Features
How decentralization and centralization worked within SL’s university system
This article deals with the subject of centralizing and decentralizing universities in Sri Lanka and discusses the advantages of one against the other. What are the appropriate conditions and the factors governing the choice? Who decides – politicians or academics? The Sri Lanka experience seems to suggest neither.
The two most important landmarks in the history of university education in Sri Lanka, other than the setting up of the University of Ceylon in 1942, were the amalgamation of the then existing universities in 1972 by the Universities Act No. 01 of 1972 and the enactment of the Universities Act No. 16 of 1978 to form autonomous universities with the University Grants Commission to carry out far more than the mere disbursement of funds.
This study will describe the factors leading to the amalgamation of the existing universities in 1972 and then the decentralization of the federal university in 1979 to form five autonomous universities.
Though the Ceylon Medical College was in existence from the latter part of the nineteenth century, university education really began in January1921when the University College was formally opened in Colombo as a government institution affiliated to the University of London. The University College was transformed into the University of Ceylon in July 1942 by the University of Ceylon Ordinance No.20 of 1942, after some negotiation between the British Governors and the Principal of the University College. Thereafter, a single University of Ceylon was established by amalgamating the existing Ceylon Medical College and the University College.
The University of Ceylon continued as the only university in the country until 1959 when the SWRD Bandaranaike government upgraded two established seats of Buddhist learning to set up the Vidyodaya and Vidylankara Universities.
The UNP government of 1965 effected a further change in the system a year later by passing the Higher Education Act No. 20 of 1966 setting up the National Council of Higher Education (NCHE) to oversee the functioning of the universities. This body was like a University Grants Commission but had a little more power. In 1967, the then University of Ceylon was split into the Universities of Colombo and Peradeniya and there were four universities in the country until February 1972.
The amalgamation
All political parties in the country were preparing for the general election in 1970 and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), led by Mrs. Sirima Bandaranaike which was in the opposition had, in its election manifesto, outlined the changes they would effect in the field of higher education if they came to power.
The advisors to the SLFP on higher education had drawn up a blueprint to achieve economies in higher education and to do away with the NCHE, controlling the universities, which they had long opposed. The Chairman of the NCHE was a former professor of Pali, Prof. GP Malalasekera with six other members, mostly well-known educationists. The former Vice-Chancellors of the universities also participated in the meetings of the NCHE.
The main reason for the desire to effect a change in the higher educational set up were to achieve economies by the rationalization of courses, reductions in staff, etc. rather than ridding the system of the ‘dictatorial’ NCHE. As soon as the SLFP assumed control, a committee was appointed by the Minister of Education, Dr. Badi-Ud- Din Mahmud, to study and make recommendations which would help to achieve the desired goals.
The committee consisted entirely of university teachers from various disciplines ranging from medicine and engineering to history and comprised Dr. Osmund Jayaratne (Chairman), Dr. VK Samaranayake, Dr. Shelton Kodikara, Dr. Upali Kuruppu, Dr. Keerthi Dissanayake and Dr. K Jayasena. Members were drawn from all the universities and the College of Technology. The committee held sittings and recorded evidence, both oral and written, for almost one year and they drew up the plan for a unification or amalgamation of the universities to form a single federal university.
It recommended the establishment of a single university on the pattern of the University of London. There was to be a Senate House at the centre with the Vice-Chancellor at the helm and the existing universities would be the campuses of the single university. Each of the campuses were to have a President as the Head responsible to the Vice-Chancellor. With the establishment of the single university the committee envisaged achieving economies by cutting down on staff as there was no need to have a Vice-Chancellor in each campus; rationalization of courses to avoid duplication; and creating centres of excellence in various disciplines in the various campuses. Economies could have been achieved if the single university had been established and the recommendations of the committee implemented. But, in reality, these things were never achieved.
The government accepted the recommendations of the committee in principle and went ahead with the drafting of the required legislation and the University of Ceylon Act No. 01 of 1972 duly enacted. The new university had a Senate House and the Vice-Chancellor’s office at its core and the former universities formed campuses subordinate to the Senate House with a President as the head of each campus. The College of Technology was absorbed as the fifth campus.
Results of the amalgamation
It is of interest to note that with the establishment of the single university all but one of the members who served on the committee were appointed Presidents of the campuses. Dr. Osmund Jayaratne in Colombo, Dr. VK Samaranayake in Vidyodaya, Dr. Shelton Kodikara in Peradeniya, Dr, Keerthi Dissanayake in Vidyalankara and Dr.Upali Kuruppu in Katubedda. The other member, Dr. K Jayasena, was appointed as the Registrar of the University of Sri Lanka.
