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Midweek Review

How Premadasa paved the way for first Parama Weera Vibushanaya, posthumously

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The Army unveiled a special war hero memorial opposite the new TV transmission tower at Kokavil after the conclusion of the war. It was put up in honour of those who made the supreme sacrifice at Kokavil in June 1990

 

By Shamindra Ferdinando

One-time Army Commander Gen. Daya Ratnayake (2013-2015) recently joined a special event on Zoom in honour of those who made the supreme sacrifice at Kokavil, 31 years ago. Prof. Raj Somadeva and writer Charith Kiriella delivered special lectures on the occasion. Those who defended the isolated Kokavil base – Officer Commanding, Kokavil transmission complex, Saliya Aladeniya, an old Trinitian who was posthumously promoted Captain of 3 Battalion, Sri Lanka Sinha Regiment (3 SLSR), and his men, perished in the battle. The LTTE didn’t hand over their bodies.

 Aladeniya, the first recipient of the country’s highest gallantry award, Parama Weera Vibushanaya, sacrificed his young life, serving on underprepared and poorly equipped Army. Opportunistic politics of the day made matters worse. 

Against the backdrop of renewed interest in Kokavil, in the wake of the recent commemorative event, and Derana ‘Big Focus’ featuring Gen. Ratnayaka , the writer felt the need to examine the then security-political environment. Let me stress that the June-July 1990 Kokavil battle was nothing but a debacle that caused a humiliating setback. Kokavil remained in the hands of the LTTE till 2009.

 A comment on the recent print media reportage of Kokavil heroism by academic Michael Roberts, too, underscored the pivotal importance of a better understanding of the then situation. Author Roberts didn’t mince his words when pointing out the inadequacies in the coverage, though he appreciated the effort.

 What went wrong at Kokavil? Why did the Army abandon the isolated detachment? Who created an environment conducive for the LTTE? And how the Kokavil debacle/tragedy transformed the entire Vanni landscape overnight to the LTTE advantage?

 Having won the Dec 19, 1988 presidential election, UNP strongman Ranasinghe Premadasa (RP polled 2,569,199/50.43%. Sirimavo Bandaranaike polled 2,289,860/44.95%) then led the party to victory at Feb 15, 1989 parliamentary election. The UNP secured 125 seats whereas the main Opposition SLFP managed 67. It would be pertinent to mention that the UNP earlier, by way of a fraudulent referendum, conducted on Dec 22, 1982, extended the life of Parliament by six years. It was the only referendum held in Sri Lanka so far. The referendum resulted in the UNP continuing till 1989, after having won the 1977 general election, with a 4/5 landslide.

 As requested by President Premadasa, rather bluntly, India brought its high profile military mission, in the North and East, to an end, in March 1990. India deployed troops, in July 1987, in terms of the Indo-Lanka Accord, forced on President JRJ. The writer was among a small group of journalists taken to Trincomalee harbour to see the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) quit Sri Lanka, following a 32-month deployment here (The IPKF is off – The Island, March 25, 1990). At the time India completed the withdrawal, the LTTE had been engaged in negotiations with a gullible Premadasa for over a year. The LTTE exploited direct negotiations with President Premadasa, the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. By the time the IPKF ended its mission here, the LTTE was ready to resume hostilities. However, the LTTE delayed the resumption of hostilities, till the second week of June, 1990.

 The then Army Commander Lt. Gen. Hamilton Wanasinghe hadn’t been prepared to fight the battle hardened LTTE. Having inflicted heavy losses on the IPKF, and gained valuable battlefield experience, the LTTE was ready to strike the Army. Having literally crushed the second JVP insurrection, by early 1990 by wiping out its entire leadership, barring Somawansa Amerasinghe, who managed to escape to India in the nick of time, before security forces could get at him, the Army, too, was cocky and probably didn’t anticipate a large scale LTTE offensive, in less than three months, after the IPKF pullout, because of the ostensible honeymoon with President Premadasa, who even gifted it arms and other wherewithal.

The Kokavil debacle should be quite rightly examined against the backdrop of Premadasa’s folly. Then State Defence Minister Ranjan Wijeratne, Army Chief Gen. Wanasinghe, the then advisor to the President, Gen. (retd.) Cyril Ranatunga, and IGP Ernest Perera, couldn’t absolve themselves of the catastrophe caused by political-military miscalculations. All of them were made to look like utter fools. Premadasa made some ludicrous attempts to persuade the LTTE to return to the negotiating table. The President’s utter failure to comprehend the LTTE strategy is still a mystery. The top brass remained silent. Obviously, no one had the courage to advice the President, whose Chief Negotiator Minister A.C.S. Hameed’s desperate last minute attempt to keep the talks with the LTTE going led to him nearly paying with his life. Premadasa’s idiocy was such that he had no qualms in sacrificing the lives of several hundred police officers and men who were ordered to surrender to terrorists in an attempt to mollify the LTTE.

 

LTTE seizes A9 north of Vavuniya

 The attack on the Kokavil detachment took place in the wake of the massacre of police officers. Gen. Wanasinghe’s Army lacked the wherewithal to meet the threat. The Army could have made an attempt to neutralise the impending LTTE threat by reinforcing isolated detachments along the Kandy-Jaffna A9 road, north of Vavuniya. Unfortunately, the Army lacked the wherewithal to meet the LTTE threat in the Eastern theatre, Vanni and the Jaffna peninsula, simultaneously. Even if the Army had realised the rapidly growing danger, on multiple fronts, the top brass feared to warn Premadasa. Actually, Premadasa never believed in consensus on security matters. Premadasa simply threw caution to the winds. 

The Army was under pressure in the northern theatre, with the Jaffna Fort under attack. Kokavil was almost forgotten as it came under intensified attack, following the massacre of nearly 600 policemen in the East. In the North, the Army found it difficult even to evacuate the wounded. The Jaffna Fort, too, was under siege.

