Midweek Review
How Premadasa paved the way for first Parama Weera Vibushanaya, posthumously
The Army unveiled a special war hero memorial opposite the new TV transmission tower at Kokavil after the conclusion of the war. It was put up in honour of those who made the supreme sacrifice at Kokavil in June 1990
By Shamindra Ferdinando
One-time Army Commander Gen. Daya Ratnayake (2013-2015) recently joined a special event on Zoom in honour of those who made the supreme sacrifice at Kokavil, 31 years ago. Prof. Raj Somadeva and writer Charith Kiriella delivered special lectures on the occasion. Those who defended the isolated Kokavil base – Officer Commanding, Kokavil transmission complex, Saliya Aladeniya, an old Trinitian who was posthumously promoted Captain of 3 Battalion, Sri Lanka Sinha Regiment (3 SLSR), and his men, perished in the battle. The LTTE didn’t hand over their bodies.
Aladeniya, the first recipient of the country’s highest gallantry award, Parama Weera Vibushanaya, sacrificed his young life, serving on underprepared and poorly equipped Army. Opportunistic politics of the day made matters worse.
Against the backdrop of renewed interest in Kokavil, in the wake of the recent commemorative event, and Derana ‘Big Focus’ featuring Gen. Ratnayaka , the writer felt the need to examine the then security-political environment. Let me stress that the June-July 1990 Kokavil battle was nothing but a debacle that caused a humiliating setback. Kokavil remained in the hands of the LTTE till 2009.
A comment on the recent print media reportage of Kokavil heroism by academic Michael Roberts, too, underscored the pivotal importance of a better understanding of the then situation. Author Roberts didn’t mince his words when pointing out the inadequacies in the coverage, though he appreciated the effort.
What went wrong at Kokavil? Why did the Army abandon the isolated detachment? Who created an environment conducive for the LTTE? And how the Kokavil debacle/tragedy transformed the entire Vanni landscape overnight to the LTTE advantage?
Having won the Dec 19, 1988 presidential election, UNP strongman Ranasinghe Premadasa (RP polled 2,569,199/50.43%. Sirimavo Bandaranaike polled 2,289,860/44.95%) then led the party to victory at Feb 15, 1989 parliamentary election. The UNP secured 125 seats whereas the main Opposition SLFP managed 67. It would be pertinent to mention that the UNP earlier, by way of a fraudulent referendum, conducted on Dec 22, 1982, extended the life of Parliament by six years. It was the only referendum held in Sri Lanka so far. The referendum resulted in the UNP continuing till 1989, after having won the 1977 general election, with a 4/5 landslide.
As requested by President Premadasa, rather bluntly, India brought its high profile military mission, in the North and East, to an end, in March 1990. India deployed troops, in July 1987, in terms of the Indo-Lanka Accord, forced on President JRJ. The writer was among a small group of journalists taken to Trincomalee harbour to see the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) quit Sri Lanka, following a 32-month deployment here (The IPKF is off – The Island, March 25, 1990). At the time India completed the withdrawal, the LTTE had been engaged in negotiations with a gullible Premadasa for over a year. The LTTE exploited direct negotiations with President Premadasa, the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. By the time the IPKF ended its mission here, the LTTE was ready to resume hostilities. However, the LTTE delayed the resumption of hostilities, till the second week of June, 1990.
The then Army Commander Lt. Gen. Hamilton Wanasinghe hadn’t been prepared to fight the battle hardened LTTE. Having inflicted heavy losses on the IPKF, and gained valuable battlefield experience, the LTTE was ready to strike the Army. Having literally crushed the second JVP insurrection, by early 1990 by wiping out its entire leadership, barring Somawansa Amerasinghe, who managed to escape to India in the nick of time, before security forces could get at him, the Army, too, was cocky and probably didn’t anticipate a large scale LTTE offensive, in less than three months, after the IPKF pullout, because of the ostensible honeymoon with President Premadasa, who even gifted it arms and other wherewithal.
The Kokavil debacle should be quite rightly examined against the backdrop of Premadasa’s folly. Then State Defence Minister Ranjan Wijeratne, Army Chief Gen. Wanasinghe, the then advisor to the President, Gen. (retd.) Cyril Ranatunga, and IGP Ernest Perera, couldn’t absolve themselves of the catastrophe caused by political-military miscalculations. All of them were made to look like utter fools. Premadasa made some ludicrous attempts to persuade the LTTE to return to the negotiating table. The President’s utter failure to comprehend the LTTE strategy is still a mystery. The top brass remained silent. Obviously, no one had the courage to advice the President, whose Chief Negotiator Minister A.C.S. Hameed’s desperate last minute attempt to keep the talks with the LTTE going led to him nearly paying with his life. Premadasa’s idiocy was such that he had no qualms in sacrificing the lives of several hundred police officers and men who were ordered to surrender to terrorists in an attempt to mollify the LTTE.