How far were the factors envisaged by the committee achieved in reality? In respect of rationalization of courses, very little was achieved. The Departments of Education at Peradeniya, Vidyodaya and Vidyalankara campuses were brought to the Colombo campus and a Faculty of Education was established in 1976 almost four years after the university came into being. Some of the teachers were transferred against their wishes as those in Peradeniya enjoyed housing and better medical facilities and, therefore, did not want to leave. The single education faculty was achieved during the tenure of the second Vice-Chancellor, Mr. LH Sumanadasa.
The first Vice-Chancellor, Prof. BA Abeyawickrama, was able to bring about only a very mild form of rationalization. What was achieved was not exactly rationalization, but creation of centres of excellence in the various campuses in respect of various disciplines. The centre of excellence for languages was created in the Vidyalankara campus, and most of the teachers in the Departments of languages were transferred to that campus. Here, too, some of the teachers were transferred under protest for the reasons cited earlier.
In most of the disciplines there was absolutely no rationalization, even as a public relations gesture. What happened was the opposite. There was duplication of certain disciplines and more than duplication of others since the campuses did not want to lose what they already had and they opposed any disciplines being taken away from them. Instead, what the campuses wanted was to expand and obtain disciplines they did not have.
So it is evident that the rationalization of courses did not work as planned and, therefore, it was not possible to achieve the planned economies of having fewer teachers and maximum utilization of scarce resources. Instead, what happened was that some of the departments in the campuses expanded and had a larger number of staff members than before.
Neither were economies achieved in respect of the top-level staff. Though there was only one Vice-Chancellor, the Presidents of the campuses were also drawing the same salary as the Vice-Chancellor and, therefore, there was one person extra at this level than under the previous system. There was only one Registrar for the whole University of Sri Lanka, but the campuses had additional Registrars, so that in that category too, there was one person additional to the cadre than in the previous system.
The Act of Parliament which established the single university determined the structure of the university, gave it legitimacy and indicated how vital matters such as the control of the university, the authority, rights and responsibilities of different governing bodies at different levels were determined.
The federation was created to achieve two main objectives; to reduce the expenditure on university education, and to rationalize courses. Both were economic reasons. It was found that having more universities meant higher costs in respect of governing boards and staff. If many of the matters could be handled by a central office, the non-academic staff of the campuses could be reduced in number.
There was also more duplication of courses because often, three of the universities had the same courses. It was planned to avoid this by rationalization, and this would result in the reduction of the academic staff needed and thereby achieve economies.
It was also felt that having one central body controlling all activities of the campuses would result in uniformity in all campuses with regard to all examinations, curricula and admissions., and in respect of appointments and promotion of staff (both academic and non-academic).
It was felt that the costs would be reduced considerably with central control since the government grant was distributed among the campuses according to student numbers and the capital vote according to the priorities. Once disbursed, the central body was responsible for seeing that the monies granted were spent according to plan.
The central body was responsible for maintaining standards of all examinations in the campuses through a system of examination boards. The curricula of all campuses were decided at the centre by Boards of Study, so that throughout the campuses the standards were maintained on a uniform basis. All admissions of students to the various faculties in the campuses were determined by the Admissions Committee at the centre.
Under the earlier organizational structure, some universities were not in a position to recruit the best graduates to the academic staff because some universities were considered inferior to others earlier. So, they had to be content with academics with poor qualifications. With the establishment of the single university all appointments had to be sanctioned by the central governing authority, the Board of Governors. This prevented campuses from recruiting personnel with poorer qualifications and also the competition among campuses to recruit staff was eliminated.
The unified university did not live up to expectations because administration became unwieldy with campuses located far from Colombo. Senate House was not able to have proper control over all activities, and some matters were necessarily attended to by the campuses without reference to the Senate House.
The campuses were also dissatisfied with the system, complaining that there were long delays in the implementation of certain decisions, and that the Senate House was indifferent to the campuses.
On the other hand, when problems arose, there was buck passing between Senate House and the campuses. Inability to put an end to problems as soon as they arose led to student unrest, strikes and demonstrations, violence and destruction of university property on many campuses on a number of occasions. This resulted in the removal of a President in one instance and the killing of a student in another followed by the closure of the university and the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry.
One salient feature in this federal structure was that the Act was not enforced. The Board of Governors met only as an advisory body and the Senate was never established. The Vice-Chancellor was all powerful – he reigned over his kingdom during a transition period extending to almost seven years. He had to carry out the directions of the Minister from time to time or sacrifice his position.
These shortcomings led to agitations among the staff on the campuses for a change. The agitation was so widespread that some of the political parties had changes to be effected in the higher education system embodied in their election manifestos. The UNP, in its manifesto for the general election in 1977, had indicated that it would set up once again fully autonomous independent universities in place of the existing campuses.