 Maj. Gen. Denzil Kobbekaduwa was placed in charge of the Northern region on July 11, 1991, exactly a month after the eruption of hostilities. Army Chief Wanasinghe never explained why Kobbekaduwa hadn’t been brought into the scene until it was too late. Did Gen. Wanasinghe fail to convince Premadasa of the urgent need to change the Northern Command? By the time Kobbekaduwa received command, the situation had deteriorated to such an extent, his appearance didn’t make any difference. Just two days after, Kobbekaduwa received the Northern Command, the LTTE overran Kokavil held by two platoons. It was the first major setback on the A9. The Kokavil debacle highlighted the absence of a strategy either to reinforce isolated detachments or evacuate them. The SLAF lacked required strike capability. The SLAF struggled to cope up with increasingly heavy commitment with just the Italian built Sia Marchettis (propeller driven light ground attack aircraft hardly sufficient even for counter-insurgency operations). Volunteers deployed at isolated Kokavil detachment never had a chance against strong LTTE units. Sinha volunteers turned down an earlier directive to abandon the base, leaving behind seriously wounded men. The LTTE executed those captured during the battle for Kokavil. Two men who crawled through the LTTE cordon managed to reach Mankulam detachment situated north of Kokavil.

 Let me stress that those killed defending detachments along the A9 North of Vavuniya, had to be buried there as the Army lacked the wherewithal to take back the dead and the wounded overland. Isolated detachments could be supplied by air and within a month after resumption of hostilities, following the 14-month Premadasa-Prabhakaran honeymoon, the A9 aka Main Supply Route (MSR) north up to strategic Elephant Pass, was lost. The SLAF carried out risky missions to supply isolated bases and evacuate the wounded.

 Four years after the combined security forces brought the war to a successful end, the then Brigadier Maithri Dias, recounted how the Army planned to evacuate Kilinochchi, even before the resumption of hostilities. Having vacated both Valvettithurai and Point Pedro detachments on the LTTE’s request, the President wouldn’t have minded the Army giving up more camps. The planned evacuation of the Kilinochchi detachment obviously is a case in point. What was really shocking was the Army seeking the assistance of a Catholic priest, based in Kilinochchi, to evacuate the personnel along with arms, ammunition and equipment.

 

Who wanted Kilinochchi evacuated?

 The then Capt. Maithri Dias, of the 6th Battalion of the Sinha Regiment (6SR), arrived in Kilinochchi several days before the LTTE resumed hostilities, on June 11, 1990, with the massacre of hundreds of policemen in the Eastern Province. Dias was responding to a directive from Lt. Colonel H. R. Stephen, the then Coordinating Officer, based in Kilinochchi (Lt. Col. Stephen was killed on the morning of Aug.8, 1992, at Araly point, Kayts. He was one of the officers killed along with war veterans, Maj. Gen. Denzil Kobbekaduwa, Brig. Wijaya Wimalaratne. The dead included Rear Admiral Mohan Jayamaha, Lt Colonel G.H. Ariyarathne, Lt Colonel Y.N. Palipana, Commander Asanga Lankathilaka, Lt Colonel Nalin de Alwis, Lt Commander C.B. Wijepura and Private W J Wickremasinghe). Only one survived the blast.

 Dias, the then General Officer Commanding 54 Division, got in touch with the writer immediately having read ‘Eelam War II: LTTE takes upper hand at the onset – The Island Feb 22, 2013).

 Brigadier Dias recounted the situation in Kilinochchi, leading to the Army headquarters directive to vacate the town in the last week of July 1990. Dias said: “I was tasked to function as a staff officer in Kilinochchi under Lt. Colonel Stephen. The deployment therein comprised one platoon of 6 SR, another platoon of 3 SR (Volunteer) as well as support personnel (3 SR volunteers were based at Kokavil, south of Mankulam) There were altogether about 90 personnel at Kilinochchi. As the then government was having talks with the LTTE, we never expected any serious trouble. Along the A9 road, north of Vavuniya, we had several camps. North of Kilinochchi, troops were positioned at Elephant Pass, Jaffna Fort and Palaly. South of Kilinochchi, troops held Mankulam and Kokavil. Immediately after arriving in Kilinochchi, I was told by Lt. Col. Stephen to prepare to evacuate the troops. On the instructions of the Coordinating Officer, I met a Catholic priest in Kilinochchi to discuss transport arrangements for my men. Lt. Col. Stephen was away in Palaly. He was to go on leave following a conference in Palaly. Following the conference I received further instructions from Lt. Col. Stephen regarding the planned withdrawal. I was told to prepare a plan for an immediate withdrawal. As earlier discussed, I went out to meet the Catholic priest, who promised to help us move men and material from Kilinochchi to Elephant Pass. The sudden disappearance of the priest made me uneasy. The following day (June 11, 1990), the LTTE started attacking the police and the Army in the Eastern Province.”

 Dias retired in 2016 after serving as the General Officer Commanding (GoC) of 53 Division after having been promoted to the rank of Maj. Gen in 2014.

  It was evident that the then government had decided to abandon Kilinochchi, even before the outbreak of hostilities in the second week of June 1990. At that time Maj. Gen. Jaliya Nanmunai had served as Security Forces Commander, Jaffna.

 

Saving Kilinochchi troops

 In spite of the much deteriorated situation at Kokavil, troops at Mankulam couldn’t intervene. The entire Army had been under tremendous pressure as the LTTE advanced on bases in the Vanni theatre.  Brig. Dias recalled the crises the Army faced: “We heard heavy gunfire from the direction of Kokavil, where troops were fighting a desperate battle. The Kokavil debacle had a devastating impact on the Army. A section of troops based, at Kilinochchi, declared their intention to vacate the camp, regardless of the consequences. Having calmed them, I took measures to further strengthen the defences until a large force could intervene to facilitate our withdrawal, northwards. Pushing towards Kokavil seemed unrealistic and suicidal.” 

