenges. OECD Publishing.

*  Perera, H., & Fernando, R. (2021). Challenges in Quality Assurance Implementation in Sri Lankan Universities. Sri Lankan Journal of Educational Research, 13(1), 45-62.

*  Rahman, A., et al. (2018). Implementation of Total Quality Management (TQM) in Efforts to Improve the Quality of Higher Education: Case Study at Gorontalo State University. Journal of Indonesian Community and Public Health, 1(2).

*  Russell Group. (2014). Quality Assurance in UK Higher Education: A Tiered System Approach. Russell Group Paper.

*  assurance.pdf

*  Wang, H., & Liu, J. (2019). Multi-Model Governance Reform at Tsinghua University. Higher Education Policy, 32(4), 567-584.

*  Yusuf, F. A. (2023). Total Quality Management (TQM) and Quality of Higher Education: A Meta-Analysis Study. International Journal of Instruction, 16(2), 161-178.

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Opinion

Growth imperative:Sri Lanka’s path to prosperity

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The World Bank’s latest projections deliver a sobering warning: Sri Lanka’s economy is set to grow at a sluggish 3.5% in 2025, slipping to 3.1% in 2026. For a nation still scarred by the 2022 economic crisis, such anaemic growth threatens prolonged hardship, failing to deliver the jobs, poverty reduction, or stability Sri Lankans need. Meanwhile, India, our regional neighbour, is projected to achieve robust growth of 6.3% to 6.8% over the same period. Sri Lanka must aim to match this momentum, targeting at least 6.5% growth to transform its economic future. This demands a national commitment to faster growth through a dynamic work culture, modernised labour policies, and a skilled, inclusive workforce. The time for half-measures is over—Sri Lanka must act boldly to ignite rapid economic progress.

The Cost of Stagnation

The World Bank’s forecast of 3.5% growth in 2025 and 3.1% in 2026 signals a dangerous trajectory. At this pace, Sri Lanka risks a vicious cycle of economic fragility, with insufficient investment to spur job creation, persistent unemployment, and stagnant wages. Youth unemployment, at 25% in 2024, could worsen, fuelling frustration and social unrest. Rural communities, reliant on agriculture and remittances, face declining incomes, exacerbating inequality and limiting access to healthcare and education. Women, who make up 35% of the workforce, are disproportionately affected, with many trapped in low-paying, informal jobs, perpetuating gender disparities. Small businesses, employing over 45% of the workforce, struggle under high costs and low demand, stifling entrepreneurship.

Macroeconomic challenges compound these issues. Low growth sustains Sri Lanka’s high public debt burden, estimated at 110% of GDP in 2024, limiting fiscal space for social programmes or infrastructure. Without faster growth, the nation remains vulnerable to external shocks, such as commodity price spikes or global recessions, and internal discontent could erode social cohesion. Sri Lanka’s potential—its strategic Indian Ocean location and educated population—will remain untapped unless bold action is taken. Rapid growth is not just an economic goal; it is a social and moral imperative to restore hope and opportunity for all Sri Lankans.

Productivity is the engine of faster growth. Sri Lanka’s workforce, while capable, is hindered by inefficiencies, outdated labour practices, and skill gaps. By focusing on three pillars—cultivating a dynamic work culture, reforming labour policies, and empowering a skilled workforce—Sri Lanka can unlock the productivity needed to break free from stagnation.

Cultivating a Dynamic Work Culture

A vibrant work culture is the foundation of faster growth. In Sri Lanka, inefficiencies persist across sectors. Public sector workers often face low accountability, with absenteeism and lack of performance metrics draining resources. In traditional industries like tea and garments, reliance on low-skill models stifles innovation. To drive rapid growth, Sri Lanka must foster a culture that values efficiency, initiative, and merit.

Leadership must set the example. Government and private sector leaders can launch campaigns like “Proudly Productive Sri Lanka” to promote productivity as a national priority. Spotlighting local heroes—tech entrepreneurs scaling startups, farmers adopting sustainable practices, or public servants streamlining services—can inspire change. Regional programmes, such as productivity workshops in Galle or Jaffna, can engage local communities. Private sector examples, like John Keells Holdings implementing performance-driven cultures, show how incentives can transform workplaces. Small businesses, critical to the economy, can benefit from recognition programmes, such as awards for innovative retailers or artisans, motivating others to improve efficiency.

Schools should teach adaptability, problem-solving, and a strong work ethic, preparing students for a global economy. Incentives, such as merit-based promotions in the public sector or performance bonuses in private firms, can drive effort while ensuring fairness. Rewarding high-performing teachers or healthcare workers could improve service delivery, boosting long-term productivity. By cultivating a work culture rooted in merit and results, Sri Lanka can pave the way for faster growth.