Decentralization
A former professor in one of the campuses, who was holding a professional appointment in a foreign university, was appointed by the President of the Republic to make recommendations regarding the new system to be established. He interviewed representatives of various associations, individuals, considered written submissions, and submitted his recommendations to the Minister of Education. The recommendations were accepted by the government, which set about drafting the legislation for the purpose.
The Universities Act No. 16 of 1978 established the new university education structure on January 1, 1979, thus repealing the Universities Act No . 1 of 1972. The former campuses were made independent universities. A University Grants Commission (UGC) was established to oversee the work of the universities. Though the UGC was modeled on its counterpart in the United Kingdom, it actually resembled the UGC in Britain only in name.
The autonomous universities were established. However, the limitations of the universities with regard to certain functions were laid down by the law itself.It would be worthwhile to compare the powers of the UGC vis a vis the universities, as laid down by the Act of Parliament establishing these universities. On the face of it, it seems that the powers, duties and functions of the UGC and the universities are clearly defined by law but, actually, nothing could be done by the universities without obtaining prior approval of the UGC.
There have been quite a few instances where the UGC has encroached on the functions of the universities and has dictated terms to the universities. Actually, in the working of the new system, there has not been very much difference between the earlier federal structure, as far as control is concerned. As in the case of the earlier organization, all the functions of the universities are being controlled by circular instructions from the UGC.
With the establishment of the new university structure, a new Ministry of Higher Education was created, with the Minister of Education holding this portfolio as well as that of Education. The Secretary to the Ministry was the same person who was functioning as the Chairman of the UGC. This added more power to the UGC and especially to its chairman. Now the Ministry of Education functions under the Prime Minister.
The present arrangement has caused most of the university teachers and other employees to be satisfied because there is a great deal more independence now than under the previous set up. The Vice-Chancellors have to take decisions without passing on responsibility. Therefore, though the expenditure is far greater than earlier, more people are kept satisfied now than under the earlier structure.
A significant feature after the establishment of the autonomous universities was the creation of the Open University of Sri Lanka (OUSL) functioning under the Ordinance No. 03 of 1980.
The objectives of the OUSL may be indicated as the advancement and dissemination of learning and knowledge by teaching and research, correspondence tuition, residential courses and seminars, and in other relevant ways. It seeks to provide education of university and professional standard to its students, to promote the educational well-being of the community generally, and to meet the demand for manpower skills, especially through training at the middle level.
The OUSL achieves its objectives through programmes at different levels and continuing education programmes. These programmes are being provide using the techniques of distance education through the printed word and through the mass media.
(The writer of this article served both as Registrar of the University of Colombo and the Open University. He had previously served as Senior Assistant Registrar of the Colombo University)
by HM Nissanka Warakaulle
Features
The Great AI Schism: When the Titans of Tech tell us to slow down
by Prof. C. A. Saliya
Something extraordinary happened in September 2026. The very people who have spent the last decade pouring tens of billions of dollars into building artificial intelligence, the visionaries, the investors, the CEOs, suddenly started telling the world to hit the brakes. It’s a bit like the captain of a speeding train leaning out of the window and shouting, “Actually, maybe we should slow down a bit!” The public, understandably, is confused. We’ve been told AI will cure cancer, solve climate change, and give us all free time. Now we’re being told it might kill us all. Welcome to the great AI schism.
To understand what’s happening, you have to listen to the people in the room. These are not wild-eyed doomsayers on the internet. They are the titans of the industry. And they are starting to argue with each other.
Dario Amodei: The Insider Who Wants to Hit Pause
Dario Amodei, the CEO of Anthropic (Claude AI), is the man who kicked the hornet’s nest. In a 3,800-word essay, posted on his website in mid-September 2026, he didn’t just suggest caution, he demanded a slowdown. “We must slow the pace at which we improve the capabilities of AI models,” he wrote. His reasoning is simple and terrifying: the technology is moving faster than our ability to control it. He warned that AI could be misused for cyberattacks, bioterrorism, and serious economic disruption.
What makes Amodei’s warning so chilling is that it comes from a man whose company, Anthropic, builds one of the most powerful AI models in the world, Claude. He’s not a critic on the sidelines. He’s in the driver’s seat, and he’s telling us the car might not have brakes. In an interview with CNN’s Anderson Cooper, he said he agreed with a departing Anthropic researcher who claimed AI could “kill us all” by the end of the decade. That researcher, 27-year-old Jacob Coxon, resigned in protest, saying the people building AI “earnestly believe that it could kill us all”. When the people building the technology start resigning because they’re afraid of it, you should pay attention.