LTTE seizes A9 north of Vavuniya
The attack on the Kokavil detachment took place in the wake of the massacre of police officers. Gen. Wanasinghe’s Army lacked the wherewithal to meet the threat. The Army could have made an attempt to neutralise the impending LTTE threat by reinforcing isolated detachments along the Kandy-Jaffna A9 road, north of Vavuniya. Unfortunately, the Army lacked the wherewithal to meet the LTTE threat in the Eastern theatre, Vanni and the Jaffna peninsula, simultaneously. Even if the Army had realised the rapidly growing danger, on multiple fronts, the top brass feared to warn Premadasa. Actually, Premadasa never believed in consensus on security matters. Premadasa simply threw caution to the winds.
The Army was under pressure in the northern theatre, with the Jaffna Fort under attack. Kokavil was almost forgotten as it came under intensified attack, following the massacre of nearly 600 policemen in the East. In the North, the Army found it difficult even to evacuate the wounded. The Jaffna Fort, too, was under siege.
Maj. Gen. Denzil Kobbekaduwa was placed in charge of the Northern region on July 11, 1991, exactly a month after the eruption of hostilities. Army Chief Wanasinghe never explained why Kobbekaduwa hadn’t been brought into the scene until it was too late. Did Gen. Wanasinghe fail to convince Premadasa of the urgent need to change the Northern Command? By the time Kobbekaduwa received command, the situation had deteriorated to such an extent, his appearance didn’t make any difference. Just two days after, Kobbekaduwa received the Northern Command, the LTTE overran Kokavil held by two platoons. It was the first major setback on the A9. The Kokavil debacle highlighted the absence of a strategy either to reinforce isolated detachments or evacuate them. The SLAF lacked required strike capability. The SLAF struggled to cope up with increasingly heavy commitment with just the Italian built Sia Marchettis (propeller driven light ground attack aircraft hardly sufficient even for counter-insurgency operations). Volunteers deployed at isolated Kokavil detachment never had a chance against strong LTTE units. Sinha volunteers turned down an earlier directive to abandon the base, leaving behind seriously wounded men. The LTTE executed those captured during the battle for Kokavil. Two men who crawled through the LTTE cordon managed to reach Mankulam detachment situated north of Kokavil.
Let me stress that those killed defending detachments along the A9 North of Vavuniya, had to be buried there as the Army lacked the wherewithal to take back the dead and the wounded overland. Isolated detachments could be supplied by air and within a month after resumption of hostilities, following the 14-month Premadasa-Prabhakaran honeymoon, the A9 aka Main Supply Route (MSR) north up to strategic Elephant Pass, was lost. The SLAF carried out risky missions to supply isolated bases and evacuate the wounded.
Four years after the combined security forces brought the war to a successful end, the then Brigadier Maithri Dias, recounted how the Army planned to evacuate Kilinochchi, even before the resumption of hostilities. Having vacated both Valvettithurai and Point Pedro detachments on the LTTE’s request, the President wouldn’t have minded the Army giving up more camps. The planned evacuation of the Kilinochchi detachment obviously is a case in point. What was really shocking was the Army seeking the assistance of a Catholic priest, based in Kilinochchi, to evacuate the personnel along with arms, ammunition and equipment.
Who wanted Kilinochchi evacuated?
The then Capt. Maithri Dias, of the 6th Battalion of the Sinha Regiment (6SR), arrived in Kilinochchi several days before the LTTE resumed hostilities, on June 11, 1990, with the massacre of hundreds of policemen in the Eastern Province. Dias was responding to a directive from Lt. Colonel H. R. Stephen, the then Coordinating Officer, based in Kilinochchi (Lt. Col. Stephen was killed on the morning of Aug.8, 1992, at Araly point, Kayts. He was one of the officers killed along with war veterans, Maj. Gen. Denzil Kobbekaduwa, Brig. Wijaya Wimalaratne. The dead included Rear Admiral Mohan Jayamaha, Lt Colonel G.H. Ariyarathne, Lt Colonel Y.N. Palipana, Commander Asanga Lankathilaka, Lt Colonel Nalin de Alwis, Lt Commander C.B. Wijepura and Private W J Wickremasinghe). Only one survived the blast.
Dias, the then General Officer Commanding 54 Division, got in touch with the writer immediately having read ‘Eelam War II: LTTE takes upper hand at the onset – The Island Feb 22, 2013).
Brigadier Dias recounted the situation in Kilinochchi, leading to the Army headquarters directive to vacate the town in the last week of July 1990. Dias said: “I was tasked to function as a staff officer in Kilinochchi under Lt. Colonel Stephen. The deployment therein comprised one platoon of 6 SR, another platoon of 3 SR (Volunteer) as well as support personnel (3 SR volunteers were based at Kokavil, south of Mankulam) There were altogether about 90 personnel at Kilinochchi. As the then government was having talks with the LTTE, we never expected any serious trouble. Along the A9 road, north of Vavuniya, we had several camps. North of Kilinochchi, troops were positioned at Elephant Pass, Jaffna Fort and Palaly. South of Kilinochchi, troops held Mankulam and Kokavil. Immediately after arriving in Kilinochchi, I was told by Lt. Col. Stephen to prepare to evacuate the troops. On the instructions of the Coordinating Officer, I met a Catholic priest in Kilinochchi to discuss transport arrangements for my men. Lt. Col. Stephen was away in Palaly. He was to go on leave following a conference in Palaly. Following the conference I received further instructions from Lt. Col. Stephen regarding the planned withdrawal. I was told to prepare a plan for an immediate withdrawal. As earlier discussed, I went out to meet the Catholic priest, who promised to help us move men and material from Kilinochchi to Elephant Pass. The sudden disappearance of the priest made me uneasy. The following day (June 11, 1990), the LTTE started attacking the police and the Army in the Eastern Province.”