Reforming Labour Policies

Sri Lanka’s labour dynamics often undermine productivity. Trade unions, while vital for protecting worker rights, have historically wielded significant influence, often prioritising short-term gains over long-term economic health. Since the 1970s, union-led strikes have disrupted critical sectors like transport, healthcare, and education, costing Sri Lanka an estimated 1% of GDP in 2023 alone due to lost productivity and investor confidence. Public sector rigidity, including resistance to modernisation, further hampers efficiency. To achieve faster growth, Sri Lanka must reform its labour policies to balance worker protections with economic flexibility.

Collaboration is essential. The government can establish tripartite councils involving unions, businesses, and policymakers to design policies that align worker welfare with economic goals. Creating independent arbitration boards to resolve disputes before strikes escalate would minimise disruptions while respecting workers’ rights. Introducing flexible work arrangements, such as part-time or contract roles in tourism and IT, would attract global firms and create jobs for young Sri Lankans. Simplifying business regulations, such as reducing licensing delays from months to weeks and clarifying tax policies, would create a business-friendly environment, encouraging investment in high-growth sectors like technology and logistics. These Sri Lanka-specific reforms, grounded in local realities, would drive productivity without compromising fairness.

Empowering a Skilled, Inclusive Workforce

Skill shortages are a major barrier to Sri Lanka’s growth, as highlighted by the World Bank. Despite high literacy, many workers lack the technical and digital skills needed for high-value industries. To achieve faster growth, Sri Lanka must invest in human capital, ensuring its workforce is equipped for modern economic demands.

Vocational training programmes, tailored to sectors like IT, renewable energy, and advanced agriculture, are critical. Establishing coding academies in Colombo and Kandy, in partnership with private firms, could prepare thousands for tech jobs. Community training centres with affordable internet can teach digital skills like e-commerce and data analysis, empowering rural and urban workers alike. Special programmes for women, who face barriers in accessing technical training, can increase their participation in high-growth sectors, promoting gender equity. Funding these initiatives through public-private partnerships and international grants ensures scalability.

Retraining workers in traditional sectors is vital to diversify the economy. Garment workers could learn advanced manufacturing techniques, while farmers could adopt precision agriculture to boost yields. To combat brain drain, which sees skilled Sri Lankans leave for better prospects, the government could offer tax incentives for professionals starting businesses, ensuring merit-based opportunities. By building a skilled, inclusive workforce, Sri Lanka can drive the productivity needed for faster growth.

Strengthening the Economic Ecosystem

Faster growth requires a supportive ecosystem. Investing in infrastructure—digital networks, ports, and energy grids—is critical to enhance connectivity and productivity. Expanding 5G and data centres can position Sri Lanka as a hub for IT and business process outsourcing, creating thousands of jobs. Upgrading ports like Trincomalee and modernising rail networks can connect rural economies to urban markets, boosting trade. Solar and wind projects, leveraging Sri Lanka’s natural resources, would ensure reliable energy for high-growth industries while reducing import costs.

A national export strategy, focusing on value-added products like organic spices, high-quality cinnamon, or eco-tourism, can drive growth, as recommended by the Asian Development Bank. Targeting markets in Europe and the Middle East, where demand for sustainable products is rising, could increase foreign exchange earnings. Simplifying trade regulations and offering incentives for high-value sectors would attract investment, reinforcing a business-friendly environment. Transparent governance and merit-based policies in these initiatives promote fairness and build investor confidence.

Overcoming Barriers

Driving faster growth will face challenges. Shifting work culture takes time, and unions may resist labour reforms. Political populism and budget constraints could hinder investments in skills and infrastructure. Public campaigns linking productivity to higher wages and better living standards can build support. Engaging unions through dialogue ensures their concerns are addressed, fostering collaboration. Redirecting inefficient subsidies to education, training, and infrastructure, while seeking international grants, can address funding gaps. Transparent, merit-based implementation will maintain public trust and ensure equitable outcomes.

Seizing the Opportunity

The World Bank’s projections of 3.5% growth in 2025 and 3.1% in 2026 demand urgent action. Sri Lanka cannot afford stagnation. By fostering a dynamic work culture, modernising labour policies, empowering a skilled workforce, and strengthening the economic ecosystem, Sri Lanka can achieve the rapid growth needed to transform its future. This is about building a nation where every Sri Lankan has access to opportunity and prosperity. The 2022 crisis exposed the cost of inaction; the World Bank’s projections underscore the need for bold change. Let us act decisively to forge a prosperous future for generations to come

The writer is Professor of Marketing University of Surrey. Views expressed in this article are personal.

by Professor Chanaka Jayawardhena
Chanaka.j@gmail.com

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Opinion

Turning around national carrier pie in the sky?