Bill Gates: The Elder Statesman with a Warning
Bill Gates has been around long enough to know a paradigm shift when he sees one. The Microsoft co-founder, who spent decades warning the world about pandemics and climate change, has now turned his attention to AI. And he’s not mincing words. In September 2026, Gates warned that AI is “powerful enough to drive events that, you know, cause a billion deaths”.
Gates is not worried about Terminator-style robots. He’s worried about people. “There’s never been a weapon as powerful as the combination of people with ill intent using the latest AI tools,” he said. His solution is simple: regulation. “No one thinks self-regulation is enough,” he told NBC’s Meet the Press. He even offered to be the man to convince President Trump to regulate AI. Gates is a pragmatist. He knows the technology is coming. He just wants to make sure it doesn’t get us first.
Sam Altman: The Showman with a Conscience (Maybe)
Sam Altman, the CEO of OpenAI (Chat GPT), has always been the industry’s greatest showman. He’s the man who told us AGI (Artificial General Intelligence) is “just around the corner” and that AI will soon be a “genie that can grant any wish”. But even Altman is now singing a different tune. In September 2026, he ruled out an OpenAI IPO in 2026, citing safety concerns. He called even a 10% risk of AI causing human extinction “unacceptable”.
“I agree with Dario that we need to pace the frontier,” Altman posted on X. This is a remarkable shift. Altman has spent years being criticised for moving too fast, for prioritising profit over safety. Now, facing mounting evidence that AI models can cause real harm, from cyberattacks to mental health crises, he’s suddenly the voice of caution. Is it genuine? Or is it a PR move? The cynics will tell you it’s the latter. But the fact remains: when Sam Altman says we need to slow down, the world listens.
Elon Musk: The Provocateur Who Saw It Coming
Elon Musk has been warning about AI for over a decade. He’s the man who called AI “more dangerous than nuclear weapons” long before it was fashionable. So it’s no surprise that he joined the chorus of slowdown calls in September 2026. But Musk being Musk, he couldn’t resist a bit of dark humour. When asked if we’re all going to die within 10 years, he replied, “I don’t want to disappoint you, but we’re all going to die someday anyway”.
But behind the joke is a serious point. Musk believes AI models could escape their constraints, take control of military systems, and even launch nuclear weapons. His solution is mutual oversight: leading AI companies should test each other’s systems for safety before release, and he even suggested a deal with China to make it happen. Musk is a provocateur, but he’s also a visionary. And his vision is one where AI is a weapon that we might not be able to control.

Satya Nadella: The Quiet Strategist
While the others are shouting about doom, Satya Nadella is quietly building an empire. The Microsoft CEO doesn’t talk about extinction risks. He talks about “agentic AI”, AI that can act autonomously, which he calls “a new paradigm”. Microsoft’s Azure cloud platform, which powers these AI agents, grew 43% in the last quarter, surpassing $100 billion in annual revenue.
Nadella’s view is simple: don’t compete to build the most powerful model; compete to control the “orchestration layer”, the systems that connect different AI models. He wants to build the infrastructure that everyone else relies on. It’s a smart play, and it’s making Microsoft a fortune. But Nadella’s silence on safety is deafening. While Amodei and Altman wrestle with their consciences, Nadella is counting the money. It’s not that he doesn’t care; it’s that his business model depends on AI being adopted, not regulated.
Jacob Coxon: The Whistleblower Who Lit the Fuse
You may not have heard of Jacob Coxon. He’s not a billionaire. He’s not a CEO. He’s a 27-year-old researcher who worked at both OpenAI and Anthropic. And in September 2026, he resigned from Anthropic with a warning that shook the industry. “Neither company is acting responsibly,” he wrote on X. “They are launching themselves directly toward a superintelligence capable of self-improvement, and gambling with our lives”.
Coxon’s warning was remarkable because it came from inside the machine. He said the people building AI “earnestly believe that it could kill us all by the end of the decade”. He called for a temporary freeze on advanced AI training. His resignation triggered a wave of concern, and even Dario Amodei admitted he agreed with Coxon more than he disagreed. Coxon is the canary in the coal mine. And the canary is not looking well.
Donald Trump: The Wildcard
And then there’s Donald Trump. The US President has consistently downplayed AI fears, calling them a “hoax” and a “sick conspiracy”. But even Trump is starting to change his tune, sort of. In September 2026, he announced plans to create an “AI Force” and appoint an AI “Czar”. He said the government would look for “bad” uses of AI through the existing criminal and civil justice systems.
But Trump’s priority is clear: winning the AI race against China. “We will not in any way hinder or stifle the growth of this incredible industry,” he said. He wants AI to account for 25% of US GDP. Trump is not a technologist. He’s a businessman and a nationalist. He sees AI as a tool for economic dominance, not an existential threat. Whether he’s right or wrong, his stance puts him at odds with almost every expert in the field.