However, those deployed at Kilinochchi had been extremely lucky as the Jaffna Command managed to muster sufficient troops to reach the beleaguered base in the last week of July. The 6th Battalion of the Gajaba Regiment (6 GR) and the 5th Battalion of the Gemunu Watch (5 GW) advanced from Elephant Pass to Kilinochchi to save those trapped at the Kilinochchi camp.

 During the rescue mission, troops at Kilinochchi had almost lost communications with those coming to their rescue. Brig. Dias said: “We ran out of fuel needed to maintain communications. Luckily, the two Land Cruisers, which we removed from the Kilinochchi police station at the onset of trouble, had fuel in their tanks and it was adequate to meet our immediate requirement.”

 Interestingly, Brig. Dias is the first GOC of the re-established 54 Division. Army headquarters restored the Division on Sept 10, 2010. The LTTE literally wiped out the 54 Division headquartered at Elephant Pass in late April 2000. Heavy losses suffered by the Division compelled Army headquarters to disband the formation. It was the worst battlefield defeat experienced by the Army during the entire conflict.

 In September, 1990, the Army vacated isolated bases at Jaffna Fort and Mandaitivu. In the third week of Nov, the LTTE overran the Mankulam detachment on the A9. Premadasa’s security advisor, retired Gen. Cyril Ranatunga remained mum. Ranatunga played it safe. Just within four weeks after the eruption of Eelam War II, on June 11, 1990, the Army lost Kokavil and Kilinochchi. Mankulam was abandoned in the third week of Nov, 1990, thereby giving the LTTE unhindered access across Kandy-Jaffna A9, between Vavuniya and Elephant Pass. 

The Army abandoned Mankulam under heavy fire just weeks after carrying out a heli-borne mission to consolidate the base. In the absence of an overall contingency plan, the Army responded to LTTE operations over a wide area. 

Premadasa lacked even basic interest in security matters thereby allowing unpardonable deterioration of the security situation. Perhaps, the threat the President faced within the UNP, with a powerful section more or less discarded by him, working with the SLFP to impeach him, unsettled Premadasa. Premadasa remained immobilised in the wake of the LTTE directive in late Oct/Nov 1990 for the Northern Province Muslims to vacate the region. The government actually did nothing to avert the unprecedented crisis. The courageous efforts made by troops, under Captain Aladeniya’s command, underscored the Army’s failure. Even though the Army discussed the possibility of mounting a heli-borne mission to break the siege on Kokavil detachment in June it never materialised. Troops called in to carry out that mission were eventually deployed for the rescue of those who had been trapped at Mankulam. But, the Army subsequently withdrew a section of the troops, including commandos sent to Mankulam. Overnight, Mankulam became vulnerable and eventually the LTTE overran it in Nov 1990. Within eight months after the IPKF withdrawal, Premadasa lost the entire Vanni region with troops confined to few coastal areas. In the Jaffna peninsula, the Army had been confined to Palaly, Kankesanthurai and Elephant Pass where troops received supplies from air and sea. The Navy struggled to move supplies required by the Army to the North from the eastern port city of Trincomalee whereas the SLAF, too, operated flights to Palaly under difficult circumstances. However, in the absence of missile threat, during the Eelam War II, facilitated supply missions to the North. But, overall supplying troops based in the Jaffna peninsula had been a tremendous challenge faced by the military.

Strategic Elephant Pass base was almost overrun in mid-1991. If not for the successful sea borne assault by troops of Operation Balavegaya led by Gen Denzil Kobekaduwa and Brig. Wimalaratne, Elephant Pass too would have been overrun.

 Premadasa caused an unprecedented catastrophe by pursuing an utterly foolish political agenda at the expense of national security. His failure as well as that of Gen. Wanasinghe to prepare for any eventuality following the IPKF withdrawal allowed the LTTE to take the upper hand in the Vanni region. By the time the LTTE assassinated Premadasa on May Day 1993, the LTTE achieved superiority in the North with all bases under pressure and the situation was rapidly deteriorating. The LTTE gradually pressed the Army in the North with Palaly under siege at the time of 1994 parliamentary elections followed by presidential polls in Nov 1994.

 

 



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Midweek Review

A question of national pride

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Marshal of the Air Force Roshan Goonetileke speaking with Field Marshal Sarath Fonseka. Admiral of the Fleet Wasantha Karannagoda is in the middle (pic by Nishan S. Priyantha)

President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, who also holds the Finance and Defence portfolios, caused controversy last year when the Defence Ministry announced that he wouldn’t attend the National Victory Day event. Angry public reactions over social media compelled the President to change his decision. He attended the event. Whatever his past and for what he stood for as the President and the Commander-in-Chief of our armed forces, Dissanayake cannot, under any circumstances, shirk his responsibilities. The next National Victory Day event is scheduled in mid-May. The event coincides with the day, May 18, when the entire country was brought back under government control and the Army put a bullet through Prabhakaran’s head as he hid in the banks of the Nanthikadal lagoon, on the following day. The government also forgot the massive de-mining operations undertaken by the military to pave the way for the resettlement of people, rehabilitation of nearly 12,000 terrorists, and maintaining UN troop commitments, even during the war.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

The majestic presence of Field Marshal Sarath Fonseka, Admiral of the Fleet Wasantha Karannagoda and Marshal of the Air Force Roshan Goonetileke, though now more than 16 years after that historic victory, represented the war-winning armed forces at the 78 Independence Day celebrations. Their attendance reminded the country of Sri Lanka’s greatest post-independence accomplishment, the annihilation of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in May 2009.