Dias retired in 2016 after serving as the General Officer Commanding (GoC) of 53 Division after having been promoted to the rank of Maj. Gen in 2014.
It was evident that the then government had decided to abandon Kilinochchi, even before the outbreak of hostilities in the second week of June 1990. At that time Maj. Gen. Jaliya Nanmunai had served as Security Forces Commander, Jaffna.
Saving Kilinochchi troops
In spite of the much deteriorated situation at Kokavil, troops at Mankulam couldn’t intervene. The entire Army had been under tremendous pressure as the LTTE advanced on bases in the Vanni theatre. Brig. Dias recalled the crises the Army faced: “We heard heavy gunfire from the direction of Kokavil, where troops were fighting a desperate battle. The Kokavil debacle had a devastating impact on the Army. A section of troops based, at Kilinochchi, declared their intention to vacate the camp, regardless of the consequences. Having calmed them, I took measures to further strengthen the defences until a large force could intervene to facilitate our withdrawal, northwards. Pushing towards Kokavil seemed unrealistic and suicidal.”
However, those deployed at Kilinochchi had been extremely lucky as the Jaffna Command managed to muster sufficient troops to reach the beleaguered base in the last week of July. The 6th Battalion of the Gajaba Regiment (6 GR) and the 5th Battalion of the Gemunu Watch (5 GW) advanced from Elephant Pass to Kilinochchi to save those trapped at the Kilinochchi camp.
During the rescue mission, troops at Kilinochchi had almost lost communications with those coming to their rescue. Brig. Dias said: “We ran out of fuel needed to maintain communications. Luckily, the two Land Cruisers, which we removed from the Kilinochchi police station at the onset of trouble, had fuel in their tanks and it was adequate to meet our immediate requirement.”
Interestingly, Brig. Dias is the first GOC of the re-established 54 Division. Army headquarters restored the Division on Sept 10, 2010. The LTTE literally wiped out the 54 Division headquartered at Elephant Pass in late April 2000. Heavy losses suffered by the Division compelled Army headquarters to disband the formation. It was the worst battlefield defeat experienced by the Army during the entire conflict.
In September, 1990, the Army vacated isolated bases at Jaffna Fort and Mandaitivu. In the third week of Nov, the LTTE overran the Mankulam detachment on the A9. Premadasa’s security advisor, retired Gen. Cyril Ranatunga remained mum. Ranatunga played it safe. Just within four weeks after the eruption of Eelam War II, on June 11, 1990, the Army lost Kokavil and Kilinochchi. Mankulam was abandoned in the third week of Nov, 1990, thereby giving the LTTE unhindered access across Kandy-Jaffna A9, between Vavuniya and Elephant Pass.
The Army abandoned Mankulam under heavy fire just weeks after carrying out a heli-borne mission to consolidate the base. In the absence of an overall contingency plan, the Army responded to LTTE operations over a wide area.
Premadasa lacked even basic interest in security matters thereby allowing unpardonable deterioration of the security situation. Perhaps, the threat the President faced within the UNP, with a powerful section more or less discarded by him, working with the SLFP to impeach him, unsettled Premadasa. Premadasa remained immobilised in the wake of the LTTE directive in late Oct/Nov 1990 for the Northern Province Muslims to vacate the region. The government actually did nothing to avert the unprecedented crisis. The courageous efforts made by troops, under Captain Aladeniya’s command, underscored the Army’s failure. Even though the Army discussed the possibility of mounting a heli-borne mission to break the siege on Kokavil detachment in June it never materialised. Troops called in to carry out that mission were eventually deployed for the rescue of those who had been trapped at Mankulam. But, the Army subsequently withdrew a section of the troops, including commandos sent to Mankulam. Overnight, Mankulam became vulnerable and eventually the LTTE overran it in Nov 1990. Within eight months after the IPKF withdrawal, Premadasa lost the entire Vanni region with troops confined to few coastal areas. In the Jaffna peninsula, the Army had been confined to Palaly, Kankesanthurai and Elephant Pass where troops received supplies from air and sea. The Navy struggled to move supplies required by the Army to the North from the eastern port city of Trincomalee whereas the SLAF, too, operated flights to Palaly under difficult circumstances. However, in the absence of missile threat, during the Eelam War II, facilitated supply missions to the North. But, overall supplying troops based in the Jaffna peninsula had been a tremendous challenge faced by the military.
Strategic Elephant Pass base was almost overrun in mid-1991. If not for the successful sea borne assault by troops of Operation Balavegaya led by Gen Denzil Kobekaduwa and Brig. Wimalaratne, Elephant Pass too would have been overrun.