The Bottom Line: A House Divided
So where does this leave us? We have the CEOs of the world’s leading AI companies, Amodei, Altman, and Musk, all calling for a slowdown. We have Bill Gates, the elder statesman of tech, warning of a billion deaths. We have a whistleblower who says the industry is gambling with our lives. And then we have Satya Nadella, quietly building the infrastructure that powers it all, and Donald Trump, who wants to speed up.
The irony is hard to miss. The people who built the AI train are now telling us to slow down. The people who profit from the AI economy are the ones building the tracks. And the public is caught in the middle, trying to figure out who to believe.
Maybe the most honest thing anyone said came from Jacob Coxon, the 27-year-old researcher who quit. “The people building AI earnestly believe that it could kill us all by the end of the decade,” he wrote. “This is not a marketing stunt”.
If the people building the technology believe it could kill us, perhaps we should listen. Before it’s too late.
(Prof. C. A. Saliya, is a charted accountant, academic, researcher and former banker. He is the author of SAMAJA GAVESHAKAYA and Springer Publication DOING SOCIAL RESEARCH. He can be contacted at saliya.ca@gmail.com. The views expressed in this article are his own and do not necessarily represent those of the organisations with which he is affiliated.)
Features
Preventing grievances from becoming communal
by Jehan Perera
The death sentence on Sivarasa Anojan, a Sri Lankan citizen convicted of blasphemy in Saudi Arabia has taken a central place in national consciousness for the past several weeks. It has been in the headline news since it was first reported last month. There have been many initiatives taken locally to get a more lenient sentencing by the Saudi authorities. There is also an undercurrent that is critical of both the culture and religion from which this sentencing emanates. This also sustains the widespread publicity being given nationally to the issue. By way of contrast, the controversy caused by the forcible removal of the Thileepan statue in Jaffna has not significantly impacted upon the national consciousness. There was only passing mention of the incident in the national media which has been overtaken by other events.
However, in the north and east of the country, and in the diaspora, the removal of the Thileepan statue has become a major issue. It has led to protest marches led by university students and widespread condemnation by civil society and political groups. The issues underlying the Thileepan statue have deep undercurrents in the Tamil consciousness particularly in the north and east which time is unlikely to dispel. The real test of harmony in a multi-ethnic, multi-religious society like Sri Lanka is not whether communities coexist peacefully when nothing controversial is at stake. Rather, the test is how they respond when an event touches their identities and grievances. The death sentence imposed on Anojan in Saudi Arabia and the removal of the Thileepan statue in Jaffna carry the risk of becoming grievances to entire communities.
In the case of Anojan, a young Tamil migrant worker, he was first sentenced to five years imprisonment and a fine of three million Saudi riyals over a Facebook comment. Both he and the Saudi prosecution appealed, with the appeal court raising the sentence to death. This has led to public sympathy for him in Sri Lanka.
Appeals for clemency have come from the President, government and opposition leaders, clergy of all faiths and Muslim political leaders. At the same time there is a need to reject attempts to turn the case into a source of anti-Muslim sentiment or collective blame. Peacebuilding therefore has to be within Sri Lanka as well as diplomatic. Religious leaders and civil society in the country should be ready to quell rumour, even as Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu and Christian leaders stand together publicly.
Thileepan Statue
The Thileepan controversy has had a different trajectory. Many Tamils admire Thileepan, the LTTE name of Rasaiah Parthipan, who died on 26 September 1987 after a twelve-day fast. His demands were addressed to India but included matters pertaining to the Sri Lankan government including the release of detainees held under the Prevention of Terrorism Act. The statue put up during this year’s commemoration was removed by police in the early hours of 27 September, a day after the commemoration ended. The government’s legal concern, as articulated by its spokesperson, was the LTTE remains a proscribed organisation and before removing the statue, police had presented facts to the court. But law and memory answer different questions and the depth of Tamil anguish cannot be disregarded.
For many Tamils, remembrance of Thileepan is connected to their sense of loss and historical memory. The memorial has been destroyed and rebuilt more than once, and each destruction has added to the meaning it carries. Many who mourn Thileepan are grieving a young man who died without violence and by his own fast. They also grieve an era of loss of the struggle for Tamil rights and self-determination for which Thileepan has become a symbol. The Office for Reparations Act, No. 34 of 2018, provides for collective reparations and gives the Office for Reparations a role in policies on memorialisation. This does not automatically permit any particular statue, nor does it override laws on public places or proscribed organisations. But it shows that memorialisation is recognised within Sri Lanka’s framework for reparations and reconciliation. There is also a wider question of equality.