Among the other veterans at the Independence Square event was General Shavendra Silva, the wartime General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the celebrated 58 Division. The 58 Division played a crucial role in the overall Vanni campaign that brought the LTTE down to its knees.

The 55 (GOC Maj. Gen. Kamal Gunaratne) and 53 Divisions (GOC Brig. Prasanna Silva) that had been deployed in the Jaffna peninsula, as well as newly raised formations 57 Division (GOC Maj. Gen. Jagath Dias), 58 Division and 59 Division (Brig. Nandana Udawatta), obliterated the LTTE.

Chagie Gallage, Fonseka’s first choice to command the 58 Division (former Task Force 1) following his exploits in the East, but had to leave the battlefield due to health issues then, rejoined the Vanni campaign at a decisive stage. Please forgive the writer for his inability to mention all those who gave resolute leadership on the ground due to limitations of space. The LTTE that genuinely believed in its battlefield invincibility was crushed within two years and 10 months. Of the famed ex-military leadership, Fonseka was the only one with no shame to publicly declare support for ‘Aragalaya,’ forgetting key personalities in the Rajapaksa government who helped him along the way to crush the Tigers, especially after the attempt on his life by a female LTTE suicide bomber, inside the Army Headquarters, when he had to direct all military operations from Colombo. And he went to the extent of addressing US- and India-backed protesters before they stormed President’s House on the afternoon of July 9, 2022. President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, wartime Defence Secretary, whose contribution can never be compared with any other, had to flee Janadhipathi Mandiyara and take refuge aboard SLNS Gajabahu, formerly of the US Coast Guard. The same sinister mob earlier ousted him from his private residence, at Mirihana, that he occupied previously without being a burden to the state. It was only after the attack on his private residence on March 31, 2022, that he came to reside in the official residence, the President’s House.

The presence of Fonseka, Karannagoda and Goonetileke at the Independence Day commemoration somewhat compensated for the pathetic failure on the part of the government to declare, during the parade, even by way of a few words, the armed forces historic triumph over the LTTE against predictions by many a self- proclaimed expert to the contrary. That treacherous and disgraceful decision brought shame on the government. Social media relentlessly attacked the government. To make matters worse, the elite Commandos and Special Forces were praised for their role in the post-Cyclone Ditwah situation. The Special Boat Squadron (SBS) and Rapid Action Boat Squadron (RABS), too, were appreciated for their interventions during the post-cyclone period.

The shocking deliberate omission underscored the pathetic nature of the powers that be at a time the country is in a flux. If Cyclone Ditwah hadn’t devastated Sri Lanka, the government probably may not have anything else to say about the elite fighting formations.

The government also left out the main battle tanks, armoured fighting vehicles, tank recovery vehicles and various types of artillery, as well as the multi barrel rocket launchers (MBRLs). The absence of Sri Lanka’s precious firepower on Independence Day shocked the country. The government owes an explanation. Lt. Gen. Lasantha Rodrigo of the Artillery is the 25th Commander of the Army. How did the Commander of the Army feel about the decision to leave the armour and artillery out of the parade?

The combined firepower of armour and artillery caused havoc on the enemy, thanks to deep penetration units that infiltrated behind enemy lines giving precise intelligence on where and what to hit.

The LTTE suffered devastating losses in coordinated attacks mounted during both offensive and defensive action, both in the northern and eastern theatres. The current dispensation would never be able to comprehend the gradual enhancement of armour and artillery firepower over the years to meet the growing LTTE threat. The MBRLs were a game changer. President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga’s government introduced the MBRLs in 2000 in the aftermath of devastating battlefield debacles in the northern theatre. (If all our MBRLs had been discarded after the successful conclusion of the war in May 2009, there is no point in blaming this government for non-display of the monster MBRLs. But, there cannot be any excuse for the government decision not to display the artillery.

Even during the three decades long war and some of the fiercest fighting in the North and East, the armour and artillery were always on display. It would be pertinent to mention the acquisition of Chinese light tanks in 1991, about a year after the outbreak of Eelam War II, and T 55 Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) from the Czech Republic, also during the early ’90s, marked the transformation of the regiment. Let me remind our readers that both Armour and Artillery were deployed on infantry role due to dearth of troops in the northern and eastern theatres.

No kudos for infantry

The Armour and Artillery were followed by the five infantry formations, Sri Lanka Light Infantry (SLLI), Sinha Regiment (SR), Gemunu Watch (GW), Gajaba Regiment (GR) and Vijayabahu Infantry Regiment (VIR). They bore the brunt of the fighting. They spearheaded offensives, sometimes in extremely unfavourable battlefield situations. The team handling the live media coverage conveniently failed to mention their battlefield sacrifices or accomplishments. It was nothing but a treacherous act perpetrated by a government not sensitive at all to the feelings of the vast majority of people.

The infantry was followed by the Mechanized Infantry Regiment (MIR). Raised in February 2007 as the armed forces were engaged in large scale operations in the eastern theatre, and the Vanni campaign was about to be launched, at the formation of the Regiment, it consisted of the third battalion of the SLLI, 10th battalion of SR and 4th battalion of GR. The 5th and 6th Armoured Corps were also added to the MIR. The 4th MIR was established also in February 2008 and after the end of war 21 battalion of the Sri Lanka National Guard was converted to 5 (Volunteer) MIR.

The contingent of MIR troops joined the Independence Day parade, without their armoured vehicles. Perhaps the political leadership seems to be blind to the importance of maintaining military traditions. Field Marshal Fonseka, who ordered the establishment of MIR must have felt really bad at the way the government took the shine off the military parade. What did the government expect to achieve by scaling down the military parade? Obviously, the government appears to be confident that the northern and eastern electorates would respond favourably to such gestures. Whatever the politics in the former war zones, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP)-led Jathika Jana Balawegaya (JJB) must realise that it cannot, under any circumstances, continue to hurt the feelings of the majority community.