Premadasa caused an unprecedented catastrophe by pursuing an utterly foolish political agenda at the expense of national security. His failure as well as that of Gen. Wanasinghe to prepare for any eventuality following the IPKF withdrawal allowed the LTTE to take the upper hand in the Vanni region. By the time the LTTE assassinated Premadasa on May Day 1993, the LTTE achieved superiority in the North with all bases under pressure and the situation was rapidly deteriorating. The LTTE gradually pressed the Army in the North with Palaly under siege at the time of 1994 parliamentary elections followed by presidential polls in Nov 1994.
Midweek Review
How massive Akuregoda defence complex was built with proceeds from sale of Galle Face land to Shangri-La
The Navy ceremonially occupied its new Headquarters (Block No. 3) at the Defence Headquarters Complex (DHQC) at Akuregoda, Battaramulla, on 09 December, 2025. On the invitation of the Commander of the Navy, Vice Admiral Kanchana Banagoda, the Deputy Minister of Defence, Major General Aruna Jayasekara (Retd) attended the event as the Chief Guest.
Among those present were Admiral of the Fleet Wasantha Karannagoda, the Defence Secretary, Air Vice Marshal Sampath Thuyacontha (Retd), Commander of the Army, Lieutenant General Lasantha Rodrigo, Commander of the Air Force, Air Marshal Bandu Edirisinghe, Inspector General of Police, Attorney-at-Law Priyantha Weerasooriya and former Navy Commanders.
With the relocation of the Navy at DHQC, the much-valued project to shift the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and Headquarters of the war-winning armed forces has been brought to a successful conclusion. The Army was the first to move in (November 2019), the MoD (May 2021), the Air Force (January 2024) and finally the Navy (in December 2025).
It would be pertinent to mention that the shifting of MoD to DHQC coincided with the 12th anniversary of bringing back the entire Northern and Eastern Provinces under the government, on 18 May, 2009. LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran was killed on the following day.
The project that was launched in March 2011, two years after the eradication of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), suffered a severe setback, following the change of government in 2015. The utterly irresponsible and treacherous Yahapalana government halted the project. That administration transferred funds, allocated for it, to the Treasury, in the wake of massive Treasury bond scams perpetrated in February and March 2015, within weeks after the presidential election.
Maithripala Sirisena, in his capacity as the President, as well as the Minister of Defence, declared open the new Army Headquarters, at DHQC, a week before the 2019 presidential election. Built at a cost of Rs 53.3 bn, DHQC is widely believed to be the largest single construction project in the country. At the time of the relocation of the Army, the then Lt. Gen. Shavendra Silva, the former Commanding Officer of the celebrated Task Force I/58 Division, served as the Commander.
Who made the DHQC a reality? Although most government departments, ministries and armed forces headquarters, were located in Colombo, under the Colombo Master Plan of 1979, all were required to be moved to Sri Jayewardenepura, Kotte. However successive administrations couldn’t go ahead with the massive task primarily due to the conflict. DHQC would never have been a reality if not for wartime Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa who determinedly pursued the high-profile project.
The absence of any reference to the origins of the project, as well as the significant role played by Gotabaya Rajapaksa at the just relocated Navy headquarters, prompted the writer to examine the developments related to the DHQC. The shifting of MoD, along with the Armed Forces Headquarters, was a monumental decision taken by Mahinda Rajapaksas’s government. But, all along it had been Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s determination to achieve that monumental task that displeased some within the administration, but the then Defence Secretary, a former frontline combat officer of the battle proved Gajaba Regiment, was not the type to back down or alter his strategy.
GR’s maiden official visit to DHQC
Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who made DHQC a reality, visited the sprawling building in his capacity as the President, Defence Minister and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces on the morning of 03 August, 2021. It was Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s maiden official visit to the Army Headquarters, located within the then partially completed DHQC, eight months before the eruption of the externally backed ‘Aragalaya.’ The US-Indian joint project has been exposed and post-Aragalaya developments cannot be examined without taking into consideration the role played by political parties, the Bar Association of Sri Lanka, media, as well as the weak response of the political leadership and the armed forces. Let me stress that a comprehensive probe should cover the period beginning with the Swiss project to humiliate President Gotabaya Rajapaka in November, 2019, by staging a fake abduction, and the storming of the President’s House in July 2022. How could Sri Lanka forget the despicable Swiss allegation of sexual harassment of a female local employee by government personnel, a claim proved to be a blatant lie meant to cause embarrassment to the newly elected administration..
Let me get back to the DHQC project. The war-winning Mahinda Rajapaksa government laid the foundation for the building project on 11 May, 2011, two years after Sri Lanka’s triumph over the separatist Tamil terrorist movement. The high-profile project, on a 77-acre land, at Akuregoda, Pelawatta, was meant to bring the Army, Navy, and the Air Force headquarters, and the Defence Ministry, to one location.
President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s visit to Akuregoda would have definitely taken place much earlier, under a very different environment, if not for the eruption of the Covid-19 pandemic, just a few months after his victory at the November 2019 election. The worst post-World War II crisis that had caused devastating losses to national economies, the world over, and delivered a staggering blow to Sri Lanka, heavily dependent on tourism, garment exports and remittances by its expatriate workers.