The JVP that now leads the NPP government was itself once proscribed when it took up arms against the state in which tens of thousands died, later entered democratic politics, and now for many years has publicly commemorated its own fallen. The opportunity to remember those who died should not belong to one community alone.
A commitment to peacebuilding requires that the same trust that has been given to former militants of one community needs to be given to members of other communities if equal citizenship and equal rights are to have meaning. Further, the Office for Reparations Act provides for reparations through livelihood. It is today a fact that those former LTTE members who went through the government’s rehabilitation process find it difficult to get jobs in the private sector.
Private sector employers are reluctant to come under surveillance for employing former LTTE members. There needs to be equal access to employment and removal of unjustified barriers to reintegration, with targeted public programmes where necessary. Until this situation is realized on the ground, the government needs to consider employing those who went through the government’s rehabilitation process and still unable to find suitable employment.
Continuing Peace
The challenge that post-war Sri Lanka faces, a full 17 years after the end of war, is to strengthen the foundations of trust between communities rather than deepen existing suspicions. Anojan is an individual Sri Lankan citizen facing a severe sentence in another country. His case should not become a reason to blame Sri Lankan Muslims. Thileepan is remembered differently by different communities, but the dispute over his memorial should not become a reason to revive the communal divisions of the past. The cases are also mirror images in an important respect. In the Anojan case, the state is an advocate pleading before another government. In the Thileepan case, the state is the actor whose decision is being judged. The first calls for quiet diplomacy and restraint in public language. The second calls for fairness and explanation, and the burden on the state is heavier.
The common roots of the two cases lie in mistrust that does not belong to one community alone. It has been produced by experiences of discrimination, violence, insecurity and loss that have been interpreted differently by different communities. Grievances turn communal when an individual is seen as a representative of a community, when institutions seem to treat communities unequally, and when people feel their pain goes unacknowledged. Each of these can be addressed. The system change that the Sri Lankan people voted for in 2024 would need to include a government that rejects collective blame, acknowledges grief and explains its decisions openly. It also requires state institutions to act transparently and consistently, so that no citizen feels that the law protects some communities more than others.
This peacebuilding imperative requires enlightened leadership as much as legal authority. It requires leaders who will speak to their own communities against prejudice, even when this is politically inconvenient. It requires religious leaders who will demonstrate solidarity across religious boundaries. And it requires civil society to recognise that peacebuilding is not simply preventing violence after tensions have risen, but is addressing the mistrust and grievances that allow tensions to rise in the first place. Sri Lanka has learned, at great cost, that communal divisions can become much larger than the events that initially give rise to them. The Anojan and Thileepan cases give Sri Lanka an opportunity to demonstrate that it has learned from its past. The test of Sri Lanka’s continuing peace is whether we can address difficult grievances without turning them into communal ones.
Features
Sri Lanka Cricket Bill: Governance reform is not yet a cricket strategy – Part II
By Sarath S. Kodithuwakku
President, Institute of Management of Sri Lanka; Senior Professor, University of Peradeniya
(Continued from yesterday)
Representation, Independence and Decision-Making
The membership-based electoral structure should provide representation without becoming a substitute for executive management. The seven Elected Directors would bring the perspectives of the SLC membership into the Board, while the seven Independent Directors would provide additional professional expertise and independence. The model’s effectiveness will, therefore, depend on whether the Board can integrate these perspectives into coherent strategic decisions while maintaining a clear boundary between governance and day-to-day management.
The equal division between Elected and Independent Directors also raises a governance-design question. An even-numbered Board can create a tie. The Bill addresses this directly: in the event of equality, the Chairperson has a casting vote; in the Chairperson’s absence, the Deputy Chairperson has a casting vote; and if both are absent, an Independent Director, elected to preside, has the casting vote. The issue is, therefore, not whether a tie can be resolved, but how this mechanism affects the balance between representation, independence and accountability.
The leadership structure reinforces this balance: the Chairperson is elected from among the Independent Directors and the Deputy Chairperson from among the Elected Directors. The casting-vote arrangement makes the Chairperson’s role and perceived independence particularly important, especially when a major strategic decision divides the two components of the Board.
The Bill’s committee provisions could support a disciplined model of delegation, but implementation will depend heavily on the terms of reference adopted by the new Board. The framework could be strengthened by requiring a published cricket-development strategy, a clear division of powers among the Board, executives and selection committees, transparent principles for major development allocations, and periodic reporting on outcomes across men’s, women’s, schools and domestic cricket. These measures would strengthen accountability without legislating the details of team selection or tournament scheduling.
From Measurement to Strategic Accountability
If the Board is to hold management accountable for strategy rather than simply for short-term results, it needs a performance framework that captures both outcomes and the capabilities that produce them.