The description of Commandos and Special Forces was restricted to their post-Ditwah rehabilitation role. The snipers were not included in the parade. Motorcycle riding Special Forces, too, were absent. The way the Armour, Artillery, Infantry, as well Commandos and Special Forces were treated, we couldn’t have expected justice to other regiments and corps. In fact, the government didn’t differentiate fighting formations from the National Guard.

The National Guard was raised in Nov. 1989 in the wake of the quelling of the second JVP-led terrorist campaign. Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike’s government swiftly crushed the first JVP bid to seize power in April 1971. The second bid was far worse and for three years the JVP waged a murderous campaign but finally the armed forces and police overwhelmed them. On Nov. 1, 1989, prominent battalions that had been deployed for the protection of politicians were amalgamated to establish the first National Guard battalion and upgraded as a new battalion of the Volunteer Force.

The Navy and Air Force, too, didn’t receive the recognition they deserved. Just a passing reference was made about the Fourth Attack Flotilla, the Navy’s premier offensive arm. The government also forgot the turning point of the war against the LTTE when Karannagoda’s Navy, with US intelligence backing, hunted down Velupillai Prabhakaran’s floating arsenals, on the high seas.

Karannagoda, the writer is certain, must have felt disappointed and angry over the disgraceful handling of the parade. The war-winning armed forces deserved the rightful place at the Independence Day parade.

The government did away with the fly past. Perhaps, the Air Force no longer had the capacity to fly MiG 27s, Kfirs, F 7s and Mi 24s. During the war and after Katunayake-based jet squadrons thundered over the Independence Day parade while the Air Force contingent was saluting the President. Jet squadrons and MI 24s (Current Defence Secretary Air Vice Marshal (retd) Sampath Thuyakontha commanded the No 09 Mi 24 squadron during the war (https://island.lk/govt-responds-in-kind-to-thuyaconthas-salvo/). Goonetileke’s Air Force conducted an unprecedented campaign to inflict strategic blows to the enemy fighting capacity. That was in addition to the SLAF taking out aerial targets and providing close-air-support to ground forces, while also doing a great job in helicopters whisking away troop casualties for prompt medical attention.

Chagie’s salvo

Maj. Gen Chagie Gallage

The armed forces paid a very heavy price to bring the war to a successful conclusion. During the 1981 to 2009 period, the Army lost nearly 24,000 officers and men. Of them, approximately 2,400 died during January-May 2009 when the Vanni formations surrounded and decimated the enemy. (Army, Navy and Air Force as well as police suffered loss of lives during the campaigns against the JVP in 1971 and during the 1987-1989 period) At the crucial final days of the offensive, ground forces were deprived of aerial support in a bid to minimise civilian losses as fleeing Tigers used Tamil civilians they had corralled as a human shield. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) as revealed by Wikileaks acknowledged the armed forces gesture but no government sought to exploit such unintentional support for Sri Lanka’s advantage. That wasn’t an isolated lapse.

In the run-up to the now much discussed 78 Independence Day parade, Gallage caused unprecedented controversy when he warned of possible attempts to shift the Security Forces Headquarters, in Jaffna, to the Vanni mainland. The GR veteran’s social media post sent shockwaves through the country. Gallage, known for his outspoken statements/positions and one of the victims of global sanctions imposed on military leaders, questioned the rationale in vacating the Jaffna Headquarters, central to the overall combined armed forces deployment in the Jaffna peninsula and the islands.

Regarding Gallage’s explosive claim, the writer sought clarification from the government but in vain. About a year after the end of the war, the then government began releasing land held by the armed forces. In line with the post-war reconciliation initiatives, the war-winning Mahinda Rajapaksa government released both government and public property, not only in the Jaffna peninsula, but in all other northern and eastern administrative districts, as well. Since 2010, successive governments have released just over 90 percent of land, once held by the armed forces. Unfortunately, political parties and various local and international organisations, with vested interests, continue to politicise the issues at hand. None of them at least bothered to issue a simple press release demanding that the LTTE halted the forcible recruitment of children, use of women/girls in suicide missions and end reprehensible use of civilian human shields.

The current dispensation has gratefully accepted President Ranil Wickremesinghe’s proposal to reduce the Army strength to 100,000 by 2030. Wickremesinghe took that controversial but calculated decision in line with his overall response to post-Aragalaya developments. The Island learns that the President’s original intention was to downsize the Army to 75,000 but he settled for 100,000.

Whatever those who still cannot stomach the armed forces’ triumph over the LTTE and JVP had to say, the armed forces, without any doubt, are the most respected institution in the country.

Maithripala Sirisena and Ranil Wickremesinghe can never absolve themselves of the responsibility for betraying the armed forces at the Geneva-based United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in Oct. 2015. The treacherous JVP-backed the Yahapalana government to co-sponsor a US-led accountability resolution. That massive act of unprecedented betrayal should be examined taking into consideration primarily two issues – (1) the Tamil electorate throwing its weight behind Sirisena at the 2015 presidential election at the behest of now defunct Tamil National Alliance [TNA] (2) a tripartite agreement on the setting up of hybrid war crimes court. That agreement involved the US, Sri Lanka and TNA. Let me stress that at the 2010 presidential election, the TNA joined the UNP and the JVP in supporting war-winning Army Commander Fonseka’s candidature at the first-post war national election. Thanks to WikiLeaks, the world knows how the US manipulated the TNA to back Fonseka, the man who spearheaded a ruthless campaign that decimated the LTTE. Fonseka’s Army beat the LTTE, at its own game. Then, the Tamil electorate voted for Fonseka, who won all predominately Tamil speaking electoral districts but suffered a humiliating defeat in the rest of the country.