On his arrival at the new Army headquarters, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa was welcomed by General Shavendra Silva, who also served as the Chief of Defence Staff. Thanks to the President’s predecessor, Maithripala Sirisena, the then Maj. Gen Shavendra Silva was promoted to the rank of Lt. Gen and appointed the Commander of the Army on 18 August, 2019, just three months before the presidential poll. The appointment was made in spite of strong opposition from the UNP leadership and US criticism.
President Gotabaya Rajapaksa hadn’t minced his words when he publicly acknowledged the catastrophe caused by the plunging of the national income and the daunting challenge in debt repayment, amounting to as much as USD 4 bn annually.
The decision to shift the tri-forces headquarters and the Defence Ministry (The Defence Ministry situated within the Army Headquarters premises) caused a media furor with the then Opposition UNP alleging a massive rip-off. Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa reiterated his commitment to the project. If not for the change of government in 2015, the DHQC would have been completed during Mahinda Rajapaksa’s third term if he was allowed to contest for a third term successfully. Had that happened, Gotabaya Rajapaksa wouldn’t have emerged as the then Opposition presidential candidate at the 2019 poll. The disastrous Yahapalana administration and the overall deterioration of all political parties, represented in Parliament, and the 19th A that barred Mahinda Rajapaksa from contesting the presidential election, beyond his two terms, created an environment conducive for Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s emergence as the newly registered SLPP’s candidate.
Shangri-La move
During the 2019 presidential election campaign, SLPP candidate Gotabaya Rajapaksa strongly defended his decision to vacate the Army Headquarters, during Mahinda Rajapaksa presidency, to pave the way for the Shangri-La Hotel in Colombo. Shangri-La was among the hotels targeted by the Easter Sunday bombers – the only location targeted by two of them, including mastermind Zahran Hashim.
President Gotabaya Rajapaksa is on record as having said that vacation of the site had been in accordance with first executive President J.R. Jayewardene’s decision to move key government buildings away from Colombo to the new Capital of the country at Sri Jaywardenepura. Gotabaya Rajapaksa said so in response to the writer’s queries years ago.
Gotabaya Rajapaksa said that a despicable attempt was being made to blame him for the Army Headquarters land transaction. “I have been accused of selling the Army Headquarters land to the Chinese.”
Rajapaksa explained that Taj Samudra, too, had been built on a section of the former Army Headquarters land, previously used to accommodate officers’ quarters and the Army rugger grounds. Although President Jayewardene had wanted the Army Headquarters shifted, successive governments couldn’t do that due to the war and lack of funds, he said.
President Maithripala Sirisena and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe declared open Shangri-La Colombo on 16 November, 2017. The Hong Kong-based Shangri-La Asia invited Gotabaya Rajapaksa for dinner, the following day, after the opening of its Colombo hotel. Shangri-La Chairperson, Kuok Hui Kwong, the daughter of Robert Kuok Khoon Ean, was there to welcome Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who had cleared the way for the post-war mega tourism investment project. Among those who had been invited were former President Mahinda Rajapaksa, former External Affairs Minister Prof. G.L. Peiris, former Presidential Secretary Lalith Weeratunga, and President’s Counsel Gamini Marapana, PC.
The Cabinet granted approval for the high-profile Shangri-La project in October 2010 and the ground-breaking ceremony was held in late February 2012.
Rajapaksa said that the Shangri-La proprietor, a Chinese, ran a big operation, based in Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore. Another parcel of land was given to the mega ITC hotel project, also during the previous Rajapaksa administration. ITC Ratnadipa, a super-luxury hotel by India’s ITC Hotels, officially opened in Colombo on April 25, 2024
Following the change of government in January 2015, the remaining section of the Army headquarters land, too, was handed over to Shangri-La.
Gotabaya Rajapaksa emphasised that the relocation of the headquarters of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, as well as the Defence Ministry, had been part of JRJ’s overall plan. The change of government, in January 2015, had caused a serious delay in completing the project and it was proceeding at a snail’s pace, Rajapaksa said. Even Parliament was shifted to Kotte in accordance with JRJ’s overall plan, Gotabaya Rajapaksa said, explaining his move to relocate all security forces’ headquarters and Defence Ministry into one complex at Akuregoda.
Acknowledging that the Army Headquarters had been there at Galle Face for six decades, Rajapaksa asserted that the Colombo headquarters wasn’t tactically positioned.
Rajapaksa blamed the inordinate delay in the completion of the Akuregoda complex on the Treasury taking hold of specific funds allocated for the project.
Over 5,000 military workforce

Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s maiden visit to DHQC on 3 August, 2021. General
Shavendra Silva is beside him
Major General Udaya Nanayakkara had been the first Director, Project Management Unit, with overall command of approximately 5,000 tri-forces personnel assigned to carry it out. The Shangri-La transaction provided the wherewithal to implement the DHQC project though the change of government caused a major setback. Nanayakkara, who had served as the Military Spokesman, during Eelam War IV, oversaw the military deployment, whereas private contractors handled specialised work such as piling, AC, fire protection and fire detection et al. The then MLO (Military Liaison Officer) at the Defence Ministry, Maj. Gen Palitha Fernando, had laid the foundation for the project and the work was going on smoothly when the Yahapalana administration withheld funds. Political intervention delayed the project and by September 2015, Nanayakkara was replaced by Maj Gen Mahinda Ambanpola, of the Engineer Service.