SLC should consider requiring an explicit multi-year cricket-development strategy, supported by measurable objectives and an annual strategy review. Such a strategy should identify the development pathway from schools and grassroots cricket through domestic competitions to high performance; define major capability priorities such as coaching, sports science, data and analytics; set resource-allocation principles; and establish indicators against which progress can be assessed.
The purpose would not be to turn cricket into a bureaucratic exercise. Strategic accountability simply creates a disciplined basis for asking whether the organisation is doing what it said it would do, whether its assumptions remain valid, and whether resources are producing the intended results.
From Measurement to Organisational Learning
SLC should, therefore, consider adopting a formal Balanced Scorecard. Rather than measuring success solely through international match results or annual financial audits, the framework could track four interdependent perspectives:
Financial Sustainability:
commercial growth, financial discipline and compliance.
Internal Processes:
domestic tournament quality, development pathways and selector-process integrity.
Stakeholder Value:
grassroots development, school cricket and women’s cricket expansion.
Strategic Capability:
coaching quality, sports science, talent development, data and analytics capability, and the organisation’s ability to convert investment into sustainable performance.
The purpose of such a framework would not be to reduce cricket development to a collection of numbers. Rather, it would create a disciplined process for asking four fundamental management questions:
What did we expect to achieve?
What actually happened?
Why was there a difference?
What should we change as a result?
Evaluating these dimensions periodically would help SLC move beyond performance reporting towards genuine organisational learning.
ICC as a Stakeholder in Governance Reform
The ICC is another important stakeholder whose interests should be recognised in the reform process. SLC’s governance arrangements do not operate solely within Sri Lankan law; they also have to be compatible with the governance obligations associated with ICC membership. The ICC’s Articles of Association require each Member to provide for free and democratic elections (or nominees from outside its members) and to manage its affairs autonomously, without government or other public-body interference in the governance, regulation or administration of cricket.
International experience demonstrates that ICC engagement in member governance restructuring is not unusual. In the United States, after the ICC expelled the old national association for chronic governance failures, the ICC directly oversaw a multi-year project to design a new governance model. The ICC Board formally approved the constitution for a replacement body (USA Cricket) before it was adopted. The resulting structure combined elected constituent directors with independent directors, showing that an ICC-backed framework can accommodate both forms of representation.
In Nepal, the ICC established a Nepal Advisory Group comprising stakeholders from across the game to recommend constitutional amendments, with adoption of the revised constitution and subsequent elections forming part of the conditions for reinstatement of ICC membership.[8] The ICC subsequently facilitated an independent panel that included ICC nominees together with representatives of Nepal’s National Sports Council and the existing cricket administration to map the election process, guidelines and timelines.[9] More recently, in 2026, an ICC delegation visited Bangladesh to engage with stakeholders on governance and electoral matters.[10] The ICC has also reported that its Deputy Chair and another ICC Board representative visited Sri Lanka and met relevant stakeholders to assess ongoing developments, while the ICC Board reiterated the need for elections to be held as soon as possible.
These precedents make the ICC a legitimate stakeholder in considering the governance implications of the proposed Bill. This does not mean that the ICC should determine Sri Lanka’s domestic legislation, nor that every feature of the Bill requires prior ICC approval. It does, however, suggest that early and formal engagement with the ICC would be prudent, particularly where the proposed arrangements concern Board independence, elections, government involvement and the transition to the new governance structure.
This is particularly relevant because the Bill creates two institutional arrangements that deserve careful scrutiny from an autonomy perspective. The Transformation Committee is responsible for managing the transition until the First Board is constituted, while the Nomination Committee, although structurally independent of the SLC Board, includes representatives connected with the Sports Ministry and the National Sports Council. Neither arrangement, by itself, establishes government interference. However, taken together, they make it important that the independence of the incoming Board is demonstrable through transparent procedures rather than assumed from the structure alone.
Given the professional calibre and international exposure of the members of the Transformation Committee, it would be reasonable to expect that the importance of ICC engagement would have been recognised. Although any such consultation has not been evident in the public domain, it is therefore reasonable to expect that the ICC has either already been consulted or will be consulted before the Bill is enacted. Such engagement would allow potential incompatibilities to be identified before the new structure is enacted and implemented, rather than after the fact.
The Transition Is Itself a Governance Challenge
The transition provisions introduce a significant organisational-change challenge. Replacing the existing club- and association-based governance structure with a new hybrid Board and governance architecture is not simply a legal exercise; it is an organisational change programme. The Sri Lanka Cricket Transformation Committee is required to manage the transition until the First Board is constituted and, during that period, to establish rules covering matters including tournament structure, domestic governance, selection committee appointments, committee terms of reference, the Nomination Committee process and the election of the Elected Directors.