Let us not forget ex-LTTE cadres as well as members of other Tamil groups who backed successive governments. Tamil men contributed even to clandestine operations behind enemy lines. Unfortunately, successive governments had been pathetic in their approach to counter pro-Eelam propaganda. Sri Lanka never had a tangible action plan to counter those propagating lies. Instead, they turned a blind eye to anti-Sri Lanka campaigns. Dimwitted politicians just played pandu with the issues at hand. The Canadian declaration that Sri Lanka perpetrated genocide in May 2022 humiliated the country. Our useless Parliament didn’t take up that issue while three years later the Labour Party-run UK sanctioned four persons, including Karannagoda and Shavendra Silva, in return for Tamil support at the parliamentary elections there.

Victory parade fiasco

In 2016, the Yahapalana fools cancelled the Victory Day parade, held uninterrupted since 2009 to celebrate the country’s greatest post-independence achievement. By then, the Yahapalana administration had betrayed the armed forces at the UNHRC. The UNP-SLFP combine operated as if the armed forces didn’t exist. Sirisena had no option but to give in to Wickremesinghe’s despicable strategy meant to appease Eelamists whose support he desired, even at the expense of the overall national interest.

The Victory Day parade was meant to mark Sri Lanka’s triumph over separatist Tamil terrorism. It was never intended to humiliate the Tamil community, though the LTTE consisted of Tamil-speaking people. Those who complained bitterly about the May Victory Day celebration never wanted to publicly acknowledge that the eradication of the LTTE saved them from being terrorised any further. All concerned should accept that as long as the LTTE had the wherewithal to wage terror attacks, peace couldn’t have been restored. As Attorney-at-Law Ajaaz Mohamed repeatedly stressed to the writer the importance of UNP leader Wickremesinghe’s genuine efforts to address the national issue, he could have succeeded if the LTTE acted responsibly. The writer is also of the view that Wickremesinghe even risking his political future bent backwards to reach consensus at the negotiating table but the LTTE exploited the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) arranged by Norway, to bring down Wickremesinghe’s government.

Wickremesinghe earned the wrath of the Sinhalese for giving into LTTE demands but he struggled to keep the talks on track. Then, the LTTE delivered a knockout blow to his government by withdrawing from the negotiating table, in late April 2003, thereby paving the way for President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga to take over key ministries, including Defence, and set the stage for parliamentary polls in April 2004. The LTTE’s actions made Eelam War IV inevitable.

The armed forces hadn’t conducted a major offensive since 2001 following the disastrous Agnikheela offensive in the Jaffna peninsula. Wickremesinghe went out of his way to sustain peace but the LTTE facilitated Mahinda Rajapaksa’s victory, at the presidential election, to create an environment which it believed conducive for the final war. Having killed the much-respected Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar, in August 2005, and made suicide attempts on the lives of Sarath Fonseka and Gotabaya Rajapaksa in April and Oct 2006, the LTTE fought well and hard but was ultimately overwhelmed, first in the East and then in North/Vanni in a series of battles that decimated its once powerful conventional fighting capacity. The writer was lucky to visit Puthumathalan waters in late April 2009 as the fighting raged on the ground and the Navy was imposing unprecedented blockade on the Mullaitivu coast.

The LTTE proved its capabilities against the Indian Army, too. The monument at Battaramulla where Indians leaders and other dignitaries, both military and civilian, pay homage, is a reminder of the LTTE fighting prowess. India lost nearly 1,500 officers and men here (1987 to 1990) and then lost one-time Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in a suicide attack in Tamil Nadu just over a year after New Delhi terminated its military mission here. The rest is history.

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Midweek Review

Theatre and Anthropocentrism in the age of Climate Emergency

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Saumya Liyanage as Silindu in Beddegama (Village in the Jungle) television series directed by Priyantha Kolambage. Photo credit Priyantha Kolambage.

A few days ago, I was in a remote region of Sri Lanka, Hambantota, a dry zone area, where people mainly live on farming. The farming methods are still very primitive. I was engaged in a television series, titled Beddegama, directed by Priyantha Kolambage. The character I play is ‘Silindu’, a hunter. Silindu is a character created by Leonard Woolf, a colonial administrator, who lived in Sri Lanka in the early 20th century. In his widely read book, Village in the Jungle, Silindu, the hunter lives with his two daughters and his sister in a mud hut in the forest. They are one of the few families in this village struggling to survive amidst drought, famine and overbearing government authority.

Phenomenologically speaking, Silindu is an environmental philosopher. He believes that the jungle is a powerful phenomenon, a living entity. He thinks that the animals who live in the jungle are also human-like beings. He talks to trees and hunts animals only to dull the pangs of hunger. He is an ethical man. He believes that the jungle is an animate being and its animals are his fellow travellers in this world. His younger daughter, Hinnihami, breastfeeds a fawn. His sustainable living with fellow animals and nature is challenged by British law. He kills two people who try to dominate and suppress poor villagers by using their administerial powers. He is sentenced to death.

What I want to highlight here is the way our predecessors coexisted with nature and how they made the environment a part of their lives. Silindu’s philosophy of nature and animals is fascinating because he does not think that humans are not the centre of this living environment. Rather humans are a part of the whole ecosystem. This is the thinking that we need today to address the major environmental crises we are facing.

When I first addressed Aesthetica, the International conference on Performing Arts, as a keynote speaker, at Christ University, Bangalore, in 2018, in my keynote address, I emphasised the importance of understanding the human body, particularly the performing body as an embodied subject. What I meant by this term ‘embodied subject’ is that over the centuries, our bodies in theatre, rehearsal spaces and studios are being defined and described as an object to be manipulated. Even in modern dance, such manipulation is visible in the modernist approaches to dance. The human body is an object to be manipulated. However, I tried to show the audience that the performing body was not a mere object on stage for audience appreciation. It is a being that is vital for the phenomenological understanding of performance. The paradox of this objectification is that we objectify our bodies as something detached from the mind and similarly, we assume our environment, the world as something given for human consumption.