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Nothing pleases me more than being greeted with Ayubowan by the smiling face of a beauty clad in a bright blue saree, every time I board a SriLankan Airlines Airbus to fly to Sri Lanka, which I was forced to leave during the second JVP uprising during which people were executed for doing their duty. Perhaps, SriLankan may outlast me as I am already in the departure lounge of my life! The million-dollar question is how long. Though my fervent wish is for SriLankan Airlines to flourish as a global carrier with repute, a potential it once had, omens predict otherwise. Some of the best who worked for the predecessors of SriLankan have ventured out to build very successful airlines. Successive governments have been grappling with the question as to what could be done to the loss-making carrier; ditch it or continue to fly for prestige?

One of the key decisions of the NPP government was to let SriLankan continue as a state venture. For the Marxist-orientated JVP, perhaps, any input from the private sector is an anathema although most successful airlines are private sector entities. Many countries that had state-owned carriers have opted for privatisation for reasons of economy, only countries with vast wealth to buy aircraft outright being able to maintain state airlines. Emirates Airlines, owned by a super-rich Gulf state, which started in 1985 with only two aircraft on wet-lease from Pakistan International Airlines, is a giant in aviation today. So is Qatar Airways, which started operations only in 1994 and is owned by another super-rich Gulf state. On the other hand, the UK handed over British Airways to the private sector a long time ago and India handed over Air India back to the original owners, the Tata Group in 2021. Despite the setback of the recent downing of the 787 Dreamliner, Air India is bound to prosper as the modernisation of the fleet goes on at an unbelievably rapid pace. In early 2023, Air India ordered 250 new jets from Airbus and 220 from Boeing, the largest order in modern times. The Airbus order was increased by another 100 in December 2024. This order exceeds the total fleet strength of Emirates and Qatar combined!

True to form, the NPP government made one hell of a show with the new acquisition to the SriLankan fleet, bringing the total number of aircraft to 23. Some communiques gave the false impression that it was a brand-new aircraft bought by the airline, flypast down the West coast on its way from Airbus headquarters in France to BIA adding to the show. One can understand the water-jet welcome to any acquisition but the rest of the celebrations was well over the top. It transpires that the ‘new’ Airbus A330 is actually a refurbished 14 years old aircraft, originally owned by Garuda Indonesian Airways for 12 years and then by a now-defunct South Korean Carrier. It was not bought either but is on a dry-lease. It is said that the order was placed by the previous government! NPP seems very adept at taking credit for the actions of others and to excel in words!

I have been on board a brand-new aircraft during its inaugural flight. A grateful patient of mine, who happened to be a travel agent, passed on his invitation for the maiden voyage of a new Swissair aircraft on the Zurich to London sector. I cannot recollect the type of the narrow-body jet, as it was so long ago, but I distinctly remember that there was no tamasha at all, the only difference to a routine flight being the addition by the captain that it is a brand-new aircraft in his welcome announcement! SriLankan, as well as its predecessors have added brand new aircraft to the fleet but I cannot remember any tamashas like this. In fact, SriLankan was the first Asian airline to operate the four-engined Airbus A340 in 1994.

SriLankan can trace its ancestry to Air Ceylon, which was established in 1947 as the state-owned flag carrier which ceased operations in 1979, to be replaced by Air Lanka. Rebranding as SriLankan happened when Emirates Airlines took a 43% share of Air Lanka together with a 10-year management contract. With the end of the management contract SL government decided to buy back the shares, more due to political reasons. Though there was an operational profit during the Emirates period, it is claimed that SriLankan lost in many other ways to Emirates including valuable routes.

Srilankan could have been a success story, if not for political interference, the worst offence being handing over the chairmanship to those without adequate experience. JRJ appointed a pilot to the top job whilst Mahinda appointed his brother-in-law. Some CEOs were totally corrupt, one of them hitting the headlines when Airbus settled a graft scandal with British authorities. Worst crime, among his many others including the idiotic agreement on Hambantota port by Ranil on SriLankan Airlines was the cancellation of the order to purchase four A350 aircraft, one of the most advanced aircrafts in the skies. Perhaps, he cancelled the order to spite the Rajapaksas rather than renegotiating to buy a fewer number instead of paying hefty cancellation charges with no aircraft. If the cost involved in establishing service facilities for a new type of aircraft was deemed unjustified, SriLankan could have purchased the A350s and dry-leased them, using the funds to dry-lease a few more A330s to expand services. Puny actions of this nature together with rampant corruption at the top has made SriLankan Airlines a liability to the nation. The previous government had drawn plans for a sale and there were interested parties. AKD decided that SriLankan should remain a state venture and appointed a person from one of the interested parties as the new chairman. If he steadies the ship and the IMF demands that SriLankan be privatised as a condition of one of the future tranches, a miracle could happen!

by Dr Upul Wijayawardhna

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