In spite of President Sirisena holding the Defence portfolio, he couldn’t prevent the top UNP leadership from interfering in the DHQC project. However, the Shangri-La project had the backing of A.J.M. Muzammil, the then UNP Mayor and one of the close confidants of UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe. Muzammil was among those present at the ground breaking ceremony for Shangri-La held on 24th February, 2012 ,with the participation of Minister Basil Rajapaksa.
Having identified the invaluable land, where the Army Headquarters and Defence Ministry were situated, for its project, Shangri-La made its move. Those who had been aware of Shangri-La’s plans were hesitant and certainly not confident of their success. They felt fearful of Defence Secretary Rajapaksa’s reaction.
But, following swift negotiations, they finalised the agreement on 28 December, 2010. Lt. Gen. Jagath Jayasuriya was the then Commander of the Army, with his predecessor General Fonseka in government custody after having been arrested within two weeks after the conclusion of the 2010 26 January Presidential poll.
Addressing the annual Viyathmaga Convention at Golden Rose Hotel, Boralesgamuwa, on 04 March, 2017, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, perhaps for the first time publicly discussed his role in the Shangri-La project. Declaring that Sri Lanka suffered for want of, what he called, a workable formula to achieve post-war development objectives, the war veteran stressed the pivotal importance of swift and bold decision-making.
Gotabaya Rajapaksa explained how the government had acted swiftly, and decisively, to attract foreign investments though some such efforts were not successful. There couldn’t be a better example than the government finalising an agreement with Shangri-La Hotels, he declared.
Declaring that the bureaucratic red tape shouldn’t in any way be allowed to undermine investments, Rajapaksa recalled the Chairman/CEO of Shangri-La Hotels and Resorts, Robert Kuok Khoon Ean, wanting the Army Headquarters land for his Colombo project. In fact, the hotels chain, at the time, had proposed to build hotels in Colombo, Hambantota and Batticaloa, and was one of the key investors wanting to exploit Sri Lanka’s success in defeating terrorism.
“Khoon-Ean’s request for the Army Headquarters land caused a serious problem for me. It was a serious challenge. How could I shift the headquarters of the war-winning Army? The Army had been there for six decades. It had been the nerve centre of the war effort for 30 years,” said Rajapaksa, who once commanded the First Battalion of the Gajaba Regiment (1GR)
Rajapaksa went on to explain how he exploited a decision taken by the first executive president J.R. Jayewardene to shift the Army Headquarters to Battaramulla, many years back. “Within two weeks, in consultation with the Secretary to the Finance Ministry, Dr. P.B. Jayasundera, and the Board of Investment, measures were taken to finalise the transaction. The project was launched to shift the Army, Navy and Air Force headquarters to Akuregoda, Pelawatte, in accordance with JRJ’s plan.”
The Hong Kong-based group announced the purchase of 10 acres of state land, in January 2011. Shangri-La Asia Limited announced plans to invest over USD 400 mn on the 30-storeyed star class hotel with 661 rooms.
The hotel is the second property in Sri Lanka for the leading Asian hospitality group, joining Shangri-La’s Hambantota Resort & Spa, which opened in June 2016.
Rajapaksa said that the top Shangri-La executive had referred to the finalisation of their Colombo agreement to highlight the friendly way the then administration handled the investment. Shangri-La had no qualms about recommending Sri Lanka as a place for investment, Rajapaksa said.
The writer explained the move to shift the Army Headquarters and the Defence Ministry from Colombo in a lead story headlined ‘Shangri-La to push MoD, Army Hq. out of Colombo city: Army Hospital expected to be converted into a museum’ (The Island, 04 January, 2011).
Yahapalana chaos
In the wake of the January 2015 change of government, the new leadership caused chaos with the suspension of the China-funded Port City Project, a little distance away from the Shangri-La venture. Many an eyebrow was raised when the then Finance Minister Ravi Karunanayake declared, in March, 2015, that funds wouldn’t be made available to the DHQC project until the exact cost estimation of the project could be clarified.
Media quoted Karunanayake as having said “Presently, this project seems like a bottomless pit and we need to know the depth of what we are getting into. From the current state of finances, allocated for this project, it seems as if they are building a complex that’s even bigger than the Pentagon!”
The insinuating declaration was made despite them having committed the blatant first Treasury bond scam in February 2015 that shook the Sirisena-Wickremesinghe administration to its core.
In June 2016, Cabinet spokesperson, Dr. Rajitha Senaratne, announced the suspension of the Akuregoda project. Citing financial irregularities and mismanagement of funds, Dr. Senaratne alleged that all Cabinet papers on the project had been prepared according to the whims and fancies of Gotabaya Rajapaksa.