Performance and Sustainability

Just to bring the phenomenological lexicon to this discussion, I will draw your attention to one of the chapter in my latest book, titled, Lamp in a Windless Place: Phenomenology and Performance (2025) published by VAPA Press, University of Visual and Performing Arts, Colombo. This project is based on Sarah Kane’s famous play text 4.48 Psychosis. In this chapter I wrote phenomenological environmentalists explain the two ways that human beings interact and engage with the life-world. The one way of this engagement is defined as ‘involvement’ we involve with various activities in the world and it is one of the ways that we are being-in-the-world. The second way of being-in-this-world is that we ‘inhere’ in the world meaning that we are built with worldly phenomena or we are made out of the same stuff of our environment. (James cited in Liyanage 2025, pp. 98-99). This coupling and encroachment between our bodies and the environment occur mostly without our conscious interference. Yet, the problem with our human activities, and also our artistic practices is that we see our environment (human body) as an object to be consumed and manipulated.

Today, it is more important for us to change our mindsets to rethink our daily practices of performing arts and understand how human, nature, space and non-human species are vital for our existence in this world. Sustainable discourse comes into play with the United Nations initiative to make humans understand the major crises we are facing. In 2016, 195 parties agreed to follow the treaty of the Paris Agreement, which is mainly focused on climate change and the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels. Major scientists are talking about the ‘tipping points’. Tipping points indicate the current crisis that humans and other-than humans are going to face in the coming years.

Among those sustainable goals, the most important and the urgent point to be focused seems to be the climate emergency. Leading scientists of environmental sciences have already warned that within a few years, global warming will increase up to the level that the consequences will be catastrophic and dangerous to all, human and non-human. Ice sheets are shrinking; sea water level is increasing, and coral reefs are dying. It is becoming increasingly evident that countries in our region, particularly in South Asia, have been experiencing major climate shifts over the past few decades. Recent Cyclone Ditwah and the catastrophic flood devastated parts of not only Sri Lanka but also Malaysia, Sumatra, India, etc. Professor Missaka Hettiarachchi and Devki Perera published a landmark book, titled Nature – based method for water resource management (2025). In this work Hettiarachchi and Perera clearly argue that flood, erosion, and landslides are a part of the geological evolution and transformations. They are inherent activities in nature, which form new landscapes and conditions in natural environments. But the problem is that we experience these natural events frequently and they abruptly occur in response to human-nature collisions.

Climate Emergency

Professor Jeffry Sachs stresses the importance of taking action to prevent future climatic change. For him, we are facing three mega environmental crises: 1. Climate crisis leading to greenhouse gas emission due to fossil fuel burning. We have already come to the 1.5 warming limit now. He predicts that humans will experience 2.0 degree Celsius within two decades. 2. Second is the ecological crisis. This is the destruction of rainforests in South East Asia, Amazon and other regions. He argues that Amazon has reached the tipping point, meaning that the rain forest is in danger and it would be a dry land in a few decades time. Because of ocean acidification, scientists have already warned that we are in the wake of the destruction of coral reefs. The process is that high carbon dioxide dissolves in the water and it creates the carbonic acid. It causes the destruction of the coral reef system. 3. The third ecological crisis is the mega pollution. Our environment is already polluted with toxic chemicals, our waterways, ocean, soil, air and food chains are polluted. Micro plastics are already in our blood streams, in our lungs and even in our fetuses to be born.

The climate crisis is not just a natural catastrophe; it is political in many ways. Greenhouse gas emission is still continuing, and the developed countries such as the United States of America, Canada, China and Germany produce more carbon than the countries in the periphery. As Sachs rightly argues, the US politics is manipulated by the biggest oil companies in the world and President Trump is an agent of such multinational companies whose intention is to accumulate wealth through oil burning. Very recently, the US invaded Venezuela not to restore democracy but to gain access to the largest oil reserves in the country. We have seen many wars, led by the US, due to greed for wealth and natural resources. The US has withdrawn from the Paris agreement. President Trump calls climate change a hoax! So, the world’s current political situation is directly linked to the future of our environment, our resources and climate change.

Anthropocentrism in Performance

Back to creative arts. In the modernist era of our artistic practices and culture, we mimicked and replicated proscenium theatre inherited from Europe and elsewhere and revolutionised the ways that we see performance and perceiving. Our traditional modes of performance practices were replaced by the modern technology, architectural structures, studio training methods and techniques. Today, we can look back and see whether these creative arts practices have been sustainable with the larger human catastrophes that we experience almost daily. Eddie Patterson and Dr. Lara Stevenson have recently published an important and influential book, titled Performing Climate (2025). Being performance studies scholars, Patterson and Stevenson’s book contains 14 chapters interconnected and explores the human and non-human or more than human elements in the world. Patterson and Stevenson write that ‘performance is a messy business; a bloody mess’. ‘Performance is a mess of matter, climate, things, actors, and affects: neither a dramatic or postdramatic theatre but a network of dramaturgical elements; a site of birth and death, decay and renewal’ (Patterson and Stevenson, 2025, p. 1). In this book, they further explore the new ways of reading performance, making performance and perceiving performance. They argue that ‘we are interested in analyzing performance not as an insulated, exclusive art form predicated on human centrality but as a process that celebrates the transformative properties of waste – bacteria, debris and breakdown – composting and mulching within a larger network of bacteria, fungi and microbes embedded in the skin, air, soil and interacting with cellular networks and atmospheric conditions’ (ibid).