Structural reform on paper can encounter resistance from established interests, institutional habits and existing routines. The implementation phase will therefore require a clear change-management framework, including stakeholder engagement, transparent onboarding for Independent Directors, clarification of decision rights, alignment of legacy committees, and careful transfer of information and responsibilities.
Without attention to these organisational factors, cultural friction could undermine the intended administrative improvements. The success of the reform will therefore depend not only on the text of the legislation but also on the quality of the rules, appointments, delegation arrangements and organisational behaviours that follow it.
From Governance Reform to a Cricket Strategy
The Bill deserves credit for addressing how SLC is constituted and for creating places for specialist advice. It should not be dismissed simply because it does not prescribe a batting order or a domestic fixture list. Those are not appropriate tasks for legislation.
Its limitation is more precise: the proposed governance arrangements do not, by themselves, assure the strategic capability of the Board or the quality, independence and accountability of the decisions made beneath it. They establish the architecture. The future Board and management must supply the strategy, capabilities, discipline and learning mechanisms that make the architecture work.
A stronger reform would connect four elements: a Board selected for collective strategic capability; professional cricket management with clear delegated authority; transparent but non-mechanical selection and investment processes; and systematic evaluation of development outcomes. Within the first of these, information technology and computer science should be recognised as distinct from the broader capability to understand and govern data science, analytics and emerging AI-enabled decision support.
Ultimately, the governing question is not only who gets a seat at the SLC Board table. It is whether that Board can build, fund, execute and learn from a credible strategy for Sri Lankan cricket.
References
1. Department of Government Printing, Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka Cricket Bill, Gazette Supplement, Part II of September 25, 2026, issued on 28 September 2026.
2. International Cricket Council. Media release, 15 July 2026, reporting the ICC Board discussion of Sri Lanka Cricket and the need for elections to be held as soon as possible.
3. Sport New Zealand – Ihi Aotearoa. Nine Steps to Effective Governance, particularly Step 1: Define and Agree the Board’s Role; Step 4: Provide Strategic Leadership; Step 5: Employ and Support a Chief Executive; and Step 8: Get the Right People on Board.
4. Cricket South Africa. Governance and management frameworks, including the delegation-of-authority framework, Board committees, Cricket Committee, Cricket Pipeline Committee and CEO accountability.
5. International Cricket Council. ICC Articles of Association, provisions requiring free and democratic elections and autonomous administration without government or other public-body interference. ICC. https://images.icc-cricket.com/image/upload/prd/f7vm88yw1933dc38cgtg.pdf
6. International Cricket Council. “ICC outlines proposed USACA constitution.” ICC, 2017. https://www.icc-cricket.com/news/icc-outlines-proposed-usaca-constitution
7. International Cricket Council. “Approved constitution marks historic landmark for cricket in USA.” ICC, 2017. https://www.icc-cricket.com/media-releases/approved-constitution-marks-historic-landmark-for-cricket-in-usa
8. International Cricket Council. “ICC welcomes Nepal Special General Meeting to adopt revised constitution.” ICC, 2018. https://www.icc-cricket.com/media-releases/icc-welcomes-nepal-special-general-meeting-to-adopt-revised-constitution
9. International Cricket Council. “Independent Panel meet to progress Nepal elections under revised constitution.” ICC, 2018. https://www.icc-cricket.com/media-releases/independent-panel-meet-to-progress-nepal-elections-under-revised-constitution
10. International Cricket Council. “ICC delegation visits Bangladesh to engage with stakeholders on governance and electoral matters.” ICC, 2026. https://www.icc-cricket.com/media-releases/icc-delegation-visits-bangladesh-to-engage-with-stakeholders-on-governance-and-electoral-matters
11. International Cricket Council. “ICC Board approves governance, membership and member support decisions.” ICC, 2026; see also “ICC Board Meeting,” 2026, reporting ICC representatives’ meetings with stakeholders in Sri Lanka. https://www.icc-cricket.com/media-releases/icc-board-approves-governance-membership-and-member-support-decisions
(Concluded)
-
Latest News7 days agoGold winner Tharanga gets brand-new Honda Vezel from SLAAJ
-
News6 days agoUS-assisted ‘Ice’ detection: NPC to examine IGP’s move to transfer drug-busting team
-
Editorial5 days agoColombo Port drug bust: The plot thickens
-
Editorial6 days agoDrug busting, transfers and trust deficit
-
Features3 days agoThe first woman in the foreign service or Ceylon Overseas Service it was then called
-
Latest News4 days agoTharindu Rathnayake, bowlers secure Asian Games Bronze for Sri Lanka
-
News6 days agoSri Lankan facing death penalty in Saudi Arabia: Mano G appeals to Crown Prince
-
Editorial4 days agoFuelling discontent and protest