The then Minister Karunanayake spearheaded the campaign against the DHQC project alleging, in the third week of January, 2015, that Rs 13.2 billion, in an account maintained at the Taprobane branch of the Bank of Ceylon had been transferred to the Consolidated Fund of the Treasury. The matter was being investigated as the account belonged to the Ministry of Defence, he added. The Finance Minister stressed that the MoD had no right to maintain such an account in violation of regulations and, therefore, the opening of the account was being investigated. The Minister alleged that several illegal transactions, including one involving Samurdhi, had come to light. He estimated the Samurdhi transaction (now under investigation) at Rs. 4 billion.
Having undermined Shangri-La and the DHQC projects, the UNP facilitated the expansion of the hotel project by releasing additional three and half acres on a 99-year lease. During the Yahapalana administration, Dayasiri Jayasekera disclosed at a post-Cabinet press briefing how the government leased three and a half acres of land at a rate of Rs. 13.1 mn per perch whereas the previous administration agreed to Rs 6.5 mn per perch. According to Jayasekera the previous government had leased 10 acres at a rate of Rs 9.5 mn (with taxes) per perch.
The bottom line is that DHQC was built with Shangri-La funds and the initiative was Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s whose role as rock solid wartime Secretary of Defence to keep security forces supplied with whatever their requirements could never be compared with any other official during the conflict.
By Shamindra Ferdinando
Midweek Review
The Hour of the Invisible
Picking-up the pieces in the bashed Isle,
Is going to take quite a long while,
And all hands need to be united as one,
To give it even a semblance of its former self,
But the more calloused and hardy the hands,
The more suitable are they for the task,
And the hour is upon us you could say,
When those vast legions of invisible folk,
Those wasting away in humble silent toil,
Could stand up and be saluted by all,
As being the most needed persons of the land
By Lynn Ockersz
Features
Handunnetti and Colonial Shackles of English in Sri Lanka
“My tongue in English chains.
I return, after a generation, to you.
I am at the end
of my Dravidic tether
hunger for you unassuaged
I falter, stumble.”
– Indian poet R. Parthasarathy
When Minister Sunil Handunnetti addressed the World Economic Forum’s ‘Is Asia’s Century at Risk?’ discussion as part of the Annual Meeting of the New Champions 2025 in June 2025, I listened carefully both to him and the questions that were posed to him by the moderator. The subsequent trolling and extremely negative reactions to his use of English were so distasteful that I opted not to comment on it at the time. The noise that followed also meant that a meaningful conversation based on that event on the utility of learning a powerful global language and how our politics on the global stage might be carried out more successfully in that language was lost on our people and pundits, barring a few commentaries.
Now Handunnetti has reopened the conversation, this time in Sri Lanka’s parliament in November 2025, on the utility of mastering English particularly for young entrepreneurs. In his intervention, he also makes a plea not to mock his struggle at learning English given that he comes from a background which lacked the privilege to master the language in his youth. His clear intervention makes much sense.
The same ilk that ridiculed him when he spoke at WEF is laughing at him yet again on his pronunciation, incomplete sentences, claiming that he is bringing shame to the country and so on and so forth. As usual, such loud, politically motivated and retrograde critics miss the larger picture. Many of these people are also among those who cannot hold a conversation in any of the globally accepted versions of English. Moreover, their conceit about the so-called ‘correct’ use of English seems to suggest the existence of an ideal English type when it comes to pronunciation and basic articulation. I thought of writing this commentary now in a situation when the minister himself is asking for help ‘in finding a solution’ in his parliamentary speech even though his government is not known to be amenable to critical reflection from anyone who is not a party member.
The remarks at the WEF and in Sri Lanka’s parliament are very different at a fundamental level, although both are worthy of consideration – within the realm of rationality, not in the depths of vulgar emotion and political mudslinging.
The problem with Handunnetti’s remarks at WEF was not his accent or pronunciation. After all, whatever he said could be clearly understood if listened to carefully. In that sense, his use of English fulfilled one of the most fundamental roles of language – that of communication. Its lack of finesse, as a result of the speaker being someone who does not use the language professionally or personally on a regular basis, is only natural and cannot be held against him. This said, there are many issues that his remarks flagged that were mostly drowned out by the noise of his critics.
Given that Handunnetti’s communication was clear, it also showed much that was not meant to be exposed. He simply did not respond to the questions that were posed to him. More bluntly, a Sinhala speaker can describe the intervention as yanne koheda, malle pol , which literally means, when asked ‘Where are you going?’, the answer is ‘There are coconuts in the bag’.
He spoke from a prepared text which his staff must have put together for him. However, it was far off the mark from the questions that were being directly posed to him. The issue here is that his staff appears to have not had any coordination with the forum organisers to ascertain and decide on the nature of questions that would be posed to the Minister for which answers could have been provided based on both global conditions, local situations and government policy. After all, this is a senior minister of an independent country and he has the right to know and control, when possible, what he is dealing with in an international forum.
This manner of working is fairly routine in such international fora. On the one hand, it is extremely unfortunate that his staff did not do the required homework and obviously the minister himself did not follow up, demonstrating negligence, a want for common sense, preparedness and experience among all concerned. On the other hand, the government needs to have a policy on who it sends to such events. For instance, should a minister attend a certain event, or should the government be represented by an official or consultant who can speak not only fluently, but also with authority on the subject matter. That is, such speakers need to be very familiar with the global issues concerned and not mere political rhetoric aimed at local audiences.