Our modern theatre has always been anthropocentric. Even in Sri Lanka, the father of modern Sinhala theatre, Professor Ediriweera Sarachchandra adapted traditional dance drama and developed a modern theatre for middle class theatregoers. This modern theatre was anthropogenic, patriarchal and marginalised the subaltern groups such as women, non-human beings, environment and so forth. The traditional dance and dramas, nadagam and kooththu were much more embedded in rituals performed by communities for various social, cultural and spiritual purposes were uprooted and established in the proscenium theatre for the audience, whose aesthetic buds were trained and sustained by the colonial theatre and criticism. Even traditional dance was uprooted from its traditional setting embedded in the ecosystem and placed on the proscenium theatre for the sake of modernisation of dance for the modern theatregoers. A new group of spectators, theatregoers, were produced to watch those performances which took place in city theatre buildings, insulated architectural spaces where the black boxes were lit up with expensive lighting technology and air-conditioning. As Patterson and Stevenson argue, the Western theatre has been obsessed with the human drama or autobiography. This western history of theatre has been ‘blind to the non-human agency and the natural world has always been in the background to the human centred stories’ (Patterson and Stevenson 2025).

Carbon Emission theatre

The performance practice that we have inherited and is continuing even today is highly problematic in the ways that we centre human agency over the non-human and the environment. This anthropocentric performance practice, as German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk called it, is ‘biospherical’. The biospherical theatre sees human action in the artificially constructed atmospheres for artistic innovations (Patterson and Stevenson 2025). Biospherical theatre is proto-laboratories and human greenhouses – in which able-bodied actors are trained and perform within air-conditioned black boxes; or more tellingly white people in white cubes’ (ibid).

Patterson and Stevenson further assert that ‘biospherical theatre is an enclosed Western form it is labour intensive, carbon intensive, hierarchical, exclusive, inaccessible extractive rather than generative of new knowledge and different ways of being with the world (ibid, p. 10). We inherited this hierarchical, exclusive, and carbon-oriented performance space from our past; as a colonial heritage. This colonial heritage of labour intensive, carbon intensive theatre is the major practice of performance in our societies. I am currently the Chairman of the National Theatre Sub-Committee under the purview of the Arts Council of Sri Lanka. Theatre practitioners today in Colombo are highly critical of the Ministry of Cultural Affairs for not having quality enclosed theatres in major cities in the country. They do not see the problems pertaining to the performance practice that is not ecologically sustainable for island nations like us.

We are possessed with the model of Globe theatre, which has been the model for theatre and entertainment in our regions for centuries now. However, today, we are forced to revisit and rethink this model of Globe theatre in the wake of the climate emergency. Patterson and Stevenson remind us that ‘inside these globes, art develops in enclosed and air-conditioned bubbles (laboratories, rehearsal rooms, conservatories, and galleries). This kind of theatre is biospherical: a human centric endeavour, evolving inside the globe, largely upholding the fantasy of itself as disconnected from atmospheric and environmental interactions beyond the human’ (Patterson and Stevenson 2025, p. 16).

Conclusion

According to Jim Bendell, it is not enough for us to develop resilience towards the climatic emergency; we need to embrace relinquishment (Stevenson, 2020, p. 89). It is the letting go of certain assets, behaviours and beliefs. Grotowski articulated this concept many decades back in his actor training at the Polish theatre laboratory. Grotowski developed the idea of via negative, letting go, or elimination for actors. Letting go of all the acculturations as Eugenio Barba articulates, to tap into the pure impulses and action. Grotowski even rejected the audience participation in his later works, para theatre, like Antonin Artaud, who rebelled against the dialogic, bourgeoisie theatre in France at the time. So, the modernist theatre directors have shown us that the Globe theatre is no longer a sustainable pathway for performance practice. It is time for us to rethink the carbon intensive, labour intensive, hierarchical, exclusive, and class-oriented theatre and performance.

References

Hettiarachchi, M., & Perera, D. (2025). Nature-Based Methods for Water Resources Engineering. The Institution of Engineers, Sri Lanka.

India Today Global. (2025, September 24). “U.S. government is in an open war against the Sustainable Development Goals”: Jeffrey Sachs. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qb4Jpqq4wvE

James, S. P. (2009). The Presence of Nature A Study in Phenomenology and Environmental Philosophy. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN IK.

Liyanage, S. (2025). Lamp in a Windless Place: Phenomenology and Performance. VAPA Press. (Original work published 2025)

SDSN. (2024, October 11). Sustainability Fundamentals with Jeffrey Sachs. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dJR0Q8ueQpc

Stevens, L. (2019). Anthroposcenic Performance and the Need For ‘Deep Dramaturgy’. Performance Research, 24(8), 89-97.

Stevens, L., & Varney, D. (2022). The Climate Siren: Hanna Cormick’s The Mermaid. TDR, 66(3), 107-118.

Woolf, L. (2012). The village in the jungle. Forgotten Books.

Author wishes to thank Himansi Dehigama for proofreading this manuscript.

Professor Saumya Liyanage is a professor of Drama and Theatre Currently working at the Department of Theatre Ballet and Modern Dance, Faculty of Dance and Drama, University of the Visual and Performing Arts, Colombo. He is the chairman of the State Theatre Subcommittee.

by Saumya Liyanage

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Midweek Review

Islander Unbound

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The pomp and pageantry of just a few hours,

Is not for him on this day in February,

When he’s been asked to think of things lofty,

Such as that he is the sole master of his destiny,

And that he’s well on track to self-sufficiency,

Rather, it’s time for that care-free feeling,

A time to zero in on the best of clothing,

Go for a carouse on the golden beaches,

And round-up pals for a cheering evening.

By Lynn Ockersz

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