Other than Handunnetti, I have seen, heard and also heard of how poorly our politicians, political appointees and even officials perform at international meetings (some of which are closed door) bringing ridicule and disastrous consequences to the country. None of them are, however, held responsible.
Such reflective considerations are simple yet essential and pragmatic policy matters on how the government should work in these conditions. If this had been undertaken, the WEF event might have been better handled with better global press for the government. Nevertheless, this was not only a matter of English. For one thing, Handunnetti and his staff could have requested for the availability of simultaneous translation from Sinhala to English for which pre-knowledge of questions would have been useful. This is all too common too. At the UN General Assembly in September, President Dissanayake spoke in Sinhala and made a decent presentation.
The pertinent question is this; had Handunetti had the option of talking in Sinhala, would the interaction have been any better? That is extremely doubtful, barring the fluency of language use. This is because Handunnetti, like most other politicians past and present, are good at rhetoric but not convincing where substance is concerned, particularly when it comes to global issues. It is for this reason that such leaders need competent staff and consultants, and not mere party loyalists and yes men, which is an unfortunate situation that has engulfed the whole government.
What about the speech in parliament? Again, as in the WEF event, his presentation was crystal clear and, in this instance, contextually sensible. But he did not have to make that speech in English at all when decent simultaneous translation services were available. In so far as content was concerned, he made a sound argument considering local conditions which he knows well. The minister’s argument is about the need to ensure that young entrepreneurs be taught English so that they can deal with the world and bring investments into the country, among other things. This should actually be the norm, not only for young entrepreneurs, but for all who are interested in widening their employment and investment opportunities beyond this country and in accessing knowledge for which Sinhala and Tamil alone do not suffice.
As far as I am concerned, Handunetti’s argument is important because in parliament, it can be construed as a policy prerogative. Significantly, he asked the Minister of Education to make this possible in the educational reforms that the government is contemplating.
He went further, appealing to his detractors not to mock his struggle in learning English, and instead to become part of the solution. However, in my opinion, there is no need for the Minister to carry this chip on his shoulder. Why should the minister concern himself with being mocked for poor use of English? But there is a gap that his plea should have also addressed. What prevented him from mastering English in his youth goes far deeper than the lack of a privileged upbringing.
The fact of the matter is, the facilities that were available in schools and universities to learn English were not taken seriously and were often looked down upon as kaduwa by the political spectrum he represents and nationalist elements for whom the utilitarian value of English was not self-evident. I say this with responsibility because this was a considerable part of the reality in my time as an undergraduate and also throughout the time I taught in Sri Lanka.
Much earlier in my youth, swayed by the rhetoric of Sinhala language nationalism, my own mastery of English was also delayed even though my background is vastly different from the minister. I too was mocked, when two important schools in Kandy – Trinity College and St. Anthony’s College – refused to accept me to Grade 1 as my English was wanting. This was nearly 20 years after independence. I, however, opted to move on from the blatant discrimination, and mastered the language, although I probably had better opportunities and saw the world through a vastly different lens than the minister. If the minister’s commitment was also based on these social and political realities and the role people like him had played in negating our English language training particularly in universities, his plea would have sounded far more genuine.
If both these remarks and the contexts in which they were made say something about the way we can use English in our country, it is this: On one hand, the government needs to make sure it has a pragmatic policy in place when it sends representatives to international events which takes into account both a person’s language skills and his breadth of knowledge of the subject matter. On the other hand, it needs to find a way to ensure that English is taught to everyone successfully from kindergarten to university as a tool for inclusion, knowledge and communication and not a weapon of exclusion as is often the case.
This can only bear fruit if the failures, lapses and strengths of the country’s English language teaching efforts are taken into cognizance. Lamentably, division and discrimination are still the main emotional considerations on which English is being popularly used as the trolls of the minister’s English usage have shown. It is indeed regrettable that their small-mindedness prevents them from realizing that the Brits have long lost their long undisputed ownership over the English language along with the Empire itself. It is no longer in the hands of the colonial masters. So why allow it to be wielded by a privileged few mired in misplaced notions of elitism?
-
Midweek Review4 days agoHow massive Akuregoda defence complex was built with proceeds from sale of Galle Face land to Shangri-La
-
Features7 days agoWhy Sri Lanka Still Has No Doppler Radar – and Who Should Be Held Accountable
-
News3 days agoPakistan hands over 200 tonnes of humanitarian aid to Lanka
-
News3 days agoPope fires broadside: ‘The Holy See won’t be a silent bystander to the grave disparities, injustices, and fundamental human rights violations’
-
Latest News7 days agoLandslide early warnings in force in the Districts of Badulla, Kandy, Kegalle, Kurunegala, Matale, Nuwara Eliya and Ratnapura
-
News4 days agoBurnt elephant dies after delayed rescue; activists demand arrests
-
Features7 days agoSrima Dissanayake runs for president and I get sidelined in the UNP
-
Editorial4 days agoColombo Port facing strategic neglect
